

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of knowledge is as old as philosophy itself. In the history of philosophy, various attempts have been made to give a comprehensive definition of knowledge. Naturally, philosophers are not unanimous about the nature of knowledge. A popularly accepted term of what is called 'knowledge' in the west is '*jñāna*' in Indian Philosophy. But there is a special sense too in which the nearest kith and kin of knowledge is *pramā*. *Pramā* is roughly transliterated as valid cognition.¹ A careful scrutiny from historical standpoint would reveal that in the epistemological consideration in Indian philosophy, there are two dominant senses in which the word '*jñāna*' has been used. One is the narrower sense in which it is restricted only to *pramā* (valid cognition). The chief exponents of this view are Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. For them, *jñāna* is necessarily restricted to the scope of valid cognition. The cognition, say, *samsāya*, *viparyaya* etc are excluded from the scope of *jñāna*. According to Prābhākaras, non-valid cognition is not only theoretical impossibility but also self-contradictory.² Valid cognition is apprehension and it is something different from remembrance, which is not valid.³ Memory (*smṛti*) is invalid since the object is not directly known but merely recollected or remembered. Valid knowledge is experience and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impressions left by some previous experience.⁴ Memory is regarded to be invalid not because it gives no new knowledge but because it rather depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently.⁵ It is clear from this that in Prābhākara's epistemological scheme, knowledge is defined in terms of something externally given and in no case the knowledge can be wrong. It is something logically impossible that the object appears otherwise than it is. To put it in modern

terminology, all cognitive expressions are cases of only right judgements. A false judgement is inconceivable. Prābhākara asserts, "It is strange indeed how cognition can apprehend an object and yet be invalid."⁶ To him, doubt and error are valid so long as they are apprehensions.

On the contrary, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, we also find a different conception of *jñāna* which includes not only valid one but also non-valid one. They seem to accept the word 'cognition' in the episodic sense, when they confine it to *pramā*, the non-erring and non-dubious awareness. But the *lakṣaṇa* of *jñāna* is also extended to cover '*apramā*', the erring and dubious awareness etc. within it. Knowledge in the sense of *Pramā* is 'episodic' in nature according to the Nyāya view, because for the Nyāya a piece of knowledge in the sense of *pramā* is always 'object-oriented' and in this sense it is different from the sense of its Western Platonic counterpart as 'disposition'. Dispositional sense of knowledge is emphasised in the Nyāya inclusion of memory within the scope of knowledge. Knowledge for the Nyāya thus both episodic and dispositional, in the episodic sense it is *pramā* or *yathārthānubhava* and in the dispositional sense it covers *smṛti* (memory). Thus for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, '*jñāna*' is infallible in some cases and fallible in some other. They put forward various causal and justificatory grounds (*pramāṇas*) for distinguishing the infallible kind of *jñāna* from fallible one. Naturally, they advanced logical grounds for admitting *apramā* within the jurisdiction of '*jñāna*'. A critical and exhaustive exposition of *apramā* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition thus deserves special attention for a comprehensive understanding of their contribution to the epistemological literature of Indian Philosophy.

Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra considers '*jñāna*' as that which leads to the attainment of the highest good.⁷ But the modern scholars of the Nyāya Philosophy differ among themselves as to the English rendering of the word '*jñāna*'. The English word 'knowledge' refers to a piece of awareness which is necessarily true and valid. But the scope of the word '*jñāna*' in the

Nyāya philosophy certainly wider than this. It includes both valid and non-valid cognitions. The word '*buddhi*' (cognition) is taken to mean the same thing as the word '*jñāna*' means. Broadly speaking, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, cognition (*buddhi*) is taken to mean the same thing as apprehension (*upalabdhi*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and cognisance (*pratyaya*).⁸ Hence, knowledge means awareness or apprehension of objects. It includes all cognitions that have a more or less determinate objective reference. In other words, cognition (*jñāna*) is considered in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy as something that looks beyond itself or to put it in a modern terminology, cognition is intentional.⁹ The object of apprehension may be a thing or a quality, an act or an emotion, the existent as well as non-existent. But in every case in which there is knowledge, there must be something that stands out as the object of cognition. It consists simply in the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of objects. All things are made manifest or revealed to us when they become objects of cognition (*prameyas*).

Scholars of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, without any dispute consider knowledge as an attribute of the self, it is not a substance, since it cannot be the stuff or the constitutive cause of anything, nor is it the permanent substratum of certain recognized and variant properties. The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems of philosophy look upon cognition as a substantive mode or modification (*vyrtti*) of the material principle called *buddhi*, as it reflects the light or consciousness, which is immaterial and intangible can be reflected on any material substratum. It is generally believed that knowledge is neither a mode nor a substance but a kind of activity or function (*kriyā*). The Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas agree in describing knowledge as an activity, a transitive process.¹⁰ However, the Nyāya emphatically repudiates the conception of knowledge as an activity. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* traces the act theory of knowledge to a grammatical prejudice, a confusion between knowledge as manifestation and the verb, 'to know' as denoting an action. When we hear the expression 'I know', 'I cognise', etc. we are in a belief that cognition or knowledge is an

activity or process. But this only shows how in philosophy we may be deceived by the vague expressions of ordinary language.¹¹ Knowledge as an attribute of the self, is always directed to objects. It always refers beyond itself. Knowledge is never self-manifested.¹²

It is interesting to note in this passing that the Nyāya philosophers conceived the word '*jñāna*' in a wide sense. In the epistemological considerations of western philosophy, thought or consciousness, as a cognitive fact, has sometimes been regarded as an essential attribute of the mind and a pervasive character of all mental phenomena. However, the Nyāya does not pass over the distinction between thought (*jñāna*), on the one hand, and feeling, on the other. Under cognition, it brings together all cognitive facts, like sensation, perception, memory, inference, doubt, dream, illusion and the like. In this sense, the '*buddhi*' of the Nyāya corresponds to cognition which, placed by the side of feeling and will, gives us the tripartite division of mental phenomena in the traditional school of Western psychology. But in Indian epistemological tradition, Śrīharṣa formulated several sceptical counter-examples to dispute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of knowledge. Firstly, he gives the example of a lucky guess of gambling play, which fortunately happened to be true. Secondly, affirming a true conclusion from false premises. Mistaking a cloud of dust to be smoke one infers fire to be present, and accidentally fire is there. Here conclusion is true, but it is not knowledge proper. These examples of Śrīharṣa will be reminiscent of what are called Gettier examples in modern western philosophy. E.L. Gettier formulated some cases which he placed as counter examples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. Here we may give one example: Smith and Jones both have applied for the same job. Smith has sufficient evidence for his belief that Jones is going to get the job, and he has counted sometime before that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. From these he infers the conjunctive proposition that (a) the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket. Now it is actually Smith who gets the job and unknown to Smith, he himself has ten

coins in his pocket. Thus (a) is true, is believed to be so and is justifiably believed but Smith can not be entitled to have knowledge. Here we find that this fails to be a case of knowledge after fulfilling the generally accepted conditions of knowledge. But if knowledge is defined simply as a true awareness then in all the above cases, we have to say that the subject had knowledge, because they are hitting the truth. If truth-hitting episode, a true awareness, amounts to knowledge, then we do not thereby obliterate the distinction between truth and knowledge-hood. As B.K. Matilal says, "In Navya-Nyāya, a knowledge event is a true awareness which is not infected with a dubious attitude. This is a negative condition which brings back the subjective mooring. It is not claimed here that awareness must have certainty in order to be knowledge. It should be non-dubious, which is further explained as its being 'not overwhelmed by a doubt about its lack of knowledge-hood' (*of apramānya-jñānanāṣkandita*). It is argued by the Navya-Naiyāyikas that if an awareness which happens to be true and hence have knowledge-hood is infected by a doubt about its knowledge-hood or the lack of it, then the resultant state cannot perform all the functions that a piece of knowledge is supposed to perform. But it may be maintained that the knowledge-hood of such awareness is not destroyed thereby. Only the external causal factors here interfere to render certain functional powers of knowledge inert. For example, using such ^{an} awareness as a premise we can not derive any further knowledge by inference, although there may be logical connection between the two pieces of knowledge."¹³

Prābhākara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (*anubhūti*).¹⁴ It is totally different from remembrance, which is not valid. All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid by itself. A cognition which apprehends an object cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises from the impression of a prior cognition and therefore, cannot be treated as valid cognition. Kumārila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent

knowledge.¹⁵ “Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects, which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions.”¹⁶

The Mīmāṃsaka upholds the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* which may be treated as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of cognition. All apprehension is intrinsically valid. It is not validated by any other cognition. Validity of knowledge is not due to any extraneous conditions. Both Prābhākara and Kumāriḷa uphold the intrinsic validity of cognition. Prābhākara says, “All cognitions as cognitions are valid, their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects.”¹⁷ Kumāriḷa also says, “The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object, it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object.”¹⁸ Therefore, all cognitions are presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on account of this belief. A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of cognition or from a subsequent contradicting cognition. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope-snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of cognition is inferred, yet cognition itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. But if all knowledge is self-valid, how can error at all arise? Prābhākara and Kumāriḷa give different answers to this question.¹⁹ Prābhākara says that so far as the element of apprehension is concerned all the so-called invalid cognitions are valid, while the element that is invalid is no apprehension at all. An illusion is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose distinction is not apprehended illusion is not a positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension.²⁰ According to Kumāriḷa, an illusion manifests a real object in the form of a different object which too is real. In all cases of illusory perception it is only the relation between the subject and predicate elements which is unreal though appearing as real. Accordingly, an illusion is a positive misapprehension.²¹

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of cognition called *paratahprāmānyavāda*. According to it, cognition is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after the said cognition has been arisen. The nature of cognition lies in its correspondance with its object. The test of truth is a fruitful activity. If cognition leads to fruitful activity, it is valid, if it does not, it is invalid. Validity and invalidity are not intrinsically connected with cognition. They are the result of a subsequent test; cognition arises simply as cognition and becomes valid or invalid afterwards due to extraneous conditions.

The Bhatta Mīmāṃsakas agree with the Naiyāyikas so far as the invalidity of cognition is concerned, because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But they criticise the Naiyāyikas with regard to the validity (*pramāṇya*) of cognition. If the validity of cognition also like its invalidity depends on extraneous conditions, no cognition would ever become valid. The Naiyāyika contends that cognition arises simply as cognition, that it is neutral and that the question of its validity or invalidity arises afterwards and depend on external test. The Mīmāṃsaka points out that the so-called 'neutral' cognition is impossibility. We always experience either valid or invalid cognition. There is no third alternative. To say so is to maintain the absurd position that cognition when it arises is devoid of all logical value. Hence, neutral cognition is no cognition at all. All cognitions must be either valid or invalid.

Prābhākara's theory of knowledge is known as *triputipratyaksavāda*. He regards knowledge as self-luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation. Knowledge reveals itself and as it does so, it also simultaneously reveals its subject and its object. In every knowledge situation, we have this triple revelation. The subject and the object both are manifested by knowledge itself, simultaneously with its own manifestation. The self is known as the knower and it can never be cognized as an object. The *triputi* of the *jñātā*,


jñeya and *jñāna* is simultaneously revealed in every act of cognition. The subject, the object and the knowledge are simultaneously manifested in every act of knowledge which is self-luminous. It does not need any other knowledge for its revelation. The self and the object both depend on knowledge for their manifestation. Therefore, the self is not self-luminous. Every knowledge has a triple manifestation – the cognition of self as the knower, the cognition of the object as the known and the self-conscious cognition.

Prābhākara does not admit error in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid by itself. To experience is always to experience validity. Therefore, error is only partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. All knowledge, as knowledge, is quite valid, though all knowledge is not necessarily perfect. Imperfect knowledge is commonly called 'error'. But it is true so far as it goes; only it does not go for enough. All knowledge being true, there can be no logical distinction between truth and error. Prābhākar is true to his realistic position in maintaining that knowledge can never misrepresent its object. Error is one of 'omission' only, not of 'commission'. It is only non-apprehension, not mis-apprehension. This view of error is called *akhyāti* or non-apprehension.

1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF COGNITION OR KNOWLEDGE

Taking cognition in the most comprehensive sense as the cognition of objects, the Naiyāyikas proceed to distinguish between its different forms, according to the differences in the nature and validity of cognitions. In view of this, cognition is divided into *anubhava* or presentation and *smṛti* or memory.²² There is no clear attempt to define what is *anubhava* either in *Tarkasaṁgraha* or in *Tarkasaṁgrahadīpikā*. By implication it may suggest, according to some modern scholars of the Nyāya School, a kind of cognition arising only after a sense-object contact.²³ In *anubhava*, there is a presentational cognition of objects and so it is felt to be given to us. It is original in character and not the

reproduction of a previous knowledge of objects. *Smṛti* or memory, on the other hand, is not the presentation of objects, but a reproduction of previous experience. Here, our cognition appears to be due not so much to objects themselves as to our past cognitions of those objects. Each of these has been further divided into valid (*yathārtha*) and non-valid (*ayathārtha*) forms, according as it does or does not accord with the real nature of its objects. The classification of knowledge from the standpoint of Nyāya Philosophy is depicted by the following table :



In the *Tarkasaṅgraha*, *ayathārtha anubhava (apramā)* is “a cognition which has for its determinans (*prakāra*) something ‘P’, when its determinandum (*viśeṣya*) is characterized by the absence of that something.”²⁴ To take for instance the erroneous perceptual cognition of a snake. The object of this perception is ‘something’ that has the feature ‘snakeness’. But here that which actually exists before the percipient is something that has for its feature ‘rope-ness’ or ‘absence of snakeness’. This perceptual cognition has thus ‘snakeness’ as its determinans, when its determinandum is actually characterized by ‘absence of snakeness’. Such type of cognition is a kind of *apramā* or non-valid presentation (*ayathārthānubhava*), which includes all cognitions, that are either false or not true but not false. In this connection, Viśvanātha said that the notion with regard to something that it has a particular

attribute, which it has not, is described as non-valid or invalid cognition.²⁵ Hence, under *apramā*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika includes doubt (*saṁśaya*), with its varieties of conjecture (*ūha*) and indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*), as well as error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*).

However, it is to be noted here that cognitions which do not agree with the real nature of their objects are not always false or erroneous (*bhrama*). There may be cognitions which fail to give us a correct presentation of objects and so are not true (*pramā*). But at the same time they may not make any claim to truth, nor lead to any definite assertion. Such is the case with doubt, conjecture, indefinite cognition and *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning). These are not true indeed, but yet they are not false (*viparyaya*). It is in this view of such facts that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika divides non-valid presentation (*ayathārthānubhava*) further into *saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error) and *tarka* (hypothetical argument). Hence, it is not correct to speak of *apramā* or non-valid presentation, always as a case of *bhrama* or error. It becomes so when it definitely contradicts its object.

1.3 IS SMṚTI PRAMĀ ?

Memory (*smṛti*) is knowledge of one's own past experience. It is a representative cognition of past experiences due solely to the impressions produced by them.²⁶ According to the Nyāya, memory is different from recognition, which is a form of qualified perception and has reference to the direct presentation of some object, although it involves an element of representation.²⁷ Apart from Jainism which considers memory (*smṛti*) is to be an indirect instrument of valid knowledge, all other schools of Indian philosophy agree in holding that knowledge derived from memory is not valid (*pramā*). The Naiyāyikas distinguish between true and false cases of memory. True memory would represent in thought only those characters of an object which are really possessed by it, whereas the characters represented by false memory would not correspond to the real nature of the remembered object.

According to Udayana, the validity of memory is only relative, it is dependent on, derived from and determined by the validity of a prior direct experience on which it rests. If the preceding *anubhava* is valid, recollection derived from it is true, if not, the latter is to be taken as false.²⁸ And for this reason, the term '*pramā*' is not applied to memory because it lacks any independent validity of its own.

According to the Nyāya, true memory also cannot be called *pramā* or valid knowledge. But on this very point, opinions are divided in Indian philosophy. Some of them consider memory to be as valid as perception and inference, and look upon it as the source of our knowledge of past facts. The Vaiśeṣika accepts memory as valid knowledge distinguished from all forms of wrong cognition. The Jaina philosophy also counts memory among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta, is not definitely opposed to memory being regarded as valid knowledge.²⁹

The *Mīmāṃsā* refuses to recognise memory as *pramā* (valid knowledge) because it gives no new knowledge. However, the Nyāya does not admit the *Mīmāṃsā* view that any knowledge becomes invalid simply because it refers to a previously known object. According to it, what makes memory invalid (*apramā*) is the absence of the character of presentation in it. In some cases, memory may correspond to real objects. Still it is not valid knowledge, since it does not correspond to given objects and does not arise out of the objects themselves. Memory thus based on no given datum and hence, fails to give presentational knowledge (*pramā*) and so, is not a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

It is to be remarked that the two varieties of memory-cognition – the veridical and non-veridical – are not to be described as '*pramā*' and '*apramā*' respectively. '*Pramā*' and '*apramā*' are two varieties of '*anubhava*' which is just one sub-class under the class 'cognition', the other sub-class being '*smṛti*' or memory.³⁰ It follows from the usage that the 'special means' (*karāṇa*) of a

veridical memory cannot be designated as '*pramāṇa*'. "Annambhaṭṭa accepts the fourfold division of '*pramā*' and '*pramāṇa*' prevalent in the Nyāya school, he recognizes the possibility of a veridical memory-cognition which is however, discounted in the Nyāya school, according to which a memory cognition can never be veridical."³¹

Cognition may be expressed in words. The complex object aRb is of three factors, a, R and b. Here 'a' means qualificand cognition 'R' is the relation and 'b' is qualifier. For example – 'this' 'table' is a table, here qualificand is denoted by this, 'table' is qualifier and the tableness is present. This is related with the table, so 'this' is qualificand, table is qualifier and 'tableness' is relation. So this is a cognized relation.

When in relation there are two relatives then it will be correlatives. Like 'R' is the relations and the two relations are 'a' and 'b', 'a' is related with 'R' and 'b' is related with 'R'. So this is the example of a correlation. Here 'a' is *Pratiyogī* and 'b' is *anyogī*.

Though 'a' and 'b' are related with 'R' but 'a' is related with 'R' not such way 'b' is related with R. So, these 'a' and 'b' are related with 'R' but they are not in some same way, although this is a relation between two terms, still it is the second term (*pratiyogī*) which determines the relation and not determines the first term (*anyogī*). When we consider the term 'colour possessing will be the second term which produces the cognition of inherence of colour.

When contact takes as a relation then cognition of contact requires a cognition of both its terms. In the relation between two terms the first term is perceived at the time of cognition and it is related with sense organs. This is because contact like twoness is *vyāsajyavṛtti*. Though twoness is not a relation still we have to cognise both the terms. It will be clear when we take an example. If 'a cat is on the mat' then 'eat' is qualificand, and 'mat' is qualifier and 'being on' is the relation. Though we know cat is a furry thing so we can cognize there

is a furry thing in the mat. Still this furry thing will be qualificand. The difference between the two things is the difference of interpretation 'cat' and 'furry thing'. In the first type of cognition of 'cat' there are 'catness'. In the second type of cognition, the first type is expressed in different modes.

The mode under which a qualificand is cognized in different cognitions are technically called 'limitors of being the qualificand of the cognition.

Nature of cognition: Cognition of an object may be simple or complex. Cognition is a state of self. In the objective sense objects consists three elements, a qualificand, a qualifier and the relation between them, such as xRy , here 'x' is qualificand, 'y' is qualifier and 'R' is the relation, this is an objective cognition. If we take the broad sense then cognition does not contribute anything to the object. As the three elements qualificand, qualifier and the relation between them are objectively real. For example this is a brown box, here 'this' indicates qualificand, 'box' is the qualifier and inherence between 'brown' colour and 'box' is objectively real. Here relation is the important thing, because we do not know the quality of an object without the object matter quality is inherent in the object.

Classification of cognition: Cognition is classified into a different classification. The first classification is of two kinds – informative and recollective. Cognitions may be true or false in nature. True cognitions are informative cognition and false cognitions are recollective. True cognitions in the informative sense are the four kinds that is called '*yathārthānubhava*' perception, inference identification on the basis of similarity and testimony. This true cognitions or '*yathārthānubhava is pratyakṣa, anumiti, upamiti, śabda*'. These are valid knowledge and source of valid knowledge are *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda*. False cognitions are only two kinds; doubt and wrong belief.³²

These are the classifications of cognition. Nāya Nyāya deals with the state of cognition. They deal with internal states of different types of cognition.

In *Tarkasamgraha-dīpikā* (henceforth TSD) Annambhatta defines 'cognition'. He defines cognition and also defines its mark. The mark of cognition is 'consciousness' (*Buddhi*). The other feature of cognition is to describe its nature. In *Tarkasamgraha* (henceforth TS) Annambhatta describes three characteristics of cognition – these are quality or *guṇa*, it is the ground of all linguistic usage or *vyavahāra* and attribute of consciousness or *jñānatva*, this may be explained as internal perception. All the three are the marks of cognition but alone (i) and (ii) and (iii) are the marks of cognition. The first mark quality is found in colour, smell, taste etc. The second mark which is the ground of all linguistic usage is found in time, soul or manas. The combined use of first and second explains the third mark of cognition.³³

In TSD, Annambhatta explains consciousness is the defining mark of cognition revealed in internal perception like. 'I am conscious'. If we take such type of perception, there may be a little elucidation. There is a kind of internal perception, which is called *anuvayavasāya*. For an example, when we perceive a box this is only a perception, this is not a cognition. Later part of such cognition will be original perception be *anuvyavasāya*. The internal perception reveals the state of original perception as a state of consciousness.³⁴

The state of cognition or '*jñāna*' is described as a state of consciousness in the English language. The common feature is described as '*jñānatva*. Unfortunately, this term is described in the light of state of consciousness. For example, 'potness' is universal of the particular, sensible pot is revealed in the sense perception of the particular pot.

There a question arises that why Annambhatta gives the definition of cognition – *Buddhilakṣanāmaha* (TSD). The answer may be in the term 'defining mark' (*lakṣana*) in the TSD is intended to mean only common feature but not differentiating ones.³⁵

It is to be noted that the term 'cognition' is synonymous with 'jñāna' which is used by Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers. This term 'cognition' is used in sāmkhya philosophy with the term 'mahat' which is a kind of internal organ (*antah kāraṇa*). Nyāya Vaiśeṣika usage has its basis in *Nyāya sūtra* (1.1.15).

After the definition of 'cognition' there is discussion about sub-classes as memory and *anubhava*. Annambhatta in TS explains as consciousness that result only from *saṃskāra*. If the term 'consciousness' were omitted from the definition it would like memory (*saṃskāramātra-janya-jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ*).³⁶ In TS, there is a discussion about a state of consciousness other than memory (*smṛti*) is *anubhava* that is of two kinds – one is veridical (*yathārtha*) and other is non-veridical (*ayathārtha*).

Anubhava is as direct or immediate cognition. But if we take such expression then this will appear presently, 'mediate' knowledge like inference etc. all will be *anubhava*.

This type of distinction like memory and *anubhava* are similar to the Kantian distinction of cognition a 'direct' or immediate and 'indirect' or mediate.

The veridical *anubhava* or *yathārthānubhava* or *pramā* involves the concept of *prakāra*, and *viśeṣya*. In Gaṅgeśa's new school of Nyāya these two concepts *prakāra*, and *viśeṣya* have been discussed and these concepts are very much important to explain true knowledge or *pramā*.³⁷

When we have cognition, we must have a cognition of something- this something is an 'object', so in the process of cognition, we must have an 'object' or 'cognition.' This is called 'viśeṣya' of cognition. This 'cognitum' of cognition must be a cognitional object. This complex object is constituted of three things – *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* and *saṃsarga*. Other than 'saṃsarga' the other two components of the 'object' of cognition are the 'viśeṣya' and the 'prakāra'. An example will clear the total concept. If we have perception of 'a pot' it is a complex idea, which is 'potness'. According to Nyāya philosophy 'something'

that is 'pot' is known as '*viśeṣya*' and 'potness' is known as '*prakāra*'. This '*prakāra*' is the *viśeṣana* of perception. In other inferential cognition and testimonial cognition there are *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* or *viśeṣana*. This 'characteriser' '*prakāra*' and 'characterised' '*viśeṣana*' are the cognition of cognition.³⁸

The definition of veridical cognition '*prama*' as given in TS and TSD is *tadvatitat prakārakānabhava*. The Sanskrit word '*tat*' is ordinarily a demonstrative pronoun meaning 'that'. The term '*tat*' is a variable and hence it has here been translated as 'something'. It has no constant value. The word '*tat - vat*' also a variable which means 'something'. The change of '*tat*' to '*tad*' is formed by affixing the seventh case-ending to '*tad-vat*' and means when there is that which has the something. The total sense of the expression '*tat-vati anubhava*', would thus amount to, 'veridical' cognition or '*pramā*' is an '*anubhava*' which has for its 'determinans'. '*Prakāra object*' 'something', when the determinandum (*viśeṣya - object*) is that which has that 'something'. It will be seen that this is a version of the correspondence theory of truth.³⁹

With regard to TS and TSD definition of cognition there a difficulty arises of '*avyāpti*'. In veridical cognition potness is present in the pot. In veridical cognition potness is present in the pot. It is rather to say potness is present in the pot but not vice-versa. The definition of '*pramā*' requires that there must actually be the '*tad-vat*'. Here we can not have that; for if '*tat*' in the present case stands for the '*prakāra*' 'pot' the '*tad-vat*' should be the *viśeṣya* 'potters' or having 'pot', the '*tad-vat*' should be the *viśeṣya* potters as having pot. But 'potness' can not surely have 'pot' for its 'determinance' or characteriser. Thus the required '*tad-vat*' is the present case non-existent, and the definition of '*pramā*' in terms of '*tat-vat*' fails here accordingly.

Annambhaṭṭa explains the term '*tat-vat*' in his TS but there arise a *prima facie* difficulty. Annambhaṭṭa himself possessed the solution, by interpretation of the term '*tat-vati*'. When there is that which has something. 'P' and when

there is a 'that' which has the relation of something 'P'. It is clear that there is not '*tat-vati*' meaning that there is something 'P' but there is a '*tad-vat*' meaning that there is a relation to something 'P' when we say about 'pot' (something) there must be a relation with potness. Relation between pot and potness – potness is said to be *pratiyogīn* (the relatum) and pot is said to be *amyogīn* (the seat). Again it is said that if 'pot' and 'potness' are related entities the pot bearer some relation to '*potness*' and '*potness*' bears some relation to '*pot*'.⁴⁰

Annambhaṭṭa discusses the phrase '*tad-vat*' in TS, he intended to mean that the 'something' must bears the relation with 'something'. To express the term 'relation' he determines the term has in ordinary sense. To ordinary sense, is in secondary sense.

According to Nyāya School they explain veridical anubhava and also explain that not all veridical cognition is *pramā*. Nyāya school explains veridical memory (*smṛti*) this is not *pramā* not all the Indian schools accept veridical cognition as *pramā*. The *Vaiśeṣika* School explains '*Pramā*' the veridical cognition but they do not explain it in true *anubhava*.

Annambhaṭṭa defines non-veridical *anubhava* as a cognition which explains the absence. The non-veridical cognition (*ā-pramā*) has its *prakāra* of something 'P', when its *viśeṣya* is characterized by the absence of something. For an instance, the false perception of a snake has the relation with the object of something 'snake-ness'. But here that which actually exists before the percipient is something that has for its feature 'rope-ness'. This perceptual cognition has thus snakesness for its determinants. When its determinandum is actually characterized by 'absence of snake-ness'. If we take such definition, there arises the question of 'overcoverage.' In the case of cognition – the table has conjunction with 'X'. Now the 'conjunction' and 'contact' are different (*avyāpyavṛtti*). When the table has contact with 'X' it is not that all the parts of the table have contact with 'X'. Some of the parts of table have the contact with

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table. So, conjunction means conjunction with some parts of the object. In other words when we have 'contact' with the table, then there also contact with the parts of the table, then the other parts of the table which have no contact with 'X' are called 'absence contact'. So in conjunction there is no 'absence conjunction' but in contact there is 'absence contact'. So the cognition of this table has contact with 'X' may as well be described as a cognition which has for its determinance (*prakāra*) something p (contact). When its *viśeṣya* (determinandum), 'the table' is not characterized by 'P'. It would thus confirm to the definition of a false cognition '*a-pramā*' while as a matter of fact it is accepted as an instance of 'true cognition'. The TS definition of false cognition is thus too wide in that it involves an over-coverage (*ativyāpti*) in relation to instance of true cognition.⁴¹

If we take the definition of false cognition (*apramā*) then the difficulty will vanish.

In TSD the definition asserts the following a *false cognition* is that which has for its determinan is (*prakāra*) something 'P' in a certain relation 'r' (*sambandha*) to a certain aspect 'a' (*avacchedaka*) of the determinandum (*viśeṣya*) when the latter has the absence of the something 'p' in that relation 'r' (*yatsambandhavāha*) to that aspect 'a' (*yadavaccheda*). There would be then no over coverage of the TS definition; for there is here actually some contact by the relation of 'inherence' and a cognition of contact would be false only when there is absence of all contact or contact as such (*samyogābhāvāvacchedena*) by that relation.⁴²

To explain 'table' and the table does actually have the conjunction. This cognition satisfies true cognitions (*pramā*). It would be cleared about the definition of false cognition (*apramā*) when the table does not have the conjunction with 'X'. But this concept of definition has been argued that when we explain that every part of a 'table' does not have conjunction with 'X'. It may be said that TS definition of false cognition suffers from the blemish of over

coverage. The *prakāra* of cognition is unpervasive. The difficulty would be solved if the *prakāra* were a pervasive or *vyāpyavṛtti* in character (TS – 154) (39) TS: ‘veridical *anubhava*’ (*pramā*) is of four kinds: *Pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti*, *śabda*. Its special condition (*kāraṇa*) is also four kinds: *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*.⁴³

The English term ‘perception’ is similarly used for *pratyakṣa*. When we perceive a ‘tree’, the ‘tree’ known through perception (*pratyakṣa*)

This is veridical *anubhava* (*pramā*). Like the perception is similarly used for *pratyakṣa* and *anumiti* is used for *anumāna* and *upamiti* used for *upamāna* and *Śabda* is used for *Śabda*. The term *anumāna* and *upamāna* have been used for both veridical *anubhava* and there must be a special condition. The term *anumiti* and *upamiti* have been used for veridical *anubhava* but there must not any special condition. The English term ‘perception’ is used for *pratyakṣa* like inference is used for *anumāna* and testimony for *śabda* and comparison for *upamāna*. It is to be noted that though the term *pratyakṣa*, *upamiti*, *anumiti*, *śabda* are used for significance of veridical state of *anubhava* but they have a wider usage as well. They used for any state of cognition which may be veridical and non-veridical.⁴⁴

Annambhaṭṭa usages the term ‘*kāraṇa*’. ‘*Kāraṇa*’ is a causal condition which is called *Kāraṇa*, but not all causal conditions are called *kāraṇa* only the uncommon causal condition is called *kāraṇa* (*asādhāraṇam kāraṇam*). An effect is dependent on two sets of condition. One condition is *sādāraṇa kāraṇa* which are used for ‘God’, ‘Space’ ‘Time’, etc. The other condition is *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* which are used for cognition. Annambhaṭṭa used only the term *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*. The term *kāraṇa* is used for either in terminal condition or a causal condition functioning through an intermediary (*vyāpāravat kāraṇa*).⁴⁵

Annambhaṭṭa himself was not quite steady to explain the term *kāraṇa*. In the cause of *pratyakṣa*, *upamiti* and *śābda-badha* he takes the term to mean the causal condition through an intermediary or *vyāpāra*. But for *anumity pramā* the causal condition is used. For the unsteady use of '*kāraṇa*' he describes *indriya* or sense organs as *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, cognition of resemblance or *sādṛśyajñāna* as the *upamāna pramāṇa* and statement or *śābda* as *śābda pramāṇa* and in the case of *anumiti parāmarsā* is for *anumāna pramāṇa*. He is not faithful with his own concept of *kāraṇa*. But *kāraṇa* is always described as *asādhāraṇa – kāraṇam*.⁴⁶

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1. The Sanskrit term *pramā* is usually translated today as 'knowledge'. A *pramā* is usually regarded as a special kind of *jñāna* whose truth is guaranteed. But according to B.K.Matilal, it is not satisfactory to say 'pramā as knowledge'. According to him, a *pramā*, is to be understood always as an episode which is true and non-dubious. But knowledge is justified true belief is not usually understood in the episodic sense. For details one may see, B.K.Matilal, *Perception*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 107-12.
2. According to Prabhākara, knowledge is self-revealing and guarantees its own truth without reference to anything else. Every knowledge must carry in it an assurance of its truth and we should have no doubt. In this sense, a non-valid cognition is a case of impossibility and self-contradiction.
3. Ganganatha Jha derives the Prabhākara definition of *pramā* from the following verse of the *Prakāraṇa-Pāñcikā* :
Pramāṇamanubhūtiḥ, sā smṛteranyā na sā smṛtiḥ na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrvapratipativyapekṣanāt, Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources*. Banaras Hindu University, Banaras, Second Edition, 1964, p. 70.
4. *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛteranyā smṛtiḥ punaḥ / ~~pamāṇam~~ pūrvavijñāna-samskāra mātrajam jñānamucyate //* - *Prakāraṇa Pāñcikā* : Sālikanātha Misra , (Ed) A. Subramanyam Sastry, Banaras Hindu University Darsana Series, Banaras, 1962, p. 127.
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6. *Bṛhātī*, Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 3, Part-II, Madras, 1936, p. 24.
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8. 'buddhiḥ upalabdhiḥ jñānam iti anarthāntaram', - Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.15.
9. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, that it is always about something and directed towards that something.
10. 'jñānakriyā hi sakāṃmikā', *Śāradīpikā*, Pārthasārathi Mīśra, (Trans) D. Venkataramiah, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1940, p. 56.
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13. Knowledge, Truth and Pramatva, in *The Philosophy of J.N.Mohanty*, (Ed) Daya Krishna and K.L.Sharma, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1991, p. 182.
14. *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛternyā smṛtiḥ † punaḥ/pūrvavijñāna-saṁskāra mātrajam jñānamuchyate // - Prakāraṇa- Pañcikā*, p. 127.
15. *tasmāt dr̥dham yadutpannam nāpi saṁvādamṛcchati/jñānantareṇa vijñānam tatpramāṇam pratiyatām // - Ślokavārttika : Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sries, 1898, V. 2.80.
16. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
17. *yathārtham sarvameveha vijñānamiti siddhaye*, - *Prakāraṇa-Pañcikā*, p.43.
18. *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramānatā / arthānyathāvahe tūthadoṣajñānadapodyate // - Ślokavārttika*, V. 2.53.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *op.cit.* pp. 103-04.
21. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *Ibid*, p. 96.
22. *Sarvavyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam sā dvidvidha-smṛtiḥ † anubhavaḥ cā – Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpika*. Annaṁbhaṭṭa, [Eng. Trans] by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, Second Revised Edition, 1983, Verse No. 34.
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25. *tacchuṇye tammatiryā syādapramā, sā nirupitā – Bhāṣā-Pariccheda, Kārikā No. 127.*
26. *saṁskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ – Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpika*, Verse No. 35.
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29. S.C. Chatterjee, *Ibid*, pp. 26-27.
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32. *Siddhāndamuktāvati* on verse no. 51.

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36. *Ibid*

37. *Ibid*

38. *Ibid*, p. xix.

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40. *Ibid*,

41. *Ibid*, p. xx

42. *Ibid*, p. xx.

43. *Ibid*

44. *Ibid*

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