I N T R O D U C T I O N

A critical exposition of David Hume's moral psychology will be attempted in the following pages. The details of his moral psychology consists mainly of an elaborate and highly complex theory of the passions stated in Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature.

In the present context I should like to make a few remarks of general nature and then would proceed to introduce my line of approach.

Hume's task in Book II of his Treatise is to rehabilitate the passions from the rationalists' distrust; to demolish sophisticated theories, deriving from Hobbes, in which all passions were regarded as forms of self-love; to make way for his rival hypothesis of innate benevolence and sympathy. Besides a reversal of the roles hitherto ascribed to reason and feeling, he offers also a methodologically deterministic thesis about human action, in terms of which 'freely chosen' and 'caused' do not rule one another out. The idea of the self plays an important role in Hume's intricate account of the passions, especially in the case of the passions as pride and humility, when the 'object' is ourselves, and not the least for those as love and hate, when the 'object' is other people. Sympathy plays a role in Hume's theory of passions somewhat similar to imagination in his theory of knowledge. He regarded imagination and perhaps sympathy as cohesive forces, and the associative principles as important scientific principles governing the working of the mind,

both in the domains of knowledge and belief, and in social intercourse. Hume regarded himself as the Newton of the sciences of man and this fact is borne out by his pursuit of the experimental method as also by his adherence to Newton's methodological canons of economy and simplicity of explanation, testability of hypotheses, and refusal to postulate occult causes. But above all, Hume stresses facets of human nature that had largely been neglected since Aristotle. He postulates an original fabric of human nature consisting of various propensities or dispositions.

Hume's theory of knowledge, set out in Book I of the Treatise, has been studied in detail by many scholars. Moreover several people have considered parts of Book III, which gives his theory of ethics. Book II of the Treatise, however, has been relatively neglected, though one or two scholars (notably Dr. P. Ardal) have turned their attention to it in the last few years. I have therefore ventured to choose for my study a field in which there is still plenty of scope for philosophical interpretation. Hume's thought in the Treatise is highly subtle and complex, not least in Book II, and in my enterprise I have endeavoured to work out Hume's position and its viability.

Moral psychology is a part of moral philosophy; and the psychological side of ethical inquiry has always occupied an important place with the British moralists. They have held that without an adequate conceptual map of the psychological areas of human inclinations, actions and choices, a theory of ethics would become futile.

if not impossible. Considerations such as these have led to an interest in description of phenomena, rather than the framing of abstract theories of human behaviour. The description, with the British moralists, Hume included, is at times a description of the way to talk about the subject. They believed that by showing how language is really used can the conceptual confusions which it has generated be cleared up. Hume's refusal to use the word 'reasonable' to 'actions' is significant. He has been able to show, I believe, that describing how to talk about a subject is not very different from describing the complexities of the subject itself. The two cannot properly be distinguished, since in the absence of a great deal of penetrating observation and accurate description of morally significant psychological phenomena like actions and feelings, descriptions of our ways of talking about them could be futile.

The British moralists', or for that matter Hume's as well, understanding of the nature and scope of moral psychology was not exactly similar to that of the contemporary thinkers, since the latter do not share the concern of the former. For the present day philosophers, despite their interest in description of relevant phenomena, the description is primarily a description of the way to talk about the subject. The problems of moral psychology today are not empirical problems only, and under Wittgenstein's influence we have come to believe that they are solved by looking into the workings of our language. Since the problems are conceived as 'philosophical', the moral philosophers' task, even in the domain

of moral psychology, has to be of waging "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language".

It is far from my intention not to recognize that the language which we use about things may affect our attitude to these things, and, therefore, even our actions. Hume and Berkeley did not deny this. On the contrary, I would like to suggest that there are other paths open that could be trodden not without rewarding illumination. Why not hold to the belief that no human characteristic which is relevant to moral outcom can escape being an empirical characteristic, and, then proceed to investigate human nature? This is what Hume in fact does in Books II and III of the Treatise. Since I do not propose to deal with Hume's theory of ethics, I shall confine my remarks to his moral psychology. Investigation of human nature not only leads to the consideration of a more interesting set of concepts than the right and the good, as well as feelings, desires, intentions and other psychological phenomena. Such a programme reopens the issue of philosophical anthropology, as it came to be called by Max Scheler. Even if total explanations are no longer possible, there could be no reason why we should not look at human beings in general in their context in the world. The social basis of man and the moral basis of society are thoughts that are important for Hume's image of man. No statement of the sociality of man could be more explicit than that of Butler (Sermons, i), yet I should say that Hume's (Treatise, II, ii, 5) is no less satisfactory.

I shall briefly mention one implication of Hume's image of man before I turn to a more important topic.

Human nature, for Hume, is something given and the task is not to change it, rather to change human situations, and thus to modify and improve human behaviour. Man becomes human in society -- this is one of Hume's central ethical teachings. His rejection of reason as a creative force has proved scandalous in philosophy, but that must be taken as a characteristic way of his looking at human nature. Hutchenon's question, "What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end?" has also been Hume's. Aristotle, on one interpretation of course, does not give reason that atrophied look, rationalists loved and adored. For him, it has been held, the rational element in man is not something altogether separate and distinct from the feeling element, nor is its development something different from or opposed to the development of the feeling element. In this light what does Hume's reversal of the roles of reason and emotion mean? Human nature, for Hume, comprises of reason and the passions, and the picture of slavery of the former to the latter is only a metaphor overstated. The picture should leave no room for uneasiness if understood aright. It should be remembered that Hume would not have approved Miror's etching entitled 'Reason, a slave of passions', which shows a nude middle aged woman riding on the back of an undressed aged and bearded male crawling. Nor was he a Keats to have intended to say, 'O, for a life of sensations rather than of thought'. The metaphor of the slave is, I suppose, intended to tease the philosophic respectability, a matter, as we know, in which Hume delighted. Could it not be said that the fulfilment of human nature, as Hume envisaged, lies in a spontaneous life, which

it is for reason to cultivate and develop and make productive, not take over. The passions are the most personal part of us, the best and also the worst that is in us. The person who chooses and decides, in doing so, chooses and decides himself.[1] Again, he identifies himself with some of his own passions and their corresponding aspirations and ideals. Reason is not in competition with the passions and there is no struggle for mastery at all. The part of reason is simply to organize and to inform choice whether of means (in the case of purposive, intentional or end-oriented actions) or of ends (such as some general desire for security or human happiness). Hume would have been happy to give any number of examples of good moral principles. The question of destroying the autonomy of ethics did not bother him at all. He writes much in the vein of a rule-utilitarian. But that is another story). Reason as attested information has to do with the choice of ends, and for that matter, of values. A choice is not an impersonal calculation. Should this manner of understanding Hume's intentions be found acceptable, it could also be said that Hume has been able to show the relevance of rational procedures to the choice of values.

The point last-mentioned is significant in another way as well. It is a fragment of a wider issue, and Hume's contribution to that [illegible] by itself makes his moral psychology worth studying. If as we

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1. It is impossible not to be reminded of Hume's discussions of shame and pride when reading Sartre's discussions of the same subject, i.e., the sense that it is possible to say that the existence of the passions is actually dependent on the existence of another person.

have mentioned earlier, for Hume, as human characteristic worth moral action can be non-empirical, then a problem arises concerning defending the part played by emotion in morality against the uncompromising and apparently strong arguments admitting any moral value to emotionally motivated conduct. It is to this issue that I now propose to turn.

Kant's attitude towards the emotions is focused in the Ground-Work of the Metaphysic of Morals where he contrasts the man who acts out of respect for his duty with the man who acts out of sympathetic feeling. I take Kant's objection to acting out of sympathetic feeling as against the emotions as a whole. I do not wish to say anything about Kant's thoughts on ethics, nor hazard any interpretation of his views on the subject. I simply take him as a convenient point of departure. In fact I have in mind a set of views that may summarily be called Kantian, or even rationalistic.

I take the so-called Kantian views to run as follows: The moral value of an act is in no way constituted by the presence or absence of natural inclination. The inclinations or emotions are products of the passionate side of our nature and are 'pathological'. This view of the passions is the outcome of the belief that morality must be necessarily binding. We are rational creatures, and therefore what is moral is what is binding upon us as rational creatures. A point of digression: Could not Kant be said to investigate human nature? A rightful question indeed. But there is a difference none the less. The position and function assigned to reason is different in Kant's case. He looks upon reason as something distinct from

human nature. He says that the ground of obligation is to be sought, not in the nature of man, nor in the circumstances in the world in which one is placed but simply a priori in the notions of pure reason. A principle of conduct is right only if it could be accepted by any rational creature whatsoever, irrespective of any contingent attributes it may possess. It is the rational constitution of man that is uppermost in Kant's mind. A Humean reply could be that by rejecting the inclinations in favour of the rational, a greater part of man's ethical self, is left out. The rational man is not the whole man.

Could it not be argued that the Kantian does have a room for our feeling of respect? One version of the categorical imperative appeals to it. But respect alone does not go far enough. There are many feelings which have to be overcome, or disciplined or awakened if morality is to become dominant. Respect, closely connected as it is with an intellectual approach, cannot produce on its own the full involvement which devotion to a moral cause requires. Kant distructs feelings too much; he fears that they are, with the exception of respect, of unreliable and misleading nature and should, therefore, be excluded altogether. As remarked earlier, the ethical self of man is not necessarily rational, and hence the rejection of any reference to man's nature excludes the ethical self. Kant's disregarding the ethical self of man needs postulating a different basis for ethics outside man, lest consideration of man's nature blur the boundaries between morality and psychology. For the Kantians in general existence and obligation fall apart.

Hume did of course know the possible objections against incorporating emotions to morality. At least he appears to have anticipated the Kantian type of argument. In a passage on page 413 of the Treatise he refers to the "supposd pre-eminence of reason above passion" and says, "The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, uncertainty and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on". That our emotions are capricious, that they are not subject to our deliberation and choice and that individuals differ in their emotional capacities — these are a few representative weighty objections against admitting moral worth to the passionate side of human nature.

It is possible to show that moral worth could be admitted to emotions and should that turn out to be the case, moral psychology, as Hume understands it, would become a worthwhile field of inquiry.

If Hume is taken to hold that any human characteristic which is relevant to moral worth is an empirical characteristic, it also implies that the characteristics concerned are subject to empirical conditions such as psychological history and individual variation. The suggestion is borrowed from Professor Bernard Williams's Inaugural Lecture at the Bedford College (published as Morality and the Emotions) and that it is outrageously human is evident from the fact that any such suggestion would at once be rejected by the Kantian.

What lies behind the Kantian's rejection? Refusal to admit moral worth to emotionally motivated conduct is based on a restricted

or even unsophisticated model of the emotions. There is a good sense in which the emotions are capricious, emotive behaviour does not usually commit the agent to similar behaviour when in the future circumstances are appropriate. It is also not incorrect to say that emotionally motivated actions cannot be backed by justifying reasons. But none of the considerations warrant us to say that we cannot talk significantly of emotionally motivated behaviour as either rational or justified. Take for instance, panic at the sight of a mouse, which is different from panic at the sight of a snake. The latter sort of panic is determined by the beliefs involved in the situation. Beliefs may be justified or unjustified according as they are held by persons who apply it consistently in appropriate situations. It is this point that emerges from Hume's relating the passions to beliefs. Beliefs can be relevant about the significance of situations encountered by persons experiencing passions. This fact is also reinforced by Hume's causal explanation of the phenomenon of the passion: "That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd". (Treatise, p.286.) If a phenomenon is susceptible to causal explanation, it also implies that the phenomenon is respectable, otherwise the talk of cause makes no sense at all. This point of course does not entitle us to deny the charge of capriciousness to emotions, nor does Hume do it. He does admit the changeableness and inconstancy of the passions.

But we must not forget the influence that general rules and the imagination exert on the passions, and those two principles are responsible for universalizability of our emotional reactions. Without going into the detail it will suffice to say, then, that so far as emotions are susciptible to beliefs and capable of consistent repetition it cannot be the case that all emotionally motivated conducts are necessarily capricious.

It must have been evident from the quotation above that Hume does not assimilate the emotion to sensation. His distinction between passion and the sensation of passion is worth nothing. Thus statements about emotions are not thought of as reports that one is experiencing certain sensations. And if it be so, it is also correct then to assert that statements about emotional experiences are not just reports of involuntary sensations. Emotions do not just 'happen' to us. Again emotions differ in their degrees of conative or dispositional properties. Hume's analysis of the passions of pride and love are instances at hand. The passion of love is such that one in love can reasonably be expected to go out of one's way by way of showing care and concern for the other self. The logic of the emotion word 'love' thus analysed entitles us to speak of choosing to act up to an emotion. Bodily expressions of emotions can be decided to be expressed or suppressed. An angry person might consider that he should not shout or any one who is afraid may decide that he must not flee as a part of his strategy. Most educational programme comprises of what may be called training of emotions, and in our everyday life we do temper the expression of our emotions in accordance

with the circumstances. In our persuasive discourse we deliberately set out to influence the emotional behaviour of other people. The border line between persuasion and propaganda is often difficult to draw, and it is a fact that the political agitator more often than not succeeds. Similar direction should then be possible to be given to ourselves. Educating emotional dispositions is as old as pedagogy itself. From Plato to Pestalozzi in the West, and from the Āranyakas to Tagore in India the topic has come up again and again. Vyasa the celebrated commentator on Patanjali's Yoga Sutras (I.12), has said that the emotional dispositions flow into both directions, towards virtues and towards vices — *chittasyāpi nāma ubhayato vāhini, vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca*. Moral life could be said to consist in training the dispositions that flow towards vices, and thereby change its course or direction of flowing. There appears no reason to distrust the moral worth of the emotional dispositions that already flow towards virtues. On the basis of an awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings there remains a possibility that once emotionally motivated behaviour can be as free as any other.

The variability of emotional capacity among people is an empirical characteristic and in view of that state of affairs one might not seek to found morality on such a contingent basis. Reason in the Kantian's scheme is unique in escaping being empirical. But what would happen if we choose to follow Hume in holding a close connection between emotions and morality? Granted that some emotions could be deliberately cultivated, it would then remain an open ques-

tion whether the variability of emotional capacity of people is innately determined. Could it not be a prejudice that we are powerless to guide our emotional development? The moral discourse need not be necessarily non-emotive, on the contrary, emotions have an important role to play in it. Hume's examples of benevolent or sympathetic conduct furnish us with cases of emotional experiences that are not only free, but consistent and principled. And should this contention be viable, there appears no need to suppose that people would be seriously handicapped by their pathological, i.e., natural emotional make-ups.

The considerations submitted above call for revising the concept of emotion. The arguments against emotions having moral import are then convincing only initially. Since the Humeians do not take account the entire phenomena of the emotions they present us with a distorted picture of the case. Herein lies the special value of Hume's moral psychology. It does help us connect the perspective and remove the misgivings. Of course I do not mean to suggest that emotionally motivated conduct is unconditionally valuable nor does Hume; though to admit that at least some of our emotionally motivated conduct is *prima facie* right and desirable action is to go a longer way as Hume does than could have at all been possible in the Humian formulism.

Now a word about 'naturalism'. If we care to remember that naturalism is a doctrine of man, Hume's naturalism could then be described as human naturalism, not only because he makes an application of a kind of scientific method to the study of human nature (his

own description of the Treatise on the title-page: "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects" and also his reference to "an ingenious naturalist" on page 282) but also for his view that phenomena are to be explained by reference to human nature alone. Hume shared that opinion with other eighteenth century thinkers. It is a positivistic doctrine inasmuch as it refuses to appeal to any thing except that which is empirically conceivable. I have used the term 'naturalism' in the specific sense of a meta-ethical notion, in order to refer any ethical position which implies that value-words are definable in terms of the factual ones or evaluative statements can be justified by an appeal to relevant facts. Nowhere I have entered into any discussion whether Hume is engaged in deducing moral conclusions from factual premisses about human nature. That has not been a part of my programme, though I believe that Hume's view that "the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty" cannot be easily disposed of in favour of a non-naturalist point of view. At least Hume obliges us to open the issue whether one could draw from a scientific account of human nature practical conclusions as to how men ought to act.

To come back to the passions. In Hume the empiricist view of emotions finds an able exponent. The significance of the Book II of the Treatise lies in making a systematic examination of the concepts involved in the description and explanation of those human actions which it is the function of morals to approve or disapprove. The domain of the passions comprise such concepts.

A decision concerning Hume's use of the word 'passion' needs

to be taken. Hume uses 'feeling' interchangeably with 'sentiment' as much as with 'impression'. Passions are said to be secondary impressions, or impressions of reflexion. Hume's phrase "sentiment of the human mind" points to, what may be called in his own words, the 'sensitive' rather than "the cogitative part of our nature". It appears from the manner of Hume's talking about the passions that he takes the word 'passion' as coextensive with the whole class of affective phenomena. One thing is certain that a passion is not a sensation, since a passion is said to be an impression of reflexion. Impressions of sensation are original, and those that are secondary and reflective, i.e., the passions, arise either "from the original impressions (of sensation), or from their ideas". Are passions feelings or emotions, or both? Ordinarily we would say that joy is a feeling while love is an emotion. Both joy and love are, for Hume, passions, though, the former is a 'direct' and the latter is an 'indirect' passion. On the score of the distinction between direct and indirect passions, Hume could be said to have made a distinction between feelings on the one hand and emotions on the other. But it is hardly sustained throughout. Under the class of 'violent' passions (properly so-called) he puts joy and love together. This consideration leads one to believe that, for Hume, the passions are not a subclass of the class of affective phenomena, rather the class of passions and the class of affective phenomena, irrespective of feelings and emotions, map an identical domain. On page 263 of the Treatise occurs the phrase "affections or emotions". Elsewhere Hume disquietingly speaks of even 'sensation' alternatively with 'impre-

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ocion' in the cocondary and reflective cenco, e.g., "pride is a pleacant cenction" (Ibid., p.285) and "by pride I underctand that agreeable impreccion...etc.", (Ibid., p.297) Such terminological ambiguities demand a decision and in this context I chould like to maintain that Hume's uce of the word 'paccion' is umbrella like, it covers a whole range of affective phenomena, feelings, emotions, attitudes, even evaluations. The last two could be illustrated by cuch paccions as benevolence and pride. The care and concern exhibited by the benevolent percon bespeaks of his attitude towards the other. Pride is self-ecteem, love is an ecteem for the percon loved. Hume's inventory of paccions includes the names of virtues and vices as well. This is significant. Hume ceeks to explain human action in terms of motives and intentions. A reacon for action refers to the agent's psychological history, his emotional make-up and the paccionate experiences, or in other words his habits and passions. On the other hand, the intentionality of action constituted by the agent's desires and aversions. It could then be said that an explanation of action in terms of motives and intentions is descriptive, and as such connected with praise and blame. Hume's list of motives is composed of the names of virtues and vices as much as that of Ryle. Of course, Hume was not anxious to combat a particular view of the relationship between feelings and motives as Ryle has been. Anyway, Hume's theory of the passions is a prolegomena to his 'emotionistic' (the phrase is Ardal's) view of ethics. Passions or emotion words form part of the vocabulary of approbation and disapproval, and a number of them. Hume shows in the Book

III of the Treatise, belongs to the language of moral evaluation.

Hume could of course have distinguished between feelings and emotions in the following manner. Since he understands by passion "a violent and sensible emotion of mind" (ibid., p.437) and the notion of calm passion is not generic but specific, Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions is based upon the degrees of intensity. He admits the possibility that a given violent passion could, with a change in the causal set of factors giving rise to it, become, just as well a calm passion, on acquiring a greater degree of intensity, could be transformed into a violent one. The causal factors would include, besides "the peculiar temper and disposition" of the individuals, "the circumstances and situations of the object...the borrowing of force from any attendant passion... custom or...exciting the imagination" (see ibid., pp.437-8). Psychologists usually endorse Hume's contention that a feeling differs very little from passion (or for that matter emotion) except that its phenomena are less intense. I could cite one such endorsement. F. Paulhan writes, "passion may spring from the development of a feeling, or, on the other hand, it may itself give rise to a feeling by a decrease in the intensity of causes that produce it" (The Laws of Feeling, p. 67. Translated by C.K.Ogden, Kegan Paul, London, 1930). To generalize the point, emotion is a feeling, or at least an experience which involves a feeling. Hume uses the phrase "weak passion", and we might say that a feeling is an idea or copy of an impression.

Concerning the point that a violent passion can, by losing

intensity, because calm Hume has made the observation that: "impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible" (op.cit., p. 276). Is he entitled to make this remark after having said that an impression is a perception of the mind? How could there be an unperceived impression, and passions being a subclass of impressions, how is it that there could be an "imperceptible" passion, or in other words, an unfelt feeling? Does the argument even get partial apply to Hume's notion of passion? And if it does, then the assertion that a passion can become "imperceptible" should be quite disturbing. Anthony Kenny, (Action Emotion and Will) who has drawn attention to this point, finds it uncomfortable enough. I do not propose to consider Kenny's view that passions, for Hume, are perceived by some sort of an inner sense -- a thesis which, despite Hume's numerous ambivalent faculty-expressions, I believe, is hard to establish. But Kenny does overlook quite a few important points and trims a too literal a view of Hume's words. Hume does not claim exactness for his division of passions, and calls it "vulgar and spacious". The question of "imperceptibility" of a violent passion concerns the person who is experiencing the passion. The relation between a passion and the person is such that a passionless state of mind is inconceivable. Apart from it, the change from perceptibility to imperceptibility of a passion is a qualitative one, or else cannot be in accord with Hume's intentions. The word 'imperceptible' is a metaphor, and the contention of the passage quoted above seems to be that a violent passion may so lose intensity that it may no longer be identifiable as

a passion with the former degree of intensity, but this does not imply that it will cease to be recognizable, only it ceases to be experienced as a "soft" one. An impression is recognized as a passion only if it influences the will. And Hume has said more than once that both violent and calm passions direct the will. On this point the following remark of Hume is relevant: "passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action" (op.cit., pp.418-19). It is true that violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will, yet the calm ones "when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" can control the "furious movements" of the former. The calm passions are dispositional, while the violent ones tends to be episodic. The dispositional nature of the calm passions is brought out by Hume's remark that the calm passions "produce" no "little emotion in the mind" that "they are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (ibid., p. 417). Hume's notion of calm passions is often misunderstood. Kenny is one instance, another is Rachael Kydd's view that Hume had a special theory of calm passions, which I would be considering later.

As regards Kenny's point it would suffice to say that intensity of activation is not the most characteristic aspect of emotion. Psychologists speak of an almost imperceptible gradient between emotions. The geography of emotions is not only episodic but also dispositional, just as the geography of a terrain is not only mountainous but has downs and dales as well. It is a commonplace expe-

rience that we may go for days, or even weeks, without any overt expressions of emotion, yet never be free from emotional undercurrents which influence our perceptions, our interests, our attitudes, our prejudices, our thoughts, and all our action. There are ways of behaving emotionally.

It must have by now been evident that for Hume passions have motivational significance. And it is no wonder since the terms emotion and motivation have a common derivation. The Latin word emovere means to stir up, excite or move. To be moved in an emotional sense means to be stirred up. In a motivational sense it means to 'bestir one self'. Emotion not only stirs up but also causes us to bestir ourselves. Precisely, it is this view of Hume's theory of passions that has been denied by recent philosophers — a move which I consider to be a serious philosophical howler. In consequence I have tried to work out a dispositional view of Hume's theory of passions. Philosophers have sought to find or institute an affinity between Hume's theory of passions and that of Descartes. I postpone my detailed argument against any such attempt to a later place, and in the present context I should like to content myself with making a few explanatory remarks.

A dispositional view of passions, as I said above, is essentially motivational, and a motivational account of emotions is chiefly available for interpreting human behaviour. Statements about emotions, besides interpreting behaviour, describe it as well. This is an important point. Hume's account of the emotions is sophisticated enough to make room for the two functions of inter-

pretation and description. The classical theory of the emotions does not distinguish between identifying and recognising an emotion. The conditions of existence of an emotion, as Hume has shown, are unsatisfiable in a solipsistic universe, related as emotions are to an object and the conative tendency of emotions make expressions part and parcel of the emotive experience. Besides, Hume's social image of man leaves no doubt that emotions place the agent in a social context. Without a given system of social relationships and institutions and concepts belonging to that system human actions would hardly become intelligible. It is quite mistaken to take Hume as implying that he proposes to explain behaviour by specifying its cause only i.e., a certain feeling or inner experience. It must be admitted that Hume suffers from a tension between a two sub-contrary views of the emotions. On the one hand, he uses such an apparatus of analysis that suggests a Cartesian point of view, i.e., the first-person statements of emotion are incorrigible, an emotion is a purely private mental event, and it is contingently connected with its manifestation in behaviour. And on the other, Hume advocates induction and shareability of emotions by sympathy, maintaining a difference of category between feelings such as joy and emotions such as love, speaks of "the bent and tendency" of emotions, and holds the intentionality of the emotion by specifying the passions by their objects.

The tension in the climate of Hume's thought may be due partly to his analytical commitments and partly to his inherited vocabulary. Nevertheless it is certainly possible to show that the main

current of Hume's theory of the passions is dispositional or motivational, and this is no better illustrated that by his view that in the direction of the will the passions are volitional sovereigns. A non-dispositional theory of the emotions such as that of Descartes would never come to espouse such a position. One of the primary aims of Descartes' Les Passions de l'Ame is to show that the will is free in its nature to such an extent that it can never be constrained. And above all, for Descartes, the passions of the soul are to a large extent dependent upon the body, and Hume is in no manner a dualist and advocates no double-aspect doctrine concerning man. It is very rightly that Albert G.A. Ihle has remarked that in the case of Descartes the bodily code might be regarded "as an active catalytic agent with respect to the occurrence of the passion" (Descartes and the Modern Mind, p. 400, Yale University Press, 1952). Could such a remark be made about Hume's theory of the passions?

Kenny has admitted that Hume allows the case that it is possible for the mind to make a mistake in its perception of the passion. And this is quite significant, since admission of the possibility helps us distinguish between identifying a passion and recognising it. How do we come to learn the meaning of passion or emotion words like pride or love? Much would depend on the type of concept of emotion one has. The emotionally aroused person will tell you not only that he is slightly or strongly excited but also that he has such and such emotion. He will say that he is angry, jealous or in love. But it may not be possible that one can find experiential and behavioural differences to verify every emotional term in the language, just as

much there are emotions that are easily recognized in ourselves, most easily expressed in one's language, and most easily identified when we see them represented in pictures or on the stage. The latter are also most readily predicted in terms of the situations which arouse them. Again, there should be no denying the fact that to the emotionally aroused individual the most obvious aspect of emotion is feeling. The subjective nature of feelings poses some problem. A first-person statement 'I am angry' may be taken as a case. What does 'anger' mean? Is it a conscious observable mental process verifiable by the speaker? And can he not be mistaken? Hume allows that introspection discloses particular features of experience, which are designated by passion or emotion words like 'anger', etc. On page 276 of the Treatise he says that "our very feeling convinces us" of the emotions we are experiencing, so much so that the feeling of an emotion is its "very being and essence". In these passages Hume is stating the necessary condition of having a passion in the case of first-person statements. Passions, for Hume, are simple impressions and hence indefinable. The very indefinability of passions on account of their simplicity makes emotion statements, at least in the first-person case, ascertainable by some sort of inspection. A similar case in the history of thought is provided by Moore. The word 'beautiful' can be meaningful or significant only if the speaker experiences "appropriate emotion" (Principia Ethica, p. 190, Cambridge, 1959). Moore insists, in the case of aesthetic emotions, that one should "feel and see" it. But the emotional element, i.e., the feeling introspected, is not the whole story of a passion for

Hume, there are other elements like objects, causes, tendencies etc., which taken together make the story complete. Hume would say that it is quite difficult to imagine what the feeling alone, unaccompanied by any expression would be like. At least such an abstraction would have no value in a science of human nature.

The possibility of being mistaken about emotions is endorsed by Hume. For him the reasons for mistake lie in the resemblance in causal factors responsible for the production of passions. Joy and pride could be ordinarily mistaken, and this has been shown by Hume in the following passage: "Men sometimes boast of a great entertainment" though, " 'tis only the master of the feast, who beside the same joy, has the additional passion of self-applause and vanity" (op.cit., p.290). In another passage on page 293, Hume makes it abundantly clear that the required feeling of joy is not sufficient, though necessary, to produce the passion of pride. General rules and custom also have as less an influence upon passions such that "if a person full-grown and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he would be very much embarrass'd with every object and would not readily find what degree of love and hatred, pride and humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it" (ibid., pp. 293-4). More significant is Hume's remark that one's initial experience of pride, for example, may vanish when one discovers that neither of the two so-called objects of the passions "have any singularity". "Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguish'd; and upon comparing the object we

passes, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance" (ibid., p. 292). So it should with a little caution be said that Hume thinks the only way to learn the meaning of an emotion-word is by experiencing what it stands for. Psychologists often speak of maturation and learning in emotional development, and in this both the processes of incorporation and correction are operative. One may come to learn to use the expression 'I am angry' of himself by having experience of the passion and also by being told by others. There is no reason why the man will not sometimes accept corrections from outsiders about his own emotions or about the correct description of them. Since emotions have a social dimension, both the spectator and the agent will have to and in fact do cooperate in mapping the geography of the emotions.

Hume could be taken to hold that the criterion for identifying a passion is not necessarily the recognition of the special qualities of an experience. For we learn about our own emotion in the same way as other people learn about them. And if it were the case otherwise, inter-personal communication on the emotional level or 'sympathy' as Hume calls it, would have been altogether impossible. If introspection were the sole criterion of our knowledge or understanding of our emotions many emotions could not be distinguished. Shame and embarrassment are two emotions that cannot be distinguished by their feelings, unless we refer to the specific situations that give use to them. Hume's discussion on the passions of malice and envy illustrate the point. So does the distinction between pity and malice, in which case the feelings vary concomitantly with the ob-

jects of the passions. Malice and envy differ not so much in feeling as by the superiority and inferiority of the other person. "Connected ideas are readily taken for each other" says Hume, and this explains the notorious ease that we can be mistaken about our own emotions. Again, for all the subtle linguistic differentiation of emotion-words there does not always exist distinct emotions. At least there is no obvious reason to suppose so. This is evidenced by Hume's discussion of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice. With the affections of pity and malice other passions are "confounded" such that there "is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice" (op.cit., p. 381). All these go to show that Hume's theory of the passions is sophisticated and does not allow being given naive and unqualified description as has become fashionable among philosophers.

Many of the problems raised by Hume's theory of the passions have a recency to our times. I should like to make a brief mention of a few of them.

Hume does not appear to make a very clear distinction between motive and intention. "By the intention we judge of the actions", says Hume on page 340 of the Treatise, and again on page 404 we find him speaking about "the union betwixt motives and actions" having a constancy amounting to causal (in his sense of constant conjunction of course) necessity. Obviously Hume has raised these issues in connexion with ascription of responsibility for voluntary actions. Ascription of responsibility can be made only if there is "moral evidence" for an action. By "moral evidence" Hume means "a conclusion

concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation" (ibid.). Elsewhere Hume couples 'motive' with 'character' and these two conjects are said to have constant connexion with actions. Similar assertions are made in respect of intention as well. By "intention" Hume means "that quality" in the agent, "which pleases or displeases" and is "constant and inherent in his person and character" (ibid., p. 340). If we remind ourselves that for Hume moral judgments are expressions of approval or disapproval of the spectators, or properly speaking "to feel" those emotions, then intention of the agent is the necessary condition for the arousal of the aforesaid feelings in the spectator. Intention, says Hume, connects the actions with the agent in the sense that the actions are index to something "durable" in him. What Hume has called "moral evidence" is as much dispositional as his account of intention. Personal history of the agent, his temper and character are motives to actions and connect him with his actions as it could be said to constitute his intentions. Hume's position seems to be somewhat as follows: Whatever connects the actions with the agent sufficiently so as to make ascription of responsibility possible are either motives or intentions of the agent.

Now speaking of motives and intentions interchangeably is not peculiar to Hume. Anscombe in her Intention has divided motives into three classes, one of which is comprised by motives that are equivalent to intentions, the others being backward-looking motives and interpretative motives. Attempts at distinguishing and defining the notions of motives and intentions are not altogether free from confu-

ation, and the reason for this may partly be assigned to the ambiguity of the notions. Anscombe herself mentions that at the popular level of discourse motive and intention are not treated as distinct in meaning. I do not mean to suggest that Anscombe takes a Humean stand, rather I should like to say that even if we accept Anscombe's view that motives put actions "in a certain light" for Hume, it is not the agent's putting, on the contrary, the spectator's putting the agent's action into certain light that is important. If it is said that motives explain actions, Hume would say that the explanation consisted in ascribing responsibility to the agent for his action only if his motives determined it in the causal sense. Hume's methodological deterministic view of human actions instantiates the general thesis that it depends on the way an action is described, how much there is left to be explained by reference to either motive or intention. Descriptions of human actions, for Hume, have built-in reference of motives, it is an inference on the basis of "causal evidence". I am far from suggesting that the distinction between motive and intention is philosophically redundant. A description of human action is recognised only if it makes reference to intentions. It is also possible to engage into the kind of above-mentioned talk without reference to motives. To act from a motive does not necessarily imply that the agent possesses a concept of motive, and the asymmetry between motive and intention is such that one may have a motive for an intention, though it is not conceivable that one can have an intention for a motive. Considerations such as these serve only to suggest that the distinction between motive and intention is not that perspi-

cuous as it might appear to the unsophisticate.

Granted that there are motives for doing or performing actions for which responsibility could be ascribed to the agent, or for that matter, since motivated actions are voluntary, one can ask: what is the relation between motivational emotions and actions? An action, for Hume, stretches from the agent's personal history, including his "situation", emotions and traits of character, to particular state of affairs which he desires to realize. If the latter could be designated by intention, the state of affairs to be brought out by an action, in this sense Hume seems to have distinguished intention from motive. Impulsive actions apart, ascription of praise or blame is possible if the action could "be deriv'd from a particular forethought and design" (op.cit., p. 340). Causal authorship of an action is not sufficient for the truth of an ascriptive judgment, there needs be an intention, which, says Hume, "shows certain qualities, ...remaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person..." (ibid.). Should this reading be found unobjectionable, it could be said that "motive in general" (the phrase is Annette's) or motive and intention as distinguished above would together constitute the sufficient and necessary conditions for a voluntary action being performed.

Should assignation of voluntariness of an action be justified by reference of the agent's emotive life, i.e., emotions are motivational in character, in that case Hume could be held advocating a relationship between emotions and motives on the one hand, and motivational emotions and actions on the other. It would be unfair to Hume

to take him saying that emotions as such are connected with motives, since what he calls "weak passions" (as distinguished from the calm ones, see op.cit., p.419) are feelings that have nothing to do with directing actions and conduct. In this regard Hume would not have any quarrel with Ryle, who has proposed a distinction between inclinations and feelings. By 'inclination' Hume would mean "a settled principle of action" which can direct "the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion" (ibid.). But Ryle could still insist on a difference. He might suggest that Hume's explanation of actions by motives is causal. If to offer X as a causal explanation of Y is to say that whenever X then Y, Ryle's own law-like generalization view of motives is no less causal. For to say 'he boasted from vanity' is to assert 'whenever an opportunity for boasting arrives, he takes it' -- and this assertion construes the original statement as a causal one. Nor it could also be said that Hume's view offers private impulses and Ryle's public circumstances. We have already drawn attention to the fact that Hume has laid emphasis on the 'situation' of the agent, together with the fact of admitting the possibility of one's being mistaken about one's own feelings.

Closely connected with Hume's view of motivational character of the passions is his account of desires, which should be appreciated against the background of the traditional analysis of human action characterizing it in terms of an alleged antecedent. The presence of such an antecedent has been made in the tradition a necessary condition of something's being an action, and this antecedent has been

called 'the will'. The idea that a human act (or action) is a bodily movement following from or caused by the will, a volition or an act of will, occurs earlier in Hobbes and Locke, and later in Mill, and has remained dominant in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century philosophy. Austin expressed the tradition thus: "Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and immediately our wishes and desires for the same movements...The antecedent wishes and those consequent movements are human volitions and acts ... Our desires of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them are the only volitions; or the only acts of the will" (see his Lectures on Jurisprudence, 11, lect.XVIII). This view has also been accepted by most analytic jurisprudents after Austin.

Desires, for Hume, are direct passions, i.e., the impressions that arise from good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain "most naturally, and with the least preparation" (op.cit., p. 433). Hume has drawn our attention to the instinctive genesis of desires, and the question -- why desires do arise -- is held "perfectly unaccountable". Benevolence, the love of life, punishment to our enemies, hunger and lust are instances of this class of desires, which, for all practical purposes, are instincts. There is another class of desires of more general nature: "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such". The distinction between the two classes of desires lies in the fact that the latter are generated by the hedonic quality of impressions, while the former generate such hedonic qualities. The hedonic quality of the impressions is the necessary condition of the passions properly

so called, i.e., the indirect passions together with the direct passions or desires described as "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil."

Hume speaks of "calm desires and tendencies", now it can be asked whether he intends to ascribe/to calm desires to the class of reason-like calm passions. It does so appear since Hume, on page 417 of the Treatise, mentions the aforesaid two kinds of desires, instinctive ones such as the love of life or benevolence, and the general ones like appetite to good or aversion to evil, in the context of passions owing to this "calmness and tranquillity" being mistaken for reason. He says, "When any of these passions (the desires) are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason..." The point of interest then is that the division of the passions into direct and indirect, and again into calm and violent cuts across one another. The division of passions into direct and indirect is made according to the origin, while that of calm and violent is concerned with intensity. One is naturally led to the conclusion that, for Hume, the passions are motivational or dispositional in nature. Supposing now that it be allowed that so far I have been right, a few considerations can be made.

The notion of 'passion' becomes interchangeable with desire, since the love of life, benevolence and the general appetite to good are referred to by Hume as both 'desires' and passions, and it would be so irrespective of the division of the passions into direct and indirect ones. The position is not perhaps without its difficulties.

Assimilation of desires to emotions cannot be complete, for desire in the sense of wanting is hardly an emotion, just as much as there are uses of 'desire' in unemotional content, e.g., a letter might open with the following words: "The Prime Minister desires...etc." This is not to suggest that an account of desires is not essential to a treatment of emotions, since the connexion between emotion and behaviour is made by desire. My emotions do not make me want to do the same sort of things, rather my emotions differ from one another according to the different sort of things it makes me want to do.

The role of desires, for Hume, lies in "the government of the will and actions". There are two points in the contention: (a) production of volition and (b) volition effecting action. The production of volition has been dealt with by Hume with greater explicitness. Voluntary behaviour is motivated by passion, and such behaviour is accompanied by an indefinable internal impression called 'a volition', which in turn is caused by one or other passion. To take Hume's own example. A suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty, and this pleasure produces the impression of volition. Thus the production of volition by passion is just a particular case of the production of one passion by another in accordance with the principle of association of impressions. As regards the case of volition effecting action the following are worth noticing. An act of will, as Hume gives us to understand, is comprehended under what he calls "the actions of the mind" as are the desired effects. I venture to suggest this interpretation on the basis of what Hume says on pages 400-1 of the Treatise. He enunciates his determinism

by seeking to prove "a constant union in the actions of the mind". The view, to put it in his terminology, that the actions of the mind are necessary can be proved by examining the 'particulars' apart. He does not distinguish between the mind and the body, so much so that on page 276 he used the expressions 'the soul' and 'the body' interchangeably, and again on page 303 he takes the self include "the qualities of our mind and body". These assertions are particular instances of Hume's more general view concerning the epistemic status of the concept of body. In Book I of the Treatise, there occurs an unmistakable phenomenalist declaration that the notion of external existence when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions is absurd (see p. 188). Hume makes a reference to this view again on page 298, where his notion of the body appears to be "a part of ourselves" or "near enough connected with us". And what else could Hume mean by the first person pronouns other than a system of perceptions? In the Appendix, again, we find him criticising the view that the will has a discoverable connexion with its effects. An act of volition cannot explain a motion of the body, since the causal relation between them is so construed that one is distinguishable and separable from the other. The motion of the body cannot "be foreseen without the experience of /its/ constant conjunction" with the act of the will. I shall examine this contention in another context and therefore postpone criticism of it to a later place. What Hume says in the Appendix is that we perceive constant conjunction of the actions of the mind, and hence we cannot reason beyond it. Volition can effect action only in the sense of hoping

a probable occurrence of the latter. Kenny has remarked that Hume "does not and cannot well explain" how volition effects action. This remark is, in a sense, true, though at the same time stands in need of qualification in another important sense. Hume's own view with regard to the question how volition effects action is given on page 439 in the sentence that follows his statement about the way desire arises: "The Will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be obtain'd by any action of mind or body." Willing then is a special case of desiring, when the object of desire is a likelihood, or a possible state of affairs such that its idea is lively enough to generate a movement towards the object. The philosophical elucidation of the conceptual relation between desire and action depends crucially on the probability of the desired end. For desiring is trying to get what one desires. To desire or producing a volition is not to have an idle wish, a mere feeling. Hume would say that X desires Y is to say that X does something to get Y. This point has been overlooked in Hume's case and I should think that Anscombe's criticism of Hume (Intentions, p.76) illustrates such an oversight.

Hume's account of desire is essentially empiricist. He describes desire as a feeling or impression, and the content of desire is said to be an idea. The object of desire, the good is conceived "merely in idea, and ... consider'd as to exist in any future period of time" (Treatise, p.439). It could be a present object as well, or even in some cases past. But it is undeniable that the notion of as yet unattainedness, if it could be so said, is built into the notion of

an object of desire. Again, it is possible that I may be mistaken about the desirability characterization of my object of desire. It is a common experience that we often falsely believe that we desire one thing only to discover that we really desired another. Much of the drama of our emotive life consists in this. Hence the necessary and sufficient condition of something's being an object of desire is that the object would satisfy the desire and nothing else will do that. An object of desire may be desired either as an end or as a means. Hume speaks of "the greatest possible good". Hence a consideration of choosing the right means leading to desired end has an influence on our action. 'What counts as getting an object of desire?' — is a question that demands an answer. In fact these considerations are hinted at by Hume in connexion with his discussion on the notion of reasonableness of actions: "In exerting any passion in action" he says, we may "choose insufficient means for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgments of causes and effects" (ibid., p. 416). He may not have been explicit in the manner of many of our contemporary philosophers, but it would be untrue to say that he was not aware of the complexity of the issues involved or was insensitive to their subtleties.

Hume's notion of the will is then a kind of desire with a force. Such a conception of desire, as if desire were a force — is found in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics (1147a 34). I do not wish to suggest an identity of intentions of Aristotle and Hume. A passage in Aristotle (1139a 36) says that it is not reason as such that acts in action, but reason which is with a view to something

and is practical. If this statement is taken on its face value, then Aristotle's 'will' could be said to be a 'calm passion' in Hume's terminology. They seem to agree about the applicability of the description 'not in accordance with reason' to actions and desires, while disagreeing about the case of rational desire, i.e., a desire with a rational end. The problem of thought and action is a problem for Aristotle, and not for Hume.

Desire mediates the object of desire with conduct, and conduct or action, for Hume, is the realization of desire which is instinctive appetite. I shall try to show later the fact that desire is an instinctive appetite does not rule out the case for the deliberation of real means. If desire relates to the end, will does to the possible means, that are in Hume's word 'sufficient' only if the object of desire conceived as existent. On page 440 of the Treatise Hume puts it very clearly that what we desire is the 'existence' of the object of desire. As regards voluntarity it may be said that it is the property of an act originated in one's own desire, it is the activity of desire as will. Voluntarity consists in the fact whereby the power of circumstances translates itself into action through desire. Hume would hold that it is nonsense to say a desire itself is involuntary: it would be to commit a contradicto in adjecto, i.e., to assume a desire without desiring. It is possible to do something without desiring it, but impossible to desire without desiring. The will is the development and augmentation of voluntarity. Between desire and the will there is no qualitative difference, for Hume, but one of intensity such that the will can be said to dominate desire.

Kant's use of the word 'inclination' presents an interesting case. Hume's desires are motives, and if motives are a particular class of reasons, then it could be asked whether desires play the role of principles of volition or maxims as Kant would put it. It is one thing for Kant to deny intrinsic worth to conduct or actions done from inclination, and it is another thing to say that such conduct do not deserve praise or encouragement. Should one can afford to agree with Nowell-Smith's suggestion (Ethics, Ch.10) that Kant puts actions done from inclination in a category logically co-ordinate with 'from duty', then, since some sorts of actions (though of different sorts of course) are done from a maxim, it would be possible to say that actions willed through desire can be given a reason for its having been performed. This is one of Hume's contentions, namely, that our desires are part of our character. To speak of a person's desires is to speak of the pattern, course and direction of his thoughts, feelings and actions. This argument would be valid only if it could be shown that Kant does paraphrase 'inclination' by 'desire'. And if it be the case then it should also be admitted that, for Hume, reason-explanations of actions may into the same domain as do the causal ones.

As I have sought to indicate and argue earlier that Kantian's distrust of emotions renders much of our moral life incomprehensible. I would like to add now that Kant's distrust of desires leads him to believe that all actions springing from desire, unaccompanied by the sense of duty, is devoid of moral worth. An action done from love, if it is not done from duty, is worth no more than the most selfish

action. In fact, a consequence of such a line of argument would put all motives on the same level. And to seek to do so is to prevent a distorted view of moral life. Hume, I think, is right when he says that conflict of the passions for the government of the will is what describes moral life in a richer manner than does Kant, who, to my understanding, simplifies the moral life so much that, for him, it is a contest between one element which alone has worth and a multitude of others which have none. It appears satisfactory to view the moral life as a struggle between a multiplicity of desires having various degrees of worth.

It is possible to argue, on Hume's lines, that since the calm passions or desires are reason-like in their functions and influence on the will, it would be natural to expect that these should arise the desire to do one's duty. It may be that the desire to do one's duty is different in kind from all other motives. The closest Hume comes to such a notion of motive is when he says that non-performance of an action displeases us after a certain manner and we feel to lie under an obligation to perform it. Promising entails obligation and the obligation is willed in the sense that we bind ourselves by "our own consent". But it would be wrong to say that the desire to do one's duty alone has moral value, and none else has. If this argument is valid, then it may be further argued that because of the nature of affinity between desire to do one's duty and other desire or motives, the latter as well can have moral value. Nor it would be the case that addition of any motive to one's sense of duty makes the motivation of an act less good; on the contrary it might improve

the motivation. Let us illustrate the case by examining an instance of a deliberate action.[1]

I was struck to find an anticipated account of Hume's notion of 'desire' in a treatise of ancient Indian psychology, namely the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali. The work is assigned to the second century B.C., and the famous commentary on it by Vyasa to the fourth century A.D. Patanjali defines 'desire' (sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ II.7) as that which dwells on pleasure. The pleasure may be either recollected or experienced, and desire ensues upon it. The will-to-live (abhiniveśa) is the paradigm of desire, and on this point there is an agreement between Patanjali and Hume, Kant and Schopenhauer. On the score of this philosophical consensus we can better understand why Spinoza defined desire as 'the very essence of man'. Vācaspati Miśra, another philosopher belonging to the school of Patanjali has made desire a necessary condition of pleasure, since he says there are certain pleasures, e.g., of satisfaction, which cannot be enjoyed in the absence of desire (See his Tattva Vaiśāradī on Patanjali's II.13.) Vācaspati has argued also that pleasure is fomented by desire, for one cannot possibly say that one finds no satisfaction or happiness in a thing

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1. I have not mentioned the word 'want' in connexion with Hume's account of desire, because I believe 'desire' should be distinguished from 'want', though 'want' is a member of the family of desire-concepts together with 'inclination'. Much of the recent discussions on 'desire' glides into discussions on 'want'. Anscombe, Kenny and a host of others have written in a vein as if the logic of the behaviour of the word 'want' were identical with that of the word 'desire'. It may have been so owing to the pervading influence of Wittgenstein's concentration on the analysis of 'wanting'. However this is an issue which I do not wish to enter into in the present context.

and at the same time take pleasure in it. Further, it is held that pleasure leads to action, because desire generates volition or that one wills, 'let me do it', which is the verbal form of the volition, and this is also comprehended within desire. A volition with desire reaches upto the intended objects which can be expressed by words.

I have no intention of suggesting that Hume and Patanjali agree in every respect. There are very basic differences between them since they belong to two different philosophical traditions. They hold radically different concepts of freedom, of action and above all, of man. Action in the philosophical tradition of the West signifies some kind of intervention on the part of the agent, whereas in that of the East actions presuppose a hinterland of predispositions or samskāras, as they are technically called, which in their turn accrue new predispositions. I sought to mention Patanjali's instance in respect of Hume's account of desire, or for that matter, of the passions, only in order to drive home an important philosophical conviction, namely, that the image of man and the notion of his freedom play a crucial role in determining as well as shaping the nature and scope of such inquiries as moral psychology and moral philosophy, if not of philosophy at large. The proper study of mankind is Man.

"Human Nature is the only science of man" said Hume, and recalling the difficulties that beset such a science he remarked that "few can form exact systems of the passions" (Treatise, pp.273 and 332). To an examination of his theory of the passions I shall now proceed.