

● Chapter 3

Components of Language

3.0 Components of Language (viz. Syntax, Semantics, Phonology & Morphology)

Linguistics, which can be either theoretical or applied, is the scientific analysis of language. Linguists are those who are involved in this study. Some linguists try to define languages by exploring their histories in order to find out the universal properties of languages. Theoretical linguistics constitutes with some sub-fields, such as the study of language structure or syntax, meaning (semantics) etc. The study of grammar encompasses with morphology, syntax, phonology etc. According to the concept of 20th century philosophers, linguistics is basically defined the phonology, grammar (morphology, syntax) and semantics.

The field of linguistics can be classified into the following four branches:-

Syntax

Syntax is conceived as the study of how words combine to form grammatical sentences. It discusses the manner in which such words being found as arranged and related to each other in order to form sentences expressing the complete thought. In linguistics, the word 'Syntax' is the study of the rules, or "patterned relations" that govern the way that how the words in a sentence come together. Syntax is a kind of rules that define

the structure of a programming language. These rules specify how the words, symbols, and punctuations are used to form a statement. In all languages, sentences are structured in certain specific ways. What is syntactic structure? Are sentences structured? As many other questions it can be posed about human language. It is difficult to answer the questions in any direct form. In fact, it is impossible to answer the question 'what is structure?' Without actually constructing a theory of syntax, we cannot define the concept of structure.

Semantics

Semantics is the study of the meaning of words, phrases and sentences. In the field of linguistics, semantics is generally considered to be the study of meaning (and related notions) in languages, whereas in the field of logic, it is generally considered to be the study of linguistic reference or *denotation* and *truth conditions* in languages. Semantics is the process of adding rules of meaning, which means that the symbols are given meaning by way of reference. It is concerned with meaning in signs (words and sentences), especially languages and it directly affects philosophy and logic, and we must study its history and development as well as the biological facts whereby language is communicated. It deals with the changes and development of the meanings including, in its ultimate aim, the discussion of the way in which the earliest meanings can be attached to words. Semantics may also denote the theoretical study of meaning in systems of signs. Semantics is of course a part of linguistics, which is the study of languages, and this turns out to be a very complicated business, because there is a variety of different ways of languages.

Phonology

Phonetics-Phonology-Phoneme

Phonetics:

Phonetics is the subject of vocal sounds used in language systems. It is the study of the physical aspects of sounds of human utterances. It includes an explanation of the physiological mechanism of the lungs, throat, mouth and nose and also of the ear. The sounds, producible by the human voice can be studied comprehensively by several approaches, of which two are useful for our phonetic study. They are articulatory phonetics and acoustic phonetics. In articulatory phonetics the human physiology is studied, and in acoustic phonetics the physics of the sounds.

Phonology:

Phonology is the study of patterns of a language's sounds. Phonology deals with speech sounds, their physical production and their history. It is concerned with the sounds actually made by the human voice, and an analysis of these sounds into different types. Phonology involves the consideration of meanings. Therefore it pertains to the classification of the sounds of a language into those units of sound called phonemes, which operate in making the essential perceptual distinctions between the possible utterances of a language.

Phoneme:

A sound utterance in human language is composed of discrete parts, the smallest of which are called phonemes. There are approximately 40 phonemes in English, slightly more than the average number across all human languages. Examples of

such phonemes in English include the vowels (aa-ee-ii-oo-uu) and consonants such as (p,d,...). Not all languages share the same phonemic structure. The sound pattern has to be decoded in order to understand a language. We learn to associate a sound pattern with a particular phoneme that exists in the native language to which we are exposed as infants. The human infant is born with the ability to decode any human language, which is to transform the analogue or continuous gradations in sound properties into one of a particular set of phonemes. Phonemes are the atoms, or building blocks, from which words and sentences are constructed. Phonemes are not simply strung together like beads on a wire to form words, even though they are vocalized in such a temporal sequence. There are apparent rules that govern how phonemes are combined into smaller and larger groups (such deeper innate structure, as is described of a sequence of phonemes that can be produced in isolation: the beginning of the syllable is the onset and what comes thereafter is the rime. The onset is usually a group of consonant and the rime is the vowel and any other consonants. Even though we could make several types of sounds through our vocal organs, each language has only a few sounds, which bear a significant role in the determination of meaning. For example in Sanskrit 'Ka' and 'Sa' have distinction of their sounds as in *Kūpa: sūpa, Kāma: śāma, Kāla : śāla*, etc. Similarly in English p and b have distinctions of their sounds as in pin: bin, cap: cab, prim: brim, napping: nabbing. Whereas in the utterance of t in the words tone and stone, even though there is a phonetic difference of the former being aspirated and the latter unaspirated, we do not difference of the former being aspirated and the latter

unaspirated, we do not differentiate them because they do not contribute any difference in meaning.

Morphology

Morphology is the study of the internal structure of words. Morphology treats the formation of words or word building by the union of the separate constituent parts. All languages have words and in all languages some words, at least, have an internal structure, and consist of one or more morphemes. Thus, the form of books comprises the root morpheme "book" to which is added the suffix morpheme "s" indicating plural. In this several modifications are involved such as declension, conjugation, compound-formation, etc.

In linguistics, syntax is distinguished from morphology, or the theory of the construction of words out of minimal units of significance, only some of which are words. According to this division, it is a matter of morphology that the word *solubility* decomposes into "dissolve" + "able" + "ity"; but it is a matter of syntax to analyze the construction of the sentence, "That substance is able to dissolve." Although syntax is a traditional grammatical topic, it was only with the rise of formal methods growing out of the study of mathematical logic that the subject attained sufficient explicitness to be studied in depth, in works by Zelig Harris (1957) and Noam Chomsky (1957). Since then a flourishing field has been created; for it was rapidly discovered that the syntax of human languages was far more complex than at first appeared. In this respect, the development of syntax is comparable to other fields of cognitive science such as human vision, problem-solving capacities, and the organization of commonsense knowledge, all of which gave rise to difficult

problems once the goal of fully explicit representation was put in place.

3.0.1 In Pāṇini's philosophy

Pāṇini was concerned himself with the syntactical, morphological, and phonological description of Sanskrit. He has also given due consideration to pronunciation, which is an important characteristic of any spoken language.

Pāṇini's goal was to provide, adequately, a well-described grammar for Sanskrit. His aim was not to analyse the language semantically, rather in syntactic structure. He maintains that the basic formal features of language are phonological, morphological and syntactic. The semantic content is the secondary element, which depends on the others. Pāṇini's work is to simply picture the events of the physical and non-physical world. Pāṇini's *Ad* is written in the *sūtra* style¹, which represents a particular type of style in the *Sanskrit* literature. His goal was to provide an adequate descriptive grammar for *Sanskrit* and not to make a semantic analysis of the language. As a result, Pāṇini focused only on deriving grammatically correct phrases and sentences, not on the derivational process, involving a number of syntactical, morphological and phonological operations. Thus, Pāṇini's *Ad* is primarily known as *derivational Grammar*.

Following the rules of his grammar, we can analyze the language or sentences by *dhātu* (verb), *pratyayas* (suffix), *kāraṅkas* (*kartā* and *karma*) etc. It is said that all words are to be

¹ The definition of *sūtra* is follows:

*alpāksaram asandigdham sāravad viśvatomukham/
aṣṭobhañ anavadyam ca sūtram sūtravido viduḥ||*

analyzable into atomic elements 'root' or bases and affixes or inflection –better known in Sanskrit as *dhātu* and *pratyaya*. Pāṇini is a grammarian of the sentence and he deals with syntactic relations between certain kinds of sentences. In his grammar, the words (*padas*) never stand in their absolute and isolated position. His division of the word into *Śabda* and *pada* is also an aid to syntax. A *Śabda* is a meaningful unit no doubt but it cannot be used in a sentence unless it acquires the status of a *pada* by adding nominal and verbal suffixes to it, and with the additions of nominal and verbal suffixes its function in a sentence becomes fixed and precise. A sentence, in his philosophy, is accompanied by a word qualifying the verbal activity. Thus, a verb with such a word makes a sentence ef. *Sa kriyā viśeṣaṇam ceti vaktavyam* (MB. Ad.II.1.1. VK.9) e.g. *Suṣṭhu Pacati*. Cf. also *Ekārtha padasamūho Vākyam* (KK. On AP. VIII.1.8). Pāṇini has used a technical term 'kāraka' to denote anything that contributes towards the fruition of an action. The word *kāraka*, is derived from the verbal root *Kṛ* meaning "do" by adding the genitive suffix *ṛvul* (*aka*), meaning is that 'one who does' (*karoti iti Kārakam*).

Pāṇini divides compounds into four classes: *avyayībhāva*, *tatpuruṣa*, *bahuvrīhi* and *dvandva*. The *tatpuruṣa* class is very wide embracing several types of compounds exhibiting contrasting features; but they are all grouped into a single class to the technical advantage of the grammarian. Pāṇini names a certain type of *tatpuruṣa* as the *karmadhāraya*, which is treated by some later grammarians, as a separate class. The *dvigu* is a subclass of the *karmadhāraya*. For further convenience of illustration, compounds are subdivided on the basis of the form of the members or their meanings-

e.g. *viśeṣaṇapūrvapada-*
karmadhāraya, viśeṣaṇottarapada-karmadhāraya,
upamānapūrvapada-karmadhāraya, nañtatpuruṣa, etc.

Let us define a syntactically formulated sentence, where Pāṇini has used Natural or inherent (logical) relations between things and events of the real world symbolised by linguistic expressions. 'Devadatta falls from the Chariot or (*ratha*)', is the actual sentence, here, according to Pāṇini, the nominal stem is *ratha* (chariot) stands in ablative relation with the verbal stem \sqrt{pat} (fall). He formulated this sentence as '*rathāt Devadatta patati*'. He mentions 'the fixed one in relation to the act of recession is the case known as *apādāna* (ablative); cf. *dhruvamapāyeapādānam* (*Ad.I.4.24*). By formulating his characterisation of ablative in the above manner he gives recognition to the fact that language does not function in a vacuum, in the closed system of its units. He discovers that nominal stems co-occurring with a particular verb, can be subsumed under one class on the basis of common role played by entities indicated by them in relation to the action denoted by the class of verb stems.

According to Pāṇini, the affix "cvi" comes after a word when the agent has attained to the new state expressed by the word, what the thing previously was not and when the roots *kṛ* (to make), *bhū* (to be) are conjoined with 'it'.² Thus we get "*aśuklaḥ śuklaḥ sampadyate tam karoti= śuklikaroti.*" In the same way, there can be a form '*gorbhavati*' from *agor gaursampadyate go'bhavat* (some one who is not a cow has attained to the state of a cow, he became a cow). Now, some

² Pāṇini, *Ad*, V.4.5

one like a *Bāhika* can become a cow only when cow-ness is attributed to him. In other words the meaning of the word 'gauḥ' is secondary (*gauṇa*) in that context. In '*śuklibhavati*', on the other hand, something, which is not white, can become white in a real sense (*uttarāvasthā vastusatyaiva-Puṇyarāja*). Therefore the meaning of the word '*śukla*' is not secondary. The grammatical significance of 'gauḥ' in the example quoted above being considered as conveying a secondary meaning is that it will not have the designation of 'pragṛhya' (as required by Pāṇini I.1.15 in association with I.4.61, which respectively say that a *nipāta* which ends in the vowel 'o' will be known as 'pragṛhya' and 'ūrī' and 'ḍāc' when in association with verbs will be known as *gatis*). This is because between primary and secondary meanings of a word it is with reference to the primary meaning that grammatical operations apply to the word. Here a question might be arises that if grammatical operations take place only on such words as are used as conveying their primary meaning then how do the *sūtras* VI.1.90 and VI. 1.93 operate in regard to the words like "go" as is evident in the resultant forms in sentence like '*gaurbāhikasti ṣṭhati*' and '*gām bāhikamānaya*' respectively when obviously the word is used in its secondary sense. The answer to this question is that the statement about grammatical operations not taking place in regard to words which convey a secondary meaning applies only where words are concerned as distinct from *prātipadikas*, for instance to 'go', which with the change of the vowel 'o' into 'au' becomes 'gauḥ' in the sentence '*gaurbāhikastiṣṭhati*'. Similar is the 'a' in accordance to VI. 1.93 in such examples like '*gām bāhikamānaya*'. There are several other criteria in his attempt to achieve a total accountability of linguistic data.

Pāṇini was not led away by semantic considerations, but he has used them in his grammar so far as they do not go against formal considerations. He provides rules to derive the verbal and nominal forms through affixation, conditioned in part by the semantics categories. The fact is that Pāṇinī clearly understood the importance of semantic features in grammatical analysis, involving only formal features. Pāṇini made use of semantic components to distinguish members of groups semantically related when this required for the accurate description of the data, e.g. domestic animals that are not young, a thing that is not concrete.³

Pāṇini made use of semantic aspects in his grammar in three main ways (Proceeding of the International Seminar on studies in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, " Pāṇini's Uses of Semantics" P.S. Subrahmanyam, P. 127-128, University of Pune.)

1. Pāṇini has used semantic concepts, i.e. *vartamāna* (present time), *bahutva* (plurality) as a starting point in his grammar to derive the corresponding phonological forms by a series of replacement rules.
2. He has used semantic concepts for grouping words and stems to form class system (for example, *varṇa* 'color words').
3. The shades of meaning were conveyed by the whole derived words (consisting of the root and suffixes or compound).

³ S. Iyer, (1982), *Pāṇini's Use of Semantics in the proceedings of the International Seminar on Pāṇini*, Pune Vidyapeeth, p. 128.

In addition, Pāṇini utilised semantic markers to distinguish members of groups of semantically related words when this is required for the correct description of the data.

1. Domestic animals (*paśu*) P. 2.4.7
2. Tree (*vṛkṣa*) P. 2.4.12
3. Grain (*dhānya*) P. 2.4.12

Thus, it can be said that Pāṇini's use of semantic aspects of the word was limited to the derivation of correct forms, and therefore can be called as secondary. Meaning is a reciprocal relation between word and sense, which enables them to call up each other. Generally speaking the connotations or meanings of words develop from basis. So, one might say that each form has only one form.

In the time of Pāṇini, there were some other grammarians who held the opinion, that the meaning of a word is determined, if a compound word, then by its principal word; and if a derivative word, then by the suffix. Pāṇini controverts this opinion by declaring that inasmuch as the meaning of a word is fixed by usage and idiom, therefore the proofs for the meaning of a word are not to be searched either in the affixes which go to form it; or by its principal word, if it is a compound. Pāṇini considers that the proof of the meaning of a word is something else, which is to say in the usage of a people and not in the suffixes. A person, who has never heard the name of grammar, understands fully when told to bring a *Rāja-puruṣa*. He brings an official and not a king, nor even any person in general. Similarly when told to bring an *oupagau* he brings a cowherd's child, not a cowherd, nor a child in general, nor both. Therefore, when the sense of a word is determined by usage, there is no use to strive to find out the sense by grammatical rules.

Pāṇini observes that without semantic consideration, it is not adequate enough to account all the facts of the language. He needs to seek some other basis to encompass them. He accordingly introduces several other criteria in his attempt to achieve total accountability of linguistic data, which in any case, is the minimum and legitimate demand on a linguistic theory. He next turns to meaning. He recognises appropriate semantic categories to establish case relations (in a sentence) in certain environments. In relation with the verbal stems meaning 'fear', 'protect' etc. the source of fear is the case known as ablative; cf. *Bhirāthānām bhayahetuḥ* (Ad. I.4.25). e.g. *caura* (thief) in *caurebhyorakṣati* 'he protects (him) from thieves' and *vṛka* (wolf) in *Vṛkāḍ bibheti* 'fears the wolf'. Similarly, cf. *Vāraṇārthānāmīpsitaḥ* (Ad.I.4.27) e.g. *Yava* (barley) *inyavebhyo gām vārayati* 'he keeps off the cow from the barely field. 'The person whose sight one wishes to avoid is called ablative-case; cf. *antarddhau yenādarśanamicchati* (Ad.I.4.28) e.g. *adyāpaka* (teacher) in *adyāpakān niliyate*, 'he avoids the sight of the teacher', i.e. he does not wish to be seen by the teacher. Also, 'the teacher is ablative in relation to the verbal stems signifying regular teaching c.f. *ākhyātopa yoga* (Ad. I.4.29) e.g. *adyāpākad adhite* 'he receives regular instructions from a teacher'. Likely, in relation to verbal stems meaning 'like' one that is being pleased is known at dative-case; c.f. *rucyarthānām priyāmanaḥ* (Ad.I.4.33) e.g. *Yajñadatta in Yajñadattāya rocate śaṣkulī* 'The cake please Yajñadatta i.e. 'Yajñadatta likes cake'.

According to Pāṇini, the word *agni* means a name or named and a particular or a universal. If the word *agni* means the form *agni* in grammar, then it is both a name (*Saḍjñā*) and a named or meaning (*Saḍjñī*).

Pāṇini says (VIII 1.28) that a finite verb in a sentence will be unaccented provided a word which is not a finite verb precedes it and the two are in the same sentence (*sāmānavākya*). Now according to Kātyāyana, a sentence can have only one finite verb (*ekaṅtin*). According to this definition, a sentence like 'yam daṅdo harānena' 'this stick, with this take' is really two sentences, since after 'danda' there is the verb 'asti' understood. Hence the verb 'hara' is accented, since 'ayam danda hara anena' are also two sentences, it having two finite verbs, there is consequently no *sāmānavākyatva*.

There are some other words e.g. *rūḍhi*, whose meanings are not derived etymologically but are conventionally fixed. "Tailapāyikā", does not mean "a woman who drinks oil" as the explanation of the word from the component words (*taila*-oil, *pāyika*- a woman who drinks) may lead one to believe. Therefore, the word *taila-pāyika* means a 'cockroach'. For him the construction of sentence such as *agnina siñcati, puṣpāṇo devadattaḥ*, although semantically illogical, though these are grammatically correct sentences.⁴

As regards the concept of semantic in Pāṇinian philosophy, Cardona states, 'it is possible though not completely exact to say that Pāṇini's definitions of *kāraḥ* are set up on the semantic level'.⁵ There are six kinds of *kāraḥ* in number such as *apadāna, sampradāna, karaṇa, adhikaraṇa, karman, kartṛ*. A subtype of agent called *hetu* is also introduced. He does not consider *hetu* as a separate case. In the case system, the position of 'activity' (linguistically represented by a verbal stem) is fundamental. These relations are spun around it. An 'activity'

⁴ Cardona, George.(1975), *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,P. 155-58.

⁵ *Ibid.* p.218.

entails an agent or *kartā*, one who performs it and a place, location (*adhikaraṇa*) where it is performed. Besides, some activities involve an instrument, a mean (*karaṇa*) with or by which it is desired to be achieved through that activity by the agent; while some in addition may require a recipient (*sampradāna*), one who is benefited by it. Some activities denote mere separation, recession (*apādana*) of an object from another. After assigning the *kāraṅkas* in different operations Pāṇini has also assigned different cases to recognise the *kāraṅkas* from *prathamā* to *saptami* excluding *ṣaṣṭhi*. The change in the surface level does not affect in passive and active voice in deep structure level.

Pāṇini's treatment of phonetics, phonology and morphology is so complete and exhaustive that it leaves nothing to be desired. Syntactic constructions also are responsible for certain phonological changes. Pāṇini tries to connect the semantic level with the phonetic level starting from the former. The *visarjanīya* of words ending in *is* or *us* is optionally changed into *Ṣ* before voiceless velars and labials provided the two words stand in a synthetic construction, cf. *isusoh sāmārthye* (Ad.VIII 3.44) e.g. *sarpis karotisarpis karoti* (optionally) "makes clarified butter", *Yajus Karoti*-> *Yajus-Karoti*" composes *Yajas* "S optionally replaced by *Ṣ* insyand" flow after *anu*, *vi*, *pari*, *abhi* and *ni* if the subject of syand is not an animate being; cr. *Anu vi abhi nibhyah syandate aprāniṣu* (Ad. VIII 3.72) e.g. *anusyandatetailam* "the Oil flows" but *anusyandate matsy udake* " the fish floats in the water". For the *n* of *kān*, **ru* is substituted before an *āmredita* (the second member of a reiterative), cr. *Kānāmredite* (Ad.VIII 3.12) eg. *Kās Kān āmantrayate* "whom does he invite"?

Pāṇini's treatment of accent (*svarāghāta*) is a remarkable contribution in his philosophy. From the internal evidence of the *Ad*, it seems that Pāṇini had taught the *Ad* to his students with a proper sense of accent. Now the question arises why it disappeared later. Many arguments can be put forward in this connection. The major argument in this regard, in the opinion of the researcher here, is the lack of Vedic studies. In Pāṇini's time Vedic studies rested on a high pedestal. Accent plays a major role in Vedic studies. Vedic studies are generally considered difficult due to their technical nature. From Pāṇini onward, people left the Vedic studies and turned to studies of classical languages where accent has not much to do, and language is free from variation of tone or pitch. Classical Sanskrit marks no accent and there is hardly any involvement of difference of stress.

Pāṇini takes into consideration both linguistic and non-linguistic factors. Language, it seems according to him, functions not within the narrow confines of its units but rather within the much larger and broader context of man's entire world. Any factor from this totality of environments could be operating on the linguistic system. Pāṇini has given due recognition to this fact while presenting a description of Sanskrit. However, occasionally both linguistic and non-linguistic factors jointly might be operative. For instance, in a compound *n* of *vana* "forest" changes optionally to *ṇ* after the words that denote verb, *oṣadhi*, or forest tree, *Vanaṣpati*, provided other phonological factors that effect such change are present there, cf. *Vibhāṣā Oṣadhi Vanaspatibhyaḥ* (*Ad.* VIII.4.6). Thus we have *śirīśavanam- śirīśa-vaṇam* "a forest of *śirīśa* trees", *dūrvāvanam- dūrvā-vaṇam* "a thicket of *dūrvā* grass". Here the necessary

conditioning phonological factors mentioned in *raṣābhyām no nah samāna pade, aṭ kupuāñ num vyavāye api* (Ad. VIII.4-1.2) are present, but it is the presence of the *śirīśa* and *dūrvā* that makes the change optional. Such conditioning factors could be very complex also.

Pāṇinī reduced almost all the grammatical notions to the level of morphemes. For instance, from the Pāṇinian point of view, concepts such as person, tense and case are nothing but a set of suffixes expressing these ideas. For example, his declaration, *Tiṅasrīṇi trīṇi prathamamadhyamottamāḥ* (P.1.4.101)

3.0.2 In Bhartṛhari's philosophy

Bhartṛhari's contribution to language-theory is very much remarkable and real in nature. Syntax, semantic and phonology these are the three components, which he describes as the characters of language. The semantic-syntactico studies of the language are the stepping-stone towards the realisation of Ultimate Reality i.e. *Śabdabrahman*. Among the grammarians, Bhartṛhari is mostly concerned with establishing the authority of grammar. He accepts grammar as a means to comprehend the total reality of things, which is of the nature of the purest light. His basic principle is that *vyākaraṇa* (grammar) is intimately connected with the Ultimate Reality, i.e. *Śabdabrahman*. Bhartṛhari in *VP*, describes grammar as the "purifier of all sciences."⁶ Without Grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*) we can never know

⁶ *VP*. I.14

*Taddvāramapavargasya vāñ malānāñ cikitsitam/
pabitrañ sarvavidhānāmadhividharñ prakāśate//*

the reality or *Śabdatattva*, this is true even for a single word.⁷ It is through the use of correct forms of language-as defined by the Grammarians-that different kinds of knowledge can be obtained. The grammar, when heard, brings to our mind at once the categories of words like parts of Speech (namely noun, verb, particle, pronoun, preposition, adverb, interjection and conjunction) or the normative rules defining the linguistic forms like root and suffix or rules ordaining the formation of words and sentences. But the grammar of each language speaks of the socio-religio-philosophical speculations and aspirations of its speech community. It is because the grammar helps to understand the deep structure of the language which is the only source for understanding the human culture of different times. According to Bhartṛhari, Brahman is eternal, it is beginning and end less i.e. *Śabdatattva* or speech element (*Yadakṣram*). With the help of this element the world is capable of caring its existence and social behaviour.⁸ He describes Brahman as true and pure existence is known by one term *Omkār* is related with *Pranava*. The relation between these two objects (*Brahman* and *Omkār*) is like the relation of *Vāccya* (significant) and *Vācaka* (signifier). Here, *Vidyā* is Brahman. *Veda* is the *Śāstra*, where we get the knowledge of *Brahman*.⁹ It seems to him, *Śabda*

⁷ VP.I. 13

Arthapravṛtṭitattvānaṁ śabdā eba nibandhanam.

Tattvavabodaḥ śabdānāṁ nāsti vyākaraṇādṛte.

⁸ VP.I.1

Anādinidharṁ Brahman śabdatattvaṁ Yadakṣram/

Vivartyate'rthabhāvena Prakṛyā Jagato yataḥ//

⁹ VP.I.9

Sattvā viśuddhistatrottā vidhaivaikapadāgamā/

Yuktā Praṇavarūpeṇa Sarvavādāvirodhinā//

Brahman = Vidyā = Speech element. Grammar is the shortest and surest way leading (Tapasāmuttamam) towards the Śabdabrahman. Grammar is the first and foremost thing (prathamān chandasamāgam)¹⁰ as well. Apparently the speech (vācah) seems to be divided (prāptarupavibhāgayā) into different parts (Noun, Verb, etc.) though it is one. Śabda Brahman can be seen only after passing through the darkened path of the grammar (mārgohayamanjasaḥ). There are two kinds of grammar one stresses the analytical and critical processes and the other stresses on collecting the words and sentence-formation, without taking recourse to the analytical process. The trained or cultured people know the words by their nature. They also know the various powers hidden therein, as well as the nature of all the beings. Thus, Grammar becomes an instrument in their hands to show or display the power of the words, through their different usages in different times.¹¹

Regarding the relation between semantics and syntax, Bhartṛhari asserts that semantics (*arthapravṛttitattvanam*) is closely related, rather intricately aligned, with the outer form of the words (*saṁsarga*). Meaning can be retained only in an external form of the words (*Saṁsarga* or syntactical structure of the word). The relation that exists between a word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) is the significating power (*śakti*). The logic behind this relation is that the whole is prior to the parts. He

¹⁰ VP.I.11

*Asannaṁ Brahmaṇastasya tapsāmuttamam tapaḥ/
Prathamam chandasamāgamāhuvyakiraṇam budhaḥ//*

¹¹ VP.I.144.

*Tadvibhāgāvibhāgābhyām kṛyamāṇamavasthitam/
Svabhāvjaiśca bhāvānām dṛśyante śabdaśaktayaḥ//*

maintains that sentence meaning is not based on word meaning. Sentence is the unit of speech indivisible and destitute of time and succession. The sentence meaning is an instantaneous flash of insight or intuition (*pratibhā*). As he says, there is no cognition without the operations of words; all cognitions in the world are apprehended through and intertwined with word. Everything is a manifestation of Brahman i.e. 'Śabdatattva'. The words, which the speaker utters, the objects, which the words denote, and the listener are all internally related with the ultimate word-principle. We born with *Vāk*, which exists within it and us is identified with ourselves. He tries to establish that sentence and sentence meaning are indivisible. According to him śabda is identical with *sphoṭa*, which is the ultimate ground of meaning and it can be manifested through different forms of uttered sounds.

Concerning the meaning of word and sentences, Bhartṛhari holds that 'we cannot understand the meaning of the words of *āgama* by merely hearing them; we have to use reasoning to determine the meaning and this does not amount to go against the *Vedas*.¹² This power of understanding the meaning of word is due to the inherent power, *pratibhā* (intuition) and *śabda bhāvanā* (linguistic potency) present within us. He elaborates different ways and phases through which this power can be realised. In his theory, the words do not directly refer to the objects but to the idea or concept of the object. Bhartṛhari's concept of object is quite different. He believes that all words are universal, so these stand for concepts. Even the terms like 'this'

¹² VP. I.136

Vedaśāstrā virodhī ca tarkaścakṣurapaśyatārī
Rūpamātrāddhi vākyaṛthaḥ kevalānnāvatiṣṭate//

or 'that', which are ordinarily believed to signify pure particulars, are also regarded as universal, in his theory.

Bhartṛhari upholds the view that there are two kinds of meanings: Etymologically or grammatically derived ones, and fixed ones i.e. based on roots etc. He accepts a unique position regarding the problem of sentence meaning. For him *vāc* is not just "uttered and articulated speech". It is a multi-layered phenomenon, and uttered speech (*vaikharī*) is the final stage of the externalisation of the linguistic process¹³. Language moves from direct mystical vision (*paśyantī/pratibhā/sphoṭa*) to the spoken words (*vaikharī*) and inner thought (*madhyamā*).¹⁴

He asserts that meaning is dependent on usage and on speaker–listener relationship and the capacity of each of them to express and to comprehend what is going to be expressed and what has been expressed.¹⁵ Language is one integrated whole and in an extension of *vākya* (that what is to be uttered) and its components have no separate identity. They derive their identity from the whole utterance. In Bhartṛhari's opinion the very existence of the '*padas*' (words) depends on the phonemes. In one way, a '*pada*' is nothing but a mere collection of phonemes (*varṇas*). Similar is the case with a sentence, which is nothing but a mere collection of phonemes (*varṇas*) or *padas* (i.e. words). If the formation of a '*pada*' depends on the phonemes,

¹³ VP.I.143

*Vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantīyāścaitadadbhutam/
Anekafīrthabhedāyāstrayā vācaḥ param padam//*

¹⁴ According to Patañjali, prior to *Paśyanī* there is a stage called *parā*, when speech is the supreme principle. In this view, there are four stages. *Parā*, *Paśyanī*, *Madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. (R.V. IV 58.3 quoted in MBh. Vol.I, P.3).

¹⁵ V.P. II.130

*Loke'rtharūpatām śabdaḥ pratipannaḥ pravarttate/
Śāstre tubhayarūpatvām pravibhaktām vivakṣayā//*

then the formation of the sentence also depends on the phonemes and *padas*.¹⁶ Bhartṛhari have described two separate kinds of the words: one is being used as the base –words for the grammatical constructions and the other being invariably used to convey a definite sense or meaning. No meaning becomes automatically explicit, by the mere virtue of words physically present.¹⁷ Bhartṛhari explains the above remarks in the following way. By listening a few words or sentences, someone asks, what have you said? That means there is nothing like an automatic understanding, coming out of the used words. In reality, the object of its usage is 'the thing' to be known, and not the mere phonemic construction. According to him 'form' and 'object' are two aspects of the same word, which we treat sometimes as separate entities, with some hypothetical object in our mind. Still these aspects seem to function harmoniously without countering each other, though the separation is merely hypothetical.¹⁸

As all the kinds of meanings are attached to the outer forms of the words, in the same way Grammar becomes the carrier of all sorts of knowledge. Thus it is the first and foremost of all the branches of knowledge.¹⁹ Bhartṛhari was a holist. He

¹⁶ VP. I.73

*Pade na varṇā vidhante varṇeṣvavayavā iva/
vākyaṭpadānāmatyantarṇ praviveko na kaścana//*

¹⁷ VP.I.56

*viśayatvamanāpannaiḥ śabdainarthaḥ prakāśyate/
Na sattayaiva te 'rthānāṁ agṛhītāḥ prakāśakāḥ//*

¹⁸ VP.I.57

*Ato 'nijñārtarūpatvātkimāhetyabhidhīyate/
Nenidīyaṇāṁ prakāśye 'rthe Svarūpaṁ gṛhyate tathā//*

¹⁹ VP.I.15

*Yathārthajātayaḥ sarbāḥ śabdākṛtinibandhanaḥ/
Tathaiva loke vidyānāṁ eṣa vidyā parāyaṇam//*

maintains that unless a word is used with a definite object or in a definite sense, it remains useless and meaningless. He considers 'sentences' as the primary units of meaning, rather than the words. The comprehension of meaning lies in the *sphoṭa*, which already present in the hearer's awareness. As the hearer hears the succession of audible phonemes, the latent and undifferentiated language potency within him is brought to "fruition" in the form of grasping the speaker's meaning. Thus, while the audible words are necessary for such verbal comprehension to occur in the hearer, though they are not sufficient. It is the hearer's own ability to understand the meaning referred to by these words, by virtue of sharing the same *sphoṭa* with the speaker, which completes the act of cognition.

Bhartṛhari explains the apparent difference between *sphoṭa* and *dhvan/nāda*. Initially, the word or *sphoṭa* exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity but it is manifested as a sequence of different sounds or *dhvani/nāda*. The spoken words do not directly convey the meaning, to the hearer. It only inspires the hearer's linguistic potency, which in turn directs him to the comprehension of meaning. The speech is expressed syllable-by-syllable, part-by-part but at last it expresses a unitary meaning. Bhartṛhari shows us how the meaning as a unit is transferred by different stages of utterance. Let us take an example to define it – If a person utters the word 'śravana' –he has to express it vocally as 'śra-va-na'. Here, it has three sound units, which taken together implies "śravana" as a meaningful unit. Here, the first syllable "sra" expresses the whole unit of meaning but in an

indistinct way. It becomes gradually clear with the utterance of successive sound-units till the last sound-unit is uttered.²⁰

But, what guarantees that the hearer of speech properly comprehends what is uttered? In the second kāṇḍa, of the *VP*, Bhartṛhari states: Sentence meaning is produced by word meanings, though it is not constituted by the words. Its form can be apprehended through Intuition, which is innate awareness (*pratibhā*) possessed by all beings. It is a cognitive state evident to the hearer...not describable or definable, but all practical activities depend on it directly or through recollection of it.

3.0.3 In Wittgenstein's philosophy

Wittgenstein holds that language is a kind of natural phenomenon, but this does not entail the fact that meaning and rules are themselves natural facts about language. They can be known as non-natural and so these are counted as transcendental facts about language. Wittgenstein adopts the term 'grammar' in his quest to describe the workings of this public, socially governed language, using it in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner. Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of correct syntactic and semantic usage, in Wittgenstein's hands, the wider — and more elusive — network of rules which determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn't.

It seems to us that, Wittgenstein has given two different types of theories of words and sentences, one in the *TLP* and the other in the *PI*. In *TLP*, he accepts the following remarks on syntax. A word or a name is a primitive sign, which cannot be

²⁰ *VP*.I.83-84

dissected.²¹ The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.²² A propositional sign is a fact.²³ Though, there is no essential difference between a propositional sign and a word. Wittgenstein contrasts 'the language of everyday life' with 'a sign-language'. A fact can be expressed only through a proposition, i.e., it has to take help of language. This view entails the fact that the world cannot be expressed independently of language. In order to express something linguistically, we should follow certain linguistic rules; otherwise, what is expressed cannot be intelligible. Without rules, nothing would be expressed, for example, if we want to express a musical piece using some system of musical notation, we have to follow the rules of its notation. Wittgenstein calls such rules "the logic of our language". In the Preface of the *TLP*, Wittgenstein says that the philosophical problems arise because of the misunderstandings of the logic of our language. 'Syntax', Wittgenstein dictated, 'is the totality of rules that specify in what combinations a sign has meaning and a symbol is a sign used according to those rules.'

Wittgenstein's broad philosophical framework is grammatical. That means, it is meant to bring out the grammar of the language, which is the subject matter of the philosophical discourse. By grammar, Wittgenstein means the rule-structure of language or the norms or regularities, which govern the use of language. It is grammar, alone which gives a clear view of the meaning of the signs in language. According to Wittgenstein,

²¹ Wittgenstein, L (1961): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness (trans.), London: Routledge, 3.26

²² *Ibid.* 3.202

²³ *Ibid.* 3.14

Grammar is not abstract, it is situated within the regular activity with which language-games are interwoven: " ... the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI 23). What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as "given" is precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, agreement is required "not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments" (PI 242), and this is "not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (PI 241). Forms of life can be understood as changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc.

Our ordinary languages are syntactically structured. Maps, musical notation, temperature curves etc. also depict the reality; they, however, make do without the syntax. A map can depict the reality truly or falsely, but never in a nonsensical fashion. Everything a map represents is possible. On the other hand, a description by means of verbal language can be nonsensical. I can say, for instance, 'A is to the north of B, and B is to the north of A'. Such a proposition does not tell us anything, as it does not have the form of the fact it is supposed to represent.

Syntax is hence connected with the possibility of nonsense. ('Nonsense' is not the opposite of 'sense'. You can indeed say, 'This proposition expresses a sense,' but you cannot say, 'This proposition expresses nonsense.' It is the use of signs that is nonsensical.) This excessive multiplicity of language must be confined by artificial rules; and these rules are the syntax of language. The rules of syntax assign to the combinations of signs the exact multiplicity they must possess in order to be the pictures of reality. The rules of syntax deal with signs. Wittgenstein's picture theory in the *TLP* is not meant to explain

meaning or sense of a propositions; it aims at showing how sense is already be an internal feature of a proposition. Wittgenstein writes: "it belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us"²⁴ (*TLP* 4.027). Sense, however, does not depend on a proposition being a picture of the world. Sense lies in the way, through which the proposition represents the world that means, it being the logical picture of the world.

In *RLF*, Wittgenstein explains that by syntax he means "the rules which tell us in which connections only a word gives sense, thus excluding all nonsensical structures."²⁵ He continues: "The syntax of ordinary language, as is well known, is not quite adequate to this purpose. It does not in all cases prevent the construction of nonsensical pseudo propositions...."²⁶ Thus, the syntax of ordinary language permits the formulation of propositions like "A is red and A is green," which if false is necessarily false. But if, as Wittgenstein held, all necessity is the logical necessity, and then the necessary falsehood of this proposition implies that it is a logical contradiction. By the symbolic criteria laid out in *TLP*, however, it is not a contradiction. When one tries to represent it as a contradiction in the TF-notation, the particular "inadequacies of the notation" reveal themselves.

Let us consider:

²⁴ Ibid. 4.027

²⁵ Copi, Irving M., And Robert W. Beard, (Ed.) (1966), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, New York: MacMillan p. 31.

²⁶ Ibid.

A is red	A is green	
True	True	False
True	False	False
False	True	False
False	False	False

This is a propositional sign of the TF-notation. It attempts to represent "A is red and A is green" as a contradiction. The attempt is unsuccessful, however, since, as Wittgenstein explains, "the top line, "TTF," gives the proposition a greater logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities."²⁷

In *PI*, he mentioned different views regarding syntax. These are as follows-There is no grammatical criterion to distinguish between a word and a sentence. "Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order: Bring me a slab! Might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word..."²⁸ For Wittgenstein, all nonsense can be given a sense in principle. That is, nonsensical propositions are the ones that we do not still know how to make sense of, and for which we are in search of a sense. There is, for Wittgenstein, no instance of a proposition containing two logically incompatible elements. Thus, there is no nonsensical thought expressed by a nonsensical proposition. In sum, Wittgenstein thinks that there is no illogically formed proposition, and, therefore, there is no illogical thought. A proposition is nonsensical not because linguistic strings fail to mean something, but because we fail to give a determinate

²⁷ Ibid., 37

²⁸ Wittgenstein, L. (1953): *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe (Trans) ,Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 9e.

meaning, even if we think that we have done so. Propositions are nonsensical, when we do not give any determinate meaning to a word in the proposition. Wittgenstein acknowledges only one kind of nonsense; nonsense occurs when we mean nothing, but have an illusion of meaning something. Linguistic expressions, for Wittgenstein, are meaningful only when they have a *use* in the language.²⁹ If linguistic expressions do not have any *use* in the language, they are simply meaningless, that is, Wittgenstein thinks that linguistic strings *themselves* can never have meaning unless they are used in a certain manner. Hence, nonsense arises when we have an illusion that we mean something by a linguistic expression, although we mean nothing - we have failed to give a determinate meaning - it has no *use* in the language.

The semantics aspect of Wittgenstein's *TLP* can be revealed through his remarks given below:

1. Objects are simple.³⁰ A name means an object.³¹ A proposition is a picture of reality.³²
2. It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions.³³
3. Objects contain the possibility of all situations.³⁴

²⁹ Even in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein is concerned with a *use* of language. For example, "[O]nly in the context of a proposition has a name meaning (§ 3.3)", "If sign is *useless*, it is meaningless (§ 3.328)." and "In philosophy the question, "What do we actually use this word or this proposition for?" repeatedly leads to valuable insights (§ 6.211)." See also, Ishiguro, "Use and Reference of Names" and Conant, "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use".

³⁰ Wittgenstein, L (1961): *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness (trans.), London: Routledge, 2.02

³¹ *Ibid.* 3.203

³² *Ibid.* 4.01

³³ *Ibid.* 2.0122

³⁴ *Ibid.* 2.014

4. Only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.³⁵
5. Objects can only be named.....I can only speak about them. I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.³⁶
6. The totality of propositions is language.³⁷

The opening section of the *PI* contains a long quotation from Augustine's *Confessions* in which Augustine describes what might be called a primitive version of Wittgenstein's *TLP*-stage "picture" theory of language. In it, Augustine describes his own experience of learning language as one in which he grasped the meaning of every word by learning what object or property it named (*PI*, I, 1).

In place of this, Wittgenstein offers his famous analogy between languages and games. The point of the comparison, we should note, is not that language can be defined as a game; but rather, that no satisfactory definition for "game" can be found. There is no essential element of all games, only a variety of overlapping uses for the term, which bears a "family resemblance" to one another (*PI*, I, 11). These analogies to games and tools point in a very different direction from the earlier ones. They describe language, not by comparing it with an unspoken transcendent, but by linking it with the elements of everyday life that are so mundane as to be, as it were, *beneath* the level of speech. Wittgenstein believes that our use of language depends on a series of unspoken agreements and behaviours so ordinary that we seldom have cause to remark on

³⁵ Ibid. 3.3

³⁶ Ibid.3.221

³⁷ Ibid. 4.001

them, or even to be aware of their existence. Those things that are hidden "are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (*PI I*, 129). By this Wittgenstein means that languages only make sense with reference to the forms of life of which they are a part: "Only in the stream of thought and life [n.b.] do words have meaning" (*Z* 173). The analogy of tools implies that language first of all finds its meaning in some sort of "use-not, obviously, in the sense of utility, but in the sense of being connected to a human action: "Every sign by itself seems dead....In use it is *alive*" (*PI I*, 432). While in the *TLP*, Wittgenstein had also spoken of the connection of signs to their "logical-syntactic" use in language (*TLP* 3.32ff), the meaning of "use" now takes a more existential turn. The existence of language points to a human realm of practice or activity rather than a transcendent one: "it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language game" (*OC* 204). And what is typical of this realm is just that its contents are *not* in any sense justified by reason or logic; they cannot be, since they are apart from language: "the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting" (*OC* 110). Rather than our actions being grounded in our language, that is, in our stated intentions, purposes, and meanings, it is the other way round.

Regarding semantics, he says "As meaning is use, there is no distinction between an 'elliptical' sentence and a complete sentence. In Russian one says 'stone red' instead of 'the stone is red'; do they feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?"³⁸

³⁸Wittgenstein, L. (1953): *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe (Trans), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 10e.

Wittgenstein was concerned with logically perfect language, a language in which it would be easy to see the logical relations between different statements, and one in which all the logical relationships could be completely utilized. Ordinary languages like English and French fall short of the ideal at least in two respects.

1. They allow sentences which are really meaningless combinations of symbols, and
2. Words used in these languages can be vague and ambiguous.

So, a perfect language must repair these defects at the very least, and this presents a very serious problem.

Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a word is its use in the language.³⁹ According to him, what one says, or what people in general say, can change. Ways of life and uses of language change, so meanings change, but not utterly and instantaneously.

Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or not, what part of speech it is, whether it carries overtones, and if so what kind they are, and so on. To know all this, or to know enough to get by, is to know the use. And generally knowing the use means knowing the meaning. Philosophical questions about consciousness, for example, then, should be responded to by looking at the various uses we make of the word "consciousness." Scientific investigations into the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us to

³⁹ Ibid. Sect. 43.

change our use of such words). The meaning of any word is a matter of what we do with our language, not something hidden inside anyone's mind or brain.

Wittgenstein's argument, based on the holistic characterization of meaning in his later philosophy, is that no meaning can be given to the notion of a correspondence between a meaning and a machine structure. It is not that the semantic correspondence thesis is necessarily false, but that it is senseless. It is not a thesis, a theory, at all (*PI* 109,128). According to Wittgenstein, a sentence 'acquires' meaning not by being paired with a structure of meaning particles, but by its role in a 'background language'. The view of the later philosophy is that *meaning must be characterized holistically*. This has consequences concerning what kind of thing can 'correspond' with a thought or meaning, . . . if you call the picture the wish [or the thought] . . . then what you're doing is comparing the picture with an expression of our language, and certainly it doesn't correspond with such an expression unless its part of a system translatable into our language. (PG 149) Wittgenstein is here rejecting the coherence of the semantic correspondence thesis, the view that a mere picture or structure can correspond with a meaning. If one says that a picture corresponds with a meaning, what one really means is that it is *the picture's role* in a linguistic system that corresponds with the meaning: '. . . it is the *system* of language that makes the sentence a thought and makes it a thought for us' (PG 153).

It is an accident that the same word has these two uses. It is not an accident that we use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how we use it. So do the various

uses of a word, Wittgenstein argued, and to search for common meanings of a word is a productive as looking for the essential feature of games.

Wittgenstein has distinguished between the use of language that involves time and the context and the rules that are timeless and so are independent of the context. In language, Wittgenstein holds, there are "countless different kinds of use of what we call symbols, words, sentences. And this multiplicity is not something fixed once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten" (*PI*, sect.23). There is not, then, a theory of meaning nor a theory of language-games in Wittgenstein's philosophy. But meaning and language-games are concepts related to each other and language-games are a way of getting at the meanings of words in any given language. The way to understand the meaning of a word is to consider it within the language-game to which it belongs. The meaning of a word, then, is its use in the language. The way in which a word functions is a clue to grasping the meaning of a word and, wrote Wittgenstein, "One cannot guess how a word functions" but "One has to *look* at its use and learn from that."⁴⁰ The language-game in which a word is used is critical in understanding the meaning of the word. Language itself is a comprehensive form of life combining the most diverse elements according to rules, which are flexible and varied. The language-game is representative of a form of life and words have meanings only within the context of the language-game. Different concepts will be more natural or useful to one, depending on one's environment, one's physical

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 109.

needs and desires, one's emotions, one's sensory capacities, and so on,. That is why "forms of life" are so important to Wittgenstein. What matters to you depends on how you live (and vice-versa), and this shapes your experience. So if a lion could speak, Wittgenstein says, we would not be able to understand it. We might realise that "roar" meant zebra, or that "roar, roar" meant lame zebra, but we would not understand lion ethics, politics, aesthetic taste, religion, humor and such like, if lions have these things. We could not honestly say "I know what you mean" to a lion. Understanding another involves empathy, which requires the kind of similarity that we just do not have with lions, and that many people do not have with other human beings.

3.0.4 In Chomsky's Philosophy

In Chomskian philosophy, grammar is being used in an all-embracing sense, covering the subject matter of phonology and semantics as well as covering the morphology and syntax. Syntax is the core element among all of them. His conception of the nature of syntactic and semantic theory has gone through three major phases so far; each may be associated with a particular book. The first phase is marked by *Syntactic Structures* (1957); the second by *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965); the third by *Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar* (1972). On the other hand, his conception of phonology has remained relatively unchanged over the years.

Like Pāṇinī, Chomsky was focused on finding the rules of language, Though Chomsky belongs to modern period, and he took a more scientific, mathematical approach. He propounded

the theory of generative grammar, a set of rules for breaking down sentences into smaller parts. According to generative grammar, sentences can be broken down into nouns, noun phrases, verbs, verb phrases, and determiners. The long and complicated sentences can be reduced to smaller parts.

In Chomsky's view, syntax is the important thing to understand the fundamental nature of language. Regarding the concept of syntax, Chomsky maintains that syntax is the study of linguistic form, and its primary concern is to determine the grammatical sentences of any given language and to bring into light their underlying formal structure. In his scheme of "transformational grammar" every intelligible sentence follows not only the learned grammatical rules of a particular language but also from a universal grammar that is innate in the human brain. This "deep structure" supports all languages that can be studied as an abstract system. In Chomsky's view, only such a quasi-mathematical analysis can help us to define the linguistics as a science. When a grammar is fully explicit about all possible constructions within a specific language, it is called generative grammar. A particular type of *generative grammar* that has become the leading framework in modern linguistics is *transformational grammar* which was first proposed by Noam Chomsky. According to Chomsky experience does not supply linguistic understanding but merely awakens and enriches a framework of shared parameters that he calls "UG." Chomsky says, all languages, share the same deep-structure elements; they differ from each other in surface structure because of the application of differing rules for transformations, pronunciation, and word usage. Chomsky considers U.G as the base of the grammar of a particular language. He is of the opinion that if the


grammar of a language is 'supplemented' by a U.G, which is part of the human biologically endowed language faculty, we will be able to see the modus operandi of the organization of particular grammar. U.G comes from Chomsky's interest in arriving at a generalization of the formal properties of the particular grammars of particular languages.

In his book *SS*, Chomsky discusses a simple grammar, that is *Generative Grammar*, which is capable of generating an infinite set of sentences by means of a finite number of recursive rules operating upon a finite vocabulary. The basic view is that sentences are generated by means of a series of choices made 'from left to right'. For example –

'This man has brought some bread'

The sentence generated as follows. The word 'This' is in first position, which is capable of occurring at the beginning of English sentences. The words 'that', 'those', 'these', 'the', some has the same capability of occurring at the beginning of any English sentences.

We can realize the relationship between different words by the 'state diagram', which Chomsky discussed in his book *SS*.



We can construct different sentences by the help of the above diagrams, e.g.

`The man has eaten a bread.` (Present Perfect Tense). Or

`These men have eaten these breads.` (Present perfect tense).

The structure of these two sentences is-Subject + has / have + past participle verb.

Though, Chomsky himself, proved the inadequacy of *Finite State Grammar* or *generative grammar* in his work *SS* (p.21-24).

'Finite state grammar' is capable of generating only simple type of sentences. For the inadequacy of this *generative grammar* or *finite structure grammar*, Chomsky made a more satisfactory grammar, which is known as *Phrase Structure Grammar*. This grammar is intrinsically more powerful than the 'Finite State Grammar'. Let us explain the *Phrase Structure Grammar* by taking an example,

`The boy hit the girl`.

The 'Phrase Structure rules will allow us to derive the sentence into -

Sentence \rightarrow NP+VP.

1) NP \rightarrow ART+N.


2) VP \rightarrow V+NP.

3) ART \rightarrow 'The'.

4) N \rightarrow 'boy', 'girl'.

5) V \rightarrow 'hit'.

We can represent the above structure of sentence in the form of the following tree diagram.



Then again Chomsky decided to abolish *Phrase Structure Grammar* for its limited capacity. It can only generate the active sentences e.g. 'the boy hit the girl'. It does not generate the passive sentences e.g. 'the girl was hit by the boy', because there are certain reasons behind it –

- 1) A PS-rule (Phrase Structure rule) only permits us to replace one symbol in a string at a time. 'THE had been derived from 'ART or 'the +boy had been derived from 'Noun' and so on .So we must only rewrite one symbol at a time .P-S rules do not allow us to alter the order of the symbols, but merely to replace any symbol by one or more symbols.
- 2) A P-S rule simply tells us that a certain symbol can be replaced by another symbol. NP1 or V appears are constants in this rule.

To remove this problem, Chomsky takes the help of *Transformational grammar*, which is constituted by T-rules as well as PS-rules.

- 1) T-rules (Transformational Rules) have no restriction to alter the places of symbols. It allows us to change the order of constituent symbols.
- 2) T-rules inform us that certain grammatical form can be transformed into something of a different grammatical form.
- 3) Ambiguous sentences can be accounted nicely by the *Transformational grammar*.

Let us apply the rule of *Transformational grammar* in different sentences.

Transformational Grammar=P-S rules-rules.

Chomsky has defined the sentences by the help of Transformational Grammar-

- | | | |
|------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 1) Sentence | → | NP+VP |
| 2) VP | → | VERB+NP |
| 3) NP {N p-sing} | → | {N P-PI} |
| 4) NP sings | → | T+N |
| 5) NP PI | → | T+N+S |
| 6) T | → | The |
| 7) N | → | {man, ball, door, dog} |
| 8) Verb | → | Aux +V |
| 9) V | → | {hit, take, bite, eat, open} |
| 10) Aux | → | Tense (+m)(+have+en)(+be+ing) |
| 11) Tense | → | {Present, past} |
| 12) M | → | will, can, may, shall, and must. |

1-12 is the Phrase Structure rule. We can generate the sentences in this form

`The man may have opened the door`.


- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1) <u>The man may</u> | <u>have opened the door</u> |
| NP | VP |

We can generate the first sentence by this way -(to +fly, plane+s) someone +fly+plane+s.

And sentence by this way- (plane +s +are +ing +fly) plane +s +be +ing +fly.

It can be said that the Transformational explanation of structural ambiguity depends upon the application of optional rules.

In the book *SS*, Chomsky has found three major components -the rewriting rules, the transformational rules and the morphological rules. In *ATS* (1965), Chomsky put forward a more comprehensive theory of transformational grammar differs from the earlier theory in a number of important respects. Aspects -type grammar labeled 'semantic component'. In this system Chomsky relates the meaning (or meanings) of each sentence, which generates the physical manifestation of the sentence in the medium of sound. The following figure represents the *Aspects theory of grammar*.



The base rules generate an indefinitely large set of underlying phrase markers (which represent the deep structure of all the sentences characterized by the system); and these are

converted into derived phrase markers (which represent the surface structure of the sentences) by the transformational rules most of which (apart from 'stylistic rules) are now obligatory. The meaning of each sentence is derived, mainly if not wholly, from its deep structure, by means of the rules of semantic interpretation; and the phonetic interpretation of each sentence –its physical description as an acoustic 'signal' –is derived from its surface structure by means of the phonological rules. Chomsky takes those two sentences having different surface structures, may be same in the meaning, (Chomsky's examples were 'everyone in the lab considers John incompetent' and 'John is considered incompetent by everyone in the lab'⁴¹), because they have the same *deep structure*.

Chomsky holds that the sentences have two types of structure- one is *Surface structure* (grammatical) and the other is *Deep structure* (logical). The 'surface structure' is the structure of a sentence. A Phrase-marker (PM) in accordance with P-s rules demonstrates this. But the conception of a generative-transformational system was introduced by Chomsky to overcome a limitation of taxonomic or P-S-grammar, namely, the failure to reveal the underlying conceptual scheme of a sentence. Within this scheme Chomsky develops the concept of an underlying deep structure⁴².

In the *ATS*, we find two major components – the base component and the transformational component. A base component consists of two elements –the rewriting rules show the structure of sequences of words. The syntactic, semantic and phonological properties of lexical items are assign to the lexicon,

⁴¹ Chomsky, N. (1957), *Syntactic structures*, Mouton: the Hague, p.76

⁴² Chomsky, N. (1966), *Cartesian linguistics*, New York: Harper and Row, page 33.

generates the deep structure. Another component of the rewriting rules and the lexicon generates the deep structure. Another component of the model – the Transformational component- transforms the deep structure into the surface structure. The base and the transformational components together form the generative part of the model. Now there are two interpretive components – the phonological and the semantic. The semantic component is joined with the generative part at the deep structure level. Thus the meaning – receiving syntactic structure is formed. This model is called the *Standard theory* (ST). At this stage, Chomsky is of the opinion that the logical difference between two sentences of the same grammatical form can be indicated with the underlying deep structures. The deep structure of a sentence reflects a sentence as expressing a thought; the surface structure of a sentence reflects a sentence as expressing its physical shape of sound sequence. Though surface structures fail to clear up meanings of ambiguous sentences, still they determine at least the part of the meaning.

All sentences (manifested) have an arrangement. We may call it 'actual' arrangement or 'surface structure'. But this visible or audible arrangement does not always reveal the full semantic content contained in those sentences. To bring out the full semantic interpretation of a sentence, we are to search for an underlying the concept of an underlying 'deep structure'. Chomsky hopes that by this concept of deep structure we shall be able to explain our intuitive understanding of many aspects of language. Chomsky introduces an abstract, technical notion i.e. 'syntactic description' (SD) that determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence. The 'deep structure' and the

'surface structure' are the two aspects of SD, the former determining the semantic part and the latter determining the phonetic part.⁴³

Chomsky observed certain types of sentences, which are grammatically well formed and correct but may be meaningless. His most famous example of a meaningless but syntactically correct sentence is *colourless green ideas sleep furiously*. This sentence is constructed in accordance with the rules but it has no literal meaning. We know that a green object can't be colourless and can't sleep furiously. It is obvious that the rules of a particular language cannot be innate ideas. We understand the rules or the grammar of a particular language. These rules can be divided into *prescriptive rules* and *descriptive rules*. *Prescriptive rules* are that kind of rules which are developed and taught by teachers and grammar experts. *Descriptive rules*, on the other hand, are formed and used naturally. While prescriptive rules are learned consciously, we learn descriptive rules from experience, usually without the realization that we use a set of rules at all. With the help of a descriptive rule we can make a noun plural, and put a verb in the past etc.

The logical subject is that Np which is immediately dominated by 'S' (sentence) in the deep structure. The grammatical subject is the left- most Np, which is immediately dominated by (top-most) S in the surface structure.

For example, in the sentence 'John was persuaded by Harry to take up golf', the grammatical subject is 'John'. But the deep structure of this sentence consists of one sentence (S2) embedded within another (S1).

⁴³ Ibid. same page no.


Harry persuade John

S1

John take up golf

S2

Each sentence has its own logical subject. The logical subject of S1 (the matrix sentence) is 'Harry'. In S2 it is 'John'. Further more, the deep structure subjects of S2 is identical with the deep structure object of S1.



According to Chomsky, 'John plays golf'-obeys the rules of the language, but 'golf plays John' violates the grammatical rules a bit, and 'golf plays aggressive' shows an extreme type of violation of grammatical rules. According to Chomsky, sentences are of two types-some are grammatical and others are less grammatical. Chomskian opinion is that a sentence may be grammatical even if it has no literal meaning. He accepts the sentence 'color green ideas sleep furiously' as grammatical, though staying lower in the degree of grammaticalness.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Chomsky, N. (1957), *Syntactic structures*, Mouton: the Hague.P.15.

In the following diagram it will be clear to us that what Chomsky meant by the sentences.



Chomsky would conceive that surface structure played a much more important role in the semantic interpretation of the sentences. If it is true then it would be impossible to accept the standard hypothesis where it is stated that the deep structure fully determines the semantic interpretation, would be false.⁴⁵ Another interesting linguistic ability is that we have the ability to understand a sentence when a word is left out. The sentence "Stop that!" should actually be "You stop that!", but we comprehend it when "you" is omitted, as it usually is. We can easily paraphrase sentences in the passive voice, and recognize that the two sentences have the same meanings. Although the two sentences "The cat climbed a tree" and "The tree was climbed by the cat" have some different words and differ in word order, we instantly see that they have the same meaning.

⁴⁵ Chomsky, (1977) *Essays on Form and Interpretation*, New York: North Holland, p.151

3.1 A Contrast

In Sanskrit grammar, words normally derived from verb (root), and suffixes and other 'atomic' words are learnt through grammar, for it supplies the roots (and meaning) and the significance of the suffixes. The list roots (called *Dhātupāṭha*) is an integral part of Pāṇini's grammar. Pāṇini is widely considered as 'the father of modern structural linguistics', for his significant influence on many of the foundational ideas in Indian linguistic system. Noam Chomsky has always acknowledged his debt to Pāṇini for his modern notion of an explicit generative grammar. Chomsky writes, 'It seems that even Pāṇini's grammar can be interpreted as a fragment of such a "generative grammar", in essentially the contemporary sense of this term.'⁴⁶ Pāṇini's use of meta-rules, transformations, and recursion together make his grammar as rigorous as a *modern Turing machine*. He is worried mainly with the denotation of a term and occasionally in a few cases with its connotation. It is the denotation of a term that forms the chief concern in his grammatical analysis. Therefore, denotation of terms alone can constitute the basis of the classification of the technical terms of the *Ad*. Bhartṛhari was the scholar of Pāṇini. It seems to us that his grammar is the developed form of Pāṇini's work. According to Bhartṛhari, any noun denotes primarily to the form of a substance, before it is related with that particular thing. Thus, the indicated form becomes its primary meaning. Pāṇini asserts that a noun is used

⁴⁶ Chomsky, N, (1986), *knowledge of language :Its nature, origin and use*, New York: Praeger pub., p.13, fn.3

in the nominative case only with the idea of denoting its individual or meaning. Substantives relation with a particular thing is denoted by its possessive capacity over that thing .In turn, it is denoted by the genitive or sixth case, i.e. *sambandha kāraka* or *ṣaṣṭhi vibhakti*.⁴⁷ He also maintains that nominative case is used only because of this indication or meaning of any noun. Even the proper noun, gives at first the indication of a 'common form' of that 'particular thing'. It is only after this, that the relation between the thing and the noun becomes established. This relation is evident by the mere virtue of this possessive nature. The true possessive nature of any noun indicated by the words like –"this noun is indicative of this thing."⁴⁸ The grammar of Pāṇini is regarded as one of the best of its types throughout the world. It is written in the abrupt style and has a unique feature of its own. Bhartṛhari used the terms like phoneme (*Varṇa*), the usable word (*pada*), and the sentences (*vākya*). There are many divisions of this kind. In Bhartṛhari's opinion we may pronounce different *padas* at different occasions; still their similar sounds may be accepted as 'one' and 'the same'. The multiplicity of number is related to the pronunciation and not to the phoneme or the word as such, the phoneme or the word as such, their united existence being the subject of 'mind'. Pronunciation helps it to be expressed again and again. Separate existence in different sentences does not

⁴⁷ VP.I.66

*Prākṣarṅjñinābhisambandhātsarṅjñā rūpapadārthikā/
ṣaṣṭhyāśca prathamāyāśca nimittatvāya kalpyate//*

⁴⁸ VP.I.67

*Tatrārthavattvāprathamā saṅgāśabdāvidhīyate/
Asyeti vyatirekaśca tadarthādeva jāyate//*

make it different, basically, every time⁴⁹, For example, 'Ti', we used this suffix in different places. It is one but it has no fixed meaning .It has different meaning in different places i.e. *paccati* etc.

In Bhartṛhari's philosophy, two types of meanings are distinguished: those, which have a fixed nature and those, which are obtained through extraction of partial meanings from putative complexes. Pāṇini's *Ad* bears the same theory that some meanings are fixed and some are abstracted through analysis. Pāṇini's *Ad* is a kind of *smṛti* whose object is the correctness of speech.⁵⁰ For Bhartṛhari grammar is the first step in the ladder leading to liberation. This is the straight royal road for all those who desire salvation.⁵¹ He declares in one of memorable verses of Brahmakāṇḍa that Grammar is the doorway to the salvation, the remedy for all the impurities of speech, the purifier of all the sciences and the every branch of knowledge.⁵² To him the highest goal is the attainment of Brahman. Here a question must be arises that 'what type of salvation (*apavarga*) is aimed to be achieved by the study of grammar?' Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory is holistic for the reason that *sphoṭa* is a unity and whole. The meaning that the *sphoṭa*

⁴⁹VP.I.71

*Padabhede'pi varṇānāmekatvaṁ na nibartate/
Vākyeṣu padamekaṁ bhinneṣvapyupalabhyate//*

⁵⁰ VP. 1.29

*nānarthikāmimāṁ kaścid vyavasthāṁ kartumaharti/
tasmānnibadhyate nityā sādhutvaviṣayā smṛtiḥ//*

⁵¹ VP. I. 16

*Idamādharṁ padasthānaṁ siddhisopānaparvaṇām/
Iyaṁ sā mokṣamāṇānamajihnā rājapaddhatiḥ//*

⁵² See, f.n.6

reveals is also a unity. Besides, there is no difference between the *Śabda* and the meaning. This conception of meaning being an indivisible entity⁵³ is absolutely one (VP, I.93-103), which is holistic in nature. Bhartṛhari holds that meaning cannot be a composite entity at all because to say so is to commit a semantic error. A composite meaning paradoxically leads to the disappearance of meaning. The compositionality appears due to the maniness of the constituent elements viz. *padas* and *varṇas*. The meaning is timeless though the phonemes, which produced are temporal. It is the temporal division of words that makes meaning appear itself divided. Bhartṛhari rejects the compositionalist view of meaning espoused by the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

Bhartṛhari accepts the theory of *akhaṇḍa pakṣa* or sentence-holism. The meaning of a statement does not become clear from its mere 'form'. That type of meaning might be dubious and uncertain. According to this theory the sentence is the primary and indivisible unit of meaning. Here the sentence meaning is grasped as a whole. Bhartṛhari maintains that an individual word has no meaning; it will be meaningful when it is used in a sentence. This view is similar to that of Bhartṛhari in the context that individual word has no meaning; it will be meaningful when it is used in a sentence in a certain context.⁵⁴

Pāṇinian *padas* we think never stand in their absolute and isolated position, rather always in syntactic structure. He was concerned with the syntactical, morphological, and phonological description of *Sanskrit*. He has also given due consideration to accentuation, which is a very important characteristic of any

⁵³ Matilal, B.K.(2001) *Word and the World*, Oxford University Press,

⁵⁴ Bhartṛhari, VP.I.136-137

spoken language. However, semantics is one such branch of linguistics, which is left unattended by him.

In Wittgenstein's philosophy, we have found a kind of contradictory standpoint. Wittgenstein in *TLP*, rules out word meaning. Wittgenstein's picture theory in the *TLP* is not meant to explain meaning or sense of a proposition; it aims at showing how sense is already an internal feature of a proposition. For him only propositions which are constituted out of proper name (logical name) are to be meaningful as they always pictures facts which make the proposition as either true or false. There he understands meaning in terms of truth and falsity. Meaning is not underlying in the mind. To him, meaning is an integral feature of language and therefore, cannot be explained theoretically in a meta-language. Meaning is shown rather than said (cf. *TLP* 4.002)

In *TLP*, he speaks regarding the distinction between 'sign' and 'symbol' (*TLP*, 3.32, 3.321, 3.322 & 3.323), where he vaguely anticipates the possibility of the same word or expression of being used in different senses. When he says that a sign is what can be perceived of a symbol, he clearly recognizes that one and the same sign, written or spoken, can be common to different symbols. In this way one and the same symbol lends itself to different modes of signification. For example, Wittgenstein notes that "in everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification...(for example) the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity and as an expression for existence...". But when he goes on to *PI*, he accepts that an expression is to be meaningful if it has use. In *PI*, He holds that a sentence can also convey different meanings, mainly depending upon who uses it,

in which context it is used, to whom it is addressed, and so on. The language-game is representative of a form of life and words have meanings only within the context of the language-game. Language itself is a comprehensive form of life combining the most diverse elements according to rules, which are flexible and varied. Wittgenstein's broad philosophical framework is grammatical. That is, it is meant to bring out the grammar of the language which is the subject matter of the philosophical discourse. By grammar, Wittgenstein means the rule-structure of language or the norms or regularities which govern the use of the language. It is grammar alone which gives clear view of the meaning of the signs in language. Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation makes a broad distinction between the use of language that involves time and the context and the rules that are timeless and so are independent of context. According to him, the rules of language (grammar) are analogous to the rules of games; meaning something in language is thus analogous to making a move in a game. The analogy between a language and a game brings out the fact that only in the various and multiform activities of human life do words have meaning. Language can express meaning of a word and sentence. To him, meaning is the fact of language use.⁵⁵ If it appears to us as external or independent of others, it is due to a false appearance. Meaning for him is a grammatical representation, that is, a representation of rules and their application. Meaning and rules constitute a single whole of language use, i.e., a language-game. A language game is the articulation of the embedded meaning insofar as the

⁵⁵ The "fact" mentioned here is transcendental for the reason that it is not a mere causal or natural fact. Meaning in this sense is a non-temporal aspect of language-use. For a contrary view, see Colin MacGinn (1980) *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, Oxford: Blackwell.

meaning is co-terminus with the rule-structure. In this sense, meaning is not external to language-use; it is its internal structure. Meaning, for him, is not a property of behaviour nor is it a mental content. It is in essence a grammatical function, i.e. a property of grammar.

The point on which Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein appear very close to each other in sentence-holism, that is, as the meaning of the inflections of words, verbal or nominal, depend upon the concerned words and those of words themselves depend on the sentences of which they are parts. But, Bhartṛhari's concepts of *ākāṁkṣā* and *yogyatā* of sentence forming words, not to be found in Wittgenstein, are functionally replaced by the concept of the rules of game.

Chomsky believes that in all languages there are certain phonological, syntactic and semantic units, which appear as universal for their nature. For that reason Chomsky describes the child's acquisition of language 'as a kind of theory construction', which implicitly exists there. The child needs no explicit instruction in constructing this ideal theory. The innate features of the human mind produce syntactical structures. Though we use these structures in communication, still they are not essentially connected with communication. If Chomsky's views about the innate contribution to language acquisition are accepted then we find that grammar then provides a striking example of strong innate constraints on the form of human thought.

Bhartṛhari holds that all kinds of meaning (*Yathārtha jātayaḥ sabdaḥ*) are attached to the outer form of the words or syntactical connection of the words (*sabdākṛit nibandhanaḥ*).

Meaning (*arthajāti*) depends on Syntax (*śabdajāti*). Grammar becomes the carrier of all sorts of knowledge (*Vidyānāsa vidyā parayānam*). According to Bharṭṛhari, a word is retained originally in the mind and it is its external application only that we hear it severally at different occasions and in different contexts. As Bharṭṛhari, Chomsky maintains that the semantics (Meaning) depends on syntax or syntactical structure of the sentences.⁵⁶

Like Chomsky, Bharṭṛhari also maintains the existence of universal word or *Śabdabrahman* or 'speech element' or 'word sense' in our mind from the beginning of our life or sociological refinement or tradition.⁵⁷ The eternal word, remains in the mind in its 'minute form'⁵⁸ and which becomes perceivable by the ears, only when it is activated by its own causes. The eternal word, which resides in Breath (*Prāṇa*) and mind (*buddhi*), strikes or moves at different places of articulation and it becomes manifest in the form of different sounds.⁵⁹ For him, the meaning of the sentence is a flash of insight (*pratibhā*). When the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from out of the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different flash of insight is produced

⁵⁶ Chomsky, N (1957), *Syntactic structure*, The Hague: Mouton. Page.17

⁵⁷ VP. I. 121

*Itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā/
Yām pūrvāhitasarṅskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate//*

⁵⁸ VP.I.116

*Ajasravṅtīryaḥ śabdaḥ sukṣmatvānnopalabhyate/
vyañjanādvāyuriva sa svanimittātpatīyate//*

⁵⁹ VP. I.118

*śabdeṣvevāśritā śaktiviśvāsya nibandhanī/
Yannetraḥ pratibhātmāyām bhedarūpaḥ patīyate//*

(out of it). That flash of insight presented by the word-meanings is described as the meaning of the sentences.⁶⁰

Chomsky also agreed to the concept of creativity. According to Chomsky, one of the qualities that all languages have in common is their "creative aspect". By this concept of Creativity, Chomsky meant the capacity that all native speakers of a Language have to produce and understand an indefinitely large number of sentences that they have never heard before. The native speaker's 'creative' command of his language, it should be noted, is in normal circumstances unconscious and unreflecting. He is generally unaware of applying any grammatical rules or systematic principle of formation when he constructs either new sentences or sentences, he has previously encountered. And yet the sentences that he utters will generally be accepted by other native speakers of the language as correct and will be understood by them. Let us define a sentence which has been defined by Chomsky i.e. *colourless green ideas sleep furiously*' basing on our linguistic intuition, we will say that this sentence is not meaningful, but nonetheless grammatical.



⁶⁰ VP.I.143

*Vicchedagrahaṇe' rihānaṁ pratibhā' nyeiva jāyate/
Vākyaṛtha iti tāmahuh padāthai' rūpapādītām//*