

CHAPTER VI

The Centralisation in Politics For The Sake of Commerce, 1865-1885

Relations between India and Bhutan improved to some extent after the signing of the treaty of Sinchula. The money allowances given to Bhutan in lieu of the Duars placed a powerful lever in the hands of the British. It could be withheld on political grounds, and stipulations in furtherance of trade could be attached before resumption of payment. In fact, since the conclusion of the Duar war, and till 1885 in particular, the civil strife in Bhutan assumed serious proportions, with the warring parties often asking the British Government for help. The British, steadfast in the

policy of non-intervention in the internal matters of the country, remained by and large neutral. As is to be expected, these internal dissensions had some adverse effect on the commercial transactions between the two countries. And, the British, by using the effective lever of withholding the subsidy, tried to overcome the difficulties.

The internal feuds of Bhutan originated from the fact that the defacto central authority in Bhutan had been from a long time of a weak and vascillating type. The provincial governors of the different Dzongs held the real power in their hands so much so that Pemberton (1838) and Eden (1864) had found the Deb Rajas a mere puppet in the hands of the Ponlobs. Very often, the border disturbances and the atrocities of the Bhutanese were unknown to the Deb and the letters written to them by the British were even suppressed by the border chiefs. In February 1867, some dissensions in Bhutan were reported by the Commissioner of Cooch Behar, who characterized them as civil war. It seemed that differences between the Paro Ponlob and the Tongsa Ponlob, had reached a climax, with the Tongsa Ponlob refusing to recognize the authority of the Deb Raja Tshenyi Lupon Tsuendue Pekar¹. The Tongsa Ponlob wanted to place a child, aged five or seven years, on the seat of the Dharma Raja, which had been lying vacant for some time, and thereby assuming for himself the control of the whole of Bhutan.

The other faction, led by the Paro ponlob and supported by the Deb Raja, made some tentative suggestions for help to the Commissioner of Cooch Behar. The British government, however, stood firm in its resolution of non-interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan, and refused to give its assistance to any of the warring factions².

Obstructions On The Chukha Bridge

A more serious outcome of the internal quarrels was a severe obstacle that was placed in the path of trade and commerce between Bhutan and Buxa, at a place called Chukha. In June 1867, it was reported to Haughton, Commissioner of Cooch Behar, that there was a complete stoppage of commercial intercourse at Chukha, and no one was allowed to pass the bridge. Haughton's reaction at the receipt of this news was one of despair of ever making the Bhutanese see reason. In a letter written to the Thimphu Dzongpon on 19 June 1867, Haughton admonished him, because "by trade countries flourish and the people become rich but by the avarice of rulers, trade is destroyed and the people become poor". Haughton also reminded the Thimphu Dzongpon of the provision of free trade in the treaty of Sinchula, and requested him to allow the traders to pass freely to and from Buxa³. No reply was

received by Haughton of this letter, and the bridge remained closed. Five months later, Haughton again remonstrated to the Thimphu Dzungpon, and followed it up with a letter to the Dharma Raja appraising him of the situation. In the second letter to the Thimphu Dzungpon written on 21 November 1867, Haughton warned the Bhutanese that the British government would not allow 'the least breach of the treaty or any unfriendly act, to pass un-noticed'. He also pointed out the inconvenience which the Indian people at Buxa were facing because of the stoppage of supplies which they had been in the habit of buying from the Bhutanese⁴. But it seemed all these appeals as well as threats were of no avail.

Informing the Dharma Raja of this stoppage, which was rightly considered to be contrary to the spirit of Article IX of the treaty of 1865, Haughton appealed to the spiritual head of Bhutan, who was supposed to be 'a man of peace, and whose profession it is to promote the happiness of men' to induce his people to abstain from these unfriendly acts⁵. The traders were prevented from crossing the bridge, according to one report, by the amount of custom duties exacted by the Bhutanese officials. But, another reason for this obstruction was surmised to be the deliberate stoppage by "one of the candidates for the executive power anxious to prevent any intercourse between ourselves and his rival"⁶. If the first be true, then it was unjust on

the part of the Bhutanese to try to exact duties from the traders, so soon after the signing of the treaty for duty free trade between the two countries. As far as the second reason was concerned, it was possible that the Tongsa Ponlob, out of jealousy at the lucrative trade which the Paro Ponlob carried on with the plains, was making attempts to obstruct and disrupt it. The Bhutanese authorities on their part claimed that they had stopped the bridge at Chukha during internal dissensions fearing that some 'evil disposed persons would use the bridge for improper communications'. They also pleaded that the British should not harbour any ill feelings against them because of this.

But, the smallest infraction of the treaty of Sinchula, or any unfriendly act on the part of the Bhutanese, was not likely to be overlooked by the British. In order to drive home this fact to the Bhutanese, Haughton proposed the withholding of the allowance money, or so much of their allowance as may appear fitting, unless the clearest explanations regarding the obstruction was given, and the most satisfactory assurances made that such incidents would not be repeated in the future. The British were willing to believe that this closure of the bridge was not the act of the government, but of one of its principal officers - the person on whom suspicion was most acutely developed being the Wangdiphodrang Dzongpon. If such suspicion proved

correct, asserted Haughton, the allowance money could be paid through the Paro Ponlob who had always showed a friendly disposition towards the British⁷.

The proposal of withholding the payment of the subsidy was supported by Girdleston, officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India. He asserted that any hindrance to trade over the bridge in question must prove a general impediment in a country like Bhutan, and it was therefore expedient to adopt the proposal of Lieutenant Colonel Haughton⁸. The Government of Bengal was however doubtful if this act on the part of Haughton could be permissible under the provisions of the treaty. Mackenzie, the Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, expressed a doubt whether Colonel Haughton's construction of the treaty was correct, and whether the general provision for 'free trade' in article IX of the treaty could be construed as binding the Bhutan government to place no restrictions on the liberty of their own subjects to proceed into British territory. The words 'free trade', explained Mackenzie, in the first part of the article could possibly be held to be explained and, therefore, limited by the second sentence of the article commencing 'no duties shall be levied'⁹. Nevertheless, the Government of India upheld Colonel Haughton's interpretations, and authorised him to withhold the

allowance if the bridge was not opened.

The Bhutanese, however, claimed that the Chukha bridge had been fully reopened, and hence there was no reason in withholding the payment. But a technical reason for the non-payment of subsidy was furnished by the fact that the Bhutanese agent who had been deputed to receive the subsidy on January 10, 1868, belonged to a rank inferior to that stipulated under the article of the treaty. The person who turned up to receive the subsidy was the Subah of Buxa, while it was stated in the treaty that no person below the rank of a Dzongpon should be sent. Haughton dismissed the Subah without any discussion, leaving alone any payment. He wrote once more to the Dharma Raja that no payment would be made so long as a person of rank was not deputed and a satisfactory explanation of the closure of the road to Buxa was given¹⁰.

Moreover, Haughton was not willing to believe that the Chukha bridge had been reopened, as claimed by the Bhutanese. In a letter written to the Thimphu Dzongpon on 9 January 1868, he asserted: "As a person of the rank of Jongpen or superior rank has not been sent, the allowance to your government could not be paid. You write that the road is not closed, but last year the roads were thronged with traders. This year, I have not seen one. How then can it

be said that the road is not closed"¹¹. In reply to the above letter, communication was received from the Thimphu Dzongpon to the effect that the closure was made by a junior officer, and that the road had since been reopened. He also explained that since he had been away to Punakha at that time, he could not be present in person to receive the payment, but had sent the subah of Buxa instead, and pleaded that the payment be made over to him. This letter had no effect on the Government of India, who had already decided to withhold the payment of subsidy, if not in whole, at least in part, as long as a satisfactory explanation was not given by the Bhutanese for the closure of the Chukha bridge. In February 1868, the Bhutanese government made yet another effort to receive the subsidy by sending a representative of the Thimphu Dzongpon, and the Subah of Buxa. The Bengal government had meanwhile changed its mind and strategy, by deciding that payment should be made but the venue was to be changed. Payment would be made not at Buxa but at Darjeeling¹².

In deciding upon Darjeeling as being a more suitable place for the payment of subsidy than Buxa, Haughton had certain considerations in mind. He wished to (a) make the Bhutanese realise their error in not deputing in time a person of rank to Buxa, (b) to favour the Paro ponlob who was favourably inclined towards the British Indian government, and who the British found had not received his share

of even the previous year's subsidies, and (c) to suit his (Haughton's) own personal convenience as he was likely to be at Darjeeling by the time the new representative would come to receive the payment¹³. One would therefore find that in the so called neutral stand of the British in the internal feuda^s of Bhutan, the over all consideration was to favour the faction which was desirable from their own point of view.

In the mean time, in March 1868, Major Murray, who had been the Commander at Buxa, informed Haughton that the road to the interior was fully opened, and in consequence trade was once more flourishing quite briskly¹⁴. The Bengal government therefore decided that it would not be judicious to withhold payment any longer if the Bhutanese representatives agreed to go to Darjeeling. When, on reaching Buxa, the Bhutanese representatives heard that they would have to go to Darjeeling in order to collect the subsidy, they tried to avoid going there, on one pretext or the other. But once they realised that the British authorities had taken a firm stand, they eventually decided to comply. Even though the Thimpu Dzongpon himself was not present at Darjeeling but only his representative, the ^Government of Bengal did not allow that to stand in the way of payment. Endorsing the proposal of the Government of India, the Secretary of State observed that the "case is one in which it is not expedient

to insist upon very strict explanations with regard to the past conduct of the authorities"¹⁵. Eventually the subsidy for the year 1868 was paid to the Bhutanese government on 15 October 1868, thus bringing to a close the conflict over the stoppage of intercourse at the Chukha bridge, and subsequent suspension of the payment ~~of revenue~~.

The Fairs And Firearms

In spite of some obstacles being raised in the path of trade by stoppage of goods at the Chukha bridge commercial transactions were not entirely brought to a close. The Bhutanese fair at Udalguri continued as before. Colonel H. Hopkinson, Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier, visited this fair on 19 March 1868. There he met a deputation of Bhutanese, and heard a complaint that Indian ryots^a were in the habit of tapping caoutchouc from the trees in the Bhutanese area, without paying licence fee¹⁶. Caoutchouc formed quite an important commodity of export for the Bhutanese, and it was quite natural that they would wish to keep entirely for themselves the produce of the trees in their area. Hopkinson promised them redress in this matter. Dewangiri was another place where a brisk trade was carried on between the ryots^a of Assam and the hill people. The Deputy Commissioner of Assam on visiting

Lewangiri in May 1869, claimed that there were more Bhutanese squatters there than in the previous year. The number was estimated to be about 150 to 200, but of these not more than 50 were permanent squatters. Two thirds of the men were evidently traders from the interiors of Bhutan, and a brisk business seemed to be carried on between them and the petty traders from Assam. The Assamese and Cacharee traders brought up heavy loads of dried fish, rice, pan (betel leaf) and betelnut, and other articles of produce all of which commanded a ready sale among the Bhutanese. They took back in return from the Bhutanese, salt, blankets etc. All the Bhutanese appeared to be very civil, and readily conceded in giving the house tax, which the Deputy Commissioner collected from them at the rate of Rs. two per hut¹⁷. This indicated that the Bhutanese were perfectly aware that they were living on British soil and under British protection, and acknowledged their submission by paying up the tax.

Some amount of commercial activity was also going on at Buxa. When the terms of the treaty of Sinchula were being drawn up by Colonel Bruce in 1865, the proposal to hold an annual fair at Buxa at the time of making the annual payments, had been proposed by Bruce. He seemed to have been impressed by the eager desire for trading, evinced by the Bhutanese who accompanied the Bhutanese envoys to Buxa, and believed that the establishment of a large annual fair on the frontier

would be a great boon to them. This proposal by Colonel Bruce was heartily supported by the Lieutenant Governor, who promised to undertake measures to carry it out¹⁸. That Buxa had indeed become quite a prosperous mart, with many Hindus from Cooch Behar setting up shops for traffic with the Bhutanese, had been corroborated by Haughton in a letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Haughton wrote, "No doubt but for the never ending internal disputes of the Bhooteas, Buxa would become an important emporium"¹⁹. Commercial activities at Buxa, notwithstanding internal feuds continued quite briskly, the evidence of which was given by a Kyah (Marwari) merchant of Assam, Panna chund. He said that the majority of the merchants present in Buxa were the Kyah merchants. They dealt in rice, tobacco, and gun powder, and were prepared to go to Bhutan, if they managed to secure the permission of the Deb Raja. It was noticed by Panna that no taxes were levied on goods brought into Buxa from the plains below. Elephant teeth or ivory, found in the jungles by the Bhutanese, were sold by them for rupees ten a pair to the merchants at Dewangiri. The same pair would fetch these merchants rupees twenty or thirty when they again sold them in the plains. The horns of the rhinoceros were also said to be cheap in Bhutan and so was musk. These items brought by the Kyah merchants to the plains fetched double their value. Cloth was

however one of the important items which the Bhutanese took back from the plains²⁰.

A number of fairs were also being held at that time to facilitate commerce between the two countries. The Ganga Sharad^a fair at Karagola Ghat, the Julpesh fair, the Gopinath, Mustanghur and Nek Mard fairs in the Dinajpur district were some of them²¹. Even though the Rangpur fair had been officially abolished way back in 1832, plans were being made in 1869 to fix up a date for holding this fair so as not to clash with another fair shortly to be held at Falakata, by the Commissioner of the Cooch Behar division for the 'purpose of interchange of commodities between the Bhutanese to the north and the people of the plains'. From the correspondence between Grazier, Officiating Magistrate of Rangpur, and the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, it is known that the Rangpur fair was scheduled to take place around 20 December 1869, previous to the Falakata one, so that the hill traders "find it more convenient to attend the distant fairs first where they would get better prices for their goods and to finish up at Falacotta"²². But, Haughton, Commissioner of the Cooch Behar Division, decided not to hold the two fairs at such a short interval of time, which he said would lead to unnecessary expenditure. He claimed that when he had proposed to open a fair at Falakata, he was unaware that another fair was being opened in the

adjoining district of Rangpur. According to him, it would not be wise to "invite traders to attend to Dooar Fair, at the very time the Collector of Rangpur is bidding for their custom"²³. Ultimately the Falakata fair was held a year later from the 5th to the 25th of January 1871. The existence of these fairs, and the interest taken by the authorities for effecting smooth transactions at them, show that the commercial relations between the two countries were fairly satisfactory during the period.

It is worth noting that though trade between Bhutan and India was mainly by the barter system, some sort of coinage was also in circulation in Bhutan. When the Bhutanese had invaded Cooch Behar in 1772, they had carried off the Raja's minting apparatus, and had since struck a debased coinage in their country, that represented half of the value of Cooch Behar's Narayani coins²⁴. The Tongsa Ponlob of Bhutan had in 1870 asked Colonel Haughton for two dies or iron moulds with which to strike coins. The British Indian government were in two minds, whether to supply these dies to Bhutan, which would enable them to strike a larger number of these debased coins. Ashley Eden, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, felt that since the British government were in no way concerned with the coinage of Bhutan, it would only be a neighbourly act to oblige the Bhutan government by giving them the dies²⁵. But another

group led by Haughton feared that in the course of transactions, such debased coinage would find their way into Indian territory, and would be greatly detrimental to the economy of the country. Haughton suggested that they could instead send a large number of Indian coins of various denominations so as to circulate a coinage of good value in Bhutan. It was also felt by Haughton that a wider circulation of British coinage in Bhutan, could only be to the advantage to the commerce of both the countries²⁶. In the end it was decided to adhere to the second opinion, and this point was agreed to by the Governor General in council. The annual payments to Bhutan afforded the means of pouring a good supply of coins into that country, and the Governor General felt that this circumstance might easily be made the ground of a courteous refusal to supply dies to Bhutan²⁷.

The civil war in Bhutan however was continuing as before, in which the Tongsa and the Paro Ponlob^bs were the main contenders in the power struggle. The British government for all their policy of non-interference in the affairs of Bhutan, followed the overall consideration of favouring the faction which was advantageous from their own point of view. Their inclination towards the Paro Ponlob was evident from a number of instances. Be that as it may, when the Bhutanese asked in 1869 for permission to buy arms in

India to meet their martial needs, the British firmly refused. The Subah of Buxa in a letter to the Commissioner of Cooch Behar pointed out that according to the terms of the treaty of Sinchula, India and Bhutan were bound to assist each other in times of war, and therefore he solicited the help of the British in this civil war which had broken out in the country. He also made a further alternative suggestion, saying that if it was simply impossible for the Indian government to render any assistance, they should at least issue a parwanah authorising the Bhutanese to purchase arms and ammunition anywhere within the British dominions. This claim to purchase arms in India was made, asserted the Subah of Buxa, under the article IX of the treaty which provided for Bhutanese traders to travel freely as far as Calcutta and likewise allowed Indian merchants to proceed to Bhutan, and trade freely²⁸.

The Bengal government gave a fitting reply to this demand. Haughton in a letter to the Subah of Buxa said that though the treaty did provide for free trade, British laws could not be abolished in favour of the Bhutanese. "Our laws place restrictions on dealings in warlike weapons, gun powder etc. and Bhooteas must submit to the restrictions which for the sake of peace and good order we are compelled to impose upon our own subjects. The Bhooteas are free to go to Calcutta and to trade precisely as our own subjects,

but my friend how can you suppose that this freedom to trade has anything to do with the entertainment of soldiers"²⁹.

Thus, though the British might favour a particular Bhutanese faction, they wanted to avoid direct involvement, and hence confrontation as far as possible.

Conflict Over Dewangiri

As mentioned earlier, Dewangiri was one of the places where a brisk commercial transaction was carried on between the Bhutanese of that area ^{and} ~~with~~ the Assamese or Cacharee traders who came there mainly during the months of December, January, February and March to exchange their wares.

Dewangiri may be described as a ridge 500 yards long and 100 yards broad and about two thousand feet above the plains. This place was approachable from the British territory by three bad and difficult passes or ravines of the Darrang, Matunga, and the Dea rivers. A description given by Major J.M. Graham, Boundary Commissioner, who visited Dewangiri on 13 January 1873, together with Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald, shows that there were about twenty three permanent houses in Dewangiri, inhabited by wealthy Bhutanese, who had no fields but depended entirely upon trade for a living.

During the winter months Dewangiri was visited by traders from Bhutan and Tibet who brought down with them lac, bees

wax, India rubber, blankets, gold, musk, oranges, tails, ponies, mules, asses, etc. which were exchanged with the Assamese ^aryots or with Marwar^l traders for hard cash, or in exchange for Assam silk, cloth, rice dried fish, betelnuts, brass plates, etc.³⁰.

It may be recalled that in the Duar war, the British succeeded in assuming control of Dewangiri by overthrowing the Bhutanese after the latter had initially succeeded in taking possession of it. The British began collecting taxes from the few squatters who lived there permanently, and as has been stated before the inhabitants too quite willingly gave up the taxes demanded of them. The Deb Raja of Bhutan, Jigme Namgyal, was not in favour of this exaction by British on the 'poor beparies' (traders) of Dewangiri. In a letter to the Commissioner of Cooch Behar, he requested him to send an order prohibiting the collection of taxes at Dewangiri, since he said it was useless to collect such trifling sum from the traders. The Deb Raja claimed that he knew of no custom whereby traders were liable to pay rent, and asserted that without free allowance to the beparies, both Indian and the Bhutanese governments would be greatly inconvenienced³¹. Haughton wrote back to say that if the settlers at Dewangiri did not engage themselves in cultivation they would not be taxed, and promised that enquiry on this point would be made. It is known from Graham's report

that the people of Dewangiri did not engage in agriculture, but notwithstanding that fact, they were still being taxed. Previously in 1872, Haughton appears to have accepted that if any tax were levied on traders residing temporarily at Dewangiri, it would immediately have to be remitted³². But taxes on the permanent residents continued.

One interesting incident was observed by Major Graham, who visited Dewangiri along with Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald on January 1873. A Bhutanese interpreter who accompanied them, reported that a Zinkaff or a subordinate official of the Tongsa Ponlob with eight followers had arrived in the village about eight days previously, and had levied tribute from each house in the village in the form of cloth valued at Rupees twenty five. He had stopped the traders from going down to the plains on the plea that the plains were unhealthy and claimed that since there were no orders from the Tongsa Ponlob to allow pillars to be erected, he could not agree to the demarcation of the boundary. He further pretended that he knew nothing of Dewangiri being made over to the British, and generally acted as if Dewangiri was very much under Bhutanese control³³.

This Zinkaff had in fact brought a Parwana with him, bearing the seal of the Tongsa Ponlob, which proclaimed him as the chief of Dewangiri. It was specified in the parwana that any one trading in Dewangiri without the permission of

the 'pachoong zincaf' would be severely punished, and that no one should be allowed to rob and extort the traders³⁴. The Zinkaff himself wrote a letter to the Boundary Commissioners stating that the Tongsa Ponlob had sent him to Dewangiri to establish the former custom of the traders, meaning thereby the trade which was carried on prior to the Duar war. He further professed satisfaction at the fact that hostilities now being terminated between the two countries, trade could be carried on as before. He requested Graham and Macdonald to send traders to Dewangiri during January, February, and March and asserted that he would place a chief at each trading Chowkey so that there would be no disturbance among the traders. As far as demarcation of boundaries were concerned, he forbade the British to build any pillars till he himself received explicit directions from the Tongsa Ponlob, and made clear his intentions of collecting revenue from the inhabitants of Dewangiri³⁵. The British officers were greatly surprised at this attitude on the part of the Zinkaff, and also at the authorities in Bhutan for that matter, and were determined to retain their suzerainty over Dewangiri at all costs.

In fact, in 1872, some proposals were mooted by Major Thomas Lamb, Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup, for the occupation of that portion of the hill country which had been declared British territory. Lamb had three suggestions for

the control of Dewangiri - firstly, permanently occupying Dewangiri by having a detachment of troops there throughout the year; Secondly, having a guard at the entrance to Dewangiri, and thirdly removing the village of Dewangiri and establishing a hat at Koomrikatta. Dewangiri was, according to Lamb, a place of strategic importance as far as the commercial aspect was concerned, and in order to facilitate Indian traders, he suggested that the village should be abolished and no one permitted to reside there or occupy the heights in that vicinity, and the Bhutanese should be made to come down to a hat in the plains preferably Koomrikatta. This place was similar in all respects to Udalguri in the adjoining district of Darrang, where also a hat was set up every year. The Bhutanese traders would require a depot, said Lamb, and this should be in such a place where the British could command without difficulty, Dewangiri being difficult to have access of. A political strategy was also implied in Lamb's suggestion when he said that Koomrikatta would be visited by a patrol, who would do their best to obtain information of what was going on in the hills beyond the British frontier³⁶.

Major Graham, on his visit to Dewangiri in January 1873, also made a suggestion in the same vein. According to him, Dewangiri being so cramped and confined from scarcity of water, and being so inaccessible, was highly unsuitable as a

location for a fair. He also suggested ^oKomrikatta as being a much more suitable place for a fair. He believed that the Bhutanese would throw all the obstacles they could, in the way of establishing a fair in the plains, and it seemed to Graham, that the only way of securing the establishment of such a fair at Koomrikatta would be to prevent Indian traders from proceeding to Dewangiri, as a result of which the Bhutanese would be forced to come to Koomrikatta³⁷. This decision of the British to altogether exterminate Dewangiri may have caused the Bhutanese Zinkaff Pachoong to act as he did.

The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, realizing the importance of Dewangiri as a commercial depot, gave his preference to the suggestion that Dewangiri should be occupied and utilized. He had recommended that a small party of fifty troops should take up their position at Dewangiri in December 1873, and remain there till the end of March. Their presence there, the Lieutenant Governor felt, would mark the resolve of the government not to tolerate any interference by the Bhutanese on Indian soil³⁸.

In all probability the British in the end, gave up the idea of removing the fair from Dewangiri to Koomrikatta. The difficulty of access to Dewangiri was attempted to be resolved by the Public Works Department of the ^Government, of India, by granting an assignment of rupees ten thousand to the

Kamrup District Road Committee in 1873, to meet the cost of constructing a road to Dewangiri. The Road Committee was urged to lose no time in opening the line of communication, if it be only a bridle path. The ^Government of India was also asked to pass early orders for the posting of a military guard of fifty men at Dewangiri³⁹.

In December 1873, Lamb once again visited Dewangiri to make a survey of the general state of things. It seemed that the agent Pachoong or Bhasoong, as Lamb refers him, when questioned about extorting money from the villages worth about rupees three hundred and seventy four, replied that the usual payment of one piece of cloth, valued at Rs. 20 from each house had been taken according to an ancient custom together with Rs. 3 as fees. It was also stated that each householder had been given a maund of salt in exchange for the cloth taken, valued at Rs. 5. Lamb, on telling the Bhutanese Zinkaff that he could not take either money or cloth from any one at Dewangiri, except in the way of trade, received the reply that they had the Deb Raja's permission to do so. Lamb then proceeded to explain to them that such orders had no force whatsoever because Dewangiri was British and not Bhutanese territory⁴⁰.

In the end the British government decided to deduct the sum collected by the Bhutanese as revenue from the next

annual payment, and further warned them that any encroachment upon British territory would be seriously dealt with in future.

Added to the conflict over Dewangiri were the age old problems of the Bhutanese raids on Indian territory. There were complaints of atrocities being committed upon Indian traders by Bhutanese at a place called Dea Chowkey, which was a small trading mart on the Indian territory to which a number of Bhutanese traders came regularly to sell salt and other articles. It was reported that these traders had committed oppressions on the Indian merchants. The Bhutanese Government when appraised of the situation seemed genuinely sorry and hastened to make amends. It was stated that if any of the Bhutanese traders had committed any oppression, the British Government might punish them. The Bhutanese claimed that all the traders from Dea Chowk^{ey} on their way back to their homes had been stopped, and that officials had been ordered to arrest the officers. The Bhutanese at this stage professed friendship with the British as was reflected in their words, "If the ryots of the Dharm Raja oppress the ryots of the Maharanee, or if the ryots of the plains oppress the ryots of the Dharm Raja, it will be very difficult as the Maharanee and Dharm Raja are friends"⁴¹.

However, atrocities were again repeated when some Bhutanese visiting Assam committed dacoity in the market of Subankhata in the same year. When the matter was brought to the knowledge of the Deb Raja he promised to hold an enquiry² and hand over the plundered property as well as the guilty persons to the Commissioner of Cooch Behar. The Bengal government however, as a penal measure, authorised the Commissioner of Cooch Behar to deduct one thousand rupees from the treaty allowance. The ^Government of India also approved of this decision⁴². The Deb Raja of Bhutan had meanwhile forbidden the Bhutanese traders from going to Dewangiri, probably out of a fear of a recurrence of the charges of dacoity. At this, the Cooch Behar Commissioner expressed his view that 'no attempt should be made to stop the normal current of trade'. The Deb Raja complied with the request, countermanded his recent decision and opened the road⁴³. However, in his efforts to prevent such incidents from repeating themselves the ^{Deb}Raja placed two of his subordinate officials or Zinkaffs on the borders of Dewangiri to keep watch upon the Bhutanese traders who would cross the border and enter Kamrup. This attitude on the part of the Deb Raja was helpful, and the ^Government of India expected the trade between Bhutan and India to increase.

The Revival of Trade

But, in all probability, trade between India and Bhutan did not show a marked improvement in the years immediately following the Duar War. The Bengal Administration Report for the year 1875-76 says that the traffic from Bhutan was registered at Labha in the Darjeeling district, and was very insignificant, not exceeding five or six thousand rupees both ways⁴⁴. It improved to some extent the next year as the Administration Report for the year 1876-77 showed. The imports into Bengal from Bhutan was more than the exports from Bengal into Bhutan, the former amounting to Rs. 12,708 as compared with Rs. 7,590 of the exports. It may bear repetition that this trade was entirely by land and was carried on by carts and pack bullocks and occasionally by coolies⁴⁵. The goods transported between the two countries began to be officially registered at the frontier posts, together with their respective volumes and values during the last quarter of the 19th century. Barring the occasional mistakes of the Mohurirs at the various frontier posts, these records may be accepted as being generally correct, giving a reasonably fair idea of the trade carried on between the two countries. The Table 4 shows the extent of and the fluctuations in trade during the seven years from 1878-79 to 1884-85.

Table 4
 Volumes of Indo-Bhutan Trade Through the Bengal Frontier,
 1878-79 to 1884-85
 (in Rs.)

Year	Imports from Bhutan	Exports to Bhutan	Total
1878-79	84,901	88,108	1,73,009
1879-80	3,85,406	2,89,588	6,74,994
1880-81	2,43,922	1,96,947	4,23,569
1881-82	1,25,448	1,05,168	2,28,216
1882-83	1,11,442	86,693	1,98,135
1883-84	96,350	1,23,000	2,19,350
1884-85	1,34,189	1,43,308	2,77,497

Source : Reports on the External Trade of Bengal with Nepal Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan for the official years ending 1878-79 - 1884-85, Govt. of Bengal.

The frontier stations at which this trade was recorded were Ambari Falakata, Buxa, and Hantuparah all in the Jalpaiguri District. The first two stations were kept open for five months and the third station for ten months of the year. The Reports from which the above data have been collected claim that the figures for the years 1880-81 and 1881-82 could not be acceptable to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. Under his order enquiries were made by the Deputy Commissioner of Jalpaiguri, which showed some fabrications in the figures for the shell lac trade since 1878-79.

These fabrications were for the most part done by the Mohurirs at Buxa and Ambari stations. But from September, 1881, it was stated that an intelligent and careful Mohurir had been appointed replacing the others⁴⁶.

Comparing the figures for 1882-83 with that of the next year, it will be found that the gross value of trade for 1883-84 was 10.70% in excess of the previous year's figures. The value of imports, however, decreased by 13.54%, while that of exports increased by 41.88%. As regards the imports, the decrease was mainly due to a large falling off in the horse trade. The trade in madder ~~or manjist~~ was exceedingly active, and so was the trade in vegetables, fruits and nuts. On the other hand ghee, and foreign tea, registered a decrease. Wax was another item which showed a slump; only 21 maunds being registered at Ambari in 1883-84, against 137 maunds in the previous year. Manufactured woollen goods, chiefly blankets, showed an advance, as did musk and yak tails. This was as far as the imports into India were concerned. The total value of exports to Bhutan in 1883-84 went up from 86,693 of the previous year to 1,23,000. This increase was mainly due to European piece goods, rice, manufactured silk goods, betel nuts and tobacco, all of which were sold at higher rates, than what they fetched the previous year. Trifling decreases were however, also noticed in the quantity of metals exported, and in the salt trade⁴⁷.

For the year 1884-85, the registering stations at Ambari and Hantuparah were kept closed for seven months of the year from April to October, and Buxa was kept closed for two months namely July and August. From the figures available it appeared that the total bulk of trade during 1884-85 increased some what to 2,77,497 from 2,19,350 of the previous year, or by 26.51%. The import trade however, increased considerably by 39.27% in comparison with the previous year, while the export trade showed an advance of 16.51%. The chief items of increase in the import trade were madder or manjeet, fresh fruits and vegetables, musk, foreign tea, and manufactured woollen piece goods, Madder or Manjeet rose from 511 maunds in the previous year to 1,099 maund in 1884-85. Fresh fruits and vegetables showed an increase of 945 maunds and the value of musk rose from Rs. 5913 in 1883-84 to Rs. 8344 in 1884-85. The trade in foreign tea amounted to 35 maunds against 12 maunds in the ^eproceeding year, but decreases were also noticed in certain items, particularly the number of horses, which showed a further falling off from 498 the previous year to 247. The trade in ghee was also fast declining and so was wax. However, on the whole the value of imports from Bhutan increased considerably as compared with the previous year.

As regards the export trade for 1884-85, the greatest improvement was under indigo, ^Rrice, husked as well as

unhusked, sugar and European manufactured woollen goods. The exports of indigo rose from 2 maunds in 1883-84 to 8 maunds the next year. The export of rice went up by 24.24% while that of paddy by 34.11%. The trade in undrained sugar increased by 665 maunds or 50.19% and that of manufactured woollen goods showed an advance of Rs. 1,366 or 37.09%. Certain items also showed a falling off, of which mention can be made of iron, betelnuts and a trifling decline in tobacco. It is however, worth mentioning that no salt was exported to Bhutan during 1884-85⁴⁸.

This was as far as the Bhutanese trade with Bengal was concerned. Some statistics however are also available of the Bhutanese trade carried on with Assam during 1877 only. The trade between Bhutan and Assam was registered by the frontier mouzahdars at the following stations - Ripu, Guma, Chirang, Sidli and Bijni in Goalpara, Darrang in Kamrup (near to Dewangiri), and Gohpur, Helem, Daimara, Balipara, Udalguri, and Khagrapara in Darrang. During the cold weather months, it was reported, numerous Bhutanese merchants came down through the several routes or duars to attend the fairs held at Dhubri, Datma and Udalguri. For eight months of the year, there was an entire cessation of trade with Bhutan, as the Bhutanese of the interior did not dare to venture into the terai or even into the lower range of their hills during the hot weather months. This trade, it was believed, was

essentially a free one, and no duties were levied on merchants trading in Bhutan, or in the Naga and Mishmi Hills⁴⁹.

The trade with Bhutan was believed to be much larger than, what the returns show. But these figures help to form a general idea of the volume of trade carried on between Assam and Bhutan. For the year 1877, the exports from Assam into Bhutan was estimated at Rs. 1,98,423, while the imports into Assam from Bhutan was value^d at Rs. 91,546. The increase of exports over imports was attributed to the large amount of silk, valued at Rs. 1,45,943, which was reported to have been taken from the Kamrup district into Bhutan. However, the Lieutenant Governor found it difficult to accept that such huge quantities of silk had been brought into Bhutan, especially when the manufacture of silk had been for several years on the decrease. Moreover no large fairs were held in the Kamrup district to form a nucleus for such extensive transactions. In Darrang where two fairs frequented by the Bhutanese were held in that year, the amount of silk exported was trifling. It may thus again be concluded that as in the case of the Mohurirs of the Bengal frontier, the Mouzahdars of the Assam frontiers too had supplemented facts largely from their imagination⁵⁰.

Be that as it may, besides silk, the other items exported from Assam into Bhutan included betelnuts, paddy, rice, and European cotton piece goods, the approximate values of which goods were as given in Table 5.

Table 5
Some Items of Bhutanese Imports and Exports Through Assam,
1877

(in Rs.)

Goods exported to Bhutan	Value	Goods imported from Bhutan	Value
Silk Cloth	1,50,315	Rubber	19,230
Betel Nuts	1,120	Salt	22,758
Paddy	17,184	Ponies	18,640
Rice	14,512	Blankets	18,215
European piece-goods	4,566	Wax	n. a.

Source : To Secretary to the Government of India, Revenue, Agricultural and Commerce Dept., from SOB Redsdale Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, dated Shillong, 19 January 1878, Foreign, Political A, June 1878. NAI.

From these statistics, some idea can be formed of the value of the trade carried on between Assam and Bhutan. Though it is true that the statistics for only one year are available, nonetheless, these figures may be taken to serve as an average index of Assam-Bhutan trade during this period.

Development of Bhutan As An Entrepot

The hope that Bhutan might play an important part, though a secondary one, in opening and improving Anglo-Tibetan trade was still entertained by the British administrators.

The possibility of also finding out a direct route between Assam and Tibet was discussed from time to time. An alternative route was also suggested by some, which argued in favour of using the Brahmaputra valley as the great high road to Tibet. However, in spite of efforts to open up communication with Tibet through Assam, the almost impenetrable Assam Himalayas, inhabited by the war-like tribes did not offer an easy route for commerce. There was never a route through it comparable with that through Nepal or Sikkim or Bhutan, and it possessed no hill stations like Darjeeling to focus British attention on its potentialities⁵¹.

The British statesman, on their part, believed that the Lhasa authorities were not averse to the expansion of their trade with India, but that it was the jealousy of the Chinese which was the sole obstacle to British commercial interests in that country. It might be recalled that Chinese jealousy had prevailed way back in 1774 and 1783, when the first British commercial missions were sent. It was with a view to remove these suspicions that the British authorities decided to take up the matter with the authorities in Peking itself. On 24 April 1873 the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce of England, submitted to the Secretary of State for India, concrete proposals of British trade with Tibet and Central Asia. The society

pleaded for (a) a better access to Tibet from the side of Sikkim, (b) completion of the Calcutta-Darjeeling railway, (c) removal of any restrictions upon the trade with Tibet through Bhutan from Bengal and Assam, (d) permission of the Peking authorities for unrestricted trade along the whole frontier of Tibet, and (e) establishment of consular agencies at Lhasa. On 4 June 1873, the Duke of Argyll sent these proposals to the then Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrooke⁵².

Since 1871-72, contemplations were afoot regarding the construction of a railway tract connecting the plains with the hilly regions, from the commercial point of view. There was a proposal 'to lay a line along the Caragola and Darjeeling road with a branch cut to the east from Titalya or thereabouts, through the Dooars or Cooch Behar towards Assam'. It was hoped that though the trade with Bhutan was 'very trifling' owing to the exclusiveness of the people, it would no doubt increase very considerably if a railway came into that part of the country. It was also further hoped that this railway would also lead to the opening up of trade with central Asia eventually⁵³. Even though the railway line was not immediately laid, the idea of constructing such a line in order to facilitate trade in this region had come to stay.

It was also considered that a direct route to Tibet from Darjeeling through Sikkim would be quite useful. It was with the construction of this road in view that J.W. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of the Darjeeling district, visited Sikkim, and as a result of his tour submitted to the government a detailed report "regarding the actual extent, condition and prospects of trade with Tibet, the best line for the construction of road over the passes and on other matters which would enable government to take action upon the important question of the resumption of commercial intercourse between India and the countries beyond its northern frontier"⁵⁴. Attempts were also made to collect all the information possible as to the goods which were most in demand in Tibet, to see that restrictions on trans-himalayan trade was removed, and to encourage trade by the establishment of fairs. The frontier officials were also told that any opening for friendly relations should be made use of and should at once be reported to the government⁵⁵.

There was also talk of introducing Darjeeling tea into Tibet, and European planters were full of confidence that they could 'supplant the China article both in quality and price'. In 1874, the Commissioner of Cooch Behar observed, "our relations with Central Asia via Phari are beginning to take shape and must before long under the influence of railways and trade, become of great practical value. Bhutan

must have a part in these relations, though a subordinate one"⁵⁶. It was in pursuance of the above mentioned policies that the British, while maintaining a close watch over Bhutan, left her autonomy unimpaired, and adopted a conciliatory policy. The British were also keen that Indian trade with Bhutan should be flowing freely at this stage in order to unlock the road to Tibet and Central Asia.

The policy of conciliation adopted towards Bhutan was highlighted when, in 1874, the Bhutanese envoy, on coming down to collect the treaty money, made a representation to the effect that a drought was on in Bhutan at that time, and pleaded that the exportation of rice might not be checked. He was assured that the British government did not wish to put any restrictions on the grain trade, and that the rice would be exported as usual to Bhutan. Presents were exchanged at the meeting, an indication that harmonious relations existed. The presents delivered to the envoy consisted of forty two yards of red broad cloth, thirty six bottles of country spirits, and some betel nuts, etc. The presents received from the envoy consisted of some baskets of fruits and vegetables, four silk scarves, five pieces of mekli cloth and a blanket⁵⁷.

It was also further decided that a Bhutanese should be sent to reside in the British territory as an agent. The

British government promised that the agent would be given fifty rupees per mensem as a sumptuary allowance, and eight hundred rupees was to be expended in building a house for him. The Deb Raja, Jigme Namgyal, appointed one Fentook as their agent, who was colonel Haughton's interpreter, being unable to depute any of their own subjects owing to their ignorance of any language but their own⁵⁸. The British agreed to this appointment mainly because they were anxious to preserve the most friendly intercourse with Bhutan. It was not their custom to maintain agents of foreign countries in India, and in allowing Fentook to act as Bhutanese agent they were departing from their custom⁵⁹. All this was being done to placate the Bhutanese, who the British hoped would help them in keeping open the commerce not only with their own country, but also with Tibet and further north.

But, the British policy of opening up of a line of communication for the purposes of trade and commerce with Tibet, and also perhaps with China, did not meet with much success at least in the last decades of the nineteenth century. After repeated proposals were put forward demanding that the Chinese government should be approached through the British Legation at Peking to grant an order of admission to Tibet, the Chefoo Convention was held on 13 September 1876. This convention agreed to provide facilities to the British for explorations in Tibet. The Tibetan government,

however, viewed the outcome with suspicion, and ultimately the Chefoo Convention ended in a failure.

It cannot be doubted that internal dissension among the Bhutanese chiefs was also responsible for frustrating the British expectations. The efforts of the British to maintain personal contacts with the Deb Raja often failed due to frequent contests for power amongst the Ponlobs in Bhutan, and quick successions to the post of the Deb Raja. A line of thinking was gradually emerging that a strong and centralised Bhutan alone would serve the material gains of the British in the Himalayan territories⁶⁰.

Favouring the Strong to Devour the Weak

The rivalry for power, and the intrigues of various parties served to vitiate the atmosphere of the Bhutanese courts, and were not at all conducive for maintaining cordial relations with India. Even though the envoy who had come to collect the compensation money in 1874, had declared that the internal condition of the country was perfectly tranquil, the fact was that it was not so. The then Deb Raja of Bhutan, Jigme Namgyal, who had held the post from 1870 onwards, had just resigned in favour of his brother Kyitsalpa Dorji Namgyal who continued as the Deb Raja till 1879. In 1876, Kyitsalpa completed the defeat of his

remaining rival Tsewang Norbu, who was then the Paro Ponlob. The Paro Ponlob together with the Punakha Dzungpon escaped to Kalimpong in India and sought asylum there. The British also gave them shelter and refused to hand them over to the Bhutanese⁶¹. In spite of their professed neutrality, they were always slightly inclined towards the Paro Ponlob, as stated earlier.

Though partial the British might be to one particular section of the Bhutanese contenders for power, they did not embroil themselves directly by supplying arms and ammunition. An appeal was again made in 1877 to this effect by the envoy who came down to collect the annual subsidy. He arrived on 10 January 1877, and asked G. Dalton, Deputy Commissioner of Cooch Behar, the permission to purchase or to obtain on loan about fifteen or sixteen rifles or muskets. Dalton replied that though the British rules regarding the possession of fire-arms and especially their export were very strict, there might be no objection to selling the envoy about ten or twelve guns⁶². The Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division when informed of this, felt that it would be better if instead of selling the muskets they could be made over as presents to the envoy⁶³. The Bengal government, however, when apprised of the situation, favoured the policy of non-intervention as taken on previous occasions. The Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal

ordered the Commissioner of the Rajshahi and Cooch Behar Divisions to desist from selling the muskets to the Bhutanese, let alone presenting them⁶⁴.

The civil war in Bhutan continued unabated, and again an officer of the insurgent party in Bhutan arrived in 1877 itself with a letter addressed to the Lieutenant Governor in Bengal, and with similar letter to H. Ulick Browne, Commissioner of the Cooch Behar and Rajshahi Division. The object of the letter was to obtain the intervention of the Government of Bengal in the conflict between the Punakha Dzongpon and Jigme Namgyal (the ex Deb Raja who ruled from 1870-74), who even though had retired in favour of his brother Kyitsalpa, was the all powerful head of the state, the authority of Kyitsalpa not being considered of any importance. Upon the receipt of this letter the Government of India reiterated its stand of strict non-interference in the internal affairs of the country, though willing to continue its friendly relations⁶⁵.

In 1878, during the reign of Kyitsalpa, another representation was made to the British government signed by seven insurgent parties of Bhutan. These seven insurgents were - the Regent who ruled between the death of one Dharma Raja and another, the Punakha Dzongpon, the Paro Ponlob, the Wangdiphodrang Dzongpon, the Daka Ponlob, a superceded Paro Ponlob, and the Gelchen. They informed the Government of

India that they were very much interested in the proposal made by the British for the construction of a road right up to Tibet through Bhutan. Further they assured that they would be willing to place as many as two thousand to three thousand labourers at the disposal of the British government for the purpose⁶⁶. It was in 1875 that the then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Sir Richard Temple, had proposed to the Deb Raja, Kyitsalpa Dorji Namgyal, that a road be made through Bhutan. Kyitsalpa had evaded the matter, and had informed his predecessor and patron, Jigme Namgyal, who in turn wrote to Tibet stating what had happened. One Chinese and one Tibetan official were immediately said to have arrived in Bhutan and after a meeting with them it was decided by the Deb Raja to oppose the construction of the road by all possible means aided in every way by the Chinese and the Tibetan officials⁶⁷.

Be that as it may, this proposal for the construction of the road was ^eceived with enthusiasm by the above mentioned seven insurgents in Bhutan, who expressed their desire to help the British in the construction of the road whenever necessary. The Commissioner of the Rajshahi and Cooch Behar Divisions thought that an attempt could be made to facilitate trade with Bhutan and Tibet by letting the Deb Raja know that his officials had expressed their eagerness to help in the building of the road. The British,

however, did not entertain very high hopes on the prospects of building the road, being sure that the Deb Raja, after consultation with the Chinese and the Tibetan officials as on the previous occasion, would evade the issue. The main reason for the refusal of the Tibetan and Chinese officers, concluded the Commissioner of the Cooch Behar and Rajshahi Division, was the lurking fear that the ultimate objective of the British would be to occupy both the countries⁶⁸. In the end, therefore, the British government did not undertake the construction of the road, in order to avoid antagonising the authorities of both Bhutan and Tibet.

In the frequent changes that were taking place during this period in Bhutan for the seat of the Deb Raja, Kyitsalpa (1874-79) was succeeded by Chhoegyal Zongpo (1879-82) who in turn was succeeded by Lama Tshewang (1882-84). It was in all probability this Deb Raja, Lama Tshewang, who had asked the Commissioner of Cooch Behar and Rajshahi Division, in 1883, that a telescope may be given to him, the price of which he promised to send over⁶⁹. The Bengal government conceded the grant of a telescope to him, indicating their friendly attitude to the new Raja, and their acceptance of him as the new head of the state.

Meanwhile, there emerged a personality on the scene of Bhutan, who would ultimately change the destiny of that

country. He was Ugyen Wangchuk, son of the erstwhile Deb Raja of Bhutan, Jigme Namgyal, who as already mentioned, was the Deb from 1870 to 1874. It may also be remembered that Jigme's brother, Kyitsalpa, had ruled from 1874 to 1879. In 1881, Ugyen Wangchuk, the son, became the Paro Ponlob, and in 1884, he took over as the Tongsa Ponlob^b, handing over the charges of Paro to one of his own relations. Ugyen Wangchuk immediately set himself the task of ~~sp~~^{ho}isting one of his own nominees to the post of the all important Deb Raja, a post held for long by his father, and subsequently his uncle. Consequently, the civil war again broke out in Bhutan in 1885, in which the Thimphu and the Punakha Dzonqpons, named Alu Dorji and Phuntshok Dorji respectively, opposed the Tongsa Ponlob on the question of the election of the Deb Raja. Ugyen Wangchuk, together with the Paro Ponlob who was his relation planned to depose the Deb Raja, Gawa Zangpo, who had succeeded Lama Tshewang in 1884. The outcome of this dispute was that a battle was ^ought in Changlimithang in Thimphu which is the present halipad. Gawa Zangpo once again asked for arms and ammunition from the British including 200 muzzle loading rifles and 400 rounds of ammunition for each rifle. In reply the Indian government once again reiterated its policy of non-intervention and, though professing its desire that peace be maintained in Bhutan, sent a civil refusal to the request made by the Raja⁷⁰. The

out come of this battle at Changlimithang was that Phuntshok Dorji was killed, and Alu Dorji ran away to Tibet where he sought the help of the Dalai Lama, which was refused apparently on the advice of the British⁷¹. This left the Deb Raja absolutely defenseless, and Ugyen Wangchuk succeeded in getting his nominee, Pam Sangye Dorji, appointed as the Deb Raja, and himself emerged as the virtual ruler of Bhutan.

Thus began a new era for Bhutan. The internal disputes did not end all at once but started dimishing gradually. The refusal of the British to help the erstwhile Deb Raja Gawa Zangpo, had evidently earned the good will of Ugyen Wangchuk. The British government in India too, on its part were very happy at the emergence of a strong centralised power in Bhutan. They still firmly believed that a strong and stable political authority in Bhutan would help them in furthering their commercial ambitions not only in Bhutan but also in Tibet and Central Asia.

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