

C H A P T E R - 3

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULARS (Sāmānya and Vyakti)

I

We have already mentioned in the Introductory chapter that the problem of universal and particulars (sāmānya and vyakti) is one of the many aspects of controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and the Buddhist phenomenologists. The Naiyāyikas assert that the universal (sāmānya) is a separate category (padārtha) and is something over and above its corresponding particulars (vyakti) in which it resides. But the Buddhist phenomenologists, on the other hand, insist that the unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas or kṣaṇas) are the only realities, and the universals have no objective existence what so ever, these being illusory creation of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). This problem of universals and particulars be viewed both metaphysically and epistemologically. We shall begin with the metaphysical or ontological aspect of the problem first.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, the universal is a synthetic principle which assimilates

the individual objects subsumed under it into an identical mode of being. But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to this view. According to them, the external world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called "unique particulars" (svalakṣaṇas); their synthesis exists only in our thought and hence, it has no objective reality of its own. The so-called universals, maintain the Buddhists, are nothing but mental images or conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). In contrast with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṃsakas who are un-compromising realists so far as the ontological status of universals is concerned, the Buddhists have been generally designated as nominalists; but their is a kind of nominalism which cannot be distinguished from conceptualism, since a name and a concept, according to them, cover the same ground. Conceptual thought has been defined by them as naming thought capable of coalescing with a name. "Names originate in concepts", says Dignāga and vice-versa,

"concepts can originate in names."<sup>1</sup> Hence, to determine the import of names is the same as to determine the fundamental character of concepts. For the Buddhists conceptualism is the same as nominalism, there being no difference between them whatsoever.\*

Reality, according to the Buddhists, consists of a plurality of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas). Every vestige of generality is absent in it. Generality, similarity, relation or universal is always something imagined or constructed by the spontaneous creativity of our understanding which in the Buddhists' terminology is known as Productive Imagination (kalpanā). Positively the real is the efficient (arthā-kriyā-kāri), negatively the real is the non-ideal (nirvikalpa), by which is meant 'not ideationally constructed'. This non constructed dynamic particular which is said to be grasped immediately by our first moment of sensation in the cognition of an empirical object is claimed to be the only 'pure'

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1. Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ, vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ  
Quoted in Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā by Vācaspati Miśra.  
(Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1936, 1944), p. 681.

\* As stated in the book of Sushanta Sen, A Study of Universals (Research Publication, Visva-Bharati), p. 44

reality by the Buddhists. This reality is 'pure' in the sense that it is not mixed up with the slightest bit of imaginative construction (kalpanā) of our mind. Directly opposed to this pure reality, there is pure identity, pure imagination of our understanding. God, Soul, the Sāṃkhya concept of primordial Matter etc. are examples of this pure imagination (viśuddha kalpanā).<sup>2</sup> These are, to use a phrase used by Kant, "transcendental illusions" having no objective validity whatsoever. But between these pure realities of efficient particulars and pure idealities of the so-called metaphysical entities, there is a half-imagined world, a world which though consisting of constructed images, are yet established on a firm foundation of efficient particulars. It is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience. The images arise in functional dependence on the moments of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) reflected in sensation and by an act of imputation they are objectivised and identified with those bare particulars. The result is the phenomenal world. Hence, we find that there are two

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2. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, (Mouton and Co. S.Gravenhage, 1958, Vol.1), P.70.

kinds of imagination, one pure and the other mixed with reality; and two kinds of reality, one direct and pure, and the other indirect and mixed with imagination.<sup>3</sup>

The pure reality consists of unique particulars which are directly reflected in pure sensation. These particulars are shorn of all sensible qualities; they have no duration in time, nor have they any extension in space. Each of them is differentiated and distinguished from everything else in the world (sarvato-vyāvṛtta). Hence they are discrete, disconnected and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the 'Unique particular', svalakṣaṇa means 'of its own kind' which has no parallel to it in the whole universe. It exists only for one moment, because no sooner it is born than it is destroyed and replaced by another unique particular which, although similar to it, is quite different from it. Lasting only for a 'moment', it is called momentary (kṣanika). But as a matter of fact, there being no separate reality called time which is the temporal receptacle of objects as

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3. Ibid.

understood in the realistic systems, the unique particular itself is called the 'moment' (kṣaṇa). As it is shorn of other duration in time or extension in space, the best English term for the Buddhist particular would be 'Point-instant', a term used by Stcherbatsky. This svalakṣaṇa, kṣaṇa, or 'point-instant' alone is the pure reality, according to the Buddhists, because it is not yet mixed up with the imaginative construction (kalpanā) of our mind. But over and above this pure reality, there is another reality which is impure so to speak, because it consists of objectivised images on the basis of these unique particulars. This reality has been endowed by us with a position in time, a position in space and with all variety of sensible and abstract qualities. This is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience.

From the above discussion it is clear, that a man, a cow, a jar etc., will not be real particular, according to the Buddhists; the real particulars here will be the transcendental point-instants which underlie

these phenomenal individual objects. Any general image constructed by thought with reference to and on the basis of these point-instants is a universal. In this sense every predicable concept, every relation and quality will be a universal. From the Buddhist point of view, whatever can be expressed in speech by a name is a universal. The particular point-instant is inexpressible, since it is a thing shorn of all relations and is the ultimate subject of all possible predication. Hence the particular and the universal "may be mutually defined as the negation of one another, they are correlated as the real and the unreal (vastu, avastu), as the efficient and the non-efficient (samartha, asamartha), as the non-constructed and the constructed (nirvikalpaka, kalpita), the non-artificial and the artificial (akrtrima, krtrima), the non-imagined and the imagined (anāropita, āropita), the uncognizable and the cognizable (jñānena aprāpya, prāpya), the unutterable and the utterable (anabhilāpya, abhilāpya), the own essence and the general essence (svalakṣaṇa, sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the thing shorn of all its extension and the thing

containing albeit quite rudimentary extension (sarvato vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta), the unique and the non-unique (trailokya-vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta), the non-repeated and repeated in space-time (deśa-kāla-anugata, ananugata), the simple and the composite (anavayavin, avayavin), this indivisible and the divisible (abhinna, bhinna), the transcendental thing and the empirical thing (paramārtha-sat, samvṛti-sat), the essence unshared by others and the essence shared by others (asādhāraṇa, sādharāṇalakṣaṇa), the external and the internal (bāhya, abāhya), the true and the spurious (analīkam, alīkam), the non-dialectical and the dialectical (viruddha-dharma-adhyastam, anadhyastam), the significant and the insignificant (atuccha, tuccha), the unformed and the formed (nirākāra, sākāra), the Thing-in-Itself and the phenomenon (svalakṣaṇa-paramārtha-sat, samvṛti-sat=sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)!"<sup>4</sup>

A question can be raised here: how can the utterly heterogenous point-instants having nothing identical in

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4. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (Mouton and Co. S-Gravenhage, 1958, Vol.1), pp.184-185.

common produce an illusory image of identity in our mind ? The mental origin of the idea of universal which is the same as the idea of identity (anuvṛtti pratyaya) is perfectly conceivable when, corresponding to it, there is an identical character called universal existing in external objective world. But the Buddhists deny the objective existence of universals altogether while retaining the notion of identity as a mental concept (vikalpa). The genesis of this notions, therefore, remains an unaccounted mystery. To say that the idea of identity is simply an illusion (alika) without giving any rational explanation of the illusion in question is simply to evade the intricacy of the problem. To this the Buddhists answer that the postulation of an objective universal to justify the origin of the idea of identity is based or necessitated by an erroneous view of causation a view which holds that the effect must be similar to the cause. But our experience teaches us, argues a Buddhist, that the things or objects which are utterly dissimilar can yet produce a similar effect and they can do so by virtue

of their inherent power.<sup>5</sup> For example, the plant known as 'guduci' is used in medicine for the purpose of curing fever. But there are other plants which are also used in medicine for the same purpose. But these different plants all of which produce the same febrifuge effect have not the slightest similarity with one another, other in shape, or in substance, or in stuff or in any other. Their similarity lies not in having an identical property in common but in producing a similar or a nearly similar effect. In the same way, the utterly dissimilar particulars of a certain class, though not having in common an objective identical property called universal, can yet stimulate our Productive Imagination(kalpanā) by virtue of their inherent power (śakti) in such a way as to produce a general image, the notion of an identical universal in our mind.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Evamatyantabhede'pi kecinniyataśaktitah, Tulya-pratyavamarśādehertutvaṃ yanti nāpre. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasamgraha (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926, Vol.1), p.239.

6. Yathā gudūcyādināmeva jvarādisāmane śaktirnānyeṣām, indriyaviṣayālokamanskārādīnām ca viśiṣṭajñānotpādane, tathāikāpratyavamarśo'pi keśāmcideva śaktiniyama iti. Kamalśīla, Tattvasamgraha-panjikā (Gaekwad, 1926), p.497.

II

The problem of universal, though mainly an ontological problem, has a well-marked epistemological hinterland which shapes and determines the nature of the former. In the present section, therefore, an attempt will be made to study this problem in its epistemological background without which the true significance of it cannot be fully appreciated.

The controversy between realism and phenomen-  
alism in India is closely associated with two different theories of sense-perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists assume an imageless (nirākāra) consciousness and a direct perception by the senses of both the particular and of the universal residing in it. The Buddhist phenomenologists transfer these universals out of the external world of mere particulars directly reflected in sensation, faced by an internal world of mere images, that is to say, of mere universals. Sensation becomes related to images as particular to universals.

Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of senses, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant (svalakṣaṇa) of external reality and is absolutely devoid of the forms of the understanding (kalpanāpoḍam).<sup>7</sup> It is, therefore, the bare moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition and is thus unutterable in itself. The Buddhists agree with the Mimāṃsakas in holding that in all perception there must be an element of novelty, i.e., a felt addition to our experience. Cognition in the true sense, must be a new cognition, cognition of the object not yet cognised (anadhigata-artha-adhigantṛ). If this be the case, argues a Buddhist, then such feeling of novelty belongs only to the first moment of sensation in the knowledge of an object. In the following moments, when the attention of the perceiver is aroused, it is no more that pure sensation which it was in the first moment; it becomes the repeated cognition of the first flash of awareness. True perception, therefore, according to the

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7. Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu, Chapter-I.

Buddhists, is always momentary sensation, enduring perception is not perception at all; it is not cognition proper, it is re-cognition. The cognitive element of our mind is limited to that moment only when we get first awareness of the object's presence. It is followed by the synthetical operation of the intellect which constructs a general form of image of the object. But the function of sense-perception consists only in signalling the presence of the object in the ken, its mere presence and nothing else. To construct an image of the object whose presence has thus been reported by sense-perception is the function of Productive Imagination (kalpanā). Therefore, the salient feature of sense-perception lies in the fact that though it is followed by the construction of a general image, in itself it is non-constructive in nature. What passes as perception ordinarily and is regarded as such by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and other realists under what they call savikalpaka-pratyakṣa or judgmental perception is not perception at all. It is the original sensational core-followed by the construction of a general image of

the object and by an act of identification of the image so constructed with the given in sensation. In the judgemental perception, 'this is a cow', the 'this' is the sensational core and is unspeakable in itself and the element 'cow' is a general concept constructed by the understanding and expressed in a mnemonic image ( a connotative name) and identified with the given sensation by an act of imputation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, on the other hand, consider both the pure sensation (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and the judgemental perception(savikalpaka pratyakṣa) to be sense-perception and caused by sense-object contact (indriyārtha sannikarṣa). The difference between these two kinds of perception is, for them, one of quantity to be explained as follows. All the elements of judgemental perception are directly presented to our pre-judgemental level of perception as self-contained units not qualifying one another and as realities outside. In the savikalpaka perception also, according to the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is immediate presentation (which may also be called immediate discovery) of reals outside, and as such there is no difference in quality between these two kinds of perception. The only difference in the latter case is that the items of the nirvikalpaka perception are presented (immediately discovered) as standing in a qualifier-qualified relation; and according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, this qualifier-qualified relation is as much an independent reality outside as the items themselves.

According to the other Indian realists also like the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā thinkers, the difference between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perception is never one of quality but one of the degree of distinctness and clarity. The nirvikalpaka perception, they hold, is vague, indistinct and inexpressible in words. On the judgemental plane, all the items of the nirvikalpaka perception become clear and distinct by qualifying one another.<sup>8</sup>

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8. Satkari Mukherjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism (Calcutta, 1944), pp. 258-60.

Hence the difference between these two cases of perception, according to the Indian realists, is not one of kind, as the Buddhists maintain, but either one of quantity or of degree. The difference consists in a qualified and non-qualified cognition of the objects perceived, not in the passive receptivity of sense and the spontaneous construction of understanding. Substance (dravya), quality (guna), universal(sāmānya) etc., according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, are not thought-constructs as the Buddhists say, but ultimate irreducible forms of reality as the objective material of both kinds of perception—determinate or judgemental and indeterminate or pre-judgemental. We have direct apprehension of these ultimate entities through different forms of sense-object-contact. In the case of perception of a universal qualifying an object, the corresponding contact is either samyukta-samavāya or samyukta-samaveta-samavāya.<sup>9</sup> In the case of a universal like 'jariness (ghatatva) corresponding to the substance 'jar' (ghata), the sannikarṣa or contact is samyukta-

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9. S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, (Calcutta University 1939), pp.182-83.

samāvāya through which the universal in question is perceived. The individual jar (ghata) being a substance (dravya) is samyukta or in direct conjunction with the sense and the jariness (ghatatva) is related to the individual jar by the relation of inherence (samavāya) and thus through samyukta-samavāya or the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction with the sense, in perceiving the jar we also perceive the 'jariness' inherent in the jar. In the case of the perception of universals corresponding to qualities and movements (guna and karma), the particular contact involved is samyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Blue colour, e.g. **is a** quality and bluness inheres in the blue colour as its universal and blue colour again inheres in the blue substance. We perceive the substance through the relation of conjunction (samyoga) with our sense of sight, the colour blue of the blue substance through the relation of samyukta-samavāya or inherence in that which is in conjunction with the eyes and the bluness of the colour blue through the

relation of samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, i.e., through inhering in an inherent quality of the substance which is in conjunction with the sense. The same type of sense-contact operates in the perception of universals corresponding to motion. Again, soundness (śabdatva) as the universal of different kinds of sound is perceived by the auditory sense through another kind of sense-contact known as samaveta-samavāya.<sup>10</sup> The universal 'soundness' is in contact with the ear through its inherence (samavāya) in sound which inheres as a quality (samaveta) in the auditory sense.

The Buddhists, however, deny the perceptibility of universals on the ground that they are not forms of reality at all and the aforesaid varieties of sense-contact are not possible. The universals, according to them, are the intelligible concepts, the workmanship of our understanding which the sense cannot know. The function of the sense consists merely in presenting the efficient particular (svalakṣaṇa) which is the

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10. Ibid, pp.183-84.

affirmative elements in perception. It is the understanding that elaborates the presented element into a known empirical object by means of a concept of a universal of its own creation. A judgemental perception thus involves both the receptivity of sense and the spontaneity of the understanding, and therefore is not pure perception. Pure perception is, as we have indicated already, nothing but presentation as such without any imaginative or conceptual elaboration. It is the bare datum in its immediacy and is unutterable in itself. Perceptual judgment is a further elaboration, the interpretation of the datum through any one of the five kinds of thought-construction (pañcavidha-kalpanā), namely, the image of substance (dravya-kalpanā) a quality (guna-kalpanā) an action (karma-kalpanā), a universal (sāmānya-kalpanā), and a name (nāma-kalpanā).<sup>11</sup> It should be noted here that though the name 'universal' (sāmānya) is given to one of the five kinds of categories of the understanding,

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11. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic(Vol.I), p.217

yet all of them should be treated as universals from the Buddhist point of view, since all of them represent the general construction of our understanding as opposed to the particular point-instants of external reality.<sup>12</sup> This is how a perceptual judgement transforms the non-significant datum of sense into a significant knowable object. Perception or more properly sensation, according to the Buddhists, does not know though it apprehends, while judgment knows but only by distorting what it apprehends. The subject of the judgment is the datum in its immediacy and as such unutterable. The predicate is an intelligible concept or universal. Judgment is the act of predication, i.e., the interpretation or mediation of the unutterable immediacy by an intelligible universal and is so far a deviation or distortion of the given in its immediacy.

Both the Mimāṃsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, however, reject the Buddhist view that the savikalpaka perception is a construction of the understanding

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,12. "..... all categories are universals" *ibid*,p.218.

and therefore void of truth. The savikalpaka, according to the non-Buddhist Indian realists, answers to the real relational character of objects and is not a superimposition of thought-constructs ab-extra on an intrinsically non-relational manifold. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the relational as well as the non-relational represent different stages of knowing rather than of being so that though in the order of being there may not be relations without relata or vice-versa, in the order of knowing relations and the relata are first apprehended in themselves before they are apprehended as qualifying one another. It is clear from the above that if reality is essentially non-relational - a non-relational dynamic manifold as the Buddhists say or a non-relational undifferentiated essence of pure presentative consciousness (Brahman) as the Advaitins say, - then the relational consciousness of the non-relational reality will be more or less a construction of the understanding and will so far be a distorted representation of its intrinsic nature. Thus the movement of experience from the nirvikalpaka or non-relational

plane to that of the savikalpaka or relational will be a falling away from truth and reality, according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṃsikas, however, (and also for the Sāṅkhya-philosophers for whom relational forms are real evolutes of prakṛti as the original non-relational matrix of objective reality) nirvikalpaka, i.e., non-relational, and savikalpaka or relational experience are not negatively related as according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. On the contrary, the relational forms being not the impoverishment but rather the fuller and more developed forms of the non-relational experience, the latter is only a less adequate and less articulate apprehension of what is apprehended more clearly and distinctly and more in accordance with its developed intrinsic nature in relational experience. Thus the advance from the nirvikalpaka to the savikalpaka is not a falling away from truth as the Buddhists and Advaitins say but a marked gain in content, clearness and distinctness of apprehension.

The above discussion is sufficient to show how the ontological problem of universal can be linked up and is practically based upon the logical problem of perception. The validity or invalidity of the savikalpaka perception determines the reality or unreality of the universals. But the problem of universal can be viewed from a more general epistemological point of view. It rests upon the question - are sensibility and understanding, sensation and conception, two different and distinct sources of human knowledge or, do they represent two different stages of the same process of knowing ? The Buddhists maintain a sharp, radical and transcendental distinction between these two separate faculties of human knowledge, while the Mīmāṃsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers deny this distinction altogether. According to the Buddhists, the sensibility is passive and receptive and is the source of direct knowledge, while the understanding is creative and spontaneous and is the source of indirect knowledge, the sensibility directly apprehends

only the non-relational dynamic particulars, while the understanding creates the general images of the particulars and knows them.

The sense-perception of an entity, according to the Buddhists, is possible only if it is causally efficient (artha-kriyā-kāri), that is, if it possesses the faculty of affecting our sensibility. But mere efficiency is not enough for the sense-perception of an object, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore, over and above its causal efficiency, that cause alone is the object of sensation which invariably calls forth in our cognition its own general image.<sup>13</sup> But a universal neither can effect our sensibility, nor can it call forth an image of the object, since it is ex-hypothesi devoid of any kind of causal efficiency.<sup>14</sup> We cannot, therefore, according to the Buddhists, have any sense-perception of the

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13. Arthasāmarthyasamuttham hi pratyakṣagocaram. Sa eva cārthaḥ pratyakṣagocarō yo jñānaprātibhāṣamtmanoḥvayavyatirekā-vanukārayati. Vācaspati Mīśra, Nyāyavārtikatātpariyatikā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p.17.

14. Na ca sāmānyam nirastasamastārthakriyāsāmarthyamevam bhavitumarhati, Ibid.

universals. Nor can we have any sense-perception of the so-called empirical individual objects, because they are nothing but the meeting point of several universals on the basis of some efficient particulars. The transcendental particulars therefore, which underlie the so-called empirical individual objects and which are causally efficient are the proper objects of our sense-perception.<sup>15</sup> That a particular of this kind should also be cognised by the conceiving, synthetic faculty of our mind or by inference is impossible.<sup>16</sup> The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference or intellection. Inference or intellection cognises relation<sup>17</sup> but in an absolute particular no relation can be found. Relation is possible only between two universals not ~~between~~ between two svalakṣaṇa particulars.<sup>18</sup> Therefore it is only the universals that

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15. Tasmāt svalakṣaṇa viṣayam pratyakṣam. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīka, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1925), p. 17.

16. Na ca svalakṣaṇamanumānasyāpi gocaraḥ, Ibid, p. 18.

17. Sambandhagrahānapekṣamanumānam. Nyāyamañjarī (Vol. I, edited and translated into Bengali, by Pancanan Tārka-vāgīś, (Calcutta University), p. 229.

18. Pratibandhaḥ sāmānyadharmāvāśrayate. Vācaspati Miśra, Op. cit., p. 18. The relation holding between a universal and its corresponding particular is not real relation, according to the Buddhists, but an imputed one imposed by the understanding.

can be inferred not the absolute particulars. The distinction between sensibility and understanding, or, between perception and intellection, is therefore, viṣaya-gata, i.e., arises from a difference of their respective objects. In the case of perception, the object is svalakṣaṇa real. In intellection (indirect knowing), however, what we know is not the real in itself but certain universals constructed by thought on the basis of our perception of unique reals.

Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers join issue with the Buddhists. They point out that the Buddhists' view of perception as svalakṣaṇa-viṣaya does not square with the facts of experience since the universals like the particulars, also admit of perception. In fact, most perceptions of particulars are also perception of universals inhering in particulars. The different kinds of sense-contact which are operative in the perception of universals have been discussed already.

Nor is the Buddhist view of intellection as sāmānyal-  
akṣaṇaviśaya necessarily true in every case, since  
the particulars also can very well be inferred like  
the universals. The existence of a particular fire,  
according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, can  
either be perceived directly by the visual and  
tactile sense, or it may be inferred indirectly from  
the presence of smoke.<sup>19</sup> To a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist,  
therefore, the distinction between perceiving and  
mediate knowing is not viśaya-gata strictly speaking;  
it arises from the difference of their respective  
kāraṇas or instrumental causes and is thus kāraṇa-gata  
and not viśaya-gata. Thus, perception is jñānākaraṅka

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19. Particulars are empirically conceived by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, but these are transcendently understood by the Buddhists. The Buddhists' particular is the point-instant, the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa), and radically different from all constructions of the conceptive faculty of our mind. But the realists' particular is the concrete physical individual objects of our everyday experience. The concrete individual objects, being a meeting point of several universals, is nevertheless treated as a particular by the realists, but for the Buddhists it is a construction of our mind on the basis of transcendental particulars and therefore treated as a universal cognised by inference.

jñāna, i.e., karana while parokṣa or mediate knowing or intellection is knowledge mediated by another knowledge as its instrumental cause. In the case of perception, the instrumental cause or kāraṇa in the sense of phalāyoga-vyavacchinna kāraṇa (the last cause in the causal series immediately after which the effect arises) or in the sense of vyāpāravat-asādhāraṇa kāraṇa (operative uncommon cause) is either the sense-object contact or the sense itself. But neither the sense-object contact nor the sense is itself knowledge though it causes knowledge which we call perceptual cognition. In inference and other forms of indirect knowledge, however, the resulting knowledge is mediated by some other knowledge. Thus, in inference the knowledge of the conclusion is mediated by the knowledge of a universal proposition (vyāpti-jñāna) and pakṣadharmatā-jñāna, i.e., the knowledge of the mark as a dharma or property of the pakṣa or the subject of inference.

As we have already shown that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers sensibility and understanding, sensation

and intellection, are not two radically distinct and separate source of knowledge, because both the particulars and the universals can be apprehended either directly by different sense-faculties or indirectly by understanding, there cannot be, therefore, no strict viṣaya-gata limit for each source of knowledge; one can very well interfere into the realm of the other. This view of the realists is known as pramāṇa-saṃplava, a view which admits that the very same thing, be it a universal or a particular, can be cognised in two different ways - either directly by sense-organs or indirectly by the understanding.<sup>20</sup>

As against the above theory of the realists, the Buddhists put forward the theory known as pramāṇa-vayavasthā, according to which there is a sharp and radical distinction between two sources of knowledge corresponding to two kinds of object. The objects are either particulars or universals and accordingly the source of knowledge are either sensation or conception. Each

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20. Ekasmin viṣaye' nekapramāṇapravṛttih saṃplavaḥ,  
Nyāyamañjarī (Vol. I, ed., p. Tarkavagis, 1939), p. 227.

source has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. The particulars are apprehended by the senses but the universals are conceived by the understanding. The senses cannot know the universals nor can the particulars be known by the understanding. The reason for this conclusion has been discussed already.<sup>21</sup>

Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist philosopher, proposes an experiment by way of introspection to demonstrate the rigid dichotomy between sensibility and understanding. The experiment consists in pointing to the simple psychological phenomenon of absentmindedness. He says that when we are absentminded,

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21. It should be noted here that from the empirical point of view it is just the Buddhist theory which would deserve to be called 'samplava' theory, since the two sources of knowledge, sensation and conception, are not found in our everyday experience in their pure and unmixed condition. The empirical world is a world created by our understanding by a synthesis (samplava) of its concepts with the pure sensation. In order to separate them and to show their mutual exclusiveness, we must go beyond actual experience, beyond all observable conscious and sub-conscious operation of the intellect, and assume a transcendental difference, a difference which, although unobserved by us directly, is urged upon us necessarily by uncontradicted ultimate reality.

i.e., when our attention is otherwise engaged (anyatra-gatacitta), we cannot recognise an object presented in our senses even if the senses are operative fully. In this case, the observer will not 'understand' anything except the bare presence of the object.<sup>22</sup> The attention of the observer must be directed to the object; the disposition of the past experience must be remembered, the name and its connotation must be recalled; only then will the observer begin to 'understand' and recognition will follow.<sup>23</sup> The experiment of Dharmakīrti signifies the fact that the understanding is a separate faculty different from the senses. The understanding is the mind's spontaneous activity subsequent to the function of the sensuous passive apparatus. There is a minimum limit to every empirical cognition, the limit being the pure unutterable sensation absolutely free from the construction of the understanding and on the basis of which the understanding constructs its universals.

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22. Anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam, Sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravarttate Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasamgraha (Gaekwad, 1926, Vol. I), p. 241

23. Saṃketa manaskārāt sadā dipratyayāime, Jāyamānstu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtya anantaram., Ibid, p. 240.

The experiment of Dharmakīrti offers a remarkable coincidence with one proposed by Bergson. "I am going", says the French philosopher, "to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations ..... all my perceptions vanish, the material world sinks into silence.....I can even, it may be, blot out and forget my recollections upto my immediate past; but at least I keep the consciousness of my present, reduced to its extremest poverty, that is to say, of the actual state of my body".<sup>24</sup> This consciousness "reduced to extremest poverty" is evidently nothing but Dharmakīrti's moment of pure sensation, the present moment. Bergson adduces it as a proof that the idea of nought is a pseudo-idea. The Buddhists refer to it exactly for the same purpose. But it is at the same time a proof that sensation and understanding are two quite heterogeneous sources of knowledge, the sensations being the basic foundation upon which the understanding builds up its entire superstructure. The universal is an illusion, it is mere name or concept

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24. Creative Evolution, p.293, (Macmillan, London, 1911)

of the understanding without any objective correlative correspondening to it. Thus we find that the Buddhists' rejection of the reality of universals is founded upon the epistemological doctrine that the senses and the understanding are two utterly heterogeneous mental faculties, although united by a special causal relation, in as much as the images of universals always arise in functional dependence on sensation.

III

The Buddhists offer various arguments to disprove the ontological reality of universals. Kamalsila, a well-known Buddhist philosopher, argues that, had the universal been a separate objective reality apart from the particulars, we could have apprehended it separately as a fruit in a basket. But to have an abstract idea of a universal apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility. The universal cowness (gotva) is supposed to be bereft of the characteristics, colour or shape, which an actual individual cow possesses. But try as we may, we can not imagine, or have an idea of this universal 'cowness' devoid of those peculiar features of an actual cow. Hence the ontological unreality of the universals<sup>25</sup> is proved.

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25. Etaduktaṁ bhavati-anugāmi-pratyayānām piṇḍādivyat-iriktaṁ . nimittamalamvanabhutameva bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayiṣitam, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt; tadvilakṣaṇavarnākṛtyādipratibhāsanācca. Tathāhi-bhavadbhiḥvarṇākṛtyakṣarākārasunyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam, vijñānam ca varṇādipratibhāsānugatamanubhūyate, tat kathamasya varṇādisunyamālamvanam bhavet, na hi anyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālamvanam yuktamatiprasaṅgāt. Kamalāsīla, Tattvasaṁgraha-panjikā (Gackwad, 1926, Vol.1), p.243.

It should be noted here that Berkeley, an English nominalist, adopts almost the same line of argument in his celebrated "introduction" to his "Principles of Human Knowledge" and also in the main body of the Principles to dispose of Locke's conceptualistic theory of universal.<sup>26</sup> As against Locke, Berkeley denies the mental existence of the universals in the form of general ideas by pointing out the psychological impossibility of imagining the general as opposed to the particular, the abstract as opposed to the concrete. Our capacity of forming ideas, argues Berkeley, is always limited to the particulars. The so-called ideas of universals, therefore, are mere names or words without any corresponding mental concepts or objective correlative.

But though the type of argument advanced by both Berkeley and a Buddhist is almost the same, the enormous difference between these two philosophers should not be

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26. As stated in the book of Sushanta Sen, A Study of Universals, (Research publication, Visva-Bharati, 1978), p. 59.

overlooked. So far as Berkeley repudiates the objective existence of the universals by pointing out the psychological incapacity of our mind of having general or abstract ideas as opposed to the ideas of the particulars, a Buddhist would readily agree with him. But he would point out to Berkeley that what he calls the idea of particular is also general, general in respect of the particulars coming under it. The non-general is only that thing which is strictly 'in itself' (sva-lakṣaṇa), i.e., a thing whose being or knowledge is not determined by anything other than itself. If, on the other hand, the being of knowledge of a thing is determined by, relative to, or dependent on things other than itself, then it is no longer 'in itself' (sva-lakṣaṇa) it is no longer a particular, it becomes general. In this sense, only the very first moment of unutterable sensation represents particulars. Moments which follow this first moment of pure sensation or the determinate images or concepts which subsequently arise in functional dependence

on this first moment, are all universal or general, since, according to the Buddhists, their being and knowledge are determined by a negation of their opposites, and hence dependent on them. The idea of a particular blue colour as opposed to the idea of blueness in general is a particular idea, according to Berkeley. But a Buddhist would say that if it is blue in colour, this means that it already not non-blue and then it is general, no more 'in itself' (sva-lakṣaṇa) but 'in the other' (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) relative, dependent, constructed and dialectical. The absolute particular blue is the unutterable point-instant of the first moment of sensation which is subsequently understood by the understanding by a general image of blue. The reality and meaning of this image of blue consist in the negation of things which are not blue in colour. In this way, the idea of the blue which is proposed by Berkeley to be a particular idea is also general or universal, according to the Buddhists. The particulars are empirically conceived by

Berkeley, transcendentially understood by the Buddhists.

We have seen how the psychological impossibility to have an abstract general idea over and above the ideas of particulars is made the ground for rejecting the ontological reality of the universals. But there are many other arguments advanced by the Buddhists which tend to disclose the absurdity of a realistic theory of universal. Most of these arguments try to show that even granting a separate ontological existence to the universals apart from the particulars, the realists fail to explain with success the relationship between them.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the particular and its corresponding universal are related to each other as the 'support' and the thing 'supported' (ādharādheya-sambandha). But a support, the Buddhist argues, is always a cause which modifies its content. An unsupported apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into non-falling down

object when it is supported by a basket. But the universal is supposed by the realist to be an eternal never changing entity which cannot be efficiently acted upon so as to be modified by a cause and hence it cannot be supported by a substratum.<sup>27</sup>

Again, one particular object is said to 'support' several universals at the same time, which according to the Buddhists, is an unintelligible jargon. Thus the fact of 'being a tree' (vrkṣatva) and that of 'being a śimsāpā tree' (śimsāpātva) are two separate universals which are supported by the self-same particular tree named śimsāpā. They are regarded as two separate universals, because each of them has its own separate name. They, therefore, cannot be possessed in common by the same supporting particular, just as cowness (gotva) and horseness (aśvatva) do not represent two characteristics possessed by one common substratum.<sup>28</sup>

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27. Api cāstu sāmānyam vastusat tathā'pi nityatvādanupakāryatayā svalakṣaṇādhāratvānupapattih. Adhāratvamapi hi karaṇatvameva. Patanadharmāno hi vadarādayaḥ kundādivirpatanadharmānaḥ kriyānta. Na ca nityam kriyata iti nādheyam. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 484.

28. Tathā vrkṣatvaśimsāpātva svatantre eva sāmānye svaśabdābhyāma va gamito na gourasva iti vatsāmānadhikaranyam bhajetām., ibid.

But even supposing for the sake of argument, urges a Buddhist, that a self-same particular can 'support' two or more universals at the same time, it will lead us to the absurd position to think that there can not be any existential and connotative difference between those different universals which are ontologically distinct from one another. If one of them be suggested by a name or by a conception, then all the remaining ones, since their existence depends on the same supporting cause, will be eo ipso suggested and their names will practically become synonyms. Thus the names of the universals like existence, substantiality, solidity, arboreity and śimsāpāness, all of which are supposed to inhere in the self-same śimsāpā tree, will have the same meaning, which is evidently absurd. Again if different universals be supported by the same particular, then, in perceiving one of these universals, we should be able to perceive the rest of them. But that this is not the case is proved by the fact that from a considerable distance in a dim moonlit night, a śimsāpā tree is

perceived merely as something existent and nothing else. Had the hypothesis in question been true, i.e., if the self-same particular tree supported the different kinds of aforesaid universals, then in perceiving the universal 'existence' within it, we could have perceived the rest of them at the same time. But this is ~~not~~ the case.<sup>29</sup> These considerations, the Buddhists claim, conclusively dispose of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention that a single individual object is the support of several universals at the same time.

Again, when a universal is said to be present in a particular instance of it, the Buddhist asks the Naiyāyikas - is it present in it in its entirety, or, is only a part of it present in that particular instance? If it is present in its entirety, then, in accordance with the law of contradiction, nothing of it will be left to be present in its other particular instances, so that if there be one individual cow by

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29. Ekopakārake grāhye nopakārāstato'pare, Drṣṭe tasminnadrṣṭā ye tadgrahe sakalagraha, Ibid.

virtue of its possession of the universal 'cowness' (gotva), there will be no other individual cows in the world. And if it is present in its various particular instances part by part, then, the universal in question, instead of being a simple unanalysable entity as claimed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, will be a complex one composed of parts; and as no complex entity is eternal, the universal would cease to be eternal (nitya). But this conclusion directly goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of universal. Moreover, if only a part of the universal 'cowness' be present in a particular cow, then we are landed in the absurdity that an individual cow is only partly a cow and partly some other animal such as a horse.

Next, the Buddhists ask the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers - are the so-called universal present everywhere (sarva-sarva-gata), or, are they confined only to their respective particular instances (vyakti-sarva-gata)?

If it is present everywhere, then all things will be confused together and form a chaos, because a cow would be then characterised not only by cowness (gotva) by also by horseness (aśvatva), dogness etc., which are everywhere by supposition.<sup>30</sup> If the universal is, on the other hand, confined only to its respective particulars, e.g., if the universal 'cowness' be present only in all individual cows and not in any other animals, then it would be difficult to account for its sudden appearance in a newly born particular object which springs into existence at a spot where the universal in question was not found previously and whereto it couldn not have moved from another individual in which it was, being by hypothesis, incapable of movement. Only the substances are capable of movement, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, and if the universal in question moves from another individual, it would cease to be a universal and turn out to be a substance. Moreover, how can we explain the perception of the individual from which its corresponding universal is transmitted to the other

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30. Jayanta Bhatta., Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba) 1936, pp. 272-73.

newly born individual ? It cannot be said that the universal in question is born a new along with the newly born individual, because the universals are eternal entities which do not admit of any temporal origination. As the sudden appearance of a universal in a newly born individual object cannot be explained with success, so also we cannot explain its sudden disappearance from an individual when it is broken or destroyed. The universal in question cannot be destroyed along with the destruction of the individual, since it is an eternal entity incapable of destruction. Nor can it be said that it moves forward in search of an another individual as its abode, because it is ex hypothesi devoid of any motion. Even if for the sake of argument we admit it can move forward to another individual for its locus, the individual to which it moves cannot accommodate it, because it is already possessed of its own universal and the new-comer universal would prove superfluous to it. Again, suppose the species we call cow becomes extinct in the course of evolution so that not a single individual cow is

anywhere left on the earth, where will the eternal 'cowness' (gotva) go ? Will it wander about like a floating adjective in empty space and empty time ? Even if it does so, its subsistence in space and time (which, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are substances) would make them understood as cow, as the presence of a cow-universal (gotva-jāti) in an individual cow makes the latter understood as a cow. But this is obviously absurd. All these Buddhist objections in connection with the relation of a universal to its corresponding particular objects have been summed up in the following verse :

Na yāti na ca tatrāsīn na cotpannam na cāmsavat,  
Jahāti pūrvam nādhāram aho vvasana-samtatih

Pramānavārtika, 1/153

The main point of the realists' answer to the objections summed up in the verse<sup>31</sup> is that all of them are based on a false spatial view of universal,

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31. In the next section we shall see how can all other objections adduced by the Buddhists against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universal be answered successfully from the stand point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism.

that the universals are spatial entities spatially located in particulars. But the particular is not the spatial seat of the universal, it is only a means of revealing it (vyañjaka). The universal 'cowness' is present not only in the particular cows but also in other animals such as horses, dogs etc. But it is not manifested in other animals except in **the** individual cows. That is why, the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, cannot be perceived in it. It can be perceived only in a cow which along possesses the capacity to manifest it. Hence, despite its omnipresence, a universal cannot be perceived anywhere and everywhere in the world, it can be perceived only through the perception of the individual which is capable of revealing it.<sup>32</sup> Hence it is both correct to say that the universal is omnipresent (sarvasarva-gata) and also that it is present in its respective particulars (vyakti-sarva-gata).<sup>33</sup> When a new particular is born, it comes to be related to its corresponding universal

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32. Sarvasarvagatā jātiriti tāvadupeyate, Sarvatrāgrah-  
aṇam tasyā vyañjakavyaktyasannidheḥ, Jayanta Bhatta.,  
Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba), p.285.

33. Tatra yat tāvat pṛṣṭam sāmānyam sarvagatam vyaktigatam  
veti tatra pakṣadvayamapi vyañjam kaṣṭikurmaḥ, Nārāyan  
Bhatta, Mānameyodaya, p.231.

and is manifested through it. Though the universal is eternal and omnipresent, its relation to a particular individual and hence its manifestation come into existence only at the moment when the individual in question comes into being.

But the Buddhists might report to the above argument of the realists that potential or unmanifested existence is equivalent to non-existence. Efficiency, activity or actuality (arthakriyākāritva) is the mark of the real. If an entity is devoid of this efficiency, if it is unable to affect our sensibility so that it fails to produce any kind of sensation within us, it should be pronounced as unreal or non-existent. The Buddhists could readily concede to Berkeley's dictum- Esse est percipi - to be is to be perceived - if perception is taken in the sense of pure sensation devoid of any kind of imaginative construction. Hence to say that the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, is not perceived in it, because it is not manifested there, is a clear contradiction in terms. Moreover,

it is said by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers that only some particulars possess the capacity of revealing a specific universal. But it cannot explain — why the universal in question should be perceived in those particulars. The flame of a torch reveals the objects in a dark chamber, but it cannot be said that those objects are felt or perceived within the flame.

IV

In the foregoing sections of this chapter, we had engaged our attention in finding out the various grounds offered by the Buddhist phenomenologists on the basis of which they seek to deny the ontological reality of the universals. In our present discussion our main programme will be to expose the weakness of this phenomenological theory by showing that the so-called grounds put forward by the Buddhists in support of their theory can not stand the test of criticisms offered by the Nyāya realists. Consequently, our discussion will have the effect of reductio ad absurdum; it will indirectly substantiate the logical soundness of the realistic theory of universals, in accordance with which the universal is a separate ontological entity (padārtha) apart from the particulars, by reducing the Buddhists position to illogical absurdity.

The first thing we are to examine here is the theory of pramāna-vyavasthā upon which the entire edifice of the Buddhist phenomenology seems to rest.

It is a theory which maintains that sensation and inference, the only sources of human knowledge, are radically opposed and mutually exclusive in the sense that each of them has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. Pure sensation apprehends only the non-constructive particulars whereas the universals, which are nothing but the constructions (kalpanās) of our understanding, are the special field of inference. Sensation cannot apprehend the universals, nor can the particulars be apprehended by inference. This theory is in flat contradiction with the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-samplava, according to which the self-same object can be cognised either directly by sense-perception or indirectly by inference. There is no hard and fast opposition between sensation and inference and each of them can change its function with the other with regard to the same object.

We have seen in our previous sections how the case of Buddhist phenomenologists stands or falls with

their theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā and hence., if this theory is proved to be false and the cause of the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-samplava be championed, the entire superstructure of the Buddhistic phenomenism will collapse and crumble to the ground.

The Naiyāyikas point out that if the theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā on which the Buddhists have relied so much be accepted, it would rather go against their claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge. Universals, which according to the Buddhists, are nothing but the constructions of our understanding, are the exclusive objects of inference. But inference always depends upon a prior knowledge of the thing to be inferred (sādhya) as invariably related with some of its mark (linga, sādhana). This invariable concomitance between the sādhya and sādhana has been technically called the relation of vyāpti. But the knowledge of any kind of relation (sambandha) presupposes a previous knowledge of its different relata (sambandhi) as independent units. The sādhya constitutes a relatum

in the relation of vyāpti. Hence without a knowledge of the sādhya apart from the relational context, the relation of vyāpti which is regarded as the ground of inference cannot be ascertained. The sādhya, in the case of inference as interpreted by the Buddhists, is always a universal, i.e., a construction of the understanding, the knowledge of which must, therefore, be derived from inference. Hence we find that inference here depends upon the knowledge of relation(vyāpti) and the knowledge of relation, in its turn, depends upon inference (of the sādhya). This is clearly a case of petitio principii, a defective way of ratiocination technically known in Indian philosophy as anyo'nyāśray-adoṣa.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, if the knowledge of the sādhya, as one of the relata in the relation of vyāpti be itself the result of inference, then, for this inference of sādhya an another relation of vyāpti should be assumed, in which case the required knowledge of the sādhya would again be the result of another inference, for which

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34. "Na hyavijñātasambandham liṅgam gamakamiṣyate,  
Sambandhadhiśca sambandhidvayāvāgatipūrvikā,  
Sāmānyatmakasambandhigrahaṇaṅcānumānataḥ.  
Tasmādeva yadiṣyeta vaktamānyo'nyāsamīśrayam".  
Jayanta Bhatt. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. I, (Bengali translation by Pañcānan Tarkavāgīś, (Calcutta University 1939), p. 254.

another relation of vyāpti should again be assumed and the knowledge of the sādhya required; and this process would be multiplied indefinitely. The fallacy of indefinite regress (anavasthā), thus, becomes inevitable.<sup>35</sup> Hence we find that the Buddhist theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā which emphasises the inferential character of the universals as opposed to their perceptual character, annuls the very claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge, since the relation of vyāpti which is considered to be the ground of inference cannot be ascertained on this theory.

But the Buddhists, in support of their theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā put forward an objection against the theory of pramāṇa-sāmplava as sponsored by the Naiyāyikas. Pramāṇa means the source of cognition and cognition, according to the Buddhists, must be the cognition of something new, cognition of something not yet cognised (agrhitagrāhi). There must be an element of novelty in our cognition, argues a Buddhist, a felt addition to our experience not received before. But if the Nyāya theory

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35. Anumānāntarādhīna sambandhigrahapūrvikā,  
Sambandhādhigatirna syānmanvantarāśatairapi, Ibid, p.254.

of pramāṇa-sāmplava be true i.e., if the self-same object be cognised both by perception and inference consecutively, then the source which comes latter must be dismissed as a source of cognition, since it gives us then not the cognition of something new, but re-cognition of something which has already been cognised. Instead of being agrhitagrāhi, it would be a case of grhitagrāhi, and hence, should not be regarded as a pramāṇa.

But the Naiyāyikas answer the above objection of the Buddhists by saying that the character of being agrhitagrāhi is not always a universal and necessary mark of pramāṇa since a grhitagrāhi source may equally given rise to a piece of valid knowledge (pramā). To this, the Buddhist might again object that the grhitagrāhi source engages itself in re-producing a piece of valid knowledge which has already been produced by the agrhitagrāhi source, but since a thing which has been produced once cannot be re-produced again, the attempt of the grhitagrāhi source in doing so would be a fruitless endeavour. But the Naiyāyikas

answer that the knowledge produced by the gr̥hitagrāhi source here is numerically different from that produced by the agr̥hitagrāhi source, and hence the charge of re-producing an already produced entity does not hold good. Moreover, if the knowledge produced by the gr̥hitagrāhi source was every found to be cancelled, it could have been regarded as a case of apramāṇa, but it is never found to be so and hence the claim of the gr̥hitagrāhi as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) cannot be dismissed.<sup>36</sup>

It may be urged by the Buddhists that if the gr̥hitagrāhi source of knowledge be regarded as a case of pramāṇa, then smṛti or recollection also being gr̥hitagrāhi, should be treated as a genuine source of knowledge. But recollection is never recognised by the Naiyāyikas as a source of knowledge. As a source of knowledge. As against this Jayanta Bhatta answers that recollection is not regarded as a source

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36. Yadapi pramāṇa-viśeṣaṇamanadhigtārthagṛhitvamabhidhīyate paraistadapi na sāmpratam. Pramāṇasya gr̥hitataditaravīsayappravṛttasya prāmāṇye viśeṣabhāvāt. Nanu gr̥hitaviśeṣe pravṛttam pramāṇam kiṃ kuryāt ? Pramāṇamiti cet gr̥hyetāpi tāmeva vidhātum. Kṛtāyāḥ karaṇāyogāditi cenna pramāntara-karaṇāt ..... Pramāṇasya tu na kiñcit vādhyam paśyāmo yena tadapramāṇamiti vyavasthā-payāmah., Ibid, p.172.

of knowledge, not because that it is a gr̥hitagrāhi source but because that it is not caused by the object to be recollected.<sup>37</sup> The recollection of an entity even after its destruction is a clear evidence that smṛti is not caused by the object in question(arthajanya).

The Buddhists have raised another fresh objection against the Nyāya theory of pramāna-samplava. It is urged by them that if sense perception and inference were cognisant of the same objective reality as is maintained by the Naiyāyikas, then the difference in contents of the two cases of cognition in question cannot be accounted for. In perceptual cognition an object is cognised with all its vividness and distinctive individuality. But in inferential cognition the supposedly identical object is felt as less vivid and less distinct. It is a blurred picture of reality which cannot be specifically identified with this or that individual that is cognised with its distinctive identity in perception. We know from the testimony of perception that one individual cow is different from

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37. Na smṛter pramānatvaṃ gr̥hitagrāhitakṛtam, Api tvanarthajanyatvaṃ tadaprāmānyakāraṇam. Ibid, p.175.

another individual cow. But the evidence of inference gives us knowledge not of this or that individual cow, but of the cow in general a knowledge in which the mutual difference between the individual cows has faded out. Certainly this difference in contents of the different kinds of cognition in question cannot be successfully, explained, if they are supposed to be cognisant of the self-same objective reality.<sup>38</sup>

But the Naiyāyikas refuse to be convinced by this argument of the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the Buddhists' contention that the difference in contention that the difference in contents is incompatible with the sameness of object is not true as a matter of fact. The same object which is clear and distinct when perceived from close vicinity is pale and blurred when viewed from a considerable distance.<sup>39</sup> In fact the difference between the contents of perceptual cognition and inferential cognition consists, hold the Naiyāyikas, not in the difference

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38. *Yadi ca pratyakṣaviṣaye śabdānumānāyorapi vṛttitiṣyate, tarhi pratyakṣasamvitsadrśimēva te api buddhiṃ vidadhyātām na caivamasti.*, Ibid, p.230.

39. *Dūrāvidūradeśavyavasthitapadārtha pratitivat*, Ibid, p.266.

of their respective objects, but in the difference of the ways (upāya) in which the same object is cognised. Their difference isn't viṣaya-gata strictly speaking but upāya-gata.<sup>40</sup>

Apart from this, another line of explanation has been adopted by some Nyāya thinkers to account for the difference in contents between perceptual cognition and inferential cognition. Their difference, according to them, is not qualitative but quantitative. The contents of a perceptual cognition are only in excess of those of an inferential cognition. The excess is due to the different qualities of the thing that are cognised in perception alone. But in so far as the identity of the object, irrespective of the excess or diminution of qualities is taken into account, there is absolutely no difference between perceptual and inferential cognitions. Thus, for instance, the perception of a cow and the inference of a cow have a common content, which is due to the common substance, which is due to the

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40. Viṣayāsamyepi-upāyabhedāt pratītibhedo bhavati, Ibid, p.266.

common substance, viz. and individual possessed of the cow-universal (gotva). Hence there is no qualitative difference in the content of consciousness relating to the substance. But a substance is cognised with a greater number of qualities in perception and so felt to be more vivid and distinct. In inferential cognition, on the other hand, the number of qualities cognised is much less, as sensible qualities are not cognised in it, and hence the content of inferential cognition is felt to be more pale and hazy. The so-called qualitative variation in the contents of perceptual and inferential cognitions has, therefore, reference to the numerical ratio of adjectival qualities that are perceived or unperceived along with the substance and has nothing to do with the substantive core of reality.<sup>41</sup>

From the discussion above it is evident that the Buddhists' attempt to dismiss the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-samplava is an utter failure and their own theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā upon which they try to base their phenomenalist theory of universals has not legs to stand

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41. Bahutarālpata radharma vaddharmibhedaviṣayatvam eva stutāsfuta pratibhāsatvam, nādhikam. Raghunāth Śiromani, Ātmatattvavivekadīdhiti (Bibl. Indica), p.336.

upon. It, therefore, should be rejected as offering no solution of the problem of universal.

Having thus failed in this direction, the Buddhists take another line of approach in defence of their nominalistic theory. They say that the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā realists had to postulate the ontological reality of the universals apart from the particulars to account for the uncontradicted notion of identity (anuvṛttipratyaya) which we have with regard to all individual objects belonging to a certain class. When we experience an individual object, we experience it not merely as an individual unit but as a member belonging to a certain class. This classification of an individual object at the time of its experience is possible only, argue the realists, if we have experienced in it a common character which runs identical through all other members of the class in question. The genesis of the notion of identity (anuvṛttipratyaya) with regard to an individual object of experience as explained above cannot be accounted for unless an ontological principle

residing in the individual in question is held to be its cause or ground. This ontological identical character shared by the individual members of a given class has been termed as universal (sāmānya) by the realists.

But the Buddhists object against the above contention of the realists that it is not necessary that the notion of identity should always be grounded upon or caused by one identical ontological universal. Several individual objects having nothing in common may yet give rise to an identical notion. It is a matter of common observation, argue the Buddhists, that a particular entity without having the slightest bit of similarity with other objects may yet produce a similar result along with the others. The plant qudūci, for example, which is said to have a febrifuge effect to medicine has nothing in common, neither in shape, nor in stuff, not in colour with other plants which are said to have the same febrifuge effect. In the same way the svalakṣaṇa particulars, though they

do not share a common identical character called universal, may yet be the cause of the notion of identity (anuvṛttipratyaya) in our mind. It should be noted there that the Buddhists do not deny the notion of identity itself; what they are at pains to deny is that there is a corresponding ontological universal which causes this notion of identity. They are of opinion that the discrete particulars are endowed with such a capability (śakti, sāmarthyā) as to produce directly the notion of identity without being grounded on one ontological universal.<sup>42</sup> That the notion of identity can be sometimes explained without the help of a corresponding ontological universal has been admitted even by the Naiyāyikas themselves. It has been said by them (Naiyāyikas) that the different universals, e.g., a horse-universal (aśvatva) a cow-universal (gotva) etc. are so many self contained units of reality without sharing a common identical universal. The Naiyāyikas do not admit a universal inhering in other universals to avoid the

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42. Vide sec.-I, foot-note No.6, p.149.

fallacy of indefinite regress (anavasthā). But nevertheless these universal-units are all referred to by a common concept and a name, viz. universal. So if in some cases the notion of identity can be explained without an identical ontological principle called universal, the Buddhists demand that we may with equal propriety and cogency explain the notion of identity with regard to experience of an individual cow without taking recourse to a corresponding universal called cowness (gotva).

But the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya realists do not admit the validity of the above argument of the Buddhists. They argue that even admitting for the sake of argument that discrete particulars having nothing in common in the shape of an identical universal are yet endowed with a capability (śakti) of producing the notion of identity in our mind, one has the right to ask: (i) is the capability cognisable or non-cognisable and (ii) is it different in each individual or one and the same for all? If it be one

and cognisable, then it amounts to the admission of an ontological universal, only expressed in a somewhat different phraseology.<sup>43</sup> If, however, the capability (śakti, sāmarthya) itself be held to be non-cognisable, how can it lead to the cognition of something else, that is, an identical universal? If the capability itself is not cognised, how can that which is said to be produced by the capability be cognised? In that case, it will lead us to the rejection of the notion of identity itself, because no object is accepted by mere existence unless it is, in some form or other, actually cognised.<sup>44</sup> But to reject the notion of identity itself will be going against the actual deliverance of experience. Even the Buddhists do not deny it, though they deny its corresponding ontological universal.

Again, if the capability (śakti, sāmarthya) be different in each individual and something wholly different from the individual itself, how could it lead

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43. Grhyate yadi saikā ca jātirevānyaśabdikā, Kumarila, Ślokavārtika (Ākrtivāda), Śloka No.13.

44. Bhavennirviṣayā buddhiryadi śaktirṇa grhyate, Nai hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaścidīṣyate, Ibid, Śloka No.14.

to any single notion of identity by means of the individuals that are many and diverse ? Even granting that it can do so, it can not explain our feeling that this notion of identity or the idea of the universal embraces all the individuals coming under it, since it is an entity which is wholly different from the individuals.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, if the capability of each individual be identical with it, we could have no other entities save those of the individuals; and these individuals being many and diverse, they could not form the basis of any single notion of identity.<sup>46</sup>

Again, the Buddhist argument, that is, the several cases of universal which are referred to by the same name and concept, viz., universal' without recognising any higher universal presiding over them, does not afford any advantage to the Buddhists. The fact that the universals do not possess any higher universal in common does not prove that lower universals

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45. Sāmarthyam yadi ... prativyakti bhinnam, na tarhi tasyānugatayikalpotpādaniyāmakatvam, mitho vyābhicārād. Raghunāth, Atmatattvavivekdīdhiti (Bibl. Indica), p.389.

46. Bhinnatve vā 'pi śaktināmekabuddhirna labhyate, Viśeṣaśaktyabhede ca tābanmātramatirbhavet. Kumārila, op. cit, Śolka No.16.

are ontologically unreal or the ideas of them logically unsound. Kumārila makes the situation clear by means of an analogy. The forest is nothing apart from the trees within it. Hence though the ideas of forest apart from the trees is clearly a mistaken one, yet the ideas of the trees themselves cannot be so. Similarly, in the present case, though the idea of the universal corresponding to different universals may be mistaken, that of the universals themselves like cowness (gotva), horseness (aśvatva) etc. cannot be so.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, the Naiyāyikas point out that though the universals do not admittedly possess a higher universal, their identity of reference is not ungrounded in a common objective character. The common character in question may be defined as the character of existing in all the individuals of a class without existing in the individuals of other classes.<sup>48</sup> This common character is not a universal but that does not argue that is not

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47. Banopanyāsatulyo 'yamupanyāsaḥ kṛtastvayā,  
Bhrāntitvana hi naitasyā bharāntirgotvādidhirapi  
ibid, Śloka No.20.

48. Vastutaḥ sāmānyesva api taditarāvṛttive sati  
sakalatādvṛttitvam upādhisāmānyam ekam asti,  
Ātmatattvavivek, commentary by Śaṅkar Mīśra  
(Bibl. Indica), p.390.

objective. In fact it has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas that there are two types of common character (sāmānya) viz. (i) universal (jāti) and (ii) non-universal (upādhi) and it is on the latter that the identity of reference of the various universals is grounded.

Thus we find that the Buddhists' attempt to explain the genesis of the awareness of identity (anuvṛittipratyaya) by means of the individuals alone without admitting any ontological identical universal proves, on closer examination, to be a failure. But the Buddhists advance many other arguments to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Let us examine these arguments one by one.

One of the most important and serious charges that the Buddhists put forward against the Naiyāyikas is that, even granting the ontological reality of the universals for the sake of argument, it cannot be decided with certainty whether these universals exist everywhere (sarva-sarvagata) or whether they exist only

in their corresponding individual objects(vyakti-sarvagata). Both these alternatives are fraught with insuperable difficulties which we have already discussed in our previous section and so we need not repeat them here. But these difficulties, the Buddhists hold, would not arise at all if the universals be regarded as the imaginary construction of our understanding (kalpanā).

Now this question — whether the universals are omnipresent or present only in their corresponding individuals - has given rise to a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyikas, on the one hand, and the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers in general contribute to the vyakti-sarvagata theory of the universal and deny its omnipresence. They argue that in accordance with the omnipresence theory, the universal cowness (gotva) would be present not only in the individual cows but also in dogs, horses etc. Therefore, when someone would be asked to tether a cow, he might rush to a horse leaving a cow, since (cowness'

is present in a horse as well. This would cause great chaos and confusion in our practical behaviour. The Buddhists also repeat the same argument against the omnipresence theory of universals.

But the Naiyāyikas like Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhatta, Udayana and others who endorse the sarva-sarvagatatva of universal do not admit validity of the above argument of the Vaiśeṣikaṣ and the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the supposed difficulty in our practical behaviour will not arise at all, since, though the universal cowness (gotva) is present in dogs, horses, snakes, etc., these animals cannot manifest the universal in question and hence it cannot be perceived in them. A universal is said to be manifested only by the ākṛti or the form of its corresponding individual so that the perception of this ākṛti is an essential pre-requisite of the apprehension of the universal in question. What is ākṛti then ? It is the specific arrangement and relation subsisting among the different parts of an individual whole (vilakṣaṇa-avayava-samyoga). An

individual cow is a whole (avayavi) composed of parts (avayavas). But there is such a peculiarity in the arrangement and relation among its different parts as is not found in the relation and arrangement among the various parts of a horse or a dog etc. That is why an individual cow, having this specific ākṛti of its own can manifest its corresponding universal cowness whereas an individual horse cannot do it, because a horse lacks that specific arrangement and relation among its parts (ākṛti) which is found in a cow. Similarly the ākṛti of an individual horse is capable of manifesting the universal horseness (aśvatva) only, not the universal cowness, through the latter co-exists with but does not inhere (samaveta) in the former.

The whole (avayavi) inheres in its parts (avayavas) by the relation of samavāya and the universal inheres in the whole by virtue of the same relation. Though the universal is related with each and every part of the whole, yet these parts separately cannot manifest

the universal. All the parts should be arranged and related into a definite form or ākṛti in order to manifest its corresponding universal. That is why if any particular part of the whole, e.g., the tail, ear, or eye of an individual cow is lost or destroyed, that defective whole still continues to manifest its respective universal, because the manifestation of the universal does not depend on any particular part of the whole but upon the specific arrangement of its different parts taken together (ākṛti) and the loss of any particular part of the whole does not mean the loss of the internal ākṛti of the whole in question.

Though as a general rule the ākṛti of an individual is the revealer (vyañjaka) of its corresponding universal, it should be noted here that all universals are not thus revealed through ākṛti. For example there is no specific ākṛti of the individual qualities (gunas) and actions (karmas). Hence the universals corresponding to these entities, viz., gunatva and karmatva cannot be revealed through ākṛti. In such cases the

manifestation of these universals will entirely depend upon their inherence (samavāya) in their corresponding individual loci. The universal gunatva, inspite of its presence in the different individual karmas, can inhere only in the individual gunas and nowhere else. That is why 'gunatva' becomes manifested only by the individual gunas and we perceive 'gunatva' in the gunas only, not in the karmas. Similarly, the universal karmatva, though it is present in the different gunas, can inhere only in its corresponding individual karmas and be manifested by them. That is why karmatva can be perceived only in the different karmas, not in the gunas.

Now, if this distinction between the existence of the universals and their manifestation only through certain individuals is kept in mind., there will be no difficulty in upholding the omnipresence theory of the universals (sarva-sarvagatavāda). Though a universal is omnipresent, it is not perceived everywhere simply because it is not manifested everywhere. It can only

be perceived in its corresponding individual object which alone possesses the capacity of manifesting it.

The realists are of opinion that the universals are eternal entities (nitya padārthas) free from origination and decay. If the universal cowness (gotva) were a non-eternal entity like the individual objects, argue the Naiyāyikas, it would be destroyed along with the death of an individual cow and thereafter all other cows of the world would cease to be cows. To avoid this absurdity, the eternity of the universals must be admitted.

Here, the Buddhists might raise an objection that if the universals in question were eternal, it would have been perceived eternally. But the 'cowness' is not perceived in a place in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another. This proves conclusively, argue the Buddhists, that the universals are born or destroyed along with the birth and death of the individuals.

The answer of the Naiyāyikas to the above objection is the same as before: Non-perception is not the only mark of a thing's non-existence. The universal cowness (gotva) is eternally present in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another, but it is not perceived there simply because an individual cow having a definite form (ākṛti) which alone possesses the capacity of manifesting the universal in question is absent at that time.

Kamalaśīla, a famous Buddhist philosopher, argues that if the universal were a separate ontological category as contained in its corresponding particulars, we could have reflected it distinctly just like a fruit in a basket (kuṇḍavadaravat). But as it is psychologically impossible to have an abstract idea of generality apart from the idea of particulars, the existence of the universals as a separate ontological category (padārtha) should be dismissed as a figment of our imagination. Incidentally it is

interesting to note that Berkeley, a famous British empiricist of the eighteenth century, offered almost the same ground as given by Kamalaśīla to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Berkeley argued that because the formation of abstract general ideas apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility, the objective existence of the universals corresponding to the former kind of ideas is simply an illusive notion of our mind.

The Naiyāyikas answer that the above objection of the Buddhists - why should not a universal be perceived distinctly like a fruit in a basket if it were really an existent entity in an individual - is ambiguous. If by distinct perception it is intended that it should be perceived outside an individual, the answer is that the universal has no medium of manifestation outside the same. Hence it is always perceived as contained in the individual, not outside it. But the case is entirely different with a fruit as contained in a basket. The fruit is a whole (avayavi) which inheres in its parts (avayavas) outside the basket.

Had the universal also been a composite entity composed of parts just like the fruit, it could have subsisted in its parts outside its particular locus. But the universal is an unanalysable simple entity devoid of part. It can inhere only in its corresponding individual objects. Hence it is never perceived outside its individual locus.<sup>49</sup>

The question where the universal should inhere can be decided by the evidence of experience alone. That the cow-universal inheres in the individual called 'cow' and not in the horse is proved by the very fact that it is felt there and not elsewhere. The ultimate nature of things is to be accepted on the evidence of experience exactly in the way in which it manifests itself (svabhāva eva pratīti-sakśīkah). It will be over-stepping the limit of our jurisdiction to expect things to behave according to our preference. Therefore, the question why does the universal inhere in its relevant individuals only and not in anything else is not legitimate, because it is the very nature

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49. Vyaktivṛttitvā jāteḥ pṛthagdeśatayā'nupalambhaḥ, Tadagraho vā na punastadatiriktāyā abhāvādeveti. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba, 1936), p.284.

(svabhāva) of certain individuals to allow their corresponding universals to be related with them by the relation of inherence (samavāya).

But the opponent might observe that the Naiyāyikas' appeal to the ultimate nature of things (svabhāva) is only a trick for concealing the failure of rational explanation. If the unquestionable nature of things can be accepted as an explanation of a philosophical problem, the Buddhists also can make the same appeal. The Buddhists deny the existence of universals and assert that it is the individuals themselves which, inspite of their lack of a common identical nature, do possess a natural capacity (svābhāvika sāmānya) for generating identical concepts. And this attempt to take shelter under the ultimate nature of the individuals does not stand in a position of disadvantage as compared with the similar appeal made by the Naiyāyikas.

But the Naiyāyikas point out that the two cases mentioned above are not similar. The appeal to the

ultimate nature of things is the last resource which is necessitated by the failure of other possible explanations. The postulation of a universal distinct from the individuals is dictated by logical necessity as well as experimental evidence and the consequential problem of its relation with the individuals demands an explanation. And when an explanation is not available except one based upon the nature of things, we have to accept it as a metaphysical necessity. The Buddhist hypothesis could be accepted if the universal were found to be an impossible finction.

We started our discussion of this point by way of refuting Kamalaśīla's objection that if the universal were an ontological reality, it could have been perceived distinctly as a fruit in a basket (kundavadaravat) and we marked an ambiguity in the expression "perceiving distinctly as a fruit in a basket". If this expression means that the universal is not perceived outside its corresponding individual, then, as we have shown, it would be a malicious distortion of the position of the

Naiyāyikas. But if it means that the universal and its corresponding individual are not perceived as logically distinct entities inspite of their ontological inseparability, the Naiyāyikas emphatically assert that they are perceived as distinct entities and never felt to be identical with each other. The numerical difference of the universal from the individuals is attested by the fact that it is felt as different from the individuals in which it was previously perceived when it is perceived in a new individual. And even when it is perceived in a new individual, it is felt as distinct from the individual and as related to it. If the cow-universal were identical with any one of its corresponding individual, it could not have been shared then by the other individual cows of the world and consequently there would be no other individual cows save that one with which the universal cowness is identical. But that the cow universal is shared by innumerable cows is a matter of direct experience. This proves conclusively that the individual cow and its corresponding universal are

logically distinct entities and are never felt to be identical with each other.<sup>50</sup>

The Buddhists advance many other arguments against the ontological reality of the universals and most of these arguments are based on showing that the relation between the universal and its corresponding individuals is an unexplained mystery. Dharmakīrti, a famous Buddhist logician, points out<sup>51</sup> that the cow-universal can become related with a newly born individual cow in three different ways : (i) it can move forward to the newly born calf from another individual cow; or (ii) it can pre-exist there even before the birth of the calf or (iii) it can be born along with the birth of the calf. But none of these explanations are logically tenable. The universal cannot move forward from one individual to another, since in that case the universal would cease to be a universal and would turn out to be a substance (dravya) which alone possesses locomotion. Nor can it be supposed that the universal pre-exists there even before the

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50. Bhedena tūpalabhyte eva, piṇḍāntarāsaṃsargini piṇḍe 'nubhūyamāne tat saṃsargitayānubhavāt. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka (Bib. Indica), P.402.

51. Dharmakīrti, Pramānavārtika, 1/153.

birth of the cow, because it is not perceived and cannot be acted upon at that time. Nor can it be said that the universal is born along with the birth of the individual, since it is an eternal entity free from origination and decay.

But the Naiyāyikas point out that the above-mentioned difficulties alleged by Dharmakīrti are nothing but the figment of his imagination. A Naiyāyika never holds that the universal moves forward from one individual to another, nor that it is born with the individual. Since a universal is an eternal entity, it is existent all the while and even before the birth of the individual and after its destruction. The non-perception of the cow-universal during the interval of time between the death of a cow and the birth of another is not the proof of its non-existence; it is simply not manifested at that time due to the absence of an individual cow which is said to be its revealer (vyañjaka). In fact, the universal is a self-existent principle independent of the existence and non-existence of its corresponding individuals. It may be objected

by the Buddhists that the existence of the cow-universal in empty space and time before the birth of the individual cow or after its death should make space and time understood as a cow just as the existence of a cow-universal in an individual makes the letter understood as a cow. The Nyāya answer to this objection is that it is not merely the existence of the universal rather its inherence (samavāya) that makes the individual understood as a cow. The cow-universal, though it exists, does not inhere in space and time and so the question of the latter appearing as a cow does not arise.<sup>52</sup> This also disposes of the further objection of the Buddhists that the co-existence of all universals in the same locus will result in confusion. In accordance with the omnipresence theory of the universal (sarva-sarvagatavāda), it is a fact that the cow-universal co-exists with the horse-universal in a same individual locus. But that does not make a cow to be understood as a horse or vice-versa. It is inherence (samavāya) and not mere existence that determines the cognition of an individual in terms of class-character. The horse-

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52. Yady api aparicchinna-deśāni sāmānyāni bhavanti tathāpy upalakṣaṇaniyamāt kāraṇa-sāmagrī-niyamācca sva-viṣaya-sarva-gātāni antarāle ca samyoga-samavāya-vṛtty-abhāvād avyapadeśyāni. Praś astapādabhāṣya (Benares, 1895), p. 314.

universal inheres in the individual horse and not in the cow. If the different universals were admitted to co-inhere in the same individual, the difficulty allged by the Buddhists would be irrefutable. But the Naiyāyikas never admit the possibility of co-inherence of two such different lower universals (i.e., apara sāmānyas) in the same individual locus. Nor can there be any inherent impossibility in the co-existence of different universals in the same locus since they are not objects of limited dimension. It is only seen in the case of limited entities that one excludes the other from its locus. The horse and the cow cannot co-exist in the same substratum. But the entities like space and time which are not subject to limitations of dimension are in different position. In these cases the existence of one does not cancel the existence of the other in the same locus since the opposition imposed by dimension is absent. Universals also share this character and so their co-existence in the same individual locus does not involve any difficulty.

The distinction between its existence in and by itself (svarupa-sāmānya) and its inherence (samaveta-sāmānya) and consequential manifestation in a individual is essential to the understanding of a universal and its relation with the individuals. The difficulties raised by the Buddhists mainly spring from their deliberate refusal to subscribe to this distinction. The universals are self-existence principles. The individual only serves to manifest its being and the existence and the non-existence of the individual does not affect the being of a universal. The proposition "the cow-universal is in the cow" would be illegitimate if it were understood to connote the actual assistance of the cow-universal in the individual. The position would be legitimate if the copula 'is' meant 'is manifested'.<sup>55</sup> Our ordinary assertions such as there is no cow here or its explanatory form "it does not possess cowness (gotva)" are only loose modes of expression. The denial of the universal cowness in such propositions is to be understood as nothing more than the denial of manifestation due to the non-existence of an individual.

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53. Antargaḍum nirūpakamātram na tu gotvasyādhāramityarthah. Tathā ca piṇḍe gotvāmīti vyavahāro na mukhyaḥ kintu lākṣaṇika ityarthah. Ātamatattvaviveka, commentary by Śaṅkara Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p. 407.

It does not mean that the universal in question was not existent at the time when the individual was non-existent. The universal is self-contained so far its existence is concerned. The individual is required only to make the universal related to it.

It may be urged by the Buddhists that the relation of inherence (samavāya), being eternal like the universal, cannot also be non-existent like the latter. So the universal and the inherence being present all the time the former should always appear as related. But it does not appear to be related so long as the individual is not present. The Naiyāyikas answer that this objection of the Buddhists is based on the forgetfulness of the fact that the apprehension of relation presupposes not only the actual existence of relation (sambandha) but also the terms or the entities to be related (samabandhis). It is true that the cow-universal and the relation of samavāya, being eternal, are always present. But the individual cow which is a perishable entity may not be always present

on the scene. Yet it is one of the terms of the relation of inherence. Hence so long as the individual cow does not present itself, the relation of the cow-universal with it is not apprehended. The situation can be made clear by a concrete example. Suppose a man stands in a place and somebody puts a stick in his hand. The man may then be legitimately stated to be one who bears a stick. Suppose then that somebody else takes away the stick from him and this makes a difference in the quality of the man and this can be expressed in the form that the man does no longer possess a stick. The case is similar with the universal and its relation with the individual. The universal cowness is all the while there, but when an individual cow appears on the scene, we say — "there is a cow here" and when the same individual departs from the place we say "there is no cow here". The universal which is always present may be compared with the man of our example and the individual which is present occasionally with the stick. The presence and absence of the individual do not mean the corresponding

change of attributes so far as the universal is concerned.<sup>54</sup>

As regards the Buddhist charge that the universal cannot exist either in its entirety or in its partial extension in the individuals, the Naiyāyikas answer that the universal does not admit of degree of dimension. So the question of extension is irrelevant here. It exists in its own nature which is non-dimensional. In this respect it is rather on a par with spiritual entities to which the question of dimension is entirely repugnant.

The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that the relation between the individual and its corresponding universal is one of support and the supported (ādharādheya sambandha). But a support, say the Buddhists, is always a cause which modifies the nature of the thing supported, just as an apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into a non-falling-down object when supported by a basket. Similarly, if

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54. Deśakāle sāmānyasvarupam asti, piṇḍopagamāpagamādinā goura asti gouranāstitivvahārah, yathā avicalati. Caitre daṇḍopaga-māpagamābhyām dāndi Caitro nāyam dandīti vyavañārah iti praghattārthaḥ, Ātmatattvaviveka commentary by Saṅkara Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p. 410.

the individual supports the universal, the latter would also get modified by the former. But this would be in flat contradiction with the Nyāya standpoint which holds that the universals are eternal entities (nitya padārthas) incapable of any kind of modification.<sup>55</sup>

As an answer to this objection, the Naiyāyikas would point out that the appeal to the fruit-basket relation cannot successfully refute the case of relation between the individual and its corresponding universal, because the two cases are not similar. The relation which holds between an apple and a basket is a mechanical separable relation (samyoga) while that which holds between a universal and its corresponding particular is necessary and inseparable (samavāya). To impute the analogy of one to the case of another which are by no means similar may be a tactful verbal sophistry but not a logically sound position. Moreover, the relation of samavāya which holds between a universal and its corresponding individuals cannot modify the terms related

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55. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā (Chowkhamba), pp.185, 484.

by it. Such an explanation would be inadmissible in view of the pluralistic metaphysics advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.