

C O N C L U S I O N

The main objective of our thesis, as it has been stated in the opening chapter, i.e., Introduction, is to critically evaluate the realism-phenomenalism controversy in Indian Philosophical literature. To say something about realism in Indian philosophy we should confine our attention to the study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, as this philosophical school largely represents the Indian realism. On the contrary, the Buddhist philosophy may be designated as the phenomenological school, since in consonance with the main tenets of European Phenomenalism, Buddhism tries to interpret both the external world and the internal mind in terms of experienced qualities and sense data only without posulating any underlying substance which lies beyond the scope of sense-experience. Consequently, our discussion has basically been concentrated on these two schools — Nyāya and Buddhism.

Like the Western philosophy, the controversy between realism and phenomenism is centered round the following issues :-

- i) The reality of substance as a separate category.
- ii) The existence of whole (avayavin) apart from the parts (avayavas).

iii) The reality of universals(sāmānya) apart from the individuals or particulars(vyakti). All these issues have been taken up for elaboration along with the arguments and counter arguments.

In the first chapter of our dissertation, entitled *In Defence of Substance*, we observe that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have analysed an object as the conglomeration of qualities (gunas) and substance (dravya). This substance (dravya) is an underlying agent in which the qualities play and all these qualities or attributes inhere in the substance. In support of the notion of substance the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists argue that we should admit the reality of substance (dravya), otherwise, we have to imagine the attributes or properties as homeless or 'attributes of nothing' which contradicts the fact. Thus the Nyāya-realists have established concept of substance as a separate entity.

The Buddhist phenomenologists, on the otherhand, like the phenomenologists of Europe, have denied the existence of substance and advanced almost the same arguments like the European phenomenologists to refute the substance as a separate category. Their basic point for non-acceptance of the notion of substance is its non-perceptibility. They hold that an object is nothing but the assemblage of properties and there is no unchanging underlying substance to hold the qualities together. The so-called substance (dravya) is nothing but the figment of our imagination (kalpanā), having no objective reality (vastusat) whatsoever. Moreover, the Buddhists argue that since the so-called substance and qualities are always felt together, they must be supposed to be identical. The Buddhists consider the perception of svalakṣaṇas or unique particulars as the only valid perception. This perception, according to the Buddhists, is indeterminate (nirvikalpa) which is free from association with names, class characters etc. (nāmajātyādyamukta). The

determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa), on the otherhand, that is, the perception of objects associated with names and other qualifications, to the Buddhists, is no perception at all, it is mere inference; because the perceptual knowledge with the qualities comes only after the recollection of the class-concept by means of which a determinate perception takes place. And, since the idea of substance enters into determinate perceptual knowledge, it can not be an object of perception. Thus, the Buddhists have established the 'so-called' substance' as unreal and imaginative.

All these arguments of the Buddhists, specially the arguments of the Buddhists logicians like Śāntarakṣita, Kamalśīla, and Dharmakīrti, to refute the Nyāya concept of substance have been put forward with much logical rigour and consistency. But if we critically observe these arguments and contrast these with those of the Naiyāyikas, it will be clear to us that all these Buddhist arguments have not been fully

worked out whereas the Nyāya arguments have been done. The Naiyāyikas, in defence of substance, argue against the Buddhists by saying that, as a matter of fact, our experience manifests itself in the shape of a synthetic judgement consisting of two items delivered by two separate sense organs in one whole when we say, 'The jar that I have touched is the same as what I see'. How can these two acts of touching and seeing refer to one and the same thing, unless two sensible qualities are supposed to co-exist in the same substratum (darśana sparśanavyām ekārtha grahanāt)? And if this is admitted, the reality of substance cannot be denied. Moreover the Naiyāyikas argue as against the Buddhists that if the perception of the so-called 'substance' is nothing more than the sensible qualities alone, then the knowledge of identity of one in spite of the change of its qualities would be unaccountable. So, an abiding substance over and above the qualities must be admitted. Moreover the Naiyāyikas opine that substance itself without its attributes, is perceptible. We may cite Udayana here.

According to him "it is also possible to perceive a substance without its qualities. For example, an ill person perceives a conchshell as yellow; its original quality, white, is not seen. Here the conch is perceived but not its quality 'whiteness'. This shows that perception of the substance is independent of that of its qualities". Again, to reply to the objection of the Buddhists, i.e., the indeterminate perception is real perception whereas determinate perception is mere inference, the Naiyāyikas point out that the determinate perception is as real as the indeterminate one, because the sense function, which is a necessary condition of all perceptual knowledge, is equally present in the case of determinate perception as well. For example, we can not get a determinate visual judgement by simply recalling the name, if we shut up our eyes immediately after the sense object contact. So, there is no reason for disbelieving in the objective validity of determinate knowledge, and consequently for impugning the objectivity of substance. Moreover, the

Buddhist phenomenologists explain an object as the cluster or conglomeration of atoms, or, point-instants (paramānupuñja), and these atoms are invisible. But the Naiyāyikas point out that, if a single atom by itself is invisible, a collection of atoms must also be invisible. So the visibility of gross physical objects remains unexplained on the basis of the Buddhist theory of paramānupuñjavāda. We have seen, on the other side, that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have clearly explained the construction of an object and its visibility from the conjunction (saṁyoga) of invisible atoms. According to them from the combination of these atoms the gross material objects are originated. The process of origination is as follows : Two atoms conjoined together give rise to a binary compound which is technically called dvyanuka. The dvyanuka is infinitely small and therefore imperceptible. Three such binaries suitably adjusted produce a triad or trasarenu which is the minimum visible entity. Its magnitude is finite and all other finite objects are made out of it. Thus the

Naiyāyikas have explained the origination of physical object and its visibility. Moreover, this theory of the Naiyāyikas corresponds to the fact of experience also, because, we do not call an object as 'paramānupuñja', as the Buddhists opine rather we give a name to it and suppose it to be a unity. For example, we do not call a book as the collection of book atoms, we call it a book unity. And this unity is not possible without an unifying agent. This unifying agent is called substance. So, we have to admit substance. Again, we have the common experience that though the quality, i.e., the colour of a baked jar is completely different from an unbaked one, yet we call both of them as jar. The Buddhists can not explain that having the different qualities why and how these two jars are called as jar? The Naiyāyikas assert that this is possible due to an unchangeable substance which belongs to these two jars. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have advanced more reasonable and fact oriented arguments

than the Buddhists to establish the notion of substance and have defined substance as that which possesses actions and qualities and is the inherent cause (kriyā gunavat samavāyī kāraṇam iti dravyam).

In the second chapter entitled the Whole and Part, we see that the whole, according to Naiyāyikas, is not only the cogglomeration of parts, it is something over and above the parts (avayavas). This whole (avayavin) is ontologically different from its parts and it has its own reality. To establish the whole as a separate entity the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists advocate that the production of sensible material order from infrasensible atoms is explainable only on the basis of the assumption that the whole is different from its parts. On the other hand, the Buddhist phenomenologists do not accept the reality of whole as a separate entity over and above the parts. The parts according to them, are the only reality and the so-called whole (avayavin) is our mental construction (kalpanā), the 'whole' (avayavin) is mere

assemblage of parts (avayavas). The Buddhists argue that the perception of the 'whole' is not possible. The knowledge of the so-called 'whole' comes through inference. The so-called perception of the empirical objects like an apple or a tree which the Naiyāyikas call the determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) is really the construction of human mind on the basis of the indeterminate perception of the 'unique-particulars'. To prove the inferability of the 'whole' the Buddhists offer an example such as : In the perception of a 'whole' tree we perceive only the front part of the tree with which our sense organs are in contact, but what about the unperceived back part ? In fact in such case what happens is this: On perceiving directly the front part, our intellect indirectly infers or interprets that there exists a back part of the tree with which our visual senses are not in direct contact. This intellectual interpretation, according to the Buddhists, is inference. Hence, the

inferability of the whole is proved. In this way the Buddhists deny the existence of the whole and its perceptibility. But if we critically observe these arguments and compare these with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments we may say that the Buddhist arguments are not sufficiently clarified and their view fails to explain the facts of experience for the following reasons: The Buddhists analyse a 'whole' table as the aggregates of parts (avayava-samūha). Now the question may arise that if a table is conglomeration of parts or atoms, then how do we see them as 'one' ? The Buddhists do not have any clear explanation on this question. They explain such perception of unity (perception of one) as illusory (bhākta), it has no objective basis (vastusat). But the Nyāya realists argue that every illusory perception presupposes a valid cognition of the illusory object in the past. So, the perception of unity can not be explained as illusory. Again, the Buddhists can not account for āśraya-āśrayī sambandha

or the relation between container and the content. In experience we come accross many things existing in some locus as its contents, i.e., the book on the table, the table on the floor, the pen in the hand, the cloth in the threads and so on. But the Buddhists can not explain how the table is on the floor or the cloth in the threads, because they do not admit any type of relation neither samyoga nor samvāya and the relation between the two entities, i.e., the relation between the container and the contained. But we have observed in our disscussion that the Nyāya realists have clear explanation on the above problem. The cloth, for example, is according to them, in the threads by the relation of inherence samavāya. Here, the threads are the container (āśraya) and the cloth is contained (āśrayī). Hence, the āśrayī is related to the āśraya by the inherent relation or samvāya sambandha. Thus the Naiyāyikas explain the relation between the whole (contained) and the parts (container).

The Buddhists again argue that if the avayavi and avayavas are completely two a distinct entities then they can not occupy the same space, but the fact is otherwise. The avayavin and avayavas, whole and parts, occupy one and the same space, (samānadeśavṛtti). Therefore, they should be adjudged to be one and the same. The Naiyāyikas in reply say that due to the relation of inherence they do not occupy different space. Samavāya is āśraya āśrayi sambandha, it is the relation of substrate and content between two inseparables. The samaveta resides in the samavāyi, the cloth in the yarns. The content naturally occupies the space of the substrate, and these two, therefore, come to occupy the same space, cloth occupies no other space than that yarns. So, the Buddhist argument on the ground of space to refute the Nyāya theory of whole, does not hold water.

Again, the Buddhists have tried to prove that the part and whole are contradictory notion and therefore,

they can not belong to the same locus. But it is not the fact. How do the contradictories appear together even in false perception ? Is it possible to perceive, even falsely, that a thing is both a rope and a snake at one and the same time ? It seems to us that the concept of 'virodha' or contradiction can not be adequately formed without reference to experience, and in this respect the Buddhists contention, i.e., the whole is nothing but conglomeration of parts, is not acceptable.

In the third chapter of our dissertation entitled the Universal and Particulars, we have observed that the Naiyāyikas designate the category of universal as a synthetic principle which assimilates the individual objects into an indential mode of being. But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to this view. According to them, the external world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called 'unique particulars' (svalākṣaṇas). The so-called 'universals', according to the Buddhists, are nothing but mental images or

conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). The Buddhists opine that any individual a cow, a jar, or a man - is not real particular, the real particulars are the transcendental point-instants which underlie these phenomenal individual objects. They refute the concept of so-called 'universal' as a separate category over and above its corresponding particulars on the ground of its non-perceptibility. Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the pure receptivity of senses, the pure momentary sensation of an efficient point instant (svalakṣaṇas) of external reality and is absolutely devoid of the forms of the understanding (kalpanāpodam). This momentary sensation of unique particulars, that is, indeterminate perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) is true perception. And when all these unique-particulars are qualified or attributed with class or class-characters they become the object of enduring perception. And this enduring perception with universal - determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) - is not perception in true sense, as they are conceived by understanding.

In other words these svalakṣaṇas with universals according to the Buddhists, have no objective reality (vastuśat), they are nothing but conceptual constructions, and thus they are the object of inference. Thus the Buddhists have denied the perceptibility of universals and have established their inferability. But in the course of our discussion we have seen that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have advanced more logically sound arguments to refute the above charge of the Buddhists. They opine that both the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and the savikalpaka pratyakṣa or judgemental perception are caused by the sense-object contact (indriyārtha sannikarṣa). The difference between these two kinds of perception is, according to them, one of quantity. All the elements of determinate perception (Judgemental perception) are directly present in our pre-judgemental level of perception as self-contained units, not qualifying one another and as realities outside. So, there is no qualitative

difference between these two kinds of perception - determinate and indeterminate. Their difference consists in a qualified and non-qualified cognition of the perceived objects, not in the passive receptivity of senses and the spontaneous construction of understanding as conceived by the Buddhists. Thus the Naiyāyikas have established that both the momentary- sensation (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and Judgemental perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) are based on sense-object contact. Consequently, the universal being the determinate object have perceptual basis. Thus the Naiyāyikas have advanced more logically sound arguments to refute the Buddhist theory that universals can not be cognized through sense-perception.

Moreover, the natural classification of worldly objects is not possible, the Naiyāyikas may argue, without the reality of universals. We observe different individual cows in the empirical world. Each cow differs from another cow in shape, size, colour etc. But still we call them 'cows' because they share a

common character, i.e., cow universal(gotva).

Again, to substantiate their position that the universal is an ontological category, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists argue in the following way : Things are perceived as different in some respects and identical in others. An individual cow is perceived as existing in a particular time and occupying a particular place. It stands apart from other objects as an individual existent and can be distinguished from them by its peculiarities. But it is not altogether different. In spite of its peculiar mode of existence it is an existent like other animate and inanimate existents. It is an animal like a horse and a buffalo. It is a cow like other cows. In language we have two kinds of names - proper name and common name or general words. Proper names denote individual things and common names denote their classes. A proper name is applicable to one individual only, but a common name is applicable to a number of individuals. When an object of perception is determined to be a cow we are conscious of its oneness with other objects which

also are known as cows. Cowness is a predicate commonly shared by a number of individual animals. There is a consciousness of difference and also of unity when a number of animals called cows is perceived, and both of them must have corresponding realities as their bases. The objective basis of the consciousness of difference is the mutually exclusive nature of individual things and that of the consciousness of unity is their common nature. Common names refer to this latter. The reality of the common nature of objects can not be denied. Objects are always conceived in a two fold ways, which would not be possible if they are not of a double nature. The double nature of an object consists in its specific individuality and its class-character. The reality corresponding to our class concepts is called universal, because it is not confined to this or that particular individual but is common to a number of them. There are many universals as there are class-concepts. Cowness is a universal residing in all past, present and future cows. Similarly, there are such universals as 'humanity', 'horseness', 'redness' etc. The universals are of a varying extension

according to the number of particulars in which they reside.

The Buddhists deny the reality of universals and hold that only unique particulars are real. They say that there is nothing common in them. The Vedāntins deny the reality of particulars and say that the being (sattā) alone is real. But both these views are not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas point out that the Buddhists cannot explain the consciousness of identity in different particulars. If a universal cow is unreal there is no sense in calling certain animals by the common name 'cow'. And if particulars are unreal, as the Vedāntins opine, why should a particular thing be perceived as different from another ? As a matter of fact universal and particulars are relative to each other, so that a denial of one means a denial of both. There can be no universal. Unless there are particulars and there can be no particulars unless there is a universal to be particularised. Thus the Nyāya realists have established that neither the idea of universal is never

contradicted nor that of particular. Therefore, both of them must be grounded in reality.

Again, the Buddhists argue that the idea of universal is secondary and that it is derived from the same causal efficiency (arthakriyā) possessed by a number of particulars. Now a question may crop up, the Naiyāyikas point out, that why should a number of particular animals, cows for instance, should possess the same causal efficiency if they are totally different from one another ? A functional unity of diverse particulars presupposes their structural identity. The actions of A and B can not be the same unless they share a common nature. Moreover, if there is no universal at all, how can an action of A be the same as an action of B ? And if two different actions can be identical, why should two particular cows not be identical ? So, the universal can not be derived from such causal efficiency. The Buddhists assert again that like the universals the particulars are also idea, only the transcendental point-instants

(svalakṣaṇas) are real. But the Buddhists are also wrong. All valid ideas, according to the Nyāya realists, have corresponding real objects as their bases. We have such ideas as 'this is cow', 'that too is a cow', 'this cow is different from that cow' etc., and all our practical activities are based on such ideas. Therefore, they are valid and universal and particulars must be their objective counter parts.

Thus in the Nyāya-Buddhist controversy we have tried to champion the cause of Nyāya-realism and vindicate its position.