

## CHAPTER – IV

### THE THEORIES OF NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKṢA IN NYĀYA, VAISĒSIKA AND NAVYA NYĀYA

It is already known to us that Gautama's *sūtra* (NS 1/1/4) on perceptual knowledge states that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that cognition (*jñāna*) which is due to sensory contact with the object (*intriyaṛthasannikarṣotpanna*) and which is non-linguistic (*avyapadeśya*), certain (*vyavasāyātmākā*) and non-deviating from the object (*avyabhīcarīn*). According to Vātsayāyana and his followers this *sūtra* states only a definition and no division of perceptual knowledge while according to others it represents both a definition and a division. The first interpretation asserts that all the words in the *sūtra* except that for the definiendum (perception – *pratyakṣa*) are constituents of the definiens. But the second interpretation treats only three out of these five as constituents of the definiens, the other two, namely, 'non-linguistic (*avyapadeśya*)' and 'certain' (*vyavasāyātmākā*) as indicative of a division. The definition, in whatever way it is viewed, is basically a causal definition though it does not enumerate the causal conditions exhaustively. The causal factor that is mentioned in the definition is sensory contact with the object. But such a contact can generate not only a cognitive state but also an affective state in appropriate circumstances. Hence, the word 'cognition' is very much necessary for the definition. In the preceding *sūtra* Gautama has enumerated the varieties of knowledge (*pramā*) including the perceptual variety. Truth which is necessary for knowledge seems to have been represented by the word 'non-deviating' (from the object) in Gautama's definition of perception. This avowedly forms a part also of the definitions of other varieties of knowledge and is not anything exclusive to the definition of perceptual knowledge.

The word 'certain' that is to be taken as a part of the definition has been incorporated to exclude doubt, as doubt is characterised not by certainty but by oscillation between opposing positions. Doubt can be eliminated even if this component is not incorporated by stipulating that strictly speaking it is deviating from the object in respect of the false alternative involved in doubt. Alternatively, if 'sensory contact' as occurring in the definition is understood as contact with any of the five external sense organs, then if doubt is held to be necessarily mental as some philosophers hold and thus not due to such a contact there would be no need to introduce the word 'certain' to exclude doubt.

The word 'non-linguistic' has been interpreted by some as useful for excluding what is usually referred to as *ubhayajñāna* (a cognition which is produced by the dual factors of sensory contact and testimony). Supposing, that a person is perceptually aware of the features of a perceptible object but is not conversant with the word for its kind then on the basis of the testimony of another to the effect that the object is an X he may come to know the object as perceived in that situation as an X. Such knowledge is thus due to two sources of sensory contact and testimony. Since the presupposition of the definition is that perceptual knowledge is not due to testimony, the component under consideration looks useful for excluding such knowledge produced by dual sources as noted here.

Many philosophers do not however accept the thesis of *ubhayajñāna*<sup>1</sup>.

They interpret the component 'non-linguistic' in the definition as indicative of refutation of the theory according to which every cognition takes its rise as wrapped up in language. Linguistic clothing of cognition, according to the Naiyāyikas, is not essential for perception even though such a relationship may appear to be obvious for other varieties of cognition. Thus, the usefulness of the component as intrinsically non-linguistic in character. The implication then is that the component has not been inserted to secure an act of exclusion which a

component normally performs in a definition. Later interpreters of the *sūtra* thus treat only the three words 'cognition' due to sensory contact with the object' and 'non-deviating'. They do not take the remaining two words '*avyapadeśya*' (translated so far as 'non-linguistic) and *vyavasāyātmāka* translated so far as 'certain') as components of the definition. The two words under reference are thus interpreted by these philosophers as representing a division into undeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) varieties of perception. The proposal was explicitly floated in the Nyāya tradition first by Vācaspati in *Tātparyatikā* and later supported by Gaṅgeśa in the *Pratyakṣakhanda* of his *Tattvacintāmani* and also by Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*.<sup>2</sup> But the interesting point to be noted here is that neither Gautama nor Vātsyāyana has spoken of this distinction anywhere in their works. Therefore, the thesis of *nirvikalpaka* is not a theory of the masters. It is thus natural to suppose that it has been smuggled into Nyāya from the work of the sister system of Vaiśeṣika. It seems to us that the theory has actually been borrowed from Praśastapāda.<sup>3</sup> The theory was ably defended and greatly developed by Gaṅgeśa within the backdrop of the system of Navya Nyāya propounded by him. But I am afraid that Gaṅgeśa differs from Praśastapada in significant respects. This will be clear as we proceed.

Praśastapāda writes about the causes and types of perception after giving his definition of perception. While dealing with perception of substances he mentions that the external substance can be perceived by the visual sense organ or by the sense organ of touch only. Such perception is possible in respect of substances (which are wholes consisting of parts, have intermediate magnitude (neither atomic nor infinite), and have colour as a property) provided that there are the common general causes and also the threefold contact between four things (between self and mānas, manas and the sense organ, and the sense organ and the object). If these merely are the causes in respect of an act of perception,

such perception cannot be anything other than mere acquaintance. Prasāstapada's own word is 'svārūpa-alocana-mātra', the component 'alocana' of this expression being synonymous with 'grahana' and thus the compound is treated as equivalent to 'svārūpa-grahana-mātra' by Sridhara.<sup>4</sup> But though the factors noted here are sufficient for such a type of acquaintance these are merely necessary for a different type of perception which he refers to as involving a *viśeṣana* for which these factors and their product, i.e., this acquaintance itself together constitute the sufficient condition. His own word for such a perception is 'viśeṣana-apekṣa'. As we are not giving any causal interpretation to the component 'apekṣa', the compound is being treated as 'involving *viśeṣana*', i.e., in the sense that the substance the perception is about is held as 'possessing something as its attribute or *viśeṣana*'. Since such a perception is distinct from the earlier variety this element of *viśeṣana* qua epistemic *viśeṣana* is absent there. Therefore, the phrase 'mere acquaintance' ('svārūpālocana-mātra'/'svārūpagrahaṇa-mātra') does not stand for perception of the substance as having something as its character or mark, although these figure in it as discrete objects. This variety of perception has later come to be known as *nirvikalpaka* and the other type as *savikalpaka*. But though Prasāstapāda himself has not used these words it is clear that he was able to draw the distinction in its essence. This will be clear if we consider Prasāstapāda's examples of perception of the *viśeṣana-apekṣa* type.

Prasāstapāda gives us six examples of cognition involving *viśeṣana*.

- (i) (This) substance (*drvyam*) exists (*sat*).
- (ii) (This) is earth(en) (*prthivī*)
- (iii) (This) has horns (*visāṇ*)

- (iv) (This is) white (*śukla*)  
 (v) (This is) a cow (*gau*)  
 (vi) (This ) is moving (*gacchati*).

(Our representation of the examples is based Vyomaśivacārya's interpretation).<sup>5</sup>

In all these cases something is taken to be a character of something else. In (i) this character is the universal of existence which is called *samānya* (general) in the sense that this is common to every such thing that can have a universal in it. Cases (ii) and (v) are examples of cognition where also a universal is taken to be a character of something. The universal involved here in these two cases is not such that it is common to everything that can have a universal in it, since everything does not belong to the class of earthen objects or to that of cows. This type of universal is called *viśeṣa* in the sense that it is specific to a given group of things and is not present in others. In (iii) what appears as the attribute, ontologically speaking, is not a universal but a pair of horns which are substances and hence particulars. In (iv) the character is a given colour and that in (vi) is action. These two characters, being properties are thus to be regarded as particulars and not as universals.

We have noted above that according to Praśastapāda the perception of the *viśeṣana-apeka* type (*savikalpakapratyakṣā*) is caused by *svarupa-ālocana-mātrā* (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣā*). He has not however given us examples of the different *nirvikalpaka* perceptions corresponding to the examples of the different *nirvikalpaka* perceptions corresponding to the examples of the former (the six cases from (i) to (vi) we have been discussing). In our rendering of the examples which we have tried to make idiomatic we have used English words within parentheses showing them in the subject position although except of (i) in the

corresponding Sanskrit sentence there are no separate words for them. Nevertheless, we assume that what is being asserted by those sentences may be represented in the way we have done to give them a look of idiomatic expressions in English. Prasastapada's examples under reference are examples of cognitions involving a predicational structure as the *viśeṣana* is taken as related to some *viśeṣya* of subject. I have indicated what figures as *viśeṣya* by using words within parentheses though in Sanskrit this is indicated by the use of the word for the *viśeṣya* with appropriate nominal suffixes used in accordance with the appropriate syntactical rules. Given that there is a *viśeṣya* in each of such examples and that we are not in error here, we can legitimately enquire about the nature and contents of the *nirvikalpaka* cognition for each of the examples. Let us first consider the first example.

(This) substance exists (*sat drvyam*)

This example is different from all others in that we have here two words in the Sanskrit sentence. The first word (*sat*) in it has been interpreted as standing for the *viśeṣana*. It is thus also supposed that the other word stands for the subject or the *viśeṣya*. As this is an example of perception we further suppose that the perception is about a single specific object. This fact has been indicated by us in our translation by the use of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' within parentheses. But the word '*dravya*' (substance) explicitly used by Prasāstapāda for the *viśeṣya* (subject) suggests that it has been represented as a thing identified by the property of substance-hood. In later Nyaya such a property is described as *viśeṣyatā-avacchedaka-dharma* (delimiting property for subject-hood). It is not clear from Prasāstapāda's writing whether such a property is also to be treated as a *viśeṣan*. It cannot however be a *viśeṣana* as distinct from *upalakṣaṇa* (as per their definitions by Gaṅgeśa).<sup>6</sup> But it is surely a *prakāra* that is often taken as *viśeṣana*. If it is a *viśeṣana* then like the other property (i.e. *satta* or existence) which is clearly a *viśeṣana* it should also figure in the preceding *nirvikalpaka* perception as a discrete content along with the thing (substance) and the other

property (existence). But there is no clear statement in this respect in the literature that may serve as the guide for us.

In Prasastapāda's work all the six examples have been represented by a single Sanskrit sentence (*Sat dravyam pṛthivī visāni śuklah gaur gachati*) which has been translated by us by six different independent sentences in English. If the word 'dravya' is taken as the *viśeṣya* word also in respect of the other cases, the first example will not be different from the other ones in this respect. Following the commentators we have however treated the remaining examples as distinct from the first one by treating them as single worded sentence in as much as the word 'dravya' is not taken as part of these sentences, although the subject of such sentences, ontologically speaking, is actually a substance. But if the other interpretation (i.e. the word 'dravya' be taken as the word for the *viśeṣya*) is accepted then if substance-hood is taken as a *prakāra* (and therefore also as a *viśeṣaṇa*) in respect of the *viśeṣya* in question (it does not matter what the major *viśeṣaṇa* is, that is, whether it a universal or substance or quality or action), the preceding *nirvikalpaka* would have, for its discrete contents, that specific substance, substance-hood, and the major *viśeṣaṇa* (which is a universal in respect of the first and also in respect of the second and fifth examples and which is a particular in respect of the remaining ones).

If the word 'substance' not taken as representing the *viśeṣya* in these examples then the preceding cognition is about the referent of the word 'this' used by us within parentheses in our translation. The referent, although an individual substance, does not figure as something as having the property of substance-hood and the respective other contents figure as contents as pertaining to the *viśeṣya* in question.

As the cases other than the first, second and the fifth are such that the *viśeṣaṇa* -s involved in them are not universals, the perception of *svarupa-ālocana-mātra* type, if it is to be supposed to be operative as a cause here, must

be about discrete objects, namely, about the *viśeṣya* (referent of the word 'this') and the *viśeṣaṇa* concerned which also is a particular. As this particular is substance (a pair of horns) in case of ("(This) has horns"), a quality (white colour) in case of ("(This) is white") and motion is ("(This) is moving"), these particulars are not without a universal although this universal does not inhere in the subject or the *viśeṣya* but inheres in the *viśeṣaṇa* which is distinct from it. Therefore, this universal also must figure as content in the preceding cognition. But the question is whether in this preceding cognition this universal is taken to be a property of the *viśeṣaṇa*. If this is the case then this preceding cognition is not an instance of mere acquaintance of *svarupa-alocana-matra* as the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal which are its contents are to be understood as related. The preceding cognition may however be treated as mere acquaintance in which that *viśeṣaṇa* (which is a particular) and its universal figure as discrete contents along with the *viśeṣya* of the cognition in the example. Such a position cannot however be maintained if the *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-* perception as represented in Praśāstapāda's examples is a case of what has come to be known in later Nyāya as a case of *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi-buddhi*.

A cognition of this type is one in which the *viśeṣaṇa* in respect to the *viśeṣya* is taken as qualified by some further *viśeṣaṇa*, for example, in *Raktadandavān puruṣaḥ* (The person has a red stick (in his hand), the main *viśeṣaṇa* here being the stick which again is taken as a red one, that is taken as related to red colour. It is here stipulated that such a composite cognition must be causally due to a cognition which is not about discrete contents but actually about some of the contents as related, in the example cited the preceding cognition is about the stick as red, the red colour (which is a limiter of *viśeṣaṇata*) figuring as the *prakāra* in respect of the stick. Hence, if Praśāstapāda's examples (iii), (iv) and (vi) are treated as cases of such composite cognitions, these should be taken as due to a simpler *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-jñāna* about the pair of horns as related to the universal of being a horn, about the

white colour as related to its specific universal and about motion as related to its universal in respective cases. It seems to us that this was not perhaps the illustration of the perception of *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa* type which he apparently takes to be directly due to mere-acquaintance variety of perception. We can also put forward some other arguments against the hypothesis under reference.

The hypothesis of *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi-buddhi* stipulates that the cognition immediately preceding the perception in the examples under consideration (that is, in the third, fourth and sixth cases) is about the thing figuring in the later cognition as the *viśeṣaṇa* but as related to its specific universal and perhaps also along with the *viśeṣya* which is a substance as a discrete content in it. If that substance figures also as a qualified content in it there will be no logical difference between the two perceptions and the hypothesis will also be open to the charge of infinite regress as the preceding perception like the original one shall have to be taken to be due to a similar perception. It may thus be held that this preceding perception is about that substance as a discrete content but also about the *viśeṣaṇa* as *characterised* by its own universal. Alternatively, it may be maintained that this previous perception is only about this relational complex involving the *viśeṣaṇa* and the universal and not about the substance as a discrete unrelated content. But this is not acceptable as *Prāśastapāda* stipulates that the substance figures as the content in the two perceptions to be taken as causally related of which the perception taken as the cause is a mere acquaintance only. Thus, we shall have to consider whether the perception acting as the cause in respect of the final *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa* cognition is all about discrete contents or not. If it is about the *viśeṣya*-substance but not understood as related to the *viśeṣaṇa* and also about the *viśeṣaṇa*-complex involving the *viśeṣaṇa* as characterized by its universal we shall have to assume that the *viśeṣya*-substance figures as a content also in a preceding third perception in which the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal are to be supposed to figure only as discrete contents along with the substance if all the

contents of the earliest perception although they would differ in respect of the contents of the intermediate perception. But it will be difficult to take this earliest perception as the cause of the perception in the cited examples as it will be a remote and not an immediate antecedent in respect of it. Therefore, it should be supposed that the substance figures as a content also in the intermediate perception and thus there will be no difference between the first and the second alternatives. But it will be difficult to take this earliest perception as the cause of the perception in the cited examples as it will be a remote and not an immediate antecedent in respect of it. Therefore, it should be supposed that the substance figures as a content also in the intermediate perception and thus there will be no difference between the first and the second alternatives. But the postulation of this intermediate perception will in any case be an unnecessary duplication of causes in respect of the original perception in the examples as it is supposed here that both the earliest and the intermediate perceptions are causes. Hence, the intermediate perception may be dropped from the causal process, the necessary implication being that Praśastapāda's examples are not cases of *viśista-vaiśistya-avagāhi* cognition and also that the perception to be taken as the cause are about all the three, namely, the substance (*viśeṣya*), the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal as discrete contents. This can also be claimed to be consistent with the principle of non-delay (*avilamba*) in the rise of effect.

In support of such a position we can further say that the perception of discrete contents has been claimed by Praśastapāda not only as a cause but also as *pramāna* in respect of the cognitions cited by him in his examples. If the word '*pramāna*' stands for the *kāraṇa* in respect of *pramā* and if the *kāraṇa* is (*karana*) as has been proposed by some, our argument does surely gain greater acceptability. Let us therefore elucidate this thesis of Praśastapāda in some detail.

It is known to all students of Indian philosophy that *kāraṇa* (instrumental cause) is *asādhāraṇa* (usually translated as extraordinary) *kāraṇa* (cause), and that this is taken either as the latest of the conditions (*sadhakatama/phala-ayoga-vyavacchinna*) or as a condition (*vyaparavat*) that produces the phenomenon in question by producing something which also acts as a cause in respect of the phenomenon. The first position is very old and held by philosophers of different schools while the second one is of later innovation made by the philosophers belonging to the modern school of Nyāya founded by Gaṅgeśa. The causal condition which is the latest to arise for the production of an effect cannot be more than one and in that sense it is an *asādhāraṇa* or extraordinary causal condition. Similarly, something that produces an effect by producing an intermediate thing which also is a cause for the same thing is an extraordinary causal condition, as this intermediate thing occurring the effect necessarily takes place. In fact, this intermediate thing is mostly, though not always, the *kāraṇa* also according to the first interpretation. A philosopher should have the freedom to choose any of the two stipulations and may indeed use one in one context and the other in another context. In our present context the *nirvikalpaka* cognition is held by Prasastapada's terminology).<sup>7</sup> Supposing that the perception in his examples are cases of *pramā* or knowledge, this condition is then also to be called a *pramāna* in the sense of being the *kāraṇa* of *pramā*. But the interpretation that is being followed here is clearly the first one.

If some philosopher chooses, as Gaṅgeśa does, to follow the *vyaparavat* model of interpretation the *nirvikalpaka* cannot be regarded as such a causal condition, that is, as the *kāraṇa* of *pramā*. The factor that produces an intermediate thing which along with that factor produces the qualified cognition will be such an extra-ordinary causal condition. Gaṅgeśa takes the sense organ as a causal condition. Gaṅgeśa takes the sense organ as a causal condition that produces the qualified cognition by producing the contact with the object which also is necessary for that cognition. Hence, according to the second stipulation

about the concept of *kāraṇa* it is not the *nirvikalpaka* but the sense organ which is to be regarded as the *kāraṇa* and also the *pramāṇa* in respect of the qualified perception. It may be noticed here that the sensory contact is not the last (i.e., the latest) of the conditions to generate the qualified cognition, for unless that contact occurs and thus obtains the *nirvikalpaka* also cannot occur for producing the qualified cognition. The intermediate factor, if the *nirvikalpaka* is not to be so regarded in this context, is then not the latest (*sadhakatama/phala-ayoga-vyavachinna*) condition. If, however, the *nirvikalpaka* itself is taken as the *karya* (effect) the sensory contact can be regarded as the latest condition. Clearly there is some ambiguity here as *nirvikalpaka* itself may be regarded as such an intermediate factor with reference to the later cognition in as much as it is caused by the sense organ and also causes the qualified cognition. Such an ambiguity is however absent in the first stipulation as no two conditions can be called *kāraṇa* according to this stipulation. Therefore, if this stipulation is to be preferred for this reason, it will certainly be a matter of greater justification to treat, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, the *nirvikalpaka* as the *kāraṇa* and also as the *pramāṇa* in respect of the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* cases of perception.<sup>8</sup>

This Vaiśeṣika strategy was carefully avoided by Gaṅgeśa and his followers who denied that a cognition can be *kāraṇa* in respect of perception though such *kāraṇa* in respect of non-perceptual cognition is necessarily some cognition or other. In fact this thesis has been utilised by them in the formulation of the definition of perception as a cognition the *kāraṇa* in respect of which is something other than a cognition (i.e. as *jñānaakāraṇa karaṇa*). These philosophers do not however deny that the *nirvikalpaka* is a cause (*kāraṇa*) of the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* perception. But they will admit its necessity only as a condition in the role of cognition of the *viśeṣana* which itself is not a argument for admitting the *nirvikalpaka*.

Prāśastapāda himself asserts that though the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* cognition is due to the *nirvikalpaka* this *nirvikalpaka* does not owe its origin to any

cognition whatsoever.<sup>9</sup> In this sense, as the commentators mention, the *nirvikalpaka* is the simplest and ultimate cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa*, being itself not qualified.<sup>10</sup> But the *nirvikalpaka* is something more for Praśastapāda and his followers. According to them if the qualified perception is true and is *pramā* then, as has been noted by us earlier, this perception must be due to the efficacy of the *nirvikalpaka* without which the resultant perception would not have been a true cognition, that is, an instance of *pramā*.

The thesis of *parātaḥprāmānya* (extrinsic validity) in respect of origin of *prāmānya* as developed in Navya Nyāya stipulates that the truth in respect of a perceptual cognition is due to a factor which is other than the factors that produce this cognition qua a perceptual cognition. Thus, an illusory perception or a veridical one is equally due to sensory contact. But if it is a case of veridical perception it is due to contact with a thing (the *viśeṣya*) which does actually have the property/feature in it that appears as the *viśeṣaṇa* in the qualified cognition.<sup>11</sup> This feature of the sensory contact is called *guna* in Sanskrit which means a (meritorious) quality as opposed to defect or *doṣa*. But in a sense, this is arguing in a circular way. Truth of the cognition consists in the *viśeṣya* thing's possessing the *viśeṣaṇa*. Thus, if the *guna* in question is so formulated that it presupposes this (in stating that the required sensory contact with the object is actually contact with a thing that must have the *viśeṣaṇa* in it), the Navya Nyāya formulation of the thesis of *parātaḥ prāmānya* does not carry conviction as an explanation of the origin of the veridicality of perception.

The Vaiśeṣika thesis that truth is ensured by the *nirvikalpaka* is supposed to be not inconsistent with the theory of extrinsic validity. It rather seems to fare better, as it does not have the ring of circularity around it. It may be said that the sensory contact necessary for the *nirvikalpaka* and for that matter also for the *pratyakṣa* is actually contact with the thing which is not only the *viśeṣya* but is something that does have the *viśeṣaṇa* in it. The Navya Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika theses do not thus substantially differ from one another. Nevertheless

it can be claimed that the truth analysis is not inbuilt in the thesis of the *nirvikalpaka* which is defined as acquaintance of discrete contents (*svarupa-alocana-matra*). But the truth analysis is very much imbedded in the *guna* thesis concerned (namely, *viseanavadviśeṣyasannikarṣa*).

Given this subtle difference of the Vaiśeṣika thesis from the Navya Nyāya one as mentioned here we can utilise it in expressing our preference for the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the *nirvikalpaka* is the *pramāna*, i.e., the *kāraṇa* in respect of *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-pratyakṣa-pramā* as it does not smack of circularity in any way. If the conditions including the sensory contact that produce the *nirvikalpaka* are still in operation now being aided by the *nirvikalpaka* itself produced by them, the cognition being produced is not only perception but also a veridical one. Where the *nirvikalpaka* about the *viśeṣaṇa* is missing, for example, in perceptual illusion about a thing as silver when the thing is not actually silver the resultant cognition cannot be an instance of *pramā*.<sup>12</sup>

## TRUTH AS AVYABHICARITATVA

The words 'true'/'false' are supposed to represent predicates applicable to sentences in the indicative mood or to their meaning called propositions, or to beliefs with respect to them. In Western philosophy different theories of truth have been offered under the labels of correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatism and semantic theory. Of these the first and the last ones are taken to be acceptable theories in respect of the nature of truth. The other two theories are valued not so much as theories about the *nature* of truth but as theories about the test of truth and are regarded and often referred to as theories of knowledge or of justification by philosophers of eminence. The words 'true'/'false' are both positive terms in appearance as one of them has not been formed from the other by adding to it some negative particle. Philosophers in the West, however,

almost invariably have treated one as having positive meaning and the other as having its negation as its meaning. To a bearer of truth-value must belong one of these two values represented by the words 'true'/'false' and this view is known as bivalence theory of truth. Although recent developments in many-valued logic pose threat to this theory it still commands a great following. The words that will be mostly used in idiomatic translation of 'true'/'false' in the languages of India that have mainly descended from Sanskrit are *satya/mithyā*.. Both these words are positive in appearance. The things to which these words may be applied can certainly be beliefs and in an extended sense these may be applied even to *abhilapaka vakyas*, i.e. to the sentences that express those beliefs. But these two Sanskrit words have been used by many philosophers to refer not simply to beliefs or sentences but also to what these beliefs or sentences.

### THE NAVYA-NYĀYA CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The individual man is really a particular self delimited by a body. As Navya-Nyāya philosophers hold that there are innumerable selves all different from one another, an individual man has a unique self. But as Navya-Nyāya philosophers also accept the doctrine of rebirth, a man in this birth may become an animal in his next birth. As the self of an individual remains the same whether he is born as a man, or as an animal, a human being must have a human body. Thus, the uniqueness, of the self cannot guarantee that the individual is a human being. Thus an individual man who is identical with his self must also have a human body. This human body delimits the self which is neither human nor non-human. Thus the body is very important for an individual man.

The self of the individual is, as we have already stated, is ubiquitous and all substances of limited magnitude like atoms and composite substances are in contact with it. Thus the self of an individual will be all over the earth, in the firemanent, in the stars, and so on. Yet although the self of the individual is

infinitely extended yet it is the subject of knowing, feeling and willing, only in so far as it is delimited by body. Thus knowledge, feeling, willing do not belong to the self all over, but belong to the self only in so far as it is restricted by the body. Thus, knowledge-feeling, willing are qualities of non-pervasive occurrence (*avyapya-vrtti*).


Then there is a function of the totality of all men in the creation of the universe. The universe is created for the enjoyment or suffering of human beings. The general causes of the creation of the universe are God's will, knowledge, time, as also the stock of merit and demerit of the individual human beings. Thus *adrsta* of every man is a general cause of the creation of the universe. Every individual has passed through innumerable births and deaths. There is no first birth of an individual, just as there is no first creation of the universe. A universe is created, endures for a long time then is lost in total dissolution. Again, another universe is created, and so the cycle of creation, duration and dissolution goes on. So also with the individual man, with the difference that he is not born again if and only if he attains liberation in this life. Thus in the creation of the universe the *adrsta* of men is as much responsible as God's will and knowledge.

*Adrsta* is the special cause of pleasure and pain of the individual, and is also a general cause of all type of cognition and other states, internal or external, of the individual.

### KINDS OF PERCEPTION

According to Navya-Nyāya perceptions are primarily of two kinds : (1) indeterminate and (2) determinate. Determinate perceptions again are of two kinds : (a) ordinary (*laukika*) and (b) special (*alaukika*). Ordinary perception involves epistemic relations (*sannikarṣa*) of six kinds. Special perceptions are of three kinds : (i) perceptions of all instances of a universal. (ii) Perception of an

object by a sense-organ although the object is not a proper object of ordinary perception by that sense-organ. These two kinds of special perception are common to all men. (iii) This kind of special perception is available to only yogins who can perceive very small things like atoms, distant or future things and so on. The following diagram makes this classification of perceptions clear.



#### (A) Indeterminate Perception

In ordinary perception of the determinate kind we have a qualificative cognition having a qualificand, a qualifier and a relation between them. For example, when we perceive something as a cow or something as cowness-possessing, the thing is the qualificand of the perceptual cognition, cowness is its qualifier and inherence is the qualification (for, cowness inheres in the present thing). Now the Nyāya argument is that the qualificative cognition requires cowness is, he cannot know or perceive as a cow requires the prior cognition of cowness. But this cognition of cowness which produces the determinate cognition cannot itself be a determinate cognition, as this will lead to an infinite regress; so, every determinate perception requires an indeterminate knowledge of cowness there is no knowledge of a relation. This indeterminate knowledge

has to be perceptual, for in no other way can one initially know cowness in isolation.

This indeterminate perception of Navya-Nyāya has some similarities with what Russell (once called 'knowledge by acquaintance' which he contrasted with knowledge by description. Knowledge by acquaintance requires a direct relation of the object with the knower. The Navya-Nyāya theory of indeterminate perception is similar to knowledge by acquaintance is the referent of logically proper names like 'this', 'I', etc., according to the Navya-Nyāya theory that any word denotes an object or objects only under a mode which is a property of the object or objects. So a cognition involving words is necessarily a qualificative cognition of an object possessing a property. As indeterminate perception is postulated to causally explain determinate or qualificative perception, it cannot involve any name. This indeterminate cognition cannot also be expressed in language, for using language is possible only when there is a distinction between the meant object and the mode under which it is meant. So Navya-Nyāya philosophers use inference to postulate this primitive kind of perception.

#### (B) Determinate perception

Determinate perception is qualificative cognition the object of which is of the form aRb. When we perceive a cow classify the perceived object as a cow, or as cowness-possessing. In this cognition the perceived object is the qualificand, cowness is the qualifier and inherence is the qualification. The object cognized is, therefore, a qualified object, but not a fact.

Both indeterminate and determinate perception requires the instrumentality of sense-organs. The sense-organs have to be related to the object perceived, but this relation is not merely an objective relation. It may be described as an epistemic relation, the relation of the sense-organ with the object that produces the cognition. There are six kinds of epistemic relations (*sannikarṣa*) in ordinary perception. Thus when we perceive a jar as jarness-

possessing, the jar is the object of determinate perception. The sense-organ of vision is related to the jar epistemically by contact. When we perceive the colour of the jar, say, the red colour, it is the colour which is the object of perception and the sense-organ of vision has to be related epistemically to the red colour of the jar. This relation is a chain relation and cannot be a direct relation. The sense-organ of vision is related to the jar by contact and the red colour of the jar inheres in it. Hence, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the red colour of the jar is contact-cum-inherence.

The distinction between a particular and a universal is not the same as that between a thing and a quality. According to Navya-Nyāya, qualities are as particular as the things to which they belong. So just as there are universals inhering in things - thing-universals - so also there are universals inhering in qualities - quality-universals.

When we perceive the universal of the red colour our sense-organ of vision has to be related to the universal of the red colour, i.e. redness, in a very indirect relation. The eyes are in contact with the jar, the red colour inheres in the jar, and redness inheres in the red colour. Hence the epistemic relation of the sense-organ of vision to the redness is contact-cum-inherence-cum-inherence.

Here we must note the difference between an objective relation of the sense-organ to the object perceived and the epistemic relation between them. When we perceive a jar the sense-organ of vision is epistemically related to the jar; yet objectively the jar is related to its red colour and the red colour to the universal of red colour by inherence. Thus although the jar is related to all of its qualities by inherence, when we perceive the jar we do not perceive all its qualities. Thus the objective relation between the jar and its qualities does not produce the perception of all qualities of the jar simultaneously. It is a fact that a jar is objectively related to all its qualities, but this does not mean that whenever we perceive the jar we perceive all the qualities of the jar. To determine the epistemic relation between a sense-organ and the object perceived, we have first

of all to note what object is perceived, a thing, its colour or the colour universal, and then to calculate backward to the epistemic relation. So the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived can be calculated only by first knowing what object is perceived.

According to Nyāya, the sense-organs are not parts of the body but are imperceptible elements (*pañca mahābhūta*). Thus the sense-organ of vision is the fire which is located in the eye-balls. The auditory sense-organ is the *ākāśa* which is imperceptible and is located in the earhole. According to Nyāya, sound is a quality of *ākāśa* which is the sense-organ of hearing. As a quality of *ākāśa* sound inheres in it. Hence when we hear a sound the sound is related to the sense-organ of hearing by inherence. We may also hear the sound-universal present in the particular instances of sound. In hearing the sound-universal the sense-organ of hearing is indirectly related to it. Sound inheres in the sense-organ of hearing (*ākāśa*) and the universal of sound inheres in the sound; so the sense-organ of hearing is related to the universal of sound by inherence-cum-inherence.

According to Navya-Nyāya we can perceive not merely positive objects but also negative objects like absence of a jar on the floor. Here it is necessary to relate epistemically the sense-organ of vision with the absence of the jar on the floor. First of all the sense-organ of vision is related to the floor by contact and the absence of the jar is the qualifier of the floor. Hence the sense-organ of vision is related to the absence of the jar on the floor by the relation of contact-cum-qualifier<sup>ness</sup>.

### (C) Special Perception

Among systems of Indian philosophy only Navya-Nyāya admit this type of perception. There are three kinds of this type of perception.

(i) The first kind of this type of perception is the perception of all instances of a universal. When we perceive an elephant, we also perceive

ordinarily the universal elephantness inhering in the elephant. These are all cases of ordinary perception. But Navya-Nyāya philosophers argue that by perceiving one elephant as possessing elephantness, we perceive in a special way all instances of elephantness i.e., all elephants, past, present and future, near and far.

When we perceive one elephant, we have perceived all elephants merely as elephants. This is why when we at once recognize it as an elephant. But recognition is not possible if we had not already known the elephant. It is the first time that we are seeing the second elephant. How can we then recognize it as an elephant? According to Navya-Nyāya a philosophers this experience of recognition can be explained only if we hold that by perceiving one elephant in the ordinary way we have perceived in a special way all elephants.

This Nyāya theory of perceiving in a special way all instances of universal by perceiving the univesal in the ordinary way in one instance of the universal avoids a difficulty of the conceptual theory of universals. According to this theory we perceive a number of elephants, then compare and contrast these perceived particulars and then abstract the qualities common the all of them and then generalize to form the concept of the universal of elephant. A difficulty in this theory of abstract universal is that we shall have to perceive many elephants. As we have not yet got the universal of elephant, it is not clear how we can be sure that we are seeing a second elephant. Without having the universal we cannot possibly recognize a second elephant as an elephant. The Nyāya theory of this kind of special perception explains how we can recognize a second elephant as an elephant. Even when we perceive the first elephant we also perceive the elephant-universal present in the first elephant. But this perception of the universal does not suffice to explain our recognition of the second elephant as an elephant. Hence there is the need for this special kind of perception.

Even though this is a special kind of perception it is common. It is the ordinary actual cognition of the universal which functions as the epistemic relation. The universal is actually perceived in the instance present here and now, and this universal is present not only in this object but in all its instances. So the actual ordinary perception of the universal functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and all instances of the universal. As this epistemic relation is not of an ordinary kind, it is regarded as of a special kind (*alaukika*).

This kind of special perception is used in Navya- Nyāya to explain the perception of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire. Not one can see all cases of smoke, or all cases of fire. Then how can one know, as one actually does, that all cases of smoke are related in the appropriate manner with fire? The reply is that by seeing one case of smoke, one ordinarily sees smokeness which inheres in all instances of the smoke-universal. In this special sense, one sees all cases of smoke, which explains the possibility of perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire. We shall explain later why Navya- Nyāya philosophers cannot admit inductive inference.

(ii) The second kind of special perception is the perception of objects by a sense-organ, although these objects are not the proper objects of perception by the sense-organ.

As an example we may take the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant. Fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Yet when we see a piece of sandalwood we see it as fragrant. This is possible only if we had smelt the piece of sandalwood when we saw it before. It is the memory of the fragrance which functions as a very special kind of epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the fragrance. It will not do to say that we see the piece of sandalwood and remember that it is fragrant. Our experience is of visual perception of the piece of sandalwood as fragrant. To explain this experience it is necessary to postulate this kind of perception.

There are five more different cases in which this kind of special perception is used in Navya-Nyāya to explain various types of experience, (a) The first case is of recognition. We saw Devadatta before: when we see him now we recognize him to be that person. The recognition is perception and it takes the form 'This is that Devadatta'. Now in this recognition the memory of Devadatta whom we saw before functions as epistemic relation to produce this perception, (b) According to Nyāya, we can know one cognition of an object in a higher order introspective cognition. The object of this higher order introspective cognition of a cognition has the form 'I know the jar'. When I perceive the jar I am aware only of the jar, but not of my perceiving it. If I have to know my perception I have to perform a higher order introspective act. This introspective act has as its object the first order act. Yet the first order act cannot be cognized in a second order act unless and until the object of the first order act is also cognised.

The second order act cognizes the first order act and also the object of the first order act. This is possible only if we hold that the object of the first order act becomes an object of the second order act. As the second order act is introspection or inner perception it perceives the object of the first order act only in so far as it is cognized in the first order act. Here the epistemic relation between the second order inner perception and the object of the first order act is the first order act of the cognition itself. So in this case also a cognition becomes the epistemic relation between the inner perception and the object of the first order perception. This is a perception of special kind. (c) The third case of this type of epistemic relation is in explaining an illusory perception. When, for example, we mistake a piece of rope for a snake though not present here and now. When we mistake a piece of rope for an idea or a memory of a real snake we perceive the snake which is not here and now. But how can the sense-organ of vision be related to a snake not here and now? According to Nyāya, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the absent snake is

through the memory of a snake seen in the past. Here, too, it is a memory which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the absent snake. (d) In the case of perception of a negative object, the sense-organ has to be epistemically related to the object. For example, when we perceive that there is no jar on the floor, we have to know the jar before. This memory of the jar seen before becomes the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the jar. We cannot perceive simply absence; the absence has got to be absence of some thing. Even though the absence is before our eyes, the jar which is absent is not. Yet unless and until we can see the jar we cannot see the absence of the jar. Here, too, the memory of the jar functions as the epistemic relation between the visual sense-organ, and the absent jar. (e) Navya- Nyāya philosophers hold that the meaning of a word may be known in different ways. One way is to identify an object as the meaning of a word based on perception of similarity (*upamiti*). For example, a forester tells a city dweller that a *govaya* is similar to a cow. When that man goes to a forest and perceives an animal similar to a cow he knows that the meaning of the word 'gavaya' is any animal of this kind. Now the problem is that the person has to see the similarity of the *gavaya* which is present and a cow which is absent. How can one perceive the similarity between a present and an absent thing? According to Nyāya philosophers the perception of the similarity requires perception of the two objects which are similar. As the *gavaya* is present there is no difficulty in explaining how it can be perceived. But how can an absent cow be perceived? It is not ordinary perception, for it is the memory of a cow seen before which functions as the epistemic relation between the visual sense-organ and the absent cow. So this perception of similarity between a present thing and an absent thing is of a special kind.

(iii) The special perception of this kind is not common to all individuals but is the prerogative of yogins. Yogins can 'see' small things like atoms, distant and past and future things which cannot be perceived normally.

But perception according to Nyāya requires an epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived. In the case of yogic perception the epistemic relation is the special cognition in the mind resulting from yogic exercises.

In all these three forms of special perception, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived is very peculiar. In all these three cases it is knowledge of a sort that functions as the epistemic relation. In the first case it is the perception of the universal in ordinary way which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and all instances of the universal. In the second case it is sometimes memory and sometimes informative knowledge which functions as the epistemic relation. This has been explained above in detail. In the third case it is the knowledge resulting from yogic practices which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived. In emphasizing the instrumentality of sense-organs in all forms of perception, ordinary or special, Nyāya philosophy goes against the yoga theory of Patanjali. According to Nyāya a blind man cannot see anything even by yogic exercises. For seeing the function of the visual sense-organ is essential. Thus a blind yogic cannot see God, he can have other kinds of perception of God.

#### (D) False cognition

Now we explain the difference between a true cognition and a false cognition. ~~and a false cognition.~~ For this is necessary to define 'a true cognition'. This may be done by analysing a particular instance. For example, when we cognize a serpent as (a) serpent, this cognition is true, while if we cognize a piece of rope as a serpent this cognition is false. Now when we cognize truly what is objectively a serpent as serpent-ness-possessing, then this cognition has the object serpentness – possess~~x~~ing serpent as its qualificand, and serpentness as its qualifier. Thus the cognition has two properties – (i) having-serpentness possessing-serpent as its qualificand, and (ii)

having serpentness as its qualifier. As these two properties belong to the same cognition of a snake as a snake, (ii) is said to be limited by (i). Hence a true cognition has 3 properties – (i), (ii) and (iii) i.e. (ii) limited by (i). It is (iii) alone which is the defining mark of the true cognition.

In the false cognition of piece of rope as a snake, there are also 3 properties – (a) having the piece of rope – possessing the absence of snakesness as its qualificand, (b) having snakesness as its-qualifier, and (c), (b) limited by (a). Of these 3 properties, (c) alone is the defining mark of a false cognition : the property – having-snakesness-as its qualifier – limited by the property – having-something with absence of snakesness as its qualificand.

The technical definitions given in earlier Nyāya are the following.

D1 A cognition having that as its qualifier in a that-possessor is true.

D2 A cognition having that as its qualifier in a negation-of-that – possessor is false.

By using the relative pronoun 'that' the earlier Nyāya philosophers attempted to give a general definition. The usual practice of earlier philosophers was to eliminate nouns of particular definitional sentences by relative pronouns to achieve universality. Thus in Gangeśa's accepted definition of pervasion, there are two pairs of relative pronouns, two 'that-which is; in such a case it is difficult to fix the reference of which 'which' to which 'that'. Gangeśa's definition may be translated as follows:

D3 Pervasion is the co-presence of that with that which is not limited by the limiter of counterpositiveness of any constant absence co-present with which and excluding its counter positive.

It will be easier to fix the reference of relative pronouns by using different variables thus :

D3\* Pervasion is the co-presence of  $x$  with  $y$  where  $x$  is not limited by the limiter of counterpositiveness of any absence ( $z$ ) co-present with  $y$  and excluding its ( $z$ 's) counterpositive.<sup>14</sup>

And that perception is of two kinds – indeterminate and determinate.

'That perception' means the perception as has been defined by Gaṅgeśa earlier. He has given two definitions of perception; here I explain the second definition. 'Perception' is defined as that cognition which does not have another cognition as its instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*). An instrumental cause is not just any cause, but a special cause which has an operation. An operation is an effect of the instrumental cause and also a cause of another effect of the instrumental cause. For example, when a woodcutter fells a tree with an axe, the axe is the instrumental cause of the felling of the tree. Its operation is the contact of the axe with the tree.<sup>15</sup> The contact of the axe is an effect of the axe and yet this contact is also a cause of the felling of the tree which is also an effect of the instrumental cause. Contact of the axe with the tree is, therefore, the operation of the axe. The coming together of the axe with the tree cannot be the operation, for contact is the effect of coming together and contact is the cause of the felling of the tree. Hence the coming together is a cause of a cause of the felling of the tree.

Perception is a cognition which cannot have another cognition as its instrumental cause. But in various types of perception many factors like memory function as causes. Memory is a cause, but not the instrumental cause, of different types of perception.

Gaṅgeśa has concluded with an explanation of a secondary (introspective) cognition of a primary cognition of an object. For example, if the primary cognition is of a jar, the secondary cognition is of the form 'I cognize the cognition of a jar'. Gaṅgeśa's explanation is that the cognition is perceived indeterminately in introspection while the cognition of a jar is a determinate perception. Thus the whole introspective cognition is in one part indeterminate and in another part determinate. Any cognition the structure of the object of

which is a composite of incongruous parts, as in this case, is technically called a cognition of the form 'of a half man and half lion'. This has reference to Indian mythology where the Lord Viṣṇu assumed the form of half a man and half a lion in order to kill the giant Hiranyakaśipu. So any cognition with a composite structure of incongruous parts is described as a cognition of the man-lion form.<sup>16</sup>

The position of the opponent has been explained differently by different commentators of Gaṅgeśa. Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the opponent's position as follows. Any cognition of man-lion form is unproved because there is no indeterminate perception, so determinate perception is the only kind of perception.<sup>17</sup> Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains the opponent's position as follows. A cognition of the man-lion form is unproved, for determinate perception being produced by perception cannot be regarded as a perception at all. So indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.<sup>17</sup>

Whether determinate or indeterminate perception be the only kind of perception, there cannot be any cognition of the man-lion form, as held by Gaṅgeśa.

So the commentators hold that for this reason Gaṅgeśa has begun this chapter with 'and that.....' in which sentence he asserts that there are two kinds of perception – indeterminate and determinate. This is in response to the opponent's objection that either determinate perception or indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.

If both indeterminate and determinate perceptions be admitted, still one and the same cognition cannot be regarded as both determinate and indeterminate. For indeterminateness and determinateness are mutually exclusive universals (*viruddhajāti*) so nothing can be an instance of both. According to Gaṅgeśa the introspective cognition is both determinate and indeterminate. The opponent argues that this is not possible.<sup>18</sup> According to Gaṅgeśa indeterminateness and determinateness of perception are not universals at all, and hence not mutually exclusive universals. This is because whether a

perception is determinate or indeterminate is determined by the object perceived, and not by any property inherent in the perceptions.<sup>19</sup>

Hence determinateness and indeterminateness of a perception being determined by its relation to objects are not universals and hence not mutually exclusive universals. They are imposed properties (*upādhis*). Mutually exclusive imposed properties may belong to one and the same object without any difficulty. This is because universals classify objects according to their natural kinds and hence mutually exclusive universals cannot belong to the same object, for this would mean that the object would belong to two different natural kinds. But imposed properties do not classify objects. Hence, there is no difficulty in two so imposed properties belonging to one and the same object.

No *Nyāya* philosopher, however, admits the possibility of one cognition being perceptual in one part and inferential in another. This is because, according to *Nyāya*, perception, inference and other kinds of cognition are instances of different universals. Thus being a perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣatva*) is one universal, and being inferential cognition (*anumititva*) is another universal, and they are mutually exclusive. So no cognition can be both perceptual and inferential. But indeterminateness and determinateness of perception are not universals, and hence there is no difficulty in one perception being both determinate and indeterminate at the same time.

1. “Tatra nāmajātyādi-yojanārahitam vaiśiṣṭyānavagihiniṣprakārakam nirvikalpam” *Tattvacintāmani, pratyakṣa khanda, 1/100*

Of these (two), indeterminate perception is that in which no names, universals etc. are introduced, which is not of a relation, and which does not have any mode.

According to *Nyāya* there is one kind of perception in which a relation (between two objects) gets cognized. This is determinate perception. To cognize a relation between two objects is to cognize one object as the other. This is

fundamentally different from the Western theories that to perceive a relation is to perceive a fact which is stated in a proposition (sentence). According to Nyāya even determinate perception in which we cognize a relation between two objects can be expressed by one word. For example, when I perceive a jar in determinate perception I perceive it as jar<sup>ness</sup>-possessing. The expression 'possessing' indicates a relation between the jar and jar<sup>ness</sup>. So to perceive one object as possessing another object which is called the 'property of the object' is really the mode (*prakāra*) under which the object (*viśeṣya*) is cognized. In determinate perception there is always a mode under which an object is cognized.

A determinate perception is a qualificative cognition the object of which is a relational complex of the form  $aRb$ . We now introduce three epistemic definitions :

Qualificand of a qualificative cognition :  $a$  in the cognized structure  $aRb$  is called 'the qualificand of the cognition, as well as 'the qualificand of  $b$ '.

b. Qualifier (mode) of a qualificative cognition :  $b$  in the cognized structure  $aRb$  is called 'the qualifier (mode) of the cognition as well as the qualirfier (mode) of  $a$ '.

Qualification of a qualificative cognition :  $R$  in the cognized structure  $aRb$  is called 'the qualification of the cognition'.

So  $aRb$  is a complex term, not a sentence as in Western logic. It is interpreted as 'a as related to b by R', and not as 'a is related to b by R'.

There is a more complex form of qualificative cognition, viz. doubly qualificative cognition. For example, when we cognize a stick, being a stick is the qualifier of the stick which is the qualificand. But when we cognize the first order cognition of the stick then the first order cognition is the qualificand of which the stick is the qualifier and being the stick is the qualifier of the qualifier. Thus this is an example of a doubly qualificative cognition

(*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya vagāhi-jñānam*). It may be represented symbolically as aR (bRc). This is well-formed because bRc is one complex term and not a sentence.

In determinate perception which is defined here, there is no cognition of a relation between two objects. It is not a perception of an object under any mode. It is a direct acquaintance with an object.

According to Nyāya, however, perceptions, whether determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any names or words. Gaṅgeśa has explained indeterminate perception apparently in terms of three negative characteristics – (i) there is no introduction of names, universals etc., (ii) it is not a cognition of any relation, (iii) and it does not have any mode. Now (ii) and (iii) are almost equivalent, for if there is no relation cognized in a perception, there cannot be any mode of the perception. Conversely, if there is no mode cognized in a perception, then it cannot be a perception of any relation. This is because the Nyāya theory is that the cognition of a relation is always the cognition of one object as another, one object as a mode of the other by the relation.

Perceptions, determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any words i.e., when we perceive an object we do not cognize its name, although in determinate perception we know at least one of its properties. Hence to characterize indeterminate perception as that in which we do not know names of objects becomes inappropriate. As a matter of fact Rucidatta explains the term '*nāma-yojanā-rahitam*' as '*vaśiṣṭyanavagāhi*'. That is, Rucidatta explains (i) as the same as (ii). But then the question arises: why should Gaṅgeśa give (i)? If (i) and (ii) are one and the same thing then giving two characteristics is really a repetition of one characteristic. This opens one to the objection of useless repetition.

— It may appear from the text of Gaṅgeśa that Gaṅgeśa did not accept the theory that in determinate perception words are not involved. If words are, as a rule, involved in determinate perception then indeterminate perception can be

defined correctly as that which does not involve the use of words. But this reading of Gaṅgeśa is not justified by what Gaṅgeśa has explicitly stated about determinate perception. So, the commentators like Rucidatta have interpreted (i) as meaning just the same as (ii). But Rucidatta does not explain how the charge of useless repetition can be answered. The only solution seems to be regard (ii) merely as an explication of (i).

It may be argued that there is no need to postulate indeterminate perception

*Nanu jñātvaṁ savikalpakabhinnavṛtti ityatra kiṁ mānaṁ. Na pratyakṣaṁ asiddha<sup>het</sup>veḥ, atindriyatvābhyupagamācca. Naca vyavaharaḥ tasya savikalpaka-sādhya-tvat, Napīdam na viviccitaṁ pūrvamadhunā vivechayamītyanuabhava-pramāṇakā-vālocanavikalpau vahuviśeṣaṇa -jñānabhyam tadupapatteḥ” Ibid, 1/1.*

What evidence is there for holding that cognitionhood is located in anything other than determinate perception? It cannot be perception for it is not established. Moreover, indeterminate perception is beyond the range of sense perception. It cannot be use of words, for that comes about only by determinate perception. It also cannot be argued that the evidence of indeterminate and determinate perception is the introspective evidence that I did not determine it before, but I am now determining it. For this difference can be explained by cognition and non-cognition of many qualifiers. The opponent argued that there is no reason to postulate the existence of any perception other than determinate perception. The evidence, if any, for indeterminate perception can be of three kinds – internal perception or introspection inference based upon verbal usage or introspective evidence of different kinds of perception. The opponent argued that none of these alleged grounds is adequate. We cannot prove the existence of indeterminate perception by introspection. For there is no such introspective evidence for the existence of indeterminate perception. Jaydeva Miśra here

argues that it is not a controversy over a fact. It is not a controversy over whether we do or do not have introspective awareness of indeterminate perception.<sup>20</sup> The point is that, whether we have or do not have a particular type of cognition can be settled, in appropriate cases, by introspection. According to *Nyāya*, a cognition reveals only its object, but never itself or the subject. Thus, when I know a table, this knowledge will be expressed as, 'this is a table', but never as 'I know that it is a table'. For in the knowledge of the table, it is the table, which is the object of knowledge, but not the knowledge of the table, and not the subject. In order to know a primary knowledge about an object, a secondary knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) which has the primary knowledge as its object is necessary. So if there is any indeterminate perception, it can be known directly only in introspection. But there can be no such introspective awareness of indeterminate perception. According to *Nyāya*, indeterminate perception cannot be an object of sensory perception. Introspection is inner perception depending upon the function of the inner sense (*mānas* which is *antahkārana*).

∴ This argument proves that there cannot be any secondary perception of indeterminate perception in introspection. This is because the secondary perception must be a doubly qualificative cognition. Yet indeterminate perception is not a qualificative cognition at all, hence, its cognition cannot be a doubly qualificative cognition.

This argument proves that it is not a controversy over a mere fact whether there is or there is not introspective perception of an indeterminate perception.

The second argument is that indeterminate perception may be the cause of use of words, and hence from the use of words the existence of indeterminate perception may be inferred. The opponent now points out that use of words is possible only when one has determinate perception.

This is because of the *Nyāya* theory of how a word means an object. A word can mean an object only under a mode. If a mode is not cognized the

object cannot be meant by a word. Nyāya does not accept the existence of what Russell calls 'logically proper names' which refer to objects under no mode. Indeterminate perception being a direct acquaintance with an object without any mode cannot be the cause of use of words. It is only determinate perception which is cognition of an object under a mode which can be a cause of use of words.

The opponent then considers another kind of introspective evidence for indeterminate perception. The argument is that sometimes we have introspective knowledge that did not know the object under any mode but are now knowing it under a mode. This shows that there is a primitive stage of perception where we can directly acquaint with the object without knowing its name or any property.

The opponent argues that it is not necessary to postulate this primitive stage of perception in order to explain this introspective knowledge. For it is sufficient to hold that at the prior stage we did not know the object with as many properties as we do now. At the earlier stage, therefore, we know the object as possessing fewer properties than what we now know. There is an increase in knowledge about an object because there is an increase in the number of properties known. There is no stage of knowledge where we know an object without any properties at all. The so-called indeterminate perception is really a less determinate perception.

Gangeśa's argument for qualificative cognition being caused by cognition of a qualifier and its criticism

The Nyāya argument is : the (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is caused by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, the reason being that it is a qualificative cognition like, for example, inference. This argument is not valid, for one qualificative cognition produced by the totality of causes of the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand is about both objects having reciprocal expectancy. Among these, in perception, from the sense-organ contact with an object fit for perception, in inference on the strength of the presence of the

probans in the locus of inference (cognition) under the mode of the limiter of pervaderness, in verbal cognition by virtue of (semantic) fitness etc., a qualifier not previously known gets manifested in the form of the limiter of being the referent of the word. So also in analogy, a cognition of a qualifier is nowhere the cause (of a qualificative cognition). Neither is informative cognition of that-ness in recognition. Even when there is informative cognition of that-ness still when memory traces are either not activated or are erased no recognition is produced. Hence, it is the activated memory trace which is, an (epistemic) contact, auxiliary to the sense organs for the cognition of the qualifiers. So also in the case of visual cognition that the sandal wood is fragrant the cognition of the qualifier functions as the (epistemic) contact auxiliary to the sense organs. And illusion is not a qualificative cognition at all.

The Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception is presented in the form of an inference for the sake others which consists of five sentences as its parts (*avāya*) thus :

(1) Proposition : The (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. (2) Reason : Because this is a qualificative cognition. (3) Pervasion with example: Every qualificative cognition is produced by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, for example, inference,

(The fourth and fifth members are not stated but can be supplied very easily).

- (4) Application: The perception of the form '(the) cow' is a qualificative cognition.
- (5) (5) Conclusion : Hence, it is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

The cognition of the qualifier cannot itself be a determinate perception which, in its turn, will need a cognition of its qualifier and so on ad infinitum. So

to stop this infinite regress the Nyāya philosophers hold that a determinate perception which a qualificative cognition is having a qualificand, a qualifier, and a relation between them as its complex object can be produced only if there is a prior cognition of the qualifier. The point is that if I perceive what a cow as a cow is objectively, i.e., as cowness possessing, then the cognition of cowness exists at the moment preceding the perception is necessary. I might have perceived what is objectively a cow not as a cow but simply as an animal, or as a white object and so on. In Western philosophy perception is regarded as selective, because the object perceived always possesses almost an infinite richness of properties which cannot be perceived all at once. So every particular act of perception is selective in the sense that a particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property which happens to be present in the self when one perceives the object. But how is the cognition of the particular property to be explained? The property must itself be perceptible object; the object is perceived through the property, but the property itself is perceived not again through a property, but directly. This perception which precedes the perception of the object through a mode, i.e., through a qualifier, is not a perception through a mode, i.e., it is an indeterminate perception. This is the Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this argument by not merely denying the pervasion at (3) which will be, some qualificative cognition is not caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier, but by a stronger assertion that no qualificative cognition is caused in that way. This stronger assertion the opponent proves by examining different types of qualificative cognition. He examines perception, inference, verbal knowledge, analogy, recognition and the visual perception that

a piece of sandal wood is fragrant. We shall presently explain the opponent's argument case by case.

But he proves also a general theory that no qualificative cognition is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. His general argument is as follows:

A qualificative cognition is really a cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand without a cognition of a relation between them. A qualificative cognition is one cognition about two objects. Both the objects, namely, the qualificand and the qualifier are perceived. There are causes which produce the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand. When the totality of these causes is present one ought to have two cognitions of the qualifier and the qualificand. But because there is mutual expectancy between the qualifier and the qualificand, there is only one qualificative cognition resulting from the totality of causes.

Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains that if a qualificative cognition was about a relation (between the qualifier and the qualificand) when the qualifier by being a term of the relation of the qualificative cognition has to be cognized prior to the qualificative cognition.<sup>21</sup> For it is not possible to know a relation without knowing its terms. Hence, the opponent denies the cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition, by using the concept of expectancy.

Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the concept of expectancy thus. Two objects have expectancy in the sense that there is absence of cognition of their non-relatedness. If there are two objects but we do not cognize their unrelatedness, then we shall have one cognition of one object qualified by the other.<sup>22</sup> He gives a second interpretation of expectancy which some other philosophers propose. Two objects have expectancy if and only if they are related as a limiter and limited. The point is that in the Nyāya interpretation of a qualificative cognition, where there is a cognition of a relation, the qualifier and the qualificand of the qualificative cognition are correlatives; i.e., the property of being the qualifier determines the property of being the qualificand

and vice-versa, they are not the limiter and the limited of each other. The opponent's position is that two objects having expectancy are cognized in one qualificative cognition by being objects of one cognition without any relation between them being cognized. They are yet objects of one cognition. The problem is to explain the unity of the cognition of two objects having expectancy. The problem is solved by postulating that of the two objects being cognized in one cognition, one becomes the limiter and the other the limited by the limiter. So, the opponent explains a qualificative cognition without postulation a prior indeterminate cognition of the qualifier. When we have cognition of a cow as cowness-possessing, there is really one cognition of two unconnected objects, namely, the cow and cowness. But because cow and cowness have expectancy there is one cognition of the cow as cowness-possessing.

Now the opponent proves his conclusion that in no case a qualificative cognition is caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier by examining different cases of determinate perception. He first explains how a determinate perception can be explained without postulating a prior cognition of the qualifier as a cause. When we perceive a cow as cowness-possessing, the cowness is as much perceptible as the cow. As there is an epistemic relation between the visual sense organ and the cowness it becomes perceived when we perceive a cow in determinate perception.

In inference for oneself the conclusion is always a qualificative cognition. For example, when we infer the hill, as fire-possessing, fire is the qualifier and the hill is the qualificand of the qualificative cognition. This inference for oneself requires two cognitions as its causes :

- (a) First we have to cognize with certainty that smoke is pervaded by fire (i.e. wherever there is smoke there is fire).
- (b) Then we have to perceive the hill as smoke-possessing (i.e., the hill has smoke on it).

- (c) By combining these two cognitions we get a doubly qualificative cognition of the form – the hill possesses smoke pervaded by fire. This is a doubly qualificative cognition because the hill is qualified by smoke which is qualified by pervasion by fire. To cognize a pervasion which is a relation between a pervader and a pervaded, it is necessary to cognize both under certain modes. The mode under which the pervader is cognized is called ‘the limiter of being the pervader’ and the mode under which the pervaded is cognized is called the limiter of being pervaded’. In the above example, fireness is the limiter of the pervadeness and smokeness is the limiter of the pervadedness. This is because the pervasion is a relation between smoke as smoke and fire as fire. In (b) we have to cognize the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference which is the hill in this example. Now it is argued by Nyāya philosophers that we can conclude that the hill is fire-possessing only when we cognize fireness. For to cognize fire as fire we have to cognize fire as the locus of fireness. But fireness is to be cognized under no mode at all, i.e., in indeterminate perception. Thus to infer the conclusion, one has to cognize the limiter of the pervadeness in indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this explanation and offers another which avoids indeterminate perception of the qualifier. His explanation is that in the conclusion we cognize fire under the mode of fireness which is the limiter of the pervadeness on the strength of the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference. The point is that there is no need to postulate an indeterminate perception, for when we cognize the pervasion as a relation between the pervader and the pervaded we have to cognize them under their modes; so the pervader is cognized as that which is qualified by the limiter of pervaderness. So

fireness is cognized as the qualifier of fire on the basis of the presence of smoke in the hill.

In cognizing the meaning of a word, the object has to be cognized under a mode which is the limiter of being meant by the word. The Nyāya argument is that we can cognize the meaning of word 'cow' only as that which is qualified by cowness. Anyone who does not have a prior cognition of cowness cannot cognize the meaning of the word 'cow'. It may be argued that cowness can be cognized only in a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent rejects this argument by pointing out a novel qualifier previously not cognized becomes cognized as the limiter of being meant by a word because of semantic fitness etc. It is the word which by its semantic power reveals new qualifiers not previously cognized at the time one cognizes the meaning of a word. A word can mean an object only under a mode; so the mode is part of the meaning of word. The object is what is meant; the mode is the limiter of meantness residing in what is meant by the word.

So also in analogy, cognition of the qualifier is not a cause of a qualified cognition. For analogy is the cognition of the meaning of a word on the basis of perceived similarity. It has been already shown that in the case of cognition of word meaning, a prior cognition of the qualifier is not necessary.

In recognition also the case is the same. In recognition of the form 'this is that Devadatta' the cognition of thatness is presupposed. For 'that' means Devadatta as perceived earlier. So it might appear that the cognition of thatness is presupposed in recognition. The opponent, however, points out that past cognition of thatness cannot be a cause, for the past cognition cannot continue as a cognition, but is present in the self in the form of an impression (*samskāra*) of the past cognition. If this memory impression is not recalled or is erased, then there is no recognition. This proves that it is the activated impression which is an auxiliary factor functioning with the sense organ as the epistemic relation between the sense organ and the qualifier in order to produce the cognition of the

qualifier. As the cognition of the qualifier is thus perceptual in nature, this cognition cannot be presupposed as its cause. This cognition is determinate perception and not indeterminate.

According to Nyāya, we have visual perception of a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. This is a special type of perception (*alaukika*). For it a prior knowledge of fragrance is necessary which can only be obtained by olfactory perception. A person who did not have this prior olfactory perception could not have perceived visually a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. The opponent points out that even in this case there is no need to postulate any indeterminate perception, for the cognition of fragrance acts merely as epistemic relation and is an auxiliary factor in the functioning of the visual sense organ.

Nyāya admits illusory perception and explains it in terms of a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent who is a Mīmāṃsaka does not admit any illusory perception at all. According to him, the so-called illusory perception is not one qualificative cognition but is really a couple of cognitions of different types not distinguished by the knower.

“Ucayate. Sādhyāprasiddhi-padārthopasthiti – vācyātvajñāna-tattvānubhāvānām anumityādihetuvam. Sādhyāprasiddhyādikaṁ vinā anumityāderasambhāvāt. Sādhyādikaṁ ca viśeṣanamiti tajñānanumityādihetuh. Yadyapi anumityādipratyekaṁ prati sādhyādi-viśeṣanajñānatvena na kāraṇatā. Tathāpi viśiṣṭa-jñānamātramprati viśeṣanajñānatvena kāraṇatā, vādhakabhāvat”. *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyaksapariccheda, 2/11.*

It is said (by me in reply). It may be said that the cognition of the probandum (prior to its cognition in the conclusion), memory of what is meant by a word, cognition of significance, informative cognition of thatness are causes of the inferential conclusion etc. Without a prior cognition of the probandum, etc. no inferential conclusion etc. is possible. The probandum etc., is the qualifier, and its cognition is a cause of the inferential cognition etc.

Although the cause of every particular inference is not the cognition of the probandum etc. as qualifier, yet as a merely qualificative cognition an inference etc. is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, for there is no inconsistency here.

The opponent has argued that in an inferential conclusion, say, of the form (the) hill(is) fire-possessing, where fire is the probandum and is also the qualifier of the locus of the inference, (the) hill, fireness is cognized for the first time in the conclusion on the strength of the presence of the *prōbans* (smoke) in the locus (hill), as the limiter of the pervadeness. But Gaṅgeśa points out that the probandum has to be cognized prior to its cognition in the conclusion. If we use the language of Western syllogism to explain Gaṅgeśa's point, the probandum, which very roughly corresponds to the object meant by the major term, must be known in the major premise, prior to being known in the conclusion. Without the major term in the major premise being known the conclusion cannot be drawn.

Now the probandum, fire, is the qualifier in the conclusion – (the) hill (is) fire-possessing, and hence it has to be cognized before the conclusion can be cognized and fire can be cognized only when fireness is cognized.

Rucidatta here points out that the prior cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is not the cause of the conclusion. For the cognition (firm belief) of pervasion as the cognition of pervasion is the cause of the conclusion which follows from it and it is not delayed because cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is delayed. For the cause of the conclusion is the cognition of pervasion as cognition of pervasion, not as cognition of the probandum.<sup>22</sup>

Jayadeva Miśra states this objection a bit differently. The prior cognition of the probandum is not a cause of the conclusion, but the cognition of pervasion is the cause. Now if it is argued that cognition of pervasion which is a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is not possible without cognizing the probandum, then the cognition of the

probandum becomes a cause of the cognition of pervasion which is a cause of the inferential cognition. But then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of the cognition of pervasion which is a cause of the inferential cognition. But then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of a cause of the conclusion, and, hence, is not a cause of the conclusion.<sup>23</sup>

Jayadeva Miśra replies to this objection by stating that it is the cognition of pervasion which is the prior cognition of pervasion which is the prior cognition of the probandum. Is not debarred from being a cause of the conclusion.<sup>24</sup>

Gaṅgeśa replies to the opponent by examining the different cases of qualificative cognition which the opponent discussed. Inference was the first example discussed by the opponent. Hence Gaṅgeśa first of all refutes this objection. After this Gaṅgeśa refutes the objection of the opponent by examining verbal cognition, analogy, recognition in the order in which the opponent discussed them.

The opponent has argued that verbal cognition, where an object is always cognized under a mode, does not require the prior cognition of the mode (qualifier). He has argued that by semantic fitness, the qualifier as limiter of being meant by a word, even a novel property, is cognized. Now Gaṅgeśa points out that cognizing the meaning of a word is impossible without the memory of the object meant by the word. In this memory it is the mode or the qualifier which is present as the cognized object. For example, the meaning of the word 'cow' is whatever possesses cowness. To cognize the meaning of the word 'cow' one has to remember cowness. Hence, in verbal cognition, the cognition of the qualifier must be present antecedently and hence this cognition of the qualifier really functions as a cause of the verbal cognition.

About analogy by which we cognize the meaning of a word on the basis of a perceived similarity between a known and an unknown object. Gaṅgeśa points out that a prior cognition of being meant by the word is necessary.

In the case of recognition of the form 'this is that Devadatta' it is the prior perception of thatness which is a cause of the recognition.

Now the question arises if the cognition of the probandum is a cause of the conclusion which is a qualificative cognition, then how is the theory that the cognition of the qualifier is a cause of qualificative cognition proved? The answer to this question is that the cognition of a conclusion is one type of functions as the cognition of the qualifier in producing this qualificative cognition. The point is that if a specific cause of a specific effect is established, then a general causal connection is also established, if there is no difficulty. This may be explained as follows.

Whenever we want to establish a general causal law, we have to consider only special, particular, instances. For example, if we want to establish the general causal connection between fuel and fire, we cannot get any fuel in general and fire in general, we can have only particular instances of fuel like dried grass, pieces of wood etc. And there is also no general dried grass, too. In one particular instance, we can get only one particular bundle of grass particulars. This being the case, it will be impossible to establish a general causal connection if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities of particular instances. It is, of course, not possible to ignore the particularities in all cases. For example, if an individual, Rāma, is intelligent, because he drinks cow's milk, it will not do to establish a general causal connection between drinking cow's milk and being intelligent. For other factors like heredity, environment etc., of the individual may be causally relevant.

In this case of qualificative cognition, if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities and find out the common general feature, then there will be no cause of qualificative cognition in general. So qualificative cognition will arise from no cause at all, although all particular instances of qualificative cognition like inference, verbal testimony etc., will have special causes like cognition of the probandum etc.

Then a new important problem arises. A qualificative cognition is the cognition of a relation between two cognized objects, the qualificand and the qualifier. But to cognize a relation, it may be contended, it is necessary to cognize both the terms. Gaṅgeśa's argument here is that a determinate perception which is a qualificative cognition is produced by the cognition of only the qualifier. It may be argued that this cognition is necessary but not sufficient, for to cognize a relation it is necessary to cognize both the terms, the qualificand and also the qualifier. It is interesting to note that Viśvanātha in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* asserts that in indeterminate perception both the qualificand and the qualaifier are cognized, although as unrelated.

*Aloka*, however, refutes this theory, Jayedeva Miśra says that it might be argued that as a relation is determined by both its terms, a cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition must require the cognition of the qualificand just as much as of the qualifier. The answer is that although a relation is between two terms, still it is the second term (*pratiyogīn*) which determines the relation and not the first term (*amyogīn*). This is enough to explain the meaning of relation words. This becomes clear when we consider such a term as 'colour-possessing' (coloured), which produces the cognition of inherence of colour, not of inherence of things which have the colour. If things are the second terms (*pratiyogins*) of inherence, then there would be at times a cognition of thing-possessing colour. This however, never happens; we always cognize colour-possessing things.

But, then, a question arises about contact as a relation. A cognition of contact requires a cognition of both its terms. The solution is that in perceiving two things related by contact it is the cognition of the second term of the relation which must occur prior to the cognition of the relation. The first term of the relation is cognized at the time of perception when it is epistemically related with the sense-organ. This is because contact like two-ness is *vyāsajvavṛtti* which belongs to both, but not each. So in the cognition of such qualities it is

necessary to cognize both the terms. However, two-ness is not a relation. Rucidatta, too, in his *Prakāśa*, states the solution, but attributes it to "some Nyāya philosophers".

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