


SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA IN NAVYA NYĀYA: A CRITICAL STUDY



Thesis submitted for the award of the PhD degree in Arts
(Philosophy) of the University of North Bengal

By

Smt. Riki Chakraborty

Supervisor

Professor Raghunath Ghosh,

Department of Philosophy,

University of North Bengal

**UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
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Preface

The research project entitled: '*Some Problems Concerning Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa in Navya Nyaya: A Critical Study*' is the result of the sincere and systematic study on the problem of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyaksa*) as admitted in Navya Nyaya. An effort has been made to throw some light on the epistemological problems concerning *nirvikalpaka pratyaksa* and suggested some solutions of them. I personally believe that the principles as embedded in the Navya Nyaya texts have got some epistemological values and bearing in *Pramanasastra* in general. The Navya Naiyayikas have given emphasis on the *pramana-s* than *prameya-s* and given a logical analysis of each and every concept. From different definitions of *pratyaksa* as formulated by different systems like Nyaya, Navya Nyaya, Buddhists, Advaita Vedantis etc we may draw a conclusion that all the systems of Indian Philosophy are more or less influenced by their metaphysical presuppositions. The Navya Naiyayikas are less influenced by the metaphysics and hence they are called more realistic thinkers in comparison to others. An effort has been made to show whether there is a distinction between the concepts of *Nirvikalpaka* or the Buddhist concept of *svakaksana* as conceived through perception along with the discussions on other problems which may arise from the common sense understanding.

I have been able to complete my thesis due to the favour I received from my Supervisor- Teacher, Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Dean, Faculty of Arts, Commerce & Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, who has taught me the texts and helped me in giving critical exposition of the same. I am grateful to all of my teachers of the Department of Philosophy, NBU and my parents, my

family members including my small son for cooperating and encouraging me in the research work. I personally welcome all sorts of criticism on my thesis so that I can improve the same afterwards.

Riki Chakraborty. 15.05.09.

(Smt. Riki Chakraborty)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of knowledge is as old as philosophy itself. In the history of philosophy, various attempts have been made to give a comprehensive definition of knowledge. Naturally, philosophers are not unanimous about the nature of knowledge. A popularly accepted term of what is called 'knowledge' in the west is '*jñāna*' in Indian Philosophy. But there is a special sense too in which the nearest kith and kin of knowledge is *pramā*. *Pramā* is roughly transliterated as valid cognition.¹ A careful scrutiny from historical standpoint would reveal that in the epistemological consideration in Indian philosophy, there are two dominant senses in which the word '*jñāna*' has been used. One is the narrower sense in which it is restricted only to *pramā* (valid cognition). The chief exponents of this view are Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. For them, *jñāna* is necessarily restricted to the scope of valid cognition. The cognition, say, *saṃśaya*, *viparyaya* etc are excluded from the scope of *jñāna*. According to Prābhākaras, non-valid cognition is not only theoretical impossibility but also self-contradictory.² Valid cognition is apprehension and it is something different from remembrance, which is not valid.³ Memory (*smṛti*) is invalid since the object is not directly known but merely recollected or remembered. Valid knowledge is experience and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impressions left by some previous experience.⁴ Memory is regarded to be invalid not because it gives no new knowledge but because it rather depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently.⁵ It is clear from this that in Prābhākara's epistemological scheme, knowledge is defined in terms of something externally given and in no case the knowledge can be wrong. It is something logically impossible that the object appears otherwise than it is. To put it in modern

terminology, all cognitive expressions are cases of only right judgements. A false judgement is inconceivable. Prābhākara asserts, "It is strange indeed how cognition can apprehend an object and yet be invalid."⁶ To him, doubt and error are valid so long as they are apprehensions.

On the contrary, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, we also find a different conception of *jñāna* which includes not only valid one but also non-valid one. They seem to accept the word 'cognition' in the episodic sense, when they confine it to *pramā*, the non-erring and non-dubious awareness. But the *lakṣaṇa* of *jñāna* is also extended to cover '*apramā*', the erring and dubious awareness etc. within it. Knowledge in the sense of *Pramā* is 'episodic' in nature according to the Nyāya view, because for the Nyāya a piece of knowledge in the sense of *pramā* is always 'object-oriented' and in this sense it is different from the sense of its Western Platonic counterpart as 'disposition'. Dispositional sense of knowledge is emphasised in the Nyāya inclusion of memory within the scope of knowledge. Knowledge for the Nyāya thus both episodic and dispositional, in the episodic sense it is *pramā* or *yathārthānubhava* and in the dispositional sense it covers *smṛti* (memory). Thus for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, '*jñāna*' is infallible in some cases and fallible in some other. They put forward various causal and justificatory grounds (*pramāṇas*) for distinguishing the infallible kind of *jñāna* from fallible one. Naturally, they advanced logical grounds for admitting *apramā* within the jurisdiction of '*jñāna*'. A critical and exhaustive exposition of *apramā* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition thus deserves special attention for a comprehensive understanding of their contribution to the epistemological literature of Indian Philosophy.

Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyāya-sūtra considers '*jñāna*' as that which leads to the attainment of the highest good.⁷ But the modern scholars of the Nyāya Philosophy differ among themselves as to the English rendering of the word '*jñāna*'. The English word 'knowledge' refers to a piece of awareness which is necessarily true and valid. But the scope of the word '*jñāna*' in the

Nyāya philosophy certainly wider than this. It includes both valid and non-valid cognitions. The word '*buddhi*' (cognition) is taken to mean the same thing as the word '*jñāna*' means. Broadly speaking, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, cognition (*buddhi*) is taken to mean the same thing as apprehension (*upalabdhi*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and cognisance (*pratyaya*).⁸ Hence, knowledge means awareness or apprehension of objects. It includes all cognitions that have a more or less determinate objective reference. In other words, cognition (*jñāna*) is considered in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy as something that looks beyond itself or to put it in a modern terminology, cognition is intentional.⁹ The object of apprehension may be a thing or a quality, an act or an emotion, the existent as well as non-existent. But in every case in which there is knowledge, there must be something that stands out as the object of cognition. It consists simply in the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of objects. All things are made manifest or revealed to us when they become objects of cognition (*prameyas*).

Scholars of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, without any dispute consider knowledge as an attribute of the self, it is not a substance, since it cannot be the stuff or the constitutive cause of anything, nor is it the permanent substratum of certain recognized and variant properties. The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems of philosophy look upon cognition as a substantive mode or modification (*vr̥tti*) of the material principle called *buddhi*, as it reflects the light or consciousness, which is immaterial and intangible can be reflected on any material substratum. It is generally believed that knowledge is neither a mode nor a substance but a kind of activity or function (*kriyā*). The Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas agree in describing knowledge as an activity, a transitive process.¹⁰ However, the Nyāya emphatically repudiates the conception of knowledge as an activity. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* traces the act theory of knowledge to a grammatical prejudice, a confusion between knowledge as manifestation and the verb, 'to know' as denoting an action. When we hear the expression 'I know', 'I cognise', etc. we are in a belief that cognition or knowledge is an

activity or process. But this only shows how in philosophy we may be deceived by the vague expressions of ordinary language.¹¹ Knowledge as an attribute of the self, is always directed to objects. It always refers beyond itself. Knowledge is never self-manifested.¹²

It is interesting to note in this passing that the Nyāya philosophers conceived the word '*jñāna*' in a wide sense. In the epistemological considerations of western philosophy, thought or consciousness, as a cognitive fact, has sometimes been regarded as an essential attribute of the mind and a pervasive character of all mental phenomena. However, the Nyāya does not pass over the distinction between thought (*jñāna*), on the one hand, and feeling, on the other. Under cognition, it brings together all cognitive facts, like sensation, perception, memory, inference, doubt, dream, illusion and the like. In this sense, the '*buddhi*' of the Nyāya corresponds to cognition which, placed by the side of feeling and will, gives us the tripartite division of mental phenomena in the traditional school of Western psychology. But in Indian epistemological tradition, Śrīharaṣa formulated several sceptical counter-examples to dispute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of knowledge. Firstly, he gives the example of a lucky guess of gambling play, which fortunately happened to be true. Secondly, affirming a true conclusion from false premises. Mistaking a cloud of dust to be smoke one infers fire to be present, and accidentally fire is there. Here conclusion is true, but it is not knowledge proper. These examples of Śrīharaṣa will be reminiscent of what are called Gettier examples in modern western philosophy. E.L. Gettier formulated some cases which he placed as counter examples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. Here we may give one example: Smith and Jones both have applied for the same job. Smith has sufficient evidence for his belief that Jones is going to get the job, and he has counted sometime before that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. From these he infers the conjunctive proposition that (a) the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket. Now it is actually Smith who gets the job and unknown to Smith, he himself has ten

coins in his pocket. Thus (a) is true, is believed to be so and is justifiably believed but Smith can not be entitled to have knowledge. Here we find that this fails to be a case of knowledge after fulfilling the generally accepted conditions of knowledge. But if knowledge is defined simply as a true awareness then in all the above cases, we have to say that the subject had knowledge, because they are hitting the truth. If truth-hitting episode, a true awareness, amounts to knowledge, then we do not thereby obliterate the distinction between truth and knowledge-hood. As B.K. Matilal says, "In Navya-Nyāya, a knowledge event is a true awareness which is not infected with a dubious attitude. This is a negative condition which brings back the subjective mooring. It is not claimed here that awareness must have certainty in order to be knowledge. It should be non-dubious, which is further explained as its being 'not overwhelmed by a doubt about its lack of knowledge-hood' (*of apramānya-jñānanāskandita*). It is argued by the Navya-Naiyāyikas that if an awareness which happens to be true and hence have knowledge-hood is infected by a doubt about its knowledge-hood or the lack of it, then the resultant state cannot perform all the functions that a piece of knowledge is supposed to perform. But it may be maintained that the knowledge-hood of such awareness is not destroyed thereby. Only the external causal factors here interfere to render certain functional powers of knowledge inert. For example, using such ^{an} awareness as a premise we can not derive any further knowledge by inference, although there may be logical connection between the two pieces of knowledge."¹³

Prābhākara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (*anubhūti*).¹⁴ It is totally different from remembrance, which is not valid. All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid by itself. A cognition which apprehends an object cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises from the impression of a prior cognition and therefore, cannot be treated as valid cognition. Kumārila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent

knowledge.¹⁵ "Valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects, which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions."¹⁶

The Mīmāṃsaka upholds the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* which may be treated as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of cognition. All apprehension is intrinsically valid. It is not validated by any other cognition. Validity of knowledge is not due to any extraneous conditions. Both Prābhākara and Kumārila uphold the intrinsic validity of cognition. Prābhākara says, "All cognitions as cognitions are valid, their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects."¹⁷ Kumārila also says, "The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object, it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object."¹⁸ Therefore, all cognitions are presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on account of this belief. A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of cognition or from a subsequent contradicting cognition. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope-snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of cognition is inferred, yet cognition itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. But if all knowledge is self-valid, how can error at all arise? Prābhākara and Kumārila give different answers to this question.¹⁹ Prābhākara says that so far as the element of apprehension is concerned all the so-called invalid cognitions are valid, while the element that is invalid is no apprehension at all. An illusion is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose distinction is not apprehended illusion is not a positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension.²⁰ According to Kumārila, an illusion manifests a real object in the form of a different object which too is real. In all cases of illusory perception it is only the relation between the subject and predicate elements which is unreal though appearing as real. Accordingly, an illusion is a positive misapprehension.²¹

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of cognition called *paratahprāmāṇyavāda*. According to it, cognition is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after the said cognition has been arisen. The nature of cognition lies in its correspondance with its object. The test of truth is a fruitful activity. If cognition leads to fruitful activity, it is valid, if it does not, it is invalid. Validity and invalidity are not intrinsically connected with cognition. They are the result of a subsequent test; cognition arises simply as cognition and becomes valid or invalid afterwards due to extraneous conditions.

The Bhatta Mīmāṃsakas agree with the Naiyāyikas so far as the invalidity of cognition is concerned, because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But they criticise the Naiyāyikas with regard to the validity (*pramāṇya*) of cognition. If the validity of cognition also like its invalidity depends on extraneous conditions, no cognition would ever become valid. The Naiyāyika contends that cognition arises simply as cognition, that it is neutral and that the question of its validity or invalidity arises afterwards and depend on external test. The Mīmāṃsaka points out that the so-called 'neutral' cognition is impossibility. We always experience either valid or invalid cognition. There is no third alternative. To say so is to maintain the absurd position that cognition when it arises is devoid of all logical value. Hence, neutral cognition is no cognition at all. All cognitions must be either valid or invalid.

Prābhākara's theory of knowledge is known as *triputipratyakṣavāda*. He regards knowledge as self-luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation. Knowledge reveals itself and as it does so, it also simultaneously reveals its subject and its object. In every knowledge situation, we have this triple revelation. The subject and the object both are manifested by knowledge itself, simultaneously with its own manifestation. The self is known as the knower and it can never be cognized as an object. The *triputi* of the *jñātā*,


jñeya and *jñāna* is simultaneously revealed in every act of cognition. The subject, the object and the knowledge are simultaneously manifested in every act of knowledge which is self-luminous. It does not need any other knowledge for its revelation. The self and the object both depend on knowledge for their manifestation. Therefore, the self is not self-luminous. Every knowledge has a triple manifestation – the cognition of self as the knower, the cognition of the object as the known and the self-conscious cognition.

Prābhākara does not admit error in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid by itself. To experience is always to experience validity. Therefore, error is only partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. All knowledge, as knowledge, is quite valid, though all knowledge is not necessarily perfect. Imperfect knowledge is commonly called 'error'. But it is true so far as it goes; only it does not go for enough. All knowledge being true, there can be no logical distinction between truth and error. Prābhākara is true to his realistic position in maintaining that knowledge can never misrepresent its object. Error is one of 'omission' only, not of 'commission'. It is only non-apprehension, not mis-apprehension. This view of error is called *akhyāti* or non-apprehension.

1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF COGNITION OR KNOWLEDGE

Taking cognition in the most comprehensive sense as the cognition of objects, the Naiyāyikas proceed to distinguish between its different forms, according to the differences in the nature and validity of cognitions. In view of this, cognition is divided into *anubhava* or presentation and *smṛti* or memory.²² There is no clear attempt to define what is *anubhava* either in *Tarkasaṅgraha* or in *Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā*. By implication it may suggest, according to some modern scholars of the Nyāya School, a kind of cognition arising only after a sense-object contact.²³ In *anubhava*, there is a presentational cognition of objects and so it is felt to be given to us. It is original in character and not the

reproduction of a previous knowledge of objects. *Smṛti* or memory, on the other hand, is not the presentation of objects, but a reproduction of previous experience. Here, our cognition appears to be due not so much to objects themselves as to our past cognitions of those objects. Each of these has been further divided into valid (*yathārtha*) and non-valid (*ayathārtha*) forms, according as it does or does not accord with the real nature of its objects. The classification of knowledge from the standpoint of Nyāya Philosophy is depicted by the following table :



In the *Tarkasaṁgraha*, *ayathārtha anubhava (apramā)* is “a cognition which has for its determinans (*prakāra*) something ‘P’, when its determinandum (*viśeṣya*) is characterized by the absence of that something.”²⁴ To take for instance the erroneous perceptual cognition of a snake. The object of this perception is ‘something’ that has the feature ‘snakeness’. But here that which actually exists before the percipient is something that has for its feature ‘rope-ness’ or ‘absence of snakeness’. This perceptual cognition has thus ‘snakeness’ as its determinans, when its determinandum is actually characterized by ‘absence of snakeness’. Such type of cognition is a kind of *apramā* or non-valid presentation (*ayathārthānubhava*), which includes all cognitions, that are either false or not true but not false. In this connection, Viśvanātha said that the notion with regard to something that it has a particular

attribute, which it has not, is described as non-valid or invalid cognition.²⁵ Hence, under *apramā*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika includes doubt (*saṁśaya*), with its varieties of conjecture (*ūha*) and indefinite cognition (*anadhyavasāya*), as well as error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*).

However, it is to be noted here that cognitions which do not agree with the real nature of their objects are not always false or erroneous (*bhrama*). There may be cognitions which fail to give us a correct presentation of objects and so are not true (*pramā*). But at the same time they may not make any claim to truth, nor lead to any definite assertion. Such is the case with doubt, conjecture, indefinite cognition and *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning). These are not true indeed, but yet they are not false (*viparyaya*). It is in this view of such facts that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika divides non-valid presentation (*ayathārthānubhava*) further into *saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error) and *tarka* (hypothetical argument). Hence, it is not correct to speak of *apramā* or non-valid presentation, always as a case of *bhrama* or error. It becomes so when it definitely contradicts its object.

1.3 IS SMṚTI PRAMĀ ?

Memory (*smṛti*) is knowledge of one's own past experience. It is a representative cognition of past experiences due solely to the impressions produced by them.²⁶ According to the Nyāya, memory is different from recognition, which is a form of qualified perception and has reference to the direct presentation of some object, although it involves an element of representation.²⁷ Apart from Jainism which considers memory (*smṛti*) to be an indirect instrument of valid knowledge, all other schools of Indian philosophy agree in holding that knowledge derived from memory is not valid (*pramā*). The Naiyāyikas distinguish between true and false cases of memory. True memory would represent in thought only those characters of an object which are really possessed by it, whereas the characters represented by false memory would not correspond to the real nature of the remembered object.

According to Udayana, the validity of memory is only relative, it is dependent on, derived from and determined by the validity of a prior direct experience on which it rests. If the preceding *anubhava* is valid, recollection derived from it is true, if not, the latter is to be taken as false.²⁸ And for this reason, the term '*pramā*' is not applied to memory because it lacks any independent validity of its own.

According to the Nyāya, true memory also cannot be called *pramā* or valid knowledge. But on this very point, opinions are divided in Indian philosophy. Some of them consider memory to be as valid as perception and inference, and look upon it as the source of our knowledge of past facts. The Vaiśeṣika accepts memory as valid knowledge distinguished from all forms of wrong cognition. The Jaina philosophy also counts memory among the forms of valid mediate knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta, is not definitely opposed to memory being regarded as valid knowledge.²⁹

The *Mīmāṃsā* refuses to recognise memory as *pramā* (valid knowledge) because it gives no new knowledge. However, the Nyāya does not admit the *Mīmāṃsā* view that any knowledge becomes invalid simply because it refers to a previously known object. According to it, what makes memory invalid (*apramā*) is the absence of the character of presentation in it. In some cases, memory may correspond to real objects. Still it is not valid knowledge, since it does not correspond to given objects and does not arise out of the objects themselves. Memory thus based on no given datum and hence, fails to give presentational knowledge (*pramā*) and so, is not a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

It is to be remarked that the two varieties of memory-cognition – the veridical and non-veridical – are not to be described as '*pramā*' and '*apramā*' respectively. '*Pramā*' and '*apramā*' are two varieties of '*anubhava*' which is just one sub-class under the class 'cognition', the other sub-class being '*smṛti*' or memory.³⁰ It follows from the usage that the 'special means' (*karaṇa*) of a

veridical memory cannot be designated as '*pramāṇa*'. "Annambhaṭṭa accepts the fourfold division of '*pramā*' and '*pramāṇa*' prevalent in the Nyāya school, he recognizes the possibility of a veridical memory-cognition which is however, discounted in the Nyāya school, according to which a memory cognition can never be veridical."³¹

Cognition may be expressed in words. The complex object aRb is of three factors, a, R and b. Here 'a' means qualificand cognition 'R' is the relation and 'b' is qualifier. For example – 'this' 'table' is a table, here qualificand is denoted by this, 'table' is qualifier and the tableness is present. This is related with the table, so 'this' is qualificand, table is qualifier and 'tableness' is relation. So this is a cognized relation.

When in relation there are two relatives then it will be correlatives. Like 'R' is the relations and the two relations are 'a' and 'b', 'a' is related with 'R' and 'b' is related with 'R'. So this is the example of a correlation. Here 'a' is *Pratiyogī* and 'b' is *anuyogī*.

Though 'a' and 'b' are related with 'R' but 'a' is related with 'R' not such way 'b' is related with R. So, these 'a' and 'b' are related with 'R' but they are not in some same way, although this is a relation between two terms, still it is the second term (*pratiyogī*) which determines the relation and not determines the first term (*anuyogī*). When we consider the term 'colour possessing will be the second term which produces the cognition of inherence of colour.

When contact takes as a relation then cognition of contact requires a cognition of both its terms. In the relation between two terms the first term is perceived at the time of cognition and it is related with sense organs. This is because contact like twoness is *vyāsajyavrtti*. Though twoness is not a relation still we have to cognise both the terms. It will be clear when we take an example. If 'a cat is on the mat' then 'eat' is qualificand, and 'mat' is qualifier and 'being on' is the relation. Though we know cat is a furry thing so we can cognize there

is a furry thing in the mat. Still this furry thing will be qualificand. The difference between the two things is the difference of interpretation 'cat' and 'furry thing'. In the first type of cognition of 'cat' there are 'catness'. In the second type of cognition, the first type is expressed in different modes.

The mode under which a qualificand is cognized in different cognitions are technically called 'limitors of being the qualificand of the cognition.

Nature of cognition: Cognition of an object may be simple or complex. Cognition is a state of self. In the objective sense objects consists three elements, a qualificand, a qualifier and the relation between them, such as xRy , here 'x' is qualificand, 'y' is qualifier and 'R' is the relation, this is an objective cognition. If we take the broad sense then cognition does not contribute anything to the object. As the three elements qualificand, qualifier and the relation between them are objectively real. For example this is a brown box, here 'this' indicates qualificand, 'box' is the qualifier and inherence between 'brown' colour and 'box' is objectively real. Here relation is the important thing, because we do not know the quality of an object without the object matter quality is inherent in the object.

Classification of cognition: Cognition is classified into a different classification. The first classification is of two kinds – informative and recollective. Cognitions may be true or false in nature. True cognitions are informative cognition and false cognitions are recollective. True cognitions in the informative sense are the four kinds that is called '*yathārthānubhava*' perception, inference identification on the basis of similarity and testimony. This true cognitions or '*yathārthānubhava is pratyakṣa, anumiti, upamiti, śabda*'. These are valid knowledge and source of valid knowledge are *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda*. False cognitions are only two kinds; doubt and wrong belief.³²

These are the classifications of cognition. Nāya Nyāya deals with the state of cognition. They deal with internal states of different types of cognition.

In *Tarkasamgraha-dīpikā* (henceforth TSD) Annāmbhaṭṭa defines 'cognition'. He defines cognition and also defines its mark. The mark of cognition is 'consciousness' (*Buddhi*). The other feature of cognition is to describe its nature. In *Tarkasamgraha* (henceforth TS) Annāmbhaṭṭa describes three characteristics of cognition – these are quality or *guṇa*, it is the ground of all linguistic usage or *vyavahāra* and attribute of consciousness or *jñānatva*, this may be explained as internal perception. All the three are the marks of cognition but alone (i) and (ii) and (iii) are the marks of cognition. The first mark quality is found in colour, smell, taste etc. The second mark with is the ground of all linguistic usage is found in time, soul or manas. The combined use of first and second explains the third mark of cognition.³³

In TSD, Annāmbhaṭṭa explains consciousness is the defining mark of cognition revealed in internal perception like. 'I am conscious'. If we take such type of perception, true may be a little elucidation. There is a kind of internal perception, which called *anuvayavasāya*. For an example, when we perceive a box this is only a perception, this is not a cognition. Later part of such cognition will be original perception be *anuvyavasāya*. The internal perception reveals the state of original perception as a state of consciousness.³⁴

The state of cognition or '*jñāna*' is described as a state of consciousness in the English language. The common feature is described as '*jñānatva*'. Unfortunately, this term is described in the light of state of consciousness. For example, 'potness' is universal of the particular, sensible pot is revealed in the sense perception of the particular pot.

There a question arises that why Annāmbhaṭṭa gives the definition of cognition – *Buddhilakṣanāmaha* (TSD). The answer may be in the term 'defining mark' (*lakṣana*) in the TSD is intended to mean only common feature but not differentiating ones.³⁵

It is to be noted that the term 'cognition' is synonymous with '*jñāna*' which is used by Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers. This term 'cognition' is used in sāmkhya philosophy with the term '*mahat*' which is a kind of internal organ (*antah kāraṇa*). Nyāya Vaiśeṣika usage has its basis in *Nyāya sūtra* (1.1.15).

After the definition of 'cognition' there is discussion about sub-classes as memory and *anubhava*. Annambhatta in TS explains as consciousness that result only from *saṃskāra*. If the term 'consciousness' were omitted from the definition it would like memory (*saṃskāramātra-janya-jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ*).³⁶ In TS, there is a discussion about a state of consciousness other than memory (*smṛti*) is *anubhava* that is of two kinds – one is veridical (*yathārtha*) and other is non-veridical (*ayathārtha*).

Anubhava is as direct or immediate cognition. But if we take such expression then this will appear presently, 'mediate' knowledge like inference etc. all will be *anubhava*.

This type of distinction like memory and *anubhava* are similar to the Kantian distinction of cognition a 'direct' or immediate and 'indirect' or mediate.

The veridical *anubhava* or *yathārthānubhava* or *pramā* involves the concept of *prakāra*, and *viśeṣya*. In Gaṅgeśa's new school of Nyāya these two concepts *prakāra*, and *viśeṣya* have been discussed and these concepts are very much important to explain true knowledge or *pramā*.³⁷

When we have cognition, we must have a cognition of something- this something is an 'object', so in the process of cognition, we must have an 'object' or 'cognition.' This is called '*viśeṣya*' of cognition. This 'cognitum' of cognition must be a cognitional object. This complex object is constituted of three things – *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* and *saṃsarga*. Other than '*saṃsarga*' the other two components of the 'object' of cognition are the '*viśeṣya*' and the '*prakāra*'. An example will clear the total concept. If we have perception of 'a pot' it is a complex idea, which is 'potness'. According to Nyāya philosophy 'something'

that is 'pot' is known as '*viśeṣya*' and 'potness' is known as '*prakāra*'. This '*prakāra*' is the *viśeṣana* of perception. In other inferential cognition and testimonial cognition there are *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* or *viśeṣana*. This 'characteriser' '*prakāra*' and 'characterised' '*viśeṣana*' are the cognition of cognition.³⁸

The definition of veridical cognition '*prama*' as given in TS and TSD is *tadvatitāt prakārakānabhava*. The Sanskrit word '*tat*' is ordinarily a demonstrative pronoun meaning 'that'. The term '*tat*' is a variable and hence it has here been translated as 'something'. It has no constant value. The word '*tat - vat*' also a variable which means 'something'. The change of '*tat*' to '*tad*' is formed by affixing the seventh case-ending to '*tad-vat*' and means when there is that which has the something. The total sense of the expression '*tat-vati* *anubhava*', would thus amount to, 'veridical' cognition or '*pramā*' is an '*anubhava*' which has for its 'determinans'. '*Prakāra object*' 'something', when the determinandum (*viśeṣya - object*) is that which has that 'something'. It will be seen that this is a version of the correspondence theory of truth.³⁹

With regard to TS and TSD definition of cognition there a difficulty arises of '*avyāpti*'. In veridical cognition potness is present in the pot. In veridical cognition potness is present in the pot. It is rather to say potness is present in the pot but not vice-versa. The definition of '*pramā*' requires that there must actually be the '*tad-vat*'. Here we can not have that ; for if '*tat*' in the present case stands for the '*prakāra*' 'pot' the '*tad-vat*' should be the *viśeṣya* 'potters' or having 'pot', the '*tad-vat*' should be the *viśeṣya* potters as having pot. But 'potness' can not surely have 'pot' for its 'determinance' or characteriser. Thus the required '*tad-vat*' is the present case non-existent, and the definition of '*pramā*' in terms of '*tad-vat*' fails here accordingly.

Annambhaṭṭa explains the term '*tad-vat*' in his TS but there arise a *prima facie* difficulty. Annambhaṭṭa himself possessed the solution, by interpretation of the term '*tad-vati*'. When there is that which has something. 'P' and when

there is a 'that' which has the relation of something 'P'. It is clear that there is not '*tat-vati*' meaning that there is something 'P' but there is a '*tad-vat*' meaning that there is a relation to something 'P' when we say about 'pot' (something) there must be a relation with potness. Relation between pot and potness – potness is said to be *pratiyogīn* (the relatum) and pot is said to be *anuyogīn* (the seat). Again it is said that if 'pot' and 'potness' are related entities the pot bearer some relation to '*potness*' and '*potness*' bears some relation to '*pot*'.⁴⁰

Annambhaṭṭa discusses the phrase '*tad-vat*' in TS, he intended to mean that the 'something' must bears the relation with 'something'. To express the term 'relation' he determines the term has in ordinary sense. To ordinary sense, is in secondary sense.

According to Nyāya School they explain veridical *anubhava* and also explain that not all veridical cognition is *pramā*. Nyāya school explains veridical memory (*smṛti*) this is not *pramā* not all the Indian schools accept veridical cognition as *pramā*. The *Vaiśeṣika* School explains '*Pramā*' the veridical cognition but they do not explain it in true *anubhava*.

Annambhaṭṭa defines non-veridical *anubhava* as a cognition which explains the absence. The non-veridical cognition (*a-pramā*) has its *prakāra* of something 'P', when its *viśeṣya* is characterized by the absence of something. For an instance, the false perception of a snake has the relation with the object of something 'snake-ness'. But here that which actually exists before the percipient is something that has for its feature 'rope-ness'. This perceptual cognition has thus snakesness for its determinants. When its determinandum is actually characterized by 'absence of snake-ness'. If we take such definition, there arises the question of 'overcoverage.' In the case of cognition – the table has conjunction with 'X'. Now the 'conjunction' and 'contact' are different (*avyāpyavṛtti*). When the table has contact with 'X' it is not that all the parts of the table have contact with 'X'. Some of the parts of table have the contact with

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table. So, conjunction means conjunction with some parts of the object. In other words when we have 'contact' with the table, then there also contact with the parts of the table, then the other parts of the table which have no contact with 'X' are called 'absence contact'. So in conjunction there is no 'absence conjunction' but in contact there is 'absence contact'. So the cognition of this table has contact with 'X' may as well be described as a cognition which has for its determinance (*prakāra*) something 'p' (contact). When its *viśeṣya* (determinandum), 'the table' is not characterized by 'P'. It would thus confirm to the definition of a false cognition '*a-pramā*' while as a matter of fact it is accepted as an instance of 'true cognition'. The TS definition of false cognition is thus too wide in that it involves an over-coverage (*ativyāpti*) in relation to instance of true cognition.⁴¹

If we take the definition of false cognition (*apramā*) then the difficulty will vanish.

In TSD the definition asserts the following a *false cognition* is that which has for its determinan is (*prakāra*) something 'P' in a certain relation 'r' (*sambandha*) to a certain aspect 'a' (*avacchedaka*) of the determinandum (*viśeṣya*) when the latter has the absence of the something 'p' in that relation 'r' (*yatsambandhavāha*) to that aspect 'a' (*yadavaccheda*). There would be then no over coverage of the TS definition; for there is here actually some contact by the relation of 'inherence' and a cognition of contact would be false only when there is absence of all contact or contact as such (*saṁyogābhāvāvacchedena*) by that relation.⁴²

To explain 'table' and the table does actually have the conjunction. This cognition satisfies true cognitions (*pramā*). It would be cleared about the definition of false cognition (*apramā*) when the table does not have the conjunction with 'X'. But this concept of definition has been argued that when we explain that every part of a 'table' does not have conjunction with 'X'. It may be said that TS definition of false cognition suffers from the blemish of over

coverage. The *prakāra* of cognition is unpervasive. The difficulty would be solved if the *prakāra* were a pervasive or *vyāpyavṛtti* in character (TS – 154) (39) TS: ‘veridical *anubhava*’ (*pramā*) is of four kinds: *Pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti*, *śabda*. Its special condition (*kāraṇa*) is also four kinds: *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*.⁴³

The English term ‘perception’ is similarly used for *pratyakṣa*. When we perceive a ‘tree’, the ‘tree’ known through perception (*pratyakṣa*)

This is veridical *anubhava* (*pramā*). Like the perception is similarly used for *pratyakṣa* and *anumiti* is used for *anumāna* and *upamiti* used for *upamāna* and *Śabda* is used for *Śabda*. The term *anumāna* and *upamāna* have been used for both veridical *anubhava* and there must be a special condition. The term *anumiti* and *upamiti* have been used for veridical *anubhava* but there must not any special condition. The English term ‘perception’ is used for *pratyakṣa* like inference is used for *anumāna* and testimony for *śabda* and comparison for *upamāna*. It is to be noted that though the term *pratyakṣa*, *upamiti*, *anumiti*, *śabda* are used for significance of veridical state of *anubhava* but they have a wider usage as well. They used for any state of cognition which may be veridical and non-veridical.⁴⁴

Annambhaṭṭa usages the term ‘*kāraṇa*’. ‘*Kāraṇa*’ is a causal condition which is called *Kāraṇa*, but not all causal conditions are called *kāraṇa* only the uncommon causal condition is called *kāraṇa*^m (*asādhāraṇam kāraṇam*). An effect is dependent on two sets of condition. One condition is *sādāraṇa kāraṇa* which are used for ‘God’, ‘Space’ ‘Time’, etc. The other condition is *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* which are used for cognition. Annambhaṭṭa used only the term *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*. The term *kāraṇa* is used for either in terminal condition or a causal condition functioning through an intermediary (*vyāpāravat kāraṇa*).⁴⁵

Annambhaṭṭa himself was not quite steady to explain the term *kāraṇa*. In the cause of *pratyakṣa*, *upamiti* and *śābda-badha* he takes the term to mean the causal condition through an intermediary or *vyāpāra*. But for *anumiti pramā* the causal condition is used. For the unsteady use of 'kāraṇa' he describes *indriya* or sense organs as *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, cognition of resemblance or *sādṛśyajñāna* as the *upamāna pramāṇa* and statement or *śābda* as *śābda pramāṇa* and in the case of *anumiti parāmarsā* is for *anumāna pramāṇa*. He is not faithful with his own concept of *kāraṇa*. But *kāraṇa* is always described as *asādhāraṇa – kāraṇam*.⁴⁶

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1. The Sanskrit term *pramā* is usually translated today as 'knowledge'. A *pramā* is usually regarded as a special kind of *jñāna* whose truth is guaranteed. But according to B.K.Matilal, it is not satisfactory to say 'pramā as knowledge'. According to him, a *pramā*, is to be understood always as an episode which is true and non-dubious. But knowledge is justified true belief is not usually understood in the episodic sense. For details one may see, B.K.Matilal, *Perception*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 107-12.
2. According to Prabhākara, knowledge is self-revealing and guarantees its own truth without reference to anything else. Every knowledge must carry in it an assurance of its truth and we should have no doubt. In this sense, a non-valid cognition is a case of impossibility and self-contradiction.
3. Ganganatha Jha derives the Prabhākara definition of *pramā* from the following verse of the *Prakāraṇa-Pāñcikā* :
Pramāṇamanubhūtiḥ, sā smrteranyā na sā smṛtiḥ na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrvapratipattivyapekṣanāt, Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources*. Banaras Hindu University, Banaras, Second Edition, 1964, p. 70.
4. *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smrteranyā smṛtiḥ punaḥ / pramāṇam pūrvavajijñāna-saṁskāra mātrajam jñānamucyate //* - *Prakāraṇa Pāñcikā* : Sālikanātha Misra, (Ed) A. Subramanyam Sastry, Banaras Hindu University Darsana Series, Banaras, 1962, p. 127.
5. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *The Basic Ways of Knowing*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Second Revised Edition, 1989, p. 86.
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7. 'tattvajñānāt niḥśreyasa-adhigamaḥ - Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.1.
8. 'buddhiḥ upalabdhiḥ jñānam iti anarthāntaram', - *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1.1.15.
9. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, that it is always about something and directed towards that something.
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13. Knowledge, Truth and Pramatva, in *The Philosophy of J.N.Mohanty*, (Ed) Daya Krishna and K.L.Sharma, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1991, p. 182.
14. *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛternyā smṛtiḥ ~~ḥ~~ punaḥ/pūrvavijñāna-saṁskāra mātrajam jñānamuchyate* // - *Prakāraṇa- Pañcikā*, p. 127.
15. *tasmāt dr̥dham yadutpannam nāpi saṁvādamṛcchati/jñānantareṇa vijñānam tatpramānam pratiyatām* // - *Ślokavārttika* : Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sries, 1898, V. 2.80.
16. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
17. *yathārtham sarvameveha vijñānamiti siddhaye*, - *Prakāraṇa-Pañcikā*, p.43.
18. *tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramānatā / arthānyathāvahe tūttadosajñānadapodyate* // - *Ślokavārttika*, V. 2.53.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *op.cit.* pp. 103-04.
21. Govardhan P. Bhatt, *Ibid*, p. 96.
22. *Sarvavyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam sā ⁽dvividha-smṛtiḥ ~~ḥ~~ anubhavaḥ cā* – *Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā*. Annaṁbhaṭṭa, [Eng. Trans] by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, Second Revised Edition, 1983, Verse No. 34.
23. *annupramāna vyāpārāt param bhavati yāḥ sāḥ anubhavaḥ* – *Tarkasaṁgraha, Adhyāpanā*, N.C. Goswami, Sanskrit Pusthak Bhandar, Calcutta, Second Revised Edition, 1930, (Beng) p. 286.
24. *tadabhāvavati tatprakāraḥ aubhavaḥ anyathārthaḥ; yathā suktau 'idam rajatam' itī ⁽jñānam, sā eva 'pramā' itucyate* – *Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā*, Verse No. 38.
25. *tacchuṇye tammatiryā syādapramā, sā nirupitā* – *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda, Kārikā No. 127.*
26. *saṁskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ ⁽ḥ* – *Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpikā*, Verse No. 35.
27. S.C.Chatterjee, *Ibid*, p.22.
28. An examination of the Nyāya Theory of Memory, Sabujkali Sen, *'Philosophica'*, vol. 8, March & June 1979, No. 12.
29. S.C. Chatterjee, *Ibid*, pp. 26-27.
30. *sarvavyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam sā dvividhā smṛti anubhavaḥ ca* – *Tarkasaṁgraha , Dīpikā*, Verse No. 34:

31. *Tarkasaṅgraha*, *Dīpika*, p. 354.
32. *Siddhāndamuktāvati* on verse no. 51.
33. *Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpika*, p xviii.
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35. *Ibid*
36. *Ibid*
37. *Ibid*
38. *Ibid*, p. xix.
39. *Ibid*
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46. *Ibid*.

CHAPTER - II

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

1. Reality of the object in Perception

Perception is the one instrument of knowledge admitted by all schools alike.¹ The obvious conception of a contact between sense-organ and object (*indriyārthasannikarsa*) was the starting-point for the development of the doctrine, and appears in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā sūtras.² But the ambiguous character of the 'object' suggested doubts as to its reality at a very early period: so that the defence of the validity of perception assumes at a very early stage the form of a 'refutation of idealism'. An early statement of the refutation is fortunately preserved in Śābara's Bhāṣya on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, and forms as convenient preface to the doctrine of perception.

The *Vrttikāra*'s refutation, embodied in Śābara, falls into three parts each of which meets a distinct difficulty; and the first and third parts deal with the two difficulties which, according to Vātsyāyana's interpretation, led to the insertion into the *Nyāya-Sūtra*'s definition of the two words *avyabhicārī* and *avyapadeśyam*. The second part meets the 'idealistic' argument from dreams which is dealt with in a later section of the *Nyāyasūtra* in the course of a polemic against Buddhist views.³ The three difficulties are (1) the existence of erroneous 'perceptions' side by side with true perceptions; (2) the existence in dreams of 'perceptions' which admittedly have no basis (*nirālambana*) in an external object present to sense, and (3) the impossibility of characterizing (*vyapadis-*) cognitions without reference to the objects cognized, so that thought without things seems empty, void, or nothing (*śūnya*)³. And, as things have already been shown to be unreal, the paradoxical conclusion emerges that everything is void and nothing (*śūnyavāda*).

FIRST DIFFICULTY

Perception and Error

The argument in Śābara is as follows. The opponent says that the means of cognition need examination, because they sometimes err (*vyabhicārāt parīkṣitavyam*). "For in as much as mother of pearl has the look of silver, thereby perception errs; and inference and the other means of cognition err because they are based on perception." It is replied: "This is not so. That which is really perception does not err; and what errs is not perception". The opponent asks for a definition of perception so understood, and the *Vṛttikāra* answers with an amended version of the *sūtra*: - *tatsamprayage puruṣasyendriyāṅām buddhijanma sat pratyakṣam* - "When a man's sense-organs are in contact with that, the arising of cognition is true perception". In other words, perception, properly so called, is cognition which has as its object the very thing with which the sense-organs is in contact (*yadviśayakam jñānam, tenaiva samprayoga*).⁴ The opponent asks: "How is it known that in the one case (i.e. that of real perception) the organ is in contact with an object which is the object -as -cognized, while in the other case (that of error) it is in contact with something other than the object-as-cognised, while in the other case (that of error) it is in contact with something other than the object-as-cognised? A man who apprehends silver where there is actually mother of pearl thinks that his visual organ is in contact with silver." The reply is that it is known when a conflicting cognition arises, so that the man says to himself 'this was a mistaken cognition and arose when the organ was actually in contact with something different - yes, but how could it be known before the conflicting cognition arose? Since at that time there was nothing to distinguish a true perception from an erroneous apprehension, - It is answered that false cognition arises when either the organ is affected by obscurities or the object by impediments to perception such as minuteness. Contact of organ and object is the cause of (true) perception, while defects affecting either factor (organ or object) are the cause of false

apprehension. – Yes, but how is it known that defects are or are not present? The answer is: “If after looking for defects carefully we do not find them we accept the experience as not impaired by defects: because there is no proof that it is so impaired.

Vātsyāyana, commenting on the word *avyābhicārī* in the definition of perception given in the *Nyāya Sūtra*⁵ answers the same objection to the validity of perception in the same way.⁶

In the summer the sun’s rays commingle with earth-warmth and become tremulous. These coming in contact with the visual organ of a person at a distance,⁷ the cognition of water arise from contact of organ and object. And (as it ‘arises from contact of organ and object’) it would turn out to be perception” (and so perception, which is supposed to be a *pramāṇa*, an instrument of *pramā* or truth, is an instrument of error).

“It is with reference to this possible objection that the word *avyābhicārī* is introduced into the definition. Cognition of ‘that’ in what is not that (*atasmimś tat*) is characterized as *vyābhicārī*: while cognition of ‘that’ in what is that is *avyābhicārī*, non-erroneous. Perception is non-erroneous cognition.”⁸

The first phase of the discussion, of error in perception may be regarded as ending with the limitation of the name perception to *true* cognitions of sense. But obviously the difficulty can recur in an acuter form as soon as analysis reveals the distinction between the “bare impression of sense’ and ‘fictions of imagination’: for the application of the formula *tasmin tad iti jñānam* - ‘knowing that as that’ — is seen to be less simple than it looked at first when the ‘ideal element’ in perception is insisted on. The discussion then passes into another phase: a phase which may be said to crystallize in the term *kalpanāpodha*, “stripped of ideas,” by which Dinnāga describes pure perception.

SECOND DIFFICULTY

Perception and Dreams (Idealist Argument)

The second part of Śabara's argument is the part to which the appellation of a refutation of idealism may most appropriately be given, the analogy between perception and the baseless fabric of our dreams being in the characteristic vein of idealism.

The objector argues: "All ideas are without external objects, like dreams (*sarva eva nirālambanāḥ svapnavat pratyayāḥ*). An idea has no ground in external objects : reality (*svabhāva*) is falsely attributed to a dream ; and the waking person's apprehension of 'a post' or 'a wall', too, is no more than an idea (*pratyaya eva*) ; and therefore it, too, is not grounded in any external object (*tasmāt so 'pi nirālambanah*)".

It may be said in reply: - The waking man's apprehension of a post was perfectly certain (*supariniścita*): how shall it prove false? But the apprehension in the dream was perfectly certain in exactly the same way: prior to waking there was no difference in this respect. But there is a difference, for dreams are found to be erroneous, while error is not found in the waking cognition.

The opponent retorts that his point is that error will be found in waking cognition, seeing that the waking cognition resembles dream-cognition (*tatsāmānyāt*). If the dream-cognition is false because it is an idea (*pratyayatvāt*), the same must be true of waking-ideas. The mere fact of having an idea is enough to establish falsity, - and it is impossible to say that waking-cognition is *other than an idea*.

The answer to this is that the falsity of dream-cognitions is known from something else than from their being ideas, namely from their conflicting

character. And if it be asked 'whence comes this conflicting character?' the answer is that it comes from the impaired efficacy of the internal organ in sleep. Sleepiness is the cause of the erroneous character of dream-ideas. Therefore a waking person's ideas are not erroneous (since then the internal organ is not thus impaired).

To the objection that when a person is awake, too, there may be defects in the instruments of cognition which cause falsity of ideas, the answer is that if there were such defects they would be known. As for the objection that at the time of having the dream-ideas the impairment of the internal organ is not realized, though present, the answer is that on waking the person realizes that his internal organ was overcome with sleep.

DIALECTIC OF WHOLE AND PART

The treatment of the dream-argument in the *Nyāya* is confined to four sūtras (NS IV, ii. 31-34) and forms a small part only of the general polemic directed against the Buddhist denial of reality (NS IV. Ii. 4-37). The general purport of the skeptical dialectic which this passage as a whole meets is perhaps best described in a couplet found in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* -

Buddhyā, vivicy amānānām svabhāvo nāvadhāryate ato nirabhilapyās te niḥsvabhāvās ca darśitāḥ.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is accepted as one of the four means of knowing (*pamāṇa*) accepted in Nyāya-Logic. In fact, it has been accepted as eldest among the four means of knowing (*Pramāṇajyeṣṭha*) on account of the fact that other *pramāṇas* like inference (*anumāna*) etc. are dependent on perception. In the case of inferential cognition (*anumiti*) the perceptual knowledge of *hetu* (prabans) and the invariable relation between *hetu* (prabans) and *sādhyā* (prabandum) are essential. The knowledge attained through comparison (*upamiti*) depends on the

perceptual knowledge of similarity (*sādrśyajñāna*). Even the testimonial knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) would not be possible, and thereby no perceptual knowledge of word etc. Hence, the Indian Logicians in general and Naiyāyikas in particular have given much emphasis on the theory of perception and its primacy. Considering its importance in Indian epistemology Gautama has mentioned perception at the very beginning and afterwards the mention of inference etc. is made.

Let us concentrate on some of the definitions of perception given in various texts of the Nyāya system of Indian Philosophy.

II

Kesava Misra in his *Tarkabhāsa* has interpreted term '*Sākṣātkāra*' as perceptual knowledge and the term '*pratyakṣa*' as the means of perceptual knowledge.⁹

According to some thinkers like Uddyotakara etc, the term '*pratyakṣa*' literally means what is related to the senses, while others like Prasāstrapāda etc. are of the view that the term '*pratyakṣa*' literally means 'knowledge which is dependent on the senses.'¹⁰

In the Nyāya system perception is defined as the knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object.¹¹

But in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama the definition of perception is quite different from the above-mentioned one. To Gautama – perception is the knowledge which is produced out of the contact of the sense-organ with object and is not caused due to words (*avyapadesya*), is certain (*vyavasāyāmaka*) and invariably connected with the object (*avyabhicārī*).¹²

It may be argued that the definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas is defective. Because in the case of perception there is a contact between object and sense-organ which is associated with mind which is again connected with *ātman* or self. So self and mind are vital causes of perception which cannot be

denied, but the role of self and mind is not mentioned in the above-mentioned definitions.¹³

In reply, the Naiyāyikas may argue that in the definition of perception, the special cause or the uncommon cause (*kāraṇa*) of it has been mentioned. *Kāraṇa* is defined as “*Vyāpāravat asādhāraṇakāraṇam kāraṇam*,” (i.e., the uncommon cause along with intermediary is called a *kāraṇa*). But self, mind etc. are not the uncommon causes but the common causes of perception by virtue of the fact that they are common in inference, comparison and testimony also. Hence, it is necessary to mention the characteristics of the perceptual cognition which are different from other sources of valid cognition. It is not at all necessary to mention the role of *ātman* and mind in the definition.¹⁴

According to the Naiyāyikas, sense-object-contact is the primary cause and self-mind-contact is the secondary cause of perception, which is explained with the help of the following metaphor. A person sleeps soundly; suddenly he wakes up hearing a loud sound or a violent push. Here the primary cause of his waking up is the sense-object-contact and not the conscious-guidance of his mind by the self. So sense-object-contact is primary and self-mind-contact is the secondary cause of perception.

It may be objected that the definitions of perception given in *Tarkasamgraha* and *Nyāyabhāṣya* is not applicable to God's perception and hence it suffers from the defect called *avyāpti*. God's perception not caused by sense-object-contact does not come under the purview of the above-mentioned definition.

In order to accommodate such perception the Neo-logicians have given the another new definition of perception which runs as follows: “*Jñānakāraṇakam Jñānam pratyakṣam*” or the knowledge in which the knowledge is not the instrument is called perception.¹⁵ As inference is based on the knowledge of invariable concomitance, comparison on the knowledge of similarity, verbal testimony on the knowledge of words, they are described as

jñānakāranaka-jñāna (i.e. the knowledge arising out of the instrumentality of another knowledge). As perception does not depend on other knowledge, it is called *jñānakāranakajñāna*. This new definition has been introduced by the Neo-logicians so that God's perception may come under the purview of perception.¹⁶

Let us explain and examine the definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas. Regarding this a question may arise why the terms 'sense-organ' (*indriya*) 'object' (*artha*) and 'contact' (*sannikarṣa*) are inserted in it. The Sanskrit term '*indriya*' does not stand for sense-organ in the physiological sense. For, the definition of *indriya* is that which, not being the seat (*anāśraya*) of a manifest (*udbhūta*) specific quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) other than sound is the seat of that conjunction with *mānas* (*manahasamyoga*) which is the condition of cognition (*jñānakāraṇa*). According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the conjunction of *indriya* with *mānas* which is a quality inheres in the sense-organ as well as in the *mānas* or mind. So *indriya* is the seat (*āśraya*) of that conjunction which is one condition of perception. Again it is not the substratum (*anāśraya*) of manifest specific quality other than sound. The first part of the definition (i.e. not being the locus of the manifest specific quality other than sound – '*śabdetarodbhūtavīśeṣaguṇanāśrayatve sati*') has been given so that self or *Atman* does not come under sense-organ. Though self is the locus of the contact of the mind, the cause of knowledge, it is the locus (but not the non-locus) of the manifest specific quality other than sound. So the definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to the ear as it is the locus of sound, which is the manifest specific quality. So, the adjunct 'other than sound' (*Śabdetara*) has been inserted in the definition. As the specific qualities like colour etc. exist in eye etc. the definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to them and hence the adjunct 'manifest' (*udbhūta*) has been inserted in the definition. As the colour etc. are not manifest specific qualities, they cannot be taken into consideration.¹⁷ There are five external sense-organs and one internal sense-organ. The perceptions

caused by external sense-organs are known as olfactory (*ghrāṇaja*), the gustatory (*rāsana*), the visual (*cākṣuṣa*), the cutaneous (*spārśana*) and the auditory (*śrōtra*) organs. Perception caused by internal sense-organ is known as *Mānasa*. Each and every sense-organ has a particular object of its own i.e. different sense-organs have different objects e.g. the function of olfactory sense-organ is to receive smell which is the object of this sense-organ etc.¹⁸

In the definition of *pratyakṣa*, the term '*artha*' is rendered as 'object' which stands for a 'real thing', but it does not stand for anything of which one may be aware without the contact of the sense-organ. So the word '*artha*' is used in the sense of only perceptible object. Perception will not be possible without a contact between such an object and the sense-organ. In the *Nyāyasūtra*, the word '*artha*' means the five qualities belonging to the five elements that are earth (*prthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and empty space (*ākāśa*) from which the senses originate.¹⁹

To the Naiyāyikas, our perception is dependent on the contact of the sense-organ (*indriya*) with the object (*artha*). This contact or relation is known as '*sannikarṣa*' which is the 'operative relation'.

Gautama has included the term '*sannikarṣa*' instead of the terms '*saṃyoga*' or '*samavāya*', as *sannikarṣa* embraces both the entities (i.e. object and sense-organ).²⁰

In the *Nyāyabhāṣya* Vātsyāyana says that *indriyārthasannikarṣa* is the special cause (*kāraṇa*) of perception. And the sensible objects i.e. quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), universal (*jāti*) etc. do not have any relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) with the sense-organs. So Gautama in his *sūtra* has used the term '*sannikarṣa*' (instead of the term '*saṃyoga*') through which the other relations including *saṃyoga* are to be understood.²¹

This sense-object-contact is of six kinds.²²

First, we have a case of direct contact which consists in the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between sense and its object. For example, in perception of a substance like a pot or a cloth, we may perceive either by visual or by tactual sense-organs. In both kinds of perception the visual sense-organ (*cakṣu*) or the tactual sense-organ (*tvak*) comes in direct conjunction (*saṁyoga*) with the substance which is the operative relation.²³

Secondly, we have a case of indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) which is called 'inherence in the conjoined' (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) between the sense and the sensible qualities of the object. For example, in the case of perception of a pot we cannot have direct perception of the colour of it. The relation between the sense and the colour is not directly perceived by the sense. So the relation between the sense and the quality is called 'inherence in the conjoined' (*saṁyuktasamavāya*).²⁴

Thirdly, not only the colour i.e. red colour of the pot but the universal i.e. 'redness' which inheres in the particular colour is also perceived. Here the operative relation between the sense-organ and the universal is called 'inherence inherent in the conjoined' (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*) in the case of the perception of redness of the pot, we have an indirect relation with redness which inheres in the substance 'pot'.²⁵

Fourthly, the indirect sense-object-contact is known as inherence (*samavāya*) which remains in the perception of sound by the auditory sense-organ or ear. According to the Nyāya School, the ear which is a sense-organ is the space (*ākāśa*) limited by auditory passage (*karnaśaṣṭkulyavacchinnam nabhaḥ*) and sound is a quality. As quality always exists in a substance through the relation of inherence, sound as a quality exists in the space (*ākāśa*) which is a substance through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).²⁶

Fifthly, the sense-object-contact called 'inherence in the inherent' (*samaveta-samavāya*) remains not only in the perception of sound by the ear but in the perception of 'soundness' also which inheres in the sound which again is

related to ear through the relation of inherence. The relation between soundness and ear is called *samavetasamavāya*.²⁷ These five kinds of relation remain between the sense-organs and the positive entities. Sixthly, there is the relation between the sense-organ and the negative entity which is called the relation of 'characteriser and characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva*). For example, 'I am seeing the absense of a jar on the ground'. According to the Naiyāyikas, an absence is as much a fact as presence. The case may be cited in a different way if we turn the sentence as 'I am seeing the ground endowed with the absence of a jar'. Here my eye which is the sense-organ is in conjunction with the ground which is characterized by the absence of a jar. So there is the operative relation between the eye as the sense-organ and 'the absence of a jar' as the object. This relation is described as the relation of 'characteriser-characterised.'²⁸

In order to accommodate absence in perception, the Naiyāyikas admit this sixth kind of sense-object-contact (relation of characteriser-characterised). According to this view, non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*) are not separate *Pramāṇas* but they are included in perception and inference respectively. So the Naiyāyikas have to admit the sixth kind of sense-object-contact, where it is stated that absence can come in contact with the sense-organ.

According to Vātsyāyana, it is the function of a lamp to reveal the object which exists and also which does not exist. So when a man cannot see an object with the help of a lamp, he would come to the conclusion that the object is not there. If it were present there, it would have been seen with the help of the lamp. In the same way, when an object is not known with the help of a particular *Pramāṇa*, it would be treated as absent. The knowledge of the absence of an object through a particular *Pramāṇa* proves the non-existence of it. So the *Pramāṇa* (particularly perception) which reveals the existence of an object also reveals the non-existence of other object.²⁹ That is why, the Naiyāyikas do not

accept 'anupalabdhi' as a separate source of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*).

According to them, this non-existence of an object can be perceived through the relation called 'characteriser-characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva*).

In the super commentary *Nyāyabodini* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasaṅgraha* three types of contact in the case of the perception of absence have been accepted. They are qualifier in the conjoined (*saṁyukta- viśeṣaṇa*), qualifier inherent in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa*) and qualifier inherent in the inhered conjoined object (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa*). In the case of the perception of a jar, we also perceive the non-existence of clothness in it. Here the absence of clothness inheres in the jar which comes in contact (conjunction) with the eye, because in a jar there is the distinction (*bheda*) of a cloth, which is also revealed simultaneously. So there is another case of the perception of non-existence. This contact between 'the eye' as the sense-organ and 'the absence of clothness in the object' is called *saṁyukta- viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. conjoined qualifier).

Again, while perceiving a jarness (existing in a jar) the absence of earthness in it is also revealed. Here the absence of earthness inheres in the jarness (through the relation of inherence) which also inheres in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye. So the perception of the non-existence of earthness in jarness is possible through the contact called *saṁyukta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier inherent in the conjoined).

Again, in the case of the perception of colourness (existing in the colour of a jar), we also perceive the non-existence of blueness in it. The absence of blueness inheres in the colourness which also inheres in the colour which again inheres in the jar. This is conjoined with the eye. So, the contact between the eye as the sense-organ and the absence of blueness as the object is called *saṁyukta-samaveta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. qualifier inherent in that which is again inherent in the conjoined).³⁰

In the definition of perception viz., *indriyathasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam*, etc Vācaspati Miśra is of the opinion that the term 'utpanna' is the indicative of the fact that the sense-object-contact is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.

In the adjunct '*Indriyārthasannikarṣa*' of the definition, the term '*artha*' has been inserted after keeping some purpose in view. It is to indicate the fact that the object should be knowable in shape and size.³²

Let us consider the purpose of the inclusion of the term '*avyapadeśyam*' which means 'unnameable' or 'non-expressible' through words. According to Vātsyāyana, every individual manifestation of knowledge of an object which is produced out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object is expressed by words like colour, taste etc. The cognition which is expressed through words would be taken as produced from verbal testimony. In order to exclude this possibility the term *avyapadeśya* has been inserted in the definition. It has further been stated that the name of the perceived object is necessary when this knowledge is being communicated to others. The main purpose of the use of the term is to point out that the knowledge produced from the sense-object-contact can never be considered as verbal comprehension.³³

Some scholars think that the term *avyapadeśyam* has been inserted in the definition in order to include indeterminate perception (which is not expressed through words) under perception. When our sense-organ has got contact with a particular object, the knowledge of that object cannot be expressed at first. But the existence of such knowledge cannot be ignored, as it becomes the cause of the later knowledge endowed with name, universal etc. Hence the term *avyapadeśyam* indicates that the indeterminate perception is also a kind of perception.³⁴ Moreover, this adjunct removes the charge of impossibility of the definition given by *Bhāṣārthari*.³⁵ According to *Bhāṣārthari*, there is no knowledge in this world which cannot be expressed through words and hence we always come across an object qualified by words.³⁶

So far as this theory is concerned, one might think that the definition of perception unduly extends to the verbal cognition leading to the defect of impossibility, as each and every individual manifestation of knowledge is expressed through words. Through the insertion of the above-mentioned term Gautama wants to indicate that there is at least the existence of a state which is not endowed with a word, its denotation and their relation. Though the judgements like 'this is a cow' are verbalized knowledge, there is the initial sense-perception which is capable of being defined and this has become possible through insertion of the adjunct *avyapadeśya*.³⁷

Let us consider the significance of the insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* in the definition of perception. When we attain the knowledge of water in the case of mirage connected with sunrays during summer, it (i.e. the knowledge of water) would come under the purview of perception as it is produced out of the sense-object-contact. The insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* entails that such type of knowledge would not be considered as a perceptual one. The perceptual knowledge would always be non-deviated (*avyabhicārī*) and hence it is always the right cognition of an object. That is, when an object is known as such, it is called non-deviated knowledge and an object known otherwise is called deviated (*vyabhicārī*).³⁸

One may have doubt (regarding the nature of an object seen at a distance) in the form – 'Whether it is smoke or dust.' Such type of dubious knowledge would be treated as a perceptual one as it is produced from the sense-object-contact. In order to exclude such type of knowledge from perception, the term *vyāvasāyātmaka* has been inserted in the definition. The cognition which being produced from the sense-object-contact becomes certain in character is called perception.³⁹

It may be argued that doubtful cognition is produced from the contact of the self with mind and not by sense-object-contact. So, there is no necessity for incorporating the term *vyāvasāyātmaka* in the definition.

The above-mentioned view is not tenable.⁴⁰ For when one sees an object with the help of eye, one has a doubtful cognition. It is found that in all cases of perception our sense-organ is operative. The doubtful cognition would be included in perception on the basis of having the characteristic 'sense-object-contact'. In order to exclude such type of cognition from the purview of perception the adjunct '*vyavasāyātmaka*' has been inserted in the definition. To Vācaspati Miśra doubtful cognition has already been excluded from perception with the help of the term *avyabhicāri* (i.e. non-deviated) and hence the term *vyavasāyātmakam* has been inserted only to include determinate perception under the purview of perception. This point or interpretation has not been mentioned by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara as it is very simple to them and needs no explanation.⁴¹

As per the nature of the sense-object-contact which is instrumental to all perceptions, perception has been divided by the Naiyāyikas into two broad classes viz. *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal perception. Again, normal (*laukika*), perception has been divided into six classes i.e. olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perception due to six kinds of sense-organ. There is another classification of normal perception viz., *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate perception and *savikalpaka* or the determinate perception.

Though the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perceptions is generally recognized in Indian philosophy, there is difference of opinion among the different systems as to their exact nature and validity. To some thinkers, *nirvikalpaka* is not at all a case of perception; and hence all perceptions are *savikalpakas*. But according to the Naiyāyikas, *nirvikalpaka* is as much a case of perception as *savikalpaka*.

Literally *nirvikalpaka* means that in which there is no *vikalpa* and *savikalpaka* means that in which there is a *vikalpa*. Now what is to be understood by the term *vikalpa*? The term *vikalpa* means name, universal, a

quality or a relation of 'characteriser-characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*). So, *nirvikalpaka* perception is a perception which is not endowed with name, universal, quality or relation of characteriser-characterised.

In other words, *nirvikalpaka* cognition means *niṣprakāra* which means that which has no *prakāra* or qualifier. *Prakāra* denotes 'something having some character' (i.e. *viśeṣaṇa*). *Nirvikalpaka* cognition is thus a cognition whose object is not given as having some character. That is to say, an indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka* perception is a cognition which does not apprehend the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand. But in the case of determinate perception there is the apprehension of the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand. When a jar is known, there is apprehension of qualifier (i.e. jariness), qualificand (jar) and their relation (i.e. inherence). But *nirvikalpaka* cognition of a jar would be the cognition of something which is not characterized by the specific features of the jar. The object of *nirvikalpaka*-cognition would be simple entity and not anything complex. How can the reality of the *nirvikalpaka* perception be proved?

The reality of such perception is proved with the help of an inference in the following way:

The cognition of a qualified entity (*viśiṣṭa*) is due to the cognition of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The cognition of 'cow' is the cognition of a qualified entity.

Therefore, the cognition of 'cow' is due to the cognition of a qualifier.

From the cognition 'a person possessing a stick' (*dandi puruṣaḥ*) we have the cognition of something having the character 'with a stick'. But without the cognition of 'stick' one cannot have the cognition of 'one with a stick'. The cognition of stick is the cognition of qualifier. Here the cognition of 'one with a stick' (*viśiṣṭa*) is followed from the cognition of a 'stick' (*viśeṣaṇa*). The cognition of 'stick' again is followed from the cognition of its qualifier, i.e. 'stickness' if stick is taken as a qualified object. And the cognition of 'stickness'

is here the *nirvikalpaka* cognition. To claim that it establishes the reality of *nirvikalpaka* is to claim that the cognition of a qualifier is the cognition of something that is not itself qualified. Because if the cognition of qualifier were taken to be determinate or *savikalpaka* the defect of *infinite regress* would crop up. For example, the cognition of a qualified entity 'cow' is due to the cognition of its qualifier 'cowness'. Again the cognition of the entity 'cowness' is dependent on the cognition of 'cowness-ness' and in this way it will lead to the defect called *infinite regress*. So in order to avoid this difficulty the Naiyāyikas accept the qualifier of a qualified entity as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate. So here the cognition of 'cowness' is cognized in itself, that is, without any further qualifier. And the actuality of *nirvikalpaka* perception is proved in this way.

III

From the above discussions the following comments may be made. First, the definition of perception given by Anāmbhatta is to some extent different from that given by Gautama. In the later, three terms viz., *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmakam* have been included but these are not found in the former. It is perhaps the intention of Gautama to include both the definition and classification in the same *sūtra*. For the characteristic feature of a *sūtra* is to discuss all the matters in a very minimized way.⁴¹ In the *sūtra tatpūrvakamanumānam pūrvavacchavat-sāmānyatodrṣṭānce* (1.1.5) the first part is the definition and in the second part the account of classification has been given. In the same way, it can be said that the first part of the *sūtra (indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam)* gives the definition of perception and the terms *avyapadeśyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam* existing in the second part indicate the two types of perception- determinate and indeterminate respectively.

The term *avyabhicāri* is given only to exclude illusory perception from perception as state earlier. But in *Tarkasamgraha* Anāmbhatta does not feel any necessity to include these terms, as he at first divides the valid presentative cognition into perception etc.⁴² So the question of coming of illusory perception

under purview of perception does not arise at all. But in *Nyāyabhāṣya* Vātsyāyana feels necessity to include this term as there is possibility of undue extension of the definition of perception to illusory perception.

Secondly, it is already said that absence (*abhāva*) which is already taken as a category (*padārtha*) is capable of being perceived with the help of the contact called qualifier-qualificand-relationship (*viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*). This contact is, I think, of a peculiar nature, since in our daily life we do not think this in such a way. When the ground is seen without a jar, it is generally said that there is no jar on the ground (*bhūtale ghato nāsti*). The verbal expression is of this type but it is not generally expressed in the form of 'qualifier and qualified'. Though there is no basic difference between these two types of expression, the earlier one directly pinpoints to the expression while the latter one indirectly expresses the experience. We generally do not take recourse to the 'qualifier-qualificand-form' when we feel the absence of money at the end of the month in the form - 'I am endowed with the absence of money' (*arthābhāvāvān aham*), but it is expressed as - 'I have no money'. The qualifier-qualificand-form is done by an individual to indicate such expression artificially as he has every right to express himself in his own way according to his own desire (*vivakṣā*). In spite of this, it is not a normal way of expression. Thirdly, the perceptuality of absence is not accepted by some schools like Advaita Vedānta etc. who admit that absence is known through a separate means of knowing called *anupalabdhi*. If we ponder over the fact how the absence of an object comes under the purview of perception or perceptual cognition, we will find that there is no contact in the sense of *Sannikarṣa*, as absence is not a positive entity (*bhāvapadārtha*). Had there been contact, it would have been a positive object. In other words, it may be asked how a negative fact becomes an *artha* (object) with which sense-organs can be connected. When the absence of a jar on the ground is known, there is the contact of the eye with the ground from which the absence is presumed. The argument runs as follows: 'Had there been a

jar on the ground, it would have been perceived', there is no jar at all. Obviously there is the role of perception in discovering the absence of a jar, but perception, one may argue, cannot reveal it directly through sense-object-contact because contact is directly related to ground from which the absence is assumed indirectly. For this reason only the Buddhists (specially Dharmakīrti) incorporate it under inference, the probans of which is *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) and Advaitins regard this a special source of knowledge called *anupalabdhi*.

In order to remove these difficulties the Naiyāyikas retain their original position about the perceptuality of absence by way of adducing the following arguments. To them, as soon as an individual sees the ground, he perceives the absence of a jar also simultaneously. The perceptual knowledge of "bare ground" or "empty ground" gives rise to the knowledge of the absence of a jar. Actually the knowledge or 'bare ground' incorporates the knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. Otherwise how does the awareness of 'bareness' or 'emptiness' come into being? In fact, the terms 'bare', 'empty' entails that ground is having some absence (*abhāvavat*). Without the help of such contact in the form of qualificand-qualifier relation (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*) the perceptual knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is not possible. In our everyday life we also express the absence as 'empty pocket' i.e. money-less pocket. In these cases also we have the awareness of the qualifier-qualificand-relationship. Though we do not adopt the sophisticated way of presentation like. 'The ground is endowed with the absence of a jar' (*ghatābhāvavad bhūtaḥ*), the same thing is expressed in another way of as *Śūnyam bhūtaḥ* (empty ground). In this context 'śūnya' '(empty)' stands for 'abhāva' (absence) of something, which is obviously a *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) of the ground, the qualificand (*viśeṣya*). To the Naiyāyikas such an awareness of qualifier-qualificand-character is spontaneously grasped by us, which becomes an *instrumental* (in the sense of *sannikarṣa*) to the perceptual awareness of a

negative fact. Hence, the Nyāyā position can be defended if this aspect of instrumentality is taken for granted.

Fourthly, some novel thoughts are found in the *Nayāyabodhinī* on *Dīpikā of Tarkasamgraha*, which, I think, deserves a special mention. It may be taken as new focus on the *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaya-bhāva* – contact which is accepted as a sixth normal contact revealing a negative fact.

Our attention is drawn towards the fact that, when we perceive a jar, there is the awareness of the absence of a cloth endowed with clothness (*paṭatva*). The Naiyāyikas generally explain ‘mutual absence’ (*anyonyābhāva*) which is otherwise called *bheda* with the example – *ghaṭo na paṭah* i.e. the jar is not a pot. To know ‘a jar’ is to know it as different from ‘non-jar’ or ‘a cloth’. The Buddhists, I think, have accepted the theory of *apoha* (the negative way of argumentation) after considering this aspect of knowledge. From this, it may be concluded that the awareness of each and every positive object amounts to the awareness of the absence of other objects excepting the particular one. Hence, the prior – knowledge of the absence of other objects is known as soon as a positive entity is known. It is quite natural that when a jar is as a positive entity is known. It is quite natural that when a jar is perceived, the absence of clothness (existing in a cloth) is known by us simultaneously. In this context the absence of clothness is known as inhered in the jar which is again connected with the eye, because in a jar there is the distinction (*bheda*) of a cloth which is also revealed simultaneously at the time of the perception of a jar. The absence of clothness inheres in the jar connected with eye, which is called *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier conjoined with something). In other words, the contact between an eye and “the absence of clothness” is called *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇa* (conjoined qualifier). In the same way, while perceiving jarness (existing in a jar) the absence of earthness in it is also revealed. To know something as jarness is to know as absence of earthness in it applying the same logic of *bheda* or *anyonyābhāva*. This awareness is acquired through the contact called *saṁyukta-*

samaveta-viśeṣaṇa (qualifier inherent in the conjoined). The perceptual awareness of earthness which is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) inhered (*samaveta*) in a jar which is connected with the eye (*samyukta*). While perceiving colourness (existing in the colour of a jar) the absence of bluness in it is also perceived with the help of the *samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. qualifier inhered in an object which is again inhered in the conjoined). In a particular case 'the absence of bluness' is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) inhered (*samaveta*) in the colourness existing in colour which is again inhered (*samaveta*) in the jar connected (*samyukta*) with eye.⁴³

These three sub-types of the qualifier – qualificand-contact (*viśeṣaṇa - viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*) is really an addition to the history of Nyāya literature. This contribution to Nyāya theory of *śannikarṣa* done by the author of *Nyāyabodhinī* opens a new horizon in the field of Nyāya-epistemology. Though these three are different types of *viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva-śannikarṣa*, the insight found in analyzing these is really praiseworthy and thought-provoking.

The justification of the insertion of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* in the definition of perception as given by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra is not at all tenable. *Vātsyāyana* opines that this term is inserted in order to exclude doubtful cognition from the purview of perception. The doubtful cognition though produced from the sense-object-contact cannot be called perception as it is not certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*). To Vācaspati Miśra doubtful cognition has already been excluded from perception with the insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* (i.e. non-deviated) and hence the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is inserted in the definition to include determinate perception (*savikalpakajñāna*) under the definition of perception. So far as my understanding goes, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is not used to exclude doubtful knowledge, because in the earlier *sūtra* 'Pratyakṣānumāno-pamānaśabdāḥ Pramāṇāni (1.13) it is said that perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the sources of valid cognition. In the *sūtra* perception is already taken as a valid cognition and hence in the

definition an object is rightly known through the contact of the sense-organ with an object. There is no question of having deviated cognition (*vyabhicārī*) of an object and hence the term *avyabhicārī* is not at all useful in the definition. That which is expressed with the help of language is called *vyavasāyātmaka* (determinate cognition). As it is a form of valid cognition, it is always valid and hence determinate. The validity of a piece of cognition is determined by verification which is possible in the case of determinate perception only. The indeterminate perception is not verifiable as it is formless and not expressed in language. So, the question of validity cannot be determined. So the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' should not be included in the definition on account of the fact that it is already taken as a form of *pramā*. Hence the use of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is superfluous and redundant.

Following the line of the Advaita Vedāntins Vācaspati Mīśra has said in his *Bhāmatī* commentary that, though perception is taken as eldest among the *Pramāṇas* (*Pramāṇajyeṣṭha*), it is not superior to *Āgama* i.e., testimonial knowledge so far as the validity of the statements like '*Svargakāmo yajeta*' etc. is concerned. Because, the verification of such statements is not at all possible. If the statements about some this-worldly fact or description are concerned, they are taken as perceptually true as verification is possible in such cases which have got empirical validity (*vyavahārikaprāmāṇya*).⁴⁴

The Naiyāyikas, though believer in *Śruti* or *Āgama*, do not solely depend on them for determining the validity of the statements given in *Śruti*. Hence, they are of the opinion that the validity of such statements can be determined through transcendental perception (*yogajapratyakṣa*) which is accepted as one of the supernormal means of knowing. The statements given in *Śruti* may not be taken for granted by all. Those who are non-believers of *Śruti* can be convinced through some practical means. If they practise *yoga*, they would be in a position to realize the truth of the statements through this method.⁴⁵ Hence, the primacy or supremacy of perception has to be retained according to Nyāya.

The Mīmāṃsakas say that the idea of an object is void – nothing. How so? Because we do not find any difference of presentational form (*ākāra*) between the thing and the cognition of it. It is our idea that is, the object of perception (*Pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*), and so the supposed something in the shape of a ‘thing’ separate from the thought is nothing at all. This would be so if the thought had the form of the thing, but our thought has no form (*nirākāra*); while the external thing has form (*ākāravat*), since it is perceived as connected with external space. For perceptual cognition has the thing for its object (*arthaviśayā hi pratyakṣabuddhiḥ*), and has not another thought for its object (*na buddhyantaraviśaya*). For thought is momentary, instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*), and will not endure through the time of another thought. – The view that thought is known just in its coming to birth, and that it makes known something else, like a lamp, is wrong. For no one apprehends a thought where a thing is not apprehended. But when a thing is apprehended a man knows that there is thought, as the result of an inference. Simultaneousness (of apprehension of the thing and apprehension of the thought) is impossible in this matter. It may be objected that it is after the thought has arisen that we say ‘the thing is known’, and not when the thought has not (yet) arisen. Therefore, the thought arises first, and afterwards the thing is known. To this we reply that it is true the thought arises first; but it is not known first. For it sometimes happens that even when a thing has been apprehended we say that we have not apprehended it (*jñāto py arhaḥ san ‘ajñāta’ ity ucyate*). Nor can we apprehend the precise character (*rūpa*) of the thought without designating the thing (which is the object of the thought (*na ca arthavyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopalambhanam*). Therefore thought cannot be designated (*na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*);⁴⁶ and what cannot be designated is not the object of perception. Therefore thought is not the object of perception.

Moreover, granted that in case the cognition and the object cognized were identical in form there would be no such thing as cognition, this would not

establish the non-existence of the thing, which is the object of perception (*arthasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ na (Abhāvah)*). And (as a matter of fact) the thought and the thing are not identical in form; for the thought, the existence of which we infer, is without shape or form (*anākārameva*); while the thing, which we apprehend as the object of perception (*pratyakṣam evāvagacchāmah*) has shape or form (*sākāra*). Therefore thought has the thing as its support, i.e. depends on things (*arthālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*. Cf. just below - *na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). Moreover, the thought of a cloth has a cause restricted to the case (i.e. only arises) when threads are present (*niyatanimittaḥ tantuṣvevopadiyamanesu paṭapratyayaḥ*): if it were not so, the idea of a jar would sometimes occur, in the case of a man ~~with~~ with senses unimpaired, even when threads are present. But this does not happen. Therefore thought is not independent of things, i.e. it refers to external things (*na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). And therefore perception is not an erroneous process (*na vyabhicarati pratyakṣam*).

The passage in which Vātsyāyana explains the word *avyapadesyam*^{4†} in NS I.i.4 is closely parallel to the third part of Śabara's argument.^{4#}

What Vātsyāyana has in mind is that there is no way of naming cognitive states except through the names of their objects. How can we distinguish the perception of colour from the perception of taste, except by saying that the former is the apprehension of colour - *rūpam iti jānīte*, - and that the latter is the apprehension of taste - *rasa iti jānīte*?

The words '*rūpa*', '*rasa*', denominate the object of the perceptions (*viṣayanāmadheya*), and not the perceptions as such. And yet thereby (*tena - viṣayanāmadheyena*) the perceptions are in fact expressed (*vyapadiśyate*).

From this, which Vātsyāyana would accept as so far a correct statement, some appear to have drawn a further conclusion which Vātsyāyana rejects, and which, as he thinks, the *sūtrakāra* intended to reject by the insertion of the word *avyapadesyam* in his definition of perception. This conclusion is stated in the

words: *nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānam sat śābdam prasaiyate* - the perception, being expressed by a word which is the name of the object, turns out to be an affair of words – verbal⁴⁸.

The difficulty is to see just how this conclusion is justified by these premises: a difficulty due to the fact that we do not know the precise nature of the doctrine which Vātsyāyana here criticizes.⁴⁸ In what sense can it be held that the perception is 'verbal' on the ground that you can only express it (*vyapadis-*) by using the word which is the name of the object perceived?

The position seems intelligible. As expounded by Vātsyāyana, it starts out from the assertion that wherever there is a distinct thing, there is a distinct word for it – *yāvad artham vai nāmadheyaśabdāḥ* - ; and the implication of this is that if there is a supposedly distinct thing which has not distinct name, then it is not after all a distinct thing. Now cognition, as such, comes under this description, for it has no name other than the name of the object of which it is the cognition. Therefore, it is nothing distinct from the object, - or, if it can be at all distinguished, then thoughts are just the names themselves as distinguished from the things. There are things: and there are names of things: but there is nothing else, - no third distinct entity 'cognition'.

Vātsyāyana replies that the distinct status of the apprehension as such is shown by the fact that there is apprehension of the object before the union of word and thing has come into play (*anupayakte śabdārthasambandhe*): and even after the naming has taken place the same remains true – the cognition remains distinct from the names. This is what the *sūtrakāra* asserts by the word *avyapadesya*, - i.e. distinct from names'. When it is necessary to speak of the cognition as such – as it is for practical convenience (*vyarahāra*) – we can of course indicate what particular cognition we refer to : the 'indication' (*vyapadesa*) being made by the name of the object followed (in Sanskrit) by the particle *iti*. The idea is not the object; but it can be indicated as being of the object.

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3. *Ślokavartika, Verses, 17-26. Ibid, 4.1.31.*
4. *Ślokavartika (Pratyaksa Sūtra)* – 1/42
5. *Nyāyasūtra* : 1.1.04.
6. *Nyāyabhāṣya* – 1.1.04
7. *Ibid*
8. *Ibid*
9. 'Sākṣātkāri Pramākarāṇamī pratyakṣam' *Tarkabhāṣa* Ed. Badarinath Sukla Motilal Delhi, 1996.
10. 'Indriyenārthasya sannikarṣādutpadyate jñānam tat pratyakṣam.' – *Nyāyavārtika* on 1.1.4. Pratiḡatamī akṣamī pratyakṣam – *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1.2.4.. "Akṣamakṣamī pratīya utpadyate iti pratyakṣam" – *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 442, K. Chattopadhyay (Ed), Varanasi, 1963.
11. "Indriyārthasannikarṣajanyamī jñānam pratyakṣam" – *Tarkasamī graha*, p. 15, Gopinath Bhattacharya (ed), Progressive, 1983.
12. Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamī jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri Vyavasāyāmakamī Pratyakṣam - *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4.
13. "Na tahrīdānīmīdamī bhavati? ātmā mānasā samyuḡyate, mana indriyenendriyamārthena 'iti,'" – *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1.1.4.
14. Nedamī kāranāvadhāranametāvat pratyakṣakārnāmīti kintu viṣīṣṭakāranāvacaṇāmīti, yat pratyakṣajñānasya viṣīṣṭakāranamī

taducyate, yattu samānamanumānādijñānasya na tannivartata iti".
Nyāyabhāṣya on 1.1.4.

15. Íśvara-pratyakṣantu na lakṣyam, indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam
avyapade-śya mavyashicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣamiti sūtra
tathavoktatvāt" *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse – 52.
16. Athavā jñānakāraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam, Anumitau Vyāpti-jñānasya
upamitau sādrśya-jñānasya, śāddavodhe pada-jñānasya, smṛtāvanubha-
vasya ca karaṇatvāt tatra tatra nātivyaptiḥ idam lakṣanamīśvara –
pratyakṣa-śādhāraṇam" - *Siddhanatamuktāvali*, on verse 52.
17. Śabdetarobhūtaviśeṣaguṇānāśrayatve sati jñānakāraṇamaṇṣam – yogā-
śravatvam indriyatvam." *Tarkasamgraha – Dīpika* P-VII (Gopinath
Bhattacharyya Ed.), progressive 1983.
18. Ātmādivāranaya satyantam, Udbhūtaviśeṣaguṇasya śrotre sattvāt
śabdetareti, viśeṣaguṇasya rūpādeścakṣurādāvapi sattavāt – Ubhūte". –
Siddhāntamuktāvali on verse 58.
19. Ghrāṇajam rāsanam cākṣuṣam spāśanam śrautram mānasamiti
śadvidham pratyakṣam." *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse 52.
20. Ghrāṇasya gocaro gandha..... *Bhāṣāpariccheda* verse no. 53..
21. Prthivyāpastejovāyurākāśamiti bhūtāni," *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1..13
22. C.D.Bijalwan (Ed.): *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p. 70, Heritage, New
Delhi, 1977.
23. Phanībhūṣana Tarkavāgīśa (Ed): *Nyāyaparicaya*, p. 138, W.B.B.B, 1978.
24. "Prtyakṣa-jñānahetuḥ indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ śadvidhaḥ" –
Tarkasamgraha, p. 48, (Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Ed.) Progressive, 1983.

25. "Cakṣuṣā ghaṭapratyakṣajanane saṁyogaḥ sannikarṣaḥ" –
Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 48, (Gopinath Bharracharyya Ed.) p. XXIII.,
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26. "Ghatarūpapratyakṣa-jnane saṁyukta – samavāyah sannikarṣaḥ". –
Tarkasaṁgraha (G. Bhattacharyya, Ed.) p. 48, Progressive, 1983.
27. "Rūpatvasāmānyapratyakṣe saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyah sannikarṣaḥ,
 cakṣuhsaṁyukte ghaterūpaṁ samavetaṁ, tatarūpatvasya samavāyāt." –
Ibid.
28. "Srotrena śabdaśātkāre samavāyah sannikarṣaḥ." – *Ibid.*
29. "Sabdatvaśāśātkāre samavetasamavāyah sannikarṣaḥ
 śrotrasamavetaśāśātkāre śabdatvā syasamavāyāt", – *Ibid.*
30. "Abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāvah sannikarṣaḥ ;
 ghatabhāvadbhūtaṁ ityatra cakṣuḥ saṁyukte bhūtale ghātabhāvasya
 viśeṣanatvāt." – *Ibid.*
31. "Yathā darśakena dipena dr̥ṣṭye gr̥hyamāne tadiva yanna gr̥hyate tannāsti
 yadyabhaviṣyadidamiva vyajñāsyatañānābhāvānnāstīti, evaṁ
 pramāṇena sati gr̥hyamāne tadiva yanna gr̥hyate tannāsti
 yadyabhaviṣyadidamiva vyajñāsyata vijñānābhānnāstīti, Tadyeḍam sataḥ
 prakāśakaṁ pramāṇamasadapi prakāśayātīti", – *Nyāyabhāṣya* –
 Introduction to *Sūtra* no. 1.1.1.
32. "Pañcasannikarṣeṣu, madhye saṁyogasthāne saṁyuktapadaṁ ghatayitvā
 samavāyāsthāne samavetaṣādaṁ ghatayitvā abhāvasthale nirvāhyam
 Tathāki Dravyādhikaranakābhāvapratyakṣe saṁyukta-viśeṣanatā.

Dravyasamavetasamavetādhikaranakābhāvapratyakṣe samyuktasamaveta-
samavetaviśeṣaṇatā ca sannikarṣaḥ. Tatra ghaṭe paṭatvābhavaḥ samyukta-
samaveta viśeṣantaya grhyate . Ghatasamaveta-ghatavadau
prthivītvābhavaḥ samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā grhyate.
Ghatasamaveta-samaveta-rūpatvādau śnilatvābhavaśca samyukta-
samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā grhyate iti saṅkṣepaḥ” *Nyāyabodhini*
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33. *Nyāyavārtikātātparyatīka* on 1.1.4.

34. C.D.Bijlwan (Ed.): *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p. 70-71, Heritage, New
Delhi.

35. “Tatredamindriyārthasannikarṣādutautpannamarthajñānaṁ rūpamiti vā
rasa ityevaṁ vā bhavati rūparasasābdāśca viśayanāmadheyaṁ. Tena
vyapadiśyate jñānaṁ rūpamiti jānīte rasa iti jānīte. Nāmadheyaśabdena
vyapadiśyamānaṁ sacchābdam prasajyate ata āha avyapadeśyamiti”.
Nyāyabhāṣya, on 1.14.

36. “Yat prathamākṣasannipātasamaye eva jñānāmanullikhitaśabdakaṁ
śabdānusmarāṇe hetubhūtamupajāyate tadasābdam, Aśabdāvachchinna-
viśayamavyapadeśyamindriyārthasannikarṣaika-karaṇamavikalpaṁ
pratyakṣaṁ”. – *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 76 (Chowkhamba), 1971 Ed.
Sūryanārāyana Śuklā, Henceforth, *Nyāyamañjarī*.

37. "Tasmāt pratyakṣaṣya lakṣyaṣyāsadbhāvāt kasyedem lakṣaṇamupkrāntam iti asambhavadoṣamāsānkyāha – avyapadeśyamiti" – *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 76.
38. "Tathāha Vartḥariḥ – Na so'stipratyayo loke yāḥ śabdānugamādrte anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gṛhyate – *Ibid.*
39. "Tasmād gaurityādijñānaṁ Śabdaṭve' pi tathāvidhasya jñānasya lakṣyaṣya sadhbāvāna vyartham lakṣaṇamityevamasambhavadoṣanirākaraṇarthamavyapadeśyamiti - *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 76. "Griṣme marīcayo bhaumenōṣmaṇā samsṛtāḥ spandamānāḥ dūrasthasya cakṣusā Sannikṛśyante, tatrendriyārthasannikarsādudakamiti jñānamutpadyate. Tacca pratyakṣam prasajyata ityata āha 'avyabhicārīti. Yadata smimstaditi tadvyabhicāri, Yattu transmimstaditi tadavyabhicāri pratyakṣamiti." – *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra – 1.1.4.
40. "Svalpākṣaramasandigdhamiḥ sāravad viśvato mukham. Astobhamanavadyañce sūtram sūtravido viduḥ". – Śrīmohan-Tarkatīrtha : *Bhāmātī*, Introduction, p. 44, 1973.
41. "Yathārthānubhavaścaturvidhah. Pratyakṣānumityupamitiśābdabhedāt" *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 35.
42. *Nyāyabodhini* on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 46.
43. "Na hyāgamajñānaṁ samvyavahārikam pratyakṣasya prāmānyamupahanti yena kāraṇābhāvāna bhavet api tu tāttvikam. Na ca tat tasyotpādakam atāttvikapramāṇebhyo'pi śāmvyavahārikam pramāṇebhyastattvajñānot-pattidarsānāt." *Bhāmātī* on *Adhyāsabhāṣya*: Ed by Srimohan Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1973, pp. 20-21.

44. *Bhāsāpariccheda Verse no. 66. Siddhāntamuktāvali* on the same.
45. With this cf. *avyapadeśyam* in NS I.i.4 and particularly Vātsyāyana's exposition, p. 14.1.6. The passages in Śābara and Vātsyāyana explain each other.
46. Ibid.
47. Vācaspati Miśra does violence to the *Sūtra and Bhāṣya* in his anxiety to father on the early authorities of the Naiyāyika school 'Trilocana's' doctrine of two kinds of perception – perception without qualifications (*nirvikalpaka*) and perception with qualifications (*savikalpaka*). He interprets the *sūtra* as mentioning both kinds – *nirvikalpaka* in the word *avyapadeśya*, and *savikalpaka* in the word *vyavasāyātmaka*. The doctrine however is later, and seems to have arisen in answer to the Buddhist view of perception as *kalpanāpodha*, i.e. the bare impression of sense divested of all additions made by the understanding. That this *Bauddha* interpretation of *avyapadeśya* as *kalpanāpodha* is a not unnatural interpretation is evidenced by Dr. Jhā. He says "it would seem that the *Bauddha* definition of perception as *kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* were a true rendering of Vātsyāyana's view ". But it seems to me that Vātsyāyana's view (which I believe represents the probable meaning of the *sūtra*) is different both from the *Bauddha* view and from Vācaspati's.
48. Vācaspati appears to connect it with the philosophical grammarians and quotes in this connection two passages from Bhartrhari's *Vākya-padiya*. I. 124 and I. 126 *Nyāyavartikātparyatīkā*, p. 83.

CHAPTER III

THE ADVAITA THEORY OF PERCEPTION : AN ANALYSIS

To the Advaitins the whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or Atman or Consciousness (*Caitanya*). Keeping this presupposition in view Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, a philosopher belonging to the Advaita School, thinks that mere connection (*sannikarṣa*) between sense-organ and an object is the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is covered by the Consciousness (*Caitanya*), a object ontologically cannot remain without being covered by the said Consciousness. If the Consciousness were taken as an all-pervading entity, it would logically follow that nothing is left uncovered by this. Hence, all the objects including sense-organ etc are covered by this. Though the Reality or the Consciousness is one, it may have some limited forms which are called limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) for our phenomenal necessity. The *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct experienced in our life is called constitutive while the main entity, which is free from limiting adjuncts (*niravacchinna or nirupādhika*) is called regulative. In the Dialectic part of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* Kant institutes a distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas in the context of cosmological ideas. By 'ideas' Kant means a set of *apriori* ideas such that are derived from Reason, the highest human faculty. One feature of these ideas is that there can never be intuitions or facts corresponding to them. But they do regulate the ways in which certain other ideas are to be used. Freedom, Ought, Immortality of the soul, God etc. are regulative notions. The constitutive ideas always have intuitions corresponding to them, and together they render knowledge possible. The *apriori* categories of understanding are constitutive notions. They are *apriori* but intentional, and it is with their help that we can organize the world as and when we come to know it. The result of the

application of constitutive ideas is verifiability. But the application of the regulative ideas is never verifiable, but they can be dispensed with. They are unalienable presuppositions of human state of affairs. The limiting adjuncts like *ghatākāśa* (space limited by a jar), month, week, day, night etc. are constitutive in the sense that they have intuitions corresponding to them through which our phenomenal purpose is served while the absolute entities like Time (*kāla*), Space (*akāśa*) etc. that are free from limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*) are accepted as regulative on account of the fact that they are accepted ontologically but not verifiable through experience or there we do not find intuitions or facts corresponding to them. That is why; *upādhi* is called an introducer (*paricāyaka*) by the Naiyāyikas.¹ The Advaitins also accept three types of Consciousness though it is ontologically one. These limiting adjuncts are Consciousness limited by an object (*viśayāvachchinnacaitanya*), Consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of an object (*antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavachchinnacaitanya*) and Consciousness limited by mind (*antaḥkaraṇavachchinnacaitanya*). These limiting adjuncts of the Consciousness are technically called *viśayacaitanya*, *pramāṇacaitanya* and *pramātrcāitanya* respectively² just as Time, though one in number, has got various limiting adjuncts like hour, month, week, fortnight etc. Keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in view Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has accepted two criteria of perceptuality – *Jñānagata* (existing in cognition) and *viśayagata* (existing in an object). To him when there is a union between *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode-*antaḥkārana vṛtti*) and *viśayacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object), there is the perceptuality of knowledge or cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*).³ It is to be borne in mind that he has made a clear distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is a unity between *viśayacaitanya* and

prāmāṇacaitanya, but *prāmātrcāitanya* remains isolated under such situation. How is such union of these *caityanas* possible? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra had made an effort to convince about the logic of such description. When our mind goes out of the body with the help of the sense-organ and assumes the shape of the object then it called mental mode (*vr̥tti*) which is also a limited form of the Consciousness. To them mind or *antaḥkāraṇa* has no shape of its own just as liquid substance but it can assume the shape of the object just as water assumes the form of the container. If this were the case, the *viśayacāitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object) becomes identified with its corresponding mental mode (*antaḥkāraṇa-vr̥tti*). The union of these two limited forms of consciousness gives rise to the perception of the knowledge of the object. The *prāmātrcāitanya* (Consciousness limited by mind) who being a knower remains isolated and perceives the knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*).⁴ In this case there is the distinction between a knower (*jñātā*) and a known object (*jñeya*). That is why; it is the perceptuality of knowledge of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*).

There is another type of perception, which is called the perceptuality of an object (*viśayagatapratyakṣatva*). By virtue of being cognition of an object in the previous case there is a knower; otherwise the knowledge of an object becomes meaningless. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of an object, it should be treated as different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge, which is perceived, but the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (*jñātr-jñeyabhāvasambandha*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra opines that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (*prāmātrcāitanya*); but the other two i.e., consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkāraṇavr̥tti*) and consciousness limited by an object are united in the knower (*pramātā*) are absorbed in it. It is described by him as

'*pramātr̥ṣattātirikṣattākatvābhāvah*' i.e., there will be an absence of the existence of the other forms of consciousness excepting the existing of *pramātā* or knower.⁵ It has been said that the amalgamation of the three into one is not desired (*na tāvadaikyam*), but there is only the existence of the *Pramātr̥caitanya* in which other forms of Consciousness are hidden. Therefore, the *pramātr̥caitanya* would be an object of our awareness, but other forms of the same are the manifestations of the *pramātr̥caitanya* and hence their existence does not come to our awareness. Herein lies some metaphysical presupposition. In such case Dharmarāja is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology.

When a person thinks himself identified with the world, it is the stage of liberation due to the absence of reality of more than one (*Advaita*). In this stage an object is 'no more than an object', but 'subjectified object', though there is no difference in saying 'subjectified object' and 'objectified subject' as evidenced in the *Bhāgavadgītā* – '*Sarvabhūtasthamātmānam sarvabhūtāni cātmāni*'⁶ (i.e., extension of self to others and bringing others under self), Dharmarāja preferred to use 'subjectified object', since *pramātā* (knower) only remains at this stage. There is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramātā*). Is it not a state of liberation? Such a state is generally realized temporarily at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). Abhinavagupta has explained this state of 'subjectified object' as the melting of the state of *pramātā* (*pramātr̥bhāvavigalana*).⁷ Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand itself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this time he is not confined within himself but expanded himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why; an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to emotional involvement. This sharing of others

feeling is called by Abhinavagupta as *tanmayībhavana* i.e., becoming one with other.⁸ Actually the feeling existing in an individual is transmitted to all the spectators. If each and every reader receives the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a corresponding fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahrdaya-samvāda-sālitā*). Such a phenomenon is otherwise known as 'absorption of all the audiences towards a particular object' (*sarvasāmājīkānām ekaghanatā*).⁹ To Viśvanātha also the subject i.e., *pramātā* sees himself being identified with it (*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānam pratipadyate*).¹⁰ In fact, self exists everywhere including the art-object. Hence, the Aestheticians are of the opinion that the relishment itself is *rasa* (*rasanīyah rasah*). It is the relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama), which is called *svasamvidānanda*. As if we have undertaken an activity of *Āchewing* (*carvanavyāpāra*) of the bliss arising from self knowledge. To Abhinavagupta who is chiefly influenced by the Advaitins such a chewing activity of the bliss of the self-knowledge is called *Rasa*.¹¹ This interpretation of Aesthetic experience would not have been possible, had there been no solid foundation of *Viśayagatapratyakṣa*.

The question was raised whether such *viśayagatapratyakṣa* is equivalent to the Advaita concept of liberation or not. In reply, it can be said that such perception and the aesthetic enjoyment is qualitatively same but quantitatively different. When a jar is perceived, there is the feeling of the non-duality of the self and the jar until the absorption breaks up. When such absorption does not break, an individual will see the whole world as his own self. This non-dual experience will remain forever and such situation is described as liberation according to the Advaitins. The perceptual experience of the phenomenal objects like a jar etc. occurs temporally and hence it is, though qualitatively same, it is quantitatively different. Both the experiences- the *viśayagatapratyakṣa* and aesthetic experience contain disinterested pleasure

arising out of *ātmānanda*. It may be asked to the Advaitins whether it is the case of epistemology or metaphysics. Whatever may be their reply, we have shown that a set of metaphysical presuppositions had led Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra to formulate such a definition of perception.

Now let us try to explain the problem of mind's going out first and secondly, its assuming the form of the object of cognition.

Mind, the *antaḥkāraṇa*, according to the Advaita, has parts and is the product of matter. This does not imply the so-called materialism. Rather, it resembles to the view of some New Realists like Russell, according to whom, matter and mind are different arrangements of some same neutral stuff. Both matter and mind may be said to be produced out of the same neutral stuff, where the characteristics of both of these are not present – i.e., which is neither mind nor matter. Russell, in his '*Analysis of mind*' is not interested in enquiring any metaphysical reality as the material ground of the world of mind and matter, because to him, we cannot reach at the neutral stuff as existent. He has tried to explain this world from the point of view of this neutral stuff with the help of his epistemological theory of atomic facts. But in the Advaita, the source (*adhīsthāna*) of both the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) and matter (*viśaya*) is Brahman – the principle of one non-different pure Consciousness. And in this sense, mind is the product of matter. This is the metaphysical standpoint of the Advaita. In its theory of creation, *antaḥkāraṇa* has been said to be produced out of the five material elements (*pañcabhūta*) in all of which the *Sattva-guṇa* predominates.

However, there is really no difference between mind and matter in reality or as it is the product of matter, its movement or going out in space has been granted in the Advaita. Mind or *antaḥkāraṇa* goes out to the object, like a jar of the external world. In the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, it is said that when the *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* in the form of a content like the jar goes out to be related to the

object, jar, then *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and the *viśya-caitanya* become one and non-different. The difference of the consciousness is destroyed, because of the fact that the limiting adjuncts (*antaḥkāraṇa vṛtti* and object content) are placed in the same locus. In this way, when the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, and the *viśya-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the object-content, jar) become one, then the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya (antaḥkāraṇa)* stands as the substratum of the object, jar, like the consciousness limited by the jar (*ghatādyavacchinnacaitanya*). At that time, there remains no other reality of the jar than the reality of the pramātā viz., the consciousness limited by the *antaḥkāraṇa* and the jar becomes an object of immediate cognition.

Thinkers like T.M.P. Mahadevan, P.K.Sundaram and D.M.Datta opine that the outgoing of *antaḥkāraṇa* as the *vṛtti* is actual, not metaphorical. These thinkers, perhaps, have gained the support from the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*. The *Paribhāṣākāra* clearly states that '*tathā cāyam ghaṭa ityādi-pratyakṣasthale ghatādestadākāra-vṛtteśca vahirekatra deśe samāvadhānāt*' etc. The word '*vahirekatra*' is to be noted here. But K.C.Bhattacharya says in his '*Studies in Vedāntism*', "Ultimately no doubt, *Vedānta* will hold that the body is phenomenal, this space is also phenomenal, and this 'going out' of the mind is only illusory".

These two view-points in regard to the mind's going out, in fact, based on the Advaita distinction between the empirical reality (*vyāvahārika sattā*) and the Absolute Reality (*pārmāthikā sattā*), the *pārmāthikā* point of view, all these viz., *antaḥkāraṇa*, *vṛtti* and object-content are illusory. So we may understand that the mind actually moves towards the object of cognition existing in the external world.

But, then, where does the *vṛtti* remain? In reply to the question, we may quote the words of D.M.Datta : “When we perceive an external object, our attention is directed not to the physiological changes caused by the object within the organism, but to the object itself, outside in space. And in fixing attention on an object mind comes into direct contact with it” Here we may emphasise on the word ‘attention’. Attention, it may be thought, is what the Advaitin calls *antahkārana-vṛtti*, function of the mind. This attention, in fact, goes out through the sense-organ to its object in the production of the cognition of that. This attention as the *antahkārana-vṛtti* is nothing but a relation between the mind and the object – the relation, which is made possible through the one-undivided principle of consciousness. This consciousness pervades the mind (*antahkārana*), its modification (*vṛtti*) and the object-content (*viśeṣya*). So the question, in connection with the *vṛtti* remaining either in the locus of *antahkārana* or in that of the object may be ignored.

The Advaita shows its peculiarity by declaring the activity of minds’ going out. It does not hold the accepted view that the objects of external world, first, stimulate the senseorgans, then the mind receives the impression of the objects through these organs. The Advaitins grant the sense-object contact in perception, but according to them, neither the senses nor the objects have any distinguished role. The role completely belongs to the *antahkārana vṛtti*. This is taken as the general view of the Advaita system. But if we look into the view of Sureśvara, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, in this connection, we find that the Advaita Vedānta seems not to disregard the accepted view of perception. To quote from an analysis of the theory of perception according to Sureśvara as made by V.P.Upadhyāya in his ‘*Lights on Vedānta*’ : “It is not certain whether the outgoing of the mind to the object (which is admitted by the Vivarana School in clear words) is approved by Sureśvara as well. In accordance with his

one verse (*Bṛhadāraṇya-kopaniṣadbhāṣyavṛttika* – Pune Publication, pp. 1827-28), if literally interpreted, it will have to be concluded that he is in favour of object transmitting its mould and it is this transmission of a distinct mould through the sense-organ by an object and consequent establishment of a direct contact between the mind and a particular object, which accounts for the immediacy of the perception as distinguishable from other kinds of indirect cognitions. Thus Suresvara thinks that the object transmits the mould or form through the senses to the mind, and then the mind has a contact with the form of the object and as such becomes modified into the said form (*vṛtti*).

In the light of the above exposition, we may understand the notion of the going out of mind or its *vṛtti* in this way. It is obviously said in the Advaita texts that the *vṛtti*, a modified part of the *antahkārana* goes out, not the whole of mind-apparatus. They by 'the going out', it is better to understand, is the formation of a part of mind through modification in the shape of the object of cognition. Mind or the *antahkārana* is *taijāsa*, produced of light material also it is predominated by the *sattvā-guṇa* and so transparent (*svaccha*). But this is not all of *vṛtījñāna*. Behind it there is *Sākṣī-caitanya* (*Jīvasākṣi*) and behind this *Sākṣī-caitanya* there is the Cosmic Consciousness (*Īśvara-Sākṣī*). This Cosmic Consciousness is Brahman, the Absolute Reality-Consciousness and to the Advaita Vedānta School of thought, the energy-source of the *Jiva-Sākṣī*. "The *vṛtījñāna*", as Prof. Hiriyanna puts, "draws its breath and substance from it, and the whole complex of empirical or finite knowledge would be nowhere without the light of this Absolute or Infinite Consciousness". The three entities-*Īśvara-sākṣī*, *Jiva-sākṣī* and *antahkārana* are very close to each other. The *Jivā sākṣī* may be compared with a tank of consciousness, by which, according to the Advaita, objects of the world as a whole, known or unknown are manifested. In the case of the immediate cognition of an object, when the appearance of it creates attention, the *antahkārana* is modified into the so-called *vṛtti* by the

Witnessing-self (*Sākṣī-caitanya*), which is the store of all objects – cognized or non-cognized and at that very moment, the arisen *vṛtti* coincides with the approaching object through the respective sense-organ. This coincidence, though thought to be the result of the going out of mind, may itself be designated as the said 'going out'. It may so be designated only to make distinction of a particular *vṛtti* of the *antaḥkāraṇa* and nothing more. And all this is happened instantly. So 'the going out' is just the coincidence between the *vṛtti* and the object-content. As the sense-object contact is indispensable in the case of immediate cognition like perception, so the going out of the mental mode (*antaḥkāraṇa vṛtti*) has been recognized. In fact, whatever stimuli would come from the object to the sense, without the attentive state of mind, the sense-object- contact would not be possible. Again if there arises any sense-contact with the object without the participation of kind, the contact would certainly be fruitless. The active participation of kind, like its going out in perception distinguishes it (perception) from the mediate cognitions, like inference, memory etc. and also from immediate internal cognition. The sense-organs conjoined with the *antaḥkāraṇa* are in contact with the objects, so the *vṛtti* has to go out, or we may say, it thus coincides with the form of the object. In that case, the consciousness limited by the object (*viśayachinna caitanya*) becomes one and the same. And as all this consciousness is that one consciousness, by which energized the witnessing-self (*Sākṣī*) is existent in us, we have the immediate cognition of the something.

Let us now come to the other issue. In the Advaita texts, it is said that the *antaḥkāraṇa* or its *vṛtti* not only goes out to the object, but also assumes its form. The Paribāsākāra has put, we may remember, as the water of a tank assumes the form a tub after passing through a channel, so also the *antaḥkāraṇa*, going out through the sense-channel, assumes the form of the object of cognition.

The form-assuming of *antahkarana* is not a figment of imagination. It is capable of being recognized from our own experience. Suppose, I perceive a jar before me with the visual organ. In course of the perceiving, I may close up my eyes and so far my attention continues, I may have an image in the form of the jar in my mental world. Or if the object be left out of the scene any way at that time, still I may be possessed with an image of that object particularly in the mental state. This image may be regarded as the *antahkarana vṛtti* that possesses the form of the object in concern and this image is nothing but the impression left by the total form of the object. Here we are certainly reminded of the philosophical principle that *samskāra* (impression) produces *vṛtti* (mode) and *vice versa*. Now when either for the closure of eyes or for any how removal of the object from the vicinity of the sense, we have the image of the object, then that image is of the past object as it is no more in the sense-contact. The question is : How can we possess the image of a past object ?

There must be some inner principle to record the form of the object, when it was presented to the sense-organ. D. M. Datta observes that *Antahkārana* would then be identical with this principle. From all this it will appear that the Vedāntic theory that in the perception of an object the *antahkarana* takes the form of the object is not at all unreasonable.

Secondly, according to the Advaita, the form of an object necessarily includes its primary qualities like size, shape etc. and also the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. There is no absolute difference of these qualities from the object-substance. The forms of the qualities are the forms of their substrata. So like the form of an object, the form of a quality or of an action may also arise in case of exclusively their (of quality or action) perception. The Advaita strictly upholds that the cognition of quality etc. (*dharma*) is not possible without the cognition of the substance (*dharmī*). To ascertain the immediacy in perceptuality the Advaitins do not recognise that the qualities are

only sensed by the organs, not the substance, like some western realists; or they do not believe in the Humean conception that there is no substance over and above the qualities. According to the Advaita thinkers, the object as a total form is assumed by the mind through the sense-organ. It resembles to the view of common-sense realism of the West. In fact, the Advaita view of perception may be called to be solely based on the experience of common people. The point is that the form-assuming principle of the Advaita theory of cognition dissolves the complex problem of immediate cognition in regard to the question, whether the object of perception is immediately given, or given through the medium of its sensed qualities.

Thirdly, we may refer to the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya of Brhadāraṇyakā-Śruti* in which it has been said that *antaḥkāraṇa* may assume the form of the object-substance and quality. The *bhāṣya* speaks of the form of quality assumed by the mind. But it factually implies the form of substance also. It tells the fact of our images or impressions, in this connection, as we have explained. The portion in our concern may be stated from the translation by Svami Nikhilānanda : “The mind transformed into colour. The idea is that since one remembers colours which lie in the form of impression- through the mind for their support.”

Thus the mind’s assuming the object – form is not at all baseless.

Another important issue in connection with the role of *vṛtti* may be noted. When I have the perceptual cognition of a jar, I have it through a *vṛtti*. I have also such apprehension as ‘I perceive the jar ? This is, of course, a latter cognition. The question is : is this latter cognition due to another *vṛtti*? The Naiyāyikas speak of two cognitions – *Vyāvasāya* (primary cognition) and *anuvyavasāya* (after cognition). But the Advaitins do not recognise a fresh *vṛtti* for the cognition of primary one, then for cognition of that new *vṛtti* (say, second *vṛtti*), another *vṛtti* (say, a third *vṛtti*) would be demanded, and this another *vṛtti*

would require of an another *vṛtti* (say, a fourth). Thus it would lead to infinite regress. So, the *vṛtti* is not an object of another *vṛtti*. According to the Advaita, the *vṛtti*, as initially being a mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is itself all for its objecthood. It is by nature an object of itself. Of course, the capacity of the self-uses (*svavyavahāra-jñānayogyatva*) of the *vṛtti* does not imply is objecthood (*karmatva*). Since in that case, the same *vṛtti* would both be the functioning (*kriyā*) and the object (*karma*) leading to contradiction. When there arises the *vṛtti* in the form of an object in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then that *vṛtti* will have that for its object-content. In this way, the *pramāṭr-caitanya* would be limited by the *vṛtti* having itself for its content and when that limited consciousness (*vṛtтыupahita-caitanya*) be the locus of the *vṛtti* then the reality of that *vṛtti* and that of the *promāṭr-caitanya* would be non different. Thus the *vṛtti* as cognition may have itself too for its content. There is no necessity of another new *vṛtti* after-cognition of *antaḥkaraṇa*. In fact, the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the Naiyāyika also has itself for its object-content (*svaviśayaka*), it does not require of a latter cognition, although as S.S. Suryanarayana Śāstrī points out, “when they (the Naiyāyikas) infer that all cognition is a quality, that inferential cognition is taken to apply to itself (*anuvyāvasya*) as well.” The point is : if *anuvyāvasya* be a quality, it would also need a substratum of which it is the object. But the Naiyāyikas stop at the *anuvyāvasya*. The Advaitin has not recognized the another *vṛtti* like *anuvyāvasya*, for the revelation of the initial *vṛtti* because it has explained its theory of cognition on the principle of non-difference (*abheda*) between the subject (*pramāṭrcaitanya*) and the object (*viśaya-caitanya*).

Philosophers like the Naiyāyikā and others do not recognise the necessity of *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* in knowledge situation. Only in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, the necessity of *vṛtti* has been realized. Thinkers of these

systems maintain that the sense-object contact is a necessary condition for direct cognition, but it is not all for this. Function of mind or the psychosis (*vṛtti*) is an essential factor not only in the case of direct cognition, but also in the case of indirect cognitions like *anumiti*, *upamiti* etc. In the direct cognition of external objects, the *vṛtti* goes forth to the object. In cognition of internal objects and in indirect cognitions it does not go out, because of the fact that there is no possibility of its outgoing in these cases. The outgoing of *vṛtti* the Advaitins hold, is necessary for the realization of distinctness of perceptual object, removal of the concealment of the objects, and finally for the manifestation of identity between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness.

Although, like the Naiyāyikas, a section of the champions of extreme Advaitism contends that there is no necessity of *vṛtti* for the manifestation of identity between the subject and the object, since there is naturally a direct relation between them as both are consciousness, the general view of the Advaita is in favour of accepting the necessity of *vṛtti* in the cognition of objects. Broadly speaking, there are found three views in connection with the necessity of *vṛtti*: (i) the *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of the veil of ignorance (*āvaraṇābhavārthā*) ; (ii) it is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject-consciousness (*Jīvacātanya*) and the object (*Sambadhārthā*); (iii) it is necessary for the manifestation of identity (*abhedābhivyaktārthā*) between the two appearances of one Consciousness i.e. between the subject and the object.

The difference of the views is not so clear-cut as each may be ascribed to a particular school of Advaiṭta Vedānta or to a particular Advaita thinker. In the Advaita works like *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, *Vedānta-Siddhāntasūktimañjarī* etc. none of the views has been stated as clearly associated with any school of Vedānta or any Vedāntin. The author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* seems to hold that the first two views are of the Vivaraṇa school, since according to this school

of thought, the Jīva is consciousness reflected through or limited by *avidyā* and the third one is of the Bhāmatī school, since according to this school, the Jīva is consciousness limited by antahkarana. The author of the *Vedānta-Sidhānta-sūktimañjarī* has taken great pains to analyse each of the views from different points of view including those of the *Vivarāṇa* and the *Bhāmatī*. V.P.Upadhyāya in his doctoral dissertation, '*Lights on Vedānta*' mentions that the first view is connected with the Bhāmatī School, the second, with the *Vivarāṇa* and the third, with the school of Śuresvara. In spite of this controversy it appears from the different Advaita treatises that the function of *vṛtti* to remove the veil of ignorance has commonly been accepted by all the Advaitins. An attempt will be intended here to dive deep into and to appraise of these theories of the necessity of *vṛtti*.

The first theory is this: *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of veil (*āvaraṇābhibhavārthā*); or it may be said that it is necessary for breaking the concealing power of *avidyā* (ignorance). But if it does mean the destruction of the concealing power (*āvaraṇa-sakti*) of ignorance, then in the case of cognition even of a pot the power would be destroyed and the cogniser in concern would be emancipated from the bondage of ignorance.

So according to some Advaitins, the *antahkaraṇavṛtti* destroys the ignorance of spreading over the consciousness by part – it removes that part of ignorance which conceals only the object in relation to which some *vṛtti* has been formed. It is stated that as a part of darkness is removed by a glow-worm, or as a part of mat is seen to be rolled up, or as a cowardly soldier suddenly retreats, so a certain part of ignorance is destroyed by the *vṛtti* or cognition relating to an object. But such comparison is not sound. A part of darkness being removed may again come into existence, whereas ignorance, once destroyed completely cannot come back again. The object, then, once brought out of the veil would

continue to be known for ever. It is not also something corporeal that may be rolled up; it is not a substance with moving power, so that it would retreat.

To demolish this barrage, some Advaitins argue that the removal of the veil of ignorance is possible partially only with reference to some particular object-defined consciousness (*viṣayā-vacchhinna caitanya*) which becomes connected with some particular *vṛtti*. Vimuktātman, the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* opines that the primal ignorance (*mulāvidyā*) is not set aside by the *vṛtti* but its off-shoots-some homogeneous individual ignorances (*tulāvidyā*) about each object are removed by it. These individual ignorances envelope the common object-defined consciousness and they are individually destroyed by each of the different *vṛtti* in respect of that object each time. For this reason when the veil or obscuration of an individual ignorance is once removed by a *vṛtti* the object again would be enveloped by other homogeneous individual ignorance in respect of the same object. The difficulty of the objects' ever-cognising would not arise.

But is it possible that the first perception of the pot e.g., will destroy only a single individual ignorance without dispelling all the individual ignorances obscuring the consciousness in respect of the pot? *vṛtti* or cognition has no such a restrictive feature as it would dispel only one ignorance, not others. Moreover, how can we perceive the object, until and unless all the ignorance are totally destroyed?

In this position, some Advaitins think that one ignorance veils the object-defined consciousness, others are kept in abeyance. The *vṛtti* or psychosis is in a position to remove the veil of that only one ignorance. As soon as the *vṛtti* ceases to exist, another ignorance creeps in and encroaches the object defined consciousness.

Dissatisfied with this explanation some hold that ignorance cannot remain in abeyance, by nature each of them must be present in the location of the object. "So they maintain that only one is dispelled at a time and others are simply scared away for the time being. Just as in a place, where many people are assembled together, the thunder, perchance suddenly falling down on someone, scatters away the rest of them, or the medicine, specifically curative of the complex disease, called '*sannipāta*', while chiefly affecting and remedying only one prominent trouble or complaint (constituent of the disease) cures or drives away all other accompanying troubles or complaints as well, similarly the psychosis (or the so-called cognition by virtue of being the reflections of consciousness) while casting off or dispelling once for ever only one ignorance, scares away and thus over-powers the remaining homogeneous individual ignorances also so long as it lingers. This when there is an absolute removal of one ignorance only through psychosis, there is dispersion and subjugation or neutralization of other accompanying homogenous ignorance as well by the same."

Now, although the advaitins do not recognise the difference of psychosis or cognition in a continuous stream of cognition of single object (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*), as there is neither cause, nor necessity, nor even cognition of the origin and cessation of different psychosis or cognitions in respect of a single object, yet they think that the cognition arising at each moment of the *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* is *pramā* or right cognition. So, the removal of only one ignorance and the neutralization of other accompanying ignorances through the psychosis are held simultaneously, then as Dr. V.P.Upādhyāya observes in the case of *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* the second and other subsequent *vṛttis* or cognitions would stand futile, because the entire obscuration from the object-defined consciousness has been set a side. "So some Advaitins maintain that just as when one light goes out, the darkness subjugated by it, sets in again, similarly at the time of juncture, when the first psychosis will go out and the subsequent one will

step in, the ignorance, only subjugated by the first psychosis and let loose by its obscuration upon the object-defines consciousness.

In this connection, we may refer to the view of Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara, the author of the *Nyāyachandrikā*. He strictly maintains that the removal of a particular ignorance and neutralization of other veiling ignorances do not occur simultaneously. When one psychosis arises, it removes the ignorance acting at that point of time and brings about the manifestation of the object. It does not neutralize other ignorances expected to appear and envelope the object at subsequent points of time. Ignorances are the modes of the primary ignorance and so possessed of temporary or momentary obscuring capacities. This can explain that the *vṛttijñāna* of all the moments of a continuous stream of cognition of one and the same object is not futile.

According to some, the ignorance, destroyed by the first *vṛtti* merely obscures the pure existence (*sattā*) of the object, say, pot, other ignorances which are removed by the second, third and the subsequent *vṛttis* obscure the pot as conditioned by time, space etc.

However, if the necessity of psychosis lies in the fact of dispelling the obscuration of ignorance, then one question may be raised: With which the ignorance (*avidyā*) is really connected? Is it connected with the object (*viśaya*) or with the subject (*jīva*)? According to a section of the Vivarana School, the ignorance with reference to the object is presented in two ways—one is connected with object, another is, with the subject. Ignorance lying in the object causes the projection of new external objects through psychosis, ignorance abiding in the subject is proved from our experience "I do not know this". The followers of Bhāmatī hold that the ignorance does not exist in the object, it abides only in the subject and naturally obscures the object. It is associated with the subject like a veil. The psychosis removes the veil and makes the projection of external objects possible.

Some followers of the *Vivarana* maintain that the ignorance does really be in the object – it , like a piece of cloth veils the object. While interpreting very intelligibly the necessity of dispelling obscuration of ignorance by *vṛtti* (*āvaranābhibhavārthā*), the author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* has favoured this view. He asserts that the *jīva* is all pervading consciousness qualified per accidents by *avidyā*. According to this theory of self, both the *jīva* and *avidyā* are pervasive. So the *avidyā* or ignorance also lies in the objects, e.g., the jar etc. like the *jīva*-consciousness. As there is no locational difference between the consciousness defined by jar etc. and *avidyā* the qualifying adjunct of *jīva*-consciousness, so the consciousness defined by jar etc. and the *jīva*-consciousness would have become one and identical. If both of the consciousness by thus one and non-different, then like the consciousness defined by jar etc. the *jīva*-consciousness would also be connected with the jar etc. And then these objects would be manifested constantly. But the jar etc. are not ever manifesting. So some recognise a conditional ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*) that obscures the consciousness as defined by jar etc. and is dependent on the primal ignorance (*mūlavidyā*). This conditional ignorance is a dependent mode of the primal ignorance and is called *avasthā*. On account of this, there would not be constant manifestation of the jar etc. since only the unveiled consciousness makes such manifestation possible. And if the consciousness defined by jar etc. would be veiled by the primary ignorance, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. in the worldly life of bondage. Again, if the obscuration made by the mode of ignorance were permanent, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. possible, instead of the sense contact with them. So its removal is to be granted. The removal is not caused by the Witnessing Consciousness (*sākṣi-caitanya*) since this consciousness manifests the modal ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*), product of the primal ignorance (*mūlavidyā* or *mūlajñāna*) and so cannot remove it. The *Sākṣi-caitanya* cannot remove the obscuration, in as much as such a removal would happen even in a case of

mediate cognition. This removal is actually caused by *vṛtti* or the psychosis. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has nicely established this Advaita position that the *vṛtti* removes the veil of modal ignorance lying in the object-defined consciousness.

The second theory is this: The *vṛtti* or psychosis is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness (*sambandhārthā*). Those who maintain that the *jīva* is all-pervading consciousness reflected on or associated with *avidyā*, hold that this relation is a conjunction produced by another conjunction (*samṛtyogaja-samṛtyoga*). As the relation between a tree and river is established by the relation between the wave and the river, so the relation between the *jīva* (subject) and object requires of a relation between the object and the *vṛtti* and between the *vṛtti* and the *jīva*.

A very comprehensive and argumentative explanation of this theory has been given in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Dharmarāja in his *Paribhāṣā* interpretes this theory on the line of those, according to whom *jīva* is conditioned by *avidyā* and all pervasive. Although this all-pervasive *jīva* is related to all the objects of cognition like jar etc. even in the absence of the *vṛtti* yet, the jar etc. are not always manifested. Since it is the *vṛtti* with the respective form that makes a relation between subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. And this particular type of relation is the relation of manifested and manifester (*vyāṅgyavyaṅjakabhāva*); it is a temporary relation and is always conditioned by the *vṛtti* with the form of an object in concern. The all-pervasive relation of *jīva* to the objects is not of the nature of manifested and manifester. As Pandit P. Bhattāchārya Śāstri has explained, 'the all pervasive *jīva* has relation to the whole of a village, but the movement of the *jīva* in the village gives rise to a particular type of relation to the village, in like manner, the *jīva* comes to be

related to the objects in the relation of manifested-manifester through *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* the act of knowing.

Antaḥkaraṇa is the product of the five great elements (*pañcabhūta*) in which light is the pre-dominating factor. So it is called luminous (*taijasamantaḥkaraṇa m*). It is a pure substance (*svaccha*) and by nature capable of manifesting the *jīva* consciousness. But the jar etc. are impure substances; they cannot manifest the consciousness underlying themselves. At the rise of the *vṛtti* with the forms of the respective objects like the jar etc., the inertness of these (jar etc.) are overpowered by them (the *vṛttis*) and the capacity to manifest consciousness immediately after the rise of *vṛtti*. Experience reveals that even an impure substance in conjunction with a pure substance acquires the capacity to take on a reflection. For example, the wall etc. obtain the capacity of taking on the reflection of face, when these are in conjunction with water etc. That really is meant by the manifesting capacity of the impure substances, like jar etc. is the taking reflection of that consciousness (*pratibimbatvam*). The *vṛtti* goes out in the case of immediate cognition of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* with the fire etc. in the case of mediate cognition (e.g. the reference of fire from the perception of smoke), there is no such manifestation of consciousness and there is never found the character of immediacy. The immediate cognition of objects is, thus, based on their manifesting capacity, and this capacity is generated by the *vṛtti* established relation between the subject and the object.

We may mention in this connection that some Advaita thinkers who explain *jīva* as consciousness limited by the internal organ, hold that "as the individual soul is not all pervading, the relation consists in the establishment of an identity between the *jīva* consciousness connected with the functions (*vṛtti*) and the Brahma-consciousness as the basis of the objects."

The third theory of the necessity of *vṛtti* is that it makes the manifestation of non difference (*abhedābhi vyaktyā*) between the *jīva* consciousness and the Brahma-consciousness conditioned in the cognition-situation. The advocates of this theory hold that the *jīva* or mind-defined consciousness cannot cognise the jar etc. Without the proper manifestation of non-difference between the *jīva* consciousness and the consciousness defined by the jar etc., since no relation does either exist between the manifestable jar etc. and the *jīva* consciousness or between the *jīva* consciousness and the Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc. The point is that in the absence of an identity between the comprehender and the comprehensible the comprehension does not ensue. So the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa* rightly points out that in order to give plain indication of the non-difference between the *jīva* and Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc., the theory of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* with the form of content of cognition has been introduced in the Advaita scheme of Śaṅkara. Though the limiting adjuncts of the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* (*jīva*-consciousness) and the *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness defined by the objects like jar etc.) are different – the former has the internal organ and the latter, the jar, no difficulty does arise in establishing the non-difference between *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* in as much as both the limiting adjuncts the internal organ and the object in concern rest on the same locus.

Suresvara, a protagonist of this theory of the manifestation of non-difference makes an attempt to define *jīva* as an appearance of Pure Consciousness in *buddhi* (internal organ), the modification of *avidyā*. Following the foot-prints of the Great Suresvara, Dr. V.P.Upādhyaya has given a precise expression of this view. “In any case, “Dr. Upādhyaya writes, “the psychosis is held to be indispensably necessary for establishing and manifesting an identity between the *jīva* the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, cast and settled into the internal organ and the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, permeating the object as its inmost reality.

Thus it appears from our rapid survey that the theories of the necessity of *vṛtti* chiefly differ in regard to the treatment of the advaita concepts of the *jīva*. According to some, the *jīva* is all-pervasive and unveiled, they maintain that the *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of obscuration of the object. To some, the *jīva* is all pervasive and veiled, for them the utility of *vṛtti* lies in the establishment of the relation between the subject and the object. Those, who think that the *jīva* is limited, hold that *vṛtti* brings about the manifestation of non-difference of the subject and the object. Keeping aside this subtle difference, we may unhesitatingly point out that in the case of immediate cognition, the *vṛtti* is essential in the Advaita Scheme for all the three purposes. It removes the obscuration of ignorance on the object-defined consciousness, links up the *jīva* with the object and consequently results the manifestation of non-difference of the object-defined consciousness and the *jīva* consciousness. Though Śaṅkara in his commentary to the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad does not recognise the necessity of psychosis (*vṛtti*) in the case of direct cognition, subsequently, the exponents of Śaṅkara's School, however, have taken up the issue more seriously and expended substantial energy in introducing the concept of *vṛtti* in the process of all cognitions and placing thereby the Advaita psychology of cognition on a solid foundation.

Buddhist Theory of Perception

How can the immediate of Perception be mediated in a Perceptual Judgement ?

Dinnāga's characterization of perception as 'stripped of characters'¹²—*kalpanāpodha* ¹³ is taken by the schools as the text for the treatment of this topic. But the discussion is complicated by reference to the question of the relation of language to thought, and by a polemic against the views of certain¹⁴

'Nominalists' (*śābdika*)¹³ who appear to have taught that words and thoughts are inseparable. It is against these 'nominalists' that Vātsyāyana's explanation of the word '*avyapadeśya*' in the sūtra is supposed by the commentators to be directed. As against these nominalists,¹⁴ *avyapadeśya* asserts that there is a moment in perception separable from all use of language.¹⁵ It seems likely that Diñnāga took this nominalist view as the starting-point from which to develop his own position. He takes 'name' as the first of the five characters, of which he asserts the pure percept to be devoid; and it may be supposed that his own view was arrived at by accepting on the one hand the *Śābdika's* view that the thoughts through which we determine reality are inseparably connected with words; and, on the other hand, the *Naiyāyika* view that what is immediately given in perception is independent of the words by which we come to designate it. But, if concepts are inseparable from words, and the percept is separable from words, it follows that the percept is separate from all concepts or determinations of thought. So that the *Naiyāyika's* description of the percept as not verbal (*avyapadeśya, aśabda*) becomes equivalent to describing it as free from those other determinations or qualifications – of class, quality, action, and attendant circumstances or accident^e – which, through the use of words, we assign to the reality present to sense.

The Buddhist is represented¹⁶ as holding that only pure or unqualified perception (*nirvikalpaka*) is entitled to the name of perception. He understands by pure perception as appearance (*pratibhāsam*) which is true to the real (*vastuṇy abhrāntam*) as conforming positively and negatively to the *svalakṣana*,¹⁷ the unique moment of existence which alone is ultimately real (*svataksaṇānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyiptibhāsam*).¹⁸ All the 'predicables' (*viśeṣaṇa*) or determinations of thought (*vikalpa*), are untrue to reality (*bhrānta*), because they are not appearances born of the thing (*anarthajapratibhāsovikalpaḥ*); being appearances which do not conform to

reality (*vastvananurodhipratibhāsa*), their production being conditioned by 'psychical dispositions' (*vāsanādhīnajanma*).

We have what seems a perfectly definite perception of a jar of such and such a shape, quite distinct from all other jars. But the Buddhist tells us that all the determinations (*vikalpa*) which make the supposed 'percept' definite are appearances not derived from the real thing, and that our belief that the thing as thus determined is real, is illusory – '*Vikalpo vastunirbhāsād visamvādād upaplavaḥ*'. But is it not the fact that there is correspondance in, actual practice (*pravṛttau samvādah*)? The Buddhist replies that the supposed correspondance is due to the fact that the determinations derived from previous experience illusorily impose their own appearances, under the guise of identity with the real thing; and, while obscuring the difference between the *svalakṣaṇa* and their own manifestations in consciousness, direct men's activities on the place where the *svalakṣaṇa* is – thus ensuring the 'correspondance' which is alleged.¹⁹ The gleam of a precious stone is not the stone itself : but it enables us to get it!‡

But unless the thought determination (*vikalpa*) is in contact with the thing (*vastu samśprśati*), how could it impose itself as identical with the thing? Even a mirage has an objective ground. The reply is that thought uses the percept as a vehicle (*pratyakṣaprṣṭhabhāvī vikalpah*) and so, assuming the function of the instrument of knowledge, presents to us a thing that can be acted upon (*arthakriyāsamartham vastu sāksātkaroti*), - otherwise the person desirous to act could not act on the basis of this thought-determinations. This is what the Buddhist writer meant when he said "thence also it is on the real thing that we act as a result of thought-determinations" (*tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva pravṛttih*).

But does not this amount to the admission that thought (*vikalpa*) is after all a means of knowing the real thing, seeing that it is the source of apprehensions which correspond with the real thing (*vastuni pramāṇam, tatrāvisamvādipratītihetutvāt*) ? The Buddhist tries to avoid the admission by

saying that between the momentary existence which is the real 'object' (*grāhya*) of the perception and that which is the 'object' (*adhyavasīyate*) of the thought, and between this latter again and the 'object' achieved (*labhyate*) in the ensuing activity, there is – regarded as momentary existents – no correspondence, because they are all momentary.²⁰ Regarded merely in the light of an exclusion of what is other, we can indeed find a certain correspondence in the percept, the idea, and the object achieved, - if we abstract from the (real) diversity which belongs to them as absolutely distinct 'moments' of experience (*anākalitakṣanabhedasya atadvyāvṛttavastumātrāpekṣayā saṁvādah*). We cannot say that the object of perception is the object as determined by thought, nor that either of these is the object achieved or got practically. But we can say that the object grasped in perception is like the object as determined by thought, and that the latter is like what is achieved by activity (*yādṛśaḥ kṣanaḥ pratyakṣeṇa grhyate, tādrśo vikalpenādhyavasīyate*, etc.). But even so the thought-determination (*vikalpa*) will not be an independent means of knowledge, seeing that it only apprehends the already apprehended' (And what the Buddhist is arguing here is that *vikalpa* is not a *pramāṇa*). For it is by *perception* and nothing else that an object of this character (which now appears in 'idea') was originally grasped.

"We (*the Bauddhas*) admit however that a thought determination derived from an inference (*liṅgaja*) is an independent means of knowledge, because it apprehends something of which the unique being has not been already grasped by another means of proof, i.e. by perception (*pramāṇāntarāptasvalakṣanaprāpakatayā pramāṇam*).²¹ (But this is another matter.)

This position too is unsatisfactory, replies the Naiyāyika. For the momentary existent's exclusion from what-is-other.' (*anyavyāvṛtti*) and the unreal common character illusorily imposed upon it in virtue of this negative character of excluding what-is-other – is not grasped (*grhyate*) by perception, seeing that the object (*grāhya*) of perception is characterized by the Bauddha as a 'cause'

(*hetu*), and unreal things (such as this illusorily imposed common character of being different from what is other are devoid of all practical efficacy (*samastārthakriyāvīrahāt*), - (and therefore could not be a 'cause' of perception or of anything else). It is the momentary existent that possesses practical efficacy, and so is real (*paramārthasat*); and it is this therefore that is the object of perception. (And so it is impossible for the Buddhist to deny that thought is a means of cognition on the ground that its objects have already been given in perception; i.e. on the ground (*grhītagrāhitavat*). - And it cannot be said that the object of the thought is one with the object of perception, because the percept is a momentary existent and is said' not to extend upto the time of the thought' (*vikalpakālānamupātīty uktam*).

- And if it be allowed that there is some single object - of unexplained character - common to the thought and the perception, which could admit of a correspondence for practical purposes (*pravṛttisamvādayogyā*), thought would not fall outside the definition of a source of knowledge, because (1) the idea has no reference to impressions which might have preceded it in determining the object, the case being similar to that of a series of relatively independent impressions derived from an object; and (2) because what has been conceived in thought is capable of being applied in action (*adhyavasitaprāpanayogyatvāt*). - And, if thought is thus established as a source of knowledge, it must be classed under the head of perception, because (1) the thought-determinations by which the object in perception is qualified are not referred to the object through a middle term (so that the process is not inferential); and (2) because it occurs when organ and object are in contact, and does not occur otherwise (so that it must be regarded as *indriyārthasamnikarṣotpanna*).

But although these determinations of the percept are no less produced by the object (*arthaja*) than the pure or unqualified percept (*nirvikalpaka*), the qualified perception of the object does not arise through the mere contact of organ and

object is eclipsed (*vyavahita*) by that of memory. The *Naiyāyika* replies that auxiliary circumstances (*sahakārin*) do not oust the inherent power of the thing; you would not say that the seed is not the cause of the production of the shoot, on the ground that it is eclipsed by auxiliary conditions of growth like earth and water. But what is the assistance (*upakāra*) rendered by the memory of the word to the organ and object, that it should be called an "auxiliary circumstance" ? The answer is that, as the thought-determination in its arising corresponds positively and negatively to the organ-and-object, so also does it correspond positively and negatively to the word-memory. The assistance rendered by the memory to the organ-and-object then is that, organ-and-object alone failing to produce their effect; they produce it when the memory of the word is present as an auxiliary circumstance. And the Buddhist's view that "characters which add nothing to the inherent nature of the thing itself would not be 'auxiliaries'" has already been rejected²², when we had occasion to refute the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*).²³

References

1. "Ayamevopādhih naiyayikaih paricāyaka ucyate" *Vedāntaparibhāsa*, Pratyaksa Paricchedah.
2. Tathā hi trividham caitanyam visayacaitanyam pramāna-caitanyam pramatrcaitanyanceti. Tatra ghātādyavacchinnam caitanyam visayacaitanyam antahkaranavrttyavacchinnam caitanyam pramānacaitanyam antahkaranāvachchinnam caitanyam pramatrcaitanyam. *Vedāntaparibhāsā*, (Pratyaksapariccheda).
3. 'Abye pramanacaitanyasya visayavacchinnacaitanyabheda iti brumah' *Ibid.*
4. 'Tatra yathā tadāgodakam chitrānigatya kulyātmana kedāraā pravivsyā tadvadeva caksuskonādyakaram bhavati. Tathā taijasamantahkaranamapi caksuradidvārā nirgatya ghatādivisāyadesam gatvā ghatadivisāyākarena parinamate. Sa eva parināma ucyate.' *Ibid.*
5. Ghātādivisāyasya pratyaksam to pramatrabhinnatvam , Pramātrabhedo nāma na tāvadaikyam. Kintu pramātrsattātriktasattākatvābhāvah'. *Ibid.*
6. *Śrīmadbhāgavadgītā*, Verse No. 6/29.
7. Dr. Sudhir Kumar Dasgupta : *Kavyaloka*, Vol. 1, A. Mukherjee & Co. Calcutta, 1386 (B.S.) p. 92.
8. *Ibid.* p. 8.
9. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Vrtti, 4/28.
10. *Sāhityadarpana* – 3/42-43.

11. 'Śabdasaṃnyāyamaṇa Svāsamvidānanda-carvanavyāpāra-rasaniyārūpo rasah' *Locana on Dhvanyaloka*, 1/1.
12. How can we characterize the characterless? This is the burden of Uddyotakara's criticism of Dinnāga, a criticism which, as Keith says (ILA p. 71) amounts to the retort that "a consistent sensationalism should be speechless, and therefore unable to give the definition suggested. As Uddyotakara puts it, the theory is like a dumb man's dream – it cannot be communicated (N.V. p. 45 1.9 *apratipāḍakatvān mūkasovapnasadrśam*).
13. NV, p. 44 1.1 cites the phrase *kalpanāpodham*, and NVT p. 102 1.1 says that Dinnāga's definition is the object of Uddyotakara's criticism in the passage. Vidyābhūṣana (HIL p. 277, footnote) cites Dinnāga's description of perception in Tibetan as from Chap. I of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and says that the Sanskrit equivalent is *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham nāmajatyādyāsamyutam*.
14. But when Vācaspati is polemising against the view that the pure percept^{is} ^{devoid of} all characters ^{he}, gives another interpretation of *avyapadeśya*, as being a possessive compound meaning 'having no *vyapadeśya*. *Vyapadeśya* in this compound means *viśeṣya*, thing to be qualified or subject: and so *avyapadeśyajñāna* comes to mean knowledge of qualifications *unrelated to a thing-qualified*. NVT p. 82 1.8. That is, *nirvikalpa* is certainly (as against the nominalists) *śabderahita*: but this does not mean that it is (as Dinnāga supposed) *kalpanārahita* or characterless. On the contrary, it is *jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi*. (NVT, loc. cit).
15. "It is illustrated by the experience of infants and dumb persons, e.g., by kūmarila in the *Ślokavārtika* (*pratyakṣa*, 112): *asti by ālocanajñānam nirvikalpakam bālamūkādivijñānaśadrśam śuddhavastujam*.

There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real, - like the apprehension of infants and the dumb.

This couplet is quoted in the *Tārīkīkarakṣā*, p.60, in this connection.

16. By Śrīdhara, in NK p. 130 1.4 ff. His polemic against the Buddhist view of perception falls into two halves (a) p. 130 1.4 to p. 131 1. and (b) p. 131 1.22 to p. 134 1.3, dealing with the view that perception is *kalpanārahita*, and that the knowledge of *kalpanā*'s constitutes, 'savikalpaka.' But after all these are only two different ways of saying the same thing, viz., that all thought-determinations are illusory as not immediately given. Śrīdhara is really meeting the same position twice over, with different *nirvikalpaka* is used by the Bauddha and the *Naiyāyika* respectively, the Bauddha understanding by a perception free from all *vikalpa*'s while the *Naiyāyika* uses it of the perception of unrelated *vikalpa*'s.

17. *Nayāyabindu* p. 103. *tasya (i.e. pratyakṣasya) viśayah svalakṣaṇam, yasyārthasya samnidhānāsamnidhānābhyām jñānapratibhāsabhedaś tat svalakṣaṇam. Tad eva paramārthasat, arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ, Anyat sāmānyalakṣaṇam : so numānasya viśayah.*

“The object of perception is the *svalakṣaṇa*. The *svalakṣaṇa* is that through proximity to and remotness from which differences in the cognitive appearances arise. It alone is ultimately real, since competency for action is the definition of real thing. Other objects are *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* - such is the object of inference”.

The *Nyāyabindutikā* (p. 15 1. 18) explains : *svam asādhāraṇam lakṣaṇam tattvam svalakṣaṇam, vastuno by asādhāraṇam ca tattvam asti*

sāmānyam ca. yad asādhāraṇam tat pratyaksagrāhyam "svalakṣaṇa means 'own unique character or being', . For a reality has a unique being, and it has also a common character. The unique character is the object (*grāhya*) in the case of perception."

Dharmottara goes on to say that the object (*viśaya*) of a *pramāṇā* is two fold : either the object of apprehension (*grāhya*) described by the phrase *yadākaram utpadyate-* that in the form of which knowledge arise(?) : or the object of acquisition, endeavour, or activity (*prāpanīya*, *adhyavaseya*; cf. *pravṛtṭiṣaya* p. 16 l. 6) "anyo hi grāhyo," *nyas cadhyavaseyah. Pratyakṣasya hi kṣana cko grāhyah. Adhyavaseyas tu tratyaksabalotpannena niścayena saṁtāna eva Saṁtāna eva ca Pratyakṣasya prāpanīyah kṣanasya. yaksasya prāpayitum aśakya, vāt,* i.e. the object apprehended in perception is the single moment: but this cannot be the object of endeavour or achievement, - the *prāpanīya* of perception is not the single moment : but the series of moments (which of course is unreal). He adds that in inference, on the other hand, the object apprehended (*grāhya*) is an unreality (*anartha*): but this unreal is illusorily imposed on the real (*āropita*), and is conceived of as *svalakṣaṇa* (*svalakṣaṇatvenāvasīyate*): the *svalakṣaṇa* thus supposed (*svalakṣaṇam adhyavasitam*) being the object of activity (*pravṛtṭiṣaya*).

18. The Vijñānavādin Buddhist held that cognitions are not perceived through inner sense perception by *manas*, but are somehow conscious of them. *Ātma* of course does not mean the soul or self- which the Buddhists rejected. The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* states *svayam-vedanam* [*svasamvedanam*] as the fundamental doctrine of the *Yogācāra*, i.e. *Vijñānavādin* School. In this connection the school used the simile of the lamp - which, self-illuminated, illuminates objects. You do not need another lamp to see your lamp by.

19. NK p. 190 1.20 *svalakṣaṇadeśe puruṣam pravartayati samvādayati ca.*
20. For the distinction between the *grāhya*, on the one hand, and the *adhyvaseya* or *prāpañīya* or *pravṛttiviśaya*, on the other hand. See NBT P. 15.1.20 to p. 16 1.7 referred to above, note 3 p. 121. (That passage *Pravṛttiviśaya*) The difficulty is that the doctrine of the momentariness of the real destroys the unity of the object (*viśyaikata*). Having destroyed it, the Buddhist casts about for some way of restoring it – for practical purposes.
21. *Svalakṣaṇa* in this compound cannot be taken as the object of *prāpakatayā*, because inference never grasps the *svalakṣaṇa* its object being always *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* – Also *Nyāyabindu* p. 103 1. 13 *anyat sāmānyalakṣaṇam so numānasya viśayah.*
22. The Buddhist argument in support of the doctrine that all things are momentary is stated in the *Sarvadarśanatsamgraha*, chapter on the *Buddhas* (the section corresponding to pp. 16-20 of Gough's translation). It is always expounded in the pair of tracts by *Rātnakīrti* entitled *kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* which are included in Hara Prasad Sāstri's *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit*. (One of these tracts sets out the positive and the other the negative argument). The Naiyāyika reply is given by Śrīdhara N K pp. 73-82 (Faddegon analyses this passage pp. 593-5, and translates it pp. 384-403). The context in which Śrīdhara refutes the theory of momentariness is the *ātmanitrūpana* or exposition of soul as the permanent subject of experience.
23. The Buddhist starts by identifying existence with causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*). He then exposes the antinomies of the concept of causation in a manner similar to that of F.H. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*, arguing that "a permanent entity is inconsistent with production of effects - *kramakrāmavyāvṛttāv aksanikat*

sattvavyāvṛttih, a permanent entity cannot exist because its various effects cannot be produced either successively or simultaneously.” (SDS loc. cit) Not simultaneously: because if it could produce all the effects at once it would do so, and would produce them as much at one time as it another, unless you suppose that having discharged itself of all its efficacy once and for all it retains an altogether impotent sort of permanency thereafter; which would be like looking for a crop from the grain that the mice have eaten (*sthāyitvavṛtṭyasā mūsikabhaksitabijādāv ankurajanaprarthanam anuharet*, SDS). Nor yet successively: for what can produce an effect does so forthwith - *smarthasya ksepāyogāt* “postponement being out of question in the case of what has the capacity. And conversely what does not produce an effect is incapable of producing it. In virtue of these two principles, (called the *prasanga* and the *prasangaviparyaya*) it is clear that the supposed permanent entity possesses two contradictory properties ; for it both has, and has not, the capacity to produce its effects, it has the capacity, in so far as it is now producing its (present) effect; and it has not the capacity, in so far as it is not now producing its (past and future) effects.

It is at this stage in the discussion that the Naiyayika brings in the notion of auxiliary conditions (*Sahakārin*, which Poussin renders co-factor) *nanu kramavat saharilābhāt sthayuinah atitānāgatanoh...) upapadyate* – “the successive production of past and future effects by the permanent entity is possible as the result of its getting auxiliaries in succession”. The Buddhist asks : does the auxiliary render any service (*upakara*) to the entity or not ? If not, we may disregard them, as, doing nothing, they cannot serve its purpose - *napeksaniyas te, akincit kurvatam tesam tadarthyayogat* (this is the reading of the 1902 Bombay text, confirming Poussin’s conjecture for *tadatma.....*). But if they do give any assistance, does the assistance remain something distinct, and

then it is this something distinct from the permanent entity that is the cause of the effect – since the effect is present when this adventitious additament is present, and absent when it is absent. (Even in the light of Poussin's rendering, p. 66. I cannot understand the citation in the SDS at this point. Gough mistranslates it). But the Naiyayika holds that it is the permanent entity, in conjunction with the auxiliaries that produces the effect; and so it is from the nature of the thing (*svabhāva*) that the effect arises.

It is already known to us that Gautama's *sūtra* (NS 1/1/4) on perceptual knowledge states that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that cognition (*jñāna*) which is due to sensory contact with the object (*inriyārthasannikarśopanna*) and which is non-linguistic (*avyapadesya*), certain (*vyavasāyatmaka*) and non-deviating from the object (*avyabhicarin*). According to Vatsayāna and his followers this *sūtra* states only a definition and no division of perceptual knowledge while according to others it represents both a definition and a division. The first interpretation asserts that all the words in the *sūtra* except that for the definiendum (perception – *pratyakṣa*) are constituents of the definiens. But the second interpretation treats only three out of these five as constituents of the definiens, the other two, namely, 'non-linguistic (*avyapadesya*)' and 'certain' (*vyavasāyatmaka*) as indicative of a division. The definition, in whatever way it is viewed, is basically a causal definition though it does not enumerate the causal conditions exhaustively. The causal factor that is mentioned in the definition is sensory contact with the object. But such a contact can generate not only a cognitive state but also an affective state in appropriate circumstances. Hence, the word 'cognition' is very much necessary for the definition. In the preceding *sūtra* Gautama has enumerated the varieties of knowledge (*pramā*) including the perceptual variety. Truth which is necessary for knowledge seems to have been represented by the word 'non-deviating' (from the object) in Gautama's definition of perception. This avowedly forms a part also of the definitions of other varieties of knowledge and is not anything exclusive to the definition of perceptual knowledge.

CHAPTER – IV

THE THEORIES OF NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKṢA IN NYĀYA, VAISĒSIKA AND NAVYA NYĀYA

The word 'certain' that is to be taken as a part of the definition has been incorporated to exclude doubt, as doubt is characterised not by certainty but by oscillation between opposing positions. Doubt can be eliminated even if this component is not incorporated by stipulating that strictly speaking it is deviating from the object in respect of the false alternative involved in doubt. Alternatively, if 'sensory contact' as occurring in the definition is understood as contact with any of the five external sense organs, then if doubt is held to be necessarily mental as some philosophers hold and thus not due to such a contact there would be no need to introduce the word 'certain' to exclude doubt.

The word 'non-linguistic' has been interpreted by some as useful for excluding what is usually referred to as *ubhayajñāna* (a cognition which is produced by the dual factors of sensory contact and testimony). Supposing, that a person is perceptually aware of the features of a perceptible object but is not conversant with the word for its kind then on the basis of the testimony of another to the effect that the object is an X he may come to know the object as perceived in that situation as an X. Such knowledge is thus due to two sources of sensory contact and testimony. Since the presupposition of the definition is that perceptual knowledge is not due to testimony, the component under consideration looks useful for excluding such knowledge produced by dual sources as noted here.

Many philosophers do not however accept the thesis of *ubhayajñāna*¹. They interpret the component 'non-linguistic' in the definition as indicative of refutation of the theory according to which every cognition takes its rise as wrapped up in language. Linguistic clothing of cognition, according to the Naiyāyikas, is not essential for perception even though such a relationship may appear to be obvious for other varieties of cognition. Thus, the usefulness of the component as intrinsically non-linguistic in character. The implication then is that the component has not been inserted to secure an act of exclusion which a

component normally performs in a definition. Later interpreters of the *sūtra* thus treat only the three words 'cognition' due to sensory contact with the object' and 'non-deviating'. They do not take the remaining two words '*avyapadeśya*' (translated so far as 'non-linguistic) and *vyavasāyātmāka* translated so far as 'certain') as components of the definition. The two words under reference are thus interpreted by these philosophers as representing a division into indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) varieties of perception. The proposal was explicitly floated in the Nyāya tradition first by Vācaspati in *Tātparyatikā* and later supported by Gaṅgeśa in the *Pratyakṣakhanda* of his *Tattvacintāmani* and also by Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*.² But the interesting point to be noted here is that neither Gautama nor Vātsyāyana has spoken of this distinction anywhere in their works. Therefore, the thesis of *nirvikalpaka* is not a theory of the masters. It is thus natural to suppose that it has been smuggled into Nyāya from the work of the sister system of Vaiśeṣika. It seems to us that the theory has actually been borrowed from Praśastapāda.³ The theory was ably defended and greatly developed by Gaṅgeśa within the backdrop of the system of Navya Nyāya propounded by him. But I am afraid that Gaṅgeśa differs from Praśastapada in significant respects. This will be clear as we proceed.

Praśastapāda writes about the causes and types of perception after giving his definition of perception. While dealing with perception of substances he mentions that the external substance can be perceived by the visual sense organ or by the sense organ of touch only. Such perception is possible in respect of substances (which are wholes consisting of parts, have intermediate magnitude (neither atomic nor infinite), and have colour as a property) provided that there are the common general causes and also the threefold contact between four things (between self and mānas, manas and the sense organ, and the sense organ and the object). If these merely are the causes in respect of an act of perception,

such perception cannot be anything other than mere acquaintance. Praśastapāda's own word is '*svarupa-alocana-mātra*', the component '*alocana*' of this expression being synonymous with '*grahana*' and thus the compound is treated as equivalent to '*svarupa-grahana-mātra*' by Sridhara.⁴ But though the factors noted here are sufficient for such a type of acquaintance these are merely necessary for a different type of perception which he refers to as involving a *viśeṣana* for which these factors and their product, i.e., this acquaintance itself together constitute the sufficient condition. His own word for such a perception is '*viśeṣana-apekṣa*'. As we are not giving any causal interpretation to the component '*apekṣa*', the compound is being treated as 'involving *viśeṣana*', i.e., in the sense that the substance the perception is about is held as 'possessing something as its attribute or *viśeṣana*'. Since such a perception is distinct from the earlier variety this element of *viśeṣana* qua epistemic *viśeṣana* is absent there. Therefore, the phrase 'mere acquaintance' ('*svarupālocana-mātra*'/'*svarupagrahana-mātra*') does not stand for perception of the substance as having something as its character or mark, although these figure in it as discrete objects. This variety of perception has later come to be known as *nirvikalpaka* and the other type as *savikalpaka*. But though Praśastapāda himself has not used these words it is clear that he was able to draw the distinction in its essence. This will be clear if we consider Praśastapāda's examples of perception of the *viśeṣana-apekṣa* type.

Praśastapāda gives us six examples of cognition involving *viśeṣana*.

- (i) (This) substance (*drvyam*) exists (*sat*).
- (ii) (This) is earth(en) (*prthivī*)
- (iii) (This) has horns (*visānī*)

(iv) (This is) white (*śukla*)

(v) (This is) a cow (*gau*)

(vi) (This) is moving (*gacchati*).

(Our representation of the examples is based Vyomaśivacārya's interpretation).⁵

In all these cases something is taken to be a character of something else. In (i) this character is the universal of existence which is called *samānya* (general) in the sense that this is common to every such thing that can have a universal in it. Cases (ii) and (v) are examples of cognition where also a universal is taken to be a character of something. The universal involved here in these two cases is not such that it is common to everything that can have a universal in it, since everything does not belong to the class of earthen objects or to that of cows. This type of universal is called *viśeṣa* in the sense that it is specific to a given group of things and is not present in others. In (iii) what appears as the attribute, ontologically speaking, is not a universal but a pair of horns which are substances and hence particulars. In (iv) the character is a given colour and that in (vi) is action. These two characters, being properties are thus to be regarded as particulars and not as universals.

We have noted above that according to Praśastapāda the perception of the *viśeṣaṇa-apeka* type (*savikalpakapratyakṣa*) is caused by *svarupa-ālocana-mātrā* (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*). He has not however given us examples of the different *nirvikalpaka* perceptions corresponding to the examples of the different *nirvikalpaka* perceptions corresponding to the examples of the former (the six cases from (i) to (vi) we have been discussing). In our rendering of the examples which we have tried to make idiomatic we have used English words within parentheses showing them in the subject position although except of (i) in the

corresponding Sanskrit sentence there are no separate words for them. Nevertheless, we assume that what is being asserted by those sentences may be represented in the way we have done to give them a look of idiomatic expressions in English. Prasastapada's examples under reference are examples of cognitions involving a predicational structure as the *viśeṣana* is taken as related to some *viśeṣya* of subject. I have indicated what figures as *viśeṣya* by using words within parentheses though in Sanskrit this is indicated by the use of the word for the *viśeṣya* with appropriate nominal suffixes used in accordance with the appropriate syntactical rules. Given that there is a *viśeṣya* in each of such examples and that we are not in error here, we can legitimately enquire about the nature and contents of the *nirvikalpaka* cognition for each of the examples. Let us first consider the first example.

(This) substance exists (*sat drvyam*)

This example is different from all others in that we have here two words in the Sanskrit sentence. The first word (*sat*) in it has been interpreted as standing for the *viśeṣana*. It is thus also supposed that the other word stands for the subject or the *viśeṣya*. As this is an example of perception we further suppose that the perception is about a single specific object. This fact has been indicated by us in our translation by the use of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' within parentheses. But the word '*dravya*' (substance) explicitly used by Prasastapada for the *viśeṣya* (subject) suggests that it has been represented as a thing identified by the property of substance-hood. In later Nyaya such a property is described as *viśeṣyatā-avacchedaka-dharma* (delimiting property for subject-hood). It is not clear from Prasastapada's writing whether such a property is also to be treated as a *viśeṣan*. It cannot however be a *viśeṣana* as distinct from *upalakṣana* (as per their definitions by Gangeśa).⁶ But it is surely a *prakāra* that is often taken as *viśeṣana*. If it is a *viśeṣana* then like the other property (i.e. *satta* or existence) which is clearly a *viśeṣana* it should also figure in the preceding *nirvikalpaka* perception as a discrete content along with the thing (substance) and the other

property (existence). But there is no clear statement in this respect in the literature that may serve as the guide for us.

In Praśastapāda's work all the six examples have been represented by a single Sanskrit sentence (*Sat dravyam pṛthivī visāni śuklah gaur gachati*) which has been translated by us by six different independent sentences in English. If the word 'dravya' is taken as the *viśeṣya* word also in respect of the other cases, the first example will not be different from the other ones in this respect. Following the commentators we have however treated the remaining examples as distinct from the first one by treating them as single worded sentence in as much as the word 'dravya' is not taken as part of these sentences, although the subject of such sentences, ontologically speaking, is actually a substance. But if the other interpretation (i.e. the word 'dravya' be taken as the word for the *viśeṣya*) is accepted then if substance-hood is taken as a *prakāra* (and therefore also as a *viśeṣaṇa*) in respect of the *viśeṣya* in question (it does not matter what the major *viśeṣaṇa* is, that is, whether it a universal or substance or quality or action), the preceding *nirvikalpaka* would have, for its discrete contents, that specific substance, substance-hood, and the major *viśeṣaṇa* (which is a universal in respect of the first and also in respect of the second and fifth examples and which is a particular in respect of the remaining ones).

If the word 'substance' not taken as representing the *viśeṣya* in these examples then the preceding cognition is about the referent of the word 'this' used by us within parentheses in our translation. The referent, although an individual substance, does not figure as something as having the property of substance-hood and the respective other contents figure as contents as pertaining to the *viśeṣya* in question.

As the cases other than the first, second and the fifth are such that the *viśeṣaṇa* -s involved in them are not universals, the perception of *svarupa-ālocana-mātra* type, if it is to be supposed to be operative as a cause here, must

be about discrete objects, namely, about the *viśeṣya* (referent of the word 'this') and the *viśeṣaṇa* concerned which also is a particular. As this particular is substance (a pair of horns) in case of ("(This) has horns"), a quality (white colour) in case of ("(This) is white") and motion is ("(This) is moving"), these particulars are not without a universal although this universal does not inhere in the subject or the *viśeṣya* but inheres in the *viśeṣaṇa* which is distinct from it. Therefore, this universal also must figure as content in the preceding cognition. But the question is whether in this preceding cognition this universal is taken to be a property of the *viśeṣaṇa*. If this is the case then this preceding cognition is not an instance of mere acquaintance of *svarūpa-alocana-matra* as the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal which are its contents are to be understood as related. The preceding cognition may however be treated as mere acquaintance in which that *viśeṣaṇa* (which is a particular) and its universal figure as discrete contents along with the *viśeṣya* of the cognition in the example. Such a position cannot however be maintained if the *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-* perception as represented in Prāśastapāda's examples is a case of what has come to be known in later Nyāya as a case of *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi-buddhi*.

A cognition of this type is one in which the *viśeṣaṇa* in respect to the *viśeṣya* is taken as qualified by some further *viśeṣaṇa*, for example, in *Raktadandavān puruṣaḥ* (The person has a red stick (in his hand), the main *viśeṣaṇa* here being the stick which again is taken as a red one, that is taken as related to red colour. It is here stipulated that such a composite cognition must be causally due to a cognition which is not about discrete contents but actually about some of the contents as related, in the example cited the preceding cognition is about the stick as red, the red colour (which is a limiter of *viśeṣaṇata*) figuring as the *prakāra* in respect of the stick. Hence, if Prāśastapāda's examples (iii), (iv) and (vi) are treated as cases of such composite cognitions, these should be taken as due to a simpler *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-jñāna* about the pair of horns as related to the universal of being a horn, about the

white colour as related to its specific universal and about motion as related to its universal in respective cases. It seems to us that this was not perhaps the illustration of the perception of *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa* type which he apparently takes to be directly due to mere-acquaintance variety of perception. We can also put forward some other arguments against the hypothesis under reference.

The hypothesis of *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi-buddhi* stipulates that the cognition immediately preceding the perception in the examples under consideration (that is, in the third, fourth and sixth cases) is about the thing figuring in the later cognition as the *viśeṣaṇa* but as related to its specific universal and perhaps also along with the *viśeṣya* which is a substance as a discrete content in it. If that substance figures also as a qualified content in it there will be no logical difference between the two perceptions and the hypothesis will also be open to the charge of infinite regress as the preceding perception like the original one shall have to be taken to be due to a similar perception. It may thus be held that this preceding perception is about that substance as a discrete content but also about the *viśeṣaṇa* as *characterised* by its own universal. Alternatively, it may be maintained that this previous perception is only about this relational complex involving the *viśeṣaṇa* and the universal and not about the substance as a discrete unrelated content. But this is not acceptable as Praśastapāda stipulates that the substance figures as the content in the two perceptions to be taken as causally related of which the perception taken as the cause is a mere acquaintance only. Thus, we shall have to consider whether the perception acting as the cause in respect of the final *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa* cognition is all about discrete contents or not. If it is about the *viśeṣya*-substance but not understood as related to the *viśeṣaṇa* and also about the *viśeṣaṇa*-complex involving the *viśeṣaṇa* as characterized by its universal we shall have to assume that the *viśeṣya*-substance figures as a content also in a preceding third perception in which the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal are to be supposed to figure only as discrete contents along with the substance if all the

contents of the earliest perception although they would differ in respect of the contents of the intermediate perception. But it will be difficult to take this earliest perception as the cause of the perception in the cited examples as it will be a remote and not an immediate antecedent in respect of it. Therefore, it should be supposed that the substance figures as a content also in the intermediate perception and thus there will be no difference between the first and the second alternatives. But it will be difficult to take this earliest perception as the cause of the perception in the cited examples as it will be a remote and not an immediate antecedent in respect of it. Therefore, it should be supposed that the substance figures as a content also in the intermediate perception and thus there will be no difference between the first and the second alternatives. But the postulation of this intermediate perception will in any case be an unnecessary duplication of causes in respect of the original perception in the examples as it is supposed here that both the earliest and the intermediate perceptions are causes. Hence, the intermediate perception may be dropped from the causal process, the necessary implication being that Praśastapāda's examples are not cases of *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi* cognition and also that the perception to be taken as the cause are about all the three, namely, the substance (*viśeṣya*), the *viśeṣaṇa* and its universal as discrete contents. This can also be claimed to be consistent with the principle of non-delay (*avilamba*) in the rise of effect.

In support of such a position we can further say that the perception of discrete contents has been claimed by Praśastapāda not only as a cause but also as *pramāṇa* in respect of the cognitions cited by him in his examples. If the word 'pramāṇa' stands for the *kāraṇa* in respect of *pramā* and if the *kāraṇa* is (*karana*) as has been proposed by some, our argument does surely gain greater acceptability. Let us therefore elucidate this thesis of Praśastapāda in some detail.

It is known to all students of Indian philosophy that *kāraṇa* (instrumental cause) is *asādhāraṇa* (usually translated as extraordinary) *kāraṇa* (cause), and that this is taken either as the latest of the conditions (*sadhakatama/phala-ayoga-vyavacchinna*) or as a condition (*vyaparavat*) that produces the phenomenon in question by producing something which also acts as a cause in respect of the phenomenon. The first position is very old and held by philosophers of different schools while the second one is of later innovation made by the philosophers belonging to the modern school of Nyāya founded by Gaṅgeśa. The causal condition which is the latest to arise for the production of an effect cannot be more than one and in that sense it is an *asādhāraṇa* or extraordinary causal condition. Similarly, something that produces an effect by producing an intermediate thing which also is a cause for the same thing is an extraordinary causal condition, as this intermediate thing occurring the effect necessarily takes place. In fact, this intermediate thing is mostly, though not always, the *kāraṇa* also according to the first interpretation. A philosopher should have the freedom to choose any of the two stipulations and may indeed use one in one context and the other in another context. In our present context the *nirvikalpaka* cognition is held by Prasastapada's terminology).⁷ Supposing that the perception in his examples are cases of *pramā* or knowledge, this condition is then also to be called a *pramāna* in the sense of being the *kāraṇa* of *pramā*. But the interpretation that is being followed here is clearly the first one.

If some philosopher chooses, as Gaṅgeśa does, to follow the *vyaparavat* model of interpretation the *nirvikalpaka* cannot be regarded as such a causal condition, that is, as the *kāraṇa* of *pramā*. The factor that produces an intermediate thing which along with that factor produces the qualified cognition will be such an extra-ordinary causal condition. Gaṅgeśa takes the sense organ as a causal condition. Gaṅgeśa takes the sense organ as a causal condition that produces the qualified cognition by producing the contact with the object which also is necessary for that cognition. Hence, according to the second stipulation

about the concept of *kāraṇa* it is not the *nirvikalpaka* but the sense organ which is to be regarded as the *kāraṇa* and also the *pramāṇa* in respect of the qualified perception. It may be noticed here that the sensory contact is not the last (i.e., the latest) of the conditions to generate the qualified cognition, for unless that contact occurs and thus obtains the *nirvikalpaka* also cannot occur for producing the qualified cognition. The intermediate factor, if the *nirvikalpaka* is not to be so regarded in this context, is then not the latest (*sadhakatama/phala-ayoga-vyavachinna*) condition. If, however, the *nirvikalpaka* itself is taken as the *karya* (effect) the sensory contact can be regarded as the latest condition. Clearly there is some ambiguity here as *nirvikalpaka* itself may be regarded as such an intermediate factor with reference to the later cognition in as much as it is caused by the sense organ and also causes the qualified cognition. Such an ambiguity is however absent in the first stipulation as no two conditions can be called *kāraṇa* according to this stipulation. Therefore, if this stipulation is to be preferred for this reason, it will certainly be a matter of greater justification to treat, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, the *nirvikalpaka* as the *kāraṇa* and also as the *pramāṇa* in respect of the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* cases of perception.⁸

This Vaiśeṣika strategy was carefully avoided by Gaṅgeśa and his followers who denied that a cognition can be *kāraṇa* in respect of perception though such *kāraṇa* in respect of non-perceptual cognition is necessarily some cognition or other. In fact this thesis has been utilised by them in the formulation of the definition of perception as a cognition the *kāraṇa* in respect of which is something other than a cognition (i.e. as *jñānaakāraṇa kāraṇa*). These philosophers do not however deny that the *nirvikalpaka* is a cause (*kāraṇa*) of the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* perception. But they will admit its necessity only as a condition in the rôle of cognition of the *viśeṣana* which itself is not a argument for admitting the *nirvikalpaka*.

Prāśastapāda himself asserts that though the *viśeṣana -apekṣa* cognition is due to the *nirvikalpaka* this *nirvikalpaka* does not owe its origin to any

cognition whatsoever.⁹ In this sense, as the commentators mention, the *nirvikalpaka* is the simplest and ultimate cognition of the *viśeṣana*, being itself not qualified.¹⁰ But the *nirvikalpaka* is something more for Praśastapāda and his followers. According to them if the qualified perception is true and is *pramā* then, as has been noted by us earlier, this perception must be due to the efficacy of the *nirvikalpaka* without which the resultant perception would not have been a true cognition, that is, an instance of *pramā*.

The thesis of *parātaḥprāmānya* (extrinsic validity) in respect of origin of *prāmānya* as developed in Navya Nyāya stipulates that the truth in respect of a perceptual cognition is due to a factor which is other than the factors that produce this cognition qua a perceptual cognition. Thus, an illusory perception or a veridical one is equally due to sensory contact. But if it is a case of veridical perception it is due to contact with a thing (the *viśeṣya*) which does actually have the property/feature in it that appears as the *viśeṣana* in the qualified cognition.¹¹ This feature of the sensory contact is called *guna* in Sanskrit which means a (meritorious) quality as opposed to defect or *doṣa*. But in a sense, this is arguing in a circular way. Truth of the cognition consists in the *viśeṣya* thing's possessing the *viśeṣana*. Thus, if the *guna* in question is so formulated that it presupposes this (in stating that the required sensory contact with the object is actually contact with a thing that must have the *viśeṣana* in it), the Navya Nyāya formulation of the thesis of *parātaḥ prāmānya* does not carry conviction as an explanation of the origin of the veridicality of perception.

The Vaiśeṣika thesis that truth is ensured by the *nirvikalpaka* is supposed to be not inconsistent with the theory of extrinsic validity. It rather seems to fare better, as it does not have the ring of circularity around it. It may be said that the sensory contact necessary for the *nirvikalpaka* and for that matter also for the *pratyakṣa* is actually contact with the thing which is not only the *viśeṣya* but is something that does have the *viśeṣana* in it. The Navya Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika theses do not thus substantially differ from one another. Nevertheless

it can be claimed that the truth analysis is not inbuilt in the thesis of the *nirvikalpaka* which is defined as acquaintance of discrete contents (*svarupa-alocana-matra*). But the truth analysis is very much imbedded in the *guna* thesis concerned (namely, *viseanavadviśesyasannikarṣa*).

Given this subtle difference of the Vaiśeṣika thesis from the Navya Nyāya one as mentioned here we can utilise it in expressing our preference for the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the *nirvikalpaka* is the *pramāna*, i.e, the *kāraṇa* in respect of *viśeṣaṇa -apekṣa-pratyakṣa-pramā* as it does not smack of circularity in any way. If the conditions including the sensory contact that produce the *nirvikalpaka* are still in operation now being aided by the *nirvikalpaka* itself produced by them, the cognition being produced is not only perception but also a veridical one. Where the *nirvikalpaka* about the *viśeṣaṇa* is missing, for example, in perceptual illusion about a thing as silver when the thing is not actually silver the resultant cognition cannot be an instance of *pramā*.¹²

TRUTH AS AVYABHICARITATVA

The words 'true'/'false' are supposed to represent predicates applicable to sentences in the indicative mood or to their meaning called propositions, or to beliefs with respect to them. In Western philosophy different theories of truth have been offered under the labels of correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatism and semantic theory. Of these the first and the last ones are taken to be acceptable theories in respect of the nature of truth. The other two theories are valued not so much as theories about the *nature* of truth but as theories about the test of truth and are regarded and often referred to as theories of knowledge or of justification by philosophers of eminence. The words 'true'/'false' are both positive terms in appearance as one of them has not been formed from the other by adding to it some negative particle. Philosophers in the West, however,

almost invariably have treated one as having positive meaning and the other as having its negation as its meaning. To a bearer of truth-value must belong one of these two values represented by the words 'true'/'false' and this view is known as bivalence theory of truth. Although recent developments in many-valued logic pose threat to this theory it still commands a great following. The words that will be mostly used in idiomatic translation of 'true'/'false' in the languages of India that have mainly descended from Sanskrit are *satya/mithyā*. Both these words are positive in appearance. The things to which these words may be applied can certainly be beliefs and in an extended sense these may be applied even to *abhilapaka vakyas*, i.e. to the sentences that express those beliefs. But these two Sanskrit words have been used by many philosophers to refer not simply to beliefs or sentences but also to what these beliefs or sentences.

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The individual man is really a particular self delimited by a body. As Navya-Nyāya philosophers hold that there are innumerable selves all different from one another, an individual man has a unique self. But as Navya-Nyāya philosophers also accept the doctrine of rebirth, a man in this birth may become an animal in his next birth. As the self of an individual remains the same whether he is born as a man, or as an animal, a human being must have a human body. Thus, the uniqueness, of the self cannot guarantee that the individual is a human being. Thus an individual man who is identical with his self must also have a human body. This human body delimits the self which is neither human nor non-human. Thus the body is very important for an individual man.

The self of the individual is, as we have already stated, is ubiquitous and all substances of limited magnitude like atoms and composite substances are in contact with it. Thus the self of an individual will be all over the earth, in the firmament, in the stars, and so on. Yet although the self of the individual is

infinitely extended yet it is the subject of knowing, feeling and willing, only in so far as it is delimited by body. Thus knowledge, feeling, willing do not belong to the self all over, but belong to the self only in so far as it is restricted by the body. Thus, knowledge-feeling, willing are qualities of non-pervasive occurrence (*avyapya-vṛtti*).


Then there is a function of the totality of all men in the creation of the universe. The universe is created for the enjoyment or suffering of human beings. The general causes of the creation of the universe are God's will, knowledge, time, as also the stock of merit and demerit of the individual human beings. Thus *adr̥ṣṭa* of every man is a general cause of the creation of the universe. Every individual has passed through innumerable births and deaths. There is no first birth of an individual, just as there is no first creation of the universe. A universe is created, endures for a long time then is lost in total dissolution. Again, another universe is created, and so the cycle of creation, duration and dissolution goes on. So also with the individual man, with the difference that he is not born again if and only if he attains liberation in this life. Thus in the creation of the universe the *adr̥ṣṭa* of men is as much responsible as God's will and knowledge.

Adr̥ṣṭa is the special cause of pleasure and pain of the individual, and is also a general cause of all type of cognition and other states, internal or external, of the individual.

KINDS OF PERCEPTION

According to Navya-Nyāya perceptions are primarily of two kinds : (1) indeterminate and (2) determinate. Determinate perceptions again are of two kinds : (a) ordinary (*laukika*) and (b) special (*alaukika*). Ordinary perception involves epistemic relations (*sannikarṣa*) of six kinds. Special perceptions are of three kinds : (i) perceptions of all instances of a universal. (ii) Perception of an

object by a sense-organ although the object is not a proper object of ordinary perception by that sense-organ. These two kinds of special perception are common to all men. (iii) This kind of special perception is available to only yogins who can perceive very small things like atoms, distant or future things and so on. The following diagram makes this classification of perceptions clear.



(A) Indeterminate Perception

In ordinary perception of the determinate kind we have a qualificative cognition having a qualificand, a qualifier and a relation between them. For example, when we perceive something as a cow or something as cowness-possessing, the thing is the qualificand of the perceptual cognition, cowness is its qualifier and inherence is the qualification (for, cowness inheres in the present thing). Now the Nyāya argument is that the qualificative cognition requires cowness is, he cannot know or perceive as a cow requires the prior cognition of cowness. But this cognition of cowness which produces the determinate cognition cannot itself be a determinate cognition, as this will lead to an infinite regress; so, every determinate perception requires an indeterminate knowledge of cowness there is no knowledge of a relation. This indeterminate knowledge

has to be perceptual, for in no other way can one initially know cowness in isolation.

This indeterminate perception of Navya-Nyāya has some similarities with what Russell (once called 'knowledge by acquaintance' which he contrasted with knowledge by description. Knowledge by acquaintance requires a direct relation of the object with the knower. The Navya-Nyāya theory of indeterminate perception is similar to knowledge by acquaintance is the referent of logically proper names like 'this', 'I', etc., according to the Navya-Nyāya theory that any word denotes an object or objects only under a mode which is a property of the object or objects. So a cognition involving words is necessarily a qualificative cognition of an object possessing a property. As indeterminate perception is postulated to causally explain determinate or qualificative perception, it cannot involve any name. This indeterminate cognition cannot also be expressed in language, for using language is possible only when there is a distinction between the meant object and the mode under which it is meant. So Navya-Nyāya philosophers use inference to postulate this primitive kind of perception.

(B) Determinate perception

Determinate perception is qualificative cognition the object of which is of the form aRb. When we perceive a cow classify the perceived object as a cow, or as cowness-possessing. In this cognition the perceived object is the qualificand, cowness is the qualifier and inherence is the qualification. The object cognized is, therefore, a qualified object, but not a fact.

Both indeterminate and determinate perception requires the instrumentality of sense-organs. The sense-organs have to be related to the object perceived, but this relation is not merely an objective relation. It may be described as an epistemic relation, the relation of the sense-organ with the object that produces the cognition. There are six kinds of epistemic relations (*sannikarṣa*) in ordinary perception. Thus when we perceive a jar as jarness-

possessing, the jar is the object of determinate perception. The sense-organ of vision is related to the jar epistemically by contact. When we perceive the colour of the jar, say, the red colour, it is the colour which is the object of perception and the sense-organ of vision has to be related epistemically to the red colour of the jar. This relation is a chain relation and cannot be a direct relation. The sense-organ of vision is related to the jar by contact and the red colour of the jar inheres in it. Hence, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the red colour of the jar is contact-cum-inherence.

The distinction between a particular and a universal is not the same as that between a thing and a quality. According to Navya-Nyāya, qualities are as particular as the things to which they belong. So just as there are universals inhering in things - thing-universals - so also there are universals inhering in qualities - quality-universals.

When we perceive the universal of the red colour our sense-organ of vision has to be related to the universal of the red colour, i.e. redness, in a very indirect relation. The eyes are in contact with the jar, the red colour inheres in the jar, and redness inheres in the red colour. Hence the epistemic relation of the sense-organ of vision to the redness is contact-cum-inherence-cum-inherence.

Here we must note the difference between an objective relation of the sense-organ to the object perceived and the epistemic relation between them. When we perceive a jar the sense-organ of vision is epistemically related to the jar; yet objectively the jar is related to its red colour and the red colour to the universal of red colour by inherence. Thus although the jar is related to all of its qualities by inherence, when we perceive the jar we do not perceive all its qualities. Thus the objective relation between the jar and its qualities does not produce the perception of all qualities of the jar simultaneously. It is a fact that a jar is objectively related to all its qualities, but this does not mean that whenever we perceive the jar we perceive all the qualities of the jar. To determine the epistemic relation between a sense-organ and the object perceived, we have first

of all to note what object is perceived, a thing, its colour or the colour universal, and then to calculate backward to the epistemic relation. So the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived can be calculated only by first knowing what object is perceived.

According to Nyāya, the sense-organs are not parts of the body but are imperceptible elements (*pañca mahābhūta*). Thus the sense-organ of vision is the fire which is located in the eye-balls. The auditory sense-organ is the *ākāśa* which is imperceptible and is located in the earhole. According to Nyāya, sound is a quality of *ākāśa* which is the sense-organ of hearing. As a quality of *ākāśa* sound inheres in it. Hence when we hear a sound the sound is related to the sense-organ of hearing by inherence. We may also hear the sound-universal present in the particular instances of sound. In hearing the sound-universal the sense-organ of hearing is indirectly related to it. Sound inheres in the sense-organ of hearing (*ākāśa*) and the universal of sound inheres in the sound; so the sense-organ of hearing is related to the universal of sound by inherence-cum-inherence.

According to Navya-Nyāya we can perceive not merely positive objects but also negative objects like absence of a jar on the floor. Here it is necessary to relate epistemically the sense-organ of vision with the absence of the jar on the floor. First of all the sense-organ of vision is related to the floor by contact and the absence of the jar is the qualifier of the floor. Hence the sense-organ of vision is related to the absence of the jar on the floor by the relation of contact-cum-qualifier^{ness}.

(C) Special Perception

Among systems of Indian philosophy only Navya-Nyāya admit this type of perception. There are three kinds of this type of perception.

(i) The first kind of this type of perception is the perception of all instances of a universal. When we perceive an elephant, we also perceive

ordinarily the universal elephantness inhering in the elephant. These are all cases of ordinary perception. But Navya-Nyāya philosophers argue that by perceiving one elephant as possessing elephantness, we perceive in a special way all instances of elephantness i.e., all elephants, past, present and future, near and far.

When we perceive one elephant, we have perceived all elephants merely as elephants. This is why when we at once recognize it as an elephant. But recognition is not possible if we had not already known the elephant. It is the first time that we are seeing the second elephant. How can we then recognize it as an elephant? According to Navya-Nyāya a philosophers this experience of recognition can be explained only if we hold that by perceiving one elephant in the ordinary way we have perceived in a special way all elephants.

This Nyāya theory of perceiving in a special way all instances of universal by perceiving the univesal in the ordinary way in one instance of the universal avoids a difficulty of the conceptual theory of universals. According to this theory we perceive a number of elephants, then compare and contrast these perceived particulars and then abstract the qualities common the all of them and then generalize to form the concept of the universal of elephant. A difficulty in this theory of abstract universal is that we shall have to perceive many elephants. As we have not yet got the universal of elephant, it is not clear how we can be sure that we are seeing a second elephant. Without having the universal we cannot possibly recognize a second elephant as an elephant. The Nyāya theory of this kind of special perception explains how we can recognize a second elephant as an elephant. Even when we perceive the first elephant we also perceive the elephant-universal present in the first elephant. But this perception of the universal does not suffice to explain our recognition of the second elephant as an elephant. Hence there is the need for this special kind of perception.

Even though this is a special kind of perception it is common. It is the ordinary actual cognition of the universal which functions as the epistemic relation. The universal is actually perceived in the instance present here and now, and this universal is present not only in this object but in all its instances. So the actual ordinary perception of the universal functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and all instances of the universal. As this epistemic relation is not of an ordinary kind, it is regarded as of a special kind (*alaukika*).

This kind of special perception is used in Navya- Nyāya to explain the perception of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire. Not one can see all cases of smoke, or all cases of fire. Then how can one know, as one actually does, that all cases of smoke are related in the appropriate manner with fire? The reply is that by seeing one case of smoke, one ordinarily sees smokeness which inheres in all instances of the smoke-universal. In this special sense, one sees all cases of smoke, which explains the possibility of perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire. We shall explain later why Navya- Nyāya philosophers cannot admit inductive inference.

(ii) The second kind of special perception is the perception of objects by a sense-organ, although these objects are not the proper objects of perception by the sense-organ.

As an example we may take the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant. Fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Yet when we see a piece of sandalwood we see it as fragrant. This is possible only if we had smelt the piece of sandalwood when we saw it before. It is the memory of the fragrance which functions as a very special kind of epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the fragrance. It will not do to say that we see the piece of sandalwood and remember that it is fragrant. Our experience is of visual perception of the piece of sandalwood as fragrant. To explain this experience it is necessary to postulate this kind of perception.

There are five more different cases in which this kind of special perception is used in Navya-Nyāya to explain various types of experience, (a) The first case is of recognition. We saw Devadatta before: when we see him now we recognize him to be that person. The recognition is perception and it takes the form 'This is that Devadatta'. Now in this recognition the memory of Devadatta whom we saw before functions as epistemic relation to produce this perception, (b) According to Nyāya, we can know one cognition of an object in a higher order introspective cognition. The object of this higher order introspective cognition of a cognition has the form 'I know the jar'. When I perceive the jar I am aware only of the jar, but not of my perceiving it. If I have to know my perception I have to perform a higher order introspective act. This introspective act has as its object the first order act. Yet the first order act cannot be cognized in a second order act unless and until the object of the first order act is also cognised.

The second order act cognizes the first order act and also the object of the first order act. This is possible only if we hold that the object of the first order act becomes an object of the second order act. As the second order act is introspection or inner perception it perceives the object of the first order act only in so far as it is cognized in the first order act. Here the epistemic relation between the second order inner perception and the object of the first order act is the first order act of the cognition itself. So in this case also a cognition becomes the epistemic relation between the inner perception and the object of the first order perception. This is a perception of special kind. (c) The third case of this type of epistemic relation is in explaining an illusory perception. When, for example, we mistake a piece of rope for a snake though not present here and now. When we mistake a piece of rope for an idea or a memory of a real snake we perceive the snake which is not here and now. But how can the sense-organ of vision be related to a snake not here and now? According to Nyāya, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the absent snake is

through the memory of a snake seen in the past. Here, too, it is a memory which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the absent snake. (d) In the case of perception of a negative object, the sense-organ has to be epistemically related to the object. For example, when we perceive that there is no jar on the floor, we have to know the jar before. This memory of the jar seen before becomes the epistemic relation between the sense-organ of vision and the jar. We cannot perceive simply absence; the absence has got to be absence of some thing. Even though the absence is before our eyes, the jar which is absent is not. Yet unless and until we can see the jar we cannot see the absence of the jar. Here, too, the memory of the jar functions as the epistemic relation between the visual sense-organ, and the absent jar. (e) Navya- Nyāya philosophers hold that the meaning of a word may be known in different ways. One way is to identify an object as the meaning of a word based on perception of similarity (*upamiti*). For example, a forester tells a city dweller that a *govaya* is similar to a cow. When that man goes to a forest and perceives an animal similar to a cow he knows that the meaning of the word 'gavaya' is any animal of this kind. Now the problem is that the person has to see the similarity of the *gavaya* which is present and a cow which is absent. How can one perceive the similarity between a present and an absent thing? According to Nyāya philosophers the perception of the similarity requires perception of the two objects which are similar. As the *gavaya* is present there is no difficulty in explaining how it can be perceived. But how can an absent cow be perceived? It is not ordinary perception, for it is the memory of a cow seen before which functions as the epistemic relation between the visual sense-organ and the absent cow. So this perception of similarity between a present thing and an absent thing is of a special kind.

(iii) The special perception of this kind is not common to all individuals but is the prerogative of yogins. Yogins can 'see' small things like atoms, distant and past and future things which cannot be perceived normally.

But perception according to Nyāya requires an epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived. In the case of yogic perception the epistemic relation is the special cognition in the mind resulting from yogic exercises.

In all these three forms of special perception, the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived is very peculiar. In all these three cases it is knowledge of a sort that functions as the epistemic relation. In the first case it is the perception of the universal in ordinary way which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and all instances of the universal. In the second case it is sometimes memory and sometimes informative knowledge which functions as the epistemic relation. This has been explained above in detail. In the third case it is the knowledge resulting from yogic practices which functions as the epistemic relation between the sense-organ and the object perceived. In emphasizing the instrumentality of sense-organs in all forms of perception, ordinary or special, Nyāya philosophy goes against the yoga theory of Patanjali. According to Nyāya a blind man cannot see anything even by yogic exercises. For seeing the function of the visual sense-organ is essential. Thus a blind yogic cannot see God, he can have other kinds of perception of God.

(D) False cognition

Now we explain the difference between a true cognition and a false cognition. For this is necessary to define 'a true cognition'. This may be done by analysing a particular instance. For example, when we cognize a serpent as (a) serpent, this cognition is true, while if we cognize a piece of rope as a serpent this cognition is false. Now when we cognize truly what is objectively a serpent as serpent-ness-possessing, then this cognition has the object serpentness – possessing serpent as its qualificand, and serpentness as its qualifier. Thus the cognition has two properties – (i) having-serpentness possessing-serpent as its qualificand, and (ii)

having serpentness as its qualifier. As these two properties belong to the same cognition of a snake as a snake, (ii) is said to be limited by (i). Hence a true cognition has 3 properties – (i), (ii) and (iii) i.e. (ii) limited by (i). It is (iii) alone which is the defining mark of the true cognition.

In the false cognition of piece of rope as a snake, there are also 3 properties – (a) having the piece of rope – possessing the absence of snakesness as its qualificand, (b) having snakesness as its-qualifier, and (c), (b) limited by (a). Of these 3 properties, (c) alone is the defining mark of a false cognition : the property – having-snakesness-as its qualifier – limited by the property – having-something with absence of snakesness as its qualificand.

The technical definitions given in earlier Nyāya are the following.

D1 A cognition having that as its qualifier in a that-possessor is true.

D2 A cognition having that as its qualifier in a negation-of-that – possessor is false.

By using the relative pronoun 'that' the earlier Nyāya philosophers attempted to give a general definition. The usual practice of earlier philosophers was to eliminate nouns of particular definitional sentences by relative pronouns to achieve universality. Thus in Gaṅgeśa's accepted definition of pervasion, there are two pairs of relative pronouns, two 'that-which is; in such a case it is difficult to fix the reference of which 'which' to which 'that'. Gaṅgeśa's definition may be translated as follows:

D3 Pervasion is the co-presence of that with that which is not limited by the limiter of counterpositiveness of any constant absence co-present with which and excluding its counter positive.

It will be easier to fix the reference of relative pronouns by using different variables thus :

D3* Pervasion is the co-presence of x with y where x is not limited by the limiter of counterpositiveness of any absence (z) co-present with y and excluding its (z's) counterpositive.¹⁴

And that perception is of two kinds – indeterminate and determinate.

'That perception' means the perception as has been defined by Gaṅgeśa earlier. He has given two definitions of perception; here I explain the second definition. 'Perception' is defined as that cognition which does not have another cognition as its instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*). An instrumental cause is not just any cause, but a special cause which has an operation. An operation is an effect of the instrumental cause and also a cause of another effect of the instrumental cause. For example, when a woodcutter fells a tree with an axe, the axe is the instrumental cause of the felling of the tree. Its operation is the contact of the axe with the tree.¹⁵ The contact of the axe is an effect of the axe and yet this contact is also a cause of the felling of the tree which is also an effect of the instrumental cause. Contact of the axe with the tree is, therefore, the operation of the axe. The coming together of the axe with the tree cannot be the operation, for contact is the effect of coming together and contact is the cause of the felling of the tree. Hence the coming together is a cause of a cause of the felling of the tree.

Perception is a cognition which cannot have another cognition as its instrumental cause. But in various types of perception many factors like memory function as causes. Memory is a cause, but not the instrumental cause, of different types of perception.

Gaṅgeśa has concluded with an explanation of a secondary (introspective) cognition of a primary cognition of an object. For example, if the primary cognition is of a jar, the secondary cognition is of the form 'I cognize the cognition of a jar'. Gaṅgeśa's explanation is that the cognition is perceived indeterminately in introspection while the cognition of a jar is a determinate perception. Thus the whole introspective cognition is in one part indeterminate and in another part determinate. Any cognition the structure of the object of

which is a composite of incongruous parts, as in this case, is technically called a cognition of the form 'of a half man and half lion'. This has reference to Indian mythology where the Lord Viṣṇu assumed the form of half a man and half a lion in order to kill the giant Hiranyakaśipu. So any cognition with a composite structure of incongruous parts is described as a cognition of the man-lion form.¹⁶

The position of the opponent has been explained differently by different commentators of Gaṅgeśa. Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the opponent's position as follows. Any cognition of man-lion form is unproved because there is no indeterminate perception, so determinate perception is the only kind of perception.¹⁶ Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains the opponent's position as follows. A cognition of the man-lion form is unproved, for determinate perception being produced by perception cannot be regarded as a perception at all. So indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.¹⁷

Whether determinate or indeterminate perception be the only kind of perception, there cannot be any cognition of the man-lion form, as held by Gaṅgeśa.

So the commentators hold that for this reason Gaṅgeśa has begun this chapter with 'and that....' in which sentence he asserts that there are two kinds of perception – indeterminate and determinate. This is in response to the opponent's objection that either determinate perception or indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.

If both indeterminate and determinate perceptions be admitted, still one and the same cognition cannot be regarded as both determinate and indeterminate. For indeterminateness and determinateness are mutually exclusive universals (*viruddhajāti*) so nothing can be an instance of both. According to Gaṅgeśa the introspective cognition is both determinate and indeterminate. The opponent argues that this is not possible.¹⁸ According to Gaṅgeśa indeterminateness and determinateness of perception are not universals at all, and hence not mutually exclusive universals. This is because whether a

perception is determinate or indeterminate is determined by the object perceived, and not by any property inherent in the perceptions.¹⁹

Hence determinateness and indeterminateness of a perception being determined by its relation to objects are not universals and hence not mutually exclusive universals. They are imposed properties (*upādhis*). Mutually exclusive imposed properties may belong to one and the same object without any difficulty. This is because universals classify objects according to their natural kinds and hence mutually exclusive universals cannot belong to the same object, for this would mean that the object would belong to two different natural kinds. But imposed properties do not classify objects. Hence, there is no difficulty in two so imposed properties belonging to one and the same object.

No *Nyāya* philosopher, however, admits the possibility of one cognition being perceptual in one part and inferential in another. This is because, according to *Nyāya*, perception, inference and other kinds of cognition are instances of different universals. Thus being a perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣatva*) is one universal, and being inferential cognition (*anumitīva*) is another universal, and they are mutually exclusive. So no cognition can be both perceptual and inferential. But indeterminateness and determinateness of perception are not universals, and hence there is no difficulty in one perception being both determinate and indeterminate at the same time.

1. "Tatra nāmajātyādi-yojanārahitam vaiṣiṣṭyānavagihiniṣprakārakam nirvikalpakam" *Tattvacintāmani, pratyakṣa khandā, 1/100*

Of these (two), indeterminate perception is that in which no names, universals etc. are introduced, which is not of a relation, and which does not have any mode.

According to *Nyāya* there is one kind of perception in which a relation (between two objects) gets cognized. This is determinate perception. To cognize a relation between two objects is to cognize one object as the other. This is

fundamentally different from the Western theories that to perceive a relation is to perceive a fact which is stated in a proposition (sentence). According to Nyāya even determinate perception in which we cognize a relation between two objects can be expressed by one word. For example, when I perceive a jar in determinate perception I perceive it as jar^{ness}-possessing. The expression 'possessing' indicates a relation between the jar and jar^{ness}. So to perceive one object as possessing another object which is called the 'property of the object' is really the mode (*prakāra*) under which the object (*viśeṣya*) is cognized. In determinate perception there is always a mode under which an object is cognized.

A determinate perception is a qualificative cognition the object of which is a relational complex of the form aRb . We now introduce three epistemic definitions :

Qualificand of a qualificative cognition : a in the cognized structure aRb is called 'the qualificand of the cognition, as well as 'the qualificand of b '.

b . Qualifier (mode) of a qualificative cognition : b in the cognized structure aRb is called 'the qualifier (mode) of the cognition as well as the qualirfier (mode) of a '.

Qualification of a qualificative cognition : R in the cognized structure aRb is called 'the qualification of the cognition'.

So aRb is a complex term, not a sentence as in Western logic. It is interpreted as 'a as related to b by R', and not as 'a is related to b by R'.

There is a more complex form of qualificative cognition, viz. doubly qualificative cognition. For example, when we cognize a stick, being a stick is the qualifier of the stick which is the qualificand. But when we cognize the first order cognition of the stick then the first order cognition is the qualificand of which the stick is the qualifier and being the stick is the qualifier of the qualifier. Thus this is an example of a doubly qualificative cognition

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(*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya vagāhi-jñānam*). It may be represented symbolically as aR (bRc). This is well-formed because bRc is one complex term and not a sentence.

In determinate perception which is defined here, there is no cognition of a relation between two objects. It is not a perception of an object under any mode. It is a direct acquaintance with an object.

According to Nyāya, however, perceptions, whether determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any names or words. Gaṅgeśa has explained indeterminate perception apparently in terms of three negative characteristics – (i) there is no introduction of names, universals etc., (ii) it is not a cognition of any relation, (iii) and it does not have any mode. Now (ii) and (iii) are almost equivalent, for if there is no relation cognized in a perception, there cannot be any mode of the perception. Conversely, if there is no mode cognized in a perception, then it cannot be a perception of any relation. This is because the Nyāya theory is that the cognition of a relation is always the cognition of one object as another, one object as a mode of the other by the relation.

Perceptions, determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any words i.e., when we perceive an object we do not cognize its name, although in determinate perception we know at least one of its properties. Hence to characterize indeterminate perception as that in which we do not know names of objects becomes inappropriate. As a matter of fact Rucidatta explains the term '*nāma-yojanā-rahitam*' as '*vaśiṣṭyanavagāhi*'. That is, Rucidatta explains (i) as the same as (ii). But then the question arises: why should Gaṅgeśa give (i)? If (i) and (ii) are one and the same thing then giving two characteristics is really a repetition of one characteristic. This opens one to the objection of useless repetition.

— It may appear from the text of Gaṅgeśa that Gaṅgeśa did not accept the theory that in determinate perception words are not involved. If words are, as a rule, involved in determinate perception then indeterminate perception can be

defined correctly as that which does not involve the use of words. But this reading of Gaṅgeśa is not justified by what Gaṅgeśa has explicitly stated about determinate perception. So, the commentators like Rucidatta have interpreted (i) as meaning just the same as (ii). But Rucidatta does not explain how the charge of useless repetition can be answered. The only solution seems to be regard (ii) merely as an explication of (i).

It may be argued that there is no need to postulate indeterminate perception

Nanu jñātvaṁ savikalpakabhinnavṛtti ityatra kiṁ mānaṁ. Na pratyakṣaṁ asidd^{het}h^{ve}, atindriyatvābhyupagamācca. Naca vyavaharaḥ tasya savikalpaka-sādhyatvat, Napīdam na vivicitaṁ pūrvamadhunā vivechayamītyanuabhava-pramāṇakā-vālocanavikalpau vahuviśeṣaṇa -jñānabhyam tadupapattēḥ” Ibid, 1/1.

What evidence is there for holding that cognitionhood is located in anything other than determinate perception? It cannot be perception for it is not established. Moreover, indeterminate perception is beyond the range of sense perception. It cannot be use of words, for that come's about only by determinate perception. It also cannot be argued that the evidence of indeterminate and determinate perception is the introspective evidence that I did not determine it before, but I am now determining it. For this difference can be explained by cognition and non-cognition of many qualifiers. The opponent argued that there is no reason to postulate the existence of any perception other than determinate perception. The evidence, if any, for indeterminate perception can be of three kinds – internal perception or introspection inference based upon verbal usage or introspective evidence of different kinds of perception. The opponent argued that none of these alleged grounds is adequate. We cannot prove the existence of indeterminate perception by introspection. For there is no such introspective evidence for the existence of indeterminate perception. Jaydeva Miśra here

argues that it is not a controversy over a fact. It is not a controversy over whether we do or do not have introspective awareness of indeterminate perception.²⁰ The point is that, whether we have or do not have a particular type of cognition can be settled, in appropriate cases, by introspection. According to *Nyāya*, a cognition reveals only its object, but never itself or the subject. Thus, when I know a table, this knowledge will be expressed as, 'this is a table', but never as 'I know that it is a table'. For in the knowledge of the table, it is the table, which is the object of knowledge, but not the knowledge of the table, and not the subject. In order to know a primary knowledge about an object, a secondary knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) which has the primary knowledge as its object is necessary. So if there is any indeterminate perception, it can be known directly only in introspection. But there can be no such introspective awareness of indeterminate perception. According to *Nyāya*, indeterminate perception cannot be an object of sensory perception. Introspection is inner perception depending upon the function of the inner sense (*mānas* which is *antahkārana*).

3. This argument proves that there cannot be any secondary perception of indeterminate perception in introspection. This is because the secondary perception must be a doubly qualificative cognition. Yet indeterminate perception is not a qualificative cognition at all, hence, its cognition cannot be a doubly qualificative cognition.

This argument proves that it is not a controversy over a mere fact whether there is or there is not introspective perception of an indeterminate perception.

The second argument is that indeterminate perception may be the cause of use of words, and hence from the use of words the existence of indeterminate perception may be inferred. The opponent now points out that use of words is possible only when one has determinate perception.

This is because of the *Nyāya* theory of how a word means an object. A word can mean an object only under a mode. If a mode is not cognized the

object cannot be meant by a word. Nyāya does not accept the existence of what Russell calls 'logically proper names' which refer to objects under no mode. Indeterminate perception being a direct acquaintance with an object without any mode cannot be the cause of use of words. It is only determinate perception which is cognition of an object under a mode which can be a cause of use of words.

The opponent then considers another kind of introspective evidence for indeterminate perception. The argument is that sometimes we have introspective knowledge that did not know the object under any mode but are now knowing is under a mode. This shows that there is a primitive stage of perception where we can directly acquaint with the object without knowing its name or any property.

The opponent argues that it is not necessary to postulate this primitive stage of perception in order to explain this introspective knowledge. For it is sufficient to hold that at the prior stage we did not know the object with as many properties as we do now. At the earlier stage, therefore, we know the object as possessing fewer properties than what we know now. There is an increase in knowledge about an object because there is an increase in the number of properties known. There is no stage of knowledge where we know an object without any properties at all. The so-called indeterminate perception is really a less determinate perception.

Gaṅgeśa's argument for qualificative cognition being caused by cognition of a qualifier and its criticism

The Nyāya argument is : the (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is caused by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, the reason being that it is a qualificative cognition like, for example, inference. This argument is not valid, for one qualificative cognition produced by the totality of causes of the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand is about both objects having reciprocal expectancy. Among these, in perception, from the sense-organ contact with an object fit for perception, in inference on the strength of the presence of the

probans in the locus of inference (cognition) under the mode of the limiter of pervaderness, in verbal cognition by virtue of (semantic) fitness etc., a qualifier not previously known gets manifested in the form of the limiter of being the referent of the word. So also in analogy, a cognition of a qualifier is nowhere the cause (of a qualificative cognition). Neither is informative cognition of that-ness in recognition. Even when there is informative cognition of that-ness still when memory traces are either not activated or are erased no recognition is produced. Hence, it is the activated memory trace which is, an (epistemic) contact, auxiliary to the sense organs for the cognition of the qualifiers. So also in the case of visual cognition that the sandal wood is fragrant the cognition of the qualifier functions as the (epistemic) contact auxiliary to the sense organs. And illusion is not a qualificative cognition at all.

The Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception is presented in the form of an inference for the sake others which consists of five sentences as its parts (*avyāva*) thus :

(i) Proposition : The (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. (2) Reason : Because this is a qualificative cognition. (3) Pervasion with example: Every qualificative cognition is produced by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, for example, inference,

(The fourth and fifth members are not stated but can be supplied very easily).

(4) Application: The perception of the form '(the) cow' is a qualificative cognition.

(5) (5) Conclusion : Hence, it is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

The cognition of the qualifier cannot itself be a determinate perception which, in its turn, will need a cognition of its qualifier and so on ad infinitum. So

to stop this infinite regress the Nyāya philosophers hold that a determinate perception which a qualificative cognition is having a qualificand, a qualifier, and a relation between them as its complex object can be produced only if there is a prior cognition of the qualifier. The point is that if I perceive what a cow as a cow is objectively, i.e., as cowness possessing, then the cognition of cowness exists at the moment preceding the perception is necessary. I might have perceived what is objectively a cow not as a cow but simply as an animal, or as a white object and so on. In Western philosophy perception is regarded as selective, because the object perceived always possesses almost an infinite richness of properties which cannot be perceived all at once. So every particular act of perception is selective in the sense that a particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property which happens to be present in the self when one perceives the object. But how is the cognition of the particular property to be explained? The property must itself be perceptible object; the object is perceived through the property, but the property itself is perceived not again through a property, but directly. This perception which precedes the perception of the object through a mode, i.e., through a qualifier, is not a perception through a mode, i.e., it is an indeterminate perception. This is the Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this argument by not merely denying the pervasion at (3) which will be, some qualificative cognition is not caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier, but by a stronger assertion that no qualificative cognition is caused in that way. This stronger assertion the opponent proves by examining different types of qualificative cognition. He examines perception, inference, verbal knowledge, analogy, recognition and the visual perception that

a piece of sandal wood is fragrant. We shall presently explain the opponent's argument case by case.

But he proves also a general theory that no qualificative cognition is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. His general argument is as follows:

A qualificative cognition is really a cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand without a cognition of a relation between them. A qualificative cognition is one cognition about two objects. Both the objects, namely, the qualificand and the qualifier are perceived. There are causes which produce the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand. When the totality of these causes is present one ought to have two cognitions of the qualifier and the qualificand. But because there is mutual expectancy between the qualifier and the qualificand, there is only one qualificative cognition resulting from the totality of causes.

Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains that if a qualificative cognition was about a relation (between the qualifier and the qualificand) when the qualifier by being a term of the relation of the qualificative cognition has to be cognized prior to the qualificative cognition.²¹ For it is not possible to know a relation without knowing its terms. Hence, the opponent denies the cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition, by using the concept of expectancy.

Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the concept of expectancy thus. Two objects have expectancy in the sense that there is absence of cognition of their non-relatedness. If there are two objects but we do not cognize their unrelatedness, then we shall have one cognition of one object qualified by the other.²² He gives a second interpretation of expectancy which some other philosophers propose. Two objects have expectancy if and only if they are related as as limitor and limited. The point is that in the Nyāya interpretation of a qualificative cognition, where there is a cognition of a relation, the qualifier and the qualificand of the qualificative cognition are correlatives; i.e., the property of being the qualifier determines the property of being the qualificand

and vice-versa, they are not the limiter and the limited of each other. The opponent's position is that two objects having expectancy are cognized in one qualificative cognition by being objects of one cognition without any relation between them being cognized. They are yet objects of one cognition. The problem is to explain the unity of the cognition of two objects having expectancy. The problem is solved by postulating that of the two objects being cognized in one cognition, one becomes the limiter and the other the limited by the limiter. So, the opponent explains a qualificative cognition without postulation a prior indeterminate cognition of the qualifier. When we have cognition of a cow as cowness-possessing, there is really one cognition of two unconnected objects, namely, the cow and cowness. But because cow and cowness have expectancy there is one cognition of the cow as cowness-possessing.

Now the opponent proves his conclusion that in no case a qualificative cognition is caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier by examining different cases of determinate perception. He first explains how a determinate perception can be explained without postulating a prior cognition of the qualifier as a cause. When we perceive a cow as cowness-possessing, the cowness is as much perceptible as the cow. As there is an epistemic relation between the visual sense organ and the cowness it becomes perceived when we perceive a cow in determinate perception.

In inference for oneself the conclusion is always a qualificative cognition. For example, when we infer the hill, as fire-possessing, fire is the qualifier and the hill is the qualificand of the qualificative cognition. This inference for oneself requires two cognitions as its causes :

- (a) First we have to cognize with certainty that smoke is pervaded by fire (i.e. wherever there is smoke there is fire).
- (b) Then we have to perceive the hill as smoke-possessing (i.e., the hill has smoke on it).

(c) By combining these two cognitions we get a doubly qualificative cognition of the form – the hill possesses smoke pervaded by fire. This is a doubly qualificative cognition because the hill is qualified by smoke which is qualified by pervasion by fire. To cognize a pervasion which is a relation between a pervader and a pervaded, it is necessary to cognize both under certain modes. The mode under which the pervader is cognized is called ‘the limitor of being the pervader’ and the mode under which the pervaded is cognized is called the limitor of being pervaded’. In the above example, fireness is the limitor of the pervadeness and smokeness is the limitor of the pervadedness. This is because the pervasion is a relation between smoke as smoke and fire as fire. In (b) we have to cognize the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference which is the hill in this example. Now it is argued by Nyāya philosophers that we can conclude that the hill is fire-possessing only when we cognize fireness. For to cognize fire as fire we have to cognize fire as the locus of fireness. But fireness is to be cognized under no mode at all, i.e., in indeterminate perception. Thus to infer the conclusion, one has to cognize the limitor of the pervadeness in indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this explanation and offers another which avoids indeterminate perception of the qualifier. His explanation is that in the conclusion we cognize fire under the mode of fireness which is the limitor of the pervadeness on the strength of the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference. The point is that there is no need to postulate an indeterminate perception, for when we cognize the pervasion as a relation between the pervader and the pervaded we have to cognize them under their modes; so the pervader is cognized as that which is qualified by the limitor of pervaderness. So

fireness is cognized as the qualifier of fire on the basis of the presence of smoke in the hill.

In cognizing the meaning of a word, the object has to be cognized under a mode which is the limiter of being meant by the word. The Nyāya argument is that we can cognize the meaning of word 'cow' only as that which is qualified by cowness. Anyone who does not have a prior cognition of cowness cannot cognize the meaning of the word 'cow'. It may be argued that cowness can be cognized only in a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent rejects this argument by pointing out a novel qualifier previously not cognized becomes cognized as the limiter of being meant by a word because of semantic fitness etc. It is the word which by its semantic power reveals new qualifiers not previously cognized at the time one cognizes the meaning of a word. A word can mean an object only under a mode; so the mode is part of the meaning of word. The object is what is meant; the mode is the limiter of meantness residing in what is meant by the word.

So also in analogy, cognition of the qualifier is not a cause of a qualified cognition. For analogy is the cognition of the meaning of a word on the basis of perceived similarity. It has been already shown that in the case of cognition of word meaning, a prior cognition of the qualifier is not necessary.

In recognition also the case is the same. In recognition of the form 'this is that Devadatta' the cognition of thatness is presupposed. For 'that' means Devadatta as perceived earlier. So it might appear that the cognition of thatness is presupposed in recognition. The opponent, however, points out that past cognition of thatness cannot be a cause, for the past cognition cannot continue as a cognition, but is present in the self in the form of an impression (*samskāra*) of the past cognition. If this memory impression is not recalled or is erased, then there is no recognition. This proves that it is the activated impression which is an auxiliary factor functioning with the sense organ as the epistemic relation between the sense organ and the qualifier in order to produce the cognition of the

qualifier. As the cognition of the qualifier is thus perceptual in nature, this cognition cannot be presupposed as its cause. This cognition is determinate perception and not indeterminate.

According to Nyāya, we have visual perception of a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. This is a special type of perception (*alaukika*). For it a prior knowledge of fragrance is necessary which can only be obtained by olfactory perception. A person who did not have this prior olfactory perception could not have perceived visually a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. The opponent points out that even in this case there is no need to postulate any indeterminate perception, for the cognition of fragrance acts merely as epistemic relation and is an auxiliary factor in the functioning of the visual sense organ.

Nyāya admits illusory perception and explains it in terms of a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent who is a Mīmāṃsaka does not admit any illusory perception at all. According to him, the so-called illusory perception is not one qualificative cognition but is really a couple of cognitions of different types not distinguished by the knower.

“Ucayate. Sādhyaprasiddhi-padārthopasthiti – vācyāvajñāna-tattvānubhavanām anumityādihetuvam. Sādhyaprasiddhyādikaṃ vinā anumityāderasambhāvāt. Sādhyādikaṃ ca viśeṣanamiti tajñānanumityādihetuh. Yadyapi anumityādipratyekaṃ prati sādhyādi-viśeṣañjñānatvena na kāraṇatā. Tathāpi viśiṣṭa-jñānamātramprati viśeṣañjñānatvena kāraṇatā, vādhakabhāvat”. *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyaksapariccheda, 2/11.*

It is said (by me in reply). It may be said that the cognition of the probandum (prior to its cognition in the conclusion), memory of what is meant by a word, cognition of significance, informative cognition of thatness are causes of the inferential conclusion etc. Without a prior cognition of the probandum, etc. no inferential conclusion etc. is possible. The probandum etc., is the qualifier, and its cognition is a cause of the inferential cognition etc.

Although the cause of every particular inference is not the cognition of the probandum etc. as qualifier, yet as a merely qualificative cognition an inference etc. is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, for there is no inconsistency here.

The opponent has argued that in an inferential conclusion, say, of the form (the) hill(is) fire-possessing, where fire is the probandum and is also the qualifier of the locus of the inference, (the) hill, fireness is cognized for the first time in the conclusion on the strength of the presence of the probans (smoke) in the locus (hill), as the limitor of the pervadeness. But Gaṅgeśa points out that the probandum has to be cognized prior to its cognition in the conclusion. If we use the language of Western syllogism to explain Gaṅgeśa's point, the probandum, which very roughly corresponds to the object meant by the major term, must be known in the major premise, prior to being known in the conclusion. Without the major term in the major premise being known the conclusion cannot be drawn.

Now the probandum, fire, is the qualifier in the conclusion – (the) hill (is) fire-possessing, and hence it has to be cognized before the conclusion can be cognized and fire can be cognized only when fireness is cognized.

Rucidatta here points out that the prior cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is not the cause of the conclusion. For the cognition (firm belief) of pervasion as the cognition of pervasion is the cause of the conclusion which follows from it and it is not delayed because cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is delayed. For the cause of the conclusion is the cognition of pervasion as cognition of pervasion, not as cognition of the probandum.²²

Jayadeva Misra states this objection a bit differently. The prior cognition of the probandum is not a cause of the conclusion, but the cognition of pervasion is the cause. Now if it is argued that cognition of pervasion which is a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is not possible without cognizing the probandum, then the cognition of the

probandum becomes a cause of the cognition of pervasion which is a cause of the inferential cognition. But then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of the cognition of pervasiuon which is a cause of the inferential cognition. But then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of a cause of the conclusion, and, hence, is not a cause of the conclusion.²³

Jayadeva Miśra replies to this objection by stating that it is the cognition of pervasion which is the prior cognition of pervasion which is the prior cognition of the probandum. Is not debarred from being a cause of the conclusion.²⁴

Gaṅgeśa replies to the opponent by examining the different cases of qualificative cognition which the opponent discussed. Inference was the first example discussed by the opponent. Hence Gaṅgeśa first of all refutes this objection. After this Gaṅgeśa refutes the objection of the opponent by examining verbal cognition, analogy, recognition in the order in which the opponent discussed them.

The opponent has argued that verbal cognition, where an object is always cognized under a mode, does not require the prior cognition of the mode (qualifier). He has argued that by semantic fitness, the qualifier as limiter of being meant by a word, even a novel property, is cognized. Now Gaṅgeśa points out that cognizing the meaning of a word is impossible without the memory of the object meant by the word. In this memory it is the mode or the qualifier which is present as the cognized object. For example, the meaning of the word 'cow' is whatever possesses cowness. To cognize the meaning of the word 'cow' one has to remember cowness. Hence, in verbal cognition, the cognition of the qualifier must be present antecedently and hence this cognition of the qualifier really functions as a cause of the verbal cognition.

About analogy by which we cognize the meaning of a word on the basis of a perceived similarity between a known and an unknown object. Gaṅgeśa points out that a prior cognition of being meant by the word is necessary.

In the case of recognition of the form 'this is that Devadatta' it is the prior perception of thatness which is a cause of the recognition.

Now the question arises if the cognition of the probandum is a cause of the conclusion which is a qualificative cognition, then how is the theory that the cognition of the qualifier is a cause of qualificative cognition proved? The answer to this question is that the cognition of a conclusion is one type of functions as the cognition of the qualifier in producing this qualificative cognition. The point is that if a specific cause of a specific effect is established, then a general causal connection is also established, if there is no difficulty. This may be explained as follows.

Whenever we want to establish a general causal law, we have to consider only special, particular, instances. For example, if we want to establish the general causal connection between fuel and fire, we cannot get any fuel in general and fire in general; we can have only particular instances of fuel like dried grass, pieces of wood etc. And there is also no general dried grass, too. In one particular instance, we can get only one particular bundle of grass particulars. This being the case, it will be impossible to establish a general causal connection if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities of particular instances. It is, of course, not possible to ignore the particularities in all cases. For example, if an individual, Rāma, is intelligent, because he drinks cow's milk, it will not do to establish a general causal connection between drinking cow's milk and being intelligent. For other factors like heredity, environment etc., of the individual may be causally relevant.

In this case of qualificative cognition, if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities and find out the common general feature, then there will be no cause of qualificative cognition in general. So qualificative cognition will arise from no cause at all, although all particular instances of qualificative cognition like inference, verbal testimony etc., will have special causes like cognition of the probandum etc.

Then a new important problem arises. A qualificative cognition is the cognition of a relation between two cognized objects, the qualificand and the qualifier. But to cognize a relation, it may be contended, it is necessary to cognize both the terms. Gaṅgeśa's argument here is that a determinate perception which is a qualificative cognition is produced by the cognition of only the qualifier. It may be argued that this cognition is necessary but not sufficient, for to cognize a relation it is necessary to cognize both the terms, the qualificand and also the qualifier. It is interesting to note that Viśvanātha in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* asserts that in indeterminate perception both the qualificand and the qualaifier are cognized, although as unrelated.

Āloka, however, refutes this theory, Jayadeva Miśra says that it might be argued that as a relation is determined by both its terms, a cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition must require the cognition of the qualificand just as much as of the qualifier. The answer is that although a relation is between two terms, still it is the second term (*pratiyogīn*) which determines the relation and not the first term (*anuyogīn*). This is enough to explain the meaning of relation words. This becomes clear when we consider such a term as 'colour-possessing' (coloured), which produces the cognition of inherence of colour, not of inherence of things which have the colour. If things are the second terms (*pratiyogins*) of inherence, then there would be at times a cognition of thing-possessing colour. This however, never happens; we always cognize colour-possessing things.

But, then, a question arises about contact as a relation. A cognition of contact requires a cognition of both its terms. The solution is that in perceiving two things related by contact it is the cognition of the second term of the relation which must occur prior to the cognition of the relation. The first term of the relation is cognized at the time of perception when it is epistemically related with the sense-organ. This is because contact like two-ness is *vyāsajvavṛtti* which belongs to both, but not each. So in the cognition of such qualities it is

necessary to cognize both the terms. However, two-ness is not a relation. Rucidatta, too, in his *Prakāśa*, states the solution, but attributes it to "some Nyāya philosophers".

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CHAPTER V

SOME PROBLEMS CONCERNING *NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA*

If we explain the derivation of the word '*nirvikalpaka*', we shall get the following meaning- 'something having no substitute at all.' Normally the concepts through something is expressed are called *vikalpas* or substitutes. An object may sometimes be seen through the spectacle of substitutes or *vikalpas*. Sometimes it may be known directly without via concepts. The bare object or *qua*-object is known in the level of *nirvikalpaka*. 'There is no substitute for this thing' – this type of usage is very common in language of advertisement of an object. From this it is understood that the necessity of this particular object cannot be met by some other objects. That is, there are some essential features (of this object) that are not common in others. The term 'essential' implies its inherent uncommon properties which can be expressed as 'essence'. If there is any opportunity to express the salient features of an object by language etc., it is *savikalpaka* (or determinate). There are two types of awareness: the perceptual awareness being purely private cannot be communicated to others and perceptual awareness though not wholly manifested to us cannot be denied totally. In other words, there is an awareness which is not capable of being expressed with the help of any word. Such type of knowledge is technically known as *Avyapadesya* i.e., that which is not expressed through words. Though there is awareness yet it cannot be expressed in as much as the nature of it is not wholly manifested to one. That is, something is not conceptually manifested to us. If it is asked the reason for it, the answer is that there is no substitute (*vikalpa*). The 'concept' (in the sense of mental construction) of an object becomes a substitute for expressing it. The mental constructions that are borne by 'pure object' are called concepts. Names, colours, universals etc, are borne by an object and, hence, they are called 'concepts' (*dhāraṇā*). The term

'*dhāraṇā*' is related to the phenomenon of 'bearing' (*dhāraṇā*). The name, universal, word etc is the bearers of the *qua*-object. The 'pure object' is called substratum (*ādihāra*) while the 'concepts' are called superstrata (*ādheya*). The concepts serve as substitutes for expressing that 'pure object'. The knowledge having substitute is called *Savikalpaka* while the knowledge bearing no substitute is called *Nirvikalpaka*. The Naiyāyikas accept such type of *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa*. A problem may be raised out of the *Prāmāṇya* of such type of perception and its probable solution that could have been forwarded from the Nyāya point of view.

Ontologically the Naiyāyikas accept the theory of extrinsic truth (*Paratah Prāmāṇya*) of knowledge. According to them, the truth of a piece of cognition is ascertained by virtue of its successful inclination (*samvādipravṛtjanakatva*). If our cognition is efficacious to the successful inclination, it is to be taken as acceptable. There the argument that is involved can be expressed as follows: "The perceptual cognition is acceptable if it becomes efficacious to the successful inclination (*Pratyakṣānubhūtiḥ pramā saphalpravṛtjanakatvāt*)¹. The knowledge of water would be taken as true if it really quenches our thirst. In the like manner, the untenability of our knowledge is determined by the unsuccessful inclination of the same (*visamvādipravṛtjanakatvāt*). If the knowledge of water does not quench our thirst, it is taken to be false. In this way, the truth of each and every knowledge is determined.

Now the problem is how the *Prāmāṇya* (tenability or truth) of *Nirvikalpaka* knowledge can be determined. To Nyāya cognition cannot be taken as true ab initio, as soon as it is produced. Hence some extrinsic means are needed to discover its truth. It is true that indeterminate knowledge is a kind of sensation having no name, universal etc., and hence, there is no relation between qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-samsargānavagāhi*). There are no other means through which the validity of such type of knowledge can be determined as the

two criteria, viz. *Saphalapravrttijanakatva* (capability of causing successful inclination) and *Visamvadipravrttijanakava* (capability of not causing successful inclination) of determining *Prāmānya* are not applicable here. The knowledge which does not cognise the characteristic features of an object is empty due to its non-relational character and hence the search for its empirical necessity or otherwise is in vain. The bare cognition of something without knowing its empirical base cannot help us to determine its truth and falsity. An object of cognition appears in our minds' eye when we see the object. Because, an object without any content is not possible to grasp or apprehend. It may be argued how an object can exist without being characterized by its qualifying features. What is the proof for the existence of such type of object? In reply it can be said that as indeterminate knowledge is knowledge, it must have some object, since knowledge without content (*aviśayaka*) is epistemologically not apprehendable. To know indeterminate cognition as knowledge is to presuppose the existence of a content. According to some Naiyāyikas, the object of knowledge is three fold: *Prakāratā*, *Viśayatā* and *Samsargatā*. In the case of *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* (indeterminate knowledge) there is a special type of *Viśayatā* called *Turiyaviśayatā* (i.e. fourth *Viśayatā*) which is inexplicable in nature.² Hence a problem arises how can the truth of an object be determined extrinsically? Keeping this problem in view perhaps Viśvanātha does not agree to admit the perceptuality of the indeterminate knowledge. The perceptuality of an object having no relation with qualificand and qualifier is, as observed by Viśvanātha, not possible at all.³

The non-relational cognition implies a cognition having no content of its own. Cognition associated with the concepts can easily be judged as true or false through the extrinsic way of knowing. If it is argued that the indeterminate perception may be taken as self-evidently true (*Svataḥ Pramāna*) just as the truth of the injunctions like '*Svargakamo yajeta*' (i.e. one should perform sacrifice as a

means to attain heaven) is taken as self-evidently true, it would go against the Naiyāyika's position since they do not believe in this type of truth achieved through an intrinsic way. The Naiyāyikas have accepted the existence of the indeterminate perception, but they have not given any solution to the problem which lies in indeterminate perception.

A solution of this problem, I think, can be offered from the Nyāya standpoint if all of their views are critically reviewed.

The Naiyāyikas are in favour of the view that a man's action is of three types. When one avoids some object, it is due to one's desire of rejection (*hānabuddhi*). In the case of the acceptance and rejection comes into being due to the result of the desire of being indifferent (*upekṣābuddhi*)⁴. Let us try to understand the case. The knowledge of the conduciveness of an object (*iṣṭāsādhanatājñāna*) generates the desire of acceptance. The knowledge in the form.-'The pine-apple is good for health' is known from the knowledge of the conduciveness of the desired object. If the attainment of good health is desired, the observation of a pine-apple will give rise to the knowledge in the form: 'This is conducive to its being desired' (*idaṁ madīṣṭāsādhanam*). So the knowledge of the conduciveness of being desired gives rise to the knowledge of acceptance from which an effort to avail the object comes into being. That which does not seem to be conducive to me being desired is rejected. This rejection occurs due to the desire for the same.

The above view is put forth by the traditional Nyāya philosophers. In the case of acceptance and rejection I agree with their view. So far as *upekṣā-buddhi* is concerned, I personally agree with them. An object, I think, is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for being indifferent. The indifferent state of mind which is claimed as *upekṣābuddhi* would fall under the category of rejection. That is to say, 'being indifferent' is also a kind of rejection in as much as this

phenomenon also depends on the knowledge of the non-conduciveness of the object. In favour of this argument the following form of *Tarka* (*Reductio-ad-absurdum*) may be put forward: 'Had it been conducive to us, it would have been accepted.' As it seems to us to be non-conducive, it may be ignored, which is also a kind of rejection.

That in the case of *upekṣābuddhi* there is a sense of rejection is evidenced by the fact that a snake is rejected due to having the sense of *aniṣṭasādhanatā*, which is of two types : the knowledge of an object which is capable of doing harm and the knowledge of the absence of the usefulness of an object. In the case of the former, the Naiyayikas have accepted the knowledge of *hāna* (rejection) but in the latter case there is *upekṣābuddhi* as the object does not serve our purpose nor does it any harm to us.

The above-mentioned notion of 'sense of indifference' (*upekṣābuddhi*), I think, is not at all *upekṣā* in as much as it is in our awareness that the object does not serve our purpose and hence it may be ignored. This ignorance (in the sense of indifference) is not at all *upekṣā* in the true sense of the term, but it is also rejection as it is done keeping the knowledge of the absence of its conduciveness in view. *Upekṣā*, in the true sense of term, is possible in the case of an object if there is absolute negation of the sense of conduciveness or non-conduciveness. If an individual be indifferent towards an object as it does not suit him, it is a rejection (which is put in disguise of *upekṣā*). The real *upekṣā* emerges when we have no consideration of such *iṣṭa* (*desirability*) or *aniṣṭa* (*undesirability*) which is determined in terms of our attachment. To a seer the whole world is not at all the object of attachment and hence he becomes indifferent. Moreover, an object is not manifested as such to a seer, but it is manifested as the Divine. The true nature of the object is beyond his awareness as his mind is connected (*yukta*) with the Divine on account of which the indifferent state is possible. This indifferent attitude is *upekṣā* in the true sense of the term in as much as this state does not

arise out of the sense of *laukika iṣṭasādhanatā* (conduciveness to the desire for an ordinary object).

From the above discussion it is concluded that there is no scope for *upekṣāsādhanatā* (the means of providing indifferent attitude). How did the *Naiyāyikas* insert it as one of the three types of *Buddhi*? What is the exact state of mind when there is *upekṣābuddhi*? In response to this one solution can be given in the following manner. It may be said that when an object is not endowed with name, universal, definition etc., there does not arise any question of accepting or rejecting it. In this situation alone, *upekṣābuddhi* arises. The acceptibility or rejectibility of a particular object is not determined due to the lack of its determinator i.e., knowledge of conduciveness or otherwise which depends on the *Savikalpaka* knowledge of it. At this stage *upekṣābuddhi* comes into being. This type of knowledge which is known as *Avyapadeśya* or *Nirvikalpaka* is the producer of *upekṣābuddhi*.

Another argument may be forwarded in favour of the acceptability or tenability of *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The *Naiyāyikas* are of the opinion that an object, just after its coming into being remains attributeless and actionless for a moment.⁵ If substance (*Dravya*) and attribute (*Guṇa*) are produced simultaneously, substance cannot be antecedent and hence, it cannot be inherent cause (*Samavāyi Kāraṇa*) of the attribute (*Guṇa*). That is why; attribute and action are accepted to be produced just after a moment of the origination of *Dravya*. Let us see whether the indifferent attitude towards an object is possible for a moment. It is true that an object may remain without attribute and action. An object may be described as effect (*Kārya*) by virtue of the fact that it is produced. That which is *Kārya* must exist, for as per the *Nyāya* view 'an object is produced' means the prior-absence (*Prāgabhāva*) of it is lost and hence, it becomes an absentee of its prior absence (*Prāgabhāvapratiyogī*).

So it is shown that an object exists, but due to its attributelessness it does not come to our direct awareness and hence, it cannot be rejected or accepted.

In this context it would not be completely irrelevant to point out that each and every object is recognised in the light of the impression generated in the pervious experience. In order to recognise an object at least one moment is essential. In order to recognise a jar as such the previous experience of it is to be recollected. The recollection needs at least one moment and through this a jar is recognised or known as such. During one moment the jar is not known as such and hence, it remains indeterminate to us. As the object is indeterminate only for this small period of time, the *upekṣābuddhi* towards this object arises. Through the experience of *upekṣābuddhi* the tenability of indeterminate perception can be determined and this is the extrinsic way of determining its truth (*Parataḥ prāmānya*). The forms of the argument leading to it would be as follows: 'The indeterminate perceptual knowledge is true as it can produce the indifferent knowledge towards it' (*Nirvikalpakapratyaksānubhūtiḥ pramā upekṣābuddhijanakatvāt*). Here the *Sādhyā* i.e., the acceptability of indeterminate perceptual knowledge is inferred on the strength of the *Hetu* i.e., being the producer of *upekṣābuddhi* (*upekṣābuddhijanakatvāt*).

For the existence of the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the Buddhists argument may be recalled. To them cognition free from mental constructions (*kalpanāpodha*) is a perceptual one. In this case the Buddhists believe in the existence of an object which is free from mental ascriptions as well as non-erroneous (*Kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). The Nyāya concept of *nirvikalpaka* is also free from the concepts, but it cannot be said as non-erroneous (*abhrānta*). Because, in order to understand its validity or truth we need certain extrinsic proof behind it, which is not possible. The indeterminate cognition is taken to be supersensuous and hence cannot be assigned any truth-value to it. It is very difficult to say that this piece of knowledge is either true or

false due to not having a holistic cognition (*vaiśiṣṭya*) abiding in two components-qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣana*). Truth and falsity is available only in the case of relational cognition, but not in the indeterminate cognition which is of non-relational nature. Some think that the indeterminate cognition lies there where the two components, *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana*, remain in a non-relational manner without being bound by a relation (*samsarga-anavagāhi*). If it is admitted, it will lead to another type of contradiction. If *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* remain without any relation, the *viśeṣya* or *viśeṣana* cannot be known as such. For, it is relation through which we can know the relata. If there is no relation then there cannot be any relatum like qualificand or qualifier. The existence of such indeterminate cognition has to be admitted as a logical necessity only to avoid the *Infinite Regress* in the case of determinate cognition (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*).

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- *Muktāvali-samgrahah* on *Siddhāntamuktāvali* (Edited by Pt. Panchanan Bhattacharya), p. 280.
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4. "Yada jñānam tadā hānopadānopēkṣābuddhayaḥ phalam."

- Vatsyāyanabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.3.

5. "Dravyasya guṇakriyāsamaavāyikāraṇavāi guṇakriyayorvipattēh prak
tatsattvam. Atā evotpannam dravyam kṣānamagnam tīstihāti niyamah."

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