

CHAPTER – 5

SOME CONCLUDING AND EVALUATING REMARKS

Regarding the controversy about truth, there are two alternatives of the following types. The truth of a valid cognition gets revealed from every set of causal conditions that generates the cognition itself and does not reveal its falsity (*Jñānaprāmānyam tadaprāmānyā grāhaka tāvajjñāna grāhakasāmagri grāhyam, na vā iti*¹). The another alternative goes like this. The truth of a valid cognition is not determined by a set of causal conditions, which generates the cognition. The first alternative is in favour of *Svataprāmānyavāda* and the second one in favour of *paratahprāmānyavāda*.

A problem may be raised in this connection. Those who propagate the theory of *Svatahprāmānya* believe that a set of causal conditions, which generates the cognition, can illumine its truth also. This view creates a different problem. A set of causal conditions can generate a cognition no doubt, but it cannot reveal its validity. In other words, the truth cannot be known through the same set of causal conditions, which reveal the cognition. In the case of the perceptual cognition of a jar a set of causal conditions like sense organ, object, contact, operation of mind etc. become the prime factor. In this context the content of the cognition is a jar. But how is the truth of the cognition determined by the same collocation of conditions. Truth of a cognition cannot be known through the same collocation of causes i.e., eye, object, contact, mind etc. whether the perpetual cognition of a jar is really a jar or not cannot be known through the same causes through which a jar is known. The sense, object, contact etc. are the causes of the perceptual cognition of a jar, but if this perceptual cognition is illusory the same causal condition can prove its validity leading to a

paradoxical situation. The causal condition generating an illusory cognition can generate its validity afterwards. It will lead to another problem.

Truth according to Nyāya is not merely cognitional truth (*Prāmānya*) but cognitional 'falsity' (*a-prāmānya*) as well that is apprehended 'from other sources' (*paratah*). According to Prabhākara's problem of 'falsity' of cognition would have been relevant if only there really were such a thing as error or 'false cognition'. In fact, according to them there is no such thing. It is not denied indeed that we often speak of cognition as false or erroneous. We speak for example, of the phenomenon of seeing something which is not a snake as a snake or of perceiving something which is not silver as a piece of silver and so on as illusions or false perceptions. How do the *Svataḥ Prāmānyavādins* explain these kind of perception ?

Each and every person has experienced illusion; whenever one attains knowledge, it would have been taken as knowledge proper, which is not always correct, from the standpoint of reality. A person may see something, which is not silver e.g. a piece of *śukti* or nacre as a piece of silver, may then happen to be seized with a desire to possess it and may actually exercise himself to get hold of it. This exercise on the part of a person with reference to some object proves, it may be said, the reality of a cognition (here false) of that object. In the absence of a unitary cognition of something as silver, it is not intelligible how a desire, volition or an action can at all emerge with reference to the silver, which is apprehended in such cognition.

Moreover, it has been accepted that the set of causal conditions revealing a cognition can reveal its truth and remove the chance of incorporation of the falsity of the same (*tadaprāmānyā grāhaka*). The set of conditions reveals truth and removes the chance of falsity. Earlier it is shown that truth is not capable of being revealed through causal conditions grasping cognition. How is the *aprāmānya* of the cognition not grasped ? When truth is revealed to us, we come to know that the falsity of the cognition is not grasped. But the truth is not grasped through the set of conditions like sense-object contact etc. If it is so, how the chance of falsity of the cognition is possible. If the acquired cognition of a jar

is to be proved as true, it is to be done from the standpoint of its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). A jar is to be taken as such if it can contain water, which is its causal efficacy. In the way of chance of falsity of the cognition of a jar cannot be removed if its truth is not determined. If the determination of truth of the cognition of a jar depends on its causal efficacy it is virtually *parataḥ prāmānya*.

Again, if the validity of knowledge were self-evident, then there would be no doubt regarding the validity of knowledge that has not undergone repetition. For if the knowledge is cognized then its validity is also certainly known, so how can there be a doubt? If, on the other hand, the knowledge is not cognized, then in the absence of knowledge of substantive, how can there be a doubt? Therefore the validity of knowledge is to be inferred.²

The theory fails to do justice to an indisputable fact of experience. There is sometimes such a thing as a doubt about whether a cognitive state is veridical or not. On seeing water at a distance a person with a previous experience of a mirage, for example, may naturally have a thought like 'Am I seeing really water? or Is this my cognition of water veridical or not? On hearing a knocking at the door at an odd time one sometimes doubts whether one has heard really a knocking.

Again after seeing a snake in a place having insufficient light, one may naturally doubt whether one has really seen a snake. Such doubts, which undoubtedly take place, cannot be accounted for if every knowledge were initially known to be true, i.e., if knowledge of knowledge always amounts to certainty about its truth.³ Actually it is not found in our day-to-day behaviour. As true cognitions are there, the mental states in the form of doubt etc. are also real phenomena, which goes against the acceptance of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda*.

The Naiyāyikas are consistent in their methodology because they have given the definition of *Pramā* as *tadvatītatprakāra* cognition in which there is a relational cognition between qualifier and qualificant (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-sambandha*). *parataḥ prāmānya* When it is said that '*ghaṭatvavati ghaṭatvaprakāraṇam nānam*' i.e. cognition in which the jariness has become a chief qualifier in a place where jariness really exists. In other words, a jar should

be known as having really qualified by the property 'ghatatva', when a rope is taken as a snake, it is qualified by the snakesness, which does not really exist in an object possessing snakesness. Hence, the relational cognition between qualifier and qualificand in an appropriate place is called *pramā*. When we see an object, we must judge whether it is associated with the property or qualifier existing in it. It directs the fact that a cognition can not automatically taken as *Pramā*, because there is every chance of being illusory (*aprāmā*). Hence the Naiyāyikas admit that cognition is known to be true through the light of the qualifier in the form of property existing in it. Hence it is very much extrinsic (*paratah*). The philosophers who believe in the intrinsic validity of truth have to accept that, as soon as cognition is originated, it is to be taken as true ab initio, because there is no scope to judge its validity. Had it been there, it would have been taken as *paratah* as shown earlier. If each and every cognition is taken as true, there will be no possibility of falsity of cognition, which is very much contrary to the fact. When we assign truth-value, it may be of true or false. Even in our daily life we are encountered with illusion, doubt etc. The advocacy of intrinsic validity of truth (*Svatah prāmānya*) will eradicate the possibility of having illusory and dubious cognition, which is not possible at all. Because truth is so precious as there is falsity or an object having dubious character. Whatever there may be the reasons we cannot deny the fact, which is experienced by us very often. Hence the theory of intrinsic validity of truth (*Svatah prāmānyavāda*) cannot be acceptable to the Naiyāyikas.

To the Naiyāyikas cognition is taken to be true if it leads to the successful inclination (*pravṛttisāmarthya*). From the standpoint of pragmatic value cognition's truth and falsity can be determined. This is very much consistent to the part of the Naiyāyikas and for this reason they always in favour of extrinsic validity of truth (*Paratah prāmānya*). So far as the view if intrinsic validity of truth is concerned, cognition is taken to be true ab initio without considering its pragmatic side. Normally we determine the truth/falsity of cognition if it can lead in to the goal. If water can quench our thirst, it is taken as true. This is the normal practice. If otherwise, it would be taken as presupposition. That is if the

cognition of water is taken as such ab initio, it is taken, as water for the time being without considering is mirage. But truth lies a risk factor in calling something 'water' because it may be contradicted afterwards. This epistemological 'risk' is always there if one adheres to the theory of *Svataḥ prāmānya*.

There is, of course, one point in favour of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda* which goes as follows. When the cognition of water is taken as true in terms of its causal efficacy i.e., quenching of thirst, a skeptic may raise a question as to the perfection of quenching of thirst. To know whether our thirst has been properly quenched or not we need to see other characteristic features or physiological features like softness in the mouth, existence of sufficient salivary etc. pointing to the absence of thirst in an individual. If we see these physiological factors are there, we come to the conclusion that the cognition of causal efficacy is correct. These physiological factors may again be the objects of doubt. If it is so, we need another set of factors to remove this. In this way, there would arise the defect of Infinite Regress. Some may say that in order to remove such complications it is better to accept something as true initially and work accordingly. In fact, we have the trust our acquired cognition for maintaining our day-to-day behaviour. If we on doubt each and every acquired cognition our day-to-day life would not be possible. Because we believe in our sense organs, objects and acquired cognition to some extent. Other wise we cannot proceed forward. Moreover, there are many cognitions which cannot lead us to the fact of successful inclination. When we gather the cognitions through the words 'heaven', 'liberation', 'Brahman etc. these cannot provide us a corresponding image through which we can judge the same as true. If it is said '*Svargakāmoyajeta*' or '*Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma*'. We have accepted these as true ab initio, because there is no scope for applying extrinsic validity of truth here.

In our everyday life correspondence to the reality and non-correspondence to the reality – these two criteria are still adopted by us. Immediately after the cognition of water, if there be a volition followed by the getting of water, the truth (*prāmātva*) of the cognition is ascertained from the

unfailing correspondence. The *vyatireki* inference like, 'the previous cognition is true', because it has led to successful volition : whatever cognition is not true does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, false knowledge ? If after perceiving water, a person wants to have after exercising the necessary volition, then he is assured that his primary perception was veridical or true. This ascertainment is inferential. The form of the inference being. The previous cognition was veridical, for it has led to a successful volition. The inference is '*vyatireki*'⁴ in character, for the Rule of Concomitance involved here is *Vyatireki*, as shown earlier.

The Naiyāyikas admit that when something is known, the truth and falsity of such sentence or object is kept in bracket for the time being. If some one says – 'It is raining outside', the truth and falsity of such sentence cannot be determined *ab initio* and hence this question should be kept in a bracket till verification. If it is confirmed that it is raining outside really, it is to be taken as true, otherwise it will be taken as false. But there are some cases, which cannot be explained if the essence of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda* is not accepted.

Firstly, the Naiyāyikas also believe in the statements made by *Srutis*. In other words, by virtue of being a member of *āstika* Nyāya believes in the authority of the *Vedas*. It is known to us that the Vedic statements are non-verifiable. Some of the cases are confirmed through inference. The Statement about gods existence like '*Dyāvabhūmi janyan devaḥ viśvasya karta bhuvanasya goptā*' is confirmed through the series of syllogistic arguments. But all the statements of the *Sruti* cannot be verified or confirmed through inference or other means. At the same time the Naiyāyikas cannot deny the truth of these Vedic statements. Hence they have no other alternatives than to accept the truth of these intrinsically.

Secondly, the knowledge of an object, which is known many terms, can be attained intrinsically. Whenever we see an object, we remember its causal efficacy. Whenever we see water or food, we definitely know that it will quench our thirst or remove our hunger. Actually we are so habituated that we do not bear slightest doubt about the causal efficacy of it. We never say that let us see

whether this really quenches our thirst or not. Because we are confirmed that it will quench our thirst. Such is the case with other objects. In these cases there is no question of *parataḥ prāmānya*. If the relation of an object and its causal efficacy is in non-habitual state (*anabhyāsadaśā*), there arises the necessity of *parataḥ prāmānya*, but not in the habitual cases.

Thirdly, there are some cases, which are expressed in such a language the truth of which is determined intrinsically. If it said 'it may be a man or trunk of a tree' (*ayam māṁsyo vā sthānurvā bhaviṣyati*); there are two alternatives – a man and trunk of a tree. If it is said whether this is true or not, we may safely say that this sentence is true. If the third alternative is not possible, we may say that either this is a man or trunk of a tree, from which the truth of the sentence follows. We need not go outside the sentence and verify whether the sentence is true or not. How is this truth known? It is known intrinsically. Another example of this sort may be forwarded. '*Ayam satyam mithyāvā*' (i.e., this is either true or false. Here the truth of the sentence follows intrinsically.

Fourthly, the sentence of the trustworthy persons is always taken as true as *Āptavacana* is accepted as a *pramāṇa* by the Naiyāyikas. Hence, the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person is taken as true without depending on external factors. Though the statement made by the trustworthy persons is the result of their verification, it is intrinsically true to us.

Hence, the importance of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda* has to be accepted in some cases, not to all. Hence the importance of this theory cannot be ignored totally. Other than these cases *Parataḥ prāmānyavāda* is relevant.

Some philosophers like Jayanta, the celebrated Naiyāyikas, though differ in some points from old as well as new Naiyāyikas, strongly criticized as a whole Mimāṁsā view of *Svataḥ prāmānya* theory. Being a supporter of *Parataḥ prāmānyavāda* theory he states that fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity is the test of falsehood, i.e., knowledge is true if it fulfils an extra condition (*Pravṛtti*). The Mimāṁsakas argument that the truth of a judgement cannot be determined afterwards, since judgement lasts only two moments and that when judgement causes to exist at the next moment, it cannot

be ascertained extrinsically. But Jayanta points out that the Mimāṃsakas themselves hold that the falsehood of a judgement is extrinsically determined. If the false judgement, according to them, is transitory, then how do they determine it? If they recall it in memory and then judge it extrinsically, the same method is equally applicable in ascertaining the truth of a true judgement.⁵

Jayanta accepts that there are some cases of knowledge whose truth appears to be self-evident. When a new object is cognized repeatedly, it becomes familiar and we need not test the truth of its cognition. On subsequent occasion in the same way in which we tested it when it was new. Truth, in such cases, is known through inference based on knowledge which by itself is neutral i.e. it is not known to be true or false. Had it been possible, then would have been no disappointment in practical activities. On this basis also truth and falsehood are not self-evident, but are always known through inference.

Yet again the Mimāṃsakas may contend that the very experience of an object may be the source of illumination of that object. For instance when a blue thing reveals itself as an awareness of blue, it is itself a piece of cognition. But Jayanta refutes this view stating that in such a situation erroneous cognition e.g. of silver in the shell, would also come under the purview of valid knowledge since awareness of silver is there.

Jayanta further states that the contention of the Mimāṃsakas that a judgement does not depend upon outside factors to determine its own truth is wrong, since when the initial judgement arises in our mind we do not definitely know that it is true. It is only after some time that truth, say of the apprehension of 'blue' is ascertained. The factor that ascertains the truth of a judgement is the successful inclination (*Pravṛttisāmarthya*) that follows it.⁶

Professor Raghunath Ghosh in his unpublished paper – '*The Advaita Concept of Pramā : Some Paradoxes*', has been made an effort to show some paradoxes in the definition of *pramā* (valid cognition) which has been defined by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra in his *Vedānta paribhāṣā*. To Advaitins valid cognition acquaints us with something new (*anadhigata*). In other words, novelty is a characteristic feature of truth. The memory cognition is excluded from the

purview of valid cognition no doubt, but it also excludes the recognitive cognition (*Pratyābhijñā*). Memory cognition is generated through our earlier impression alone (*Samskāramātrajanya*), while recognitive cognition is caused by the impression of the past experiences associated with the presence of the object (*Samskārajanya* but not *Samskāramātrajanya*). If it said that the object of the cognition is *anadhigata* i.e., not known earlier, it excludes both memory and recognitive cognition, because recognitive cognition is not *anadhigata* but acquired earlier. There is some justification to accept memory cognition as invalid, because the content is not verifiable due to the absence of it. As due to its non-verifiability there is every chance of committing mistake so there is no guarantee that such cognition (*Pratyābhijñā*) would be veridical. As the term *anadhigata* is incorporated in the definition it cannot justify the recognitive cognition, as it is already acquired (*adhigata*) and hence not new.

Keeping the earlier objection in view Dharmarāja Adhvarindra perhaps has tried to justify day-to-day behaviour in the light of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), which does not solve the real problem. To him an object known for a period of time is called persistent cognition of the same. When we keep looking at the table for example, it is not the same object seen for a period of time but it is different in different moments. An object existing in each and every moment is completely new (*anadhigata*) but not repeated what is already acquired can not solve the earlier problem of recognitive cognition. But if each and every object is temporally different from each other and if it is new, then how is an object recognized as identical, which will lead to the non-acceptance of recognition but which is accepted as valid in Advaita Vedānta so the term *anadhigata* as an adjunct to the object cannot justify all types of valid knowledge.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has described such type of recognitive cognition as indeterminate perceptual cognition (*Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa*). Prof. Raghunath Ghosh claims that it is paradoxical to the Advaitins that they have accepted unacquired or new cognition as a valid cognition (*pramā*) on the one hand and nirvikalpaka perception on the other. The Advaitins have given the example –

'This is That Devadatta' (*Sóyam Devadatta*) from the secular world, which points to the recognitive cognition, as the present *Devadatta*' is identified with the past *Devadatta*'. In other words, there is an identity between the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of Devadatta as our inner organ called *antahkaraṇa* goes out of the body and assumes the form of *Devadatta*'. Though the present *Devadatta*' and past *Devadatta*' are different in terms of times and though they are not completely identical yet there is an essential identity (*Svarūpagatatādātmya*) between them, which entails that they are not completely unacquired (*anādhigata*). In the same way the *Mahāvākya* – 'Tattvamasi' (Thou art That) signifies the essential identity between two – 'Thou (*tvam*) and 'That' (*tat*) i.e., Brahman or *Ātman*. In this case the phenomenon of *anādhigatatva* does not exist, leading to the falsity of the *nirvikalpaka* – cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka* – cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka* – cognition is proved as falsified, it would lead to the falsity of the *Mahāvākya*, which suicidal to the Advaitins. For the import of the *Mahāvākya* makes a platform to realize the ultimate Reality. The falsity of *Mahāvākya*, leads to the falsity of the whole metaphysical presupposition. Hence the term *anādhigata* creates confusion in the Advaita-Vedānta system of Philosophy and it should be excluded from the definition.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra had made an effort to justify the fact of being unacquired by introducing the concept of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*). To consider a piece of cognition, as occupying a moment is an attempt to justify the theory of momentariness as accepted by the Buddhists. As the Buddhists believe in the theories of *Svalakṣaṇa*, so-soul or permanent entities like *Sāmānya* etc. so they are consistent in propagating the theories of momentariness. But the theory of momentariness is not at all supportable by the Advaitisms because they believe in the existence of permanent self, but not in *Svalakṣaṇa* etc. In course of formulation of the theories of the perceptuality of cognition of an object (*Jñānagata pratyakṣa*) and the perceptuality of object (*Viśayagata pratyakṣa*), the Advaitins recommend the amalgamation of different limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of the consciousness like Viśayacaitanya (the consciousness

limited by object), *Pramāṇacaitanya* (consciousness limited by mental mode) etc. But an amalgamated situation cannot be a momentary one. Even if it is accepted as momentary, how can it be known as perception of a jar or the perception of the cognition of jar ? All these problems remain unresolved if the term *anadhigata* is not withdrawn from the definition.

It may be argued that a valid memory-cognition leads us always to the successful inclination (*Niyatasamvādo-pravr̥tti*), it comes under the purview of *pramā* (valid cognition) and hence it being a *defiendum* of a valid cognition cannot be said that it leads to the probability of the uselessness of the term *anadhigata*. In response to this it is said that the term serves the purpose of excluding the use of something, which is the qualifier of being a valid cognition other than the right memory-cognition. That is, it is useful on account of the fact that it can exclude wrong memory cognition (*ayathārtha-smṛiti*) from the purview of the valid cognition. Under such circumstances the validity of the capability of successful inclination (*Samvādi-pravr̥thyupayukta prāmāṇyam*) should not be determined as a criterion of valid cognition. In order to indicate this the adjunct *anadhigata* in the definition is justified. In other words, the fact of successful inclination of cognition presupposes its previous cognition, which is certainly *anadhigata* at least removes the possibility of excluding successful inclination as a criterion of valid cognition. In this connection it may be said that if such case is excluded with use of the term *anadhigata*, what is the utility of another term *avādhita* inserted in this definition ?

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has inserted the term *Avādhita* as an adjunct of object, which entails that the cognition of an object existing in the phenomenal world, must not be contradicted, by the latter cognition, in the phenomenal state, but not in the transcendental level. It implies factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which have an empirical reality. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The term *Avādhita* can test the truth of an object in the empirical level.

The insertion of the term *Avādhita* creates some philosophical confusion. If, there is cognition in the form : 'It is raining outside' – the question may raise

how the truth-value of such sentence can be determined ? Definitely we have to look outside whether the incident described in the sentence is true or false, which will go in favour of *Parataḥ prāmāṇyadā*, not accepted by the Advaitin. If it is said – ‘The sentence is either true or false’, it can easily be said that the sentence is true without going out of the sentence i.e. intrinsically true. It is stated by Dharmarāja Advarindra that the validity is intrinsically known. The meaning of term *Svataḥ* is as follows. The collocation of causes, which can reveal the object existing in it, can also reveal its validity if and only if there is the absence of defect. The substratum of it is the knowledge of *vṛtti* or mental mode, which can reveal the witness (*Sāksi*). If the cognition of *vṛtti* is apprehended it can apprehend the validity of it also. It has already been said that the various transformation of *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* or mind are called *vṛtti*. As this *vṛtti* is known through the witness, the validity existing in it also is known through the same witness. It may be argued that if it is accepted that the validity of *Svataḥ*, there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity. Because in each and every case witness will reveal the knowledge of *vṛtti* resulting in a knowledge of intrinsic validity. Under this situation there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity, which is contrary to the fact. But in fact we generally feel the doubt of validity. So according to Professor Raghunath Ghosh, the truth value of the sentence ‘It is raining outside’ – can be determined extrinsically, which goes in favour of *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*, which is not accepted by the Advaitins leading to a paradoxical situation.⁷

I completely agree with Prof. Ghosh’s view on the tenability of the term *anadhigata*, which I think is quite reasonable.

So far as the Buddhist view is concerned, it is not free from some problems. We know that the Buddhists believe in the theory of momentariness and the theory of extrinsic validity of truth, *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. But at the same time it is to be kept in mind that these can be related. So we should propose a theory, which should protect both the theory of momentariness and the theory of extrinsic validity of truth or *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. That which corresponds to reality (*avisamvādhikam*) is called valid cognition (*pramā*) according to the

Buddhism. Now the term *avisamvādaka* used in Buddhist system as the unfailing correspondence to the truth, generally suggests that they are in favour of *parataḥ prāmānya* because when e.g., water is known to be 'real' we have to see whether it quenches our thirst or not, if otherwise it is not water or it is pseudo water. But if this view is taken into account, the Naiyāyikas can refute this view in the following way. First in the same moment it is not possible to know an object and its causal efficacy on which *prāmānya* depends. Causal efficacy is technically called *arthakriyākāritva*. An *arthakriyākāritva* is a matter by virtue of which an object is known as such, e.g., fire can be taken as 'sat' or real if it can cook something or if it can produce some heat. So only fire is to be known as 'sat' or existence in terms of its causal efficacy. So it is not possible for a person to know both the object and its causal efficacy at the same moment. In the first moment we can know the object, in the second moment we can know the causal efficacy and we can relate them in the third moment. So if we adhere to this theory then we can not protect the sanctity of the theory of momentariness. So *parataḥ prāmānya* is a kind of contradictory step taken by the Buddhist. If it is believed as 'Svataḥ' as soon as the object arises, the validity itself is known, then it would have been consonant with the metaphysical presupposition. As their metaphysical presuppositions are like theories of momentariness, no-soul theory all these things, so *parataḥ prāmānya* should not be applicable to them. An *arthakriyākāritva* is also a kind of *parataḥ prāmānya*, which is similar to the pragmatic theory of truth. So from the pragmatic standpoint an object is to be taken as true or false. If it is so, then water fire can be known as 'sat' if it can quench our thirst or it can cook food. So these functions can be ascertained just after few moments. So here theory of momentariness and the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* can not be known together within a single moment if moment is taken as a fraction of second of a time, minutest particle of time it is impossible for human beings to know both the things at a same moment. Therefore the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* is incongruous to them, to their own metaphysical theories. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* and the object of existence – they are not similar. At first an object is existent

because it will have some *arthakriyākāritva*, *arthakriyā kāritvalakshanam sat'* and whenever the *arthakriyākāritva* is there, it is taken to be the admirer of *parataḥ prāmānya*. So *parataḥ prāmānya* is to be taken, pragmatic value is to be taken, as consistent, if they do not believe in theory of momentariness. So if we keep together theory of momentariness in one hand and theory of *parataḥ prāmānyavāda*, a pragmatic view in another hand they cannot be taken together. Moreover, the definition of perception is given in the following. An object free from mental construction and non-erroneous is called perceptual entity (*Kalponāpodḥam abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). If the perceptual object is free from mental constructions, it is unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) in nature. If an object is *svalakṣaṇa*, it has to be taken as having no truth-value, because there does not arise any question of falsity. If it is so the phrase – ‘abhrāntam’ (non-erroneous) is useless, because it is already proved that it is beyond truth and falsity. Moreover, if we want to know its non-erroneous character, we have to depend on our experience of its causal efficacy. For the attainment of such experience we need more than one moment and hence, it will lose the objects momentary character. For this reason the Buddhist view is not tenable and this view is not to be taken as logically sound.

Now let us try to throw some light on mokṣakaragupta's opinion on the concept of *pramā*, *pramāṇa* and *prāmānya* and a critical evaluation of them.

Mokṣakaragupta, a Buddhist Logician, believes that a source of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not different from the valid cognition (*pramā*) itself as told earlier. A source of valid cognition is valid cognition of an object not known before. Like Dharmakīrti he also believes that *pramā* and *pramāṇa* are identical on account of the fact that he holds that consciousness, as the principle of self-manifestation is the source of all cognition. A source of knowledge is something by means of which an object is validly apprehended. This source is valid knowledge itself, because it is free from the defect of doubt and illusion (*Pramāṇam samyogjñānamapūrvagocaram. pramiyate nenetī pramāṇam. tadeva samyogjñānam, sandeha viparyā-sadoṣa rahitatvat*).⁸ A piece of valid cognition is called an uncontradicted experience (*avisamvādirjñānam*) in this world. And

this uncontradicted experience is not found in doubtful cognition or illusory cognition. Referring to an unknown object means the object of valid cognition is not known before. Valid knowledge of an object refers to an object, e.g., a jar. Knowledge produced by the presence of an object, which certifies the real nature of the object, and which is capable of making us attain the object is called the source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The truth of knowledge remains in its ability to produce successful activity. Valid knowledge is harmonious in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity to obtain it. Thus *pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *Pramāṇa* is its source. *Apramāṇa* shows an object and this relation creates movement in the known to obtain an object (*prāpaka*). Hence a *pramāṇa* has got the capacity of leading someone to the attainment of an object. (*Avisamvādakam jñānamlokesamyajñānamabhidhiyate...gocarovisayoghatādihyasmādutpannam. Tadarthaprāpaṇa योग्यामज्ञानमप्रामाणम्*⁹).

The Naiyāyikas might raise objection to the above-mentioned position of the Buddhists in the following manners.

Knowledge is an action, an individual, having knowledge is an agent and a thing known is an object. How can a cognition be called *pramāṇa* if it does not help a person to attain an object and it is unable to cause him to attain an object? In reply the Buddhists might say that we do not mean to say that a person having knowledge is compelled to act pulling a person by the neck forcibly, but that 'determination in the form i.e., the essential nature of the object is such and such and not otherwise' is caused by knowledge. This much action is called the validity of knowledge. The knowledge is true when it reveals its object with the nature and attributes which abide in it. (*Na hi jñānena puruṣa gale padukānyāyena batadarthe pravartayitavyaḥ. api tvevambhūtamidam vastusvarupam nānyathetyanenākāreṇa niścayo janaitavyaḥ*).¹⁰

A person having knowledge may take action or may not depend on the situation of necessity. (*Purusastu tatra prayojanavaśāt pravartamrte prayojanam, na pravartatām*).¹¹

It may be argued by the Naiyāyikas that the validity of cognition is examined by the uncontradicted experience (*avisamvādi*), which is again proved by the attainment of the object (*arthaprāpti*). But we can not attain the same object, which we have perceived because of momentariness of the object. Moreover, what is perceived is the outward form (*rūpa*) of the object and what is attained is the tangibility (*sparsatva*). Thus one thing is perceived and another is attained. How then this knowledge becomes valid ? (*Nanvavisamvādatkatvena jñānasya prāmāṇyam. Avisamvādatkatvam ca dr̥ṣṭartha prāpanat Na ca yadr̥ṣṭamtat prapyate kṣaṇikavat kiñca rupam dr̥ṣṭam prapyate ca sprastavyam Tatonyadr̥ṣṭamanyat prapyata ityapratitaprāpanāt katham prāmāṇyamasya sangacchatam.*¹²

The above-mentioned objection is not tenable. For even if we obtain an object what is really different from the object we have perceived, we still have the definite cognition (*adhyavasāya*) of identity. 'I attain the same object which I have perceived' and this is meant by the expression 'attainment of what has been apprehended' (*pratipanna*). On the contrary the knowledge of water in mirage is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain an object (*Na yadināma vastuto 'nyadeva prāpyate tathāpi dr̥ṣṭamevamayā prāptamiyekatvādhyavasāyātpratitaprāpanamabhidhiyate. Tattumaricikādijalajñānam tadaprāpanayogyatvādaPramāṇameva*).¹³ To them the distinctive property of validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by its origin in general. Yet we can ascertain the distinction of one from the other by the specific features. For example, a man of low intelligence may not be able to ascertain the validity of his knowledge at the time of its origin yet he can ascertain the validity of the knowledge of fire or water through such perceptions as burning, cooking, drinking etc. when he sees them a far. A man with sharp intellect can ascertain it through his perception. (*Jñānotpattimātrena tu na bhrāntābhrāntayobhedo vadhāryate. Tataśca kattam tat samyogjñānamiticet naisa doṣaḥ yadyapi tathāpi jñāndviśeṣodayādyaithaikasya vaiśiṣṭyam tathoevate ...*).¹⁴

To the Buddhists uncontradicted means the existence of efficacy. In case of sound of a word the hearing is the efficiency, since the purpose of the sound is

served if it is simply heard (*arthasvarūpapratitirhi prāmānyam, tacca vāhyārthakriyā prāptimantareṇāpi sambhavati ... Śabdasya śrutimātreṇaiva caritārthatvāt śrutireva tatrārthakriyastitheh*).¹⁵

Whatever may be the argument in favour of the notion of *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* induced by Mokṣakaragupta cannot be accepted if the philosophical problems raised earlier are not removed. In fact, the characteristic features of *Avisamvādatva* cannot justify the theory of momentariness, what is seen cannot be attained due to the effect of momentariness. Whatever is perceived outwardly cannot be attained other wards due to the change of nature of an object. For this reason it is said that whatever is seen or perceived is not perceived but tangible (*Spārsāna*) in character. Hence the theory of *avisamvādatva* does not stand in the eye of logic if the theory of momentariness is taken for granted. The experience in the form – ‘I attain the object, which is seen earlier’ cannot justify the identity of the objects seen and attained. If such *adhyavasāya* are taken for granted, we have to admit that there is no effect of momentariness, which is impossible to accept by the Buddhists. For this reason they have introduced two levels of truth-ultimate (*Paramārtha*) and concealed (*sambhṛta*). In the latter case such experiences are allowed, but these have ultimate value. When they talk of *Kṣaṇabhangavāda*, *Nairatmyavāda* etc. they focus on the ultimate truth, which can lead one to attainment of *nirvāna*. Hence, we cannot ignore the key-concepts like *kṣanika* etc. and if it exists, the *avisamvādaka* theory or *adhyavasāya* theory will surely fail leading to the feature of the definition of *pramā*.

Moreover, the determination of *pramātva* and *prāmānya* is not possible at the same time. Because, when a piece of cognition is known as *pramā*, it is the result of some on going procedure held or adopted. The process always precedes the result. Hence when a process is on the way, right cognition is not there. When the right cognition is attained, the process is completed. It is said by Mokṣakaragupta also that ‘*Pramiṃyate*’ *neneti Pramāṇam*, which indicates the existence of some instrumental procedural factors, which are called *pramāṇas*. Though the Buddhists have tried to say that a cognition is free from doubt,

illusion etc. It is known from the valid cognition itself, which is not convincing. If a valid cognition itself were the source of knowing it as free from illusion etc. why has the clause – ‘*Avisamvādatva*’ been brought in as a criterion ? The unfailingness can only be determined by some external factors through some procedural methods that are not obviously the valid cognition itself. Hence their standpoint does not seem to be convincing logically.

Lastly, we have seen that it is the contention of Vātsyāyana that the right cognition of the sixteen categories in which *pramāṇa* is the first leads us to the attainment of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*).¹⁶ But if the right cognition of the first category i.e., *pramāṇa* itself is recognized as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*) then why the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) hits the list ? How can the right cognition of the first category i.e. *pramāṇa* be known ? Is it through other *pramāṇa* ? If answer is positive, how can the second *pramāṇa* be known ? In this way there would arise the defect of infinite regress (*anavastha*). If the cognition of the first category is not possible, how it can illumine other categories ?

Again in the introductory portion Vātsyāyana tries to distinguish between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇbhāsa* (*pseudo-pramāṇa*) as I mentioned before, by way of adopting the method of extrinsic validity. In fact, the main intention of the Bhāṣyakāra is to establish a thesis that under all circumstances a *pramāṇa* is connected with its object through the capacity of producing successful activity (*pravṛttisāmasthya*), which is known as proof by *parataḥ prāmāṇya*. Here there will arise another problem, that how can we know the validity of the second *pramāṇa* ?

Considering the importance of *pramāṇa* Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that without the proper cognition of *pramāṇa* the object cannot be properly grasped. If it is not grasped properly, no one can have successful inclination towards the object. The cognizer, after cognizing an object with the help of *pramāṇa* (means of knowing), wants to avail or forsake the object. The effort in the form of availing or forsaking is called volition. Whether our volition is successful or not depends on the result of the inclination. The object is in the form of happiness or

the cause of happiness. It may also be in the form of misery or the cause of misery. These objects of *pramāṇa* are infinite in number, as the persons adopting these are infinite in number.

According to the nihilists Skeptics, the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of the category called *pramāṇa* is not at all possible and hence there is no possibility of having right cognition of other objects. To Goutama the real means of the right cognition is called *pramāṇa*. When we have awareness, it is very difficult to detect the rightness of the awareness. This is the reason, the determination of the rightness of *pramāṇa* i.e., *pramāṇa* is beyond our capacity. That is why Goutama's Nyāya philosophy would turn into a *Sāstra*, which is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. In order to avoid such problems and to refute such views of the nihilists and Skeptics, Vātsyāyana begins with the determination of the validity of *pramāṇa* with the texts - *Pramāṇato'rthapratipattau* etc.

'*Pramāṇam arthavat*' means *Prāmāṇya* is non-deviated to the object (*arthavyabhicāri*). From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of *pramāṇa* is proved. *Arthavat* denotes 'an eternal connection' (*nityayoga*) indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (*avyabhicāri*), is called *sādhyā* of the inference inferred on the strength of the argument or hetu - '*pravṛtti sāmāthyā*' i.e., the capacity of leading to successful inclination. Here again another question will arise - if *pramāṇa* of the above inference is dependent on another inference, how can the *pramāṇa* be determined of the second one ? If there is the doubt of the *pramāṇa*, there cannot be the ascertainment of the same.

But the Naiyāyikas hold that there does not always arise the doubt of *pramāṇa* in each and every inferential cognition. Innumerable works have been done depending on time, which inferred from the watch. Many theories have been discovered depending on the mathematical calculations. But there does not always arise the doubt of *pramāṇa*. Daily business is continued on the basis of the weight taken through the scales, which is not always doubted. Moreover, if there is doubt, the cause of it must be shown. If someone adduces some

arguments in favour of some doubt, he has to take recourse to inference whose validity must be admitted. If there were no argument in favour of doubt, it would be taken as unreal. As there is an innumerable piece of inference through which our life is moving forward, there is no question of such doubt. Otherwise, there would not have been inclination towards some activities or objects. Even the Skeptics are inclined to some actions out of having some sort of certainty on these. If the phenomenon of successful inclination becomes deviated from object, it would remain in the *pseudo-Pramāṇa* also of the unfailing inclination remains in something which is deviated from an object, it may remain in the *Pramāṇābhāsa* also, which is not at all possible.

To the believers of absolute nihilism there is no real object like *pramāṇa* – as to them the usages of *Pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc, are imaginary. Hence to them, all cognitions are false and as a result, it follows from this that all *Pramāṇas* are nothing but *Pramāṇābhāsa*. If it is taken for granted, the nihilists would not be in a position to explain an individual's inclination towards something. If it is taken that water if cognized as such is illusory, then why does an individual incline to have water ? From the syllogistic argument in the form 'this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to a successful inclination' (*idam Jñānam yathārtham saphalapravṛtti – janakatvāt*), it is proved that the cognition of water is valid.

So the importance of the theory of *Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* cannot be ignored totally and has to accept in some cases. Other than these cases *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* is relevant and the Naiyāyikas, in our opinion, are consistent in their views.

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