

*The Nyāya Concepts of Pramā, Pramāṇa and
Prāmāṇya : A Critical Study*

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By

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PREFACE

The present work "*The Nyāya concepts of Pramā, Pramāṇa and Prāmāṇya : A Critical Study*" is the result of an intensive study on the problem of *Pramā, Pramāṇa* and *Prāmāṇya* in Indian epistemology with special reference to *Nyāya*.

Pramāṇa has occupied a prominent role in all systems of Indian Philosophy in general and *Nyāya* in particular. The concept of *Pramāṇa* is related to the concept of *Pramā* accepted in different systems of Indian Philosophy. The theory of knowledge has been developed by *Nyāya*, Advaita Vedanta and Bauddha systems of Philosophy after keeping their respective concepts of *Pramā* in view. In this sense the theory of knowledge or *Pramāṇa* is dependent on some metaphysical presupposition in view. For the justification of the validity of *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa*, the question of *Prāmāṇya* arises. It is true that the theories of *Prāmāṇya* play an important role in Indian epistemology. The controversy regarding *Svataḥ* and *Parataḥ Prāmāṇya* is centered around the metaphysical presupposition of a system. An effort has been made to throw some light on these theories, the reasons behind formulating such theories and some problems on understanding them with special reference to *Nyāya* view, which is followed by some critical remarks. The scholars in the field will judge how far I am successful. Any criticism constructive or destructive will be helpful for me for my future study in this field. I am very much grateful to my respected teachers of Philosophy, North Bengal University for their teaching and blessing.

Lastly, I would like to express my deep gratitude Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Supervisor of this thesis, for his teaching, constant encouragement and blessing. He has gone through the whole thesis, suggested change in many portions and taught the Sanskrit texts.

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CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

In Indian tradition all most all the schools of Indian Philosophy, claim that even for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*), the Sumum bonum of life, right cognition of the real or reals (*tattvajñāna*) is essential. The right cognition in Sanskrit is technically called '*pramā*'. The word '*pramā*' derives from the suffix '*Pra*' meaning excellent (*prakṛsta*) and the root '*ma*' meaning measurement or sometimes means cognition. So, the etymological meaning of *pramā* is either 'cognition par excellence' or measurement par excellence'. These two expressions may have the same meaning if 'measurement par excellence' is taken as a proper one for achieving the goal. In fact, the cognition acts as a measurement metaphorically. When a jar is known as a jar, the latter is the measurement of the former. When we know the existence of fire on the mountain inferentially, it is metaphorised as measurement of fire, on the mountain. The right measurement is the right cognition. In this context *pramā* has a double role in selecting the right purpose and means for achieving that goal also.

There is a controversy regarding what the Sanskrit word *jñāna* or *pramā* means. The Sanskrit word *jñāna* sometimes translated as knowledge because the Sanskrit word *jñānin*¹ means a knowledgeable person. Some Lexicographers think that as the Sanskrit word *jñāna* include any awareness like imagination, doubt, cognition, error, illusion, *reductio-ad-absurdum* etc. so to select a synonymy for the word '*pramā*', an adjective is needed. Thus the Sanskrit word *jñāna* is a genus term of which *pramā* and a *pramā* are the species, so, they translate *pramā* as 'valid cognition' or true cognition' and a - *pramā* is translated as invalid cognition or false cognition. But as in western tradition 'knowledge' by definition is true and the expression true knowledge is merely a tautology. To

avoid such confusion J.N. Mohanty² and B.K. Motilal³ hold that *pramā* can be translated as 'knowledge'. Again according to K.H. Potter as because in western tradition knowledge is generally defined as justified true belief, so *pramā* cannot be translated as knowledge. But in Indian tradition we do not find any corresponding word of belief. Moreover in Indian tradition *pramā*, is taken as aiming at fulfilling human pursuits (*Purusārthasiddhi*), whereas, in western tradition knowledge is for knowledge sake. According to some thinkers, *pramā* is not justified true belief in western sense, because *pramā* related sentences are prescriptive judgements (*Kriyayā pravartakam vākyaṃ*), which lead to liberation (*mokṣa*), so *pramā*-related sentences are imperatives (*vidhi*) since they are not descriptive. But as because all *pramā* related sentences at least in Nyāya system are not prescriptive judgement, this view is not satisfactory.

Like Philosophy of each country, Indian Philosophy has uniqueness of its own. Meaning cannot be grasped from the surface of grammar but from the deep. To avoid any confusion, we may use the English word 'cognition' for *jñāna*, 'true cognition' or 'valid cognition' for *pramā* and 'false cognition' or 'invalid cognition' for '*a-pramā*'; only for our functional purpose. Truth and validity in Indian tradition, unlike western tradition has been taken in the same sense.

From the Vedic and Upaniṣadic era, knowledge or cognition is playing an important role in the phenomenon of philosophising. Valid cognition comes under the purview of the epistemological problem. Epistemology deals with the nature, scope, validity, origin etc. of knowledge. The role of epistemology is to present metaphysics in a sound way as per the principle – '*Mānādhinā meyasiddhiḥ*', 'the substantiation of a metaphysical entity is dependent on a particular source of valid cognition' (*Pramāṇa*). Metaphysics intends to study reality as such. It also studies the basic concepts of science, like existence, negation, space, time, matter, substance, energy, number, attribute, life etc. Because a particular science, studies only a part of worldly objects (relevant objects to that science only). So it has to depend upon some presupposition. Presupposition means, whatever points, principles, topics or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though they are studied

elsewhere, “Philosophy, thus studies the presuppositions of science as facts (real) and yet facts of the second order and that makes a difference between philosophy and science. In the Upaniṣads a distinction is made between two kinds of knowledge, the higher (*Parā*) and the lower (*aparā*). The lower knowledge consists of all the empirical sciences and acts as also of such sacred knowledge related to perishable and enjoyable things that are contingent. It is to be noted that even the four Vedas are included in the category of lower knowledge. The higher knowledge is described as that whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood. “Just as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay may be known, the modification being only a name depending on a word the truth being that it is just clay, so is that teaching”. Compared with the knowledge of the ultimate ground, which is the absolute self, the lower knowledge is the nescience or false knowledge known as *avidyā*. Widely contrasted and leading in different ways, says the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, “are there two – nescience (*avidyā*) and what is known as knowledge i.e., (*vidyā*)”.⁴ Like darkness and light, they are opposed to each other and result respectively in bondage and release. What are refused to as the pleasing (*preyas*) and the good (*Śreyas*)? It is the knowledge of non-dual self that is the means to the supreme good, whereas nescience, its opposite is the cause of bondage. What is apparently good is called pleasant (*preya*) and what is good permanently is called (*Śreyah*). Anything may be pleasant, but from this it does not follow that it, by virtue of being pleasant, will be good (*Śreyah*). Good is connected with something having permanent value. Something is really good, if it is connected with an individual’s permanent welfare or well being. If otherwise, it is pleasant. In the *Śvetāsvatara*-upaniṣad it is declared that : “In the imperishable, infinite, Supreme Brahman are the two, knowledge and nescience, placed hidden. Perishable indeed is nescience, while knowledge, and verily is immortal. And he who controls knowledge and nescience is another i.e., he is distinct from either”.⁵ Here it is taught (i) that nescience (*avidyā*) is the cause of bondage consisting in transmigration (*Samsāra*), (ii) that knowledge (*Vidyā*) is the means to release (*mokṣa*) which is

immortality (*amṛtam*) and (iii) that the Self which regulates both knowledge and nescience is distinct from them because it is the witness thereof. Non-dual pure consciousness is realized through self-knowledge. Self-knowledge does not mean the self as knowledge but knowledge of the self. This knowledge of the Self is the last mental mode known as *akhandākāra-vṛtti*, where there is no trace of impurity, which is like unto the Infinite. It removes the obstacle that stands in the way of the disclosure of the self and removes itself. The Self is Self-luminous and does not require to be illumined, just as a lamp does not need another lamp for its illumination. All that the final mode does is to remove the veil which is nescience (*avidyā*), and thus leave alone the Self which is Self-revealed. The knowledge that lets the Self stand Self-revealed is *Parāvidyā* (higher knowledge).

Knowledge – even empirical knowledge – is not an act, although we sometimes use such an expression as ‘cognitive act’. It is true that both knowledge and action are related to the mind. But while action is what the agent does and is dependent on his will. Knowledge must be conditioned by its object. Action depends on the agent (*Kartr-tantra*); knowledge depends on its content (*Vastu-tantra*). For instance, it depends on a man’s will. Whether he decides to go to a particular place or not and if he decides to go how to get there. It is not so with knowledge. If what is in front of me is a pillar and I mistake it for a man standing, it would not be knowledge. Knowledge should conform to its object; it cannot be arbitrarily constituted by an act of will. Through *avidyā* i.e., *Karma*, one overcomes *mṛtyu* (death). One attains immutability through *Vidyā* i.e., *Karma*. One attains immutability through *Vidyā* i.e., meditation.⁶

Knowledge cannot reveal the Self or Brahman in the way it does empirical objects, said T.M.P. Mahadevan in his paper ‘*Vidyā* and *Avidyā*’.⁷ All that it does is to remove the barrier in the form of nescience. It leads to self-realization by the negative mode of excluding what is not the Self, as ‘not this’, ‘not this’. When the not-self has been removed, what remains is the non-dual self. Even the notion that the Self is to be known is the result of nescience. When *Vidyā* (knowledge) has destroyed *avidyā* (nescience), the one eternal self alone

shines. To the seer who has realized the Self, there are no *vidyā* and *a-vidyā*, no *jñāna* and *ajñāna*.

Almost every system of Indian Philosophy, whether Vedic or non-Vedic, makes an extensive use of the work ‘*avidyā*’ in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. In the Atharvaveda it has been stated that *Vidyā*, *avidyā* and whatever else is fit for being instructed entered the body of Brahman along with the ṚKs, *Śama* and *Yajus*.⁸ In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is said, “Both perform the sacrificial act, he who knows and he who does not know. But there is a difference between *Vidyā* and *avidyā*. For what is performed with *Vidyā*, with faith and with Upaniṣad, that is most efficacious.”⁹ Again in the Bṛhadāranyaka we find that a man, when dying shakes off his body and his *avidyā*.¹⁰ According to D.P. Sen the word *avidyā* seems to have been used in the sense of personal ignorance and the word *Vidyā* in the sense of true knowledge. Both are in the sense more or less subjective. But even in the context of Upaniṣadic teaching these two concepts are often used in a more objective and independent sense. Thus in *Iśa* Upaniṣad we read, “Into a blind darkness they enter who are devoted to *avidyā*, and into greater darkness, as it were those who are devoted to *vidyā* alone”. In *Katha* Upaniṣad *vidyā* and *avidyā* are conceived as mutually opposed and divergent. Here the word *vidyā* and *avidyā* has a richer connotation, implying much more than subjective ignorance or knowledge. In the latter Upaniṣads the concept of *avidyā* came to acquire a new dimension and also the new name *Māyā*. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad *Māyā* as universal or cosmic ignorance identified with *Prakṛti*, the root cause of phenomenal world.”¹¹ Thus *avidyā* here has the role of the creative power behind the world of our experience.

In the age of the systems (orthodox systems only), we find that the concept of *avidyā* defined and named variously. In the Nyāya, it is called *mithyājñāna*, the *Sāṃkhya* points it under the names *ajñāna*, *aviveka* and also *avidyā*, while Vedānta calls it variously as *māyā*, *avidyā* and *ajñāna*.

With regard to the nature of *avidyā* it may be said that is no mere absence of knowledge and on this point all the systems are closely agreed. *Avidyā* is in the *Yoga* view no more than a subjective state and this subjective foundation

gradually develops into a significant objective principle in the Advaita School. The Advaitins define *ajñāna* that is *avidyā*, as something which appears to be existent, is not definable as either real or unreal is made of the three *gunas* and is opposed to knowledge.¹² According to Advaitins *ajñāna* is an object of immediate knowledge, like our internal states of happiness etc. According to Samkara, Brahman is one. Infinite and undivided appears as many in name and form through *avidyā*. But the theory that *avidyā* is the creative power of Brahman having the two fold functions of concealment (*āvarana*), and projection (*viksepa*) seems to be a later development in Advaitism.

The post Samkarite Vedāntins have indulged in various kinds of speculations about the causal status of *avidyā*. Some for example Vācaspati, have argued that as Brahman appears as the world through the instrumentality of ignorance *avidyā* is just an auxiliary cause in creation¹³, others hold that as pure Brahman by itself can not be a cause of anything; it is through *māyā* that it appears as the cause. Hence *māyā* happens to be the *dvārakārana* or instrumental cause others again are of the opinion that both Brahman and *māyā* are to be taken as the material causes of the world.

The Advaitins hold that if it were permeable by reason *avidyā* would lose its character and turn into its opposite i.e. *Vidyā*. The function of *Vidyā* is just to remove the veil, to destroy the *ajñāna* so that the Self may reveal itself. Hence in Advaitism knowledge as a function of mind, i.e. Advaitism knowledge as a function of mind, i.e. *antahkarana* has been conceived as something, which dispels or destroys ignorance. *pramā* has, therefore, been defined as that which removes the ignorance concealing its' object. According to one school of Advaitism (i.e. the Vivarana school) the final knowledge which results in Self-realization are a perceptual function of the mind produced by the hearing of such scriptural sentences as 'that thou art' (*Tattvamasi*) etc. The mental state (*Vṛtti*) produced by the uttered statement 'that thou art' destroys the enveloping *ajñāna*, which conceals the true nature of the Self. But according to Vācaspati Mīśra, verbal knowledge in no circumstance can be immediate. The mind, he says becomes a direct instrument of Self-realization when purified by reasoning and

meditation¹⁴ that seems to agree with the standpoints of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala schools. When it is said in the Bṛhadaranyako-panisad – ‘*Manasaivānūdrastavyam*’ i.e. the Brahman is to be known through the mind (purified through some *Sādhanā* or practice). An impured mind (*asamskṛtaḥ manah*) cannot grasp the Brahman.

According to Saṃkara’s definition, discursive, undiscriminated knowledge is not *avidyā* in the ordinary sense of error. Indeed “it results” from *Pramāṇas* (means of procuring valid knowledge) and the object of the *Pramāṇas* is reality as it exists (*Yathābhūtavastuviśyam*). “Between Brahman and the world, there is at least one characteristic in common: *Sattā*”. Before the awakening to the true Self, every cognition is real in regard to its own object”. Saṃkara hold that being naturally pervaded by *Vidyā*, illumined by pure consciousness, it is made cognitive by its light and reflects it in all its partial truths. The light of consciousness is the illuminer of the mind (*manaso avabhāsakam*) because it is its controller (*niyantrtvāt*), being the source of its light. The mind itself is able to think only when it is illumined by the light of consciousness residing inside. Hence, knowers of Brahman declare that the mind with all its functions is made into thought, made into a cognizing subject (*Viśayikṛtam*), as pervaded by the inner *Ātman*.

Knowledge implies the knower, the known and the relation between the two (*tripuṭi*). It not only covers external objects but also subjective facts, ideas, volitions, emotions and the like. Criticizing the notion, we have of knowledge *brahmavidyā* points out that prevalent criteria of knowledge do not let us know the things as they are, as it is based upon the mutual superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the Self which is pure consciousness and non-Self. Self identification with the body, mind, Senses etc. are pre-requisites for the knowing activity as one accepts the senses as his own, has to take the body as himself etc., in this activity. The world of multiplicity (*Prapañca*) is conceived as different series of three like time, space and causation (*trayam*). The objects are taken to be related by way of cause and effect. Knowledge is based on all these condition. Though these conditions and presupposition are positive and beginning less, they would go

when other conditions and presuppositions are positive and beginning less, they would go when other conditions and presuppositions are accepted (*Yad vijñānam viliyāte*).

Brahman transcends the three divisions of time (*Trikālātpara*). He is infinite, unitary and undifferentiated (*avyakṛta*). Brahman is identical with the soul (*ātman*). He is non-dual pure consciousness. Brahmanvidyā then points out what there is to know. Not ordinary sources of knowledge, but only *aparaksā-nubhūti* enables one to know this reality, the *adhithāna*, or the world-ground which creates the occasion both the *avidyā* and *vidyā*.¹⁵


Ordinarily the word *vidyā* means knowledge or a discipline of knowledge, but in the Vedāntic tradition it stands for absolute or unconditional knowledge of the ultimate reality. An addition or prefix *Parā* is usually renders it free from ambiguity as in the form of *Parāvidyā* means “unconditional knowledge of the ultimate reality”. In the epistemological sense the term *avidyā* has the negative meaning of *ajñāna* (absence of knowledge) as also the positive meaning of conditional knowledge of the empirical reality. Knowledge concerning the *pāramārthika* is *vidyā* and concerning the *vyāvahārika* is *avidyā*.

When the Veda Vedāntic thinkers define *Vidyā*, as the unconditional knowledge of the *Pāramārthikasat*, they mean that it is the embodiment of the ultimate truth. It is a knowledge, which is true for all times (*trikālābādhitā satya*) as contrasted with that which is true-at-a-time (*Kālikasatya*).

Avidyā on the other hand, is a knowledge, which apprehends relation only (*Samsargāvagāhī*). It is necessarily relational. Not only that it is also a conditional knowledge. Both in its origin and validity it is dependent upon certain condition, under certain conditions it becomes false. In this sense the Upāniṣads describe it as *asatyam* or just *satyam* as contrasted with *Satyasya Satyam*. This means it is subject to verification and its truth or falsity is contingent upon confirmation. This is due to its being empirical and synthetic in character. All empirical knowledge is *avidyā*, which is not really true but is believed to be true and has only provisional validity. *Vidyā*, on the other hand signifies that knowledge which is unconditionally true. Whose illustrations are

the identity statements like *Aham brahmāsmi Tattvamasi*.¹⁶ etc. It can be mentioned here that the acceptance of the validity of the distinction between *Vidyā* and *avidyā* presupposes the Advaita Vedantic metaphysics

Ascertainment of reality (*tattvajñāna*) has been the prime object of all Philosophical Speculation in the East and West. This is particularly proclaimed by Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra. In the Nyāya the term '*Tattva*', stands for reality and the term '*Jñāna*' is refused to as a synonym of '*buddhi*', which means knowledge or awareness, or apprehension of the real objects. There is a difference of opinion between the old and the new Naiyāyika with regard to the classification of knowledge we include the views of the Navya Naiyāyikas, which is now current. Jayanta like other old Naiyāyikas has not clearly classified knowledge in the fashion set by Sibāditta in *Saptapadārthi* and culminated in *Tarkasamgraha* of Annanibhatta, but his analysis have and there consists in such elements which are not opposed, if not more or less relevant to the following scheme :



Except for a slight divergence in the scheme of classification of *buddhi* between old and the later Nyāya on the other hand and between Śībaditta and Annambhatta on the other it is clear that generally the Nyāya included all types of apprehension under *buddhi* but as far as valid knowledge (*pramā*) is concerned, it is simply that which is brought about by the four means of valid cognition.

Different systems of Indian Philosophy have expressed divergent opinion with regard to the nature of *pramā* and *Pramāṇa*. Prof. D.M. Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that '*pramā*' is generally defined as a cognition having the twofold characteristics of truth and novelty (*abādhitatva* or *Yathārthatva* and *anadhigatatva*) and that as regards the first characteristics – truth – all schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous.¹⁷ But on the second characteristic there is a difference of opinion. According to the Naiyāyikas, *pramā* is definite and assure knowledge of an object, which is true and

presentational in character. Jayanta is of the view that *pramā* is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion.¹⁸ Gangeśa maintained that *pramā* is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists¹⁹. For Śībāditta it is the experience of the real nature of things by Visvanātha. According to *Annambhatta* what we call *Yathātha* is otherwise known as *Pramā*.²⁰ If we compare the Nyāya view of *pramā* with western thinking, it resembles the correspondence theory of Western Realists. With the Buddhists it is the causal efficacy, which forms the criteria of truth. This view is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge in the West. Dharmakīrti also states that knowledge should correspond with experience. The view resembles the coherence theory of knowledge. According to Kapila *pramā* is determinate knowledge not known before. Prabhākara holds *pramā* as immediate experience. Another characteristic of valid knowledge has been mentioned as ‘*anadhigatatva*’ by the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas. Though Dharmarāja Adhvarindra gives two definitions of *pramā*, one of which includes memory in it, the other definition refers to novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge. This has been rejected by Naiyāyikas.

Kaṇāda, has stated that the general definition of *Pramāṇa*, should be based on the principle that the cause of cognition should be free from defects. *Prasastapāda* includes perception, inference and āṛṣa under *Vidyā* and illusion etc. under *avidyā*. Śrīdhara refers to an additional characteristic ‘*adhyāvasāya*’ meaning that *Vidyā* is a definite cognition. But he creates confusion by including memory under *Vidyā*. Samkara Miśra in his *Upaskāra* commentary on the Vaisheshika *Sūtra* however seems to be less ambiguous when he asserts that a *Pramāṇa* is that which produces true knowledge.

In the *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama simply enumerates four means of knowledge and leaves the term, ‘*Pramāṇa*’ unexplained. According to Vātsyāyana *Pramāṇa* is that which causes cognition, or in other words which is the instrument of valid knowledge. Uddatacara repeats Vātsyāyana’s views in somewhat clarifying manner and has not added anything substantial in the already existing etymology-based definition of *Pramāṇa* a logical form by inserting in it the word

'*artha*' and taking the word '*jñāna*' occurring therein to stand for the valid kind of cognition. It is actually Jayanta who has given the Nyāya definition a comprehensive and all embracing status by way of including in it the missing links propounded by the logician of his own tradition and also by evaluating the views propounded by the *Ācāryas* of other schools.

Now the subject matter of our discussion is Vātsyāyana on *Pramāṇa*.

The cause of *Pramā* is called *Pramāṇa* or the means of proof. *Pramāṇa* i.e., the instrument of *Pramā* is the most fundamental concept of the Indian theories of knowledge. Nyāya system of Indian philosophy is based on the foundation of the theory of knowledge and *Pramāṇa* plays an important role in Nyāya system. According to Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra* these are the four kinds of *Pramāṇa*. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The etymological meaning of the term *Pramāṇa* supplies us with the definition of *Pramāṇa* pointing to its general feature. The cause par excellence of true knowledge is called *Pramāṇa*. The suffix attached to the root of *Pramāṇa* denotes the sense of an instrument. The term '*Pramāṇa*'. Consists in the root 'mā' with a prefix 'pra' and suffix 'lyut'. The suffix 'lyut', being in the instrumental. *Pramāṇa* means the instrument, by which something is rightly known or as Vātsyāyana, puts it. "That the *Pramāṇa* are the instruments of right knowledge is to be understood by the etymological analysis (*nirvacana*) of the epithet (i.e. *Pramāṇa* itself). The word *Pramāṇa* signifies the instrument because (it is derived as) "by this is rightly known" (*Pramiyate anena*)²¹. Loosely the term stands for knowledge as well as for the means of valid knowledge but in Indian Logic it is generally used in the second sense. There is however, a marked difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of *Pramāṇa* amongst the philosophers. According to Nyāya, a *Pramāṇa* is that through which something is correctly known. The root *mā* literally means 'to measure'. That which measures properly (*Prakṛṣṭarūpenamāti*) is called *Pramāṇa*. To know an object correctly is a kind of proper measurement of an object 'knowing' is metaphorically called 'measuring' through our cognition. As a valid cognition

gives us a picture of a particular object, it may be described as 'intellectual measurement'.

Vātsyāyana begins with the determination of the validity or rightness of *Pramāṇa* with the texts – “*Pramāṇataḥ arthapratipattu Pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavat Pramāṇam*”.²² The phrase ‘*Pramāṇam arthavat*’ means *Pramāṇa* in non-deviated to the object (*arthavyābhicāri*). The function of *Pramāṇa* is to reveal the real nature of an object. From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of *Pramāṇa* is proved. The suffix *matup* added to *artha* (*arthavat*) denotes ‘an eternal connection’. (*Nityayoga*) which indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (*avyābhicāritā*) ‘*Pramāṇataḥ arthapratipattau*’ – in the above *Bhāṣya* means that the cognition of an object received through the instrumentality of cognition of *Pramāṇa* is valid presentative cognition. The phrase – ‘*Pramāṇataḥarthapratipattau Pravṛttisāmarthyādartha-vat Pramāṇam*’ means the function of *Pramāṇa* is to reveal an object if the cognition leads to a successful activity.

If an individual attains right cognition of an object through *Pramāṇa* he will be able to incline or reject something if he is desirous of doing so. If otherwise, it will not be taken as *Pramāṇa*, but as *Pseudo Pramāṇa* i.e., *Pramāṇabhāsa*, as it cannot lead someone to the successful activity. Here *Pramāṇa* differs from *Pramāṇbhāsa*. The means of knowledge have reference to an object. *Pramāṇa* produces valid knowledge, the object of which exists in the actual world, whereas, *Pramāṇabhāsa* produces only illusory knowledge. If someone attains the cognition of snake in place of rope, his inclination or rejection does not become successful, because the object of illusion does not actually exist there. Hence, the *Pravṛtti* either to get or to avoid that object is not successful rather as in the *Pseudo* cognition of snake there is no snake at all, the inclination etc becomes meaningless. So without the instrument of valid knowledge there is no *arthapratipatti* (cognition of an object) and without cognition of objects there is no successful activity. That is why, the fact of being non-deviatedness to the object (*arthavyābhicāritva*) is the uncommon property of *Pramāṇa* which called *Prāmānya*.

That a *Pramāṇa* must invariably be related (*avyabhicāri*) to the object is proved later through inference. Otherwise *Pramāṇa* will be variable (*vyabhicāri*), and in that case there will be no successful activity (*Pravṛttisāmarthyā*). To Vātsyāyana, means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) is meaningful (*arthavat*) i.e., constantly connected with the object actually exists. This constant connection of the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) with the object (*artha*) is called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*) is called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*). The nature of an object revealed by the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*), which reveals the actual characteristics of an object – technically called *avyabhicāritva* or non-deviatedness of the meaning, received through the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*). But in the case of illusory perception snake in the rope, there is the absence of the qualifier snakesness in the place of the qualificand i.e. rope. Hence, the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) will have its object of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) as its' pervader (*Vyāpya*) which is otherwise called non-deviatedness with the object (*arthāvyabhicāritva*). It is the probandum (*Sādhyā*), the probāns (*Hetu*) is the "Capacity of fulfilling successful activity" (*Samarthapravṛtti janakatvāt*). As the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) is the cause of the successful inclination, it is non-deviated to its object. This non-deviatedness (*arthāvyabhicāritva*) is explained as 'arthāvyabhicāryanubhavañjanaka tvamityarthah' that is the property of being a generation of an awareness, which invariably corresponds to an object. In this initial statement Vātsyāyana favours the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity of truth (*Parataḥprāmāṇya*) through this argument *Pramāṇa* differs from *Pramāṇabhāsa* (Pseudo - *Pramāṇa*). From the fact of successful activity (*Pravṛtīh-Sāmarthyā*) one can assume the reality of *Pramāṇa*, which is different from *Pramāṇabhāsa*.

As an *āstika* system Nyāya holds that the highest goal is called *nihśreyasa* or liberation. For the attainment of Liberation *tattavajñāna* (right cognition of the categories) is essential – which can be obtained by *Pramāṇa*. *Tattva* is to know an object as such. *Tattva* (reality) is cognized through *Pramāṇa* and something is accepted if it is conducive to happiness. If the object is not accepted due to having some obstacles, there is at least an acceptability of the same. If an object

seems to be the cause of misery, it is rejected or there is the possibility of rejection. The object, which is not acceptable or rejectable, comes under indifference (*Upekṣā*). *Pramāṇabhāsa* cannot provide the cognition of reality (*Tattva*), but *Pramāṇa* can easily provide'.

Tattva (Reality) is the positivity of the positive and negativity of the negative (*Sataśca sadbhāvaḥ asataśca asadbhāvaḥ*).²³ When an object is cognized as *Sat* it is to be taken "as it really is", i.e.; to cognize something in its true form. (*Sat saditi grhyamāṇam Tathābhūtama-viparitam tattam bhavati. asaccasaditi grhyamāṇam tathābhūtamaviparitam tattvam bhavati*).²⁴ When a positive object is known as positive i.e. as it actually is rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *tattva* (of *Sat* or *Bhāva*). Again when a negative object is known as negative i.e. in its' actual nature, rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *Tattva* to Vatsyāyana. The *Pramāṇa* which reveals the existent reveals also the non-existents. That which is not perceived is known as not existent because there is no perception of it. The existents are in sixteen forms e.g. *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya* etc, the knowledge of which is conducive to the Summum bonum. There are twelve *Prameya*, e.g., self, body etc. of valid knowledge – rightly known by the instrument of valid knowledge. There are also other objects of valid knowledge like substance, quality etc., which again have innumerable variety. Thus the objects of knowledge are infact innumerable. But the twelve *Prameyas* are specially mentioned, because the right knowledge of these leads to liberation and its false knowledge to worldly existence.

One point may be mentioned in this connection that among the four kinds of *Pramā*, the perceptual cognition above is not caused through the instrumentality of other cognition. When a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognitions to have direct awareness of it. It is called independent. The perceptual cognition is called *jñānākaraṇakan jñānam* i.e. a cognition not caused through the instrumentality of another cognition. Other than perception, inference etc. is dependent on the cognition of some other factors (*Jñānakaranaka*) like cognitions of *Vyāpti* etc. Cognition through comparison (*Upamiti*) is generated through the cognition of similarity (*Sādṛśyajñāna*) and

testimonial cognition (*Sābda*) is generated through cognition of word (*Padajñāna*). In the case of perception the sense organ etc. are alone taken as an instrument but not any cognition.

Another derivative meaning of the word *Pramāṇa* (*Pra + Mā + anāt*) is 'to measure'. The thing which is according to *Pramāṇa* is acceptable. And which is not according to *Pramāṇa* is not acceptable. It deserves a mention that Rabindranath Tagore also said in his famous writings '*Shantiniketan*' that - "**Praman Manena Je Rup Se Kurup**" (ugliness lies there where there is no limit or measurement). Beauty is always measured having some balance or limit.

Goutama, the author of *Nyāyasutra* and *Vātsyāyana* in his *Adibhāṣya*, has established the non-unique status of the means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*). In *Nyāyasutra* it is categorically explained that the same thing in different circumstances can really both a means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) and an object of valid cognition (*Prameya*). Thus here in Indian tradition, Epistemology i.e., the theory of means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) is interconnected with ontology or object of valid cognition (*Prameya*). The *Nyāya* dictum '*Pramāṇādihina Prameyasiddhiḥ*' means 'the theory of reality is established through the theory of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*), without the help of *Pramāṇa* an object called *Prameya* having some ontological reality cannot be substantiated. *Vātsyāyana* has placed *Pramāṇa* in the first position in the list of sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (*apavarga*), because without *Pramāṇa* valid knowledge is not possible. *Prameya* is placed in the second position, which signifies that the cognition of *Prameya* depends on the cognition of *Pramāṇa*. Any type of cognition involves these four.

Vācaspati Mishra opines that the terms '*Pramāṇamarthavat*' would mean that *Pramāṇa* is necessary factor in the phenomenon of valid cognition (*Pramā*). That is why, it is maintained by the *Naiyāyikas* at the very beginning. If *Pramāṇa* becomes non-deviated from the object (*arthavyabhicāri*), cognizer (*Prāmātā*), cognizable entity (*Prameya*), cognition (*Pramiti*) become meaningful or non-deviated to the object (*arthavati ca Pramāṇe Prāmātā Prameyam*

Pramitirityārtharthavanti bhavanti).²⁵ If *Pramāṇa* cannot reveal an object, the *Pramāta* etc. would become meaningless (*anyatama-paye' rthasya anupapattah*). An individual who inclines to accept or reject is called a cognizer (*Pramātā*). The means of proving an object is *Pramāṇa*. The object, which is being proved is called *Prameya* (*Yo'r thah Pramiyate tat Prameyām*). The valid cognition regarding some object is called *Pramitiḥ* (*Yadārtha vijñānam. Sa Pramitiḥ*). All types of human behaviour are centered around these four and *Tattva* reaches the fulfillment with the help of these four. That is why it is stated in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, (*Catasṛsu Caivambidhāsu arthatattvam Parisamāpyate*).²⁶ In fact, the first category *Pramāṇa* gives rise to the concepts of *Prameya*, *Pramātā*, and *Pramiti*. In other words, these concepts are centered around the key-concept *Pramāṇa* – the pioneer on which other concepts depend.

According to Jayanta, *Pramāṇa* is at collocation of conscious as well as unconscious factors which results in producing such an apprehension of knowable objects that is different from illusion and doubt. Jayanta clarifies that the epithet 'bodhābodhasvabhāva' characterizes the collocation of objects (*Sāmagri*) and the statement '*Pramāṇa*' is the instrument of cognition, which is other than doubt and illusion, forms the definition of *Pramāṇa*. Jayanta anticipates objection to his definition. It may be argued that *Pramāṇa* is the *Karaṇa* (instrument of true knowledge and *Karaṇa* is that which is the best of all the causes of an effect (*Sādhakatamam Kāraṇam*)).

According to Nyāya it is however, a fact that perception, inference and verbal testimony differ from one another because of the difference in the condition of their objects. We grasp an object through visual perception of qualified by its specific property. Inferential knowledge grasps the minor term as qualified only by the objects inferred on the strength of an induction. Testimony reveals the meaning of a word as associated with the word itself. Still as the substratum underlying the properties of these objects is sometime one and the same, there is no contradiction in the assertion that many means apply to the same. The great commentator on the *Nyāyasūtra* has given an appropriate example. From the words of the trustworthy person we learn that fire exists at a

distant place. A person proceeds in that direction relying upon his words. When he comes near he sees smoke and infers its existence. When he advances further and approaches fire Naiyāyikas and Vaishesikas have propounded that the same object can be grasped by perception, inferences etc. under different circumstances. Thus they uphold the principle of “*Pramāṇasam plava*”. When many means of proof reveals one and the same object it is technically called *Samplava* (mutual co-operation). The knowledge of one and the same object revealed by many means of proof is *Pramā* according to Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas assert that if we do not subscribe to the theory of ‘*Pramāṇa Samplava*’, the existence of inference cannot be established since knowledge of the relation of invariable concomitance depends upon the apprehension of the *Probans* and the *Probandum* and it cannot be gained without the aid of perception. In some cases restriction is imposed upon the function of proofs. As for an example, the Vedic Injunction alone that one who intends to attain heaven should perform *Agnihotra-Sacrifice* throws light upon the attainment of heaven by means of a Vedic sacrifice but perception and inference do not enlighten us. When one hears the roaring of thunder, he infers its cause which he neither perceives nor learns from the scripture. One directly knows that his hands are two but he does neither infer the number nor does learn it from another person. In majority of cases all proofs apply to all objects but there are few cases in which a particular proof has an exclusive object of its own.

The Buddhists maintain that each of the two *Pramāṇas* accepted by them viz.; perception and inference has its own exclusive and distinct jurisdiction. Their corresponding objects are particular and universal. The universals are cognized by inference and the particulars by the senses. In their opinion a unique particular can only be apprehended by perception and never by inference. The Buddhists uphold these restrictions as necessary and call it “*Pramāṇa Vyavasthā*”. They intend to deny existence to a universal etc. A fit reply will be given to them by re establishing the hypothesis of a universal etc.²⁷

Knowledge is a cognitive experience and it has to be distinguished from types of non-cognitive experience, such as willing, and feeling as exemplified by

volitional acts or emotional states as pleasure, anger or lust. What is peculiar about the cognitive attitude is that we want to “see” or “take in” things as they are, as they obtain in reality : we do not want to add or modify or distort the given, and to the extent we do this, it is not knowledge. To be discovered, the object of knowledge should exist prior to and independent of the knowing it must be an accomplished fact – a *Siddha-Vastu*. One that is not brought into being through the knowing. If it were simultaneous with knowledge or were created by it, how can my knowledge be true or false ? The perception of the “rope-snake” would not be an illusion and would not be recognized as such any time, if the rope (the real) were not taken as existing both during and before the illusion, it must be something absolutely independent of our knowing of it. The “rope-snake”, however has no existence independent of our knowing and is totally exhausted in that relationship (*drśyatvātmithyā*). Once this is granted that the object of knowledge should exist prior to it. We cannot also assign any period of limit to its priority. For today any such things we have to reach a stage when consciousness alone existed and the object was ushered into existence later on, presumably by the former. It is evident that such consciousness is not knowledge; it is willing. However far back, we may trace our knowledge it will always presuppose the object as prior to it. This priority is not primarily temporal, but only signifies the accomplished character of the object :

Not only is the object to be independent of our knowing, but we have also to regard the object as not being required to be known by any person or mind. When we know an object we need not at once be conscious of this very knowing for the object, which alone should determine the nature of consciousness in knowledge, says nothing about ‘its’ present known ness or its past unknown ness.

The above contention about the ideal of knowledge run counter to the commonly received principle of idealism that the object is mind-dependent in the someway or the other. But according to T.R.V. Murti all arguments of idealism (e.g., those advanced by ViJñānavāda, Berkeley or Hegel) rely upon feeling²⁸ and willing and mis-apply them to knowledge. He says that the knowledge absolutist

agrees with the realist and with Kant as against the idealist. That the object of knowledge is or should be independent of the knowing consciousness. There is profound disagreement, however, with realism in another respect. No actual knowledge (in the empirical way) is completely free from non-cognitive factors such as imagination, constructions, bias and prejudice etc. Such states appear as knowledge is taken to be knowledge, but are actually illusion or erroneous perception. The rope-snake, for example is mistaken as knowledge; what we seem to perceive is not given or known; it is a creation or projection of our imagination or fantasy, although not apprehended as such in the state of illusion. Thus knowledge as such is invariably true, and truth is known only, not self or willed. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing, not literally.

When we look at a physical thing from a distance or from a particular angle, we may get only a perspective. There could be an infinite number of such perspectives and each one may be useful, no doubt. No one perspective of a combination of them can claim to be absolutely correct. But the question is how will we come to be sure of absolute truth? The only way to be sure of absolute truth is to get into the skin of the thing as it were by becoming identical with it. Here knowledge and its object coincide. There is no possibility of discrepancy or falsity here, because we are not looking at the thing externally, mediately, from a distance or through the mediation of categories or in a biased or prejudiced way. Here we know the thing not by representation but by being it, as it were. Knowledge and the thing known become one. There is however a drawback, when we have the intuition we are not at once aware of it as intuition of the real. It is indeed a paradox. We have truth when we are identical with the real, but cannot be reflectively aware that we know the truth; and we reflectively make the assertion. We are already away from it. Our assertion may be a falsification or a distortion of the real and is therefore only appearance. To avoid this Advaita Vedānta takes recourse to negation. By consciously and systematically negating all thought-elaboration and linguistic expression in every form. We arrive at

ultimate Truth or Reality (*adhyāropāpavādābhyām nisprapāñcam bhrama Prapadyate*).²⁹

For a discovery of the real, the appearance is negated. This is possible only if the appearance were in some sense related to the real. All appearance is appearance of the real and by removal of the appearance we realize the presence of the real as underlying it. According to T.R.V. Murti a further consequence of this view is that we have recourse to two levels or orders of things, the real and its appearance.

R.K. Tripathi in his '*The Mādhyamika and Advaitism*, : also hold that the *Mādhyamikas* insist on the negation of appearance for the realization of tattva (*Prajñā*).³⁰ *Tattva* is beyond all thought and speech. In this context he makes a distinction between *Samsāra* and *Paramārtha*. The *Mādhyamika* also makes a distinction between *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*. The *Mādhyamika* also makes a distinction between *Vyāvahāra* and *Paramārtha* and hold that it is only by negating *Samvṛti* that we get the *Paramārtha*. That is why it is said that there is no difference whatsoever between *Samsāra* and *Nirvāna*, as *Nirvāna* nothing but knowing the *Samsāra* truly is. It is further held that *Samvṛti* covers or conceals reality. If the *Mādhyamika* says as the *Vedāntins* does, that reality is the ground of appearance (*Samvṛti*), then there is no difference between the two. But to be able to say this one has to depend on perceptual experience and not on mere thought. If however, the *tattva* were not said to be the ground of appearance then it would be either because there is no *tattva* or because it is not related. Either position is damaging to the *Mādhyamikas*. In the first case appearance itself will be reality and in the second, there will be dualism of appearance and reality and there will be no need to negate appearance.

According to ViJñānavādins school of Buddhism cognition is a medium of an object. The object is such as is not ordinarily present to sense but is conveyed to sense through a medium and that medium is cognition. According to this school perception does not yield knowledge of external objects distinct from percipient. The arguments in favour of their opinion are (1) the experience of a datum and the datum itself occur simultaneously, but two supposedly different

events occurring simultaneously cannot be distinguished and should be treated as identical, (2) the external world supposedly consists of a number of different objects, but they can be known as different only because there are different sorts of experiences “of” them, yet if the experiences are thus distinguishable, there is no need to hold the superfluous hypothesis of external objects. (3) Sense organs are supposedly intermediaries between external objects and consciousness. However, we have sensory experience during dreams. When the sense organ are not functioning. Thus it is feasible to explain the existence of sensations as due to the inner workings of consciousness. The absolute evolves itself in a way, which makes individuals think that there is an external world. The saint in the mystical non-dual state realizes pure consciousness and sees the misleading character of ordinary experience.

Not only metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of valid cognition, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as ‘*Khyātivāda*’ (Theories of Error) are formulated after keeping parity with such metaphysical presuppositions e.g. when a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. Now the question what is the factor which constitute falsity of the error ? Is the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to both apprehension and content ? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their presupposition. There lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda* and *Satkhyātivāda*.

The first view – *Asatkhyātivāda* held by the *Mādhyamikas* (*Śūnyavādins*) of Buddhist school. They maintained that nothing is real in this phenomenal world. For instance, in the illusory cognition of a shell as a piece of silver is real. The silver is unreal since it is sublated at the disappearance of the illusion. The shell is also not real since it is but one factor of the sublating cognition. Others being the silver and the connection between the silver and the shell. The

Mādhyamikas believe in the ultimate principle of void (*Śūnya*) which according to them is different from (1) reality, (2) unreality, (3) from both reality and unreality and (4) from neither reality nor non-reality. It implies that the real nature of things (*Śūnyatā*) is indeterminable. According to them when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object such as sky-flower or hare's horn etc. in any of the two given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has expressed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he receives not a snake as such, but rope snake. But a snake, which is a rope as well, is an absurdity. The snake may exist but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

But *Nyāya* refutes this theory by saying that "an absolutely unreal object", has a place neither in the world of theory nor in the world of practice".³¹

The theory of error held by the *ViJñānavādins* is known as *Ātmakhyāti*. They have totally rejected the view of *Sānyavādins* regarding error as a content less cognition that cognizes nothing. In their opinion there are no objects external to consciousness. If a cognition be different from its object, it must arise either before or after the object or simultaneously with it. It does not arise before the object since at that moment it has no object. It does not arise after the object since the object of cognition disappears at that instant. In case of simultaneous, there cannot be any difference between the two. Thus the *ViJñānavādins* believe that a cognition is not different from its object. Error according to them is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of sheer non-existent, rather it consists in an illegitimate process of projection of subjective ideas as objective and extra-mental facts.

But this theory also refuted by the *Naiyāyikas* on the ground that if it is accepted, there will be no difference between knowledge and the subject and object of knowledge, since according to these Buddhists everything is an idea and in that case instead of speaking as 'this is silver', one could even speak as "I am silver".

The theory of error advocated by the *Prābhākaras* known as *akhyāti* or *vivekakhyati* refute the *asatkhyati* and *ātmakhyati* views of the Buddhists. The *Prābhākaras* are of the view that error is the result of the lack of discrimination

between two cognitions. The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory image “*Yatra Yad Adhyāsastad Vikekāgrahani-Vandhano Bhramah*”. For instance in the illusory cognition of silver in the shell, the shell, by virtue of its luster which it has in common with silver is mistaken as silver on account of obscuration of memory (*Smrtipramoṣa*) The *Prābhākaras* hold that the following three forms of fusion are responsible for the lack of discrimination between two cognition : 1. For example fusion of the presentation and presentation e.g., when a crystal appears red on account of an adjacent rose both the crystal and the redness are given in cognition. Though redness is a quality of the rose and not of the crystal, the fact is not apprehended. (2) Fusion of presentation and memory e.g. when the shell is taken as silver, the presentation of the shell and the memory of silver are confused, (3) Fusion of memory and memory e.g. when a person is not able to determine whether a ball object situated at a distance is a post or an ascetic, he gets confused. In case of snake-rope illusion the given element lies on the ‘rope’ and the remembered content is ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgement -- ‘this is snake’. The two facts – the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as consequence. The *Prābhākaras* believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.

The *Naiyāyikas* propound the *Anyathākhyativāda*, urge that the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from the negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things given and remembered – are falsely confused and non-distinguished as *Prābhākaras* say. In the snake-rope illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived ‘this’ appearing to be a snake. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, ‘this snake’, that was falsely perceived through the inference of the defects of sense media etc. The illusion is a unitary

composite presentation of this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (*Laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the snake being also presented through the extraordinary (*Alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. The error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extra ordinary seen snake-characters of the jungle snake as imposing in 'this', that is seen by the external sense organ viz. the eye, by natural contact of sense and objects.

Error, according to *Samkarites* involves more than the experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false selection between real contents. *Samkara* concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in *Asatkhyātivāda* nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the *Anyathākhyātivāda*. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely non-existent (*asat*) cannot be the content of a positive experience. While every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognized as a snake, the status of snake is not non-existent (*asat*) as we cognize it in this way and it is not existent (*Sat*) also as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent valid cognition of rope. Hence the snake is neither existent nor non-existent which is described as indescribable (*Anirvacaniya*). This illusory cognition is taken as a real, which is of apparent type (*Pratibhāsikasattā*).

Ramanuja regards error as consisting in the apprehension a partial truth as the whole truth. His theory is known as *Satkhyātivāda* according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. Thus when a rope is cognized as a snake, the cognizer perceives a real snake feature in the rope existing before him. He perceives a real 'here and now' snake character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal but in considering the snake character to be the only characteristics of the object, lying before.

So far we have thrown some light on the concepts of right cognition and false cognition. Epistemology deals with the both. Apparently a question may be

raised why the discussion on *Apramā* in the form of error is done in this context. The main intention of the discussion is to show that both the theories concerning valid cognition and invalid cognition are connected with the metaphysical presuppositions accepted in a particular system. Just as *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* are influenced by the presuppositions, the error etc. is also not free from these. In order to prove this different theories of *Khyātivāda* are explained. Moreover the concept of doubt (*Samsaya*), which is also a form of a *Pramā*, has got tremendous influence in philosophical methodology. Without doubt one cannot proceed to the realm of philosophy. One can have enquiry if one has some confusion on the nature of an object. This confusion or doubt leads to further know the exact nature. Had there been no doubt, there would not have been any philosophical query. That is why, doubt though *A-Pramā* has got some positive value. In the same way. *Tarka* or *Reductio-ad absurdum*, which is taken as a form of *A-prama*, is a kind of indirect method of knowing. Any doubt can be removed through the application of *Tarka*. The example may be given in the following way. If there is a doubt of deviation on the coexistence between smoke and fire, an argument in the form of *Tarka* can be done in the following way – “If smoke be deviated from fire, it would not have been caused by fire’ (*dhumo yadi vahni vyābhicāri syattarhi vahnijanya na syāt*). As the smoke generated by fire is an established fact, it is wrong that smoke will be deviated from fire. In this way the doubt of deviation or any other doubt can be removed. Hence like *Pramā a-Pramā* is also philosophically significant.

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CHAPTER – 2

THE CONCEPT OF PRAMĀ

Pramā and *Pramāṇa* are two fundamental concepts of the Indian theories of knowledge. The word ‘*Pramā*’ is used in Sanskrit philosophical literature in a very technical sense. It is one of the species of the genus term ‘cognition’ (*Jñāna*). Every philosopher holds that truth should be the differentia of knowledge or *Pramā*. But views regarding the meaning of truth vary and consequently, the mark of *Pramā* is expressed in various ways.

The view, mostly held by the Buddhists, which other writers also occasionally support, is that the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. A true cognition for them is therefore defined in various ways, as that which reveals an object that serves some purpose (*artha* or *prayojana*) or leads to the achievement of some end,¹ or which favours a successful volition (*Samvādi Pravr̥t̥tyā-nukūla*). This view resembles the modern pragmatic theory of the West. By true knowledge (*Pramā*) they mean the identity of content between the cognition and the cognitum. But the idealist school of Buddhism, namely, the *Vijñānavādīn*, is the view that consciousness (*Jñāna*) is the principle of self-manifestation and it is the source of all knowledge. According to *Vijñānavādīn* *Pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *Pramāṇa* is that which brings about such knowledge.

Again another view, which is incidentally referred to by *Dharmakīrti* and many other writers, regards truth as a harmony of experience (*Samvāda* or *Samvāditva*). A true knowledge according to this view would be one, which is in harmony with other experiences² of the Western Theory of Coherence.

The Advaita School of Vedānta favours another view according to which the truth of knowledge consists in its non contradicted ness (*abādhitatva*)³. The

correspondence view of truth cannot directly prove itself. The only way to prove correspondence is to fall back on the foreign method of coherence (*Samvāda*) – that is to infer the existence of a real correspondence between knowledge and reality from the facts of the harmony of experience. But all that we can legitimately infer from the harmony of knowledge with the rest of our experience upto that time is not that the knowledge is absolutely free from error, but that it is not yet contradicted. For we do not know that we shall not have in future any experience that can falsify our present knowledge. As regards pragmatic text of our causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), the Advaitism argue that even a false cognition may lead to the fulfillment of a purpose. They give one of the examples⁴ to support their view. The case is that we mistake the luster for the jewel and desiring to get it and actually get the jewel. In this case the knowledge of the luster, as the jewel – which is clearly false cognition leads to the attainment of the jewel and thereby satisfies our purpose, though we come also to knowing that the initial cognition which caused our action was itself false. It is found, therefore, that the pragmatic view of truth is not tenable. Therefore the Advaitins argue that *Pramā* is defined as a cognition having twofold characteristics of uncontradicted and novelty (*abādhitatva or yatharthatva and anadhigatatva*)⁵. Thus the *Pramā*, consists in its content being uncontradicted (*abādhitārtha-viṣayatatva*). It is not sufficient that knowledge should be true, it is also necessary that the content of knowledge should be new or previously unacquired – *anadhigata*. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra gives two definitions of *Pramā*, one of which includes memory in it. The other definition refers to its novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge,⁶ which has been rejected by the Naiyāyikas. The first definition which excludes memory (*Smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition is as follows : a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition and which is not known before (*Tatrasmṛti-vyāvṛttam Pramātvamanadhigata vādhitārtha viṣayaka-jñātvam*). Here the term *anadhigata* excludes memory from the purview of valid cognition. And the second definition – ‘a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its

content which is not contradicted by any other, Cognition (*Smṛti-sādhāranantu avādhitārtha visayka jñātvam*). The only kind of knowledge to them, the knowledge of the already unacquired. But though memory is not a distinct source of knowledge, it is still a distinct experience that has to be distinguished from knowledge. The experience which reveals the new (i.e. knowledge proper) is called *anubhuti*⁷. Whereas reproduced knowledge is called *Smṛti*⁸. Thus novelty comes to be considered an essential quality of knowledge. According to the *Mimāṃsakas* knowledge is always a knowledge of something. Knowledge is produced from combination of knower and known. Valid cognition or *Pramā* is true and can never be produced as false. For this reason *Bhātta-Mimāṃsakas* do not regard *Smṛti* as *Pramā*. Because the object of *Smṛti* is now unknown. The other group of *Mimāṃsakas* is known as *Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas*.

Kumārila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) because it is apprehension. *Prābhākara* also regards apprehension (*anubhuti*), which is distinct from recollection, as a means of valid cognition. Kumārila regards cognizedness (*jñātata*) produced by a cognitive act of its result. But *Prābhākara* identifies *Pramāṇa* with *Pramā* or valid cognition and regards a cognition as manifesting itself and not as inferable from cognized of its object. According to him, all cognition as cognition are valid and their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their object. So that wrongness does not belong to the cognition themselves but to the objects cognized. Kumārila agrees with *Prābhākara*, as to the nature of valid knowledge which is in the nature of apprehension and can be set aside by its objects. Kumārila regards novelty, non-contradiction and correspondence with the objects as the test of truth.

Therefore, Kumārila holds recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehended already by perception. *Prābhākara* also excludes recollection from valid knowledge which is in the nature of apprehension which is different from recollection. A serial perception is valid because it is not produced by an impression (*Samskāra*) though it apprehends what is already apprehended. It is apprehension (*anubhuti*) and consequently valid.

The *Sāmkhyists* hold that the mode of Intellect is called cognition or apprehension or determinate knowledge. Determinate knowledge is unconscious since it is a property of unconscious Intellect. Cognition is not a property of him who reveals an object. According to *Sāmkhyists* the mode of intellect (*Buddhi*) which assumes the form an object is *Pramāṇa*. According to Jayanta, this hypothesis is closely akin to that of the Buddhists. *Sāmkhyists* hold that when an object comes within the range of our sense organ a change taken place in it (Sense Organ). It catches the form of the object in question. This image of the object, seized by the sense, organ, exerts influence upon the intellect. The intellect also transforms itself into a similar image of the intellect. This mode of intellect attributing itself to transcendental consciousness (*Puruṣa*) as its property is a means of proof. Transcendental consciousness, possessing attribution of intellect becomes the knower of a definite object fixed up by intellect.

Let us now examine Nyāya view of *Pramā* in respect of other concept. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the word *Jñāna* and *Buddhi* is taken as synonymous (*Buddhirupalabohijñānanetyanarthantaram*). *Buddhi*, *Jñāna* and *upalabdhi* belong to the same metaphysical categories (*Prameya Padārtha*) right cognition of which is essential for human liberation. In respect of *Jñāna*, the Nyāya view stands in sharp opposition to the conception of *Jñāna* in *Sāmkhya* or *Vedānta* according to which it is a modification of a substance called *buddhi* or *antaḥkarana* and *buddhi* or *antaḥkarana* being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyāya, the *jñāna* ontologically being an accidental *guṇa* of the self and therefore without parts does not assume any form or shape (*ākāra*) : Similarly not being a *Kriyā*, it does not bring about any change in the object that is known as the Bhāttas. Wrongly regard it as doing.⁹ Epistemologically *jñāna* refers beyond itself to its object i.e., it has self-transcending reference to an object. This feature distinguishes *jñāna* from the other *gunas* of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self. Yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities.¹⁰ It's existence proved by our experience (*anubhūti*). It is the root of all our behavioural usage viz. desires to get (*upādāna*), desire to leave (*hāna*) and indifference

(*upekṣaniya*) (“*Sarva-vyāvahāra hetu guṇaḥ buddhi Jñānam*”). The word ‘*guṇaḥ*’ is used to prevent the definition from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) in terms of space (*deśa*), time (*Kala*) etc. And the word ‘*hetu*’ signifies that it is the special condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) of all our behaviour.

But although the said definition can avoid fallacy of *ativyāpti*, it suffers from the fallacy of undercoverage, for the definition is unable to accommodate indeterminate cognition (*Nirvikalpaka Jñāna*), which has no behavioural usage. To avoid such problem Annambhatta’s suggestion is that “*Sarvavyāvahāra hetu*” – is not the defining characteristics of cognition. Cognition or *buddhi* is a special type of abstract concept. It can neither be defined by any synonymous word, nor can be defined extensively like many other words, i.e., the colour blue or red etc. According to Annambhatta cognitionhood is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of cognition (*Jñāna*). Cognition is the locus of cognitionhood (*Jñānatvajati*). There cannot be any cognition if it is not related with cognitionhood.

Cognition is of two types viz., recollection (*smṛti*) which originated from the bare mental impression (*Samskāra-mātra-janyam-Jñānam*). And cognition other than recollection (*tadbhinnam Jñānam*) is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Recollection is that cognition which originally from the bare mental impression (*Samskāra-mātra-janyam Jñānam*). And cognition other than recollection *smṛti-bhinnam Jñānam*¹¹ is presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Which is defined as negatively. Presentative cognition (*anubhava*) also is of two types. Valid presentative cognition (*yathtytha anubhava*) and invalid presentative cognition (*aYathārtha*). Valid presentative cognition is technically known as *Pramā*. According to Nyāya *Pramā* is always a non-recollective cognition or *anubhava*. *Pramā* is defined by Naiyāyikas as ‘*Yathārthānubhava*.¹²

The reason behind not describing *smṛti* or recollective cognition as *Pramā* is that a recollective cognition can be *Yathārtha* is true only in so far as it is an exact reproduction of a true non-recollective cognition of the same object,¹³ which the subject previously had. That means if the previous non-recollective cognition was a true one and the memory cognition is an exact reproduction of it

as it is found in the case of recognitive cognition (*Pratyabhijñā*), then the memory cognition can be said to be borrowed from that of its causes that is, the previous non-recollective cognition of the same object. Under such circumstance the recollective cognition cannot be taken as memory cognition called *smṛti*.

Moreover the Naiyāyikas hold that being a true or faithful copy of a previous non-recollective cognition, it cannot be true or veridical in the primary sense of the term. For it does not correspond to its object at the time of its occurrence.¹⁴ In the memory cognition that object is represented as what it was at the time of occurrence of the previous non-recollective cognition, but during the time which elapsed between the moment of the occurrence of the previous non-recollective cognition and that of the present memory cognition the object has not remained exactly the same at least its temporal adjunct is not the same. Therefore, the memory cognition cannot be said to correspond to the object at the present moment. This is the reason for maintaining that a memory cognition cannot be *Pramā*. A clear definition has been shown between memory cognition (*Smṛti*) and valid presentative cognition. When a cognition is generated through impression alone (*Samskāra mātra janya*) it is called *Smṛiti*. If it is caused through impressions alone with presence of the object, it is called *yathārtha anubhava*. Now the question is, what it means for a cognition to be true. According to the Naiyāyikas a cognition is true if it is 'arthāvyābhicāri'¹⁵ i.e., non-discrepant with its object that means that if a cognition represents an object as it really is then the cognition is true. In a precise language of Navya-Nyāya.¹⁶ *Tadvad Viśesyakatvāvacchinna tat Prakārakānubhava*, that is a non-recollective cognition the content of which consists of a property which actually qualifies the thing which appears as the subject of that cognition is true.

According to Udayanāchārya – etymologically the meaning of *yathārtha* signifies the similarity or correspondence. *Yathārtha* is the determinans of (*viśeṣaṇa*) of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). A presentative cognition is valid or true (*Yathāsrtha*) only if it corresponds to the external object having some content. Here there is a problem. For if we conceive correspondence as a partial one, then the definition will suffer from the fallacy of over coverage, because

there is partial similarity or correspondence between presentative cognition (*anubhava*) and the object having some content in the case of invalid presentative cognition e.s., perceiving a rope as a snake. Thus *ayatharthānubhava* will be unduly extended to the definition of *Yathārthanubhava*. On the other hand if the meaning of correspondence or similarity were accepted in full, then no presentative cognition (*anubhava*) would be valid (*Yathārtha*). As both the extreme views are unacceptable, some thinkers hold that the correspondence would be determined by subsequent cognition (*jñānāntara*), which is also affected by the fallacy of over coverage in terms of illusory cognition is corrected only by a subsequent veridical cognition. Once again *Yathārtha anubhava* could not even be defined as a cognition, which leads to successful activity (*Saphala Pravṛtījnakatia*). Because among the three types of cognition desire to accept (*hāna*), desire to leave (*heya*) and indifferent attitude (*upekṣaniya jñānā*) accepted by Naiyaikas and rejected by Buddhists – a indifferent cognition (*upekṣaniya jñānā*) does not serve any purpose – the cognition of such object does not lead to any successful activity. So if it were defined in terms of successful activity, it would be affected by the fallacy of under coverage. A cognition is supposed to be the server of the causal efficacy in any form, because it is the mark of the existence as per the principle – ‘*arthakriyākaritvalaksanamsat*’.

As in *upekṣābuddhi* there is no activity as such, it cannot be taken as an existent entity as per the Buddhist principle of *sattā*. An entity is existent if and only if it serves some purpose (*arthakriyākaritva*). It may be argued that an indifferent attitude or *buddhi* is existent on account of the fact that it generates some non-action towards an object. Like inclination (*Pravṛtī*) and refraining from (*nivṛtī*) the phenomenon of *upekṣā* is connected with the attitude of *audāsinya* (a status of being indifferent) which is the root of renunciation. The Buddhist logicians will reply that the status of *audāsinya* is nothing but a situation of *hāna* or *tyāga*. Hence, what is called *audāsinya* can be included under the category of *hāna*. Hence the *upekṣābuddhi* is not possible in their metaphysical scheme. There are two types of rejection or *hāna*. One type lies in

the case of assertive rejection after considering a lead consequence of something, which is a real rejection. At the same time we can think of another type of rejection which goes in the name of *upekṣā*. It is, infact, a kind of rejection in disguise of indifference or *upekṣā*. Hence, a real *upekṣā* without the sense of rejection is not at all possible.¹⁷

Now let us examine the similarity and dissimilarity between Indian concept of *Pramā* and western concept of knowledge. In Western tradition, we can see two main views regarding the definition of knowledge. Traditional philosophers generally defined knowledge in terms of belief. Beliefs for them may turn into knowledge if the belief is true and the believer has some justification for his/her belief. On the otherhand, according to other philosopher like Cookwilson, Prichard etc, as the nature of knowledge and belief is totally different. Knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief. For Prichard, knowledge by definition is true, so to ascribe that 'knowledge is true' – is a tautology. On the otherhand, as belief is only contingently true/false : its' propositions are posteriori. Truth and falsity is applicable only to belief. Thus the object of knowledge is totally different from the object of belief. Therefore knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief.

Hence, the question arises whether Indian concept of *Pramā* is equivalent to western concept of knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. But in Indian epistemology (*Pramāṇasāstra*) such concepts like belief, which is a form of life of western epistemology, is not accepted. J.N. Mohanty tries to point out that there are hints of the concept of belief in Indian tradition also. For *Pramā* is a certain cognition (*niścayajñāna*), may be either valid cognition or invalid cognition which is similar to belief which may become true or false. But truth and falsity are not the exclusive essential characteristics of belief or *niścaya Jñāna*. So only from the observation of the applicability of some accidental characteristics it does not follow that the locus of these characteristics are essentially identical. To some western thinkers 'being confident of' – is a necessary condition of knowledge, although have not defined knowledge in terms of belief. Hence belief and 'being confident of' – do not convey the same

meaning. Hence our opinion is that being confident is merely a mental attitude towards cognition and a mental attitude cannot be predicated as true or false. Mohanty is right in saying that 'western concept of belief' – is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścayajñāna*, if *Savikalpaka* i.e., a conceptual has a propositional structure i.e. comprehending *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣana* and their relation, so belief not only neglected in Indian epistemology, but some recent western philosophers like Chisholm, Keith Lehrer and Ayer also comments that belief is not so important in defining knowledge. For according to Chisholm and Lehrer belief is associated with our emotions, desires, etc. and as a result, if knowledge is defined in terms of belief then there will be possibility of affecting knowledge by the defect of one-eyedness. Because belief is more subjective than objective, since it is not devoid of one's impression etc. They introduce the concept 'acceptance' instead of belief and Ayer introduces the concept of 'being sure'.

There is another point of difference between knowledge and *Prāma*. According to a group of western thinkers knowledge is an act. But according to the other group, if knowledge is explained as an act, then it cannot explain all sorts of knowledge – which are recognized in common usage, again if it is an act, then it would cease to exist after sometime. But the nature of knowledge is not of that sort. So knowledge for them is a disposition.

On the other hand *Prāma* in Nyāya is neither a disposition nor a pure act of in western sense. *Prāma* is propositional or determinate cognition (*Savikalpaka Jñāna*). A proposition is neither purely subjective nor objective, rather it is said to be a neutral entity. So according to some western thinkers it is the proposition, which is either true or false. But there is a problem here. If such neutral entity is conceived, then we have to consider infinite number of proposition. Corresponding to each state of affairs. So Austin line thinkers hold that it is the judgement which is either true or false. Because in judgement there is a mental act directed to the correlative proposition, which we believe or disbelieve. Nyāya system does not distinguish between an act and a proposition because a proposition in the above mentioned sense certainly is not a quality (*guṇa*) of the self. J.N. Mohanty rightly observes that though a '*Savikalpaka*

knowledge not proposition but propositional or relational because it is a logical complex analysable into constituent elements and relations. *Prāma* is used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense, which is the synonymy for the Sanskrit term, *Samskāra*. But what originates from *Samskāra* (mental impression) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition. Some opponents also advocate that the Nyāya concept of valid cognition cannot even be spoken as an episodic occurrence, since god's cognition is eternal (*nitya-Jñāna*) and thereby cannot be ascribed as having origination. This objection may be overcome by saying that the notion of god's cognition is a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological problem.

Lastly, the objection in equating knowledge with *Prāma* is the concept of justification or evidence. If someone claims having knowledge in general we enquire for evidence to justify his claim. The word 'justification' in the western tradition is used in the two senses, viz. In the strong sense and in the weak sense. Justification in the strong sense means 'truth-ensuring' and in the weak sense it means 'truth conducive'. But the question is : is reason really infallible ? Even if reason is regarded as the 'Divine' element in man' – it is as imperfect as any other human faculty. For this reason Western epistemology suffers from Gettier like problem. Gettier has shown that it may happen that there may be justification in the strong sense, yet some conditions may not be ascribed as knowledge. This shows that the western concept of justifications is not always truth hitting.

On the other hand Indian concept of instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) is always truth hitting. No such concept of instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) guided by reason, in the strong sense and guided by senses i.e. in the weak senses is found in Indian tradition. Pure mathematics and empirical sciences have the same logical status in Indian tradition. In Nyāya, concept of universal is cognized through supernatural perception and for them *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is super-normal connection (*Praityāsatti*). Again, Nyāyayikas hold that *vyāpti Jñāna* is to be attained through the cognition of all individual manifestations of Probans and Probandum acquired by *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Hence it is a connection or

Pratiyāsatti. The influence of fire from smoke is possible only when the *vyāpti* relation is apprehended between smoke in general (*dhūmasāmānya*) and fire in general (*Vahnīsāmānya*) which is not possible by ordinary perception. The method of the super-normal connection through universal *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*) is to be resorted to for acquiring the cognition of *vyāpti* between smoke in general and fire in general. Thus *Pramā* is not equated with knowledge.

Pramā or presentative veridical cognition (*Yatharthānubhabha*) for the Nyaiyayikas is explained as that which originates after the intermediary (*Vyāpāra*) of the instrumental condition (*anupramāṇa. vyāpārāt param bhavati yah sah anubhavaḥ*). But there is no such intermediary condition for the origination of recollection (*Smṛti*).

Recollection (*Smṛti*) originates from the bare mental impression only (*Sanskāra mātra janyam jñānam*). In *Tarkasamgraha*, presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is defined negatively i.e., other than recollection (*tadbhinnam jñānam*) and its nature is associated with the concept of the instrumental condition of cognition (*ḌPramāṇa*). Both are interrelated terms. The result of the instrumental condition is the effect, valid cognition (*Pramā Karanam Prāmaṇam*).

Now a question may arise : What is an instrumental condition ? From the point of view of important in producing the effect, there are two types of conditions in *Nyāyavaiśesika* system. (1) Common condition in or *Sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* – like god, space, time, the unseen power, will of god etc – which are necessary for the production of any effect, (2) Uncommon or *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* – which are only necessary for the origination of a particular effect. Both in the early and in the later schools of *Nyāya-Vaiśesika* literature the ‘*Kāraṇa*’ (= *asādhāraṇa Kāraṇa*) is used as ‘a causal condition (*Vyāpārat kāraṇam*). In the case of ‘*Pratyakṣapramā*’, *Upamiti* and *Sābda-bodha*, he takes the term to mean, the causal condition, that function through an intermediary or a *Vyāpāra*, but in the case of ‘*anumitipramā*’, the term is taken in the sense of a causal condition that appears last on the scene. *Ananibhatta* describes sense organ (*indriya*) as the *Pratyakṣapramā*, cognition of resemblance’ (*Sādrśyajñāna*) as the

Upamānapramāṇa and ‘Statement’ (*Śabda*) as the *Śabda-pramāṇa*, while in the case of *anumiti*, *parāmarśa*, is taken to be the *anumāna-pramāṇa*, *parāmarśa* is called operative process or *Vyāpāra* because this cognition being caused by the cognition of *Vyāpti* i.e. Probandum, becomes the generator of the inferential cognition. In the form of consideration of *parāmarśa*. ‘*Vahnivyāpyadhūmabān ayam parvataḥ*’ – i.e. the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire, this piece of cognition is caused by the previous cognition of *vyāpti* reflected in the portion – *Vahni-vyāpya* (pervaded by fire) and generates the inferential cognition – ‘*Parvataḥ vahnimān dhūmāt*’ (the mountain is fire-possessing as it is smoke-possessing). Hence the definition of *vyāpāra* in the form – *tajjanyaatve sati tajjanyaajanako vyāpārah* – can easily be applicable here. In this way, the existence of an uncommon cause along with operative process can be admitted in other form of inferential cognition.

Likewise inferential cognition, another two types of cognition, e.g. cognition through comparison (*Upamiti*) and testimonial cognition (*Śabda*) are generated through the instrumentality of other cognition, like the cognition of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*) and the cognition of word (*Padajñānam*). But the perceptual cognition alone is not caused through the instrumentality of other cognition, when a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognition to have direct awareness of it.

In the case of perceptual cognition the sense organ etc. are alone taken as an instrument, but not any cognition.

In answer to the question : What is the mark of selecting an uncommon or specific condition (*asādhāranakāraṇa*) the Naiyāyikas differ. There are three views about this. According to the ancient Naiyāyikas criterion for selecting the uncommon condition (*asādhāranakāraṇa*) is - “*Phalāyogavyāvachchinnam asādhāranamkāranam*” i.e. the uncommon condition is that which being present the effect originates immediately, only when our sense organ comes in contact with the object (*Indriyārthasannikarṣa*) perception takes place. Hence sense-object contact is the non-inherent (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) condition which being

present the effect perception immediately follows. So ancient Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that instrumental condition might be a non-inherent one.

On the other hand according to Neo-Naiyāyikas, a special condition i.e. instrumental condition might be a substance or inherent condition (*Samavāyīkāraṇa*). For the instrumental condition is defined as the locus of the intermediary condition (*vyāpārat*). An intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*) is that factor which being produced by something becomes the producer of that entity produced by earlier one (*Tajanyatve sati tajjanya janako*). For example sense object – contact, caused by the sense organ produces the effect perception. So the sense is always either a quality (*guṇa*) or an action. So Neo-Naiyāyikan, therefore, are of the opinion that for selecting an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇakāraṇa*) is ‘*vyāpārat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam kāraṇam*’.

Jayanta Bhatta hold a third view for selecting an uncommon condition (*Kāraṇa*) taking clue from the famous grammarian Panini who deserves an uncommon condition as “*Sādhakatama*”, - meaning *Sādhaka* as instrumental and *tama* as excellence (*atiśaya*) i.e., the most effective cause of an effect.

Although both old and Neo-Naiyāyikas accept instrumentality as an uncommon condition yet they are different in opinion about excellence. According to the former excellence (*atiśaya*) remains to the extreme condition (*Cārama-kāraṇa*) whose presence is immediately followed by the emergence of effect. Their concept of instrumentality cannot explain the independent excellence (*Svadhina-atiśaya*) of each condition. But according to the later, the excellence can not remain in the intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*), because it cannot produce the effect without taking co-operation from other conditions. *Uddyotkara* hence, admits the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpāra -viśistakāraṇa*) as an instrument, which also does not hold good, because there are at least some cases where intermediary condition is more important than the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpāra*). The Neo-Naiyāyikas concept of instrumental condition (i.e., as the locus of intermediary condition). On the other hand fails to explain the immediate emergence of the effect.

Jayanta, as a consequence advocates that the collocation (*Sāmagri*) alone can claim instrumentality (*Karaṇatva*), because it can overcome both the demerits of the old Naiyāyikas and the Neo- Naiyāyikas. According to Jayanta an instrument is that which is most efficient or operative to the origination of an effect. The collection of condition is collectively essential for it. If one condition is absent, the effect does not take place.

Now an objection may arise, that as the collection is nothing but all conditions taken together, and individual conditions are not completely different from (*atyantabhinna*), the collection of condition, instrumentality (*Karaṇatva*) as the collection of all conditions (*Sādhakasāmagri*) also possesses the status of relative excellence (*atiśaya*). Jayanta's answer at this point is that the individual condition separately could not possess excellence (*atiśaya*) because the individual conditions separately are common conditions (*Kāraṇa*) but not an uncommon conditions (*Kāraṇa*). Uniqueness (*Viśeṣatva*) differs from excellence (*atiśayatva*). Individual condition in isolation possesses uniqueness (*Viśeṣatva*) but when these conditions get together and form the collocation, it acquires the additional property of excellence (*atiśayatva*) in relation to the isolated members. According to Jayanta, instrumentality of valid cognition is an aggregate of certain conscious and unconscious conditions, which together make the apprehension of nonerroneous (*avyabhicārinimasandighāmarthopolabdhim' vidadh' atibodhābodhasvabhāvasāmagripramāṇa*). The two adjectives of non-erroneous and non-doubtful constitute the definition and the collocation of conscious and unconscious conditions constitute the nature (*Svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā*).

If collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions is taken as instrument in the sense of most effective for producing an effect, then even the subject (*Kartā*) and object (*Karma*) of cognition are also included to that collocation (*Sāmagri*). If that there will no cognizer (subject) neither which cognition is inconceivable? Again if the object were also included into the collocation of condition which is taken as an instrument then the cognition would be without any object. If this is accepted, the Nyāya epistemology will lose its

epistemic status. Jayanta in order to avoid this problem defines instrumentality (*Sādhakatama*) as the collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions other than subject and object (*tasmāt kartr-karma-vilakṣaṇa*) which is excluded from doubt and error.

Both old and Neo-Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if subject and object is excluded from the collocation of condition then it would lose its' property of being most excellent. Because such collocation being present fails to originate the effect without any temporal gap : Secondly, if subject and object is excluded from the collocation of the condition then is it possible to maintain the nature of the instrumental condition of cognition (*Pramāṇa*) as the nature of both conscious and unconscious at all ? Because Jayanta explicitly maintains that if the means of cognition (*Pramāṇa*) becomes meaningful other factors like cognizer (*Pramātā*) i.e. the individual who has got desire of attaining or forsaking something, cognizable entity (*Prameya*) i.e. the object which becomes an object of right cognition and right cognition (*Pramiti*) i.e. the right cognition regarding some object, becomes meaningful. All these are always *Pramāṇa* centre (*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityā rthavantibhavanti-Nyāyabhasya* on *Sūtra* 1.1.1 ('*Cataṣṣvavamvidhāsu arthatattvam parisamāpyate*' – Ibid.).

Visvanatha is very much straight forward to explain the nature of valid cognition and its instrument. According to him, an invalid cognition is that if something is cognized as having some property, whereas it does not have that property (*tadabhāvavatatitprakāra kamjñānambhramayatārtha*). Invalid cognition (*apramā*) is of two types viz. Error (*Viparyaya*) and doubt (*Samśaya*). For example, in perceiving something at a distance as having the property manhood and trunkhood, I may cognize is it a man or true ? (*Sthanurvā Puruṣovā*). The nature of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect-generated. According to Gopinath Bhattacharya in the case of perceptual cognition the defect fall under three headings viz. 1. Environmental defects – includes haze, the object being very distant and bad lighting, 2. Pathological defects are faults in the usual apparatus such as jaundice and 3. Psychological defects

are such as being angry or inattentive. But according to Janardan Ganeri environmental faults are only 'local' defects and he also includes the 'global' environmental defects in it. For example, a person trying to see things at the bottom of the ocean fails not because of any local defects, but because the human visual system is not suited for such environment. It is not seen due to having some global defects.

On the other hand, valid cognition is explained as attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*) and not as absence of defect-generated because the Naiyāyikas hold that there are three types of conditions for production of any effect viz. inherence (*Samavāyi*), non-inherence (*asamavāyi*) and efficient condition (*Nimittakāraṇa*). So the absence of defect in the efficient conditions does not imply the presence of other causal conditions viz. inherence and non-inherence. So Visvanātha, for the economy of thought, rightly advocates that valid cognition (*Pramā*) is due to attribute. If there is absence of defect in the efficient condition, then the presence of a particular attribute to a particular cognition is sufficient in producing veridical cognition (*Pramā*). According to Visvanātha there is only one attribute to each type of cognition. For example, sense object. contact (*Indriyārthasannikarśa*), consideration (*Parāmarśa*), Cognition of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*) is the attribute of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumati*), verbal testimony (*Sābdajñāna*) and comparison (*Upamāna*) respectively. Thus for Visvanātha attribute means non-inherent condition (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) and he supports the concept of instrumental condition of the old Naiyāyikan.

Again valid cognition could not be explained as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), because there are also other type of cognition namely indeterminate cognition (*Nirvikalpakajñāna*) which is neither valid nor invalid cognition according to the Naiyāyikas. It is not valid since it is not cognized as having any property by any relation, self-mind, contact is the common condition presents both in valid as well as invalid cognition. Except this there are some other conditions in the case of valid and invalid condition. Attribute is that condition which is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*Pramā*), justified by inference (*anumāna*). Valid cognition is due to attribute and invalid

cognition is due to defects – this type of pervaded relation (*Vyāpti-Sambandha*) is ascertained by the method of agreement and disagreement (*anuvayi-vyātireki*) which runs thus where there is defect there is invalid cognition and where there is attribute (*guna*) there is valid cognition (*Pramā*). (*Pramājanyasāmānya kāraṇabhinna karaṇajanya janyajñātvāt apramāvat*). So the presence of attribute (*guna*) along with the absence of defects (*dosa*) for Visvanātha makes the sufficient ground for the origination of valid cognition (*Pramā*). But if this is the case then one may object that this definition will be affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) because this criterion is fulfilled in the indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpakaperception*) which is not recognized as valid in Nyāya system. One point deserves a mention here that Visvanātha presents the above mentioned criterion in the context of explaining the nature (*Svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā*) but not in the context of defining it. Visvanātha defines valid cognition as ‘*bhramabhinnamiti*’ and finally ‘*tatprakārakamya jatamtad viśesyakam*’ – which is similar to ‘*tatvatitatprakārahanubhavahyathārtha*;’. Gangeśa also initially supports this definition, which become the centrifugal force of the Nyāya definition of valid cognition.

The word ‘*tat*’ in the definition means the determinate property (*Prakāra*) and the word ‘*tadvati*’ (the suffix ‘*vat*’ means locus) means the determinandum or the locus of the determinate property (*viśesya*). Thus the meaning of the definition is: a cognition is valid (*Yathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually exists. And a cognition would be invalid (*ayathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually does not exist. For example, when someone cognizes a rope as a rope and express it in the form of ‘this is a rope’ (*idam rajju*), here this (*idam*) is determinandum (*viśesya*) and rope is the determinate property (*prakāra/viśesana*) etc. someone is cognizing the rope as having the property ropeness and the property is a valid one (*yathārtha*) since ropeness actually exist in rope and not to any other object and this is the time the cognizer cognizes the universal ropeness also by supernatural perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*). On the other hand when someone cognizes rope as a snake and express it or in the form

‘this is a snake’ (Ayam Sarpah) he is cognizing the rope as having the property of snakesness which actually does not exist and his cognition is invalid (*ayathārtha*).

According to Professor J.N. Mohanty, the definition ‘*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*’ has epistemological as well as ontological parts. The expression ‘*tatprakāratva*’ refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration has ‘that’ (*tat*) as its’ qualifier. The expression ‘*tadvati*’ refers to a correlative ontological situation namely to the fact that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge. Truth or validity (*Prāmānya*) for the Naiyāyikas could not be the exclusive property of cognition alone, side by side, it is designation of real property. This is the reason the word ‘*tat*’ has been used twice in the definition. And as Truth (*Prāmānya*) is a hybrid entity, beside determinandum (*Viśeṣya*) and the determinate property (*Viśeṣaṇa*) there is another component, viz., relation (*Sambandha*) which is technically called (*Samsarga*). The above-mentioned definition of valid cognition fails to accommodate relation (*Samsargatā*) explicitly. The explicit logical form of the definition would be – “*tannistha viśeṣyatā nirupita sāmavāya sambandhāvacchinna prakāratānistha prakāratā viśista anubhavaḥ yathrthaḥ*”

REFERENCES

1. Nyāya-Vindu, Chapter I, "Tataḥ arthakriyā – Samartha – Vastu – Pradarśakam Samyog – Jñānam" and Ibid, : "Yataśca artha-siddhis tat Samyog- jñānam". (Chowkhamba).
2. Cf. *Tattva Koumudi* (on Kār, 51). "Samvadyate also vide *Pramāṇa vārttikas bhāṣya*."
(Patna, 1953) PP. 3-4
Pramāṇam avisamvadijñānam
3. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, pp. 19f and *Advaitasiddhi* (*Nirnayasagara*, 1917), P. 340 : "Bādhitaviṣayatvena hi bhramotvam, na tu vyādhikarāṇa-Prakāratvena, tasyāpi viṣaya-bādha prayojyatvāt."
4. *Tattva-pradipikā*
Citsukhi, p. 218, *Nirnayasagar*, 1915.
5. *Vedānta paribhāṣā*,
P. 19f.
(*Venkateśvar Press*, 1911).
6. C.D. Bijalwan
Indian Theory of Knowledge based upon Jayanta's Nyāyamañjari
(Heritage Publishers), P. 40.
7. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*
(*Kārikāvali* with the com. *Siddhānta Muktāvali*),
Nirnayasagara. P. 232.
8. Ibid.

9. “Nyāya view stands in sharp opposition to the conception of *Jñāna* of *Sāṃkhya* or *Vedānta* according to which it is a modification of a substance called *buddhiḥ* or *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* being a composite substance assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyāya : the *jñāna*, Ontologically being an accidental *guṇa* of the self and therefore without parts does not assume any form or shape (*ākāra*). Similarly not being a *kriyā*, it does not bring about any change in the object, that is known as the Bhāttas, wrongly regard it as doing”. J.N. Mohanty *Gangesa's Theory of Truth*, Visvabhāratī, Centre of Advance Study in Philosophy, 1966, P. 26.
10. “Epistemologically *jñāna* refers beyond itself to its’ object, i.e., it has self transcending reference to an object. This feature distinguishes *jñāna* from the other *guṇas* of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self, yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities”. Ibid.
11. Annambhatta,
Tarkasamgraha, P. 32.
12. Udayanācārya,
Nyāyakusumāñjali,
Stavaka 4, Kārikā 1.
13. Udayanācārya,
Tatparyaparisuddhi, in *Nyāyadarśana* ed. Anantalal Thakur,
Mithila Institute Series, Darbhanga, 1967, P. 110.
14. Ibid. P. 110.
15. Vatsyāyana - *Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4;
Goutama, *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4.

16. Visvanātha,
Karikāvali with Mukṭāvali,
PP. 744-745.
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CHAPTER – 3

THEORY OF PRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA

SECTION – 1

NYĀYA THEORY OF PRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA

Gangeśa begins his logical enquiry into the means of valid knowledge, which is called *Prāmāṇyavāda*. According to Gangeśa, it is quite possible to fix upon an immaculate definition of valid knowledge, so that validity may be accepted as a real cognitive property. Validity necessarily should be defined as consistency of cognition (*Yathārtha anubhava*) as distinguished from *Yathārtha smṛti*. Validity is understood by the term *Pramā*. A correct memory is not technically called *Pramā*, which is restricted to *anubhava* as distinct from *smṛti*.

But the opponents hold that validity can not be defined at all. *Śriharsa*, the main opponent of Gangeśa, takes on the possible definition of validity which are recorded in his '*Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhādyā*' : The following is the rough list of definition scrutinized by *Śriharsa* :

1. *Tattvānubhutiḥ Pramā* (p. 239).
A valid knowledge is the knowledge of the essence of a thing.
2. *Yathārthānubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 397)
A valid knowledge is the knowledge of things as they are in reality.
3. *Samyakparicchedaḥ Pramā* (p. 411)
A valid knowledge is the correct ascertainment of the thing.
4. *Avyābhicāryanubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 427).
A valid knowledge is the knowledge, which does not deviate from reality.

5. *Avisamvādyanubhavaḥ Pramā* (p. 430)
A valid knowledge is that which is consistent or coherent with verification in practice.
6. *Abādhitānubhutiḥ Pramā* (p. 442)
A Valid knowledge is an uncontradicted knowledge.
7. *Tarkasamśayasmr̥ti Vyātirikta Pratitiḥ Pramā* (p. 443)
A valid knowledge is that which is other than hypothetical reasoning, doubt, illusion and memory.
8. *Pramātvalakṣaṇa jātyabhisambandhāt Pramā* (p. 444)
A valid knowledge is that which possesses validity as its universal property.

The very first definition of *Pramā* rejected by the opponent is the eighth definition refuted by *Śriharṣa*. The definition says that a valid knowledge is that which possesses validity or *Pramātva* as a universal property. According to the opponent there is no such universal (*jāti*) as may be called validity or *Pramātva*.

It is generally accepted that universal is pervasive of the particular in which it inheres. Cowness belongs to the entire cow, no part of the animal is free from cowness. Similarly if *Pramātva* is a universal it should cover the entire judgment irrespective of the subject and predicate.

Here we should mention the position of the predicate to the opposition. According to the opposition it is agreed that even an invalid knowledge is partially valid. They hold that in the invalid perceptual judgement “It is Silver”, invalidity belongs to the predicative part “Silver” (which is a tinsel infact), but not to the object part ‘it’ which demonstrates the mere presence of the factual object. There is no denying the fact that an object is really there out in the world. What is wrong in its identification by a wrong predicate i.e., silverness is wrongly imposed on tinsel. This aspect of partial validity of an invalid judgement is underlined in the off-quoted expression “*dharmiṇi sarvam abhrāntam prakāre tu viparyayah*” – Every illusory knowledge is right in respect of the substantive

subject, but wrong only in respect of predicational objective. An illusion is thus different from a complete hallucination in which both the subject (*dharmin*) and the predicate (*Prakāra*) are projections of imaginations.

According to Gangeśa this epistemic law of partial validity even of an invalid judgement is violated if validity is considered to be a universal and so in the invalid judgement *Pramātva*, if a universal, cannot be restricted to the subject part keeping the predicational part out of its' fold. There is an epistemic phenomenon of collective knowledge (*Samūhālabana*), which grasps two objects together in a single grip. The judgement – “These are two pieces of tin and silver” when one piece is silver indeed) should not be taken as partially valid, for it is invalid as a whole. If one still insists that, since silver is there, the judgement has some sort of validity also, we contend that validity as understood by the term *Pramā*, should not be applied in this case. Better one should employ the term *yathārtha* (consistent with fact), just as one does in respect of memory, which rightly recapitulates a past, cognition. A correct memory is not technically called *Pramā*, which is restricted to *anubhava* as distinct from *smṛti* (memory).

According to Dr. Nandita Bandyopaddhyay if we go by this technical distinction between *Pramātva* and *yathārthtva* (validity and consistency or conformity), *Pramātva* or *Prānmānya* should be necessarily defined as consistency of cognition (*Yathārthanubhava*).

The object of a knowledge appearing as the subject of a judgement is called *Viśeṣya*. The object is the factual support on which the knowledge rests. *Viśeṣya* as an epistemic category is the corresponding cognitive counterpart figuring as the subject of a judgement. So sometime the *Viśaya* itself is used in the sense of *Viśeṣya*. The term *Prakāra* generally means a *Viśeṣana* or adjective though there is a subtle difference between the two *Prakāra* is normally restricted to a *Viśeṣana* appearing in a judgement as an adjective to the substantive. Even therein *Prakāra* generally means the predicative adjective, though sometimes the term is extended to a non-predicative adjective also.

In case of the valid judgement “It is Silver”, the subject ‘it’, as *viśeṣya*, demonstratively refer to the object ‘silver’, which is factually qualified by the

adjective 'Silverness'. In the corresponding judgement Silverness is reflected as *Prakāra* or predicative adjective to 'it'. This predication faithfully represents the fact in which silverness really qualifies the object, silver. Hence this valid judgement is *viśeṣyāvṛtti-aprakāraka* i.e., it does not contain any *Prakāra*, which as a factual *viśeṣaṇa* does not really qualify the object, silver.

However, in case of invalid judgement "It is Silver" the *Prakāra* is the same silverness, which is predicated of the substantive subject 'it'. In this wrong judgement the factual referent of 'it' is the object, tinsel, which is really qualified by tinness, not by silverness, which nevertheless, is the predicate of the judgement. Thus the judgement is invalid for having a predicate, which in fact is not present as an adjective qualifying the object. So the judgement is *viśeṣyāvṛtti prakāraka* and hence invalid.

The contender thus argues that *viśeṣyāvṛtti-aprakāratva* i.e. not having a *prakāra* which is absent in the object, which is virtually the same as *Pramātva*, may be considered as the limiting determinant (*avaccedaka*) of the presence of validity in knowledge. *Pramātva* in this sense be considered a universal. In a similar way *viśeṣyāvṛthi-aprakāratva* (having a *Prakāra* which is absent in the object) determines the presence of *Prakāra* which is absent in the object) determines the presence of the negation of validity in knowledge. It would be noted that the contender does not insist on accepting a-*Pramātva* or invalidity as a universal. His insistence is only on the universalness of validity.

But how can we distinguish *Pramā* from *a-pramā* ?

The Nyāya thesis is that validity is inferred from a successful follow-up action inspired by the knowledge. One entertains the judgement 'This is Water'. Its conducive ness to a successful application establishes the truth of the judgement according to the Naiyāikas. After having the judgement one gets of the object supposed to be water and successfully performs the action which water is expected to satisfy. Our practical behaviour depends on knowledge and this knowledge is said to be verified if the behaviour stimulated by it attains the fulfillment that is expected from the object shown by the knowledge. Hence such knowledge is called *samartha-pravṛtti-janaka*. According to the Naiyāyikas

inference of validity roughly expressed as *idam jalajñānampramā, saphala-pravr̥thi-janakatvāt, puruvapalabdhajalajñānatvāt* i.e., this knowledge of water is valid, because it has produced a successful behaviour, like a similar knowledge of water that I entertained before. The contender here turns the middle term of this inference into a definition of validity.

But such a definition is met with a serious objection. A person may have the judgement, 'This is Water' and yet may remain indifferent. I.e., may not feel the need of exerting himself to get water and verify his knowledge in the process. He has just the knowledge, which he does not verify. Now if water is really there should we call his knowledge invalid simply because he does not go for verification ?

To wriggle out of this difficulty the Naiyayikas draw a line of distinction between *phalapahitakāraṇa* and *svarūpayagyakāraṇa*. An effect is pervaded by causal conditions but the converse is not true, i.e., an effect must be preceded by a cause though a cause may not necessarily be followed by an effect. A cause, which is immediately followed by an effect, is called *phalapahitakāraṇa*, while a cause, which is not followed by an effect though it has the efficacy to produce an effect, is called *Svarūpayagyakāraṇa*. A cause may not produce an effect due to the absence of a relevant auxiliary causal condition or to the presence of an obstacle. Here the absence of an effect does not point to any absence of causal competence. The cause is competent in itself (*Svarūpayogya*). Though this competence remains unrealized for some reason or other.

The contender may argue that knowledge to be valid must have for its causal condition *doṣasāmānyābhāva* or absence of any fault. The opponent goes to show that the definition fails to do justice to a valid collective knowledge such as 'These are pitcher and cloth'. Pitcher ness does not belong to cloth and clothness to pitcher. Thus these properties become *viśesyā vr̥ttiprakāra*, calling for the invalidity of the judgement agreed to be valid.

The contender may try to defend the definition by saying that the term *viśesyāv̥rttiprakāra* is intended to mean a property not located in any substantive clothness belongs to cloth and pitcherness to pitcher as such neither is

viśesyāvṛttiprakāra is the total exclusion of any *viśesyāvṛttiprakāra*. In the judgement under review, since Silverness, not factually belonging to tin appears, nevertheless as a predicate in relation to tin, it is not free from the fault of *viśesyāvṛttiprakāra* and as such the judgement is false by definition.

From validity is a real property of knowledge, follows that either it should have been self-evident (*Svataḥpramānya*), i.e. simultaneously and spontaneously apprehended in the apprehension of knowledge itself, or should have been apprehended by some other verificatory knowledge (*Parataḥ pramānya*) validity is not apprehensible either way. Hence, there is no justification for positing an unknown and unknowable property of knowledge. Since there is nothing called validity in reality, the question of its genesis does not arise. Gangeśa goes to show that the postulates of *Svataḥpramānya* is untenable no doubt, but there is enough justification for the Nyāya thesis of *Parataḥpramānya* according to which validity (and invalidity too) is ascertained by some verificatory inference. As regards the genesis of validity he argues at length in favour of the Nyāya position that validity is guaranteed by some special excellence of the causal factors that generate the knowledge, not by the causal factors in general which are common to valid and invalid knowledge.

SECTION – II

SVATAHPRĀMĀNYAVĀDA THEORIES

In earlier chapter we have seen that *Pramā* is defined by the Naiyāyikas as ‘*tadvatitatprakārahkānubhavaḥ*’. The next question related to this comes to our mind, how can we know that a particular piece of cognition is *Pramā* ? How can we know *Pramā*tva i.e. ‘*tadvatitatprakarakatvā*’ in *Pramā* ? According the Naiyāyikas, the truth of cognition depends on the actual existence of the relational complex represented by the cognition in the objective world. The truth of cognition depends on two conditions -- ontological condition and the epistemic condition. Epistemic condition can be said to be fulfilled when a *Prāmāṇā* is employed as a means of knowing things. Prof. J.N. Mohanty distinguishes between two senses of *prāmānya*. In our sense the word *prāmānya* may mean the property of being instrumental in bringing about true knowledge (*Prāmā-karaṇatva*). In this sense *Prāmānya* may mean simply the truth of a knowledge itself, if, that knowledge is true. Of these two second one is logically prior to the other in as much as the very idea of being an instrumental cause of true knowledge cannot be understood without understanding what is meant by true knowledge and effectively without understanding what is meant by truth. The thesis of *prāmānya* are concerned with *prāmānya* in the second sense, i.e.; with the truth of a knowledge.

The vedāntists distinguish between two kinds of truth¹. (i) Knowledge – metaphysically true that can never be falsified at anytime past, present and future i.e., the metaphysical truth consists in *traikālika*, *avādhittva* and the other; (ii) empirical truth² – whose nature has yet to be made precise. The theory of *Prāmānya* is concerned with the empirical truth of – the knowledge of finite human beings. The *Prāmānya* theory may demand, how does a knowledge becomes true ? and how is its’ truth ascertained ? On the other hand, another connected but quite different question arises that how is the knowledge itself

known ? This is known as the question of the theory of *Prakāśa*, is logically prior to the theory of *Prāmānya*. For unless the knowledge, itself known, no question can even be raised about its truth.

Now the question arises whether ‘truth’ ‘*tadvatitatprakārakatva*’ of a cognitive state, comes to be known ‘from itself’ (*Svataḥ*) or from other sources (*Parataḥ*). Prof. J.N. Mohanty prefers to use the words ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ respectively. According to Mimāṃsā–Vedānta, the word intrinsic means both intrinsic with regard to origin and ‘apprehension’ (*Jñāptitaḥ*). Similarly Nyāya holds that truth is extrinsic to knowledge means both extrinsic with regard to ‘origin’ (*utpattitaḥ*) and apprehension (*Jñāptitaḥ*).

If different views about *prāmānya* are compared with the different views about *prakāśa*, then there should be four different combinations :

- I. The theory of *Svataḥprakāśa* combined with the theory of *Svataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the Advaita and Prābhākara-Mimāṃsā.
- II. The theory of *Parataḥ prakāśa* combined with the theory of *Svataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the Mīśra and Bhāṭṭa schools of Mimāṃsā.
- III. The theory of *Svataḥprakāśā* combined with the theory of *parataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the Nyāya school.
- IV. The theory of *parataḥprakāśa* combined with the theory of *parataḥprāmānya* – upheld by the Nyāya school.

Now we may pay our attention towards different forms of the *Svataḥprāmānya* theory. They all agree that truth of knowledge originates from those causal conditions, which also give rise to the knowledge. With regard to the nature of the apprehension of truth they all agree that knowledge is as a rule apprehended together with its truth³. But they differ firstly, with regard to the nature of knowledge and secondly, as to the nature of our apprehension of our knowledge.

1. VEDĀNTIC CONCEPT : Dharmarāja Adhvarindra presents his own definition of valid knowledge in chapter VI of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* – when

something is cognized as having some properties actually existing and the efficacious to successful inclination (*pravṛttiśamarthya*) originating either from memory or from immediate experiences, it is called valid cognition (*tathāhismṛthyānubhava sādharmaṇam samvādi pravṛtṭyānukūlam tadvati tatprakāraṇam jñātvam prāmāṇyam*). Now, the question, 'Is the validity (*prāmāṇya*) cognized simultaneously along with the origination of that of cognition ? The Advaitism believe in the intrinsic validity of cognition (*svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*). *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* means that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended through the same *sāksi*-awareness, through which the knowledge itself is apprehended. Cognition would be intrinsically valid if and only if the validity of cognition is conditioned by the very condition, which is the condition of the cognition itself: (*Yāvat svāśraya grāhaka sāmāgrigrahyatvam*)

But what does the Vedāntalists mean by the term *prāmāṇya* ? usually *prāmāṇya* is defined in terms of uncontradicted characters (*avādhitatvam*) of knowledge.⁴ But to ascertain a particular cognition whether it is contradictory or not, we have to depend upon subsequent cognition. Because it is absurd to suppose that cognition is from within as incapable of contradiction in future. Gauḍabrahmānandi here suggests that contradictory character (*avādhitatva*) has to be explained as the property of being a cognition of anything, which has not been known to be contradictory so far. If validity is taken in this sense even then the cognition is intrinsically true only from the point of view of apprehension (*jñāpti*) and not from the point of view of origination (*utpattiḥ*). So Madhusūdaṇa Sarasvati argues that uncontradictedness refers not merely to the absence of contradiction at the time of knowing⁵ but also to the absence of contradiction in future.

Vivaraṇa regards *Prāmāṇya* in the sense of the capacity of manifesting its object as being intrinsic to a knowledge⁶ when the Mimāṃsakas and Vedāntists maintain that truth is intrinsic to a knowledge whereas falsity

is extrinsic, they ought to understand the two notions of truth and falsity in such a manner that the one remains as contradictory of the other.

Then there will arise a question whether truth is for the Vedāntists is nothing other than the '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' of the Naiyāyikas ? According to this meaning of truth a knowledge 'S is P' – is true when P really belongs to S. In Gangeśa's opinion it is only in this sense that truth may be regarded as being apprehended ab initio.⁷ It is curious that though Gangeśa considers *tadvatitatprakāratva* as the feature which distinguishes right cognition from error, Madhusūdaṇa and many Advaita writers regard it as belonging to all apprehension not excluding error. There is reason therefore to suspect that the Naiyāyika and Vedāntists do not mean quite the same by '*tadvatitatprakāratva*'.

Now what is that feature which distinguishes right cognition from error? In answer to this question it is said that not bare '*tadvatitatprakāratva*', but '*tadvatitatprakāratva*' as qualified by the property of leading to successful activity serves to distinguish right cognition from error. It seems reasonable to suggest that at least the property of being the cause of successful activity cannot in any case be a feature which one apprehends ab initio like abādhitva, *samvādipravṛttijanakatva* also refers to a future possibility.

In Advaitaratnarakṣanam Madhusūdaṇa defines truth as a property of being a certain apprehension of an object which was previously unknown.⁸ Truth in this sense, according to Madhusūdaṇa satisfies three needs :

1. It serves to distinguish right cognition from error.
2. It is capable of being apprehended *Svataḥ* as the theory demands; and
3. Further it can account for unwavering activity as the phenomena demand. It does not belong to error for the content of erroneous apprehension e.g., the snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is being perceived and therefore has no unknown existence

(*ajñātasattā*) of the object of erroneous apprehension. We cannot then say that it was unknown before : hence truth in the above sense does not belong to erroneous apprehension. According to the Advaita epistemology – the prior unknown existence of what now comes to be known is an object of *sākṣi*-awareness. Hence the property of being a certain apprehension of what was previously unknown is something that is apprehended together with any knowledge and by the same *sākṣi*-awareness. In this formulation *prāmānya* is identified with the very generic character of *Jñānatva* so that a false apprehension is by definition not knowledge at all.⁹

In another formulation, the way of defining *prāmānya* is to explain in the psychological language with reference to the knower's unawareness as to the falsity of the knowledge under consideration. In this sense *prāmānya* belongs in common to all knowledge, right or erroneous, but as the erroneous character of the error is detected, it deserts the erroneous apprehension. It is correct to say that knowledge is true, if it is not known to be false. Someone can say that knowledge is to be called 'false' when it is not true and then the definition is plainly circular. On this account truth is a derivative concept, and fits in with the Advaita metaphysics that nothing empirical is real. Empirical truth is a concept and is logically definable only in terms of falsity.

The first formulation makes of the *Svataḥprāmānya* theory on analytic consequence of the suggested definition of knowledge in terms of *prāmānya*. There is a certain absurdity in saying both 'I know that 'S is P' and 'S is P is false'. If something is known it follows necessarily that it is true. Thus according to Ayer¹⁰ I know that S is P – there are only three conditions need to be fulfilled (i) that 'S is P' is true, (ii) that I am sure of (i); and (iii) that I who knows have the right to be sure.

According to Ayer, knowledge is intrinsically true in the sense that if something is known, it follows necessarily that it is true.¹¹ This follows from the 'linguistic fact', that what is not true cannot properly *be said to be known*. It is not a knowledge, which becomes falsified, but it is really pseudo-knowledge whose pretension to be knowledge are now exposed. Hence the curiously paradoxical situation that although the *Svatahprāmānya* theory defined knowledge in terms of 'truth' thereby condemning error as pseudo-knowledge. Yet in its attempt to establish its position it includes under its 'pakṣa', all that claims to be knowledge including knowledge in the true sense and pseudo-knowledge.

It is precisely the contention of the *svatahprāmānya* theory that there is no criterion of truth, though there is criterion of error, knowledge as such is true but cannot be proved to be true, whereas error is proved to be error.

It is mentioned that prāmā alone is knowledge proper and all else is error or pseudo-knowledge. In this connection Professor J.N. Mohanty raised some problems from the point of view of the Naiyāyikas, if truth cognized from the same conditions as give rise to the knowledge, false apprehension should also become true, for the generating conditions of false apprehension, the latter being, like apprehension, a species of knowledge. Mohanty comments – "Madhusūdana confidently replies that this need not be so, for false apprehension is not species of knowledge". Prof. Raghunath Ghosh should like to submit that it is difficult to make clear distinction between knowledge and pseudo-knowledge at the initial state i.e., at the time of the origination. At the initial stage all individual manifestations of knowledge are taken to be as what they appear. In the case of snake-rope illusion, the snake is entertained as snake initially and only on this ground various psychological reactions become possible. Afterwards we come to

know of the falsity of the view of the snake when it is contradicted by the presentation of the rope. In the same way, the knowledge arising at the initial stage cannot be regarded as true, as there may be doubt as to its possibility of being contradicted by the subsequent knowledge. So the truth of knowledge can be known from its' unfailing correspondence to the fact (*samvādi-pravṛtti*) otherwise (*visamvādi-pravṛtti*) it would be taken as pseudo-knowledge. So the truth and falsity of knowledge cannot be apprehended by the collection of causes that gives rise to knowledge.¹²

2. (a) THE PRĀBHĀKARA THEORY :

There is agreement however among the Mimāmsakas as how the theory of a cognitive state comes to be known, although there is difference regarding how the 'existence' of a cognitive state comes to be known. According to Kumārila and his followers, the existence of a cognitive state gets revealed in a kind of inference known as '*jñātatā Lingakānumiti*'.¹³ According to Mūrāri Mīśra, the existence of cognitive state gets revealed in a subsequent internal perception and according to *Prābhākara* and his followers, a cognitive state is self-revealing or in other words the existence of a cognitive state gets revealed of itself. According to *Prābhākaras*, the problem of truth and error is simply meaningless on his theory, for there is no cognitive error. Then when we say knowledge is false what we actually mean. The *Prābhākaras* say we mean that it leads to unsuccessful behaviour. On the cognitive side all knowledge is true even the so-called false knowledge. For every knowledge has its object which it manifests. Bearing this in mind Mohanty concludes that the *Prābhākara* Mimāmsakas distinguishes between three levels of truth and error.

Rāmānujāchārya uses three different terms for three different kinds of truth. In the broadest sense of the term 'truth', *Yathārthya* belongs to all awareness¹⁴ (including memory and what ordinarily passes for erroneous apprehension). In a narrower sense *prāmānya* to all awareness excepting memory (but including even the so called erroneous apprehension and in a still narrower sense *prāmānya* to all awareness excepting memory (but including even the so called erroneous apprehension and in a still narrower sense of the term *samyaktva* only to such knowledge other than memory which leads to successful practice¹⁵ *Yathārthya* or truth in the widest sense is co-extensive with the property of being an awareness of, or of being true to its' object (*Sarvasyajñānasyārthā vyābhicāritatva*). The criterion of *Prāmānya* is independent in manifesting the object; memory is not *Pramā* since it does not independently manifest its' object. The test of *Samyaktva* is the absence of uncontradicted practice.

Now, Gangānāth Jha has raised an objection against Bhatta theory of *Prāmānya*, which is equally valid against the *Prabhakara* notion. For if the test of *Prāmānya* is independent in manifesting its object, then *Prāmānya* is not *Svataḥgrāhya* or in other words it cannot be said to be apprehended along with the apprehension of the knowledge, (whose *Prāmānya* it is). It is clear therefore that neither *Prāmānya* nor *samyaktva* are apprehended ab initio, in that sense no knowledge goes unknown.

Now truth, according to the Bhāttas is apprehended *svataḥ* in the sense that the same inference from *jñātātā*, which makes us aware of the truth of that knowledge. Like the knowledge its; truth also remains unknown at the beginning. The knowledge manifests its; object without itself or its truth being apprehended till of course the above mentioned inference brings both to light.¹⁷ For Bhāttas and for Prābhākara, *Pramānya* is the same as awareness of the

object (= *bodhātmakatva*). In this sense of course every knowledge is intrinsically true. Umbeka rejects the identification of *prāmānya* with *bodhakatva* because though *bothakatva* is intrinsically to all knowledge, yet it does not serve to distinguish right from wrong cognition for even the erroneous knowledge of a rope-snake has the property of *bodhakatva* inasmuch as it also manifests its own object, Umbeka realizing the fact that mere manifestation of an object is not enough, he defines *prāmānya* as *arthavisamvāditvam*, i.e., the property of being uncontradicted to its object.¹⁸ A true knowledge must be uncontradicted to its object. It is this truth which is *svataḥ* in the sense of being produced by the cause of knowledge itself, says Umbeka.

Gāgā Bhāṭṭa defines true knowledge as a knowledge whose object was previously unknown and which is uncontradicted by another knowledge.¹⁹ In this sense *Prāmānya* are the same as *Samyaktva* of the *Prābhākaras*.

Pārthasārathi suggests a new distinction between two senses of 'truth', truth as pertaining to the knowledge and truth as pertaining to the object. Apparently, his purpose is to circumvent the following difficulty. According to Bhāṭṭa, both the original knowledge and its' truth are apprehended together. The original knowledge being previously unknown, the judgement 'this knowledge is true' – is not possible. Awareness of truth would therefore presuppose a prior apprehension of the knowledge – which would contradict the central thesis of the *svataḥ prāmānya* theory. An effort has been made to avoid this difficulty by suggesting that the *prāmānya* is nothing other than *visayatathātva* or the 'suchness of the object' in which case the ascription of *prāmānya* to the knowledge cannot but be secondary.^{20, 21} Truth in this sense i.e. as the suchness of the object, or as the pure nature of the object hardly concerns the issue under consideration, *viṣaya* is

itself an epistemological concept, so that *viṣayatathātva* could only mean faithfulness of the knowledge to its' object. *viṣayatathātva* is not the same as the *yathārthya* of the Prābhākaras. For *yathārthya*, as we have seen belongs to all awareness to right and error alike. If *Viṣayatathātva* in this sense is to be *Svataḥ*, then we have to take it that every knowledge claims to be true to its object. But Parthasarathi's notion of *Viṣayatathātva* is meant to distinguish right knowledge from error.

(b) THE MIŚRA THEORY :

This theory is the form of the Mimāṃsā school, associated with the name of Muñari Miśra. They agree with all the three Mimāṃsā schools as to the origin of truth. According to them, the *anuvyavasāya* apprehending a primary knowledge should also apprehend that primary knowledge as being knowledge of such and such object which, infact, amounts to apprehending it as a true knowledge.

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Advaitasiddhi,
(Nirnayasāgar ed.), P. 499.
2. Madhusūdana Saraswati,
Advaitaratnarakṣanam,
(Nirnayasāgar ed.), P. 32.
3. Gangeśa,
“Svataste Prāmāṇyavata eva Jñānasya grahāt
(Prāmāṇyavāda).
4. Thus, for example, Vācaspati Miśra,
“*Abādhitānadhigatā samdigdha = bodhajanakatvamhipramāṇatvam
Pramāṇānām*”,
(*Bhāmati* 1.1.4).
5. “*Vyāvahāra Kālābāduyatva*”,
(*Advaitasiddhi*), P. 351.
6. “*Nāpi Prāmāṇyamārtha Pariccheda Sāmarthyam Kāraṇaguṇa
jñānātparato Vagamyate*”,
viz. ed. P 102.
“*Prāmāṇyam nāma jñānāsyārtha Pariccheda Sāmarthyam*”,
(*Vivarāṇa Prameya samgraha*),
Vasumati edition, BK, 11 P. 223.

7. *Tathāpi tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatvam tadvati tadvaiśiṣṭya jñānatvam vā prāmānyamtacca jñānagrāhaka sāmāgrigrāhyam*,
(Loc.Cit.), P.110.
8. *A jñātārthaniścayātmakatvmeva Prāmānya masmatpakse*,
(Loc.Cit.), P. 32.
9. The Late K.C. Bhattacharyya has proposed a similar theory in his paper "knowledge and Truth", included in the Second Volume of his Studies in Philosophy (Calcutta, 1958). Thus he writes : Two Propositions may be stated about knowledge that knowing is known only as implied in the explicit awareness of truth and that truth is asserted only of a content that is known. Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other". (P. 154). Again "There is ... no such thing as false knowledge" (p. 157), so that "if it now appears to be not true, it is never said to have been known but taken at best to have been believed (P. 158).
10. A.J. Ayer,
"The Problem of Knowledge"
(London,1956), Ch. 1.
11. Ibid, P. 22.
12. Professor Raghunath Ghosh
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14. “*Tasya Sarvasamvitsādhāraṇatvāt*”,
(Loc. Cit.) P. 2.
15. J.N. Mohanty
‘*Gangeśa’s Theory of Truth*’,
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16. Professor J.N. Mohanty is indebted in bringing out this three-fold sense of ‘truth’, to P. Śāstri’s ‘*Introduction to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā*’, Calcutta, 1923. It would be seen he says, that he agrees with that learned scholar in thinking that it is truth only in the broadest sense of the term that, on the *Mīmāṃsa* theory could be *svataḥ*. Mohanty however has differed from Śāstri in the precise formulation of these three senses. The difference between Śāstri’s analysis and Mohanty’s analysis may be represented thus :

On Śāstri’s analysis :

1. Truth as common to all cognitions (*Pramā, A-pramā* and *Memory*).
2. Truth as common to memory and anubhuti
(= *badhakābhāvatva*).
3. Truth as belonging only as anubhuti (*bāadhanābhāvatva* + *anadhigatatva*).

On Mohanty’s analysis :

1. *Yatharthya* (common to all awareness qua awareness of some object).
2. *Prāmāṇya*, as common to knowledge, right or wrong, but excepting memory (= *anadhigatatva*).
3. *Samyaktva*, as characterising only right *anubhuti* (*anadhigatatva* + *bādhakābhāvatva*).

17. Gāgā Bhatta writes : *“Pramātvasyānanumeyatvājñānānumāne samānasam vi + samvedyatayā jñānatva vat pramātvasya svatastva sām̐bhavāt”*.
Bhāttacintāmani, P. 13.
18. Slokavārtika with the commentary of Umbeka,
Sanskrit Series No. 13, 1940
Madras University, P. 54.
19. *Ajñātaviṣṣayakam (bodhaka jñānarahita-jñānam pramā)*.
Bhāttacintāmani, P. 13.
20. Ram Sāstri (Ed.),
Nyāyaratnākara on slokavārtika,
Benaras, 1898, P. 71
21. Nyāyaratnākara, P. 61; again
Nyāyaratnāmatā, P. 33,
(Benaras edition, 1300),
(Arthatathātvamidameva hi jñānasya prāmānyam).

CHAPTER – 4

THEORIES OF PARATAḤ PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

SECTION – I

BUDDHIST THEORY OF PARATAḤ PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA

We have analyzed the various notions of Prāmānyavā, upheld by the different propagators of the theory of *Svataḥprāmānya*. Now we take up the theory of *Parataḥ Prāmānya*, especially as upheld by the Buddhist and Nyāya School of Philosophy.

According to Buddhism *Pramā* is a kind of unfailling correspondence to the truth, which is called *avisamvāda*. *Avisamvāda* means to know an object as it is. So particularly Dharmakīrti has given this definition only to make others understand what *Pramā* is and it is to be kept in mind that the Buddhist do not make any distinction between *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* i.e. valid cognition and instrument of valid cognition because to them both the valid knowledge arises at the same moment. To show honour to the theory of momentariness they do not believe that there is a distinction between *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists consider only the momentary unique particulars (*Svalakṣaṇa*) to be real (*sat*). A momentary unique particular (*Svalakṣaṇa*) could not intermediate between the subject (*Kartā*) and the instrument (*Karaṇa*) and also produce the effect (*Phala*) within a moment. So the classical notion of causality is considered by the Buddhist Logicians as imaginary and therefore unreal (*Kalpitaḥ karma kartrādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate*) for according to the classical notion, valid cognition being an effect must have some instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*). The instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) must proceed the

effect (*Pramā*) and is most predominant condition (*atiśayatva*) among other conditions as well and which being present the effect immediately follows.

To have some causal relations between two realities (*sattā*) needs at least two moments, one moment is for its origination, and the next moment is for its relation to others. According to the Buddhist Logicians if one would like to stick to the concept of valid cognition (*Pramā*) along with the concept of its instrument (*Pramāṇa*), they are in relation of identity (*tādātmya*). The Buddhist Logicians hold that each and every cognition has an intentionality towards some object (*Visayonmukhatā*) and thus illuminates a momentary particular (*Svalakṣaṇa*). The cognizance of object means the illumination of consciousness with a certain form having some content. In such a situation we may only metaphorically conceive that when we cognize an object viz. blue, our consciousness takes the form of the object blue (*Visayākāra*) when we perceive blue a corresponding form of object 'blue' is stamped upon our cognition. Here it is this objective equiformity (*arthasārūpyameyarūpatā*) that determines or measure the limit of the perceptual judgement, 'this is blue' and thus eliminates the objects other than blue from the ken of perception, when one makes a judgement 'it is blue'. The cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is fixed to a particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination (to a particular object), Buddhists called *vyāvasthāpanā* and the cognition which is thus fixed is called *vyāvasthāpya* and in answer to the question which does fix the cognition to a particular object (*vyāvasthāpaka*), Buddhists say that it is the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*), which is the instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) fix the cognition to a particular object. According to Buddhists, objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*) is more basic and therefore more reasonable as instrument than sense organ (*indriya*) or sense object contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarsa*), which has only secondary significance in epistemology. For sometimes the sense organ being present, the effect perceptual cognition does not take place. "*Sarvātmānāpi sambandhamkascid eva gamyatedharmah, saniyamona syāt sambandhyasya visesataḥ*".¹

Here the Naiyāyika's objection is that the Buddhist concept of instrumentality (*Karanatva*) goes against the common usage as well as the grammatical notion (*Pra + mā + anāt*) of instrumentality, for common usage sense organ is taken as an instrument of perceptual cognition. In response to this objection the Buddhist Logicians hold that the instrumentality has the root to the famous grammarian Panini, according to whom 'instrument' is most effective or most predominant for the origination of effect (*Sādhakatamam kāranam karanam*) and which being present the effect follows immediately. The objective equiformity for *Dharmakīrti* is the last differentiator, after which cognition is bound to manifest.

The Buddhists believe in pragmatism. The most fundamental feature of Buddhistic pragmatism can be expressed in the word work-ability or practical value, the Buddhist is a pledged pragmatist professing that truth consists essentially in the conative satisfaction of the knowing agent. To him truth consists in the attainment of the object capable of satisfying same purpose of the knower (*arthakriyā samarthavastu pradarsakani samyagjñānām*).

In our everyday experience truth conceived empirically has a practical side of it, which cannot be altogether separated from it. When a thing is known correctly the natural tendency of the knower is to put his correct knowledge to practice. He is not content with the mere theoretical knowledge of the object, but he always goes beyond to see if the object so known is either heya i.e. to be shun or avoided or *upādeya* i.e. to be accepted or appropriated. Dr. Radhākṛishnan explains it thus 'Existence or *sattvā* means practical efficiency or *arthakriyākāritva*. Existence is the capacity to produce some change in the order of things. The seed exists, since it produces shoots, permanent things, however, cannot possess this power of producing changes. If things were unchanged in past, present and future, there would be no reason why they should produce different effects at different points of time. If it is said that the potential power is permanent and it and whenever the *arthakriyākāritva* is there it is taken to be the admirer of *paratahprāmānya*. So *paratahprāmānya* is to be taken, pragmatic value is to be taken as consistent, if they do not believe in theory of

momentariness. So if we keep together theory of momentariness in one hand and theory of *paratahprāmānyavāda*, a pragmatic view in another hand they cannot be taken together. Moreover, the definition of perception is given in the following.

An object free from mental constructions and non-erroneous is called perceptual entity (*Kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). If the perceptual object is free from mental constructions, it is unique particular (*Svalaksana*) in nature. If an object is *Svalaksana*, it has to be taken as having no truth-value, because there does not arise any question of falsity. If it is so, the phrase – ‘*abhrāntam*’ (non-erroneous) is useless, because it is already proved that it is beyond truth and falsity. Moreover if we want to know its non-erroneous character, we have to depend on our experience of its causal efficacy. For the attainment of such experience we need more than one moment and hence, it will lose the objects momentary character. For this reason the Buddhist view is not tenable. So Buddhist view is not to be taken as logically sound becomes actual, when certain other conditions are fulfilled, it is replied that whatever has power to do a thing does it, and whatever does not do it has no power. If the conditions bring about the change, then they alone exist and not permanent things. If existence means causal efficiency then things that exist are momentary.

The Buddhist giving the example of chariot wheel says that ‘strictly speaking the duration of life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts. Just as a chariot which in rolling rolls only at the point of tyre, and in resting rests only at one point, in exactly the same way the life of a living being lasts only for the period of one thought. As soon as that thought has ceased the living being is said to have ceased’.

Just as the analogy of a flame, which is always being renewed and never remains even for a moment identical with itself. A thing is more other than the conglomeration of diverse characteristics, which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomeration, appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same.

As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristics, the conglomeration is to be called a new one.² Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called *arthakriyākāritva*, which literally translated means – the power of performing actions and purposes of same kind.

Ratnakirti uses this very sense in the definition of existence or *Sattva*. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event and as such it is regarded as the characteristics definition of existence (*Sattvā*). Thus he says in *Kṣaṇabhangasiddhi*³ that though in different philosophical systems there are different definitions of existence of being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition existence and *arthakriyākāritva* (efficiency of causing any action of event).

The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific action or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existence or 'Sat'. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence.

The Buddhists is so much professed to say that self same definite specific effect which is produced now was never produced before and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again, so the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds, it had no such power than we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the

meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such power as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered and which existed even when the power was not exerted, we see the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments there should also be as many new existence i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing of each moment that exists a new power. This definition of existence conforms to the pragmatic view of Buddhism.

Buddha denies to apply his thought to first causes as well as to final causes. He is concerned with actual existence under not ultimate reality. Buddha's system is not a *darśana* or philosophy but *ayāna* or vehicles, a practical method leading to liberation. Buddha analyses experiences, discuss true nature. Buddha confines his attention to the World. He adopts an attitude of pragmatic agnosticism about transcendental realities. This alone is consistent with the facts of experience, the deductions of reason and the law of morality.

According to the Buddhists, cognition is 'apprehended intrinsically (*Sasamvedana*), because the so-called instrumental condition, on which the origination of the effect depends in is intrinsic and essential feature of cognition. Intrinsic apprehension, unlike the second order cognition (*anuvyāvasāya*) of the Naiyāyikas, which reveals the nature of antecedent cognition, means that cognition reveals itself. The momentary unique cognition having some content as its object cannot reveal itself intrinsically. So if objective equiformity is taken as an instrument, the intrinsic apprehension (*Svasamvedana*) could not be established to the same cognition because the object having some content in objective equiformity (*Viśayākāra*) is different from the required content of cognition for intrinsic apprehension (*Svasamvedana*).

Again the Buddhists logician advocates that a real (*Sattā*) being itself non-illuminated could not illumine other objects of the same time it is bound to illumine itself also. It is the form of an object as being stamped upon cognition is

taken, though metaphorically only, to be the instrument of cognition (*Pramāṇā*) which is not different by virtue from cognition itself and is said to be originated by the same content. Hence both objective equiformity as the instrument of cognition (*Pramāṇā*) and intrinsic apprehension of cognition (*Svasamvedana*) could go simultaneously.

But the Mimāṃsakas object here that as an indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) cannot illumine an object distinctly, so in Buddhist system, determinate or judgemental cognition is *Pramā* and as because determinate or judgemental cognition (*Savikalpakajñāna*) logically entails the existence of indeterminate cognition (*Visistajñānam viśesaṇa jñāna purvakam*), so indeterminate cognition is the instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*). For example, when one cognizes 'this is blue', the adjective 'blue' can be predicated only if the cognition of 'blue ness' precedes that cognition. If such basic indeterminate cognition does not proceed then one cannot ascribe something as blue.

But the determinate judgement in Buddhist system cannot be valid cognition for it contradicts with the concept of momentariness (*Ksanikatvavāda*). Determinate cognition (*Vikalpa-adhyāvasyāya*) are thought constructed and so need subsequent moment for its construction. But the unique real particulars no more exist at the time of judgemental construction. Hence judgemental cognition (*Vikalpa-adhyāvasyāya*) cannot grasp the unique real particulars (*Svalakṣaṇa*).

Moreover, indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) can't illumine the object in a specific way. On the otherhand, objective equiformity can only illumine the object without delay in a distinct way. Yet some Buddhist Loyalists may argue that indeterminate cognition said to be instrumental condition (*Pramāṇa*) only in the sense that the real source of the power of making cognition specific resides in the original pure sensation. Though the argument is untenable, for it presupposes that the power of making a cognition specific begins at the first moment and it only explicitly makes a cognition specific in the second moment which goes against the ontological presupposition of momentariness.

Momentary unique cognition is of the nature of self-revealing (*Sasamvedanasvaparakāśa*). Again as the cognition reveals some external objects (*Visayanmukhatā*) the validity or truth of the cognition is extrinsic (*Parataḥprāmānya*). For the Buddhist Logicians the validity or truth can be ascertained only if it leads to successful activity (*Sophalapravṛttipravartaka*). Thus the origination of cognition can reveal its own bare content, which is not vitiated with mental ascription (*Kalpanā*) without depending upon another subsequent cognition, but whether the content of cognition really corresponds with the external objects has to be determined by another subsequent cognition.

Again the Buddhist Logicians may argue that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the defining characteristics (*Lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*Pramā* = *Pramāṇa*) and non-contradiction and causal efficacy is the criterion for determining the truth of cognition. When both these criteria are fulfilled then the cognition in question, could be said to be valid. But yet there will be the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyāpti*). For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond, and he gets it. Here both the criteria are fulfilled because though he misunderstood 'the reflection of light on the diamond as diamond', the cognition assumes the form of that diamond (*meyarūpatā*) and luckily he gets the diamond also. On the other hand, seeing the diamond the other man runs to get the diamond and gets it. Here also both the criteria are fulfilled. Yet this explanation cannot distinguish between error and valid cognition. So the Buddhist Logician's definition of valid cognition along with the criterion of determining the truth of cognition fails to distinguish between error and valid cognition.

SECTION – II

NYĀYA THEORY OF PARATAḤPRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA

According to the Nyāya definition, cognitional ‘truth’ is ‘*tadvatitatprakāratva*’ i.e., the truth of cognitive state is constituted by the fact that its ‘determinandum’ or the element that is, ‘the characterized’ in the complex cognitum has actually the determinans the element that is ‘the characterizes’ that is presented in the cognition.⁴ More formal definition is : true knowledge is an experience whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object (*tadvatitatprakāratvam*) e.g., the knowledge ‘S is P’ has amongst others two qualifiers, ‘S-ness and P-ness’. If the knowledge is to be true, then the qualifiers must really belong to S, which is the qualificandum. The definition includes one variable i.e.; the word ‘*tat*’ which occurs twice, When the variable has been given a value.⁵ One part of the definition ‘*tadvatitatprakāratva*’ refers to an ontological situation, the other to an epistemological. The expression ‘*tatprakāratva*’ refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that the knowledge under consideration has that (*tat*) as ‘its’ qualifier. The expression ‘*tadvati*’ refers to a correlative ontological situation namely, to the fact that which is the qualifiers of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge. A.N. Whitehead says the entity designated by ‘*tadvatitatprakāratva*’ a ‘hybrid’ entity. Truth is neither a property of the object nor a mere property of the knowledge. According to Gangeśa it is rather relational in nature and as such has to be defined with reference to both the relative, the object and the knowledge.⁶ According to the Language of ‘*Tarkasangraha-dipika*’, the determinandum, the determinans and the relation of having between the *prakāra* and *viśesya* are the necessary components of the cognition.

Now, I will discuss how this definition applies to cases of true knowledge and does not apply to cases of false knowledge. In the case of a true knowledge. I know a piece of silver as silver, the knowledge is expressed in the form, 'This is Silver'. This knowledge has three qualifiers, 'thisness', 'Silver' and 'Silverness', as the value of the variable (*tat*). The knowledge in that case is one, which has 'Silverness' as its qualifier, it is '*rajatatvaprakāra*'. Now this designates real silver we can say that the this possesses Silverness (or, is *rajatatvavat*). The knowledge therefore possesses the property of *rajatatvavati rajatatvaprakāratva*, which is the same as the truth of this knowledge, 'this is silver'.

On the other hand in a case of error e.g., mistaking a piece of shell for silver when I express my knowledge in the judgement. 'This is Silver', this knowledge has also "Silverness" for its qualifiers. As regards the qualifiers there is nothing to distinguish right knowledge from error. The distinction then has to be sought in the fact that in error the "Silverness" which functions, as qualifier does not belong to the qualificandum 'this'. In other words, this is not *rajatatvavat*. The definition then does not apply to the case of error.

According to Navya-Naiyāyikas, the error is in the *dharma*, whereas according to ancient Naiyāyikas error is in *dharmi*. According to Navya-Naiyāyikas, at first there is the perception of rope, then the direct perception of *samskāra*. From *samskāra* there arises *pratyabhijñā*, where there are both *loukika* and *aloukika sannikarṣa*. In case of perception of snake in the rope, the rope, a person as a snake misperceives lying before. Such a perception is a sure case of cognition and is of some feature presented as belonging to something (rope), which actually does not have it.

Again, a doubt by definition is a knowledge with two mutually contradictory qualifiers e.g., 'is this a man or not' ? Which has amongst two mutually contradictory qualifier 'manhood' and 'absence of manhood'. Both of these cannot belong to the thing designated by this. That is why it is said doubt is not *tadvatitaprakāra*, yet no knowledge is wholly false. Every error, even doubt contains an element of truth. Now with the help of Gangeśa's definition

we are in a position, to give sense to this fact. It is possible in case of every knowledge to give a value to the variable 'tat', such that the knowledge under consideration may be shown to possess *tadvatitatprakāra*katva. In the case of doubt if one of the two mutually contradictory qualifiers does not belong to the qualificandum the other one does. Thus a false knowledge is not false in all respects, whereas a true knowledge must be true in all respects, i.e., must have no qualifiers which do not belong to the qualificandum.

It is mentioned earlier that truth on Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, is a hybrid entity, having both epistemic and ontological components. So *tadvatitatprakāra*katva is not reduced to a purely epistemological property.

It is possible to construe 'tadvati' as meaning 'tadvatviśeṣyaka

tvesati' meaning 'having a viśeṣya' which possesses 'tat'.

Two comments may be made here :

- i. On this interpretation, the ontological claim is not completely eliminated. The idea of 'tadvattva' seems incurably ontological.
- ii. The analysis of the definitions into *tadvatviśeṣyaka*tve sati *tatprakāra*katva does not fully express the unitary nature of the concept of truth. The definitions should then be more accurately analyzed or better explicated through the following stages.

1. ***Tadvadviśeṣyaka*tve *Satitatprakāra*katva :**

(= the property of having 'that' as its qualifier and an object which possesses that) – this is virtually useless, for even error has an object possessing the that. It depends upon what is to be called the object of a knowledge. No doubt, 'object' is an epistemological notion. The *prābhākaras* then have some justification in claiming that the object of the wrong knowledge. 'This is Silver' is the Silver.

2. ***Tadvadviśeṣyaka*tve *Satitatprakāra*katva :**

(= the property of having 'that' as its qualifier while the qualificandum possesses the that) – this is the conception of truth of Murāri Miśra and is

claimed by him to be apprehended by introspection for *Viśesyata* like *prakāratā* is an epistemological entity. If *tatprakāratva* can be apprehended by *anuvyāvasāya*, as the *Naiyāyikas* also admit – then *tadvadviseṣyakatva* may also be so apprehended. In case of a false knowledge – ‘Those two are a jar and a cloth’ – wherein, the cloth is taken to be a jar and vice-versa. Here the qualificandum ‘cloth’ possesses ‘cloth-ness’. But this knowledge is obviously an error, for the cloth has been known as a jar and jar as a cloth. The definition as explicated under 2. Illegitimately extends to such cases of error.⁷

3. ***Tadvadviseṣya katvāvachchinnatprakāratva :***

(= the property of having ‘that’ as its qualifier, which is, limited by the property of having a qualificandum which possesses the ‘that’). This definition avoids the difficulty mentioned under 2. In that example, ‘cloth-ness’ as a qualifier is not limited by the fact of the cloth being a qualificandum and so also in the case of the other qualifier. The qualifier must qualify with regard to the right qualificandum, which possesses that quality.⁸ This explication succeeds in bringing out the unitary nature of the notion of truth by making the two components ‘*tadvattva*’ and ‘*tatprakāratva*’ limit or determine each other.

4. The explication should also take into consideration the relation in which the property serving as the qualifier belongs to qualificandum. The qualifier also must qualify in the same relation, or better, that relation must limit the qualifier-ness of that qualifier. This helps to exclude a knowledge. ‘The jar is in its pots in the relation of conjunction’, from the purview of true ‘knowledge’, for according to the *Nyāya* ontology the jar is actually in its parts in the relation of inherence and not in the relation of conjunction. The resulting explication becomes ‘*tatsambandhāvachchinnatadvannīsthāviśeṣyatanirūpitatatsambandhāvachchinnatanniṣṭhaprakāratāsāti jñānatva*’. The truth according to this definition, is a unitary notion

having heterogeneous components, not merely epistemological. The relevance of this fact for the Nyāya theory of *paratahprāmānya* will be discussed now. As in the case of the *Svatah* theories, this theory has also two aspects; one concerns the origin of truth and the other its apprehension. In its first aspect the theory holds that the truth of knowledge is not produced by the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge itself. It is rather produced by some extrinsic circumstances, some additional factors known as *guṇas* or excellences. In its second aspect the theory holds that the truth of a knowledge is apprehended neither by that very knowledge, nor by the first apprehension of that knowledge – be that apprehension on introspection as with the Misra's or an inference as with the Bhatta's but only by a subsequent inference which argues either upon the confirmatory knowledge or upon the successful termination of the practical behaviour to which the knowledge under consideration leads us.

Amongst the host of arguments, which the Nyāya advances in support of its contention, two are most important. The first is in support of the extrinsic origination of *prāmānya* originated from the same conditions that give rise to the knowledge qua knowledge, then even an invalid knowledge, would come to possess *prāmānya* since it too has the same originating conditions and that is plainly absurd. The second argument is in support of the *paratah* apprehension of *prāmānya*.

The Nyāya contention is that every knowledge is either true or false, right at the beginning. Only its truth or falsity is due to a set of conditions that are different from those other conditions that give rise to the knowledge : in the case of truth, these conditions are called '*guṇas*' in the case of falsity they are called '*dosas*'. Immediately after the cognition of water, the truth (*Pramātva*) of the cognition is ascertained from the unfailing correspondence. The *vyātireki* inference like 'the previous cognition is true', because it has led to successful volition, whatever cognition is not true does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, false knowledge. If after perceiving water, a person wants to have

after exercising the necessary volition, then he is assumed that his primary perception was veridical or true. This ascertainment is inferential. The form of the inference being, 'The previous cognition was veridical, for it has led to a successful volition'. The inference is *yātireki* in character for the Rule of Concomitance involved here is 'vyātireki'. Like 'whatever cognition is non-veridical does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, a false perception of a 'rope' as a snake. The peculiar causal condition to this true inferential knowledge, the *guṇa* is constituted by the cognition of the *vyāpya* in what has actually the *vyāpaka*.

According to the Nyāya view of *parataḥprāmānyavāda*, the truth of knowledge is not intrinsic for if it were, there would have been no room for subsequent doubt. It seems to follow that in those cases where no such doubt takes place truth is apprehended intrinsically. These cases are very embarrassing for Nyāya. There are at least three such cases as inference confirmatory knowledge or *phalajñāna* and knowledge with which one has acquired sufficient familiarity (*abhyāsadasāpanajñāna*).

For Vācaspati, inference is known right from the beginning as valid, for amongst the originating condition of inference there is a certainty about the universal major premise. There is no room left therefore for having any subsequent doubt in the validity of the inference.⁹ Udayana is not so confident. He is willing to grant that inference arises by manifesting the suchness of the object.¹⁰ He concedes that truth is here apprehended intrinsically. Yet he makes desperate attempts to reconcile this with the *parataḥ* theory by suggesting that in such cases both may be true.¹¹ The Navya-Naiyāyikas deny that the truth of an inference is ever apprehended intrinsically. For them there is always the possibility of doubt. But how do we assess the situation?

According to Nyāya there are, strictly speaking, no fallacious inferences. The so-called *hetvābhāsas* are rather hindrances (*pratibandhakas*) to inference than errors of inference.¹² An inference then as a rule is a valid inference and does not permit any doubt about its validity. According to Vacaspati, unlike perception and *Śabda* inference arises out of a sense of certainty so that the least

doubt in the truth of the universal major would be frustrating and would not let the inference take place. If by *prāmānya* be meant this sense of certainty then certainly it is intrinsic to inference. But the real issue is whether *prāmānya* in the sense of *tadvati tatprakāraakatva* is so or not. At least Vācaspati has no sure ground for saying that it is so. According to Mohanty, for Nyāya, it is not so and this supposition is likely to fit in better with the Nyāya theory of truth.¹³

The Naiyāyikas believe that the truth of knowledge is apprehended by a subsequent inference. But the Mimāmsakas object, how is the validity of that inference to be established ? if by still another inference, how is this second inference to be validated ? In order to avoid such an unpleasant infinite regress some would like to treat inference as intrinsically valid and as in no need of validation. But the Naiyāyika need not go to that extent of holding that its *tadvatitattatprakāraakatva* is apprehended¹⁴ right from the beginning. He might adopt a more halting attitude and say that inference is accompanied by a sense of certainty that comes to be questioned only if the universal major is for a reason or other doubted.

Again in case of consideration of the confirmation or the *phalajñāna*, there is an embarrassment also. For it the inference through which the truth of the first knowledge comes to be apprehended depends upon the confirmation (e.g., quenching of the thirst in the case of a perception of water), it may be quite well be asked, how are these confirmations themselves be validated ? in reply, Vacaspati points out that the *phalajñāna* is never questioned by the discerning persons.¹⁵ Because its familiarity leads us to infer its undeviating character through the mark of *tajjātiyatva* (the property of belonging to that class).¹⁶ Thus instead of taking them as intrinsically true and as self validating, Vacaspati includes them in a much wider class of familiar cases whose sheer familiarity rules out any need for further validating them. The entire idea of familiar cases, that have become *abhyāsadaśāpanna* and whose truth is immediately inferred without waiting upon confirmation through the mark of *tajjātiyatva*. *Tajjātiyatva* can serve as a mark of truth only when the knowledge under consideration has become a familiar case. To say that it is a familiar case could then only mean that

it is a knowledge the like of which has been experienced before and has been known to be true. In such cases one takes them for granted and entertains no doubt about their truth whereas a new knowledge demands to be confirmed. The notion of 'familiarity' and the notion of 'belonging to the same class' are quite different. But what is the test of familiarity? How many times must one have similar experiences in order that it may become *abhyāsadaśāpanna*? Knowledge is called *abhyāsadaśāpanna* in whose case no doubt arises soon afterwards. A further inference based on the mark of *tajjātiyatva* is not called for. The word 'tat' in *tajjātiyatva* certainly does not mean the class of true knowledges for according to Udayana that exactly is what is to be proved by the supposed inference. *Tajjātiyatva* does not mean the class of knowledges that give rise to successful practice, for the mark is supposed to operate prior to confirmation through successful practice. Nor is *tajjātiyatva* any further un-analyzable property in such knowledge, which we perceptually discern, for no such property is so discerned. Udayana rejects these alternatives and hold that every knowledge is of some objects and the determinations of the objects also serve to mark out the knowledge. Thus hands and feet etc characterize a body. Now if I have a knowledge of something having hands and feet etc. and say 'It is a body' my knowledge is thereby included under a familiar class of knowledge; in this sense *tajjātiyatva* = *tattadupādhipiśiṣṭattadanubhavatva*. Gaṅgeśa makes use of the mark of *tajjātiyatva* in the series of examples of the later sort of inference and gives the example like – 'This knowledge of the body is true, for it is a knowledge of the body in what possesses hands and feet, etc. This shows that either there is no inference at all in the case of a familiar case or if there is any in the supposed manner the supposed sort of inference also takes place in the case of knowledges that have not yet become quite familiar.

Thus we find that in none of these knowledges truth is apprehended – on the Nyāya theory right from the beginning. In every case there is scope for and the necessity of further validation or correction.

There are two cases e.g., the knowledge of the substantive (*dharmijñāna*) and the *amvyāvasāya* of the primary knowledge where the Naiyāyikas often led to recognize intrinsic truth to avoid infinite regress.

But Vācaspati and Udayana emphasize that 'No one who does not have a knowledge introspects 'I am knowing', no one has the introspection 'I am knowing a silver', when in fact he has knowledge of a shell.¹⁷ Vardhamāna adds, 'No one has an introspection of a knowledge when in fact he has a state of feeling, and that we do not doubt the truth of introspection and Vardhamāna's remark is closer to the spirit of the Nyāya of that by calling all such knowledge *Svataḥpramā* is meant that there is in such cases no initial apprehension of falsity,¹⁸ and hence no initial doubt to start with.

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PP. 20-21.
4. Gopinath Bhattacharya, (Trans.)
Tarakasamgraha-Dipika on Tarkasamgraha,
Progressive Publishers, 2nd revised edition,
1983, P. 330.
5. J.N. Mohanty,
'Gangeśa's Theory of Truth',
Shantiniketan, Viśvabharati,
1966, P. 43.
6. Ibid., P. 43.
7. Ibid., PP. 45 – 46.

8. Thus Māthuranātha explains 'avacchinnatva' in this connection as "*idametad viśeṣyakatvānśe etat Prakāarakamiti Pratitīsākikah Svarūpasamdha viśeṣah*",
Mathuri,
P. 403.
9. Vācaspati – "*Anumānasya tu ... nirastasamastavyābhicārasamkasya svataevaprāmānyamanumeyāvyābhicārilingasamutthatvāt*".
Nyāyadarśana,
P. 9.
10. *Anumiti-jñānamhyarthasyatathātvamvyāvaccindade-votpadyate*"
Parisuddhi, Asiatic Society, ed.,
P. 113.
11. Udayana's "*Atyantāyoga Vyāvachcheda*",
Parisuddhi,
P. 120
Is thus explained by Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa on it;
Kutrāpīsvatogrhyateityārthah".
12. *Yadvisayakatvena jñānasyānumiti virodhitvam,*
(in Siddhantamukutavali).
13. J.N. Mohanty,
Gangeśa's Theory of Truth
Śāntinīketan, Visvabhāratī,
PP. 50-51.
14. So far as the origin of the validity of an inference is concerned, the Nyāya of course advocates extrinsic origin, the special excellence needed being "*Sādhyavatisādhyavyāpyavaiśiṣṭyajñānam*",
(Siddhanta Mukutavali on Kārikā No. 133).

15. “*Nacāphalajñānampariksyateprekṣāvadbhiḥ*”,
(Loc, Cit., P. 9).
16. “*Vayantubrumahphalajñānamapiabhyāsadasāpannatayā
tajjatiyatvenalingenaavadhāritāvyābhi cārameva*”,
(Loc, Cit., P. 9).
17. *Parisuddhi*,
P. 117.
18. *Aprāmānyasankānastitievastatahprāmānyagrahārthah*,
(Pariśuddhiprakāśa,
P. 118).

CHAPTER – 5

SOME CONCLUDING AND EVALUATING REMARKS

Regarding the controversy about truth, there are two alternatives of the following types. The truth of a valid cognition gets revealed from every set of causal conditions that generates the cognition itself and does not reveal its falsity (*Jñānaprāmānyam tadaprāmānyā grāhaka tāvajjñāna grāhakasāmagri grāhyam, na vā iti*¹). The another alternative goes like this. The truth of a valid cognition is not determined by a set of causal conditions, which generates the cognition. The first alternative is in favour of *Svataprāmānyavāda* and the second one in favour of *paratahprāmānyavāda*.

A problem may be raised in this connection. Those who propagate the theory of *Svatahprāmānya* believe that a set of causal conditions, which generates the cognition, can illumine its truth also. This view creates a different problem. A set of causal conditions can generate a cognition no doubt, but it cannot reveal its validity. In other words, the truth cannot be known through the same set of causal conditions, which reveal the cognition. In the case of the perceptual cognition of a jar a set of causal conditions like sense organ, object, contact, operation of mind etc. become the prime factor. In this context the content of the cognition is a jar. But how is the truth of the cognition determined by the same collocation of conditions. Truth of a cognition cannot be known through the same collocation of causes i.e., eye, object, contact, mind etc. whether the perpetual cognition of a jar is really a jar or not cannot be known through the same causes through which a jar is known. The sense, object, contact etc. are the causes of the perceptual cognition of a jar, but if this perceptual cognition is illusory the same causal condition can prove its validity leading to a

paradoxical situation. The causal condition generating an illusory cognition can generate its validity afterwards. It will lead to another problem.

Truth according to Nyāya is not merely cognitional truth (*Prāmānya*) but cognitional 'falsity' (*a-prāmānya*) as well that is apprehended 'from other sources' (*paratah*). According to Prabhākara's problem of 'falsity' of cognition would have been relevant if only there really were such a thing as error or 'false cognition'. In fact, according to them there is no such thing. It is not denied indeed that we often speak of cognition as false or erroneous. We speak for example, of the phenomenon of seeing something which is not a snake as a snake or of perceiving something which is not silver as a piece of silver and so on as illusions or false perceptions. How do the *Svataḥ Prāmānyavādins* explain these kind of perception ?

Each and every person has experienced illusion; whenever one attains knowledge, it would have been taken as knowledge proper, which is not always correct, from the standpoint of reality. A person may see something, which is not silver e.g. a piece of *śukti* or nacre as a piece of silver, may then happen to be seized with a desire to possess it and may actually exercise himself to get hold of it. This exercise on the part of a person with reference to some object proves, it may be said, the reality of a cognition (here false) of that object. In the absence of a unitary cognition of something as silver, it is not intelligible how a desire, volition or an action can at all emerge with reference to the silver, which is apprehended in such cognition.

Moreover, it has been accepted that the set of causal conditions revealing a cognition can reveal its truth and remove the chance of incorporation of the falsity of the same (*tadaprāmānyā grāhaka*). The set of conditions reveals truth and removes the chance of falsity. Earlier it is shown that truth is not capable of being revealed through causal conditions grasping cognition. How is the *aprāmānya* of the cognition not grasped ? When truth is revealed to us, we come to know that the falsity of the cognition is not grasped. But the truth is not grasped through the set of conditions like sense-object contact etc. If it is so, how the chance of falsity of the cognition is possible. If the acquired cognition of a jar

is to be proved as true, it is to be done from the standpoint of its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). A jar is to be taken as such if it can contain water, which is its causal efficacy. In the way of chance of falsity of the cognition of a jar cannot be removed if its truth is not determined. If the determination of truth of the cognition of a jar depends on its causal efficacy it is virtually *parataḥ prāmānya*.

Again, if the validity of knowledge were self-evident, then there would be no doubt regarding the validity of knowledge that has not undergone repetition. For if the knowledge is cognized then its validity is also certainly known, so how can there be a doubt? If, on the other hand, the knowledge is not cognized, then in the absence of knowledge of substantive, how can there be a doubt? Therefore the validity of knowledge is to be inferred.²

The theory fails to do justice to an indisputable fact of experience. There is sometimes such a thing as a doubt about whether a cognitive state is veridical or not. On seeing water at a distance a person with a previous experience of a mirage, for example, may naturally have a thought like 'Am I seeing really water? or Is this my cognition of water veridical or not? On hearing a knocking at the door at an odd time one sometimes doubts whether one has heard really a knocking.

Again after seeing a snake in a place having insufficient light, one may naturally doubt whether one has really seen a snake. Such doubts, which undoubtedly take place, cannot be accounted for if every knowledge were initially known to be true, i.e., if knowledge of knowledge always amounts to certainty about its truth.³ Actually it is not found in our day-to-day behaviour. As true cognitions are there, the mental states in the form of doubt etc. are also real phenomena, which goes against the acceptance of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda*.

The Naiyāyikas are consistent in their methodology because they have given the definition of *Pramā* as *tadvatītatprakāra* cognition in which there is a relational cognition between qualifier and qualificant (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-sambandha*). *parataḥ prāmānya* When it is said that '*ghaṭatvavati ghaṭatvaprakāraṇam nānam*' i.e. cognition in which the jariness has become a chief qualifier in a place where jariness really exists. In other words, a jar should

be known as having really qualified by the property 'ghatatva', when a rope is taken as a snake, it is qualified by the snakesness, which does not really exist in an object possessing snakesness. Hence, the relational cognition between qualifier and qualificand in an appropriate place is called *pramā*. When we see an object, we must judge whether it is associated with the property or qualifier existing in it. It directs the fact that a cognition can not automatically taken as *Pramā*, because there is every chance of being illusory (*aprāmā*). Hence the Naiyāyikas admit that cognition is known to be true through the light of the qualifier in the form of property existing in it. Hence it is very much extrinsic (*parataḥ*). The philosophers who believe in the intrinsic validity of truth have to accept that, as soon as cognition is originated, it is to be taken as true ab initio, because there is no scope to judge its validity. Had it been there, it would have been taken as *parataḥ* as shown earlier. If each and every cognition is taken as true, there will be no possibility of falsity of cognition, which is very much contrary to the fact. When we assign truth-value, it may be of true or false. Even in our daily life we are encountered with illusion, doubt etc. The advocacy of intrinsic validity of truth (*Svataḥ prāmāṇya*) will eradicate the possibility of having illusory and dubious cognition, which is not possible at all. Because truth is so precious as there is falsity or an object having dubious character. Whatever there may be the reasons we cannot deny the fact, which is experienced by us very often. Hence the theory of intrinsic validity of truth (*Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*) cannot be acceptable to the Naiyāyikas.

To the Naiyāyikas cognition is taken to be true if it leads to the successful inclination (*pravṛttisāmarthya*). From the standpoint of pragmatic value cognition's truth and falsity can be determined. This is very much consistent to the part of the Naiyāyikas and for this reason they always in favour of extrinsic validity of truth (*Parataḥ prāmāṇya*). So far as the view if intrinsic validity of truth is concerned, cognition is taken to be true ab initio without considering its pragmatic side. Normally we determine the truth/falsity of cognition if it can lead in to the goal. If water can quench our thirst, it is taken as true. This is the normal practice. If otherwise, it would be taken as presupposition. That is if the

cognition of water is taken as such ab initio, it is taken, as water for the time being without considering is mirage. But truth lies a risk factor in calling something 'water' because it may be contradicted afterwards. This epistemological 'risk' is always there if one adheres to the theory of *Svataḥ prāmānya*.

There is, of course, one point in favour of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda* which goes as follows. When the cognition of water is taken as true in terms of its causal efficacy i.e., quenching of thirst, a skeptic may raise a question as to the perfection of quenching of thirst. To know whether our thirst has been properly quenched or not we need to see other characteristic features or physiological features like softness in the mouth, existence of sufficient salivya etc. pointing to the absence of thirst in an individual. If we see these physiological factors are there, we come to the conclusion that the cognition of causal efficacy is correct. These physiological factors may again be the objects of doubt. If it is so, we need another set of factors to remove this. In this way, there would arise the defect of Infinite Regress. Some may say that in order to remove such complications it is better to accept something as true initially and work accordingly. In fact, we have the trust our acquired cognition for maintaining our day-to-day behaviour. If we on doubt each and every acquired cognition our day-to-day life would not be possible. Because we believe in our sense organs, objects and acquired cognition to some extent. Other wise we cannot proceed forward. Moreover, there are many cognitions which cannot lead us to the fact of successful inclination. When we gather the cognitions through the words 'heaven', 'liberation', 'Brahman etc. these cannot provide us a corresponding image through which we can judge the same as true. If it is said '*Svargakāmoyajeta*' or '*Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma*'. We have accepted these as true ab initio, because there is no scope for applying extrinsic validity of truth here.

In our everyday life correspondence to the reality and non-correspondence to the reality – these two criteria are still adopted by us. Immediately after the cognition of water, if there be a volition followed by the getting of water, the truth (*prāmānya*) of the cognition is ascertained from the

unfailing correspondence. The *vyatireki* inference like, 'the previous cognition is true', because it has led to successful volition : whatever cognition is not true does not lead to a successful volition, as for example, false knowledge ? If after perceiving water, a person wants to have after exercising the necessary volition, then he is assured that his primary perception was veridical or true. This ascertainment is inferential. The form of the inference being. The previous cognition was veridical, for it has led to a successful volition. The inference is '*vyatireki*'⁴ in character, for the Rule of Concomitance involved here is *Vyatireki*, as shown earlier.

The Naiyāyikas admit that when something is known, the truth and falsity of such sentence or object is kept in bracket for the time being. If some one says – 'It is raining outside', the truth and falsity of such sentence cannot be determined *ab initio* and hence this question should be kept in a bracket till verification. If it is confirmed that it is raining outside really, it is to be taken as true, otherwise it will be taken as false. But there are some cases, which cannot be explained if the essence of *Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* is not accepted.

Firstly, the Naiyāyikas also believe in the statements made by *Srutis*. In other words, by virtue of being a member of *āstika* Nyāya believes in the authority of the *Vedas*. It is known to us that the Vedic statements are non-verifiable. Some of the cases are confirmed through inference. The Statement about gods existence like '*Dyāvabhūmi janyan devaḥ viśvasya karta bhuvanasya goptā*' is confirmed through the series of syllogistic arguments. But all the statements of the *Sruti* cannot be verified or confirmed through inference or other means. At the same time the Naiyāyikas cannot deny the truth of these Vedic statements. Hence they have no other alternatives than to accept the truth of these intrinsically.

Secondly, the knowledge of an object, which is known many terms, can be attained intrinsically. Whenever we see an object, we remember its causal efficacy. Whenever we see water or food, we definitely know that it will quench our thirst or remove our hunger. Actually we are so habituated that we do not bear slightest doubt about the causal efficacy of it. We never say that let us see

whether this really quenches our thirst or not. Because we are confirmed that it will quench our thirst. Such is the case with other objects. In these cases there is no question of *parataḥ prāmānya*. If the relation of an object and its causal efficacy is in non-habitual state (*anabhyāsadaśā*), there arises the necessity of *parataḥ prāmānya*, but not in the habitual cases.

Thirdly, there are some cases, which are expressed in such a language the truth of which is determined intrinsically. If it said ' it may be a man or trunk of a tree' (*ayam māṁsyo vā sthānurvā bhaviṣyati*); there are two alternatives – a man and trunk of a tree. If it is said whether this is true or not, we may safely say that this sentence is true. If the third alternative is not possible, we may say that either this is a man or trunk of a tree, from which the truth of the sentence follows. We need not go outside the sentence and verify whether the sentence is true or not. How is this truth known ? It is known intrinsically. Another example of this sort may be forwarded. '*Ayam satyam mithyāvā*' (i.e., this is either true or false. Here the truth of the sentence follows intrinsically.

Fourthly, the sentence of the trustworthy persons is always taken as true as *Āptavacana* is accepted as a *pramāṇa* by the Naiyāyikas. Hence, the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person is taken as true without depending on external factors. Though the statement made by the trustworthy persons is the result of their verification, it is intrinsically true to us.

Hence, the importance of *Svataḥ prāmānyavāda* has to be accepted in some cases, not to all. Hence the importance of this theory cannot be ignored totally. Other than these cases *Parataḥ prāmānyavāda* is relevant.

Some philosophers like Jayanta, the celebrated Naiyāyikas, though differ in some points from old as well as new Naiyāyikas, strongly criticized as a whole Mimāṁsā view of *Svataḥ prāmānya* theory. Being a supporter of *Parataḥ prāmānyavāda* theory he states that fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity is the test of falsehood, i.e., knowledge is true if it fulfils an extra condition (*Pravṛtti*). The Mimāṁsakas argument that the truth of a judgement cannot be determined afterwards, since judgement lasts only two moments and that when judgement causes to exist at the next moment, it cannot

be ascertained extrinsically. But Jayanta points out that the Mimāṃsakas themselves hold that the falsehood of a judgement is extrinsically determined. If the false judgement, according to them, is transitory, then how do they determine it? If they recall it in memory and then judge it extrinsically, the same method is equally applicable in ascertaining the truth of a true judgement.⁵

Jayanta accepts that there are some cases of knowledge whose truth appears to be self-evident. When a new object is cognized repeatedly, it becomes familiar and we need not test the truth of its cognition. On subsequent occasion in the same way in which we tested it when it was new. Truth, in such cases, is known through inference based on knowledge which by itself is neutral i.e. it is not known to be true or false. Had it been possible, then would have been no disappointment in practical activities. On this basis also truth and falsehood are not self-evident, but are always known through inference.

Yet again the Mimāṃsakas may contend that the very experience of an object may be the source of illumination of that object. For instance when a blue thing reveals itself as an awareness of blue, it is itself a piece of cognition. But Jayanta refutes this view stating that in such a situation erroneous cognition e.g. of silver in the shell, would also come under the purview of valid knowledge since awareness of silver is there.

Jayanta further states that the contention of the Mimāṃsakas that a judgement does not depend upon outside factors to determine its own truth is wrong, since when the initial judgement arises in our mind we do not definitely know that it is true. It is only after some time that truth, say of the apprehension of 'blue' is ascertained. The factor that ascertains the truth of a judgement is the successful inclination (*Pravṛttisāmarthya*) that follows it.⁶

Professor Raghunath Ghosh in his unpublished paper – '*The Advaita Concept of Pramā : Some Paradoxes*', has been made an effort to show some paradoxes in the definition of *pramā* (valid cognition) which has been defined by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra in his *Vedānta paribhāṣā*. To Advaitins valid cognition acquaints us with something new (*anadhigata*). In other words, novelty is a characteristic feature of truth. The memory cognition is excluded from the

purview of valid cognition no doubt, but it also excludes the recognitive cognition (*Pratyābhijñā*). Memory cognition is generated through our earlier impression alone (*Samskāramātrajanya*), while recognitive cognition is caused by the impression of the past experiences associated with the presence of the object (*Samskārajanya* but not *Samskāramātrajanya*). If it said that the object of the cognition is *anadhigata* i.e., not known earlier, it excludes both memory and recognitive cognition, because recognitive cognition is not *anadhigata* but acquired earlier. There is some justification to accept memory cognition as invalid, because the content is not verifiable due to the absence of it. As due to its non-verifiability there is every chance of committing mistake so there is no guarantee that such cognition (*Pratyābhijñā*) would be veridical. As the term *anadhigata* is incorporated in the definition it cannot justify the recognitive cognition, as it is already acquired (*adhigata*) and hence not new.

Keeping the earlier objection in view Dharmarāja Adhvarindra perhaps has tried to justify day-to-day behaviour in the light of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), which does not solve the real problem. To him an object known for a period of time is called persistent cognition of the same. When we keep looking at the table for example, it is not the same object seen for a period of time but it is different in different moments. An object existing in each and every moment is completely new (*anadhigata*) but not repeated what is already acquired can not solve the earlier problem of recognitive cognition. But if each and every object is temporally different from each other and if it is new, then how is an object recognized as identical, which will lead to the non-acceptance of recognition but which is accepted as valid in Advaita Vedānta so the term *anadhigata* as an adjunct to the object cannot justify all types of valid knowledge.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has described such type of recognitive cognition as indeterminate perceptual cognition (*Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa*). Prof. Raghunath Ghosh claims that it is paradoxical to the Advaitins that they have accepted unacquired or new cognition as a valid cognition (*pramā*) on the one hand and nirvikalpaka perception on the other. The Advaitins have given the example –

‘This is That Devadatta’ (*Sóyam Devadatta*) from the secular world, which points to the recognitive cognition, as the present *Devadatta*’ is identified with the past *Devadatta*’. In other words, there is an identity between the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of *Devadatta* as our inner organ called *antahkaraṇa* goes out of the body and assumes the form of *Devadatta*’. Though the present *Devadatta*’ and past *Devadatta*’ are different in terms of times and though they are not completely identical yet there is an essential identity (*Svarūpagatatādātmya*) between them, which entails that they are not completely unacquired (*anadhigata*). In the same way the *Mahāvākya* – ‘*Tattvamasi*’ (Thou art That) signifies the essential identity between two – ‘Thou (*tvam*) and ‘That’ (*tat*) i.e., Brahman or *Ātman*. In this case the phenomenon of *anadhigatatva* does not exist, leading to the falsity of the *nirvikalpaka* – cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka* – cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka* – cognition is proved as falsified, it would lead to the falsity of the *Mahāvākya*, which suicidal to the Advaitins. For the import of the *Mahāvākya* makes a platform to realize the ultimate Reality. The falsity of *Mahāvākya*, leads to the falsity of the whole metaphysical presupposition. Hence the term *anadhigata* creates confusion in the Advaita-Vedānta system of Philosophy and it should be excluded from the definition.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra had made an effort to justify the fact of being unacquired by introducing the concept of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*). To consider a piece of cognition, as occupying a moment is an attempt to justify the theory of momentariness as accepted by the Buddhists. As the Buddhists believe in the theories of *Svalakṣaṇa*, so-soul or permanent entities like *Sāmānya* etc. so they are consistent in propagating the theories of momentariness. But the theory of momentariness is not at all supportable by the Advaitisms because they believe in the existence of permanent self, but not in *Svalakṣaṇa* etc. In course of formulation of the theories of the perceptuality of cognition of an object (*Jñānagata pratyakṣa*) and the perceptuality of object (*Viśayagata pratyakṣa*), the Advaitins recommend the amalgamation of different limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of the consciousness like *Viśayacaitanya* (the consciousness

limited by object), *Pramāṇacaitanya* (consciousness limited by mental mode) etc. But an amalgamated situation cannot be a momentary one. Even if it is accepted as momentary, how can it be known as perception of a jar or the perception of the cognition of jar ? All these problems remain unresolved if the term *anadhigata* is not withdrawn from the definition.

It may be argued that a valid memory-cognition leads us always to the successful inclination (*Niyatasamvādo-pravr̥tti*), it comes under the purview of *pramā* (valid cognition) and hence it being a *defiendum* of a valid cognition cannot be said that it leads to the probability of the uselessness of the term *anadhigata*. In response to this it is said that the term serves the purpose of excluding the use of something, which is the qualifier of being a valid cognition other than the right memory-cognition. That is, it is useful on account of the fact that it can exclude wrong memory cognition (*ayathārtha-smṛiti*) from the purview of the valid cognition. Under such circumstances the validity of the capability of successful inclination (*Samvādipravṛthyupayukta prāmāṇyam*) should not be determined as a criterion of valid cognition. In order to indicate this the adjunct *anadhigata* in the definition is justified. In other words, the fact of successful inclination of cognition presupposes its previous cognition, which is certainly *anadhigata* at least removes the possibility of excluding successful inclination as a criterion of valid cognition. In this connection it may be said that if such case is excluded with use of the term *anadhigata*, what is the utility of another term *avādhita* inserted in this definition ?

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has inserted the term *Avādhita* as an adjunct of object, which entails that the cognition of an object existing in the phenomenal world, must not be contradicted, by the latter cognition, in the phenomenal state, but not in the transcendental level. It implies factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which have an empirical reality. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The term *Avādhita* can test the truth of an object in the empirical level.

The insertion of the term *Avādhita* creates some philosophical confusion. If, there is cognition in the form : 'It is raining outside' – the question may raise

how the truth-value of such sentence can be determined ? Definitely we have to look outside whether the incident described in the sentence is true or false, which will go in favour of *Parataḥ prāmāṇyadā*, not accepted by the Advaitin. If it is said – ‘The sentence is either true or false’, it can easily be said that the sentence is true without going out of the sentence i.e. intrinsically true. It is stated by Dharmarāja Advarindra that the validity is intrinsically known. The meaning of term *Svataḥ* is as follows. The collocation of causes, which can reveal the object existing in it, can also reveal its validity if and only if there is the absence of defect. The substratum of it is the knowledge of *vṛtti* or mental mode, which can reveal the witness (*Sākṣi*). If the cognition of *vṛtti* is apprehended it can apprehend the validity of it also. It has already been said that the various transformation of *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* or mind are called *vṛtti*. As this *vṛtti* is known through the witness, the validity existing in it also is known through the same witness. It may be argued that if it is accepted that the validity of *Svataḥ*, there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity. Because in each and every case witness will reveal the knowledge of *vṛtti* resulting in a knowledge of intrinsic validity. Under this situation there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity, which is contrary to the fact. But in fact we generally feel the doubt of validity. So according to Professor Raghunath Ghosh, the truth value of the sentence ‘It is raining outside’ – can be determined extrinsically, which goes in favour of *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*, which is not accepted by the Advaitins leading to a paradoxical situation.⁷

I completely agree with Prof. Ghosh’s view on the tenability of the term *anadhigata*, which I think is quite reasonable.

So far as the Buddhist view is concerned, it is not free from some problems. We know that the Buddhists believe in the theory of momentariness and the theory of extrinsic validity of truth, *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. But at the same time it is to be kept in mind that these can be related. So we should propose a theory, which should protect both the theory of momentariness and the theory of extrinsic validity of truth or *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*. That which corresponds to reality (*avisamvādhikam*) is called valid cognition (*pramā*) according to the

Buddhism. Now the term *avisamvādaka* used in Buddhist system as the unfailing correspondence to the truth, generally suggests that they are in favour of *parataḥ prāmānya* because when e.g., water is known to be 'real' we have to see whether it quench our thirst or not, if otherwise it is not water or it is pseudo water. But if this view is taken into account, the Naiyāyikas can refute this view in the following way. First in the same moment it is not possible to know an object and its causal efficacy on which *prāmānya* depends. Causal efficacy is technically called *arthakriyākāritva*. An *arthakriyākāritva* is a matter by virtue of which an object an object is known as such, e.g., fire can be taken as 'sat' or real if it can cook something or if it can produce some heat. So only fire is to be known as 'sat' or existence in terms of its causal efficacy. So it is not possible for a person to know both the object and its causal efficacy at the same moment. In the first moment we can know the object, in the second moment we can know the causal efficacy and we can relate them in the third moment. So if we adhere to this theory then we can not protect the sanctity of the theory of momentariness. So *parataḥ prāmānya* is a kind of contradictory step taken by the Buddhist. If it is believed as 'Svataḥ' as soon as the object arise, the validity itself is known, then it would have in consonant with the metaphysical presupposition. As their metaphysical presuppositions are like theories of momentariness, no-soul theory all these things, so *parataḥ prāmānya* should not be applicable to them. An *arthakriyākāritva* is also a kind of *parataḥ prāmānya*, which is similar to the pragmatic theory of truth. So from the pragmatic standpoint an object is to be taken as true or false. If it is so, then water fire can be known as 'sat' if it can quench our thirst or it can cook food. So these functions can be ascertained just after few moments. So here theory of momentariness and the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* can not be known together within a single moment if moment is taken as a fraction of second of a time, minutest particle of time it is impossible for human beings to know both the things at a same moment. Therefore the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* is incongruous to them, to their own metaphysical theories. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the theory of *parataḥ prāmānya* and the object of existence – they are not similar. At first an object is existent

because it will have some *arthakriyākāritva*, *arthakriyā kāritvalakshanam sat'* and whenever the *arthakriyākāritva* is there, it is taken to be the admirer of *parataḥ prāmānya*. So *parataḥ prāmānya* is to be taken, pragmatic value is to be taken, as consistent, if they do not believe in theory of momentariness. So if we keep together theory of momentariness in one hand and theory of *parataḥ prāmānyavāda*, a pragmatic view in another hand they cannot be taken together. Moreover, the definition of perception is given in the following. An object free from mental construction and non-erroneous is called perceptual entity (*Kalponāpodḥam abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). If the perceptual object is free from mental constructions, it is unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) in nature. If an object is *svalakṣaṇa*, it has to be taken as having no truth-value, because there does not arise any question of falsity. If it is so the phrase – ‘abhrāntam’ (non-erroneous) is useless, because it is already proved that it is beyond truth and falsity. Moreover, if we want to know its non-erroneous character, we have to depend on our experience of its causal efficacy. For the attainment of such experience we need more than one moment and hence, it will lose the objects momentary character. For this reason the Buddhist view is not tenable and this view is not to be taken as logically sound.

Now let us try to throw some light on mokṣakaragupta's opinion on the concept of *pramā*, *pramāṇa* and *prāmānya* and a critical evaluation of them.

Mokṣakaragupta, a Buddhist Logician, believes that a source of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not different from the valid cognition (*pramā*) itself as told earlier. A source of valid cognition is valid cognition of an object not known before. Like Dharmakīrti he also believes that *pramā* and *pramāṇa* are identical on account of the fact that he holds that consciousness, as the principle of self-manifestation is the source of all cognition. A source of knowledge is something by means of which an object is validly apprehended. This source is valid knowledge itself, because it is free from the defect of doubt and illusion (*Pramāṇam samyogjñānamapūrvagocaram. pramiyate nenetī pramāṇam. tadeva samyogjñānam, sandeha viparyā-sadoṣa rahitatvat*).⁸ A piece of valid cognition is called an uncontradicted experience (*avisamvādirjñānam*) in this world. And

this uncontradicted experience is not found in doubtful cognition or illusory cognition. Referring to an unknown object means the object of valid cognition is not known before. Valid knowledge of an object refers to an object, e.g., a jar. Knowledge produced by the presence of an object, which certifies the real nature of the object, and which is capable of making us attain the object is called the source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The truth of knowledge remains in its ability to produce successful activity. Valid knowledge is harmonious in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity to obtain it. Thus *pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *Pramāṇa* is its source. *Apramāṇa* shows an object and this relation creates movement in the known to obtain an object (*prāpaka*). Hence a *pramāṇa* has got the capacity of leading someone to the attainment of an object. (*Avisamvādakam jñānamlokesamyajñānamabhidhiyate...gocarovisayoghatādihyasmādutpannam. Tadarthaprāpaṇa योग्यामिज्ञानम प्रामाणम* ⁹).

The Naiyāyikas might raise objection to the above-mentioned position of the Buddhists in the following manners.

Knowledge is an action, an individual, having knowledge is an agent and a thing known is an object. How can a cognition be called *pramāṇa* if it does not help a person to attain an object and it is unable to cause him to attain an object? In reply the Buddhists might say that we do not mean to say that a person having knowledge is compelled to act pulling a person by the neck forcibly, but that 'determination in the form i.e., the essential nature of the object is such and such and not otherwise' is caused by knowledge. This much action is called the validity of knowledge. The knowledge is true when it reveals its object with the nature and attributes which abide in it. (*Na hi jñānena puruṣa gale padukānyāyena batadarthe pravartayitavyaḥ. api tvevambhūtamidam vastusvarupam nānyathetyanenākāreṇa niścayo janaitavyaḥ*).¹⁰

A person having knowledge may take action or may not depend on the situation of necessity. (*Purusastu tatra prayojanavaśāt pravartamrte prayojanam, na pravartatām*).¹¹

It may be argued by the Naiyāyikas that the validity of cognition is examined by the uncontradicted experience (*avisamvādi*), which is again proved by the attainment of the object (*arthaprāpti*). But we can not attain the same object, which we have perceived because of momentariness of the object. Moreover, what is perceived is the outward form (*rūpa*) of the object and what is attained is the tangibility (*sparśatva*). Thus one thing is perceived and another is attained. How then this knowledge becomes valid ? (*Nanvavisamvādatkatvena jñānasya prāmāṇyam. Avisamvādatkatvam ca dr̥ṣṭartha prāpanat Na ca yadr̥ṣṭamtat prapyate kṣaṇikavat kiñca rupam dr̥ṣṭam prapyate ca sprastavyam Tatonyadr̥ṣṭamanyat prapyata ityapratitaprāpaṇāt katham prāmāṇyamasya sangacchatam.*¹²

The above-mentioned objection is not tenable. For even if we obtain an object what is really different from the object we have perceived, we still have the definite cognition (*adhyavasāya*) of identity. 'I attain the same object which I have perceived' and this is meant by the expression 'attainment of what has been apprehended' (*pratipanna*). On the contrary the knowledge of water in mirage is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain an object (*Na yadināma vastuto 'nyadeva prāpyate tathāpi dr̥ṣṭamevamayā prāptamiyekatvādhyavasāyātpratitaprāpaṇamabhidhiyate. Tattumaricikādijalajñānam tadaprāpaṇayogyatvādaPramāṇameva*).¹³ To them the distinctive property of validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by its origin in general. Yet we can ascertain the distinction of one from the other by the specific features. For example, a man of low intelligence may not be able to ascertain the validity of his knowledge at the time of its origin yet he can ascertain the validity of the knowledge of fire or water through such perceptions as burning, cooking, drinking etc. when he sees them a far. A man with sharp intellect can ascertain it through his perception. (*Jñānotpattimātrena tu na bhrāntābhrāntayobhedo vadhāryate. Tataśca kattam tat samyogjñānamiticet naisa doṣaḥ yadyapi tathāpi jñāndviśeṣodayādyaathaikasya vaiśiṣṭyam tathoevate ...*).¹⁴

To the Buddhists uncontradicted means the existence of efficacy. In case of sound of a word the hearing is the efficiency, since the purpose of the sound is

served if it is simply heard (*arthasvarūpapratitirhi prāmānyam, tacca vāhyārthakriyā prāptimantareṇāpi sambhavati ... Śabdasya śrutimātreṇaiva caritārthatvāt śrutireva tatrārthakriyastitheh*).¹⁵

Whatever may be the argument in favour of the notion of *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa* induced by Mokṣakaragupta cannot be accepted if the philosophical problems raised earlier are not removed. In fact, the characteristic features of *Avisamvādatva* cannot justify the theory of momentariness, what is seen cannot be attained due to the effect of momentariness. Whatever is perceived outwardly cannot be attained other wards due to the change of nature of an object. For this reason it is said that whatever is seen or perceived is not perceived but tangible (*Spārsāna*) in character. Hence the theory of *avisamvādatva* does not stand in the eye of logic if the theory of momentariness is taken for granted. The experience in the form – ‘I attain the object, which is seen earlier’ cannot justify the identity of the objects seen and attained. If such *adhyavasāya* are taken for granted, we have to admit that there is no effect of momentariness, which is impossible to accept by the Buddhists. For this reason they have introduced two levels of truth-ultimate (*Paramārtha*) and concealed (*sambhṛta*). In the latter case such experiences are allowed, but these have ultimate value. When they talk of *Kṣaṇabhangavāda*, *Nairatmyavāda* etc. they focus on the ultimate truth, which can lead one to attainment of *nirvāna*. Hence, we cannot ignore the key-concepts like *kṣanika* etc. and if it exists, the *avisamvādaka* theory or *adhyavasāya* theory will surely fail leading to the feature of the definition of *pramā*.

Moreover, the determination of *pramātva* and *prāmānyā* is not possible at the same time. Because, when a piece of cognition is known as *pramā*, it is the result of some on going procedure held or adopted. The process always precedes the result. Hence when a process is on the way, right cognition is not there. When the right cognition is attained, the process is completed. It is said by Mokṣakaragupta also that ‘*Pramiṃyate*’ *neneti Pramāṇam*, which indicates the existence of some instrumental procedural factors, which are called *pramāṇas*. Though the Buddhists have tried to say that a cognition is free from doubt,

illusion etc. It is known from the valid cognition itself, which is not convincing. If a valid cognition itself were the source of knowing it as free from illusion etc. why has the clause – ‘*Avisamvādatva*’ been brought in as a criterion ? The unfailingness can only be determined by some external factors through some procedural methods that are not obviously the valid cognition itself. Hence their standpoint does not seem to be convincing logically.

Lastly, we have seen that it is the contention of Vātsyāyana that the right cognition of the sixteen categories in which *pramāṇa* is the first leads us to the attainment of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*).¹⁶ But if the right cognition of the first category i.e., *pramāṇa* itself is recognized as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*) then why the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) hits the list ? How can the right cognition of the first category i.e. *pramāṇa* be known ? Is it through other *pramāṇa* ? If answer is positive, how can the second *pramāṇa* be known ? In this way there would arise the defect of infinite regress (*anavastha*). If the cognition of the first category is not possible, how it can illumine other categories ?

Again in the introductory portion Vātsyāyana tries to distinguish between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇbhāsa* (*pseudo-pramāṇa*) as I mentioned before, by way of adopting the method of extrinsic validity. In fact, the main intention of the Bhāṣyakāra is to establish a thesis that under all circumstances a *pramāṇa* is connected with its object through the capacity of producing successful activity (*pravṛttisāmasthya*), which is known as proof by *parataḥ prāmāṇya*. Here there will arise another problem, that how can we know the validity of the second *pramāṇa* ?

Considering the importance of *pramāṇa* Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that without the proper cognition of *pramāṇa* the object cannot be properly grasped. If it is not grasped properly, no one can have successful inclination towards the object. The cognizer, after cognizing an object with the help of *pramāṇa* (means of knowing), wants to avail or forsake the object. The effort in the form of availing or forsaking is called volition. Whether our volition is successful or not depends on the result of the inclination. The object is in the form of happiness or

the cause of happiness. It may also be in the form of misery or the cause of misery. These objects of *pramāṇa* are infinite in number, as the persons adopting these are infinite in number.

According to the nihilists Skeptics, the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of the category called *pramāṇa* is not at all possible and hence there is no possibility of having right cognition of other objects. To Goutama the real means of the right cognition is called *pramāṇa*. When we have awareness, it is very difficult to detect the rightness of the awareness. This is the reason, the determination of the rightness of *pramāṇa* i.e., *pramāṇa* is beyond our capacity. That is why Goutama's Nyāya philosophy would turn into a *Sāstra*, which is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. In order to avoid such problems and to refute such views of the nihilists and Skeptics, Vātsyāyana begins with the determination of the validity of *pramāṇa* with the texts - *Pramāṇato'rthapratipattau* etc.

'*Pramāṇam arthavat*' means *Prāmāṇya* is non-deviated to the object (*arthavyabhicāri*). From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of *pramāṇa* is proved. *Arthavat* denotes 'an eternal connection' (*nityayoga*) indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (*avyabhicāri*), is called *sādhyā* of the inference inferred on the strength of the argument or hetu – '*pravṛtti sāmāthyā*' i.e., the capacity of leading to successful inclination. Here again another question will arise – if *pramāṇa* of the above inference is dependent on another inference, how can the *pramāṇa* be determined of the second one ? If there is the doubt of the *pramāṇa*, there cannot be the ascertainment of the same.

But the Naiyāyikas hold that there does not always arise the doubt of *pramāṇa* in each and every inferential cognition. Innumerable works have been done depending on time, which inferred from the watch. Many theories have been discovered depending on the mathematical calculations. But there does not always arise the doubt of *pramāṇa*. Daily business is continued on the basis of the weight taken through the scales, which is not always doubted. Moreover, if there is doubt, the cause of it must be shown. If someone adduces some

arguments in favour of some doubt, he has to take recourse to inference whose validity must be admitted. If there were no argument in favour of doubt, it would be taken as unreal. As there is an innumerable piece of inference through which our life is moving forward, there is no question of such doubt. Otherwise, there would not have been inclination towards some activities or objects. Even the Skeptics are inclined to some actions out of having some sort of certainty on these. If the phenomenon of successful inclination becomes deviated from object, it would remain in the *pseudo-Pramāṇa* also of the unfailing inclination remains in something which is deviated from an object, it may remain in the *Pramāṇābhāsa* also, which is not at all possible.

To the believers of absolute nihilism there is no real object like *pramāṇa* – as to them the usages of *Pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc, are imaginary. Hence to them, all cognitions are false and as a result, it follows from this that all *Pramāṇas* are nothing but *Pramāṇābhāsa*. If it is taken for granted, the nihilists would not be in a position to explain an individual's inclination towards something. If it is taken that water if cognized as such is illusory, then why does an individual incline to have water ? From the syllogistic argument in the form 'this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to a successful inclination' (*idam Jñānam yathārtham saphalapravṛtti – janakatvāt*), it is proved that the cognition of water is valid.

So the importance of the theory of *Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* cannot be ignored totally and has to accept in some cases. Other than these cases *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* is relevant and the Naiyāyikas, in our opinion, are consistent in their views.

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