

CHAPTER – 4

THEORIES OF PARATAḤ PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

SECTION – I

BUDDHIST THEORY OF PARATAḤ PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

We have analyzed the various notions of Prāmānyavā, upheld by the different propagators of the theory of *Svataḥprāmānya*. Now we take up the theory of *Parataḥ Prāmānya*, especially as upheld by the Buddhist and Nyāya School of Philosophy.

According to Buddhism Pramā is a kind of unfailling correspondence to the truth, which is called *avisamvāda*. *Avisamvāda* means to know an object as it is. So particularly Dharmakīrti has given this definition only to make others understand what *Pramā* is and it is to be kept in mind that the Buddhist do not make any distinction between *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* i.e. valid cognition and instrument of valid cognition because to them both the valid knowledge arises at the same moment. To show honour to the theory of momentariness they do not believe that there is a distinction between *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists consider only the momentary unique particulars (*Svalakṣaṇa*) to be real (*sat*). A momentary unique particular (*Svalakṣaṇa*) could not intermediate between the subject (*Kartā*) and the instrument (*Karaṇa*) and also produce the effect (*Phala*) within a moment. So the classical notion of causality is considered by the Buddhist Logicians as imaginary and therefore unreal (*Kalpitaḥ karma kartrādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate*) for according to the classical notion, valid cognition being an effect must have some instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*). The instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) must proceed the

effect (*Pramā*) and is most predominant condition (*atiśayatva*) among other conditions as well and which being present the effect immediately follows.

To have some causal relations between two realities (*sattā*) needs at least two moments, one moment is for its origination, and the next moment is for its relation to others. According to the Buddhist Logicians if one would like to stick to the concept of valid cognition (*Pramā*) along with the concept of its instrument (*Pramāṇa*), they are in relation of identity (*tādātmya*). The Buddhist Logicians hold that each and every cognition has an intentionality towards some object (*Viṣayonmukhatā*) and thus illuminates a momentary particular (*Svalakṣaṇa*). The cognizance of object means the illumination of consciousness with a certain form having some content. In such a situation we may only metaphorically conceive that when we cognize an object viz. blue, our consciousness takes the form of the object blue (*Viṣayākāra*) when we perceive blue a corresponding form of object 'blue' is stamped upon our cognition. Here it is this objective equiformity (*arthasārūpyameyarūpatā*) that determines or measure the limit of the perceptual judgement, 'this is blue' and thus eliminates the objects other than blue from the ken of perception, when one makes a judgement 'it is blue'. The cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is fixed to a particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination (to a particular object), Buddhists called *vyāvasthāpanā* and the cognition which is thus fixed is called *vyāvasthāpya* and in answer to the question which does fix the cognition to a particular object (*vyāvasthāpaka*), Buddhists say that it is the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*), which is the instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) fix the cognition to a particular object. According to Buddhists, objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*) is more basic and therefore more reasonable as instrument than sense organ (*indriya*) or sense object contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarsa*), which has only secondary significance in epistemology. For sometimes the sense organ being present, the effect perceptual cognition does not take place. "*Sarvātmānāpi sambandhamkascid eva gamyatedharmah, sanīyamona syāt sambandhyasya viśesataḥ*".¹

Here the Naiyāyika's objection is that the Buddhist concept of instrumentality (*Karanatva*) goes against the common usage as well as the grammatical notion (*Pra + mā + anāt*) of instrumentality, for common usage sense organ is taken as an instrument of perceptual cognition. In response to this objection the Buddhist Logicians hold that the instrumentality has the root to the famous grammarian Panini, according to whom 'instrument' is most effective or most predominant for the origination of effect (*Sādhakatamam kāranam karanam*) and which being present the effect follows immediately. The objective equiformity for *Dharmakīrti* is the last differentiator, after which cognition is bound to manifest.

The Buddhists believe in pragmatism. The most fundamental feature of Buddhistic pragmatism can be expressed in the word work-ability or practical value, the Buddhist is a pledged pragmatist professing that truth consists essentially in the conative satisfaction of the knowing agent. To him truth consists in the attainment of the object capable of satisfying same purpose of the knower (*arthakriyā samarthavastu pradarsakani samyagjñānām*).

In our everyday experience truth conceived empirically has a practical side of it, which cannot be altogether separated from it. When a thing is known correctly the natural tendency of the knower is to put his correct knowledge to practice. He is not content with the mere theoretical knowledge of the object, but he always goes beyond to see if the object so known is either heya i.e. to be shun or avoided or *upādeya* i.e. to be accepted or appropriated. Dr. Radhākṛishnan explains it thus 'Existence or *sattvā* means practical efficiency or *arthakriyākāritva*. Existence is the capacity to produce some change in the order of things. The seed exists, since it produces shoots, permanent things, however, cannot possess this power of producing changes. If things were unchanged in past, present and future, there would be no reason why they should produce different effects at different points of time. If it is said that the potential power is permanent and it and whenever the *arthakriyākāritva* is there it is taken to be the admirer of *paratahprāmānya*. So *paratahprāmānya* is to be taken, pragmatic value is to be taken as consistent, if they do not believe in theory of

momentariness. So if we keep together theory of momentariness in one hand and theory of *paratahprāmānyavāda*, a pragmatic view in another hand they cannot be taken together. Moreover, the definition of perception is given in the following.

An object free from mental constructions and non-erroneous is called perceptual entity (*Kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). If the perceptual object is free from mental constructions, it is unique particular (*Svalaksana*) in nature. If an object is *Svalaksana*, it has to be taken as having no truth-value, because there does not arise any question of falsity. If it is so, the phrase – ‘*abhrāntam*’ (non-erroneous) is useless, because it is already proved that it is beyond truth and falsity. Moreover if we want to know its non-erroneous character, we have to depend on our experience of its causal efficacy. For the attainment of such experience we need more than one moment and hence, it will lose the objects momentary character. For this reason the Buddhist view is not tenable. So Buddhist view is not to be taken as logically sound becomes actual, when certain other conditions are fulfilled, it is replied that whatever has power to do a thing does it, and whatever does not do it has no power. If the conditions bring about the change, then they alone exist and not permanent things. If existence means causal efficiency then things that exist are momentary.

The Buddhist giving the example of chariot wheel says that ‘strictly speaking the duration of life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts. Just as a chariot which in rolling rolls only at the point of tyre, and in resting rests only at one point, in exactly the same way the life of a living being lasts only for the period of one thought. As soon as that thought has ceased the living being is said to have ceased’.

Just as the analogy of a flame, which is always being renewed and never remains even for a moment identical with itself. A thing is more other than the conglomeration of diverse characteristics, which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomeration, appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same.

As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristics, the conglomeration is to be called a new one.² Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called *arthakriyākāritva*, which literally translated means – the power of performing actions and purposes of same kind.

Ratnakirti uses this very sense in the definition of existence or *Sattva*. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event and as such it is regarded as the characteristics definition of existence (*Sattvā*). Thus he says in *Kṣaṇabhangasiddhi*³ that though in different philosophical systems there are different definitions of existence of being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition existence and *arthakriyākāritva* (efficiency of causing any action of event).

The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific action or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existence or 'Sat'. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence.

The Buddhists is so much professed to say that self same definite specific effect which is produced now was never produced before and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again, so the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds, it had no such power than we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the

meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such power as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered and which existed even when the power was not exerted, we see the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments there should also be as many new existence i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing of each moment that exists a new power. This definition of existence conforms to the pragmatic view of Buddhism.

Buddha denies to apply his thought to first causes as well as to final causes. He is concerned with actual existence under not ultimate reality. Buddha's system is not a *darśana* or philosophy but *ayāna* or vehicles, a practical method leading to liberation. Buddha analyses experiences, discuss true nature. Buddha confines his attention to the World. He adopts an attitude of pragmatic agnosticism about transcendental realities. This alone is consistent with the facts of experience, the deductions of reason and the law of morality.

According to the Buddhists, cognition is 'apprehended intrinsically (*Sasamvedana*), because the so-called instrumental condition, on which the origination of the effect depends in is intrinsic and essential feature of cognition. Intrinsic apprehension, unlike the second order cognition (*anuvyāvasāya*) of the Naiyāyikas, which reveals the nature of antecedent cognition, means that cognition reveals itself. The momentary unique cognition having some content as its object cannot reveal itself intrinsically. So if objective equiformity is taken as an instrument, the intrinsic apprehension (*Svasamvedana*) could not be established to the same cognition because the object having some content in objective equiformity (*Viśayākāra*) is different from the required content of cognition for intrinsic apprehension (*Svasamvedana*).

Again the Buddhists logician advocates that a real (*Sattā*) being itself non-illuminated could not illumine other objects of the same time it is bound to illumine itself also. It is the form of an object as being stamped upon cognition is

taken, though metaphorically only, to be the instrument of cognition (*Pramāṇā*) which is not different by virtue from cognition itself and is said to be originated by the same content. Hence both objective equiformity as the instrument of cognition (*Pramāṇā*) and intrinsic apprehension of cognition (*Svasamvedana*) could go simultaneously.

But the Mimāṃsakas object here that as an indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) cannot illumine an object distinctly, so in Buddhist system, determinate or judgemental cognition is *Pramā* and as because determinate or judgemental cognition (*Savikalpakajñāna*) logically entails the existence of indeterminate cognition (*Visistajñānam viśesaṇa jñāna purvakam*), so indeterminate cognition is the instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*). For example, when one cognizes ‘this is blue’, the adjective ‘blue’ can be predicated only if the cognition of ‘blue ness’ precedes that cognition. If such basic indeterminate cognition does not proceed then one cannot ascribe something as blue.

But the determinate judgement in Buddhist system cannot be valid cognition for it contradicts with the concept of momentariness (*Ksanikatvavāda*). Determinate cognition (*Vikalpa-adhyāvasyāya*) are thought constructed and so need subsequent moment for its construction. But the unique real particulars no more exist at the time of judgemental construction. Hence judgemental cognition (*Vikalpa-adhyāvasyāya*) cannot grasp the unique real particulars (*Svalakṣaṇa*).

Moreover, indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) can’t illumine the object in a specific way. On the otherhand, objective equiformity can only illumine the object without delay in a distinct way. Yet some Buddhist Loyalists may argue that indeterminate cognition said to be instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) only in the sense that the real source of the power of making cognition specific resides in the original pure sensation. Though the argument is untenable, for it presupposes that the power of making a cognition specific begins at the first moment and it only explicitly makes a cognition specific in the second moment which goes against the ontological presupposition of momentariness.

Momentary unique cognition is of the nature of self-revealing (*Sasamvedanasvaparakāśa*). Again as the cognition reveals some external objects (*Visayanmukhatā*) the validity or truth of the cognition is extrinsic (*Paratahprāmānya*). For the Buddhist Logicians the validity or truth can be ascertained only if it leads to successful activity (*Sophalapravṛttipravartaka*). Thus the origination of cognition can reveal its own bare content, which is not vitiated with mental ascription (*Kalpanā*) without depending upon another subsequent cognition, but whether the content of cognition really corresponds with the external objects has to be determined by another subsequent cognition.

Again the Buddhist Logicians may argue that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the defining characteristics (*Lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā* = *Pramāṇa*) and non-contradiction and causal efficacy is the criterion for determining the truth of cognition. When both these criteria are fulfilled then the cognition in question, could be said to be valid. But yet there will be the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*). For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond, and he gets it. Here both the criteria are fulfilled because though he misunderstood 'the reflection of light on the diamond as diamond', the cognition assumes the form of that diamond (*meyarūpatā*) and luckily he gets the diamond also. On the other hand, seeing the diamond the other man runs to get the diamond and gets it. Here also both the criteria are fulfilled. Yet this explanation cannot distinguish between error and valid cognition. So the Buddhist Logician's definition of valid cognition along with the criterion of determining the truth of cognition fails to distinguish between error and valid cognition.

SECTION – II

NYĀYA THEORY OF PARATAḤPRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA

According to the Nyāya definition, cognitional 'truth' is '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' i.e., the truth of cognitive state is constituted by the fact that its 'determinandum' or the element that is, 'the characterized' in the complex cognitum has actually the determinans the element that is 'the characterizes' that is presented in the cognition.⁴ More formal definition is : true knowledge is an experience whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object (*tadvatitatprakāratvam*) e.g., the knowledge 'S is P' has amongst others two qualifiers, 'S-ness and P-ness'. If the knowledge is to be true, then the qualifiers must really belong to S, which is the qualificandum. The definition includes one variable i.e.; the word '*tat*' which occurs twice, When the variable has been given a value.⁵ One part of the definition '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' refers to an ontological situation, the other to an epistemological. The expression '*tatprakāratva*' refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that the knowledge under consideration has that (*tat*) as 'its' qualifier. The expression '*tadvati*' refers to a correlative ontological situation namely, to the fact that which is the qualifiers of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge. A.N. Whitehead says the entity designated by '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' a 'hybrid' entity. Truth is neither a property of the object nor a mere property of the knowledge. According to Gangeśa it is rather relational in nature and as such has to be defined with reference to both the relative, the object and the knowledge.⁶ According to the Language of '*Tarkasangraha-dipika*', the determinandum, the determinans and the relation of having between the *prakāra* and *viśesya* are the necessary components of the cognition.

Now, I will discuss how this definition applies to cases of true knowledge and does not apply to cases of false knowledge. In the case of a true knowledge. I know a piece of silver as silver, the knowledge is expressed in the form, 'This is Silver'. This knowledge has three qualifiers, 'thisness', 'Silver' and 'Silverness', as the value of the variable (*tat*). The knowledge in that case is one, which has 'Silverness' as its qualifier, it is '*rajatatvaprakāra*'. Now this designates real silver we can say that the this possesses Silverness (or, is *rajatatvavat*). The knowledge therefore possesses the property of *rajatatvavati rajatatvaprakāratva*, which is the same as the truth of this knowledge, 'this is silver'.

On the other hand in a case of error e.g., mistaking a piece of shell for silver when I express my knowledge in the judgement. 'This is Silver', this knowledge has also "Silverness" for its qualifiers. As regards the qualifiers there is nothing to distinguish right knowledge from error. The distinction then has to be sought in the fact that in error the "Silverness" which functions, as qualifier does not belong to the qualificandum 'this'. In other words, this is not *rajatatvavat*. The definition then does not apply to the case of error.

According to Navya-Naiyāyikas, the error is in the *dharma*, whereas according to ancient Naiyāyikas error is in *dharmi*. According to Navya-Naiyāyikas, at first there is the perception of rope, then the direct perception of *samskāra*. From *samskāra* there arises *pratyabhijñā*, where there are both *loukika* and *aloukika sannikarṣa*. In case of perception of snake in the rope, the rope, a person as a snake misperceives lying before. Such a perception is a sure case of cognition and is of some feature presented as belonging to something (rope), which actually does not have it.

Again, a doubt by definition is a knowledge with two mutually contradictory qualifiers e.g., 'is this a man or not' ? Which has amongst two mutually contradictory qualifier 'manhood' and 'absence of manhood'. Both of these cannot belong to the thing designated by this. That is why it is said doubt is not *tadvatitaprakāra*, yet no knowledge is wholly false. Every error, even doubt contains an element of truth. Now with the help of Gangeśa's definition

we are in a position, to give sense to this fact. It is possible in case of every knowledge to give a value to the variable 'tat', such that the knowledge under consideration may be shown to possess *tadvatitatprakāra*katva. In the case of doubt if one of the two mutually contradictory qualifiers does not belong to the qualificandum the other one does. Thus a false knowledge is not false in all respects, whereas a true knowledge must be true in all respects, i.e., must have no qualifiers which do not belong to the qualificandum.

It is mentioned earlier that truth on Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, is a hybrid entity, having both epistemic and ontological components. So *tadvatitatprakāra*katva is not reduced to a purely epistemological property.

It is possible to construe 'tadvati' as meaning 'tadvatviśeṣyaka

Two comments may be made here :

- i. On this interpretation, the ontological claim is not completely eliminated. The idea of 'tadvattva' seems incurably ontological.
- ii. The analysis of the definitions into *tadvatviśeṣyaka*tve sati *tat*prakāra

1. ***Tadvadviśeṣyaka*tve *Satitat*prakāra**katva :

(= the property of having 'that' as its qualifier and an object which possesses that) – this is virtually useless, for even error has an object possessing the that. It depends upon what is to be called the object of a knowledge. No doubt, 'object' is an epistemological notion. The *prābhākaras* then have some justification in claiming that the object of the wrong knowledge. 'This is Silver' is the Silver.

2. ***Tadvadviśeṣyaka*tve *Satitat*prakāra**katva :

(= the property of having 'that' as its qualifier while the qualificandum possesses the that) – this is the conception of truth of Murāri Miśra and is

claimed by him to be apprehended by introspection for *Viśesyata* like *prakāratā* is an epistemological entity. If *tatprakāratva* can be apprehended by *anuvyāvasāya*, as the *Naiyāyikas* also admit – then *tadvadviseśyakatva* may also be so apprehended. In case of a false knowledge – ‘Those two are a jar and a cloth’ – wherein, the cloth is taken to be a jar and vice-versa. Here the qualificandum ‘cloth’ possesses ‘cloth-ness’. But this knowledge is obviously an error, for the cloth has been known as a jar and jar as a cloth. The definition as explicated under 2. Illegitimately extends to such cases of error.⁷

3. ***Tadvadviseśya katvāvacchinnatprakāratva :***

(= the property of having ‘that’ as its qualifier, which is, limited by the property of having a qualificandum which possesses the ‘that’). This definition avoids the difficulty mentioned under 2. In that example, ‘cloth-ness’ as a qualifier is not limited by the fact of the cloth being a qualificandum and so also in the case of the other qualifier. The qualifier must qualify with regard to the right qualificandum, which possesses that quality.⁸ This explication succeeds in bringing out the unitary nature of the notion of truth by making the two components ‘*tadvattva*’ and ‘*tatprakāratva*’ limit or determine each other.

4. The explication should also take into consideration the relation in which the property serving as the qualifier belongs to qualificandum. The qualifier also must qualify in the same relation, or better, that relation must limit the qualifier-ness of that qualifier. This helps to exclude a knowledge. ‘The jar is in its pots in the relation of conjunction’, from the purview of true ‘knowledge’, for according to the *Nyāya* ontology the jar is actually in its parts in the relation of inherence and not in the relation of conjunction. The resulting explication becomes ‘*tatsambandhāvacchinnatadvannīsthāviśeṣyatanirūpitatatsambandhāvacchinnatanniṣṭhāprakāratāsāti jñānatva*’. The truth according to this definition, is a unitary notion

having heterogeneous components, not merely epistemological. The relevance of this fact for the Nyāya theory of *parataḥprāmānya* will be discussed now. As in the case of the *Svataḥ* theories, this theory has also two aspects; one concerns the origin of truth and the other its apprehension. In its first aspect the theory holds that the truth of knowledge is not produced by the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge itself. It is rather produced by some extrinsic circumstances, some additional factors known as *guṇas* or excellences. In its second aspect the theory holds that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended neither by that very knowledge, nor by the first apprehension of that knowledge – be that apprehension on introspection as with the Misra's or an inference as with the Bhatta's but only by a subsequent inference which argues either upon the confirmatory knowledge or upon the successful termination of the practical behaviour to which the knowledge under consideration leads us.

Amongst the host of arguments, which the Nyāya advances in support of its contention, two are most important. The first is in support of the extrinsic origination of *prāmānya* originated from the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge qua knowledge, then even an invalid knowledge, would come to possess *prāmānya* since it too has the same originating conditions and that is plainly absurd. The second argument is in support of the *parataḥ* apprehension of *prāmānya*.

The Nyāya contention is that every knowledge is either true or false, right at the beginning. Only its truth or falsity is due to a set of conditions that are different from those other conditions that give rise to the knowledge : in the case of truth, these conditions are called '*guṇas*' in the case of falsity they are called '*dosas*'. Immediately after the cognition of water, the truth (*Pramātva*) of the cognition is ascertained from the unfailing correspondence. The *vyātireki* inference like 'the previous cognition is true', because it has led to successful volition, whatever cognition is not true does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, false knowledge. If after perceiving water, a person wants to have

after exercising the necessary volition, then he is assumed that his primary perception was veridical or true. This ascertainment is inferential. The form of the inference being, 'The previous cognition was veridical, for it has led to a successful volition'. The inference is *yātireki* in character for the Rule of Concomitance involved here is 'vyātireki'. Like 'whatever cognition is non-veridical does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, a false perception of a 'rope' as a snake. The peculiar causal condition to this true inferential knowledge, the *guṇa* is constituted by the cognition of the *vyāpya* in what has actually the *vyāpaka*.

According to the Nyāya view of *parataḥprāmānyavāda*, the truth of knowledge is not intrinsic for if it were, there would have been no room for subsequent doubt. It seems to follow that in those cases where no such doubt takes place truth is apprehended intrinsically. These cases are very embarrassing for Nyāya. There are at least three such cases as inference confirmatory knowledge or *phalajñāna* and knowledge with which one has acquired sufficient familiarity (*abhyāsadasāpanajñāna*).

For Vācaspati, inference is known right from the beginning as valid, for amongst the originating condition of inference there is a certainty about the universal major premise. There is no room left therefore for having any subsequent doubt in the validity of the inference.⁹ Udayana is not so confident. He is willing to grant that inference arises by manifesting the suchness of the object.¹⁰ He concedes that truth is here apprehended intrinsically. Yet he makes desperate attempts to reconcile this with the *parataḥ* theory by suggesting that in such cases both may be true.¹¹ The Navya-Naiyāyikas deny that the truth of an inference is ever apprehended intrinsically. For them there is always the possibility of doubt. But how do we assess the situation?

According to Nyāya there are, strictly speaking, no fallacious inferences. The so-called *hetvābhāsas* are rather hindrances (*pratibandhakas*) to inference than errors of inference.¹² An inference then as a rule is a valid inference and does not permit any doubt about its validity. According to Vacaspati, unlike perception and *Śabda* inference arises out of a sense of certainty so that the least

doubt in the truth of the universal major would be frustrating and would not let the inference take place. If by *prāmānya* be meant this sense of certainty then certainly it is intrinsic to inference. But the real issue is whether *prāmānya* in the sense of *tadvati tatprakāraakatva* is so or not. At least Vācaspati has no sure ground for saying that it is so. According to Mohanty, for Nyāya, it is not so and this supposition is likely to fit in better with the Nyāya theory of truth.¹³

The Naiyāyikas believe that the truth of knowledge is apprehended by a subsequent inference. But the Mimāmsakas object, how is the validity of that inference to be established ? if by still another inference, how is this second inference to be validated ? In order to avoid such an unpleasant infinite regress some would like to treat inference as intrinsically valid and as in no need of validation. But the Naiyāyika need not go to that extent of holding that its *tadvatitattprakāraakatva* is apprehended¹⁴ right from the beginning. He might adopt a more halting attitude and say that inference is accompanied by a sense of certainty that comes to be questioned only if the universal major is for a reason or other doubted.

Again in case of consideration of the confirmation or the *phalajñāna*, there is an embarrassment also. For it the inference through which the truth of the first knowledge comes to be apprehended depends upon the confirmation (e.g., quenching of the thirst in the case of a perception of water), it may be quite well be asked, how are these confirmations themselves be validated ? in reply, Vacaspati points out that the *phalajñāna* is never questioned by the discerning persons.¹⁵ Because its familiarity leads us to infer its undeviating character through the mark of *tajjātiyatva* (the property of belonging to that class).¹⁶ Thus instead of taking them as intrinsically true and as self validating, Vacaspati includes them in a much wider class of familiar cases whose sheer familiarity rules out any need for further validating them. The entire idea of familiar cases, that have become *abhyāsadaśāpanna* and whose truth is immediately inferred without waiting upon confirmation through the mark of *tajjātiyatva*. *Tajjātiyatva* can serve as a mark of truth only when the knowledge under consideration has become a familiar case. To say that it is a familiar case could then only mean that

it is a knowledge the like of which has been experienced before and has been known to be true. In such cases one takes them for granted and entertains no doubt about their truth whereas a new knowledge demands to be confirmed. The notion of 'familiarity' and the notion of 'belonging to the same class' are quite different. But what is the test of familiarity? How many times must one have similar experiences in order that it may become *abhyāsadaśāpanna*? Knowledge is called *abhyāsadaśāpanna* in whose case no doubt arises soon afterwards. A further inference based on the mark of *tajjātiyatva* is not called for. The word 'tat' in *tajjātiyatva* certainly does not mean the class of true knowledges for according to Udayana that exactly is what is to be proved by the supposed inference. *Tajjātiyatva* does not mean the class of knowledges that give rise to successful practice, for the mark is supposed to operate prior to confirmation through successful practice. Nor is *tajjātiyatva* any further un-analyzable property in such knowledge, which we perceptually discern, for no such property is so discerned. Udayana rejects these alternatives and hold that every knowledge is of some objects and the determinations of the objects also serve to mark out the knowledge. Thus hands and feet etc characterize a body. Now if I have a knowledge of something having hands and feet etc. and say 'It is a body' my knowledge is thereby included under a familiar class of knowledge; in this sense *tajjātiyatva* = *tattadupādhiviśiṣṭattadanubhavatva*. Gaṅgeśa makes use of the mark of *tajjātiyatva* in the series of examples of the later sort of inference and gives the example like – 'This knowledge of the body is true, for it is a knowledge of the body in what possesses hands and feet, etc. This shows that either there is no inference at all in the case of a familiar case or if there is any in the supposed manner the supposed sort of inference also takes place in the case of knowledges that have not yet become quite familiar.

Thus we find that in none of these knowledges truth is apprehended – on the Nyāya theory right from the beginning. In every case there is scope for and the necessity of further validation or correction.

There are two cases e.g., the knowledge of the substantive (*dharmijñāna*) and the *anuvyāvasāya* of the primary knowledge where the Naiyāyikas often led to recognize intrinsic truth to avoid infinite regress.

But Vācaspati and Udayana emphasize that 'No one who does not have a knowledge introspects 'I am knowing', no one has the introspection 'I am knowing a silver', when in fact he has knowledge of a shell.¹⁷ Vardhamāna adds, 'No one has an introspection of a knowledge when in fact he has a state of feeling, and that we do not doubt the truth of introspection and Vardhamāna's remark is closer to the spirit of the Nyāya of that by calling all such knowledge *Svataḥpramā* is meant that there is in such cases no initial apprehension of falsity,¹⁸ and hence no initial doubt to start with.

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5. J.N. Mohanty,
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7. Ibid., PP. 45 – 46.

8. Thus Māthuranātha explains 'avacchinnatva' in this connection as "*idaṃmetad viśeṣyakatvānśe etat Prakāṛakamiti Pratitisaṅkikah Svarūpasamdhā vīśeṣah*",
Mathuri,
P. 403.
9. Vācaspati – "*Anumānasya tu ... nirastāsamastavyābhicārasamkasya svataevaprāmāṇyamanumeyāvyābhicārilingasamutthatvāt*".
Nyāyadarśana,
P. 9.
10. *Anumitijñānamhyarthasyatathātvamvyāvaccindade-votpadyate*"
Parisuddhi, Asiatic Society, ed.,
P. 113.
11. Udayana's "*Atyantāyoga Vyāvachcheda*",
Parisuddhi,
P. 120
Is thus explained by Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa on it;
Kutrāpisvatogrhyateityārthah".
12. *Yadvisayakatvena jñānasyānumiti virodhitvam,*
(in Siddhantamukutavali).
13. J.N. Mohanty,
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PP. 50-51.
14. So far as the origin of the validity of an inference is concerned, the Nyāya of course advocates extrinsic origin, the special excellence needed being "*Sādhyavatisādhyavyāpyavaiśiṣṭyajñānam*",
(Siddhanta Mukutavali on Kārikā No. 133).

15. “*Nacāphalajñānampariksiyateprekṣāvadbhiḥ*”,
(Loc, Cit., P. 9).
16. “*Vayantubrumahphalajñānamapiabhyāsadasāpannatayā
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