

CHAPTER - I

In the realm of recent European ethical thought Dr. Nikolai Hartmann's "Ethics" occupies a unique position. In fact his work is a classic and a landmark amongst recent ethical literature and no other book by the English speaking people save and except perhaps Dr. G.E. Moore's "Principia Ethica" is comparable to it. Like Dr. Moore's work Dr. Hartmann's "Ethics", to quote the translator, "is the most impressive statement of intuitive ethical realism in print". Dr. Hartmann, like Dr. Moore, tried to establish "Ethical Realism in place of "Ethical Idealism", though from a different point of view. We propose here to examine the ethical theory of Dr. Hartmann critically with a view to determine in the light of our examination, how far his "Ethical Realism" as expounded in his "Ethics" can be regarded as a satisfactory account of the basic issues of moral life.

Values, according to Hartmann, are essences. They are akin to Platonic Ideas. "In their mode of Being", says Hartmann, "Values are Platonic Ideas" *1. "The kind of Being peculiar to the 'Idea' is the kind of Being of that 'through which' everything participating in it is just as it is". As to the kind of Being peculiar to ideas we know nothing as yet more definite; it is still to be investigated. But thus much is immediately evident; even for values the proposition holds good: they are that 'through which' everything which participates in them is exactly as it is - namely valuable. But in present-day conceptual language this means : values are essences *2.

Values, according to Hartmann, are ideal essences like the logical, and the mathematical and like them values are a priori essences which are non-temporal, objective,

universal and necessary. They do not emanate from the temporal evanescent things or from the percipient but are Ideal essences which can be immediately discerned or discovered only by an inner "vision" which can "behold" value a priori and is a state of consciousness other than thought or cognition though an element of cognition is involved in it as one of its constituents.

Values are Ideal self-existent essences which are absolute and are not relative. The relatedness to a personal subject does not make the values relative to the subject subject. "The relatedness", says Hartmann, "to a personal subject does not bar out the objective character of values but evidently implies it". A person cannot change the fact that a thing is good for him. The fact that it is so is not relative to his estimate of value nor to him as an appraising subject, but to him as a person. Conversely, an estimate of value is relative to the valuableness of the good for the subject. In this, "for the subject" does not play the part of a determiner or giver of values; his role is that of a point of reference in the relation appertaining to the valuational contents. It is the same "for" which is interwoven with so many categorical structures. In the fact that geometrical laws hold good only "for" spatial figures, mechanical laws only "for" real bodies, no one sees any relativity as regards the categorical import of these laws. Yet there is just as much reason here for speaking of the relativity of these laws and of their categories to entities of a definite kind. In the same way psychological laws are also relative to psychic beings; but this does not mean that they can

be made by consciousness or can be abolished by the beings themselves. But, rather, they are laws to which the psychic beings for whom they hold good are unconditionally subjected.

"In the same way also the consciousness of good and evil - so far as it exists - is subject unconditionally to the laws of values and anti-values....In short, the relatedness of these values to a human subject is not relativity to the subject's opinion of them or to his appraisal of them, but to the subject's existence, including his entire categorical constitution.

"But this means that the relation of goods to a personal subject... is not at all a relativity of their value as such, but is a relation which is contained in the valuational material and exists before and independently of any consciousness of it... Relational structure of contents is not relativity as regards values - just as the relational structure of the categories (and they all have some such structure) does not signify their relativity. The difference between relationality and relativity... is as essential for a clear understanding in ethics as it is in theoretical philosophy. The opposite of relationality is the substratum, that of relativity is absolute. ~~There~~ There are relative substrata and there are absolute relations. The relation of the value of goods to the subject is an absolute relation which is comprised in the content of their values. The thing and the subject are here objectively drawn into the structure of the valuational materials, as, so to speak, cause and effect are included in the causal nexus. In both cases the binding relation is purely objective, and, as regards any understanding of it, is absolute.

"The existence of the values of goods is consequently not in the least affected by the relation of the goods to the subject. As regards the subject and his sense of

value it bears the mark of self-existence. Its absoluteness includes the self-existence of its relevancy. To state the point formally : the existence of the goods for me depends upon the independent existence of the values of the goods. It is included in the nature of the goods" 3.

Thus values are not relative inspite of the consciousness or sensing of value, for this sensing is only recognising or receiving and not a creative activity¹. Moreover, the restriction of the applicability of the laws of values and disvalues to entities of a particular kind does not make the values relative. For, here the dependence is one-sided and irreversible. These entities are dependent on values do not depend on them. Thus, "a thing can be valuable", says Hartmann, "only through its relation to a value itself. This must be fixed beforehand. It is the condition of the possibility of there being anything of value and of its being recognised as valuable, as a good - so to speak. Nothing is ever loved, striven for, yearned after, except for the sake of some value, immediately discerned (and felt)². But, conversely, never is loving, striving, yearning presupposed in the case of a thing that is of value, or in the case of the value itself which is inherent in the thing³. That this relationship is irreversible lies in the very constitution of acting, loving, discerning, striving⁴. It is essentially a one-sided dependence. But what is evident in it is the fact that values possess the character of genuine essences, the character of absoluteness, of principles, and that the knowledge which we have of them can be no other than aprioristic knowledge"⁵ 4. Thus values are principles because their existence is presupposed for the

existence of the things that are valuable as well as for the act of evaluation; and as such values are absolute, i.e., independent and objective; and as objective and independent they are genuine self-existent essences. "Whatever in its mode of being", says Hartmann, "is not relative to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable, whatever sets up before him a self-subsistent regularity and energy of its own which the subject can grasp or miss but cannot get rid of, that has for him the character of self-existence".

"Values have self-existence ...". Values subsist independently of the consciousness of them. Consciousness can grasp or miss them, but cannot make them or spontaneously decree them ...". Hence, concerning the characteristics which values have, the proposition holds good that they have self-existence" 5.

Now according to Hartmann, self-existence or objectivity is of two types, viz., real and ideal, i.e., object which are independent of the consciousness of them are of two types, real and ideal. But at once the question arises :what is meant by real as well as ideal self-existence, how can we distinguish between the two? In reply to this question Hartmann says, "Theoretical Philosophy knows two essentially different kinds of self-existence : one real and one ideal. The former belongs to all things and events, to everything that is "actual", to whatever has existence : the latter to the structure of pure mathematics and logic, and, over and above these, to the essence of every kind which persist throughout the changes of individual existence and, when distinguished from this, permits of being discerned a priori".

But again the question arises, how can we know that the ideal object is not absolute nothing, i.e., Not-Being or merely subjective? In reply to this question Hartmann again says, "But the certainty of the phenomenon is clearly revealed by the way the ideal forms present themselves to the knowing consciousness".

"It is this consciousness which believes the logical and mathematical forms to be something independent of it". This postulated independence of consciousness is the postulated self-existence of the ideal objects. If anyone objects that affirmation is poor evidence, that a man who dreams, or was one who is deceived, or who is in error, also believes that the object he beholds is self-existent, the answer is: from a dream there is an awakening, as there is from error and illusion, but from logical and mathematical insight there is no awakening. The "belief" in ideal self-existence stands entirely on the same level as belief in real self-existence. We also cannot prove that things exist, but can only postulate this when we perceive.

"Whoever therefore, doubts ideal self-existence must also doubt real self-existence".

"Perceived reality differs from mere presentation, from the merely supposed object, by the impossibility of voluntarily displacing it, of perceiving it otherwise than just as it is perceived". But the ideal object, which is known a priori, differs in exactly the same way from one which is a "mere thought", from one which could also be thought as different. Indeed, the Kantian universality and necessity of a priori are not something psychological, and do not mean that actually everybody sees that $a=1$. In fact not everybody can see it, but only the person who has an eye - that is, the mathematical training to see it. Yet whoever has reached the level of such intelligence cannot

think as he pleases, but must think that only what in itself "is" a necessarily and objectively "is"=1.

"In the same way no ideal object of a priori insight can be displaced by the subject or made dependent upon him. It offers the same absolute resistance to the will of the subject as any real object of perception. And this resistance "is" its objectivity".7

Values are self-existents, but self-existents of which sorts? Are they real self-existents, or are they ideal? To this Hartmann replies, "Values have no self-existence that is real The mode of Being peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence. The values are originally patterns of an ethical ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own laws and order" 8.

Thus values are ideal self-existent objects. They are neither absolute nothing nor subjective, for the phenomena of affirmation and the impossibility of voluntarily displacing them as well as the possibility of valuational delusion prove the ideal self-existence of value. The last point requires elucidation. It is said that if there be valuational delusion, then that very fact makes self-existence of values doubtful. But this is, according to Hartmann, a great mistake. "On the contrary", says Hartmann, "where there are delusion and error, these consists of non-agreement with the fact. The fact, as something fixed and independent of the truth and error of the knowledge - that is, the fact as something existing in itself - is precisely the presupposition of delusion; Otherwise delusion would be not be delusion. But the "fact" is in this case the value itself. Accordingly, if anything is proof for the self-existence of values, it is exactly the phenomenon of delusion" 9.

Further, "the conviction, which accompanies every genuine judgement of values, that everyone else must judge in the same way and have the same impression" (10) indicates

the universality and necessity of value. Of course, this is not a psychological universal fact. There are people who do feel and judge differently. But this difference in feeling and judgement does not disprove the universality and necessity of value-judgments and consequently of values themselves. It only proves the absence of proper valuational consciousness, the lack of training in discernment and appreciation which is required for kindling the primary sense of value. Thus Hartmann says, "But it is here just as it is with mathematical insight. Not everyone is capable of it; not everyone has the eye, the ethical maturity, the spiritual elevation, for seeing the situation as it is. Nevertheless, the universality, necessity and objectivity of the valuational judgment holds good in the idea. For this universality does not mean that everyone is capable of the insight in question. It only means that whoever is capable of it - that is, whoever has attained the adequate mentality - must necessarily feel and judge thus and not otherwise".

"In this sense moral judgment and the primal moral feeling which underlies it are universal, necessary and objective (11). Moreover, Hartmann continues, "Values announce themselves primarily as enlistments of emotion. They are therefore exposed to doubt as to their objectivity so much the more, because feeling are less objective than discernments". But, "the concept of self-existence" itself is rooted in the fact that it is as little possible to summon up arbitrarily a sense of value as it is to construct a mathematical law arbitrarily. In both cases there is an objectively beheld existent, which presents itself and which the feeling, the intuition, the thought only follows & but cannot dominate. We can experience as valuable only what in itself is so. We may of course also be incapable of such and experiencing; but if we are in general capable of

it, we can experience the value only as it is itself, but not as it is not. The sense of value is not less objective than mathematical insight. Its object is only more veiled through the emotional character of the act" (12). Thus, according to Hartmann, values are ideal objective a priori essences and are object of an a priori sensing of value which is an a priori factum. But values by themselves do not exhaust the sphere of ideal essences. There are other ideal objects besides values. They are also known a priori. Thus Hartmann writes, "Indeed, it is also easy to see that the ~~is~~ ontological ideal and the ethical ideal spheres are not isolated members, but that a vast aesthetical ideal sphere is contiguous, and that there are still further members which introduce still further variations of content. Yet in mode of existence the sphere remains a unity. It is also a unity for knowledge. For its patterns are known in all departments always and purely a priori - without distinction as to whether the acts, which are vehicles of this knowledge, bear the stamp of intellect or emotion. In this connection, ~~sense~~ sense of value and logical reasoning stand on the same level. Idealistic knowledge of Being permits of only one mode of knowing, the aprioristic" (13).

But how do the values differ from other ideal essences? In the first place, values ~~diff~~ differ from other ideal essences regarding their relation to the real or actual ~~obje~~ objects. In respect of other ideal essences their coincidence or agreement with the real is the limit of their connection. Where they are not in agreement they are not connected. But this does not hold good in respect of values. As regards values Hartmann says, "In the ethical domainalso there is a certain agreement of the ideal and real, just as there are limits to the agreement. But the limits of agreement are here not limits of connection. The connection sub-

sists in full actuality above and beyond them" (17). In the second place, unlike categories values, though they are unconditional, inviolable principles of ideal ethical sphere, are the principles of the actual ethical sphere only conditionally. They are not the unchecked rulers of the actual ethical sphere. As regards their effectiveness in the actual ethical sphere they require help from something which belongs to the realm of the actual and which is independent, i.e., autonomous. Thus Hartmann writes, "In the ideal sphere [.....] values are inviolable, supreme determinants, decisive powers, to which there is no resistance, and to which everything is subject [.....]. Without exaggeration one might say: values are categories of the ideal ethical sphere. But one cannot say: they are categories of the ideal ethical sphere. But one cannot say: they are categories of the actual ethical sphere. Here their role is of another kind, and thereby their difference from the categories appears. Here they are longer inviolable determinants nor absolutely ruling powers. Here not everything is subordinate to them; the act of the subjects do not accommodate themselves to them unresistingly; they have their own laws, determinants of another kind [.....]. The will can counteract the consciousness of value. The same holds good of inner conduct, of the disposition" (15). Thus "ethical values are therefore only conditionally, and not once for all, principles of moral consciousness and its acts. And the additional conditions which convert them into principles do not lie in the realm of values, not even in the ideal sphere, but in the different law of the moral consciousness. It constitutes the basic difference between values and categories" (16). Values are, in a sense, weaker than categories because they cannot rule inexorably. But they are, in a sense, also stronger than the categories for they work against categorical opposition and, in the case of success, can transform

Non-Being into Being and, in virtue of this capacity, they are, while the categories are not, creative principles. Thus Hartmann says, "in one way, values are weaker in influence than categories. They do not rule unconditionally-;..... of themselves they have not the strength to execute themselves in the actual sphere; they are thrown back upon an outside power which enters in. But this power is not always there; and, when it is there, it belongs to the actional realm" (17).

"In another way", continues Hartmann, "they are stronger than categories. Categories rule the existence without check They are the only ruling powers in their own realm. Values, on the other hand, so far as they are actualised, must be carried out against a stable structure already present And, in so far as they succeed, they build upon the categorial stabilities of acts a new and higher formation which rises in the same way over these as over a material subject. In another and more special sense they are creative principles. They can transform Not-Being into Being. The generatio ex nihilo, which is otherwise an impossibility in all realm of Being, here is possible" (18). In the third place, values are indirectly the principles of ethical reality, of real ethical sphere. This is the metaphysically decisive characteristic of values as principles. Thus Hartmann writes, "the possibility of conduct contrary to values gives to them, as principles of action, their specific quality of actuality. That quality becomes manifest in the fact that even in the case of disagreement the connection is not broken (as with the categories), but continues in full force and is even solidified in a tension sui generis. In metaphysical language, it is the tension between two different sorts of principles" (19), viz., the ontological and the axiological determinism, in one world. "This one world", continues Hartmann, "..... is pre-eminently the actional sphere of the moral

consciousness; but subordinately it is the world of reality in general. For, to this latter belongs the moral consciousness, which is drawn into the real world as a member of it and there expresses itself in transcendent acts..... They are also principles of the actual, of the real ethical sphere. Indirectly, through the actional sphere, they succeed in moulding the real - in line with the ontological categories All that has been said concerning the ethical sphere of action applies, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of ethical reality. Values have a conditionally determinative relation to it also. In it, too, they are not necessarily decisive, they do not fulfil themselves without ~~pass~~ resistance. They are always in a restricted sense principles of the real ethical sphere, according to the ethos of the time Also the conditionality of the principles is here greater, for the actional sphere is the mediating factor. In life the realization of values takes a route which is not accidental, along the consciousness of value, along disposition, will and deed. Only where a personal entity with its striving for a discerned value is at hand, can a value be productively realized. Butif we include it in the way in which values generally arrived at being ontological, of actualizing principles, the proposition is essentially valid here, that values - despite their inability to execute themselves - nevertheless in their own way are stronger in force of efficiency than are the categories of Being, in that they, in the theatre of the world, oppose the force of the categories" (20). The character of values as principles clearly shows the ideal mode of self-existence of values which is ideal 'ought to be'. Values as ideal 'ought to be' signifies the fact that values in their mode of ideal self-existence are independent and indifferent to their actualisation or non-actualisation. Thus actualisation or otherwise of values does not affect the peculiar mode of

being of value as ideal self-existents'. In other words, the ontological dualism of Being and Non-being are inapplicable to values'. Being or Non-being of the actualisation of value does not affect the value as ideal 'ought to be' '. This ideal 'ought to be persists inspite of the actuality or its absence as well as possibility or its absence. Thus Hartmann says, "In the characteristics of values as principles the concept of Ought is distinctly contained. It adheres to the essence of ethical values '. There is something absurd in the thought that a value is a thing that ought to be only in so far as its matter is unreal. That a man ought to be honest, straight forward, trustworthy, is something which does not cease to be because somebody actually is so. The man ought to be even as he then is '. Ought in this sense is only an ideal or pure Ought-to-be '. Because something is in itself a value, it does not follow that someone ought to do it; it does mean, however, that it Ought to "Be", and unconditionally - irrespective of its actuality or even of its possibility.

"The Being of values, as ideal, is indifferent to real Being and Non-Being'. Their ideal Ought-to-Be subsists independently of the reality and unreality of their matter. And, again, their ideal Being is also not indifferent to real Being and Non-Being. The ideal Ought-to-Be includes the tendency towards reality; it sanctions reality when it exists, and intends it when it does not. It transcends ideality.

"This antinomy inheres in the essence of values themselves. It announces the inadequacy of the ontological modalities for their peculiar kind of Being; it is an exact expression of their essence as principles which are ideal and yet are at the same time drawn towards reality. This double nature is the ideal Ought-to-Be in them:

it is the ideal of their being directed to the sphere of the real, the idea of their categorical transcendence and of their breaking forth out of the ideal into the real.

"In this sense value and the ideal Ought-to-Be are indissolubly bound together. They are not on that account identical. The Ought signifies direction towards something, the value signifies the something itself to which the direction points. The goal conditions the direction, but the direction towards it conditions the mode of being of the goal. Value and the ideal Ought-to-Be stand in strict correlation, in reciprocal conditionality. The ideal Ought-to-Be is the mode of being of valuewhich is never lost in the skam structure of the matter. But value is the content of the Ought; it is the categorical structure, the existential mode of which is that of the ideal Ought-to-Be.....". The correlation is balanced, not like substance and attribute, but like substance and relation. On neither side is there a greater weight. The relation is stable,poised"(21) .

After his exposition of the nature of ideal 'ought-to-Be' Hartmann distinguishes it from both the 'positive ought to be' and (the ought to do'. "The positive Ought-to-Be", says Hartmann, "..... occurs where the ideal finds itself in opposition to reality, where self-existent values are unreal.

"This kind of Ought adheres to the structural non-agreement of the sphere, to the tension between them. The tension is precisely the actuality. For the real is indeed indifferent to the disparateness of the ideal as such; it has in itself..... no tendency towards it : but the ideal is not indifferent to the real; in it something presses beyond its own sphere into the real - irrespective of the possibility and impossibility of actualization. Nevertheless, the ~~positiv~~ positive Ought-to-Be '.....' is '.... fundamentally distinct from the ideal Ought-to-Be; it does not adhere to value as

such, it is added thereto. In the positive Ought-to-Be, for example, the ideal Ought-to-Be of the value is only one element; the other and equally essential factor in it is the opposition of the spheres. It therefore stands midway between the ideal Ought-to-Be and the Ought-to-Do proper.

"The positive Ought-to-Be accordingly presupposes in a given situation the Non-Being of what ought to be. Hence it is only possible within a real self-existent world - that is, it presupposes this real self-existent world, together with its real determinations which deviate from the constitution of what ought to be. It has, as condition, the whole ontological system. First, against this, in its isolation and indifference to values in general, the positive Ought-to-Be is contrasted in its own kind of Being, as something unfulfilled. For the fulfilment can take placeonly in exactly this real, indifferent, self-contained world. But the disparateness and the resistance first make what-ought-to-be non-existent and thereby make the Ought-to-Be positive" (22).

Hartmann also distinguishes the Ought-to-Do which is pre-eminently ethical from both the ideal Ought-to-Be and the positive Ought-to-Be. The ideal Ought-to-Be is different from the Ought-to-Do because the "Ought-to-Do is always conditioned by Ought-to-Be, but Ought-to-Do is not attached to every Ought-to-Be. I ought to do what ought to be, in so far as it "is" not, and in so far as to make it actual is in my power. This double "in so far as" separates these two kinds of ought. Between goods and moral qualities there is in this respect no difference. The ideal Ought-to-Be inheres necessarily in them, but Ought-to-Do does not" (23). The positive Ought-to-Be is not Ought-to-Do, "for not everything that is not, but ought to be, comes into the domain of striving" (24).

The positive Ought-to-Be, according to Hartmann,

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issues or originates in the ideal realm," but extends into the real; and in so far as it is a determining factor there, its activity is a real creating, a bringing forth" (25).

"If, now, the positive Ought-to-Be makes itself so effective in the real.... if it penetrates into the blind process of the cosmos, there must be in the existent a point of support for the Ought,.....the Archimedian point at which an ideal power can move the real and itself become a real power.

"In the stream of real existence,.....there must be a point of support, upon which Ought-to-Be impinges.... In short, there must be a real self-existent which can serve as the originating point of real tendency in the stream of Being; there must be a form capable of intent in the midst of blind events, itself brought forth and borne along by them and yet, amidst them, powerful in self-activity".(26)

"The subject is such a pole of the positive Ought-to-Be in the realm of the real.

" The subject - not as metaphysical subject in general, but as empirical, actual, just as we know it in man - fulfils in every particular the specific conditions. And indeed only the subject does this. In this he stands alone He is a real existent among others. He is wholly under the laws of actuality, shares in its comings and goings, and is at the same time different from every other being - by virtue of his inner world, consciousness, which has its own code of laws. He is the metaphysical connection with the world of values, he senses their ideal self-existence. And he possesses spontaneous self-activity, capacity to direct events. The subject is the only real entity in which the positive Ought-to-Be can be transformed into a real tendency.

"The metaphysic of the Ought is exactly this, that in its unfoldment in real existence, in its actuality it is necessarily directed to a real subject In so far as the Ought enters into Being, and in so far as the positive

Ought-to-Be becomes an existent, it can be this only as it ~~at~~ at the same time seizes hold of something already existent, and points it to that to which its own direction points. It seizes upon the subject. For this alone permits of being grasped hold of by the ideal power of values. The rest of existence is dull and dead to the call of the ideal. It does not "hear" it, it lacks intuitive rationality" (27). "Unlike the categories the positive Ought-to-Be could determine nothing at all unless there were an entity with a capacity for directing events, the direction of which could be guided towards its own aims (the valuational matter) and to which it could communicate its own purely ideal tendency. The Ought has no existential energy emanating from itself; it needs something else which offers to it its own existential energy to be directed by the ~~the~~ Ought. The Ought needs this alien energy of an existing entity, because the entity thrusts its ontological determination against the resistance OF the real" (28).

"As regards the Ought, consciousness is not a knowing but !..... a doing !.....only an active subject - that is, one capable of independent action - can be immediately determined by the Ought in the direction of further determination of an object. The real determination has the form of action, doing, conduct, and so far as it is merely inward, that of a mental attitude, a disposition, a tendency. Here the Ought-to-Be of the object is transformed into the Ought-to-Do of the subject" (29).

"In a certain way the positive Ought-to-Be determines only "at second hand"..... !. Moral subject is the administrator of the Ought in the world of real existence. He is not an absolutely faithful administrator of this metaphysical good; he can betray it. Whether he recognizes the positive Ought-to-Be as for him a universally valid Ought-to-Do, and whether he then commits himself to it

with his whole might, always rests with him the determining power of the ought Cught depends upon an intermediate element which it does not itself dominate, and, whenever it recognizes the demand of the Cught, has ~~the~~ the freedom to follow or not to follow" (30). Thus we find that the positive Cught-to-Be, according to Hartmann, is not the unchecked determinant of the real world because it can dominate the real world only indirectly through the moral subject whom who can sense the ought and feel the demand or claim imposed by the value but possesses the liberty to fulfil or not to fulfil the demand. When the moral subject decides to fulfil the demand of the value, i.e., when he transforms the positive Cught-to-Be into Cught-to-Do, he anticipates the value, i.e., he sets up the value as the end to be actualized and strives to actualise it by procuring proper means and in his very decision to actualise the value, the moral value of the decision is realized and the subject himself is transformed into personality. Thus Hartmann says, "The existential determination issuing from values does not pass through the subject without modifying him. It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind - personality, which is as much a categorial novelty as it is a valuational mark. A moral subject, who of ~~xxx~~ all real entities stands alone en rapport with the ideal world of values and who alone has the metaphysical tendency to communicate them to reality which lacks them - only such a subject is a "person". The essence of personality, for instance, does not attach to the ~~xxx~~ acts which the subject brings to the service of the values. Neither the discernment of values nor the activity, the setting up of an end, the will, transforms the subject into a person.

There are two special element - both distinctively ethical - which contribute the decisive mark. But both refer to the relation of the subject to the values.

"One is this : that the values do not coerce the subject, but, even when they are discerned, impose only a claim upon him, while leaving him free. The fact, therefore, that it is in his power to take hold on ~~the~~ value or not / and to place his own acts in its service or not gives him a kind of equality with the great metaphysical powers of existence - ideal as well as real - at least in principle: in this way he is an independent factor, a proper ultimate of existence along with these other powers. It is this which has been called moral freedom. A personal entity is a "free" entity. It contains its own principle, its own autonomy - together with the autonomy of nature which is in it and the autonomy of values which is also in it.

"But the second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which the subject retains in his acts. These are not identical with those found in the object of acts. Moral values do not inhere in the ends, as such, which are set up, but in the acts directed towards them, ~~AND~~ and ultimately in the subject of the acts. They have indeed in themselves ~~and~~ an Ought-to-Be, ideal as well as actual, but never directly an Ought-to-Do. They can and should determine the choice of ends, but they do not furnish the matter of the ends.

"Action, will, disposition - even up to the innermost and purely emotional attitude of mind - are the carriers of moral values proper; and thereby the subject can come ~~into~~ into consideration. These values are "relative" to the person as their carrier. For as their carrier the subject is a "person". However different these values may be from those which constitute the matter of the will and

the content ends, they stand in closest relation with them; for exactly that conduct has moral value which is a commitment of the person to ends directed and selected by the moral feeling for values.... The subject himself sets up his ends. There are always two acts disposed one after the other and equally transcendent; the act which initiates and that which executes. And each independently of the other has range of freedom. For each the person is accounted responsible..... And this means that he is the carrier of the whole differentiated scale moral values and disvalues. Only in a personal subject as a responsible and accountable being can these inhere" (31).

Thus moral value, according to Hartmann, is the value of choice of end and not the value of the end chosen. In other words, moral value is the value of intention and not the intended value; it is the value of aiming at and not the value we aim at. Hence moral value does not admit of being transformed into the end aimed at, i.e., the Ought-to-Be of moral value is incapable of being transformed into the Ought-to-Do of the subject.

Values, according to Hartmann, are universal and necessary. But the necessity of the Ought and consequently of the value is different from ontological necessity. Considered ontologically, necessity is inseparable from possibility, and actuality is nothing but the quipoise of necessity and possibility. Ontologically, says Hartmann, "actuality, however, is constituted of possibility and necessity. The actual must be at least ontologically possible.....". In the strict sense a thing is "really possible", only when the whole series (of condition) is at hand, down to the last member. On the other side, however, it is then not only possible, but also necessary, that is, it can no longer fail to appear. It could fail to appear, so long as

at least one condition in the series was lacking. If that also were added, nothing more could prevent the real actuality. But exactly this inevitability is ontological necessity. The consequence is this : all that is ontologically possible is precisely thereby ontologically necessary also. Hence, in so far as only the possible can be actual, everything actual must at the same time be ontologically necessary" necessary" (32) †.

But necessity is inseparable from possibility only in the sphere of ontology. Beyond this sphere they are separable. Hence in the sphere of values they are separable and as matter of fact are separate or detached. Thus Hartmann says, "possibility and necessity are bound indissolubly together within the actual; but in themselves they are not inseparable. At the boundaries of the actual they fall apart. But in the positive Ought-to-Be the boundary of the actual is transcended" (33) †. The necessity which inheres in the mode of existence of ought to be and of value "is a necessity which is "absolute" (literally: detached), free, bound to nothing outside of itself.

"Now this absolute necessity lends to values their characteristic universality as regards validity - they being valid for every case, even for those which violate them - a universality which holds even in specialization, the individuality, of content (where only one case comes into consideration) and which perdures unabated, rigorous, inaccessible to every compromise, even in the tragedy of life's conflict" (34) †.

Values, according to Hartmann, can be actualised only if the positive ought to be can seize hold of such a natural being who has the capacity of directing events. What does this capacity to direct events mean? It means,

according to Hartmann, that the moral subject who discerns value can choose to realize the discerned value and so can set it up as an end to be realized. Now what does this process of setting up an end mean? This setting up of an end means, Hartmann holds, a process which is not casual but teleological or finalistic; and this teleology makes man a teleological being without prejudicing his status as an ontological being. As a teleological process it is a process of ends and means and the relation between the end and the mean is different from that of cause and effect. "The connection between the beginning and the final stage is threefold : first, by an over-leaping of the time process the end is set up; secondly, from the end backwards against the course of time the series of means is determined; and, thirdly, starting with the first means, through the same series the end is actualised [...]. The third kind of connection between beginning and goal, the actualization [...] is in a forward direction, a casual course, in which the series of means functions as a series of causes [...] only the second kind of connection is of prime importance, the backward - running determination of the means, starting with the end. This constitutes the distinctive categorical novelty in the finalistic nexus" (35). Of these three stages of actualization, the first two being the reverse of casual process certainly cannot take place in real casually determined world which runs with the flow of time and not against it. Hence they take place in the ideal sphere. Only the third takes place in the real world; and this third process moves in line with the casual process.

Values, according to Hartmann, admit of gradation, i.e., they admit of scaling. How is this gradation known? This objective absolute gradation of value is known, according to Hartmann, by the self-same consciousness which discerns or beholds values. "Immediately", says Hartmann, "with the feeling for the value there must be a feeling for its ~~place~~ place in the scale" (36). And "every ~~morally~~ morally ~~selective~~ selective consciousness of values is necessarily a consciousness of the scale of value" (37). Thus Hartmann rejects Scheler's five fold criteria of the grade of values, viz., (1) super-temporality, (2) indivisibility, (3) dependence, (4) depth of satisfaction, and (5) degree of axiological absoluteness, and he accepts Hildebrand's theory of specific valuational response¹. In Hartmann's opinion except the depth of satisfaction Scheler's four other distinguishing marks are very crude and consequently they do not and cannot make visible the finer differences of grade within the classes and groups which are essential for ethics. Further the depth of satisfaction is, though necessary, not sufficient, because satisfaction varies not only quantitatively but also qualitatively and the difference of kind ~~regarding~~ regarding satisfaction, besides the difference in degree, is also required for a finer perception (38)². Hence the rejection of Scheler's five-fold criteria of grade and acceptance of ~~Wid~~ Hildebrand's theory specific valuational response by Hartmann. According to Hildebrand, "for each value there is one, and only one, attitude corresponding to its nature, only one emotional reaction, the response suited to it ... ¹. The appropriateness of a specific response to a specific value can by no means be transposed at will ... ¹. The connection between a mental attitude and a value is something fixed in the nature of things. And, indeed, this constant conformity holds in regard to

negative as well as positive values; also to every disvalue disvalue a specific kind of attitude corresponds, both as regards quantity and quality (39)'. Hildebrand's theory, correctly understood, furnishes us, holds Hartmann, "with a basis for the phenomenology of grades in a scale of values, and not only for the larger intervals in a whole group, but for the finer and often inponderable gradations of moral values among themselves ...'. Hildebrand himself has not elaborated his thought in this direction. But it must permit of being done. Here is a definite task in ethical investigation which needs developing" (40). This task, according to Hartmann, finds an illustration in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The series of virtues as developed by Aristotle "is evidently graduated according to rank in a moral scale ...'. A plain indication of this gradation is the differentiation of the valuation predicates, which Aristotle applies to the single virtues" (41). These virtues and the corresponding negative predicates admit of being arranged in an ascending series. "Behind these predicates", Hartmann holds, "as the word show, is hidden a graduated series, quantitative and qualitative, of acts which assign or withhold values ...'. Here is unmistakably a double gradation of emotional reactions, that is, of valuational responses" (42). In this respect Aristotle's procedure is more instructive than that of Scheler. For unlike Scheler's, Aristotle's "differentiation of grades concerns not only general outlines but finer shades among moral values" (43). Of course Aristotle's procedure is not perfect nor his table of values exhaustive. But these defects are understandable and to an extent excusable. No first historical attempt is perfect. "Yet the attempt", Hartmann continues, "is a model for us. For in so far as the problem can be surveyed today, there is no other possible way of finding out the

differences in the scale of values. Differences of response and the difference of predicates which runs parallel with it constitute the only means of access" (44). When the inner ground of this phenomenon is enquired into it is found that "the predicate and the response are ultimately only outward manifestations of an existing inner connection between grade and the kind of valuational feeling". In other words, the feeling of relation of height among values must adhere to the primal feeling for value in such a way that when two values are given the height of each is given. Indeed, it follows that a consciousness limited to one single value is only an abstraction, and that in all concrete feeling the sense of height in a scale of values is primary" (45).

Now that we do prefer value and that decisive act of preference is made between value and value are phenomena which cannot be gainsaid. But it is also a fact of experience that our preference is not always infallible. Does not this fallibility of preference show a corresponding fallibility of the consciousness of gradation and thereby the subjectivity of gradation itself? To this question Hartmann replies in the negative. According to Hartmann, "the historically and individually variable notion of the gradation, for instance, its subjective relativity, in no way contradicts its objective absoluteness. From the limitation it follows that the gradational relations are also discerned only in a fragmentary way, and that, at any given time, what is accounted higher within the discerned fragment is seen to be higher. With a wider outlook it can be discovered to be lower in the scale. That the criticism, which is passed upon a subjectively valid gradation, is generally a thoughtful beginning,

implies the existence of an objective independent gradation. The historical relativity of valuational appreciations is not a disproof, but on the contrary a confirmation, of its existence " (45)).

Since the consciousness of value as well as the consciousness of the gradation holds Hartmann, are aware of their respective objects only in a g fragmentary way, the best way to arrive at a tentative formulation of the dimension or dimensions of the gradation of value is to go analytically through the values discovered by the current systems of morals of different times and different civilizations as well as the values discovered by the different individuals. Following this procedure Hartmann finds a group of values which are disclosed by the analysis of value and Ought. The distinguishing marks of this group of values are (1) elementariness and generality, (2) poverty of content and low grade of its values, and (3) existence of polarity or opposition not only between value and disvalue but also and pre-eminently between value and value. Values of this group are borderline - values, i.e., they appear on the boundary line running between the sphere of ontology and that of axiology. In respect of the polarity or opposition between value and value of this group Hartmann notes that this particular group of values exhibits, in the first place, an ideal valuational space with more than one dimension, and, in the second place, unsought reappearance of the traditional categorial oppositions in contrasted pairs - quantity, quality, relation and modality - although with a different degree of distinctness, and that this unsought reappearance of ontological oppositions makes this group thoroughly antinomic in character (47)). Hartmann divides this group of values into three sub-groups, viz., (1) Modally opposite values, (2) Relationally opposite values, and (3) Quantita-

tively and qualitatively opposite values. The first sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of Necessity and Freedom, and (b) the antinomic values of the Real Being and Non-Being of Values. The second sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of ~~carrier~~ carrier of values as subject as well as object, as both the intention and the intended object at the same time, (b) the antinomic ~~values~~ values of activity and inertia, (c) the antinomic values of one-sided augmentation of a single value (or of a few which are closely related) and a many-sided adjustment of various values at the same time, (d) the antinomic values of harmony and conflict, and (e) simplicity and complexity. The third sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of Universality and Singularity, (b) the antinomic values of comprehensiveness and Universality, Individuality and the Individual (the opposition or contrast of these values is quantitative opposition), (c) the contrasted values of Collective Unity and the Individual (this valuational opposition is not antinomic in character when it is in the ideal sphere but it becomes so in ethical reality where each becomes tyrannical and claims absolute authority and demands the subordination of the other to itself), (d) the antinomic values of Intermediate Members - the Smaller Community and the Political Party, (e) the antinomic values of Humanity and Nation (48). After his analysis of the first group of values Hartmann takes up the second group of ~~values~~ values. The distinguishing marks of this group are (1) concreteness and fulness of content, (2) conditioning the content, (3) mediatory in function in the realization of values, (4) polarity or opposition between value and disvalue and not between value and value; and consequently, the binding line of value and disvalue is always an ascending one from the negative to the positive through the

indifference-point and (5) values of actional sphere, i.e., adhere pre-eminently to the personal subject. Along with this group of values there is another group of values conditioning the content of moral values by furnishing the material basis, i.e., allowing their ought-to-be to be transformed into ought-to-do of the subject, but which do not adhere to the subject and thus are not discoverable from the analysis of the subject. The first group of values constitutes the ~~2 usque~~ valuational foundation or basis of moral values in the subject and thus is pre-eminently actional in character while the second group of values constitutes the valuational foundation of moral values in the object and consequently is ~~predominantly~~ predominantly situational in character. The first group, viz., the group comprising the foundational values in the subject, ~~constabs~~ contains the following values with their corresponding dis-values : (a) Life as value (and death as corresponding dis-value), (b) Consciousness as a value, (c) Activity as value, (d) Suffering as a value, (e) Strength as a value, (f) Freedom of the will as a value, (g) Foresight as a value, (h) Purposive Efficiency as a value. The second group of values, viz., the good - values of material things and situations constituting the valuational foundation of moral values in the ~~subject~~ object, contains the following values : (a) Existence as a value, (b) Situation as a value, (c) Power as a value, (d) Happiness as a value, (e) More special classes of Goods as Values, e.g., material goods such as material property, and material goods such as language, Knowledge, education, etc., (49) f.

After his analysis and discussion of the values of first two groups, viz., the group of the borderline values and the group of values constituting the valuational foun-

dations of moral values in the subject and in the object respectively, Hartmann takes into account the case of moral values and classifies them into four groups, viz., (1) The group of Fundamental Moral values in which the "good" forms the core and the values in this group are common to many very different kinds of behaviour and in no way characterize one special kind only, (2) The group of values discovered by ancient systems of morals in Greece and Rome, (3) The group of values discovered by Christianity, and (4) The group of values discerned in modern times. These moral values are arrived at not by analysis of the categorial structure of the value and the Ought but by a historico-empirical investigation of values (50). The first group, viz., the group of Fundamental Moral Values contains (a) Noble mindedness as a value, (b) Richness of Experience as a value, and (c) Purity as a value. Goodness forms the core of all the values of this group, i.e., they are good and as such are valuable; and also they are very pervasive because they characterise a good number of behaviours which are completely different in kind. The second group, viz., the group of Moral values discovered by Greco-Roman systems of Morals contains (a) Justice, (b) Wisdom, (c) Courage, (d) Self-control, and (e) Aristotelian list of virtues as propounded in the Theory of Golden Mean. The third group, viz., the moral values discovered by Christian Ethics contains (a) Brotherly Love, (b) Truthfulness and Uprightness, (c) Trustworthiness and Fidelity, (d) Trust and Faith, (e) Modesty, Humility and Aloofness, and (f) the values of Social Intercourse. The fourth group, viz., the group of moral values discovered in modern times contains (a) Love of Remote, (b) Radiant Virtue, (c) Personality, and (d) Personal Love (51) †.

At the end of his historico-empirical survey of ~~max~~ moral values Hartmann concludes that this incomplete survey does not warrant even the formulation of mere "theory concerning a tabulation of values"(52)¹. But this survey is not completely valueless on that account¹. It definitely furnishes within the narrower class of moral values certain differences of grade¹. Thus, for example, brotherly love is evidently higher in value than justice, love for the remotest higher than brotherly love, and personal love (as it appears) higher than either¹. Likewise bravery stands higher than self-control, faith and fidelity higher than bravery, radiant virtues and personality again higher than these¹. But it is more difficult to say how, for example, truthfulness, wisdom and faith stand to one another in relative height; it is the same with the basic motives running through all the more special values, such as universality and individuality, likewise purity and fulness of life, pride and humility, and so on (53)¹. Thus the historico-empirical survey of ethical values (comprising both the moral value and values which are non-moral but morally relevant, e.g., actional value or situational value) does not help us to find the order or orders of the gradation of values and we should seek it elsewhere¹.

But where can the order or orders of gradation of values be found? This order can be found, holds Hartmann, if we take into consideration simultaneously the height of the value when realized with the corresponding strength of the disvalue when the value is transgressed or violated¹. In that case we can at once see that the higher the height of the merit of realization of value the less serious is its transgression or violation¹. Hence Hartmann says, "if one glances along any one such line of ascent in ~~ht~~ height and of ~~descent~~ descent in strength, the inference is unavoidable that

throughout realm of values two equally important orders of gradation hold sway and that w two opposed laws of preference correspond to them " (54)". But neither these two orders nor their respective preferences are identical. The ascent in strength is inversely related to the ascent in height. Yet the two orders are not absolutely unrelated. As a matter of fact "one may say that the order of rank in values is itself twofold - or is two-sided and has two meanings. For since ascent in strength is in the opposite direction to ascent in height, the orderly sequence as such remains one throughout" (55)". Hence arises the question : How are these two orders related? In reply to this question Hartmann says, "the law of height and of strengthis a fundamental categorical law, which prevails ontologically in all ideal and real Being and thence extends over the realm of values; but in this extension it gains a new meaning. It is therefore necessary to look to the realm of categories, and to ask how far its laws recur in the domain of values and are transformed or replaced by a new kind of regularity" (56)". There are three laws and they concern not the structure of the categorial edifice but the dynamic dependence. Hence they are the laws of dependence. They are the following :-

"1. The law of strength : higher principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse is not true. Hence the higher principles is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this sense the weaker. But the more unconditioned, the more elementary and in this sense the stronger principle is always the lower one. In the abstract, the inversion of this relationship is quite conceivable, but is never to be seen in the reality of principles.

2. The Law of Material : every lower principle is only raw material for the higher which is raised upon it.

Now since lower is the stronger, the dependence of the weaker upon it goes only so far as the scope of the higher formation is limited by the definiteness and peculiarity of the material.

3. The law of Freedom : compared with the lower every higher principle is a new formation with which is raised upon it. As such it has unlimited scope above the lower (the material and the stronger) fixity. This means that in spite of dependence upon the lower principle the higher is free, as against the lower" (57).

Now these laws of dependence are the basic laws of categories. As a matter of fact there is only one basic categorial law law of dependence, viz., the law of strength, the other two are merely corollary. But this basic or fundamental law of categories, when introduced in the realm of values, is transformed in respect of its significance or meaning. Thus Hartmann says, "now the basic categorial law, carried over into the table of values, substantiates this - and it is the wholly new meaning which it acquires in the realm of values - in the fulfilment of a value the merit increases not directly in proportion to the grievousness of violating it, but indirectly. When the higher value is violated, the transgression is less, not more serious; but when the stronger value is fulfilled, the meritoriousness is not greater but less" (58). But are the height or the strength of the value sensed? "A clear answer", says Hartmann, "can be given. If the clue to height is the assenting sense, as it expresses itself in specific responses and predicates (approval, acceptance, respect, admiration, enthusiasm), so the clue to strength lies in the negative, the rejecting sense, as it asserts itself wherever values are violated. Strength is distinguishable by the corresponding disvalues. The rejecting sense also has its specific responses and predicates.

They are reactions to disvalues" (59). The law of preference of higher value, being related to the assenting sense which discovers the height of value, is different from that of lower values which is related to the rejecting sense discovering the strength of values. Preference to higher values refers to the actualization of values while that of lower values refers to the avoidance of disvalues.

The order of rank of values is two-fold. But the ascent in height being in opposite direction to ascent in strength, the orderly sequence remains one throughout. "But it is bi-polar, and poles contend for mastery. But the kind of mastery of the one is essentially different from that of the other Thus it comes about that two kinds of mastery can co-exist in one ordered sequence" (60). But this two-fold gradation of values has an essential bearing on morality. "Morality does not subsist in values as such. Values have their ideal self-existence, independently of their actualization. But morality is their actualization in man, hence actual man's relation to them. And this relation, corresponding to the double meaning of the ordered gradation, is two fold with a two-fold Ought, a two-fold requirement: not to violate the lower value and at the same time to actualize the higher (61) .

"The actualization of values", according to Hartmann, "is a function of the personal initiative" (62), and the fiat or the initiative of the person by means of which the person solves insoluble conflict of values is the strongest proof that the "actual will of the actual person must be free" (63). And this "freedom is a fundamental condition of the possibility of all moral phenomena The whole significance of morality is abolished, if freedom be proved to be an illusion" (64). As regards the nature of moral freedom Hartmann makes the following observations. In the first

place, "freedom cannot consist in negative indifference, but only in a positive determinateness of a unique order, in a determination peculiar to the will itself, in an autonomy of the will" (65). Secondly, "the determining factor must not lie outside of the subject (or person) hence not even in the values or any other autonomous principles" (66). Thirdly, "The determining factor must also not be set indefinitely deep in the subject, but only in the conscious stratum; otherwise there is no moral freedom" (67). Fourthly, "the determining factor must also not be assumed to inhere in a consciousness that is super-individual otherwise it is not freedom of the person there must be a freedom of the individual conscious will" (68). Fifthly, "there must be freedom in two senses ; not only freedom over against the regularity of nature but equally there must be freedom over against the moral principles" (69). Lastly, "the freedom of the will is a metaphysical question metaphysical truths can be neither proved nor disproved. Nevertheless they can be discussed as problems" (70) and the only type of argument the use of which is justifiable for the discussion of problem of the freedom of the will is neither the empirico-descriptive argument nor the purely aprioristic argument but the analytical argument which has the "form of an inference from the conditioned to the condition" (71) and which "attains only a hypothetical certainty" (72). In analytical reasoning "aprioristic and empirical elements are fused. The points of departure have the character of demonstrable phenomena; as such, they have the value of facts. But the connections between these and the conclusion are of an aprioristic nature" (73). And in the analytical reasoning for the freedom of the will the following complex facts of moral life constitute the "points of departure : the the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and accountability, and the consciousness of

guilt. These are supplemented by two further factors : the dependence of moral values upon freedom and the oppositional relation of the Ought to the will, or the nature of moral conflict" (74).



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