

Some of the definitions of valid cognition (*pramā* /*samyagjñāna*) given by the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) have been logically rejected by the Naiyayikas, but there are a few more definitions given by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, Dharmakirti, Narayana Bhatta, Hemchandra etc which are not taken into account or rejected by the Naiyayikas in the works available so far. In this chapter our noble task is to encounter these problems and reject them with the help of some independent arguments and an attempt is made to have their probable solutions from the Nyaya point of view.

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his definition of *pramā* has used two terms – ‘uncontradicted’ (*avādhita*) and ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*) as adjuncts of the content of *pramā*. He has used the term ‘*arthaviṣayaka*’ as an adjective of cognition which means that the valid cognition must have some object as its content (*arthaviṣayaka*). It indicates that it is the definition of epistemic cognition of the phenomenal world. This object must be uncontradicted or non-sublated by the later cognition. To judge the acquired cognition corresponds to the fact (*avādhita*) or not – depends on the verification. If it is really raining outside, it is to be taken as uncontradicted (*avādhita*). In other words, whether the acquired cognition of water is really in the case of water or in the case of mirage can be determined through the pragmatic utility of it. If the cognition of water really serves the purpose i.e. quenching the

thirst etc. the acquired cognition may be taken as contradicted. Hence, the phenomenon of uncontradictedness always depends on the external factor, which goes in favour of extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). How can the intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) be substantiated? This question is not replied in the Advaita frame-work given by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. On the one hand, the Advaitins propogate the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) and prescribe uncontradictedness (*avādhitatva*) as an adjunct of the object of valid cognition, which seems to be paradoxical. This paradox cannot easily be removed if the Advaitins do not accept the extrinsic validity of truth so far as phenomenal objects are concerned. The theory of intrinsic validity of truth (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) can easily be admitted in the case of meta-physical truth, which is depended on the Agamic statements. The Vedic statements are always true and hence they are intrinsically true. Other than these the avadhitatva can be determined extrinsically.

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has raised earlier a problem against the Nyaya concept of *pramā*. This view needs a through review. To Dharmaraja the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*), consideration or *parāmarśa*, cognition of similarity (*sādrśyajñāna*) and awareness of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyajñāna*) are taken as an attribute (*guṇa*) of the perceptual, inferential, cognition through comparison and testimonial cognition respectively. They think if sense-object-contact is the attribute or *guṇa* of perceptual cognition, it would have been remain permanently due to the eternality of the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) remaining between attribute (*guṇa*) and the possessor of the attribute (*gunī*)<sup>4</sup>. But in the actual world perception is possible without sense-object-contact as in the case of the perception of self. Again, the cognition

of the colour etc. is cognized though there is no sense-object-contact.

In response to the above mentioned view of the Advaitins the Naiyayikas may add the following arguments in favour of their own conclusion. To Nyaya a cognition becomes *apramā* if there is any defect either in the sense organ or in other parts essential for generating cognition (*doṣa'prāmānyaḥ janakaḥ*)<sup>2</sup>. If there are defects *kaca* etc in the eye etc, or too much proximity (*atisāmpya*) or too much remoteness (*atidūratva*) or having some obstacles (*pratibandhaka*) etc, there arises a false cognition. If, on the other hand, there is no such defects (*doṣābhāva*) i.e. eye is free from defects like *kaca* etc, having no other defects like too much proximity etc, it achieves the status of attribute (*guṇa*) by way of being free from defects (*doṣābhāva*). Having normal vision is an attribute of visual sense-organ. If it is endowed with defect, it will lose its normal character. Hence *guṇa* suggests two sides: negative side in the form of the absence of defect and positive side in the form of achievement of quality of having normal vision etc. The meaning of the term "*guṇa*" has to be taken in this sense which is not taken by the Advaitins. The *guṇa* has been taken as in an extended sense, while the Naiyayikas have taken it as a restricted or technical sense. So the description of sense-object-contact, *parāmarśa*, cognition of similarity, and cognition of *tātparya* as an attribute or *guṇa* does not grasp the accurate meaning of the term used by the *Naiyayikas*. They have taken these *sannikarṣa*, *parāmarśa* etc as an uncommon cause (*asādharanakāraṇa*) associated with operative process (*vyapāra*) which is technically called *karaṇa* or instrumental factor. We may at best say that between this *karaṇa* and result i.e. perceptual or inferential cognition there is cause and effect relationship but not *guṇa* and

*gunī* (attribute and possessor of the attribute). The *karaṇa* and *kāraṇa* are the generating factors of a valid cognition if and only if there is the absence of defect or presence of attribute. Hence the instrumental factors like sense-object-contact cannot be taken as *guṇa* or attribute as taken by the *Advaitins*.

Further, even of sense-object-contact is taken as an attribute, it cannot be said that there is absence of it to apprehend colour etc of an object. The *Naiyayikas* are very much clear when they enumerate different *sannikarṣas* or contacts. When a jar is conjoined with the eye, there is a specific contact called *samyoga*. A man by nature cannot remain satisfied with mere cognition of a jar and hence he afterwards tries to see the colour inhered in the particular jar, which is also a kind of sense-object-contact called *samyuktasamavāya* (conjoined inherence). In the like manner, the property called colourness inhered in colour is apprehended with the help of the sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*) called *samyukrtasamaveta-samavāya* (i.e. inherence inhered in the conjoined). Hence, colourness, colour etc are apprehended though the sense-object-contact called *samavetasamavāya* etc. So it is not true that when colour is apprehended, *sannikarṣa* is not there. The view of the *Advaitins* is not tenable. Even the cognition of self, according to *Nyaya* is also possible through some extra-ordinary means of perceptual cognition (*alaukikapratyakṣa*) which is called *yogaja*. Though the self is not cognized directly through sense-object-contact, yet there is an indirect means where sense-organ becomes operative. Generally sense-organ have got two types of power-gross (*sthūla*) and subtle (*sukṣma*). Normally a sense organ can reveal an object proximate to it, but it has got some extraordinary `surplus power`<sup>3</sup> (as coined by Rabindranath Tagore) which can reveal those existing in past, present and future. Hence, it is not true that sense-

organ remain operative with the help of the power of self. Moreover whenever the colour etc of an object is cognized, sense-organ i.e. the eye is directly connected with the object i.e. jar and indirectly to the colour of it. Direct relation is called *sākṣāt* and indirect relation is called *paramparā*. Both are accepted in the *Nyaya* system of Philosophy. So it is not true that the sense object-contact is not found in the case of the apprehension of colour etc. It is completely a misunderstanding for the part of the *Advaitins* to the *Nyaya* view.

The second problem is raised by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in the case of *asallingakaparāmarśa*<sup>A</sup> (i.e. consideration where *liṅga* or sign is falsely apprehended). The *Advaitins* think that the cognition in the form of *parāmarśa* or consideration has been taken as an attribute (*guṇa*) of the inferential cognition (*anumiti*) which is a *gunī* and hence there must be an eternal relation. The *Advaitins* have shown an exception in the case of *parāmarśa* where there is actually no sign or probans, but *anumiti* is possible. That is, inspite of not having proper *parāmarśa* there is an inferential cognition, which may be taken as an impediment of the eternal relation between *guṇa* and *gunī*.

In reply it may be argued by the Naiyayikas that *parāmarśa* is not an attribute, but an operative process (*vyapāra*) in the *Nyaya* terminology. If there is a case where there is not proper *parāmarśa*-by virtue of not having the proper cognition of probans. It may happen that there is a false cognition of a *hetu* which gives rise to the proper cognition of *sādhya* in the subject. In this case though there is no *parāmarśa* yet the attainment of *sādhya* or inferential cognition is accidental or *yādr̥cchiki* as coined by the Carvakas. Generally a right cognition of *hetu* gives rise to a proper cognition of *sādhya*. But sometimes the attainment of right *sādhya* through a

wrong *hetu* may be accidental or *kākatālīya* which has no causal connection. The causal connection lies between *parāmarśa* and *anumiti*, but not the relation between *guṇa* and *guṇī* as accepted by the Advaitins. Such type of accidental achievement of result from a false probans or non-existent probans is just like *manimantravat* (like gem and *mantra*). Sometimes we get a good result from wearing a gem or uttering a *mantra* but this may be taken as accidental or *kadācit* which is devoid of causalities.

So far as the Buddhist definition of valid cognition (*pramā = pramāṇa*) is concerned, it is not free from some problems. That which corresponds to reality (*avisamvādakam*) is called valid cognition (*pramā*). If this definition is taken for granted, it leads to several problems.

First, to the Buddhists there is no distinction between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*). This valid cognition cum instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*) is of two types – perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Perception (*pratyakṣa*) captures an object which is of unique-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) i.e. having some unique character remaining for a single moment. *Svalakṣaṇa* is inexpressible as it is beyond conceptualisation. *Svalakṣaṇa* enjoys a non-linguistic ontology. If someone attempts to communicate the experience of *svalakṣaṇa* then it will involve mental construction (*kalpanā*). Such constructions (*kalpanā*) have to persist through more than one moment. In order to disclose the unique singular that *svalakṣaṇa* is. It flashes across the consciousness in a twinkle. That which exists is momentary in character (*yat sat tat kṣanikam*). An object remaining for more than one moment must be unreal (*asat*). An object known in terms of theoretic construction is a *post eventum* affair and it is not any

longer the singular apprehended earlier. Moments pass between apprehending a singular and its judgmental awareness through the use of concepts and relations. The Buddhists call it inference (*anumāna*). When it is said that something corresponding to reality is called valid cognition (*pramā*), it may be asked whether its correspondence to the fact is known within a moment or not. Whether an object corresponds to the fact or not needs at least a few moments to judge. After a few moments when we come to know that our previous knowledge corresponds to the fact, it is no more unique in character (*svalakṣaṇa*), but it becomes a universal character (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). Hence the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) in terms of unfailing correspondence (*avisamvādaka*)<sup>5</sup> cannot cover unique real (*svalakṣaṇa*) or perception which is the real truth or absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). Moreover, an object is to be taken as existent (*sat*) if it has causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*). An object having unique-momentary-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) cannot be known as having causal efficacy with in moment and hence its unfailing correspondence to the reality (*avisamvādatva*) cannot be judged within a moment.

The concept of unique momentary real (*svalakṣaṇa*) is so explicated that it is free from theoretic construction or *kalpanā* and as such it is said to be self-revealing and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti holds the view of momentariness of the reals and at the same time asserts that the non-erroneous character of a unique singular be ascertained extrinsically (*parataḥ*). The datum of awareness is credible if it is causally efficacious in terms of attaining some aim. If this is accepted, the unique-momentary-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) of an entity cannot be protected. For example, the awareness of water would be veridical if it leads to quenching thirst. It is called unfailing correspondence which is not

applicable to perceptual unique particular object which has got primary status in Buddhist epistemology. Jayanta has vehemently criticized this Buddhist notion of valid-cognition- cum-instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*) in his Nyaya-Mañjari. Jayanta raises a question to the Buddhists – (a) Does a source of cognition (*pramāṇa*) lead an individual to avail an object endowed with the unique singular ? or (b) Does it lead to the availability of an object bearing mental ascription ? The second one is not possible as inference is not a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) so that it can be directly apprehended. A direct awareness is not possible through conceptualisation which is an inference. So far as the first question is concerned, an object is revealed but cannot be attained due to its existence for a moment which is too inadequate to be grasped. They themselves admit that the object apprehended through concept is unreal and hence it is not possible to attain. If an individual gets something accidentally, it does not come under the purview of perceptual and inferential cognition. That is, the attainment of an object is not result of perception or inference. Hence, the unfailing correspondence to the reality is not possible at all. (“*yattrānumāne pradarśanameva nāsti, kā kathā tatprapanasya. Pratyakṣe tu bādham pradarśanamasti; na tu pradarśitam prāpyate; kṣanikatvenatikrāntatvat ... mūlābhūtavastupraptistu kākatālīyameva. Na tu tadanyatarenāpi pramāṇenāpi sprṣṭam yādgatva prapuate*”<sup>6</sup>).

The entity apprehended through pure sensation is real and uniquely singular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as told earlier. It is impossible to attain the momentary entity, but the series of the momentary entities can be grasped. Hence it is the determinate perception (*savikalpaka*) which is formed through the series of momentary entities leading to the successful inclination (*saphalapravṛtti*). Though the object

which is cognized through imagination (*kalpanā*) is based on the series of momentary real entities, an individual gets a real entity even though he is adopting inference. The grasp of real object by inference is accidental just as an individual having illusory cognition of something really gets an object. Though the inferential cognition or determinate cognition is unreal to the Buddhists, yet real is sometimes can be grasped, as the source of mental ascriptions is real. Hence an instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads to the attainment of an object having conceptual ascriptions. Hence, if there is any unfailing correspondence to the reality, it is possible in the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* level which is phenomenal reality (*samvrtisatya*) but not absolute reality (*paramārtha satya*). (“*Yatra pratyakṣa vastu svalakṣaṇavisayatvāt tasya ca kṣanikatvenaprāptyasambhave ’pi tat santānaprāptiḥ santānādhyāvasāyajananameva prāpakatvam. Anumānasya tvaropitārtha visayatve ’pi mūlābhūta vastukṣanaparampāryaprabhāvatvātmaniprabhāmaṇibuddhivat tatprāptya prāpakatvam*”<sup>7</sup>).

So far as the Mīmāṃsā view is concerned, it is not tenable. To them the prior unacquired cognition (*ajñātataṭtvārthajñānam*) is called valid cognition. They think that the term ‘unacquired’ (*ajñāta*) has been used in order to exclude memory (*smṛti*) and repeated version (*anuvāda*)<sup>8</sup>. The exclusion of memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition can be supported through. But the reasoning for exclusion of repeated version from the purview of valid cognition cannot be taken for granted. Though they admit that cognition (*jñāna*), the object (*viśaya*) and the condition for manifestation of the object (*prākāṣya*), it is very difficult to understand the distinction between object (*viśaya*) and the manifestation of an object (*prākāṣya*). To them the manifestation of

an object is different in different moments. It is very difficult to understand the difference between an object and its manifestation (*prākāṭya*). A question may be raised in this connection – whether an object is known without its manifestation or not. I think an object is known without its manifestation. It is not conceivable that an object is known but not manifested. If it is said that an object and its manifestation is not different, it is not tantamount to say that fire and its lumination are different, which is not correct. The fact that the fire exists is proved through its luminous character. Hence, object and its manifestation cannot be different. Moreover, the cognition is generally compared with a lamp by virtue of its function of revelation. As the Mimamsaka believe the cognition (*jñāna*) and its object, it proves that the cognition reveals the object. As cognition reveals an object, there is no necessity of accepting another factor called *prākāṭya* for its revelation. There is no point in accepting both cognition and manifestation for the revelation of an object.

Normally different manifestations (*prākāṭya*) and time moments (*kālāmsā*) limited by the corresponding manifestations are very subtle to understand though the Mimamsakas claim that it is not so. If an individual manifestation remains in a particular moment of time, the time-particle is very difficult to perceive due to its extreme subtleness. When we keep looking towards an object for a particular period of time, do we really feel that an object existing in a particular moment is different from that existing in another particular moment ? Normally it is not experienced. Though an object remains changing at every moment, there is a logical necessity of accepting it. But an object is not generally cognised as different in the persistent cognition. If an object existing in the first moment, there would arise the possibility of the absence of

recognitive cognition. An object cognized for five moments cannot be cognized as different apparently. If the repeated version of a cognition does not come under the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*), the recognitive cognition (*pratyābhijñā*) would not come under the purview of valid cognition. But they are called Valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence the repeated version excepting the case of memory must be taken as valid cognition.

The Jaina logicians are of the opinion that authentic cognition (*pramā*) is '*svaparavyavasāyījñānam*'. It means that the nature of authentic cognition (*pramā*) is to be self-revealing as well as object disclosing. Just as a lamp reveals its object as well as itself, a cognition reveals both itself and its content. To them, the relation between self and the cognition is explained as both different and non-different (*bhedābheda*), which is in consonance with their principle of *anekāntavāda*.

This cognition or *jñāna* is generally taken as any cognition of an object while the term '*pramā*' is used in a strict logical sense. To them the definite cognition about an object which is completely different from doubt, error etc. is *pramā*. In other words, the definiteness is an essential feature of the validity of cognition.<sup>9</sup> The characteristic of being definite is not different from the view of the Naiyayikas who believe that the definite cognition can alone be *pramā*. But the term 'definiteness' is explained in a slight different way by the Jainas. To them definiteness lies in the determination of an object in the mode (*naya*) in which it really exists.

Other Jaina logicians like Divakara, Siddhasena etc. define *pramā* as having capacity to reveal itself and its content as said earlier which remains uncontradicted (*pramāṇam svaparabhāsi*

*jñānam bādhavivarjitam / svaparabhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhūvi buddhilakṣaṇam).*<sup>10</sup>

Akalanka, a Jaina thinker, defines means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) as cognition which is uncontradicted and which manifests the unknown object (“*Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam anadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvat*”)<sup>11</sup>. But *naya* is the cognition of a thing in a particular context or it is the relationship of a thing with the cognizer. *Naya* is a particular standpoint from which we can make our judgment about a particular thing (*nīyate gamyate arthaikadeśo’neneti nayaḥ*). As human beings are not omniscient by virtue of the fact that they possess limited authentic cognition and capacity, they cannot cognize all the properties of an object at a time or in different times. They can cognize something which is limited and relative. The Jainas have taken recourse to the principle of *naya* to cognize this relative nature which is true of an object. This is the nature of authentic cognition (*pramā*). When a particular property of an object is definitely cognized, it is through particular mode (*naya*). When the various properties of an object are cognized or diverse properties are authentically cognized at a time, it is through *pramāṇa*. Hence, both *naya* and *pramāṇa* are essential for having a true nature of an object. That is *pramā* of an object presupposes both. But it should always be kept in mind that in Jaina logic absolute affirmation and absolute negation is not possible due to their belief in *Syadvāda* which suggests that everything is of ‘may be’ in character. All judgments are partial ascription to reality which cannot be grasped ‘wholly’.

The above mentioned thesis of the Jainas is not beyond question. First, the definition of definiteness is very vague. It is said as definite if an object is determined in the mode in which it exists

really. If it is accepted, the determination of an object in a particular mode in which it really exists becomes very difficult in sometimes, though not always. When a jar is determined in a particular mode i.e. having real colour in which it really is, it is said to be definite or right. But it is quite natural that when a jar is authentically cognized as having colour, it is cognized as having shape, having power containing water etc. which the jar really possess. According to the Jainas, these two aspects of a jar (having shape and power containing water) would not come under the purview of our cognition, which is not acceptable. As soon as one aspect of an entity is cognized, others are also cognized simultaneously without any effect, which cannot be denied. I do not know how would they explain such cognition ?

Secondly, *Pramāṇa* and *pramā* is not clearly distinguished when it is said – ‘*pramāṇam svaparabhāsijñānam bādhavivarjitam*’ etc. in this context *pramāṇa* is described as a cognition revealing self as well as its context. If cognition which is uncontradicted become a *pramāṇa*, what is the distinction between *pramā* and *pramāṇa* ? Perhaps like Buddhists they do make a clear distinction between *pramā* and *pramākarāṇa*. To the Buddhists it is natural because they believe in the theories of momentariness (*kṣanabhaṅgavāda*), unique momentary existence of real entity (*svalakṣaṇa*) etc. according to which both may remain in the same point of time. But to the Jainas there is no sufficient argument in favour of such non-distinction, which is again substantiated from the following definition – ‘*pramāṇam avisamvādiññānam ...*’ etc.

Keeping this problem in view Hemchandra has made some patch works on this non-distinction and tried to say that the authentic cognition (*samyak jñāna*) is acquired through the

instrumental cognition (*samyagarthanirṇayam pramāṇam*)<sup>12</sup>. From this it is not clear what is the nature of instrument of authentic cognition (*pramākarāṇa*) is.

Lastly, it is said by the Jaina logicians that when a property of an object is cognized it is through *naya*. When various aspects of an entity is cognized, they are cognized through *pramāṇa*. To cognize an object generally and specifically both *naya* and *pramāṇa* are required and hence *pramā* needs both. If this view is accepted, one could raise the questions – (a) If *naya* functions as revealer of some entity, why is it not a *pramāṇa* ? If *naya* reveals something, it serves the function of a *pramāṇa*. Why is it distinguished from a *pramāṇa* ? If it is not *pramāṇa*, what is the status of it ? Does it have instrumental value like mind, sense-organ etc ? All these questions remain unresolved if the Jaina view is accepted. (b) If *naya* is an essential factor for revelation of an object and it is not a *pramāṇa*, how can it provide us a relative cognition of an object ? The route of relative cognition and absolute cognition may be the same. One can at least say that perception is the route of absolute cognition. But if *naya* can provide us a cognition, it must be taken as a separate *pramāṇa* or *pramā-yielding* means, which is not accepted in their logic. If there is any conflict in the data of the given object, which one is to be taken as supreme ? Many properties of an object may be cognized through *pramāṇa* no doubt. If some one says that the four properties are cognized one by one through the help of *naya*, would be taken as *pramā*. As these are acquired through *naya*, it must be *pramā*. If some other person cognize the same through *pramāṇa*, which one will be superior? All these problems may arise on the path of our understanding if such Jaina views are accepted.

If all units of cognition are taken as relative, there would arise the problem of human behaviour. When we have the cognition of a jar, all aspects of jar do not come to our awareness. A few aspects cognized rightly can provide us the cognition of the object. On that basis we have inclination (*pravṛtti*), refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and indifference (*upekṣā*) towards this. If everything is taken as relative, the determining cognition would never come to our mind leading to its non-recognition. Due to this non-recognition *pravṛtti* etc are not possible. Hence, the Jaina theory cannot explain our daily behaviour.

That is why, Vatsayana has forwarded a syllogistic argument in the following manner – ‘*pramāṇam arthavat pravṛttisamarthyat*’ i.e. *pramāṇa* becomes meaningful or efficacious, as it leads us to the successful inclination. The capacity of leading to successful inclination (*pravṛttisāmarthyā*) is the probans (*hetu*) through which the meaningfulness or reality or efficaciousness (*arthavattā*) is inferred. This efficaciousness (*arthavattā*) remains in *pramāṇa* which is *pakṣa* here. The form of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) would be framed as follows : ‘*yatra yatra pravṛttisāmarthyam tatra tatra arthavattā*’ i.e. wherever there is the capability of leading to successful inclination there is the efficaciousness or reality of *pramāṇa*. It is possible as alone *pramāṇa* has got the power of apprehending an object. (‘*Pramāṇato ’rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyat arthavat pramāṇam*’)<sup>13</sup>

It may be argued that how is the right cognition of *pramāṇa* is possible ? It is the contention of Vatsayana that the right cognition of the sixteen categories in which *pramāṇa* is the first leads us to the attainment of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*)<sup>14</sup>. If the right

cognition of the first category i.e. *pramāṇa* is not possible, how it (*pramāṇa*) can illumine other categories.

Considering the importance of *pramāṇa* Vatsayana has explained its various function in his *Bhāṣya* at the very outset. Without the proper cognition of *pramāṇa* the object cannot be properly grasped. If it is not grasped properly, no one can have successful inclination towards the object. The cognizer, after cognizing an object with the help of *pramāṇa* (means of knowing), wants to avail or forsake the object. The effort in the form of availing or forsaking is called volition. Whether our volition is successful or not depends on the result of the inclination. The object is in the form of happiness or the cause of happiness. It may also be in the form of misery or the cause of misery. These objects of *pramāṇa* are infinite in number as the persons adopting these are infinite in number. (*"Pramāṇamantarena nārthapratipattiḥ nārthapratipattimantarena pravṛttisāmarthyam. Pramāṇam khalvam jñātārthamūpalabhya tamārthamabhipsati jihāsati vā. Tasyepsajihāsā-prayuktasyasamīha pravṛttirityeheyate. Sāmarthyam pūnarasyaḥ phalenabḥisāmbandhaḥ. Samīhamanastamarthamabhipsān jihāsan vā tamārthamāpnoti jahati vā. Arthastu sukham sukhaheṭuśca, dukkham dukkhaheṭuśca. So'yam pramāṇartho 'parisamkheyah pranabhṛdbhedasyaparisamkheyatvāt"*)<sup>15</sup>

According to the nihilists sceptics, the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of the category called *pramāṇa* is not at all possible and hence there is no possibility of having right cognition of other objects. To Goutama the real means of the right cognition is called *pramāṇa*. When we have an awareness, it is very difficult to detect the rightness of the awareness. That is why, the determination of the rightness of *pramāṇa* which is called *prāmāṇya* is beyond our

capacity. For this reason Goutama's Nyaya Philosophy would turn into a *Sastra* which is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. In order to avoid such problems and to refute such views of the nihilists and sceptics, Vatsayana at the very outset begins with the determination of the validity or rightness of *pramāṇa* with the texts – *pramāṇato'rthapratipattau* etc.

The phrase '*pramāṇam arthavat*' means *pramāṇa* is nondeviated to the object (*arthavyabhicārī*). In other words, the nature and essential characteristics of an object as revealed by *pramāṇa* coincide with its real nature which is technically called *arthavyabhicārī*. The function of *pramāṇa* is to reveal the real nature of an object. From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of *pramāṇa* is proved. The suffix *matup* added to *artha* (*arthavat*) denotes 'an eternal connection' (*nityayoga*) which indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (*avyabhicāritā*). It is called *Sādhyā* of the inference which is inferred on the strength of the argument or *hetu* – '*pravṛttisāmarthyā*' i.e capacity of leading to successful inclination.

If an individual attains right cognition of an object through *pramāṇa*, he will be able to incline or reject something if he is desirous of doing so. If otherwise, it will not be taken as *pramāṇa*, but as *pseudo-pramāṇa*. The illusory cognition must be taken as a pseudo- *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāsa*), as it cannot lead someone to the successful activity. If someone attains the cognition of snake in place of rope, his inclination or rejection does not become successful. As in the pseudo cognition of snake there is no snake at all, the inclination etc becomes meaningless. That is why, the fact of being non-deviatedness to the object (*arthavyabhicāritva*) is the uncommon property of *pramāṇa* which is called *prāmāṇya*. It is also

endorsed by Jayanta Bhatta who says – ‘*tasya svaprameyavyabhicāritvaṁ nāma prāmāṇyaṁ*’.

Though Vatsayana has tried to refute the nihilists and sceptics in this way and to establish the *prāmāṇya* of *pramāṇa* through some inferential procedure as shown above, one may ask another question as to how can the *prāmāṇya* of the above mentioned inference be determined ? If *prāmāṇya* of the above inference is dependent on another inference, how can the *prāmāṇya* be determined of the second one ? If there is the doubt of the *prāmāṇya*, there cannot be the ascertainment of the same.

In response to this the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that there does not always arise the doubt of *prāmāṇya* in each and every case of inference or inferential cognition. Innumerable works have been done depending on time which is inferred from the watch. Many theories have been discovered depending on the mathematical calculations. But there does not always arise the doubt of *prāmāṇya*. Daily business is continued on the basis of the weight taken through the scales, which is not always doubted. Moreover, if there is doubt, the cause of it must be shown. If someone adduces some arguments in favour of some doubt, he has to take recourse to inference whose validity must be admitted. If there is no argument in favour of doubt, it would be taken as unreal. As there is innumerable pieces of inference through which our life is moving forward, there is no question of such doubt. Otherwise, there would not have been inclination towards some activities or objects. Even the sceptics are inclined to some actions out of having some sort of certainty on these. If the phenomenon of successful inclination becomes deviated from object, it would remain in the pseudo-*pramāṇa* also. If the unfailing inclination remains in something

which is deviated from an object, it may remain in the *pramāṇābhāsa* also, which is not at all possible.

Those who are the believers of absolute nihilism think that there is no real object like *pramāṇa*, because to them the usages of *pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc. are imaginary. Hence, to them, all cognitions are false cognitions. From this it follows that all *pramāṇas* are nothing but *pramāṇābhāsa*. If it is taken for granted, the nihilists would not be in position to explain an individuals inclination towards something. If it is taken that water if cognized as such is illusory, why does an individual incline to have water ? From the syllogistic argument in the form : 'this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to a successful inclination' (*idaṁ jñānaṁ yathārtham saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt*), it is proved that the cognition of water is valid.

Vacaspati Misra is of the opinion that that terms '*pramānam arthavat*' would mean that *pramāṇa* is necessary factor in the phenomenon of valid cognition (*pramā*). That is why, it is maintained by Goutama at the very beginning. If *pramāṇa* becomes non-deviated from the object (*arthavyabhicārī*), cognizer (*pramātā*), cognizable entity (*prameya*), cognition (*pramiti*) become meaningful or non-deviated to the object (*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityārthārthavanti bhavanti*).<sup>16</sup> If *pramāṇa* cannot reveal an object, the *pramātā* etc would become meaningless (*anyatama-paye'rthasya anupapatteḥ*). An individual who inclines to accept or reject is called a cognizer (*pramātā*). The means of proving an object is *pramāṇa* (*Tatra yasyepsajihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttih sa pramātā. Sa yenārtham praminoti tat pramāṇam*). The object which is being proved is called *prameya* (*yo'rthah pramiyate tat prameyam*). The valid cognition regarding some object is called

pramiti (*yadārvhaviññānam sa pramitih*). All types of human behaviour are centered around these four (*catasṛsu caivambidhasu arthatattvam parisamāpyate*).<sup>17</sup>

Reality (*tattva*) is cognized through *Pramāṇa* and something is accepted if it is conducive to happiness. If the object is not accepted due to having some obstacles, there is at least an acceptability of the same. If an object seems to be the cause of misery, it is rejected or there is the possibility of rejection. The object which is not acceptable or rejectable comes under indifference (*upekṣā*). *Pramāṇābhāsa* cannot provide the cognition of reality (*tattva*), but *pramāṇa* can easily provide.

What is called reality ? Reality is the positivity of the positive and negativity of the negative. (*Kim panastttvaṃ ? Sataśca sadbhāvah astaścāsadbhāva*).<sup>18</sup> When an object is cognized as *sat* it is to be taken as 'as it really is', i.e. to cognize something in its true form. (*Sat saditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtama-viparītaṃ tattvam bhavati. Asaccasaditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtamavīparītaṃ tattvaṃ bhavati*).<sup>19</sup>

Though reality is explained as having two qualities – positive and negative. How is a negative fact cognized ? In reply it is said that just as a positive object is revealed through lamp, the negative object is not revealed. The negativity of something is cognized through the non-apprehension of an object. An object is cognized to be absent from the non-apprehension of it. Had it been there, it would have been seen (*“satyupalabhyamāne tadanupalabdheh pradīpavat. Yathā darśakena dīpena drśye gṛhyamāne tadiva yanna gṛhyate tannāsti, yadyabhaviṣyādīdamiva vyañjasyatā vijñānabhavannāstīti”*).<sup>20</sup>

Udayana defines *pramā* as proper discernment (*sammyak paricchitti*). According to him, it is the condition of the real nature of a thing, and it is independent of any previous perception. From this it follows that memory-cognition does not come under the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). As memory is not an independent cognition, the object of it is the same as that of the original perception which generated it. In order to exclude memory (*smṛti*) from valid cognition (*pramā*) Udayana uses the term – ‘*anapekṣā*’ (independent) in this definition which runs as follows : ‘*Yathārthānubhavo māṇam anapekṣatayesyate*’.<sup>21</sup>

It is well known that the Naiyayikas have accepted the extrinsic validity of truth. (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*) i.e. the truth of our awareness also depends on the successful inclination (*saphalapravṛtti*) of the cognition. In terms of successful inclination the truth of a cognition is always determined i.e. a cognition is to be taken as true if it leads us to get something which is in our mind. This validity is inferred in the following way: ‘*pratyakṣānubhutiḥ pramā saphala pravṛttijanakatvāt*’ i.e. the perceptual cognition would be true if it leads us to the successful inclination. The cognition of water can be taken as true if it really quenches our thirst. In the like manner the falsity of a cognition is determined on the unsuccessful inclination (*visamvāḍipravṛtti*). If the cognition of water does not quench our thirst, it is to be taken as false.

Now the problem may be raised how the truth of *nirvikalpaka* cognition can be determined. It is admitted that the indeterminate cognition is a kind of cognition having no name, universal etc. and hence there is no relation between qualificand and qualifier. The means applied to determine the cognition in the form of determinate

(*savikalpaka*) cannot be applied to the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) one. Because the criteria like successful inclination (*saphalapravṛttijanakatva*) etc. are relevant to the determinate cognition. But the cognition having no characteristic features of an object is in void and it has got no causal efficacy through which validity (*prāmāṇya*) can be determined.

The question may be raised how an object can exist without having its characters. By virtue of being a cognition the indeterminate cognition must have some object or content of its own as cognition without content (*aviśayaka*) is an inconceivable idea. To the Naiyayikas the content of cognition is of three fold: *Prakāratā*, *Viśayatā* and *Saṁsargatā*. In the case of indeterminate cognition there remains a special type of objectivity (*viśayata*) called the fourth type of objectivity (*Tūriya Viśayatā*)<sup>22</sup> which is inexplicable in nature. In spite of this the problem of extrinsic validity will remain the same as before. In other words, the validity of indeterminate cognition will remain undetermined. Keeping all these complication in view Viśvanātha does not accept the perceptibility of indeterminate cognition. The cognition in the form of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) which has no relation between qualificand and qualifier can not be grasped through sense organ (*jñānam yannirvikalpakyam tadatindrīyamisyate*).<sup>23</sup> It implies that the indeterminate cognition is beyond sense perception.

If a cognition is beyond the reach of sense-organ, how can it be cognized? Is there any cognition in the ordinary word (*laukika*) which is not connected with sense-organ? Even the super normal cognitions are somehow related to external sense-organ and inner sense-organ (*mānas*). However, a cognition without the operation of

sense-organ is impossible for a cognizer. If indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition is a cognition, it must be related to some instruments like sense-organ etc. If such cognition is *atindriya* as per the view of Visvanatha, it cannot be cognition at least in the phenomenal level. There is a possibility of such cognition, however, in the transcendental level about which the Naiyayikas are not concerned so far as the theory of perception in the ordinary stage (*laukika*) is concerned.

It should be borne in mind that right presentative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) is classified into four – perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) cognition, inferential cognition (*anumiti*), cognition through comparison (*upamiti*) and verbal cognition (*śabda*). The uncommon instrumental factors of such cognitions are perception, inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Among these the eldest one is *Pratyakṣa* or perception which is again subdivided into two –determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). As indeterminate perception is a form of perception, it must be the object of definition (*lakṣya*) of the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) which runs as follows : “*indriyārtha-sannikaṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam*”. If it is so, *nirvikalpaka* must be generated through the sense-object-contact. Otherwise it can not be a subdivision of *Pratyakṣa*. If a cognition is described as *Pratyakṣa* and if the definition given for *Pratyakṣa* can not be applied to it, then it is not at all a perceptual cognition. If it is not a subdivision of perception, a cognition must be true or false. If such indeterminate becomes true, it must be either of the four sources of cognizing. The *Naiyayikas* have incorporated it under *Pratyakṣa* but definition of *Pratyakṣa* can not be applied and the method of extrinsic validity of truth can not be applied to it.

The description of *nirvikalpaka* cognition as neither true nor false leads to another sort of paradox which is not expected from the realistic thinkers like Nyaya for the following reasons. In the Nyaya System of logic two value-system is always accepted and hence there is no scope for inducing multi-valued logic. Hence a cognition must be either true or false and like Jaina there is no scope of being indescribable (*avyaktavya*). In the Adaita Vedanta Logic there is the scope of multi-valued logic as a cognition may be true or false or different from these called *anirvacanīya* or indescribable. When they accept illusion, they think that the cognition is neither existent nor non-existent, but indescribable (*sadasda-vilakṣanaḥ anirvacanīya*). If some-thing is both existent and non-existent, it is called indescribable which is the third value accepted in Vedanta. In Nyaya a cognition must either be true or false, but not indescribable. Hence, *nirvikalpaka* cognition by virtue of being a cognition must be true or false, but there does not arise any question of being indescribable, the third alternative. Hence it is very difficult to assess the validity of such indeterminate cognition which has got some logical justification for its acceptance but it is beyond the range of determining its validity. We do not know the status of a cognition which is beyond the determination of its validity. Hence the Nyaya position can never be justified so far as the *prāmāṇya* is concerned.

Excepting the case of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the Naiyayakas, in our opinion, are consistent in their views. As there are a few defects in all most all of the definitions of *pramā* given by the opponents the Nyaya concept of *pramā* which is very much logical and well guarded has to be accepted as a perfect one.

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