

Introduction

An appraisal of Indo-Sikkim relation, a study in Regional Subsystem, is undertaken by us; for India's relation with the Himalayan States vis-a-vis her relationship with the Communist China is geopolitically a very relevant if not a contingent issue. Though in all appearances, the Indo-Sikkim relation, Sikkim being a protectorate of India, is not precisely pertaining to the arena of Regional Subsystem study. Yet this doctrinaire interpretation apart, it has a value of its own. India, faced with Chinese threat, coupled with an alleged trans-Himalayan-Confederation between Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, as a matter of course, tends to have moved to meet the Chinese designs of thwarting the present state of power balance on the Himalayan crescent. It engendered in her an effort to forge links with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan such as they were before India achieved independence. The difference, of course, is there. Britain treated them from the privileged position of a Paramount Power while independent India could treat them as a friend and not a master.

Sino-Indian relationship after an apotheosis of mutual fraternity and promise of communal fidelity (Bandung Conference), founded in 1962 on the rock of reality. A phlegmatic India, ^{that} suddenly awakened from dreams could do but little to collect herself. The discredited leadership in the presence of a hostile public opinion and pungent press criticism, apologetically defended its conduct and

^{swore} ~~swore~~ to be more worldly-wise in its deals with the neighbours than it had been so. The pretence of 'neutrality' a 'cliche' chosen by Nehru, though retained by peripheral complacency, ~~was~~ ^{was} undoubtedly questioned in 'elite' congregations and a more realistic, fruit-bearing policy was at long last effectuated.

In view of this changed political circumstances and emergence of an Indian foreign policy co-eval with that, a fresh look, in all respects, towards Indo-Sikkim relation appears to have been felt necessary in all quarters.

II

Sikkim, a tiny Himalayan state with a ^{an} area of 2,818¹ square miles and situated in between 86°-90° Lat. and 25°-30° Long., is of great strategic importance between India and Tibet. Some very important mountain passes i.e., Tangkar La, Nathula and Jelep La either originate from or open into Sikkim, and they facilitate the transportation of ideology from across the border as much as of Tibetan refugees and wool and fur. A two hundred thousand population is, in reality, capable of containing neither the march of ideas nor the partisans. Being militarily weak and politically inassertive, Sikkim, ever since India and China quarrelled and broke off, was, for self-protection, having had a tight rope walk. She made it a point neither to arrogate any right not mentioned in the Treaty (1950) with India, nor to cause any annoyance to China. But her own economic aspirations together with a desire to have more status in the

Comity of Nations, are certain salient features of modern Sikkim that led the Sikkimese to review their conduct with India. India's economic, technical and administrative assistance though ^{had} helped her to achieve a Rs. 750 (seven hundred and fifty) per capita annual income, better road links and security on the fronts; but nothing the Sikkimese consider, is more important than the achievement of a state-hood.

The entire gamut of group relationship between India and Sikkim steadily proceeded through phases of Sikkimese constant awareness of individuality, aspiration for self-containment and India assisting with money and technical know-how until when a political up-heaval inside Sikkim, threw all old conditions over board and gave birth to a new set.

The trouble started with the arrest of a leader of an opposition party². The opposition parties demanded his release, and as the Chogyal refused to comply, they started with a movement, which, in fact, aimed at realising a number of rights and privileges besides seeking release of the leader. On 4th April, 1973, the entire Nepali community of Sikkim rose in rebellion under the leadership of Kazi Lendhup Dorji, a Tibetan by origin, and Chairman of the Joint Action Council. They aimed at realising a fair election on 'one man one vote' basis, parity in the Council, land reforms and a democratic constitution. When the law and order situation in Sikkim deteriorated and the rebels seized the countryside, the Chogyal sought

Indian assistance by referring to Article III(I) of the Indo-Sikkim Treaty signed in 1950³. India did not intervene till when the Joint Action Council made a similar request, and a contingent of Indian Army, which ~~was~~^{was} already there to defend Sikkim-Tibet border, moved down and helped the local administration to bring law and order condition back to normal.

Events followed events in Sikkim in quick pace, so much so, that on 8th April, the Government of India, after having received a request from the Chogyal⁴, took over the administration of Sikkim. This request from the Chogyal, in fact, coincided with a similar request made by the President of the Joint Action Council, Kesi Lendhup Dorji, who in a representation to Mrs Gandhi on 9th April, 1973, said, "we have no faith in the Chogyal and his maladministration. Now, we will not rest content till the Government of India takes over the Government of Sikkim"⁵. To end this impasse, a tripartite agreement was signed on 8th May, 1973, to ensure the Sikkim people of their rights and privileges⁶.

This incident of a popular upsurge against the rule of the Chogyal is, in no case, a unique event in the political history of modern Sikkim. It has climaxed the long sequel of movements that were launched by the Sikkim State Congress for political and economic reforms ever since it was born in 1947. The first movement it organised was in the general meeting of the Congress held in 1947 where the following resolutions were passed after a careful deliberation: (a) Abolition of landlordism, (b) Formation of an Interim

Government as a necessary precursor to the democratic and responsible form of Government to come and (e) Accession of Sikkim to Indian Union⁷. The leaders of the newly formed Sikkim State Congress, partly due to inexperience, partly because of people's disconcert to any political change, adapted a policy of constitutional movement. Sri Tashi Tsering, the Congress leader, even went to New Delhi to see Prime Minister Nehru and Dr. B.V.Keskar and apprised them of the popular demand. After that, following summons being issued against Sri Tashi Tsering and twenty other important members on 7th February, 1949, for defying the Government Notification, while making non-rent campaign, a Satyagraha movement was launched. Though the leaders were released, as a consequence, the anger of the people however did not abate, and the reformists demanded a popular government instead of the one man rule of the Chogyal. The Tashi ministry, that came into power as a result, could last but for twenty nine days only. Because the Chogyal did never agree to reforms which the Tashi ministry proposed to undertake, the conflict between the Chogyal and the People's representatives led to Indian intervention, and the Political Officer, Sri H. Dayal took over the administration on 7th June, 1949, at the instance of Sir T. Hangyal, pending the appointment of a Dewan. It was followed by the Indo-Sikkim Treaty in 1950, which is the most important document of Indo-Sikkim relation. The outwitted politicians, after having smarted, met again in a joint convention held at Malli, on the 23rd and 24th of September, 1950. Having deliberated over various questions pertaining to their rights and privileges, they adopted a resolution consisting of the following

points: (a) forming of a democratic constitution on the pattern of constitutional monarchy, (b) introduction of joint electorate with reservations to weaker communities, (c) establishment of full responsible government and (d) launching of Second Five Year Plan³.

Thus, the present incident is very much intertwined with the chain of popular movements that started long ago, and is not, in any case, sporadic.

So, the point is that a budding nationalism in Sikkim has emerged at a time when geopolitical considerations demand that India should guard Sikkim against external influence. These two points, since one does not exclude the other, indicate, in fact, that Indo-Sikkim relation, if it is to be durable, must be broad based, more realistic and time-oriented.

Our study in the following pages, centres round the proposition that if Sikkim and India, after having accepted their respective status vis-a-vis the other, could continue to¹⁹⁰ along for many years to come. It would be our effort to study (I) where, in what context they may differ, and (II) if, in view of the power politics on the Himalayan fronts and Sikkim's increasing aspiration for a statehood, they will fail to reach an accord. In a way, we propose to understand the precise nature of their relationship for one point and for another, it will tend to be an analysis of the parameters that count in such intra-state relationship. The second point of course,

is universally acclaimed now as relevant to the study of 'behaviour' and 'trends'. In order to gather data and process them, we propose to apply here the *heuristic* models of Hass and Hye, with certain modifications to fit in with our ends.

III

Works done on Sikkim after 1947 or on Indo-Sikkim relation, up till now, are mostly either travelogues or of the nature of personal observations. Any scientific study, if ever it was attempted, was done mostly on Anglo-Sikkim relation. The few works on the period of our study, are mostly completed in a perfunctory, half-done manner. The reason primarily is the dearth of materials.

Mr Hari Rustanji, a former Dewan of the Sikkim Govt.,^{Las} recently published a book entitled "Sikkim, Bhutan and India's North Eastern Border lands"³. Basically autobiographical in nature, the book contains a few chapters on Sikkim, where, he recorded his observations on Sikkim as its Dewan and with a sense of involvement. His opinions, all very closely guarded, on the nature of Sikkim's relationship with India, are though very few, yet interesting. Except stating that there were certain irritations in the realm of Indo-Sikkim relation because of the idiosyncrasy of one person or the other in New Delhi and that, how he helped removing them, the book, in fact,

left us very little conclusion. Charlotte T. Salisbury, wife of the noted American journalist, H. Salisbury, of late published "Mountain Top Kingdom of Sikkim"¹⁰, a book recording her observations on Sikkim's cultural milieu. The significance of the book, is of anthropological nature rather than historical or political. Profusely illustrated, the book answers the needs of those readers whose quest is limited to what the Sikkimese believe in, what kind of attire they put on or what their religious rites are, and so on, and the answers offered though interesting are prefatory in nature. Desmond Doig's book 'Sikkim'¹¹ published in 1973, is sketchy.

It is in the following books, we consider, that somewhat of a scholarly effort to piece together the modern history of Sikkim is made. Mostly research works, in these books, an attempt has been made to describe the precise nature of relationship between Sikkim and India. V.H. Coelho's book, "Sikkim and Bhutan"¹² from that stand point, is a nice piece of work. A former Indian Political Officer in Sikkim, Coelho traced, in his book, the details of Indo-Sikkim relation from the stand-still agreement signed in 1947. And his efforts- whatever it was- was indeed meant to better the Indo-Sikkim relation. Coelho for obvious political considerations, refused to mention any letter, mostly being classified, exchanged between the Chogyal and the Govt. of India. "Prelude to India"¹³, a study of India's relation with Himalayan States by Narendra Goel, treated in two chapters, Sikkim's past history and Indo-Sikkim relation. Goel's study, though

not very well documented, is precise and always purposive; for his conclusions, though not always logically derived from the premises, and therefore unwarranted, are everywhere valuational. Hence, the conclusions though not dependable yet are always indicative. "The Himalayan Kingdoms; Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal"¹⁴ of Praduna Karan and Jankin William. H. Jr, is in truth, a book of Himalayan geography. By way of stating the cartographical features, the authors related the past history of Sikkim and attempted to make a meaningful surmise of Indo-Sikkim relation since 1947. Though not straightway related to our study, Karan's book- a concise study-is basically a research work and thus their conclusions are ordinarily acceptable. P.R. Rao, of course, wrote a thesis on India's relationship with Sikkim and his book 'Indo-Sikkim Relation'¹⁵ is very well documented. Dr. Rao mostly concentrated on studying Sikkim's relationship with British India ~~but~~ his study of Indo-Sikkim relation since the stand-still agreement was signed, though not much elaborate, is nonetheless important.

IV

In our study of the 'behavioural patterns' and 'trends' it seems to us to be of much help if, instead of repeating the historical methodology over again, a system study paradigm is used and data, whatever is available, is computed accordingly. In the present state of our knowledge, we can not apply, with unquestioned belief, the

principles of simulation or gaming to study the decision makers plights and, hence, arrive at any tempting conclusion. The broad area of our study, for all practical purposes, is the area of amalgamation. That is, it is to be assessed to what extent they can depend on each other on economic or on political plane. The study of Intra-State relationship, at the present state of 'Relation Study' thus quite obviously resolves into a study of mutual integration.

An attempt, therefore, towards 'action and inter-action' study in such cases will be worth its while and whatever result achieved may modestly be claimed to have closely followed from the premises. The determination of relations among variables or programming of parameters seems to be unlikely here. But for an empirical study such as this, a system coherens with the known data and pre-supposed variables, ~~will~~^{will} be one that helps understanding the problems in question. Simulation or gaming, it is true, helps determine variables and sometimes help validate the hypothesis with relation to the referent Inter-State relation. But for two obstacles we could not effectively apply the Simulation or Gaming methods in collecting data 'on' and 'from' the Human participants. Since (1) a man-computer model would involve high developmental costs, it is considered expeditious to try in our case study of ^{an} all-man model, if of course, it proves replicable. The human participants here, since they are mostly civil servants and part of ~~is~~ a non-democratic Institution, ~~they~~ do not like to be explicit in their statements. Basically inarticulate and non-committal in their utterances, the human

participants here, are not always very dependable for an all-man model either.

So for all practical purposes, we ~~cannot~~^{can} not renounce completely the conventional attitude-survey system. The problem of constructing adequate paper and pencil questionnaires is all too known, for an element of bias intrudes into the interviewer-interviewee relationship. But then, it has had the advantage of being simplistic in nature; it can be used, in our case study, to assess behaviour and quantify the behavioural consequences of attitudinal formation. Simulation, of course, in such cases, can aid in studying the area of attitude-behavioural relationship and contribute to refine the paper-pencil attitude measures. Keeping in view of our limitations and emptiness of the Human participants, we attempted simulation in a liberal sense to aid the attitude survey system and abandoned all efforts to use Inter-Nation Simulation as instrument to develop 'validators' or 'Decision latitude' in this particular case.

Having collected data by conventional survey system and simulating it as and when possible, in a very restricted manner, we have tried to compute data to test the 'politicisation hypothesis' in the referent area of tension. The reasons for doing so, though not too many, are obvious. That the 'politicisation' hypothesis was carefully chosen, in disregard of any other, is, because it tends to help analyse group behaviour and attitudinal issues in such cases as that of ours. 'Politicisation', it may be stated, refers initially to a process

whereby the controversiality of joint decision-making goes up"¹⁶.

Since, Indo-Sikkim relation started with a promise of economic assistance of the former to the latter, it seems to be apparent to similar other economic groups. But, here, in actual fact, political intents rather than anything else, grabbed the members and put them together. Hence, political union, is, in all probability, the desired end.

The concept 'Political Union' or 'Politicisation' is defined variously by people of different scholarly background. The most acceptable one, for us, seems to be what Haas and Schmitter defined. "Political Union' they wrote, 'implies any arrangement under which existing nation-states cease to act as autonomous decision-making units with respect to an important range of politics"¹⁷. But this political union presupposes some constitutional caveats, i.e., it is suppositional to the extent of conforming to some constitutional paradigms. The authors opine, "the constitutional features which can be accommodated under this label range from the unitary state to the principle of shared-but-not-sharply divided powers which is typical of the European supranational approach"¹⁸. An idea for confederation, according to the authors, is not altogether excluded. Only the attainment of necessary degree of politicisation in confederacy depends on whether the confederal powers delegate the decision making power on major issues on a central organ or retain autonomy and instructed delegates confer on a matter of formality.

Since, 'Political Union' and 'Integration' are not mutually exclusive concepts, we must, for the sake of clarity, try to explain the issues involved. 'Integration' from the stand point of an economist is a process which removes obstacles to the free movement of products and helps transcend national boundaries. But, here, the usage is applied with a wider connotation. "Integration, to us, means the process of transferring exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some larger entity. It encompasses the process by virtue of which national actions of all sorts (government officials, interest group spokesman, politicians as well as ordinary people) cease to identify themselves and their future welfare entirely with their own national government and its policies. This notion of integration, of course, is entirely compatible with the concept of divided loyalties and segmented identification on the part of individuals"¹⁹. But other questions apart, economic integration itself preconditions the process of Politicization. And in a valuation or quantificatory proposition i.e., integration in Indo-Sikhia relation, the fact that an economic understanding which resolves itself in (a) abandoning the policy of economic self-doing and (b) reposing trust on ~~the~~ other members of the same fraternal community, are some salient points. But then, if the proposition is valuational, the functional logic, must of necessity be relevant. In order to understand this approach of integration, Haas suggested to split it into several 'observable pattern variables', "attributes which occur to intervene more or less consistently between the act of economic union and

the possible end product we label political union". This, he hypothesized, can be divided into: (1) conditions which obtain before the act of union, (2) conditions existing at the time of the union is negotiated and enters into force, and (3) conditions which manifest themselves during the process which ensues after the union becomes operative. Background conditions, he observed, include: (1) the relative size of the States considering unification, (2) the rate of transaction between them, (3) the degree of pluralism prevailing in each; and (4) the extent of elite complementarity among them. Conditions at the time of economic union is being negotiated include, (5) the degree of congruence among the explicit purposes in the minds of the participating governments; and (6) the Powers bestowed on the nascent union. Process conditions include (7) the style of decision making adopted by the new union's organs, (8) the rate of transactions and (9) the adaptability shown by governments in dealing with unforeseen problems and tensions²⁰.

In order to test the importance of the variables, the system of panel ratings needs, according to Haas, to be introduced. "There were no important differences of opinion among the judges either with respect to the across-the-board value of the weights or with respect to the weight of discrete variables in specific regional unions. In establishing across-the-board weights the judges were requested to ask themselves whether a given variable was both necessary and sufficient, just necessary, merely helpful, or plainly

irrelevant". The across-the-board rating of the relative importance of each of the twelve variables was as follows, with 400 representing the highest possible score, a score that yielded perfect automatic politicization.

Maximum possible weight of twelve variables²¹.

(1) Size of units	5
(2) Rate of transaction	10
(3) Pluralism	25
(4) Elite complementarity	40
(5) Perception of dependence	20

Total of background conditions	100
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(6) Governmental purposes	50
(7) External pressure	25
(8) Powers of Union	25


Total of conditions at the time of union	100
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(9) Decision making style	55
(10) Rate of transaction	50
(11) Adaptability of governments	75
(12) External pressure	20

Total of process conditions	200
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Grand total	400
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"The over all pluralism score was then computed after the articulation measure had been adjusted to bring it into the same range as the modernization scores. This over all scores is simply the sum of the other two, adjustment. This adjustments consisted of finding the means of the distributions and then multiplying the ratio of larger mean to smaller mean by each of the scores in the smaller distribution. This transformed the small scores into roughly the same range as the larger ones, and they could then be added together. The range of variability of each of the distributions remained the same, however"²³.

IV

In our case study, the J.Nyo and the Haas models with some modifications in view of Sikkim's economic dependence on India and political aspiration for a nationhood, have been chosen to ensure examination of maximum number of parameters ascertainable and achieve a satisfactory end result. The present state of Indo-Sikkim relationship, is, in all appearances, a hypothetical case where some very unlikely actor-determinators were grouped to study if their trade and commercial transactions and political or military dependence lead to some tangible relationship, i.e., integrating in economic and political sense or just lead to nowhere.

That Sikkim is gradually aspiring after more independence, i.e., showing signs of multidimensionality and not satisfied with

the previous group relationship with India, appear to have become clear on more than one occasions. Sikkim, inspite of having received from the Indian Govt. about 186.00 million rupees in different developmental projects from 1954-71²⁴, since her economic dependence primarily preconditioned her relationship with India, felt sore about India and the Chogyal and a section of the élites became articulate about it. Abortive attempts to communicate with foreign governments, which the Treaty of 1950 forbids them to do, and unofficial demands for the revision of the Treaty²⁵ to achieve a less stringent alliance with India are a few of the signs which tell of their multiple dimensionality. The promise of a Rs. 18.00 crore Indian financial assistance during the fourth five year plan also did not change the conditions much and a clamour for treaty revision is raged. It featured in the very guarded press statements of the Chogyal²⁶ just as it did in the meetings of the different political parties. So, the necessary degree of politicization, that is presupposed to have taken place, does not, in actual fact, appear to have been achieved.

In view of the above change, an autocratic Chogyal accepting the chains of a constitution and the people having emerged victorious, and the tri-partite agreement signed on 8th May, 1973, allowed India to have more say in the internal administration of Sikkim. The participation of India in the administration of Sikkim added a dimension to Indo-Sikkim relation and somehow, smoothened the way to the setting up of a central organ for decision making on major

issues. This was a condition which, since it was not in true sense fulfilled so long, handicapped the progress of political and economic integration to a great extent amongst these powers. That India's attitude was very often big-brotherly and that India considered, in such partnership, some friends being more equal than others²⁶, were some complaints that Sikkim elites lodged against India to her great dismay. Now, as the internal conditions of Sikkim, because of the popular upsurge, altered considerably, the Sikkim elite, and the Chogyal, realising the significance of the changed context, would probably demand a more closer relation with ^{the} other partner of the treaty and help fulfil the ideal confederal conditions in a Regional Subsystem.

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24. Sikkim-Oct. 26, 1970, Dec. 23, 1970, March, 27, 1972, May 10, 1972. The Hindu-January 17, 1967. Manchester Guardian, 25 Aug, 1971. Times of India on 24th March, 1970 published; For the first time in the election campaign in Sikkim the demand for revision of treaty with India was raised at a public meeting yesterday. Mr. Nakhul Pradhan, President of the State Congress, told a rally at the weekly market that it was time the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, signed 20 years ago, was revised. The Janata Party also took out a procession before holding a meeting in the main market. The stress in the speeches of the party leaders was on unity. The general tone was anti-Indian. The speakers tried to put the blame for all the ills here on India.
25. Indian Express, 11 Jan, 1961. Sikkim Herald, December 27, 1966. Times of India, 20.4.65 and Times of India on 21 May, 1967 published: Asked how soon he would want the review, the Chogyal said, "we await the convenience of the Govt. of India. They have more important things on their heads than we have".
The Chogyal would not commit himself on the exact nature of the changes he wants. He said these "will come out of mutual discussions". He added: "How can we dictate? Everything will be in mutual interest".
Giving the reasons of his desire for a review of the treaty, the Chogyal said India had certain interests in Sikkim. These

interests were mutual and must be safeguarded. But the situation had changed so much since 1960 that there was need for a review of the Treaty.

23. Siddis- July 21, 1970. Editorial.