

CHAPTER – 2

THE CONCEPT OF PRAMĀ

Pramā and *Pramāṇa* are two fundamental concepts of the Indian theories of knowledge. The word ‘*Pramā*’ is used in Sanskrit philosophical literature in a very technical sense. It is one of the species of the genus term ‘cognition’ (*Jñāna*). Every philosopher holds that truth should be the differentia of knowledge or *Pramā*. But views regarding the meaning of truth vary and consequently, the mark of *Pramā* is expressed in various ways.

The view, mostly held by the Buddhists, which other writers also occasionally support, is that the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. A true cognition for them is therefore defined in various ways, as that which reveals an object that serves some purpose (*artha* or *prayojana*) or leads to the achievement of some end,¹ or which favours a successful volition (*Samvādi Pravr̥t̥tyā-nukūla*). This view resembles the modern pragmatic theory of the West. By true knowledge (*Pramā*) they mean the identity of content between the cognition and the cognitum. But the idealist school of Buddhism, namely, the *Vijñānavādin*, is the view that consciousness (*Jñāna*) is the principle of self-manifestation and it is the source of all knowledge. According to *Vijñānavādins* *Pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *Pramāṇa* is that which brings about such knowledge.

Again another view, which is incidentally referred to by *Dharmakīrti* and many other writers, regards truth as a harmony of experience (*Samvāda* or *Samvāditva*). A true knowledge according to this view would be one, which is in harmony with other experiences² of the Western Theory of Coherence.

The Advaita School of Vedānta favours another view according to which the truth of knowledge consists in its non contradicted ness (*abādhitatva*)³. The

correspondence view of truth cannot directly prove itself. The only way to prove correspondence is to fall back on the foreign method of coherence (*Samvāda*) – that is to infer the existence of a real correspondence between knowledge and reality from the facts of the harmony of experience. But all that we can legitimately infer from the harmony of knowledge with the rest of our experience upto that time is not that the knowledge is absolutely free from error, but that it is not yet contradicted. For we do not know that we shall not have in future any experience that can falsify our present knowledge. As regards pragmatic text of our causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), the Advaitism argue that even a false cognition may lead to the fulfillment of a purpose. They give one of the examples⁴ to support their view. The case is that we mistake the luster for the jewel and desiring to get it and actually get the jewel. In this case the knowledge of the luster, as the jewel – which is clearly false cognition leads to the attainment of the jewel and thereby satisfies our purpose, though we come also to knowing that the initial cognition which caused our action was itself false. It is found, therefore, that the pragmatic view of truth is not tenable. Therefore the Advaitins argue that *Pramā* is defined as a cognition having twofold characteristics of uncontradicted and novelty (*abādhitatva* or *yatharthatva* and *anadhigatatva*)⁵. Thus the *Pramā*, consists in its content being uncontradicted (*abādhitārtha-viṣayatva*). It is not sufficient that knowledge should be true, it is also necessary that the content of knowledge should be new or previously unacquired – *anadhigata*. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra gives two definitions of *Pramā*, one of which includes memory in it. The other definition refers to its novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge,⁶ which has been rejected by the Naiyāyikas. The first definition which excludes memory (*Smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition is as follows : a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition and which is not known before (*Tatrasmṛti-vyāvṛttam Pramātvamanadhigata vādhitārtha viṣayaka-jñātvam*). Here the term *anadhigata* excludes memory from the purview of valid cognition. And the second definition – ‘a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its

content which is not contradicted by any other, Cognition (*Smṛti-sādhāranantu avādhitārtha visayka jñātvam*). The only kind of knowledge to them, the knowledge of the already unacquired. But though memory is not a distinct source of knowledge, it is still a distinct experience that has to be distinguished from knowledge. The experience which reveals the new (i.e. knowledge proper) is called *anubhuti*⁷. Whereas reproduced knowledge is called *Smṛti*⁸. Thus novelty comes to be considered an essential quality of knowledge. According to the *Mimāṃsakas* knowledge is always a knowledge of something. Knowledge is produced from combination of knower and known. Valid cognition or *Pramā* is true and can never be produced as false. For this reason *Bhātta-Mimāṃsakas* do not regard *Smṛti* as *Pramā*. Because the object of *Smṛti* is now unknown. The other group of *Mimāṃsakas* is known as *Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas*.

Kumārila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) because it is apprehension. *Prābhākara* also regards apprehension (*anubhuti*), which is distinct from recollection, as a means of valid cognition. Kumārila regards cognizedness (*jñātata*) produced by a cognitive act of its result. But *Prābhākara* identifies *Pramāṇa* with *Pramā* or valid cognition and regards a cognition as manifesting itself and not as inferable from cognized of its object. According to him, all cognition as cognition are valid and their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their object. So that wrongness does not belong to the cognition themselves but to the objects cognized. Kumārila agrees with *Prābhākara*, as to the nature of valid knowledge which is in the nature of apprehension and can be set aside by its objects. Kumārila regards novelty, non-contradiction and correspondence with the objects as the test of truth.

Therefore, Kumārila holds recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehended already by perception. *Prābhākara* also excludes recollection from valid knowledge which is in the nature of apprehension which is different from recollection. A serial perception is valid because it is not produced by an impression (*Samskāra*) though it apprehends what is already apprehended. It is apprehension (*anubhuti*) and consequently valid.

The *Sāmkhyists* hold that the mode of Intellect is called cognition or apprehension or determinate knowledge. Determinate knowledge is unconscious since it is a property of unconscious Intellect. Cognition is not a property of him who reveals an object. According to *Sāmkhyists* the mode of intellect (*Buddhi*) which assumes the form an object is *Pramāṇa*. According to Jayanta, this hypothesis is closely akin to that of the Buddhists. *Sāmkhyists* hold that when an object comes within the range of our sense organ a change taken place in it (Sense Organ). It catches the form of the object in question. This image of the object, seized by the sense, organ, exerts influence upon the intellect. The intellect also transforms itself into a similar image of the intellect. This mode of intellect attributing itself to transcendental consciousness (*Puruṣa*) as its property is a means of proof. Transcendental consciousness, possessing attribution of intellect becomes the knower of a definite object fixed up by intellect.

Let us now examine Nyāya view of *Pramā* in respect of other concept. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the word *Jñāna* and *Buddhi* is taken as synonymous (*Buddhirupalabohijñānanetyanarthantaram*). *Buddhi*, *Jñāna* and *upalabdhi* belong to the same metaphysical categories (*Prameya Padārtha*) right cognition of which is essential for human liberation. In respect of *Jñāna*, the Nyāya view stands in sharp opposition to the conception of *Jñāna* in *Sāmkhya* or *Vedānta* according to which it is a modification of a substance called *buddhi* or *antaḥkarana* and *buddhi* or *antaḥkarana* being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyāya, the *jñāna* ontologically being an accidental *guṇa* of the self and therefore without parts does not assume any form or shape (*ākāra*) : Similarly not being a *Kriyā*, it does not bring about any change in the object that is known as the *Bhāttas*. Wrongly regard it as doing.⁹ Epistemologically *jñāna* refers beyond itself to its object i.e., it has self-transcending reference to an object. This feature distinguishes *jñāna* from the other *guṇas* of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self. Yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities.¹⁰ It's existence proved by our experience (*anubhūti*). It is the root of all our behavioural usage viz. desires to get (*upādāna*), desire to leave (*hāna*) and indifference

(*upekṣaniya*) (“*Sarva-vyāvahāra hetu guṇaḥ buddhi Jñānam*”). The word ‘*guṇaḥ*’ is used to prevent the definition from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) in terms of space (*deśa*), time (*Kala*) etc. And the word ‘*hetu*’ signifies that it is the special condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) of all our behaviour.

But although the said definition can avoid fallacy of *ativyāpti*, it suffers from the fallacy of undercoverage, for the definition is unable to accommodate indeterminate cognition (*Nirvikalpaka Jñāna*), which has no behavioural usage. To avoid such problem Annambhatta’s suggestion is that “*Sarvavyāvahāra hetu*” – is not the defining characteristics of cognition. Cognition or *buddhi* is a special type of abstract concept. It can neither be defined by any synonymous word, nor can be defined extensively like many other words, i.e., the colour blue or red etc. According to Annambhatta cognitionhood is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of cognition (*Jñāna*). Cognition is the locus of cognitionhood (*Jñānatvajati*). There cannot be any cognition if it is not related with cognitionhood.

Cognition is of two types viz., recollection (*smṛti*) which originated from the bare mental impression (*Samskāra-mātra-janyam-Jñānam*). And cognition other than recollection (*tadbhinnam Jñānam*) is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Recollection is that cognition which originally from the bare mental impression (*Samskāra-mātra-janyam Jñānam*). And cognition other than recollection *smṛti-bhinnam Jñānam*¹¹ is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Which is defined as negatively. Presentative cognition (*anubhava*) also is of two types. Valid presentative cognition (*yathṛtha anubhava*) and invalid presentative cognition (*aYathārtha*). Valid presentative cognition is technically known as *Pramā*. According to Nyāya *Pramā* is always a non-recollective cognition or *anubhava*. *Pramā* is defined by Naiyāyikas as ‘*Yathārthānubhava*.¹²

The reason behind not describing *smṛti* or recollective cognition as *Pramā* is that a recollective cognition can be *Yathārtha* is true only in so far as it is an exact reproduction of a true non-recollective cognition of the same object,¹³ which the subject previously had. That means if the previous non-recollective cognition was a true one and the memory cognition is an exact reproduction of it

as it is found in the case of recognitive cognition (*Pratyabhijñā*), then the memory cognition can be said to be borrowed from that of its causes that is, the previous non-recollective cognition of the same object. Under such circumstance the recollective cognition cannot be taken as memory cognition called *smṛti*.

Moreover the Naiyāyikas hold that being a true or faithful copy of a previous non-recollective cognition, it cannot be true or veridical in the primary sense of the term. For it does not correspond to its object at the time of its occurrence.¹⁴ In the memory cognition that object is represented as what it was at the time of occurrence of the previous non-recollective cognition, but during the time which elapsed between the moment of the occurrence of the previous non-recollective cognition and that of the present memory cognition the object has not remained exactly the same at least its temporal adjunct is not the same. Therefore, the memory cognition cannot be said to correspond to the object at the present moment. This is the reason for maintaining that a memory cognition cannot be *Pramā*. A clear definition has been shown between memory cognition (*Smṛti*) and valid presentative cognition. When a cognition is generated through impression alone (*Samskāra mātra janya*) it is called *Smṛiti*. If it is caused through impressions alone with presence of the object, it is called *yathārtha anubhava*. Now the question is, what it means for a cognition to be true. According to the Naiyāyikas a cognition is true if it is 'arthāvyābhicāri'¹⁵ i.e., non-discrepant with its object that means that if a cognition represents an object as it really is then the cognition is true. In a precise language of Navya-Nyāya.¹⁶ *Tadvad Viśesyakatvāvacchinna tat Prakārakānubhava*, that is a non-recollective cognition the content of which consists of a property which actually qualifies the thing which appears as the subject of that cognition is true.

According to Udayanāchārya – etymologically the meaning of *yathārtha* signifies the similarity or correspondence. *Yathārtha* is the determinans of (*viśeṣaṇa*) of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). A presentative cognition is valid or true (*Yathāsrtha*) only if it corresponds to the external object having some content. Here there is a problem. For if we conceive correspondence as a partial one, then the definition will suffer from the fallacy of over coverage, because

there is partial similarity or correspondence between presentative cognition (*anubhava*) and the object having some content in the case of invalid presentative cognition e.s., perceiving a rope as a snake. Thus *ayatharthānubhava* will be unduly extended to the definition of *Yathārthanubhava*. On the other hand if the meaning of correspondence or similarity were accepted in full, then no presentative cognition (*anubhava*) would be valid (*Yathārtha*). As both the extreme views are unacceptable, some thinkers hold that the correspondence would be determined by subsequent cognition (*jñānāntara*), which is also affected by the fallacy of over coverage in terms of illusory cognition is corrected only by a subsequent veridical cognition. Once again *Yathārtha anubhava* could not even be defined as a cognition, which leads to successful activity (*Saphala Pravṛtījnakatia*). Because among the three types of cognition desire to accept (*hāna*), desire to leave (*heya*) and indifferent attitude (*upekṣaniya jñānā*) accepted by Naiyaikas and rejected by Buddhists – a indifferent cognition (*upekṣaniya jñānā*) does not serve any purpose – the cognition of such object does not lead to any successful activity. So if it were defined in terms of successful activity, it would be affected by the fallacy of under coverage. A cognition is supposed to be the server of the causal efficacy in any form, because it is the mark of the existence as per the principle – ‘*arthakriyākaritvalaksanamsat*’.

As in *upekṣābuddhi* there is no activity as such, it cannot be taken as an existent entity as per the Buddhist principle of *sattā*. An entity is existent if and only if it serves some purpose (*arthakriyākaritva*). It may be argued that an indifferent attitude or *buddhi* is existent on account of the fact that it generates some non-action towards an object. Like inclination (*Pravṛtī*) and refraining from (*nivṛtī*) the phenomenon of *upekṣā* is connected with the attitude of *audāsinya* (a status of being indifferent) which is the root of renunciation. The Buddhist logicians will reply that the status of *audāsinya* is nothing but a situation of *hāna* or *tyāga*. Hence, what is called *audāsinya* can be included under the category of *hāna*. Hence the *upekṣābuddhi* is not possible in their metaphysical scheme. There are two types of rejection or *hāna*. One type lies in

the case of assertive rejection after considering a lead consequence of something, which is a real rejection. At the same time we can think of another type of rejection which goes in the name of *upekṣā*. It is, infact, a kind of rejection in disguise of indifference or *upekṣā*. Hence, a real *upekṣā* without the sense of rejection is not at all possible.¹⁷

Now let us examine the similarity and dissimilarity between Indian concept of *Pramā* and western concept of knowledge. In Western tradition, we can see two main views regarding the definition of knowledge. Traditional philosophers generally defined knowledge in terms of belief. Beliefs for them may turn into knowledge if the belief is true and the believer has some justification for his/her belief. On the otherhand, according to other philosopher like Cookwilson, Prichard etc, as the nature of knowledge and belief is totally different. Knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief. For Prichard, knowledge by definition is true, so to ascribe that 'knowledge is true' – is a tautology. On the otherhand, as belief is only contingently true/false : its' propositions are posteriori. Truth and falsity is applicable only to belief. Thus the object of knowledge is totally different from the object of belief. Therefore knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief.

Hence, the question arises whether Indian concept of *Pramā* is equivalent to western concept of knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. But in Indian epistemology (*Pramāṇasāstra*) such concepts like belief, which is a form of life of western epistemology, is not accepted. J.N. Mohanty tries to point out that there are hints of the concept of belief in Indian tradition also. For *Pramā* is a certain cognition (*niścayajñāna*), may be either valid cognition or invalid cognition which is similar to belief which may become true or false. But truth and falsity are not the exclusive essential characteristics of belief or *niścaya Jñāna*. So only from the observation of the applicability of some accidental characteristics it does not follow that the locus of these characteristics are essentially identical. To some western thinkers 'being confident of' – is a necessary condition of knowledge, although have not defined knowledge in terms of belief. Hence belief and 'being confident of' – do not convey the same

meaning. Hence our opinion is that being confident is merely a mental attitude towards cognition and a mental attitude cannot be predicated as true or false. Mohanty is right in saying that 'western concept of belief' – is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścayajñāna*, if *Savikalpaka* i.e., a conceptual has a propositional structure i.e. comprehending *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣana* and their relation, so belief not only neglected in Indian epistemology, but some recent western philosophers like Chisholm, Keith Lehrer and Ayer also comments that belief is not so important in defining knowledge. For according to Chisholm and Lehrer belief is associated with our emotions, desires, etc. and as a result, if knowledge is defined in terms of belief then there will be possibility of affecting knowledge by the defect of one-eyedness. Because belief is more subjective than objective, since it is not devoid of one's impression etc. They introduce the concept 'acceptance' instead of belief and Ayer introduces the concept of 'being sure'.

There is another point of difference between knowledge and *Prāma*. According to a group of western thinkers knowledge is an act. But according to the other group, if knowledge is explained as an act, then it cannot explain all sorts of knowledge – which are recognized in common usage, again if it is an act, then it would cease to exist after sometime. But the nature of knowledge is not of that sort. So knowledge for them is a disposition.

On the other hand *Prāma* in Nyāya is neither a disposition nor a pure act of in western sense. *Prāma* is propositional or determinate cognition (*Savikalpaka Jñāna*). A proposition is neither purely subjective nor objective, rather it is said to be a neutral entity. So according to some western thinkers it is the proposition, which is either true or false. But there is a problem here. If such neutral entity is conceived, then we have to consider infinite number of proposition. Corresponding to each state of affairs. So Austin line thinkers hold that it is the judgement which is either true or false. Because in judgement there is a mental act directed to the correlative proposition, which we believe or disbelieve. Nyāya system does not distinguish between an act and a proposition because a proposition in the above mentioned sense certainly is not a quality (*guṇa*) of the self. J.N. Mohanty rightly observes that though a '*Savikalpaka*

knowledge not proposition but propositional or relational because it is a logical complex analysable into constituent elements and relations. *Prāma* is used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense, which is the synonymy for the Sanskrit term, *Samskāra*. But what originates from *Samskāra* (mental impression) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition. Some opponents also advocate that the Nyāya concept of valid cognition cannot even be spoken as an episodic occurrence, since god's cognition is eternal (*nitya-Jñāna*) and thereby cannot be ascribed as having origination. This objection may be overcome by saying that the notion of god's cognition is a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological problem.

Lastly, the objection in equating knowledge with *Prāma* is the concept of justification or evidence. If someone claims having knowledge in general we enquire for evidence to justify his claim. The word 'justification' in the western tradition is used in the two senses, viz. In the strong sense and in the weak sense. Justification in the strong sense means 'truth-ensuring' and in the weak sense it means 'truth conducive'. But the question is : is reason really infallible ? Even if reason is regarded as the 'Divine' element in man' – it is as imperfect as any other human faculty. For this reason Western epistemology suffers from Gettier like problem. Gettier has shown that it may happen that there may be justification in the strong sense, yet some conditions may not be ascribed as knowledge. This shows that the western concept of justifications is not always truth hitting.

On the other hand Indian concept of instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) is always truth hitting. No such concept of instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) guided by reason, in the strong sense and guided by senses i.e. in the weak senses is found in Indian tradition. Pure mathematics and empirical sciences have the same logical status in Indian tradition. In Nyāya, concept of universal is cognized through supernatural perception and for them *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is super-normal connection (*Praityāsatti*). Again, Nyāyayikas hold that *vyāpti Jñāna* is to be attained through the cognition of all individual manifestations of Probans and Probandum acquired by *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Hence it is a connection or

Pratīyāsatti. The influence of fire from smoke is possible only when the *vyāpti* relation is apprehended between smoke in general (*dhūmasāmānya*) and fire in general (*Vahnīsāmānya*) which is not possible by ordinary perception. The method of the super-normal connection through universal *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*) is to be resorted to for acquiring the cognition of *vyāpti* between smoke in general and fire in general. Thus *Pramā* is not equated with knowledge.

Pramā or presentative veridical cognition (*Yatharthānubhabha*) for the Nyāiyayikas is explained as that which originates after the intermediary (*Vyāpāra*) of the instrumental condition (*anupramāṇa*, *vyāpārāt param bhavati yah sah anubhavaḥ*). But there is no such intermediary condition for the origination of recollection (*Smṛti*).

Recollection (*Smṛti*) originates from the bare mental impression only (*Sanskāra mātra janyam jñānam*). In *Tarkasamgraha*, presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is defined negatively i.e., other than recollection (*tadbhinnam jñānam*) and its nature is associated with the concept of the instrumental condition of cognition (*Āpramāṇa*). Both are interrelated terms. The result of the instrumental condition is the effect, valid cognition (*Pramā Karanam Prāmaṇam*).

Now a question may arise : What is an instrumental condition ? From the point of view of important in producing the effect, there are two types of conditions in *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* system. (1) Common condition in or *Sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* – like god, space, time, the unseen power, will of god etc – which are necessary for the production of any effect, (2) Uncommon or *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* – which are only necessary for the origination of a particular effect. Both in the early and in the later schools of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* literature the ‘*Kāraṇa*’ (= *asādhāraṇa Kāraṇa*) is used as ‘a causal condition (*Vyāpārat kāraṇam*). In the case of ‘*Pratyakṣapramā*’, *Upamiti* and *Sābda-bodha*, he takes the term to mean, the causal condition, that function through an intermediary or a *Vyāpāra*, but in the case of ‘*anumitipramā*’, the term is taken in the sense of a causal condition that appears last on the scene. *Ananibhatta* describes sense organ (*indriya*) as the *Pratyakṣapramā*, cognition of resemblance’ (*Sādrśyajñāna*) as the

Upamānapramāṇa and ‘Statement’ (*Śabda*) as the *Śabda-pramāṇa*, while in the case of *anumiti*, *parāmarśa*, is taken to be the *anumāna-pramāṇa*, *parāmarśa* is called operative process or *Vyāpāra* because this cognition being caused by the cognition of *Vyāpti* i.e. Probandum, becomes the generator of the inferential cognition. In the form of consideration of *parāmarśa*. ‘*Vahnivyāpyadhūmabān ayam parvataḥ*’ – i.e. the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire, this piece of cognition is caused by the previous cognition of *vyāpti* reflected in the portion – *Vahni-vyāpya* (pervaded by fire) and generates the inferential cognition – ‘*Parvataḥ vahnimān dhūmāt*’ (the mountain is fire-possessing as it is smoke-possessing). Hence the definition of *vyāpāra* in the form – *tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyāpārah* – can easily be applicable here. In this way, the existence of an uncommon cause along with operative process can be admitted in other form of inferential cognition.

Likewise inferential cognition, another two types of cognition, e.g. cognition through comparison (*Upamiti*) and testimonial cognition (*Śabda*) are generated through the instrumentality of other cognition, like the cognition of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*) and the cognition of word (*Padajñānam*). But the perceptual cognition alone is not caused through the instrumentality of other cognition, when a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognition to have direct awareness of it.

In the case of perceptual cognition the sense organ etc. are alone taken as an instrument, but not any cognition.

In answer to the question : What is the mark of selecting an uncommon or specific condition (*asādhāranakāraṇa*) the Naiyāyikas differ. There are three views about this. According to the ancient Naiyāyikas criterion for selecting the uncommon condition (*asādhāranakāraṇa*) is - “*Phalāyogavyāvachchinnam asādhāranamkāranam*” i.e. the uncommon condition is that which being present the effect originates immediately, only when our sense organ comes in contact with the object (*Indriyārthasannikarṣa*) perception takes place. Hence sense-object contact is the non-inherent (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) condition which being

present the effect perception immediately follows. So ancient Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that instrumental condition might be a non-inherent one.

On the other hand according to Neo-Naiyāyikas, a special condition i.e. instrumental condition might be a substance or inherent condition (*Samavāyīkāraṇa*). For the instrumental condition is defined as the locus of the intermediary condition (*vyāpārat*). An intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*) is that factor which being produced by something becomes the producer of that entity produced by earlier one (*Tajanyatve sati tajjanya janako*). For example sense object – contact, caused by the sense organ produces the effect perception. So the sense is always either a quality (*guṇa*) or an action. So Neo-Naiyāyikan, therefore, are of the opinion that for selecting an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*) is ‘*vyāpārat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam kārnam*’.

Jayanta Bhatta hold a third view for selecting an uncommon condition (*Kāraṇa*) taking clue from the famous grammarian Panini who deserves an uncommon condition as “*Sādhakatama*”, - meaning *Sādhaka* as instrumental and *tama* as excellence (*atiśaya*) i.e., the most effective cause of an effect.

Although both old and Neo-Naiyāyikas accept instrumentality as an uncommon condition yet they are different in opinion about excellence. According to the former excellence (*atiśaya*) remains to the extreme condition (*Carama-kāraṇa*) whose presence is immediately followed by the emergence of effect. Their concept of instrumentality cannot explain the independent excellence (*Svadhina-atiśaya*) of each condition. But according to the later, the excellence can not remain in the intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*), because it cannot produce the effect without taking co-operation from other conditions. *Uddyotkara* hence, admits the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpāra -viśistakāraṇa*) as an instrument, which also does not hold good, because there are at least some cases where intermediary condition is more important than the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*). The Neo-Naiyāyikas concept of instrumental condition (i.e., as the locus of intermediary condition). On the other hand fails to explain the immediate emergence of the effect.

Jayanta, as a consequence advocates that the collocation (*Sāmagri*) alone can claim instrumentality (*Karaṇatva*), because it can overcome both the demerits of the old Naiyāyikas and the Neo- Naiyāyikas. According to Jayanta an instrument is that which is most efficient or operative to the origination of an effect. The collection of condition is collectively essential for it. If one condition is absent, the effect does not take place.

Now an objection may arise, that as the collection is nothing but all conditions taken together, and individual conditions are not completely different from (*atyantabhinna*), the collection of condition, instrumentality (*Karaṇatva*) as the collection of all conditions (*Sādhakasāmagri*) also possesses the status of relative excellence (*atiśaya*). Jayanta's answer at this point is that the individual condition separately could not possess excellence (*atiśaya*) because the individual conditions separately are common conditions (*Kāraṇa*) but not an uncommon conditions (*Kāraṇa*). Uniqueness (*Viśeṣatva*) differs from excellence (*atiśayatva*). Individual condition in isolation possesses uniqueness (*Viśeṣatva*) but when these conditions get together and form the collocation, it acquires the additional property of excellence (*atiśayatva*) in relation to the isolated members. According to Jayanta, instrumentality of valid cognition is an aggregate of certain conscious and unconscious conditions, which together make the apprehension of nonerroneous (*avyabhicārinimasandighāmarthopolabdhim' vidadh' atibodhābodhasvabhāvasāmagripramāṇa*). The two adjectives of non-erroneous and non-doubtful constitute the definition and the collocation of conscious and unconscious conditions constitute the nature (*Svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā*).

If collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions is taken as instrument in the sense of most effective for producing an effect, then even the subject (*Kartā*) and object (*Karma*) of cognition are also included to that collocation (*Sāmagri*). If that there will no cognizer (subject) neither which cognition is inconceivable? Again if the object were also included into the collocation of condition which is taken as an instrument then the cognition would be without any object. If this is accepted, the Nyāya epistemology will lose its

epistemic status. Jayanta in order to avoid this problem defines instrumentality (*Sādhakatama*) as the collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions other than subject and object (*tasmāt kartr-karma-vilakṣaṇa*) which is excluded from doubt and error.

Both old and Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if subject and object is excluded from the collocation of condition then it would lose its' property of being most excellent. Because such collocation being present fails to originate the effect without any temporal gap : Secondly, if subject and object is excluded from the collocation of the condition then is it possible to maintain the nature of the instrumental condition of cognition (*Pramāṇa*) as the nature of both conscious and unconscious at all ? Because Jayanta explicitly maintains that if the means of cognition (*Pramāṇa*) becomes meaningful other factors like cognizer (*Pramātā*) i.e. the individual who has got desire of attaining or forsaking something, cognizable entity (*Prameya*) i.e. the object which becomes an object of right cognition and right cognition (*Pramiti*) i.e. the right cognition regarding some object, becomes meaningful. All these are always *Pramāṇa* centre (*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityā rthavantibhavanti-Nyāyabhasya* on *Sūtra* 1.1.1 ('*Cataṣṣvavamvidhāsu arthatattvam parisamāpyate*' – Ibid.).

Visvanatha is very much straight forward to explain the nature of valid cognition and its instrument. According to him, an invalid cognition is that if something is cognized as having some property, whereas it does not have that property (*tadabhāvavatatitprakāra kamjñānambhramayatārtha*). Invalid cognition (*apramā*) is of two types viz. Error (*Viparyaya*) and doubt (*Samśaya*). For example, in perceiving something at a distance as having the property manhood and trunkhood, I may cognize is it a man or true ? (*Sthanurvā Puruṣovā*). The nature of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect-generated. According to Gopinath Bhattacharya in the case of perceptual cognition the defect fall under three headings viz. 1. Environmental defects – includes haze, the object being very distant and bad lighting, 2. Pathological defects are faults in the usual apparatus such as jaundice and 3. Psychological defects

are such as being angry or inattentive. But according to Janardan Ganeri environmental faults are only 'local' defects and he also includes the 'global' environmental defects in it. For example, a person trying to see things at the bottom of the ocean fails not because of any local defects, but because the human visual system is not suited for such environment. It is not seen due to having some global defects.

On the other hand, valid cognition is explained as attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*) and not as absence of defect-generated because the Naiyāyikas hold that there are three types of conditions for production of any effect viz. inherence (*Samavāyi*), non-inherence (*asamavāyi*) and efficient condition (*Nimittakāraṇa*). So the absence of defect in the efficient conditions does not imply the presence of other causal conditions viz. inherence and non-inherence. So Visvanātha, for the economy of thought, rightly advocates that valid cognition (*Pramā*) is due to attribute. If there is absence of defect in the efficient condition, then the presence of a particular attribute to a particular cognition is sufficient in producing veridical cognition (*Pramā*). According to Visvanātha there is only one attribute to each type of cognition. For example, sense object. contact (*Indriyārthasannikarṣa*), consideration (*Parāmarṣa*), Cognition of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*) is the attribute of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumati*), verbal testimony (*Sābdajñāna*) and comparison (*Upamāna*) respectively. Thus for Visvanātha attribute means non-inherent condition (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) and he supports the concept of instrumental condition of the old Naiyāyikan.

Again valid cognition could not be explained as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), because there are also other type of cognition namely indeterminate cognition (*Nirvikalpakajñāna*) which is neither valid nor invalid cognition according to the Naiyāyikas. It is not valid since it is not cognized as having any property by any relation, self-mind, contact is the common condition presents both in valid as well as invalid cognition. Except this there are some other conditions in the case of valid and invalid condition. Attribute is that condition which is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*Pramā*), justified by inference (*anumāna*). Valid cognition is due to attribute and invalid

cognition is due to defects – this type of pervaded relation (*Vyāpti-Sambandha*) is ascertained by the method of agreement and disagreement (*anuvayi-vyātireki*) which runs thus where there is defect there is invalid cognition and where there is attribute (*guna*) there is valid cognition (*Pramā*). (*Pramājanayasāmānya kāraṇabhinna karaṇajanya janyajñātvāt apramāvat*). So the presence of attribute (*guna*) along with the absence of defects (*dosa*) for Visvanātha makes the sufficient ground for the origination of valid cognition (*Pramā*). But if this is the case then one may object that this definition will be affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) because this criterion is fulfilled in the indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpakaperception*) which is not recognized as valid in Nyāya system. One point deserves a mention here that Visvanātha presents the above mentioned criterion in the context of explaining the nature (*Svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā*) but not in the context of defining it. Visvanātha defines valid cognition as ‘*bhramabhinnamiti*’ and finally ‘*tatprakārakamya jatamtad viśesyakam*’ – which is similar to ‘*tatvatitativakārahānubhavahyathārtha*;’. Gangeśa also initially supports this definition, which become the centrifugal force of the Nyāya definition of valid cognition.

The word ‘*tat*’ in the definition means the determinate property (*Prakāra*) and the word ‘*tadvati*’ (the suffix ‘*vat*’ means locus) means the determinandum or the locus of the determinate property (*viśeṣya*). Thus the meaning of the definition is: a cognition is valid (*Yathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually exists. And a cognition would be invalid (*ayathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually does not exist. For example, when someone cognizes a rope as a rope and express it in the form of ‘this is a rope’ (*idam rajju*), here this (*idam*) is determinandum (*viśeṣya*) and rope is the determinate property (*prakāra/viśeṣaṇa*) etc. someone is cognizing the rope as having the property ropeness and the property is a valid one (*yathārtha*) since ropeness actually exist in rope and not to any other object and this is the time the cognizer cognizes the universal ropeness also by supernatural perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*). On the other hand when someone cognizes rope as a snake and express it or in the form

‘this is a snake’ (Ayam Sarpah) he is cognizing the rope as having the property of snakesness which actually does not exist and his cognition is invalid (*ayathārtha*).

According to Professor J.N. Mohanty, the definition ‘*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*’ has epistemological as well as ontological parts. The expression ‘*tatprakāratva*’ refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration has ‘that’ (*tat*) as its’ qualifier. The expression ‘*tadvati*’ refers to a correlative ontological situation namely to the fact that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge. Truth or validity (*Prāmānya*) for the Naiyāyikas could not be the exclusive property of cognition alone, side by side, it is designation of real property. This is the reason the word ‘*tat*’ has been used twice in the definition. And as Truth (*Prāmānya*) is a hybrid entity, beside determinandum (*Viśesya*) and the determinate property (*Viśeṣaṇa*) there is another component, viz., relation (*Sambandha*) which is technically called (*Samsarga*). The above-mentioned definition of valid cognition fails to accommodate relation (*Samsargatā*) explicitly. The explicit logical form of the definition would be – “*tannistha viśeṣyatā nirupita sāmavāya sambandhāvacchinna prakāratānistha prakāratā viśista anubhavaḥ yathrthaḥ*”

REFERENCES

1. Nyāya-Vindu, Chapter I, "Tataḥ arthakriyā – Samartha – Vastu – Pradarśakam Samyog – Jñānam" and Ibid, : "Yataśca artha-siddhis tat Samyog- jñānam". (Chowkhamba).
2. Cf. *Tattva Koumudi* (on Kār, 51). "Samvadyate also vide *Pramāṇa vārttikas bhāṣya*."
(Patna, 1953) PP. 3-4
Pramāṇam avisamvadijñānam
3. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, pp. 19f and *Advaitasiddhi* (*Nirnayasagara*, 1917), P. 340 : "Bādhitaviṣayatvena hi bhramotvam, na tu vyādhikaraṇa-Prakāratvena, tasyāpi viṣaya-bādha prayojyatvāt."
4. *Tattva-pradipikā*
Citsukhi, p. 218, *Nirnayasagar*, 1915.
5. *Vedānta paribhāṣā*,
P. 19f.
(*Venkateśvar Press*, 1911).
6. C.D. Bijalwan
Indian Theory of Knowledge based upon Jayanta's Nyāyamañjari
(Heritage Publishers), P. 40.
7. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*
(*Kārikāvali* with the com. *Siddhānta Muktāvali*),
Nirnayasagara. P. 232.
8. Ibid.

9. “Nyāya view stands in sharp opposition to the conception of *Jñāna* of *Sāṃkhya* or *Vedānta* according to which it is a modification of a substance called *buddhiḥ* or *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyāya : the *jñāna*, Ontologically being an accidental *guṇa* of the self and therefore without parts does not assume any form or shape (*ākāra*). Similarly not being a *kriyā*, it does not bring about any change in the object, that is known as the Bhāttas, wrongly regard it as doing”. J.N. Mohanty *Gangesa’s Theory of Truth*, Visvabhāratī, Centre of Advance Study in Philosophy, 1966, P. 26.
10. “Epistemologically *jñāna* refers beyond itself to its’ object, i.e., it has self transcending reference to an object. This feature distinguishes *jñāna* from the other *guṇas* of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self, yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities”. Ibid.
11. Annambhatta,
Tarkasamgraha, P. 32.
12. Udayanācārya,
Nyāyakusumāñjali,
Stāvaka 4, *Kārikā* 1.
13. Udayanācārya,
Tatparyaparisuddhi, in *Nyāyadarśana* ed. Anantalal Thakur,
Mithila Institute Series, Darbhanga, 1967, P. 110.
14. Ibid. P. 110.
15. Vatsyāyana - *Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4;
Goutama, *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4.

16. Visvanātha,
Karikāvali with Mukṭāvali,
PP. 744-745.
- 17 Prof. Raghunath Ghosh :
'Some Reflections' : On The Nyāya Theory of Action'.
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