

CHAPTER – 3

THEORY OF PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

SECTION – 1

NYĀYA THEORY OF PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

Gangeśa begins his logical enquiry into the means of valid knowledge, which is called *Prāmānyavāda*. According to Gangeśa, it is quite possible to fix upon an immaculate definition of valid knowledge, so that validity may be accepted as a real cognitive property. Validity necessarily should be defined as consistency of cognition (*Yathārtha anubhava*) as distinguished from *Yathārtha smṛti*. Validity is understood by the term *Pramā*. A correct memory is not technically called *Pramā*, which is restricted to *anubhava* as distinct from *smṛti*.

But the opponents hold that validity can not be defined at all. *Śriharsa*, the main opponent of Gangeśa, takes on the possible definition of validity which are recorded in his '*Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhādyā*' : The following is the rough list of definition scrutinized by *Śriharsa* :

1. *Tattvānubhutiḥ Pramā* (p. 239).
A valid knowledge is the knowledge of the essence of a thing.
2. *Yathārthānubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 397)
A valid knowledge is the knowledge of things as they are in reality.
3. *Samyakparicchedaḥ Pramā* (p. 411)
A valid knowledge is the correct ascertainment of the thing.
4. *Avyābhicāryanubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 427).
A valid knowledge is the knowledge, which does not deviate from reality.

5. *Avisamvādyanubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 430)

A valid knowledge is that which is consistent or coherent with verification in practice.

6. *Abādhitānubhutiḥ Pramā* (p. 442)

A Valid knowledge is an uncontradicted knowledge.

7. *Tarkasamśayasmr̥ti Vyātirikta Pratitiḥ Pramā* (p. 443)

A valid knowledge is that which is other than hypothetical reasoning, doubt, illusion and memory.

8. *Pramātvalakṣaṇa jātyabhisambandhāt Pramā* (p. 444)

A valid knowledge is that which possesses validity as its universal property.

The very first definition of *Pramā* rejected by the opponent is the eighth definition refuted by *Śriharṣa*. The definition says that a valid knowledge is that which possesses validity or *Pramātva* as a universal property. According to the opponent there is no such universal (*jāti*) as may be called validity or *Pramātva*.

It is generally accepted that universal is pervasive of the particular in which it inheres. Cowness belongs to the entire cow, no part of the animal is free from cowness. Similarly if *Pramātva* is a universal it should cover the entire judgment irrespective of the subject and predicate.

Here we should mention the position of the predicate to the opposition. According to the opposition it is agreed that even an invalid knowledge is partially valid. They hold that in the invalid perceptual judgement “It is Silver”, invalidity belongs to the predicative part “Silver” (which is a tinsel infact), but not to the object part ‘it’ which demonstrates the mere presence of the factual object. There is no denying the fact that an object is really there out in the world. What is wrong in its identification by a wrong predicate i.e., silverness is wrongly imposed on tinsel. This aspect of partial validity of an invalid judgement is underlined in the off-quoted expression “*dharminī sarvam abhrāntam prakāre tu viparyayah*” – Every illusory knowledge is right in respect of the substantive

subject, but wrong only in respect of predicational objective. An illusion is thus different from a complete hallucination in which both the subject (*dharmin*) and the predicate (*Prakāra*) are projections of imaginations.

According to Gangeśa this epistemic law of partial validity even of an invalid judgement is violated if validity is considered to be a universal and so in the invalid judgement *Pramātva*, if a universal, cannot be restricted to the subject part keeping the predicational part out of its' fold. There is an epistemic phenomenon of collective knowledge (*Samūhālabana*), which grasps two objects together in a single grip. The judgement – “These are two pieces of tin and silver” when one piece is silver indeed) should not be taken as partially valid, for it is invalid as a whole. If one still insists that, since silver is there, the judgement has some sort of validity also, we contend that validity as understood by the term *Pramā*, should not be applied in this case. Better one should employ the term *yathārtha* (consistent with fact), just as one does in respect of memory, which rightly recapitulates a past, cognition. A correct memory is not technically called *Pramā*, which is restricted to *anubhava* as distinct from *smṛti* (memory).

According to Dr. Nandita Bandyopaddhyay if we go by this technical distinction between *Pramātva* and *yathārthtva* (validity and consistency or conformity), *Pramātva* or *Prānmānya* should be necessarily defined as consistency of cognition (*Yathārthanubhava*).

The object of a knowledge appearing as the subject of a judgement is called *Viśeṣya*. The object is the factual support on which the knowledge rests. *Viśeṣya* as an epistemic category is the corresponding cognitive counterpart figuring as the subject of a judgement. So sometime the *Viśaya* itself is used in the sense of *Viśeṣya*. The term *Prakāra* generally means a *Viśeṣana* or adjective though there is a subtle difference between the two *Prakāra* is normally restricted to a *Viśeṣana* appearing in a judgement as an adjective to the substantive. Even therein *Prakāra* generally means the predicative adjective, though sometimes the term is extended to a non-predicative adjective also.

In case of the valid judgement “It is Silver”, the subject ‘it’, as *viśeṣya*, demonstratively refer to the object ‘silver’, which is factually qualified by the

adjective 'Silverness'. In the corresponding judgement Silverness is reflected as *Prakāra* or predicative adjective to 'it'. This predication faithfully represents the fact in which silverness really qualifies the object, silver. Hence this valid judgement is *viśesyāvṛtti-aprakāraka* i.e., it does not contain any *Prakāra*, which as a factual *viśeṣaṇa* does not really qualify the object, silver.

However, in case of invalid judgement "It is Silver" the *Prakāra* is the same silverness, which is predicated of the substantive subject 'it'. In this wrong judgement the factual referent of 'it' is the object, tinsel, which is really qualified by tinness, not by silverness, which nevertheless, is the predicate of the judgement. Thus the judgement is invalid for having a predicate, which in fact is not present as an adjective qualifying the object. So the judgement is *viśesyāvṛtti prakāraka* and hence invalid.

The contender thus argues that *viśesyāvṛtti-aprakāratva* i.e. not having a *prakāra* which is absent in the object, which is virtually the same as *Pramātva*, may be considered as the limiting determinant (*avaccedaka*) of the presence of validity in knowledge. *Pramātva* in this sense be considered a universal. In a similar way *viśesyāvṛthi-aprakāratva* (having a *Prakāra* which is absent in the object) determines the presence of *Prakāra* which is absent in the object) determines the presence of the negation of validity in knowledge. It would be noted that the contender does not insist on accepting a-*Pramātva* or invalidity as a universal. His insistence is only on the universalness of validity.

But how can we distinguish *Pramā* from a-*pramā* ?

The Nyāya thesis is that validity is inferred from a successful follow-up action inspired by the knowledge. One entertains the judgement 'This is Water'. Its conducive ness to a successful application establishes the truth of the judgement according to the Naiyāikas. After having the judgement one gets of the object supposed to be water and successfully performs the action which water is expected to satisfy. Our practical behaviour depends on knowledge and this knowledge is said to be verified if the behaviour stimulated by it attains the fulfillment that is expected from the object shown by the knowledge. Hence such knowledge is called *samartha-pravṛtti-janaka*. According to the Naiyāikas

inference of validity roughly expressed as *idam jalajñānampramā, saphala-pravr̥thi-janakatvāt, puruvapalabdhajalajñānatvāt* i.e., this knowledge of water is valid, because it has produced a successful behaviour, like a similar knowledge of water that I entertained before. The contender here turns the middle term of this inference into a definition of validity.

But such a definition is met with a serious objection. A person may have the judgement, 'This is Water' and yet may remain indifferent. I.e., may not feel the need of exerting himself to get water and verify his knowledge in the process. He has just the knowledge, which he does not verify. Now if water is really there should we call his knowledge invalid simply because he does not go for verification ?

To wriggle out of this difficulty the Naiyayikas draw a line of distinction between *phalapahitakāraṇa* and *svarūpayogyakāraṇa*. An effect is pervaded by causal conditions but the converse is not true, i.e., an effect must be preceded by a cause though a cause may not necessarily be followed by an effect. A cause, which is immediately followed by an effect, is called *phalapahitakāraṇa*, while a cause, which is not followed by an effect though it has the efficacy to produce an effect, is called *Svarūpayogyakāraṇa*. A cause may not produce an effect due to the absence of a relevant auxiliary causal condition or to the presence of an obstacle. Here the absence of an effect does not point to any absence of causal competence. The cause is competent in itself (*Svarūpayogya*). Though this competence remains unrealized for some reason or other.

The contender may argue that knowledge to be valid must have for its causal condition *doṣasāmānyābhāva* or absence of any fault. The opponent goes to show that the definition fails to do justice to a valid collective knowledge such as 'These are pitcher and cloth'. Pitcher ness does not belong to cloth and clothness to pitcher. Thus these properties become *viśesyā vr̥ttiprakāra*, calling for the invalidity of the judgement agreed to be valid.

The contender may try to defend the definition by saying that the term *viśesyāv̥rttiprakāra* is intended to mean a property not located in any substantive clothness belongs to cloth and pitcherness to pitcher as such neither is

viśesyāvṛttiprakāra is the total exclusion of any *viśesyāvṛttiprakāra*. In the judgement under review, since Silverness, not factually belonging to tin appears, nevertheless as a predicate in relation to tin, it is not free from the fault of *viśesyāvṛttiprakāra* and as such the judgement is false by definition.

From validity is a real property of knowledge, follows that either it should have been self-evident (*Svataḥpramānya*), i.e. simultaneously and spontaneously apprehended in the apprehension of knowledge itself, or should have been apprehended by some other verificatory knowledge (*Parataḥ pramānya*) validity is not apprehensible either way. Hence, there is no justification for positing an unknown and unknowable property of knowledge. Since there is nothing called validity in reality, the question of its genesis does not arise. Gangeśa goes to show that the postulates of *Svataḥpramānya* is untenable no doubt, but there is enough justification for the Nyāya thesis of *Parataḥprāmānya* according to which validity (and invalidity too) is ascertained by some verificatory inference. As regards the genesis of validity he argues at length in favour of the Nyāya position that validity is guaranteed by some special excellence of the causal factors that generate the knowledge, not by the causal factors in general which are common to valid and invalid knowledge.

SECTION – II

SVATAHPRĀMĀNYAVĀDA THEORIES

In earlier chapter we have seen that *Pramā* is defined by the Naiyāyikas as ‘*tadvatitatprakārahākānubhavaḥ*’. The next question related to this comes to our mind, how can we know that a particular piece of cognition is *Pramā* ? How can we know *Pramātva* i.e. ‘*tadvatitatprakarakatvā*’ in *Pramā* ? According the Naiyāyikas, the truth of cognition depends on the actual existence of the relational complex represented by the cognition in the objective world. The truth of cognition depends on two conditions -- ontological condition and the epistemic condition. Epistemic condition can be said to be fulfilled when a *Pramāṇā* is employed as a means of knowing things. Prof. J.N. Mohanty distinguishes between two senses of *prāmānya*. In our sense the word *prāmānya* may mean the property of being instrumental in bringing about true knowledge (*Pramā-karaṇatva*). In this sense *Prāmānya* may mean simply the truth of a knowledge itself, if, that knowledge is true. Of these two second one is logically prior to the other in as much as the very idea of being an instrumental cause of true knowledge cannot be understood without understanding what is meant by true knowledge and effectively without understanding what is meant by truth. The thesis of *prāmānya* are concerned with *prāmānya* in the second sense, i.e.; with the truth of a knowledge.

The vedāntists distinguish between two kinds of truth¹. (i) Knowledge – metaphysically true that can never be falsified at anytime past, present and future i.e., the metaphysical truth consists in *traikālika*, *avādhittva* and the other; (ii) empirical truth² – whose nature has yet to be made precise. The theory of *Prāmānya* is concerned with the empirical truth of – the knowledge of finite human beings. The *Prāmānya* theory may demand, how does a knowledge becomes true ? and how is its’ truth ascertained ? On the other hand, another connected but quite different question arises that how is the knowledge itself

known ? This is known as the question of the theory of *Prakāśa*, is logically prior to the theory of *Prāmānya*. For unless the knowledge, itself known, no question can even be raised about its truth.

Now the question arises whether 'truth' '*tadvatitatprakārakatva*' of a cognitive state, comes to be known 'from itself' (*Svataḥ*) or from other sources (*Parataḥ*). Prof. J.N. Mohanty prefers to use the words 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' respectively. According to *Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta*, the word intrinsic means both intrinsic with regard to origin and 'apprehension' (*Jñāptitaḥ*). Similarly *Nyāya* holds that truth is extrinsic to knowledge means both extrinsic with regard to 'origin' (*utpattitaḥ*) and apprehension (*Jñāptitaḥ*).

If different views about *prāmānya* are compared with the different views about *prakāśa*, then there should be four different combinations :

- I. The theory of *Svataḥprakāśa* combined with the theory of *Svataḥ prāmānya* – upheld by the Advaita and Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā.
- II. The theory of *Parataḥ prakāśa* combined with the theory of *Svataḥ prāmānya* – upheld by the Mīśra and Bhāṭṭa schools of Mīmāṃsā.
- III. The theory of *Svataḥprakāśā* combined with the theory of *parataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the *Nyāya* school.
- IV. The theory of *parataḥprakāśa* combined with the theory of *parataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the *Nyāya* school.

Now we may pay our attention towards different forms of the *Svataḥ prāmānya* theory. They all agree that truth of knowledge originates from those causal conditions, which also give rise to the knowledge. With regard to the nature of the apprehension of truth they all agree that knowledge is as a rule apprehended together with its truth³. But they differ firstly, with regard to the nature of knowledge and secondly, as to the nature of our apprehension of our knowledge.

1. VEDĀNTIC CONCEPT : Dharmarāja Adhvarindra presents his own definition of valid knowledge in chapter VI of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* – when

something is cognized as having some properties actually existing and the efficacious to successful inclination (*pravṛttiśamarthya*) originating either from memory or from immediate experiences, it is called valid cognition (*tathāhismṛthyānubhava sādharmaṇam samvādi pravṛtṭyānukūlam tadvati tatprakāraṇam jñātvam prāmāṇyam*). Now, the question, ‘Is the validity (*prāmāṇya*) cognized simultaneously along with the origination of that of cognition ? The Advaitism believe in the intrinsic validity of cognition (*svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*). *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* means that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended through the same *sāksi*-awareness, through which the knowledge itself is apprehended. Cognition would be intrinsically valid if and only if the validity of cognition is conditioned by the very condition, which is the condition of the cognition itself: (*Yāvat svāśraya grāhaka sāmāgrigrahyatvam*)

But what does the Vedāntalists mean by the term *prāmāṇya* ? usually *prāmāṇya* is defined in terms of uncontradicted characters (*avādhitatvam*) of knowledge.⁴ But to ascertain a particular cognition whether it is contradictory or not, we have to depend upon subsequent cognition. Because it is absurd to suppose that cognition is from within as incapable of contradiction in future. Gauḍabrahmānandi here suggests that contradictory character (*avādhitva*) has to be explained as the property of being a cognition of anything, which has not been known to be contradictory so far. If validity is taken in this sense even then the cognition is intrinsically true only from the point of view of apprehension (*jñāpti*) and not from the point of view of origination (*utpattiḥ*). So Madhusūdaṇa Sarasvati argues that uncontradictedness refers not merely to the absence of contradiction at the time of knowing⁵ but also to the absence of contradiction in future.

Vivaraṇa regards *Prāmāṇya* in the sense of the capacity of manifesting its object as being intrinsic to a knowledge⁶ when the Mimāṃsakas and Vedāntists maintain that truth is intrinsic to a knowledge whereas falsity

is extrinsic, they ought to understand the two notions of truth and falsity in such a manner that the one remains as contradictory of the other.

Then there will arise a question whether truth is for the Vedāntists is nothing other than the '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' of the Naiyāyikas ? According to this meaning of truth a knowledge 'S is P' – is true when P really belongs to S. In Gangeśa's opinion it is only in this sense that truth may be regarded as being apprehended ab initio.⁷ It is curious that though Gangeśa considers *tadvatitatprakāratva* as the feature which distinguishes right cognition from error, Madhusūdana and many Advaita writers regard it as belonging to all apprehension not excluding error. There is reason therefore to suspect that the Naiyāyika and Vedāntists do not mean quite the same by '*tadvatitatprakāratva*'.

Now what is that feature which distinguishes right cognition from error? In answer to this question it is said that not bare '*tadvatitatprakāratva*', but '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' as qualified by the property of leading to successful activity serves to distinguish right cognition from error. It seems reasonable to suggest that at least the property of being the cause of successful activity cannot in any case be a feature which one apprehends ab initio like abādhitva, *samvādipravrttijanakatva* also refers to a future possibility.

In Advaitaratnarakṣanam Madhusūdana defines truth as a property of being a certain apprehension of an object which was previously unknown.⁸ Truth in this sense, according to Madhusūdana satisfies three needs :

1. It serves to distinguish right cognition from error.
2. It is capable of being apprehended *Svataḥ* as the theory demands; and
3. Further it can account for unwavering activity as the phenomena demand. It does not belong to error for the content of erroneous apprehension e.g., the snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is being perceived and therefore has no unknown existence

(*ajñātasattā*) of the object of erroneous apprehension. We cannot then say that it was unknown before : hence truth in the above sense does not belong to erroneous apprehension. According to the Advaita epistemology – the prior unknown existence of what now comes to be known is an object of *sākṣi*-awareness. Hence the property of being a certain apprehension of what was previously unknown is something that is apprehended together with any knowledge and by the same *sākṣi*-awareness. In this formulation *prāmānya* is identified with the very generic character of *Jñānatva* so that a false apprehension is by definition not knowledge at all.⁹

In another formulation, the way of defining *prāmānya* is to explain in the psychological language with reference to the knower's unawareness as to the falsity of the knowledge under consideration. In this sense *prāmānya* belongs in common to all knowledge, right or erroneous, but as the erroneous character of the error is detected, it deserts the erroneous apprehension. It is correct to say that knowledge is true, if it is not known to be false. Someone can say that knowledge is to be called 'false' when it is not true and then the definition is plainly circular. On this account truth is a derivative concept, and fits in with the Advaita metaphysics that nothing empirical is real. Empirical truth is a concept and is logically definable only in terms of falsity.

The first formulation makes of the *Svataḥprāmānya* theory on analytic consequence of the suggested definition of knowledge in terms of *prāmānya*. There is a certain absurdity in saying both 'I know that 'S is P' and 'S is P is false'. If something is known it follows necessarily that it is true. Thus according to Ayer¹⁰ I know that S is P – there are only three conditions need to be fulfilled (i) that 'S is P' is true, (ii) that I am sure of (i); and (iii) that I who knows have the right to be sure.

According to Ayer, knowledge is intrinsically true in the sense that if something is known, it follows necessarily that it is true.¹¹ This follows from the 'linguistic fact', that what is not true cannot properly *be said to be known*. It is not a knowledge, which becomes falsified, but it is really pseudo-knowledge whose pretension to be knowledge are now exposed. Hence the curiously paradoxical situation that although the *Svatahprāmānya* theory defined knowledge in terms of 'truth' thereby condemning error as pseudo-knowledge. Yet in its attempt to establish its position it includes under its 'pakṣa', all that claims to be knowledge including knowledge in the true sense and pseudo-knowledge.

It is precisely the contention of the *svatahprāmānya* theory that there is no criterion of truth, though there is criterion of error, knowledge as such is true but cannot be proved to be true, whereas error is proved to be error.

It is mentioned that prāmā alone is knowledge proper and all else is error or pseudo-knowledge. In this connection Professor J.N. Mohanty raised some problems from the point of view of the Naiyāyikas, if truth cognized from the same conditions as give rise to the knowledge, false apprehension should also become true, for the generating conditions of false apprehension, the latter being, like apprehension, a species of knowledge. Mohanty comments – "Madhusūdana confidently replies that this need not be so, for false apprehension is not species of knowledge". Prof. Raghunath Ghosh should like to submit that it is difficult to make clear distinction between knowledge and pseudo-knowledge at the initial state i.e., at the time of the origination. At the initial stage all individual manifestations of knowledge are taken to be as what they appear. In the case of snake-rope illusion, the snake is entertained as snake initially and only on this ground various psychological reactions become possible. Afterwards we come to

know of the falsity of the view of the snake when it is contradicted by the presentation of the rope. In the same way, the knowledge arising at the initial stage cannot be regarded as true, as there may be doubt as to its possibility of being contradicted by the subsequent knowledge. So the truth of knowledge can be known from its' unfailing correspondence to the fact (*samvādi-pravṛtti*) otherwise (*visamvādi-pravṛtti*) it would be taken as pseudo-knowledge. So the truth and falsity of knowledge cannot be apprehended by the collection of causes that gives rise to knowledge.¹²

2. (a) THE PRĀBHĀKARA THEORY :

There is agreement however among the Mimāṃsakas as how the theory of a cognitive state comes to be known, although there is difference regarding how the 'existence' of a cognitive state comes to be known. According to Kumāṛila and his followers, the existence of a cognitive state gets revealed in a kind of inference known as '*jñātatā Lingakānumiti*'.¹³ According to Mūrāri Mīśra, the existence of cognitive state gets revealed in a subsequent internal perception and according to *Prābhākara* and his followers, a cognitive state is self-revealing or in other words the existence of a cognitive state gets revealed of itself. According to *Prābhākaras*, the problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory, for there is no cognitive error. Then when we say knowledge is false what we actually mean. The *Prābhākaras* say we mean that it leads to unsuccessful behaviour. On the cognitive side all knowledge is true even the so-called false knowledge. For every knowledge has its object which it manifests. Bearing this in mind Mohanty concludes that the *Prābhākara* Mimāṃsakas distinguishes between three levels of truth and error.

Rāmānujachārya uses three different terms for three different kinds of truth. In the broadest sense of the term 'truth', *Yathārthya* belongs to all awareness¹⁴ (including memory and what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension). In a narrower sense *prāmānya* to all awareness excepting memory (but including even the so called erroneous apprehension and in a still narrower sense *prāmānya* to all awareness excepting memory (but including even the so called erroneous apprehension and in a still narrower sense of the term *samyaktva* only to such knowledge other than memory which leads to successful practice¹⁵ *Yathārthya* or truth in the widest sense is co-extensive with the property of being an awareness of, or of being true to its' object (*Sarvasyajñānasyārthā vyābhicāritatva*). The criterion of *Prāmānya* is independent in manifesting the object; memory is not *Pramā* since it does not independently manifest its' object. The test of *Samyaktva* is the absence of uncontradicted practice.

Now, Gangānāth Jha has raised an objection against Bhatta theory of *Prāmānya*, which is equally valid against the *Prabhakara* notion. For if the test of *Prāmānya* is independent in manifesting its object, then *Prāmānya* is not *Svataḥgrāhya* or in other words it cannot be said to be apprehended along with the apprehension of the knowledge, (whose *Prāmānya* it is). It is clear therefore that neither *Prāmānya* nor *samyaktva* are apprehended ab initio, in that sense no knowledge goes unknown.

Now truth, according to the Bhāttas is apprehended *svataḥ* in the sense that the same inference from *jñātātā*, which makes us aware of the truth of that knowledge. Like the knowledge its; truth also remains unknown at the beginning. The knowledge manifests its; object without itself or its truth being apprehended till of course the above mentioned inference brings both to light.¹⁷ For Bhāttas and for Prābhākara, *Pramānya* is the same as awareness of the

object (= *bodhātmakatva*). In this sense of course every knowledge is intrinsically true. Umbeka rejects the identification of *prāmānya* with *bodhakatva* because though *bothakatva* is intrinsically to all knowledge, yet it does not serve to distinguish right from wrong cognition for even the erroneous knowledge of a rope-snake has the property of *bodhakatva* inasmuch as it also manifests its own object, Umbeka realizing the fact that mere manifestation of an object is not enough, he defines *prāmānya* as *arthavisamvāditvam*, i.e., the property of being uncontradicted to its object.¹⁸ A true knowledge must be uncontradicted to its object. It is this truth which is *svataḥ* in the sense of being produced by the cause of knowledge itself, says Umbeka.

Gāgā Bhāṭṭa defines true knowledge as a knowledge whose object was previously unknown and which is uncontradicted by another knowledge.¹⁹ In this sense *Prāmānya* are the same as *Samyaktva* of the *Prābhākaras*.

Pārthasārathi suggests a new distinction between two senses of 'truth', truth as pertaining to the knowledge and truth as pertaining to the object. Apparently, his purpose is to circumvent the following difficulty. According to Bhāṭṭa, both the original knowledge and its' truth are apprehended together. The original knowledge being previously unknown, the judgement this knowledge is true' – is not possible. Awareness of truth would therefore presuppose a prior apprehension of the knowledge – which would contradict the central thesis of the *svataḥ prāmānya* theory. An effort has been made to avoid this difficulty by suggesting that the *prāmānya* is nothing other than *visayatathātva* or the 'suchness of the object' in which case the ascription of *prāmānya* to the knowledge cannot but be secondary.^{20, 21} Truth in this sense i.e. as the suchness of the object, or as the pure nature of the object hardly concerns the issue under consideration, *viṣaya* is

itself an epistemological concept, so that *viṣayatathātva* could only mean faithfulness of the knowledge to its' object. *viṣayatathātva* is not the same as the *yathārthya* of the Prābhākaras. For *yathārthya*, as we have seen belongs to all awareness to right and error alike. If *Viṣayatathātva* in this sense is to be *Svataḥ*, then we have to take it that every knowledge claims to be true to its object. But Parthasarathi's notion of *Viṣayatathātva* is meant to distinguish right knowledge from error.

(b) THE MIŚRA THEORY :

This theory is the form of the Mimāṃsā school, associated with the name of Muñari Miśra. They agree with all the three Mimāṃsā schools as to the origin of truth. According to them, the *anuvyavasāya* apprehending a primary knowledge should also apprehend that primary knowledge as being knowledge of such and such object which, infact, amounts to apprehending it as a true knowledge.

REFERENCES

1. Madhusūdana Saraswati,
Advaitasiddhi,
(Nirnayasāgar ed.), P. 499.
2. Madhusūdana Saraswati,
Advaitaratnarakṣanam,
(Nirnayasāgar ed.), P. 32.
3. Gangeśa,
“Svataste Prāmāṇyavata eva Jñānasya grahāt
(Prāmāṇyavāda).
4. Thus, for example, Vācaspati Miśra,
“*Abādhitānadhigatā samdigdha = bodhajanakatvamhipramāṇatvam
Pramāṇānām*”,
(*Bhāmati* 1.1.4).
5. “*Vyāvahāra Kālābāduyatva*”,
(*Advaitasiddhi*), P. 351.
6. “*Nāpi Prāmāṇyamārtha Pariccheda Sāmarthyam Kāraṇaḡuṇa
jñānātparato Vagamyate*”,
viz. ed. P 102.
“*Prāmāṇyam nāma jñānāsyārtha Pariccheda Sāmarthyam*”,
(*Vivarāṇa Prameya samgraha*),
Vasumati edition, BK, 11 P. 223.

7. *Tathāpi tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatvam tadvati tadvaiśiṣṭya jñānatvam vā prāmānyamtacca jñānagrāhaka sāmāgrigrāhyam*,
(Loc.Cit.), P.110.
8. *A jñātārthaniścayātmakatvmeva Prāmānya masmatpakse*,
(Loc.Cit.), P. 32.
9. The Late K.C. Bhattacharyya has proposed a similar theory in his paper "knowledge and Truth", included in the Second Volume of his Studies in Philosophy (Calcutta, 1958). Thus he writes : Two Propositions may be stated about knowledge that knowing is known only as implied in the explicit awareness of truth and that truth is asserted only of a content that is known. Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other". (P. 154). Again "There is ... no such thing as false knowledge" (p. 157), so that "if it now appears to be not true, it is never said to have been known but taken at best to have been believed (P. 158).
10. A.J. Ayer,
"The Problem of Knowledge"
(London,1956), Ch. 1.
11. Ibid, P. 22.
12. Professor Raghunath Ghosh
Certain Ambiguities and Clarifications in Professor Mohanty's Gangeśa's Theory of Truth,
The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy, Volume XVI, August 1979 and February 1980, Nos. 1 & 2, PP. 140-141.
13. Gopinath Bhattacharya (Trans.)
Tarkasamgraha – Dipika on Tarkasamgraha
Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1976, P. 325.

14. “*Tasya Sarvasamvitsādhāraṇatvāt*”,
(Loc. Cit.) P. 2.
15. J.N. Mohanty
‘*Gangeśa’s Theory of Truth*’,
in the Introduction,
Shantiniketan, Visva-bharati, 1966, P. 6.
16. Professor J.N. Mohanty is indebted in bringing out this three-fold sense of ‘truth’, to P. Śāstri’s ‘*Introduction to the Pūrvamimāṃsā*’, Calcutta, 1923. It would be seen he says, that he agrees with that learned scholar in thinking that it is truth only in the broadest sense of the term that, on the *Mimāṃsa* theory could be *svataḥ*. Mohanty however has differed from Śāstri in the precise formulation of these three senses. The difference between Śāstri’s analysis and Mohanty’s analysis may be represented thus :

On Śāstri’s analysis :

1. Truth as common to all cognitions (*Pramā, A-pramā* and *Memory*).
2. Truth as common to memory and anubhuti
(= *badhakābhāvatva*).
3. Truth as belonging only as anubhuti (*bāadhanābhāvatva* + *anadhigatatva*).

On Mohanty’s analysis :

1. *Yatharthya* (common to all awareness qua awareness of some object).
2. *Prāmāṇya*, as common to knowledge, right or wrong, but excepting memory (= *anadhigatatva*).
3. *Samyaktva*, as characterising only right *anubhuti* (*anadhigatatva* + *bādhakābhāvatva*).

17. Gāgā Bhatta writes : “*Pramātvasyānanumeyatvātjñānānumāne samānasam vi + samvedyatayā jñānatva vat pramātvasya svatastva sām̐bhavāt*”.
Bhāttacintāmani, P. 13.
18. Slokavārtika with the commentary of Umbeka,
Sanskrit Series No. 13, 1940
Madras University, P. 54.
19. *Ajñātaviṣṣayakam (bodhaka jñānarahita-jñānam pramā)*.
Bhāttacintāmani, P. 13.
20. Ram Sāstri (Ed.),
Nyāyaratnākara on slokavārtika,
Benaras, 1898, P. 71
21. Nyāyaratnākara, P. 61; again
Nyāyaratnāmatā, P. 33,
(Benaras edition, 1300),
(*Arthatathātvamidameva hi jñānasya prāmānyam*).