

## *Preface*

It is now a recognized philosophical conviction that language matters to philosophy because philosophical problems are in some sense or other linguistic in nature. Language indeed matters to philosophy because language reveals reality or ontology for us. This conviction did not last long even in the family of linguistic philosophers. Linguistic philosophers after the appearance of linguistic turn have detected a few shortcomings in natural language and accordingly they proposed linguistic revision of ordinary or natural language. Linguistic philosophers, particularly semantists, advocated in favour of ideal language. Thus, there we witness *division of labour* in language. According to them every form of language cannot perform the same job. They revealed that only proper names can be the suitable vocabularies for making the relationship between language and reality. As a result they have advocated in favour of proper names as the minimum vocabularies of ideal language- i.e, a kind of formalized language that would be adequate in revealing the relationship between language and reality. In this way proper names, as such, has been a matter to philosophy.

In this thesis attempt has been made to make a comparative study among Mill, Russell and Frege regarding their views about proper names. We do not think that Mill was a linguistic philosopher. But interestingly, Mill in his book *A System of Logic* had outlined the theory of proper names from which the later and contemporary theory of proper names has been developed. In fact, it was Russell and Frege, the two great classical thinkers of proper names, who took the help

from Mill. Russell developed his realist theory of proper names as well as his description theory of proper names by borrowing clues from Mill. Equally, Frege developed his descriptive theory of proper names by taking philosophical clues from Mill's theory of proper names. In this sense we can say that in the real sense of the term Mill actually ingrained the clues of the contemporary literature of the theory of proper names. Thus a comparative study among Mill, Russell and Frege is philosophically worthy.

The New Theory of Proper Names which indeed is the contention of present day linguistic philosophers is directly linked with the classical theory of proper names as developed by Mill, Russell and Frege. In fact, Searle's cluster theory of proper names is further an extension of Frege's descriptive theory of proper names. Again, the New Theory of Proper Names as developed by Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan and Marcus is a further extension of Russell's realist theory of proper names. Like Russell, the proponents of the New Theory of Reference just stated above have emphasized on the no sense theory of proper names. Again like Russell, they have nullified referential failure in proper names. However, the New Theory of Proper Names is a further extension of Russell's realist theory of proper names in the sense that they have introduced modal necessity by introducing the concept of possible-world. In this way they have established that proper names, in the true sense of the term, are rigid designators. Thus, unlike Russell and Wittgenstein, philosophers such as Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan and Marcus have established proper names as rigid designators by bring the concept of modal necessity. Having said they, they, in some sense or other, bring back epistemic relevance. We think that the concept of

**Natural kind terms of Putnam does not forfeit epistemic relevance.  
Natural kind terms, such as, 'gold', 'tiger', etc., has causal relevance  
and developed on the basis of historicity and baptismal ceremony.**