

Mimamsa is also an orthodox (*āstika*) system and emphasises on liberation (*mokṣa*). Liberation, in this system, is attained by the joint effort of valid cognition of the self or self realization (*ātmājñāna*) and moral action (*karma*). Self-realization (*ātmājñāna*) is possible only if the subject can distinguish it from the valid cognition of not-self (*anātmājñāna*). The concept of valid cognition, thus has an important role. The Bhatta concept of valid cognition finds its room in discussion in explaining *Nyāya* concept of valid cognition, because both the theories believe that cognition itself is apprehended extrinsically (*parataḥ prakāśa*) and yet they differ each other regarding the apprehension of truth of cognition. The Bhatta's advocate that the truth of cognition is ascertained intrinsically (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*), whereas the Naiyayikas advocate that the truth of cognition is apprehended extrinsically (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Narayana Bhatta cites the Naiyayikas first as opponent and holds that the concept of justification (*pramāṇa*) in both the systems are alike but the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) is different. Both the systems define justification (*pramāṇa*) as the instrument of valid cognition (*pramākaraṇamevātra pramāṇam tarkapakṣavat*). But the Naiyayikas define valid cognition (*pramā*) as immediate experience (*anubhava*) of object having some property as its content where this property actually exist, whereas Narayana Bhatta defines it as 'the prior unacquired cognition of object having some property as its

content where this property actually exists' (*pramā ca ajñāta tattvārtha jñānamevātra vidyate*). For example, when a prior unacquired conchcell is cognized as having the property of conchcellness is called valid cognition. Thus, the Naiyayikas emphasise on immediate experience (*anubhava*) of object as it is and the Mimamsakas emphasise on prior unacquired cognition of object as it is.

The word 'unacquired' (*ajñāta*) excludes memory (*smṛti*) and repeated version (*anuvāda*) from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Memory is excluded from the purview of valid cognition because in memory the content of cognition is identical with the content of that past immediate experience (*pūrvānubhava*) whose impression is the cause of the present memory cognition. Hence, memory cognition only repeats the content of past experiences. Repeated version (*anuvāda*) is also excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) for the same reason. By repeated version (*anuvāda*), here, means either previously uttered word or the cognition of previously uttered word. Such cognitions of previously uttered words don't convey any novelty to the content of its meaning. So, repeated version (*anuvāda*) is unable to yeild any new result apart from the cognition of the original utterence of the word / words. What fails to yield any new result has been discarded, by the Mimamsakas, from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Naiyayikas only exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) but consider the validity of repeated version (*anuvāda*). The Mimamsakas hold, on the other hand, that if memory is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) since there is no novelty in the content of memory cognitions, the repeated version (*anuvāda*) also has to be excluded from the purview of valid cognition since such cognitions also don't convey any new content

to the meaning of the word or sentence (*anuvādo hyarthaparicchede vyavahāre vā na purvajñānāt kañcid viśeṣamadhatte. ataḥ phalaviśeṣabhāvāt phalartham ca pramānānām svikārāt smrtyādivādanuvādho hapi vahiṣkārya eveti*).

Now the opponents may argue that the subsequent moments of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) also repeats the same content of object and yet persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) is considered as valid cognition (*pramā*). It is argued that the time moments (*kālamśa*) make the content of cognition novel. So, what is grasped at the first moment is not the same as what is grasped at the second moment and subsequent moments.

The opponents, now, may argue that time (*kāla*), both for the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas, is one in number and the so called different time moments are imposed properties made out of extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) and what is limited by the extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) could not be taken as real. So, what is grasped in the so called different time moments could not be different or novel from what is grasped earlier.

Narayana Bhatta, here, answers that the Mimamsakas believe in three apex of reality (*tripuṭī*) for the cognition of object in epistemology, viz., cognition (*jñāna*), the object (*viśaya*) and the condition for the manifestation of the object (*prākātya*). Though, cognition is cognized by inference and not by direct perception i.e. it is cognized by subsequent moment only, the manifestation (*prākātya*) is cognized by direct perception and is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ pramānya*), because the manifestation (*prākātya*) originates in the object (*viśaya*) which is perceptible. So, the manifestation (*prākātya*), in Bhatta theory, is different in each moment. And, as these manifestations (*prākātya*) are perceptible in different time

moments (*kālāśśa*) which are limited (*avacchinna*) by these manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are also perceptible. Therefore, the time moments limited by that manifestation only containing in the object, viz., pot, is the content of cognition. The manifestation (*prākāṭya*) is unacquired (*anadhigata*) to previous time moments. Hence, we percieve a new content in each time moment (*pūrvapūrvajñānanitanām prākāṭyānumuttarottarajñānaparyantamavasthānāt tadavacchinnānām kālāśśanām tatra tatravagama iti*).

The opponents, once again, may argue that the manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are too subtle (*sukṣma*) to percieve and so also the time moments limited (*avacchinna*) by these manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are also too subtle to percieve. Narayana Bhatta, here, argues that the manifestations (*prākāṭya*) as well as time moments (*kālāśśa*) limited by these manifestations are not too subtle to percieve (*na ca prākāṭyabhedānām sukṣmatvāt tadavacchinnānām kālabhedānāmapi sukṣmatayā durvajamatvamiti vācyam*). If this is the case then the object viz., the pot, in the case of persistent cognition would be illumined to us just once as if we are percieving hundred subtle lotus leaves simultaneously incarnated by the needle (*sukṣmatve kamaladalaśatam sucya yugapadbhinnamitvat sakṛḍavavuddhvo ghata iti yougapadyabhimānaprasajñāt*). In the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), rather, we percieve the pot in the first moment and in subsequent moments distinctly. Therefore, manifestations (*prākāṭya*) and time moments (*kālāśśa*) limited (*avacchinna*) by corresponding manifestations are not too subtle to percieve (*tasmāt prākāṭyabhedānām kālabhedānām ca na sukṣmatvaṁ*).

The second term 'real' (*tattva*) of the definition of valid cognition is used to exclude invalid cognitions like error (*bhrama*),

doubt (*samśaya*), reductio-ad-absurdum (*tarka*), etc. The erroneous cognition of 'rope as snake' is not real (*tattva*), because here the determinant (*snake*) does not actually exist to the determinandum (rope). So, we do not the object as it is in erroneous cognitions (*bhrama/ viparyaya*). Again, there are two contradictory determinans in the case of doubt cognitions (*samśaya*) of which one cognition might be false (*atattva*). Here also we don't cognize the object as it is. The same holds good in the case of reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*). The reductio-ad-absurdum method proceeds by the counter hypothetical proposition which is nothing but imaginary (*āhāryajñāna*) and subsequently shows the contradiction in accepting the hypothetical proposition which indirectly proofs the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the proposition in question. As the hypothetical argument by which the reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*) proceeds are imaginary (*āhārya*) are not real (*tattva*). So the term 'real' (*tattva*) excludes error (*viparyaya*), doubt (*samśaya*), reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*), etc. from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now, Prabhakara Mimamsakas argue that the term 'real' (*tattva*) does not serve any purpose. Because, all cognitions by virtue are real (*tattva*). There is no erroneous cognition at all. So the term 'real' (*tattva*) is only a tautology of the term 'valid cognition' (*pramā*). Cognition, for them, is self-manifested (*svaprakāśa*) and illumined its object. As each and every cognition illuminates its object, it is valid. So, there is no scope of invalid cognition in this system. Immediate experiencehood (*anubhūtiva*) is the mark or defining charecterstic (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*). Immediate experience (*anubhūti*) is defined as other than memory (*smṛtibhinna*). Even the so called erroneous cognitions are valid. Because, the so called erroneous cognition, like 'rope as snake' is

expressed in the form of 'this is snake'. We have, for them, two cognitions in such cases. The one is 'this' (*idam*) which is directly perceived and does not refer to individual property of ropeness but refers to the universal property of 'thisness' (*idantva*). The other cognition is the 'snake' which we get from the memory-cognition of 'this is snake' (*ayam sarpaḥ*). But we fail to recognise it as a memory-cognition (*smṛti janya jñāna*) because the memory is not fully recollected i.e. 'this' (*idam*) of the recollected cognition is not recognised. The content of the erroneous cognition like 'rope as snake' is the perceptual cognition of 'this' (*idam*) along with its property ropeness and the memory cognition 'snake' along with its property snakesness. So the hybrid illusory cognition which emerges due to the absence of grasping the difference of the perceptual cognition and the memory-cognition. As both cognition can illumine the part of its own content separately, hence, both cognitions are valid.

Narayana Bhatta argues that each and every cognition has the inclination towards its own object. When a thirsty man who has the cognition 'it is water' leads him to get the water so that he could quench his thirst. When one has illusory cognition of 'the reflection of sunlight on the sands in the desert' as 'it is water', it would not be wise to say that in such cases we have two cognitions of which both are separately true. Because, if it would be so, then we should have, in that case, two distinct inclinations of getting two distinct objects, as a rule, corresponding to two cognitions. As illusory cognitions originate only one inclination of getting one object, hence, it follows that in the case of illusory cognition there is only one cognition and not two.

Finally, the word 'cognition' (*jñāna*) is justified. The word 'cognition' (*jñāna*) has been used to exclude 'the prior absence of cognition' (*jñāna prāgbhāva*) and non-cognition (*ajñāna*).

Though, both *Nyāya* and Bhatta Mimamsakas hold that the same concept of the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*), they differ in each other regarding the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Bhatta, as mentioned earlier, considers three apex of epistemic reality (*triputī*). The word 'valid cognition' (*pramā*) is used to denote both the cognition (*jñāna*) as well as manifestation (*prākāṣya*). They further hold that sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of cognition (*jñāna*), and, again, cognition itself (*jñāna*) is the instrumental condition (*karāṇa*) of manifestation (*prākāṣya*). Thus, cognition itself is the effect (*phala*) of sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), which, again, is also the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa /karāṇa*) for the origination of manifestation (*prākāṣya*). The Bhatta, for this reason, is also called effect-instrumentalist (*phala pramāṇavādī*).

Narayana Bhatta, after showing the justification of each term of his definition of valid cognition (*pramā*), also establishes his own theory by showing either some paradox or self-stultifying statements to other systems.

The definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of the Naiyayikas, for him, is suffering from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*), because the Naiyayikas have not put any term to exclude repeated version (*anuvāda*) in the definition. Recollection (*smṛti*), in *Nyāya* system, has been excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) because memory-cognition (*smṛti*) only repeats the content of immediate experience (*anubhūti*). Repeated-version (*anuvāda*)

also repeats the content of the original-version and yet its validity (*prāmāṇya*) is considered by the Naiyayikas. Hence, either the definition of the Naiyayikas is affected by the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*), or, the theory is self-stultifying.

The Prabhakar Mimamsaka also excludes recollection (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) is defined, in this system, as the cognition other than recollection (*smṛtibhinna*). The view of Prabhakara is unacceptable to Narayana Bhatta for two reasons :-

(a) It can't be denied that erroneous cognitions (*viparyaya*) and doubtful cognitions (*samśaya*) are invalid cognitions (which are established earlier). But the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of Prabhakara includes erroneous cognitions (*viparyaya*) and doubtful cognition (*samśaya*) within the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence, the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of Prabhakara is affected by the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*).

(b) Although, Prabhakara hold 'immediate experiencehood' (*anubhūtitva*) as the defining mark (*lakṣaṇa*), the criterion of valid cognition is given as the capacity of illuminating the object (*viśaya*), the cognition (*svātmā*) and the self (*ātmā*) (*kiñca sarvajñānesvapi ātmā jñānasvarūpam viśaya iti tṛtiyāmapī prakāśati*). Immediate experiencehood (*anubhūtitva*) means other than memory (*smṛtibhinna*). But, memory-cognition (*smṛti*) also illuminates the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*). Now, if memory-cognitions (*smṛti*) are invalid, the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*) illumined by memory-cognition (*smṛti*) would also be invalid. But, the illumination of the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*)

through memory-cognition (*smṛti*) is considered by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas as valid and perceptible. Hence, the definition of valid cognition is affected by the fallacy of under-coverage (*avyapti*) in terms of the recollective cognition of the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*).

Lastly, the Buddhists hold that the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*) is identical. Because, the real unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣana*) are momentary (*kṣanika*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) grasps these unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). As the objects of valid cognition are momentary, the corresponding cognition, for being real, might be momentary also. Generally, it is conceived that corresponding to the valid cognition (*pramā*) there might be some instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) also. But this concept of instrumentality (*karanatva*) would not fit in the Buddhist system, since, for being an instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) a prior moment of origination of the effect is needed. Hence, the Buddhist conceive that the concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) is imaginary (*kalpanā*). Thus, the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) is the defining characteristics of valid cognition-cum-instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*). this part will be explained later on.

Again, the Buddhist logicians hold that the nature of cognition is intrinsically revealed (*svataḥ prakāśa*), but the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the cognition is revealed by subsequent cognition (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Hence, the criterion for determining the validity of cognition is :- it is non-contradicted by subsequent cognition and has the causal efficacy to produce something (*avādhita ca arthakriyākāritvaṃ*). For example, a thirsty man cognize something as 'it is water'. The validity of the cognition is determined on the ground that it is not contradicted by subsequent

moment and has the capacity to quench his thirst. But, Narayana Bhatta wrongly treats it as a defining characteristics (*lakṣana*) of valid cognition and proceeded criticizing it. But, his points have some value for critical study. Let us suppose that Bhatta treats it as a criterion for determining the validity of cognition. And, if it is taken as a criterion for determining the validity of cognition then the Buddhist theory, from the point of view of Bhatta, has the following shortcomings :-

(a) The Buddhist logicians consider two sources of valid cognition, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). There are some inferential cognitions (*anumāna*) regarding past facts and future possibilities which are valid since they are under the ken of inference (*anumāna*). But, the Buddhist logicians criterion for determining these cognitions can't be applied in such cognitions, since the causal efficacy either already perishes or it is yet to occur. Dinanath Tripathi cites an example, suppose a man infers the existence of fire, of a remote past fact, beneath a tree from the black smoky spots on the leaves of that tree. Here, the inferential cognition of fire is valid, though, the causal efficacy of fire in no way be proved at present. Hence, the criterion for determining the validity of cognition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

(b) Secondly, recollection (*smṛti*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition in Buddhist system also. But, there are at least some recollective cognitions (*smṛti*) which have the efficacy to produce something and yet these cognitions, in Buddhist system, are regarded as invalid. For example, the recollection of spiritual experiences (*bhagvat viṣayaka smṛti*) produces pleasure to the cognizer (*jñāta*). Hence, the criterion

for determining the validity of cognition of the Buddhist logician suffers from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). So, the Buddhist criterion for determining the validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) is unacceptable to Bhatta.

The Buddhist logicians, again, may argue that all determinate cognitions (*savikalpaka jñāna*) are thought constructed (*kalpita*) and hence unreal. Determinate cognitions (*savikalpaka jñāna*) apparently seems to be having the property of causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) due to the close proximity (*naikaṭya*) with the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*). Thus, the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the accidental property (*āgantuka dharma*) to any determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). (*nanu arthakriyākāritvamasya arthatohtiviprakarsabhāvat daivagatameva, na svābhāvikam*). Causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) may be the criterion of determining the validity of cognition only to those cases where it is the essential property of the cognition in question. For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond and eventually he gets the diamond. Again, seeing the diamond another man runs to get it and he gets it. Now, in the first instance, the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the accidental property of the first person's cognition, whereas the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the essential property of the second person's cognition. Hence the criterion of the Buddhist for determining the validity does not suffer from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*).

The Buddhist logicians denied the validity of determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) on the ground that they are thought constructed. If thought construction (*kalpanā*) is the only ground for canceling the validity, then inference (*anumāna*) can't be taken as a valid source of cognition (*pramāṇa*) since inferential cognitions are

derived mainly by thought construction. But the Buddhist logicians have taken inference as a valid source of cognition. Hence the Buddhist theory is in a self-stultifying position. Moreover, the Buddhist logician denied the validity of determinate cognition, since they think that determinate cognition or judgmental cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) is a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the qualified elements of a determinate cognition is either a universal (*jāti*), name (*nāma*), definition (*samjñā*), action (*kriyā*) or quality (*guṇa*) of which none is real. But the Bhattas argue that the reality of these elements can't be denied. To show that all these elements are real the Bhattas refute the arguments the arguments of the Buddhist logicians. The Buddhist logicians denied the reality (*sattā*) of universal (*jāti*) on the following grounds: If universal (*jāti*) is a real entity then it might exist either each of the individual (*vyakti*) separately or its existence is all-pervading (*vibhu*) so that each and every individual can participate to that universal. It can not be said that the existence of universal (*jāti*) is all-pervading. If that is the case then we would percieve it even other than the individuals of that class also. But, we do not percieve the universal everywhere. We only percieve it to a individual of that class only. For example, we percieve the cowness to individual cows only, but not to a goat or any other creature. It can not even be said that it exists to each individual (*vyakti*) of that class only. Because, if it is the case, then we have to say that a new born individual of that class acquires the property of universal from another individual i.e. the property of universal is transferred from one individual to another. Hence, we have to consider that the universal has an active role. But, those thinkers who maintain that universal (*jāti*) as a real entity think it to be inactive (*niṣkriya*). Again, it can not be said that the universal (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*) emerges simultaneously, because they consider universal as eternal (*nitya*) and individual (*vyakti*) as a

time binding entity (*anitya*). Hence, the concept of existence of universal is inconcievable.

Now the Bhatta Mimamsakas advocate that there is no contradiction in holding that the existence of universal is all-pervading as well as it exists to the individuals of that class only. Because, the relation between universal (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*), according to them, is in relation of illumined (*abhivyañja*) and illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*). An illumined entity (*abhivyañja*) can not be felt without a illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*). Now, the Buddhist logicians may argue that if the universal (*jāti*) exists to individuals of that class only, then it can not be eternal (*nitya*) because individual s (*vyakti*) exist only for a period of time. So, when individual or individuals will perish, it might hamper that existence of universal also. The Bhattas argue that the perishability of individuals will not affect the existence of the universal. It is already mentioned that the existence of universal is all pervading and eternal and the relation between the individual and universal is the relation of illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*) and illumined (*abhivyañja*). Thus, when an individual of that universal emerges and illumines the universal, it indicates that the illumination of the universal takes place through some conditions. So, the emergence of a new-born individual and the emergence of the conditions for the illumination of the universal is simultaneous. It is not the case that the emergence of a new-born individual and universal is simultaneous. Likewise when an undividual perishes, it only indicates that the condition or conditions of illumination of the universal through that individual also perishes not that the universal also perishes. And, the question of transferability of universal from one individual to another does not arise because the Mimamsakas believe that the relation between universal and individual is

identity-cum-difference (*tādātmya*). The question of transferability of a certain property arises only to those cases where the two entities were distinct at the time of their emergence and then comes in relation. Moreover, though the Buddhist logicians don't consider the reality of universal, yet they maintain that we construct the concept of universal out of imagination by the method of exclusion (*apoha*). But the question is: how the method of exclusion (*apoha*) takes place? The method of exclusion (*apoha*) can take place only if the cognition of some positive entity takes place. I can exclude some creatures from the class of cow only if I actually cognized cowness. Thus the Buddhist logicians indirectly accept the universal as real. Likewise, all the components of determinate cognition are also real. Therefore, the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) might be taken as a valid one.

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Valid cognition (*pramā*), in Indian system, has been explained mainly by two ways, viz., (a) either having a causal explanation, or, (b) having a non-causal explanation. The causal explanation derives its root from the common sense view that every effect or product must have some instrumental condition. Valid cognition (*pramā*) being an effect must have some instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). The instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) must precede the effect (*pramā*) and is most predominant condition (*atiśayatva*) among other conditions as well and which being present the effect immediately follows. The Naiyayikas are the main upholders of such explanation of valid cognition (*pramā*) and the Mimamsakas also explicitly support such explanation of instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*) although they differ regarding the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Buddhists, on the other hand, explain the notion of valid cognition in a non-causal manner, because the notion of causality entails the notion of sequence, so that the subject / doer (*karta*) or the instrument (*karana*) could function (*vyapara*) for the origination of the effect. But, the Buddhists consider only the momentary unique particulars (*svalakṣana*) to be real (*sat*). A momentary unique particular (*svalakṣana*) could not intermediate between the subject (*kartā*) and the instrument (*karāṇa*) and also produce the effect (*phala*) within a moment. So, the classical notion of causality is considered by the buddhist logicians as imaginary

and hence, unreal (*kalpitaḥ karmakarṭṛādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate*). To have some causal relation between two realities (*sattā*) remaining at least for two moments - one moment for its origination and the next moment is for its relation to other is a pre-condition. So, the Buddhist logicians don't stick to the etymological meaning of instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) i.e. with the grammatical derivation of the word '*pramāṇa*' (*pra + mā + aṇat*). Even if one would like to stick to the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) along with the concept of its instrument (*pramāṇa*), the Buddhist logicians would suggest that they are in relation of identity (*tādātmya*).

"*dhiyo 'msayor...*

*kintu vyavasthapyā vyavasthāpakabhavaḥ, sa ca tadatmye 'pi aviruddha*".<sup>16</sup>

Dinnaga points out that 'a cognition is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*<sup>16a</sup>'. Nandita Bandopadhyaya observes that the trend towards the relation of identity between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*) prevails even in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, the *Advaita*, the *Mimāṃsakas* and the *Jaina* theories<sup>16b</sup>. But, before going to have such a big claim, let us examine the Buddhist theory of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*).

Each and every cognition, for the Buddhist logicians, has an intentionality towards some object (*viṣayonmukhatā*) and thus illuminates a momentary particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The object being cognized means the illumination of consciousness with a certain form having some content. In such a situation we may only metaphorically conceive that when we cognize an object, viz., 'blue', our consciousness takes the form of the object blue

(*viṣayākāra*). When we perceive blue a corresponding form of the object 'blue' is stamped upon our cognition. It is this objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) that determines or measures the limit of the perceptual judgment -- 'this is blue', and thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the ken of perception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called *paricchedya*, and the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) of that cognition which acts as the measure or determinant is called *paricchedaka*. When one makes a distinct judgment 'it is blue', the cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is fixed to a particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination (to a particular object) is called *vyavasthāpanā* by the Buddhists. The cognition which is thus fixed is described as *vyavasthāpya*. Now the question is -- which does fix the cognition to a particular object (*vyavasthāpaka*) ? The Buddhists establish that the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) is the fixer (*vyavasthāpaka*) or instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*).

Buddhists, specially Dharmakīrti and his followers, establish the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā/ viṣayasārūpya*) by showing the opponents view, specially the Naiyayikas and their followers the Bhatta Mimamsakas, of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) as unacceptable. The Naiyayikas define and explain instrument (*karana*) as either (a) "*phalāyogavyavacchinnaṁ asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam*" i.e. an instrument is that condition which being present the effect immediately originates. Sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), for example, is that condition which being present the effect perception (*pratyakṣa*) takes place. Or, (b) "*vyapāravat asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam*" i.e. an instrument is that uncommon condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) which is the locus of of

the intermediary condition (*vyapāra*). The sense-organ (*indrīya*), in this sense, is the instrument (*karaṇa*) for perception. Or, (c) “*sādhkatamam kāraṇam karaṇam*” i.e. an instrument is that condition which is most pre-dominant or most effective for the origination of the effect. Sumtotal of conditions except the subject and object is the instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) in this sense. But, none of these definitions of instrument (*karaṇa*), from the Buddhists point of view, is acceptable.

Although, Dharmakīrti and his commentator Prajñākara refute the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of sense-organ (*indrīya*) only by showing some self-stultifying arguments of the Naiyayikas, the same hold good the other two definitions also. The term ‘uncommon condition’ (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is the general feature of all the three mentioned definitions of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of the Naiyayikas. How can the uncommonness (*asādhāraṇatva*) be determined ? The uncommonness is determined by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*). The sense-organ (*indrīya*), for the Neo-Naiyayikas, is the uncommon condition which being present the uniqueness of perceptible objects is illumined and this sense-organ (*indrīya*) is present to all cases of perception and if the sense-organ does not present then such cognitions are excluded from the ken of perceptual cognition. But, the Buddhist logicians hold that although visual- sense-organ (*caḥṣu-indrīya*), tactual sense organ (*sparśendriya*), auditory sense organ (*sravanendriya*), to some extent, sizes up or fix only the visible perceptible objects, tactual objects, audible objects respectively and so on and so forth, yet the sense-organ fails to size up or fix the respective object in a very specific way.

“*sarvasāmānyahetuvad akṣaṇām asti nedṛśam*

*tadbhede ’py abhinnasya tasyedaṁ iti tat kūtaḥ.*”<sup>17</sup>

The eye, for example, is present to all visual perceptions, so to say, for the perception of blue patch, yellow patch, red patch etc. The eye can't be called the differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*) of the different perceptual cognitions in relation to the different perceptible objects (*sarvasya hi nilapītādiviṣayasya sāmānyena hetuvad akṣam na bhedakam*)<sup>18</sup>. It is, rather, the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) which size up or fix the object and is capable of individuating and illumining that particular cognition.

The *Nyāya* logicians, now, may argue that the sense-organ (*indrīya*) is not sufficient condition of cognition. Apart from the sense-organ there are other conditions also, so the uniqueness of a particular cognition may be explained by revealing the nature of other conditions. The same sense-organ as an instrument contacts with different types of objects with six types of relations. So, the uniqueness of a particular cognition may be individuated either by the different object or by the different types of relations or by both.

The Buddhist logicians, here, argue that even the reality (*satta*) of different objects as well as the reality of different types of relations (*sambandha*) are cognized through the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*). Different forms of objects figuring in cognition lead one to ascertain that there is contact with different objects (*arthasannikarso'pi nakaram anabhipatya jñāyate*). Objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is more basic than the different types of external objects (including relations). So, the consideration of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as instrument is more reasonable and economy of thought which can size up or fix the object of cognition accordingly and thus illumines the object. Sense-organs (*indrīya*) or sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), on the other hand, has only secondary significance in epistemology.

*“sarvātmānapi sambandham kaścīd evagamyate*

*dharmah, sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyavisesatah”*.<sup>19</sup>

The Naiyayikas may argue that the Buddhist concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) goes against the common usage as well as the grammatical notion (*pra + mā + aṇaṭ*) of instrumentality. Sense-organ (*indrīya*) is usually taken as instrument of perceptual cognition in common usage. The Buddhist logicians, on this regard, may hold that their usage of instrumentality has its root to the famous grammarian Panini. By ‘instrument’ (*karaṇa*) Panini means that condition which is most effective or most predominant for the origination of the effect (*sādhakatamam kāraṇam karaṇam*) and which being present the effect follows immediately. Objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) is most effective than the sense-organ (*indrīya*) or the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*). Because, sometimes the sense-organ being present the effect perceptual cognition does not take place. But, if there is objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) then the cognition is bound to manifest immediately. So, the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*), for Dharmakīrti, is the last differentiator (*antya bhedaka*).

*“sarveṣāṃ upayoge ’pi kārakānām kriyāṃ prati*

*yadantya bhedakam tasyas tat sādhakatamaṃ  
matam.”*<sup>20</sup>

Common peoples speak like ‘I see with the eyes’ (*cakṣusā rūpaṃ pasyāmi*), because they fail to distinguish between a cognition (*jñāna*) and the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*).

*“Yā kriyā yataḥ padārthād avyavadhānena*

*bhavati sa tasyah karaṇamucyate,*

*tataścendriyādeh pramitim pratyavyavahite*

*sādhakatvabhavān na pramāṇam*"<sup>21</sup>

Objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*), in Buddhist logic, is the instrument of cognition of object and sense-organ, etc. are the instrument only in the secondary sense i.e. they are the instrument for the origination of objective equiformity. Instrumentality (*karanatva*), for Dharmakīrti, is only imposed to sense-organ as a transferred epithet.

*"katham tanhi cakṣusā pasyati iti,*

*kārane kāryopacārād evamucyate*"<sup>22</sup>

Kumarila Bhatta, now, raises a serious objection showing a self-stultifying position in Buddhist explanation regarding the relation between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*). The Buddhist logicians, in one hand, consider the objective equiformity (*arthyasārūpya*) as the last differentiator (*antya-bhedaka* / *antya-paricchedaka*) which is nothing but cognition itself, and eliminates the instrumentality of sense-organ in the prime sense which is in a distance from the point of view of time. the differentiator (*paricchedaka*), in Buddhist system, is itself the effect.

*"paricchedaphalatveṇa vṛttasyanantarasya naḥ*

*pramāṇatvaṃ bhavet, jñānepramāṇe tu param  
phalam*"<sup>23</sup>

But, this so called last differentiator (*antya bhedaka*) which is identical with the cognition itself is caused by the senses. This view is also accepted by Dharmakīrti. The so called last differentiator

(*antya bhedaka*) is an imposed reality (*kalpita*). Hence, even in Buddhist system the senses (*indrīyādi*) are the real differentiator (*paricchedaka*). The Buddhist logicians, in this situation, have two options -- either (a) they may consider objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as the last differentiator (*antyaabhedaka*) only in the sense that there is a real time gap between the differentiator (*paricchedaka /vyavasthāpaka*) and the differentiated (*paricchedya /vyavasthāpya*), or, (b) that the sense organs are the real differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*) for perceptual cognition. If the Buddhists hold that there is time gap between objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) and bare cognition (*jñānamātra*) and the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is caused by the senses (*indrīyadi*), then the view is not different from the Mimamsaka's concept of three epistemic apex of reality (*triputī*), viz., sense-organ (*indrīya*), cognition (*jñāna*) and manifestation (*prākāṣya*). But, then the view would contradict the basic ontology of momentariness (*kṣāṇikavāda*) of the Buddhists. Therefore, they have to accept the second option i.e. the reality of the senses as instrumental condition or differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*). Thus, Kumarila establishes the causal relation between the senses (*indrīyadi*) and perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*). This view is also supported by common people (*viśayaikatvavat kṛiyākarakayoḥ svarupabhedo'pi lokasiddha eva*)<sup>24</sup>.

The Buddhist may argue that they have established that the concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) which is the prime sense to fit in the Buddhist ontology is taken only as a conceptual construction or as an imposition (*kalpita*). The imposed distinction between an effect and its corresponding instrument is made so that using the analysis as a ladder or stepping stone common people could realize that although

the said two notions are different from the pragmatic point of view but they are identical by virtue. If the instrumentality of the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*), which is the prime sense of instrument in Buddhist system, is also virtually refuted, the instrumentality of the senses (*indrīyādi*) where the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) is only imposed as a case of transferred epithet could easily be refuted. Even if one would like to stick to the instrumentality of the sense-organ for perceptual cognition, the Buddhist logicians would argue that the instrumentality of sense-organ could be refuted even from the significance of the experiences of common people. For example, when one cuts a mango tree with the help of an 'axe', thereby he is excluding the possibility of cutting a gueva tree at the same time with the same 'axe'. Hence, it follows that 'the cutting (of a tree)' is an essential and intrinsic feature of that 'axe'. Thus, the so called effect and its corresponding instrument are necessarily identical.

*"prasuna ca vṛkṣades'cchidā nirūpyamāṇa*

*chedyadravyānupraves'alakṣaṇaivavatiṣṭhate,*

*sa cānupraves'aḥ parāśor ātmāgata eva dharma iti.*

*paramarthataś'chidaya sahaikatvam iti nāsti virodaḥ"*<sup>25</sup>

Kumarila raises another objection against the Buddhist logicians that the apprehension of cognition (*sa-saṁvedana*) and objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā /viṣayākāra*) as instrument cannot go simultaneously.

*"sasamvittaphalatvam tu tanniṣedhān na yujyate*

*pramāṇe viṣayakāre bhinnarthatvaṁ prasajyate"*<sup>26</sup>

Cognition, for the Buddhist, is apprehended intrinsically (*sasaṁvedana*), because the so-called instrumental condition on which the origination of the effect depends in is intrinsic and essential feature of cognition. Kamalasila explains in detail Kumarila's position that cognition can't be apprehended intrinsically, because objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /viṣayākāra*), for the Buddhist, is an object of direct perception. This objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) solely depends upon the external object (*viṣayakaro vāhyaviṣayaḥ*). It is also mentioned earlier that consciousness has an intention towards object (*viṣayonmukhatā*) and Kumarila thinks that this object might be an external object having some content. If this is the case then the cognition manifesting the object as its content (*vyavasthāpya*) is not the essential feature of cognition itself, because it is not independent of external objects. Intrinsic apprehension (*sasaṁvedana*), on the other hand, means that cognition reveals itself. But, this intrinsic apprehension of cognition, however, is not like the second order cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the Naiyayikas which reveals the nature of antecedent cognition. So the momentary unique cognition having some content as its object can't reveal itself intrinsically.

*“idaṁ aparāṁ uktam kumarilenaiva :- sasaṁvedanasya  
niṣedhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvaṁ ayuktam, viṣayākārasya  
ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalayoḥ bhinnaviṣayatvaṁ  
prasajyate, tathā hi -- viṣayakāro vāhyaviṣayaḥ,  
svasaṁvedānām tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayam iti”<sup>27</sup>*

So it follows that if objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) is taken as an instrument, the intrinsic apprehension (*svasaṁvedana*) could not be established to the same cognition because the object having some content in objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) is different from the required content of cognition for intrinsic apprehension (*svasaṁvedana*).

The Buddhist logicians, again, advocate that cognition which illumines other objects is by law necessarily illumines itself also. Because, a real (*sattā*) being itself non-illumined could not illumine other objects. So a cognition which illumines other objects at the same time it is bound to illumine itself also (*apratyokṣopalambhasya narthadrstih prasiddhati*)<sup>28</sup>. They also hold that the Mimamsakas have misunderstood the Buddhist concept of instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*). The 'form of an object' (*viṣayākāra*) which is supposed to be different from cognition itself, as the Mimamsakas understood, is not instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*), but it is the form of an object as being stamped upon cognition is taken, though metaphorically only, to be the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) which is not different by virtue from cognition itself and is said to be originate by the same content (*svavidapyarthavin mata*). Hence both objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and intrinsic apprehension of cognition (*svasaṁvedana*) could go simultaneously.

The Mimamsakas, again, argue that cognition, for the Buddhist logicians, illumines in a distinct or specific way such that the object in question is revealed to us differentiating it from other objects. An indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) can't illumine an object distinctly. Hence, valid cognition (*pramā*), in Buddhist system, is determinate or judgmental (*savikalpaka*) and

indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*) is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). Because, determinate or judgmental cognition logically entails the existence of indeterminate cognition (*visiṣṭajñānam viséṣanajñānapūrvakam*). For example, when one cognizes 'this is blue' the adjective 'blue' can be predicated only if the cognition of 'blueness' preceeds that cognition. If such basic indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*) does not preceed then one can't ascribe something as blue.

The Buddhist logicians refuted valid cognition (*pramā*) as judgmental first and then they refuted the instrumentality of indeterminate cognition also. The determinate judgment (*vikalpa-adhyavasāya*), in Buddhist system, can't be valid cognition since it contradicts with the concept of momentariness (*kṣanikatvavāda*). Determinate cognition (*vikalpa-adhyāvasāya*) are thought constructed, hence need subsequent moment for its construction. But the unique real particulars (*svalakṣana*) exist only for one moment. Therefore, the unique real particular no more exists at the time of judgmental construction. Hence, judgmental cognition (*vikalpa-adhyāvasāya*) can't grasp the unique real particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*).

Could indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka /alocanajñāna*) be instrument-cum-valid cognition ? Dharmakirti answers in a negative way. Usually it is believed that a determinate cognition must be preceeded by an indeterminate cognition where cognition of pure adjective is directly revealed. But Dharmakirti and his commentator Prajñākara advocates that there is no need of the cognition of the pure adjective at indeterminate level. Because, cognition of adjective (*viséṣaṇa*) is a relative fact in the sense that its cognition would be meaningless if it is not related with the substantive (*viséṣya*).

*“na hi viśeṣyoparudharūpaṃ antarena viśeṣanatvamnāma,  
nāpi taduparudhatvagraham vinā viśeṣanatvagrahaṇam  
tadākaragrahane ca viśeṣyam api grihitam eveti katham  
tato viśeṣyadhir apara sādhyā syat ?”<sup>29</sup>*

Moreover, indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) can't illumine the object in a specific way. The objective difference of different cognitions can't be ascertained at the stage of indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*). It is the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) which can only illumine the object without delay in a distinct way. Thus objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) stands as the basis of determining the objective difference of cognition.

The Buddhist logicians finally establishes that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the instrumental condition-cum-valid cognition which is capable of making a cognition specific. Indeterminate cognition is incapable of making a cognition specific. Judgmental cognition, on the other hand, has been denied as valid cognition. Thus, the status of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is kept equidistant from both indeterminate and determinate cognition. This is an inconcievable position. Yet, some Buddhist loyalists argue that indeterminate cognition said to be instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) only in the sense that the real source of the power of making a cognition specific resides in the original pure sensation. The argument is not tenable, because it presupposes that the power of making a cognition specific begins at the first moment and it only explicitly makes a cognition specific in the second moment which goes against the ontological presuppositions of momentariness.

One point deserves mention here that the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) or its instrument (*pramāṇa*) are neither the fundamental category to achieve (*nirvāṇa*), nor even the fundamental categories for theorisation, whereas the Naiyayikas take the instrumental condition for cognition (*pramāṇa*) as a fundamental category for theorisation, but valid cognition (*pramā*) is not taken as a fundamental category even for theorisation. Thus the distinction between instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*), in Buddhist system, holds good only from the analytical and logical point of view. It is also advocated that momentary unique cognition is of the nature of self-revealing (*sasamvedana/ svaprakāśa*). Again, as the cognition reveals some external object (*visayonmukhatā*), hence, the validity or truth of the cognition is extrinsic (*parataḥ prāmānya*). The validity or truth, for the Buddhists logicians, can be ascertained only if it leads to successful activity (*saphalapravṛttipravartaka*). Thus, the origination of a cognition can reveal its own bare content which is not vitiated with mental ascription (*kalpanā*) without depending upon another subsequent cognition, but whether the content of cognition really corresponds with the external object has to be determined by another subsequent cognition.

There are, for the Buddhists, two sources of valid cognition, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). There is, again, a controversy among the Buddhist logicians regarding the level or status of these two sources of valid cognition. Some thinkers, like Stchebatsky, hold that the level or status of perception is higher than inference. Perception, for Stchebatsky, is the source of valid cognition from the transcendental level and inference is the source of valid cognition only from the phenomenal level. This claim arises because Dharmakīrti's definition of perception as that

cognition which is non-erroneous and free from imagination (*tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*)<sup>30</sup>, whereas inference is defined as that cognition, which is erroneous, and grasps the object through the mental ascriptions (*bhrāntam hyanumānam. svapratibhāse 'narthe 'dhyavasāyena pravṛttvat*)<sup>31</sup>. The Buddhist logicians, unlike the Naiyayikas who differentiate between perception and inference mainly in terms of sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), differentiate between perception and inference in terms of non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) and erroneous (*bhrānta*) respectively. Perception, for them, is non-erroneous because it alone can directly grasps the momentary unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). Inference, on the other hand, can't directly grasps the momentary unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The immediate object of inference is a concept which is imaginary (*kalpanā*) and hence, illusory. Concepts correspond to universal characteristics. But, this universal is not like the Naiyayikas concept of Universal which is taken as real, rather, it is imaginarily constructed by the method of exclusion (*apoha*). Thus, inference, for Stchebatsky, is the source of valid cognition only in the phenomenal level.

But, Stchebatsky's claim can't be accepted, because the object of perception i.e. the momentary unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are not transcendental reality. These particulars are also reals of the phenomenal level. Liberation (*nirvāṇa*) is the only transcendental reality. Epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), not only in Buddhist system but to any system of Indian philosophy, has nothing to do directly with the Transcendental Reality. So some recent thinkers think that both perception and inference belong to the same level of the phenomenal world. The seed of such claim is found in *Nyabindu* itself -- '*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapurusārthasiddhirti tad*

*vyutpadyate*<sup>32</sup> i.e. valid cognition aims at fulfilling all human purpose. Rita Gupta, therefore, observes that 'objective equiformity' (*meyarūpatā*) is the instrumental condition of both perceptual and inferential cognition. "Both perception and inference", in her opinion, "acquaint us with the real *svalakṣana*. Perception does it directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual constructs"<sup>33</sup>. But this explanation is not satisfactory also. Because, if it is accepted that both perception and inference acquaint us with the momentary particulars (*svalakṣana*), then it goes against the Buddhist theory of *pramāna-vyavasthā*. According to this theory, each and every instrumental condition has its own object which can be cognized exclusively by that instrumental condition only. The object of perception can't be cognized by inference and vice-versa.

Finally, the Buddhist logicians may argue that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā = pramāṇa*) and non-contradiction and causal efficacy is the criterion for determining the truth of cognition. So, it would not be right to determine the validity of a particular condition merely from its non-contradictory character and causal efficacy. Rather, when both the criteria are fulfilled then the cognition in question could be said to be valid. Even this explanation can't save the theory from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*). For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond and he gets it. Here both the criteria are fulfilled, because though he misunderstood 'the reflection of light on the diamond as diamond', the cognition assumes the form of that diamond (*meyarūpatā*) and luckily get the diamond also. On the other hand, seeing the diamond the other man runs to get the diamond and gets it. Here, also both the criteria are fulfilled. Hence, the explanation fails to distinguish between error and valid

cognition. So the Buddhist logicians definition of valid cognition along with the criterion of determining the truth of cognition can't distinguish between error and valid cognition. It is the "*tadvati tatprakāra anubhava*" which alone can distinguish between error and valid cognition.

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The Jaina is a heterodox liberation oriented system. The Jaina logicians developed their epistemology extracting different concepts from different systems and adjusted them with their own ontological set up. The Jaina logicians, like the *Nyāya* logicians, hold that consciousness is the attribute of the self, but the difference is that the *Nyāya* logicians accept consciousness as the accidental attribute, whereas the Jaina logicians accept the self as a variable constant through and is of the nature of continuum running through the succession of modes in which the cessation of the predecessor is synchronous with the origination of the successor. Advaitins, on the otherhand, accept the self (*ātman*) as the permanent static substance and the Buddhist logicians denied the existence of self (*anātmavāda*) and hold that the unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are the only reality. But, the Jainas hold that the permanent static substance cannot explain the causal relation of the changing world. Similarly, the Buddhist logicians also fail to explain the causal efficiency, since all the unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are absolutely momentary. So, the Jaina logicians established that the entity where the causal efficiency as a causal characteristic could exercise would be such that that admits both sequence and non-sequence (*arthakriyā na yujyate nityakṣanikapakṣayoh / karmākramavyam bhāvānām sa lakṣaṇatayā mata<sup>34</sup>*). Though, both the *Nyāya* logicians and Jaina logicians

explain cognition in terms of causal relation, yet the Jaina logicians do not accept the concept of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of the *Nyāya* logicians. They argue, on the contrary, like the Buddhist logicians that it is the cognition itself which is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) in its true sense and yet the nature of the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is not indeterminate (*ālocana jñāna*), rather it is the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) which can lay claim as an instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). Again, the Jaina logicians, specially Hemchandra, agrees with Gangeśa that most of the cognitions are extrinsically valid (*parataḥ-pramāṇa*), and some cognitions such as habit etc. (*abhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) are intrinsically valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*). Hence, the discussion on the Jaina view of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) is necessary for the critical study of valid cognition (*pramā*) in *Nyāya*. We shall try to explain the Jaina view of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) with special reference to Hemchandra in this regard.

Valid cognition, in Jaina terminology, is called '*samyakjñāna*' (authentic cognition). The term '*samyak*' derives from the root '*añc*' with the prefix '*sam*' (*sam + añc*). The term '*samyak*' means what is not contrary to fact and is indeclinable (*samyag ityaviparītārthavyam samaccatervā rūpaṁ*)<sup>35</sup>. The adjective 'authentic' (*samyak*) excludes doubt, indecision and error from the purview of authentic cognition. doubt is not authentic because it fully touches both the opposite characters with reference to an object which does not actually possess such a dual character. For example, when someone cognizes 'whether it is a stem of a tree or a man ?' (*sthānurvā puruṣo vā ?*) -- is called doubt. Indecision is excluded from the purview of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) since it fails to grasp the specific characteristics of its object owing to distance, darkness and the like. Indeterminate cognition

(*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), the Jaina logicians unlike the Buddhist logicians hold, is a case of indecision since it also lacks consideration of specific characteristics. Error is excluded from the purview of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) since in this case one who cognizes something as having some character which actually does not exist. Thus authentic cognition is defined as “*prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādi vyavacchedeṇa miyate paricchidyate vastutattvaṁ yena tat pramāṇam pramāyāṁ sādhatamaṁ*”<sup>36</sup>

Now, the question is : how the authentic cognition is acquired ? The Jaina logicians are of the opinion that it is acquired through the instrumental condition (*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam*)<sup>37</sup> We have shown, in our earlier discussion, that there are mainly two opposite views regarding the origination of valid cognition / authentic cognition (*pramā/samyakjñāna*). Hemchandra, The Jaina logician, partially rejected and partially accepted both the views. The *Nyāya* logicians define means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as causal condition in general (*arthopalabdhi hetuḥ pramāṇam*). The Sanskrit word ‘*hetu*’ means the causal condition in general. But, causal condition in general (*hetu*), for Hemchandra, is the common attribute of all conditions. Consequently, if this definition is accepted, besides the sense-organ or sense-object-contact -- the subject, object, etc. would also lay claim as the causal condition. But, the subject or object is not the instrument of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*). Moreover, if this definition is accepted then even a remotely conducive condition lay claim to the recognition of causal condition. Thus the definition of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of the Naiyayikas suffers from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyāpti*).

The Jaina logicians accept the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) to avoid any remotely conducive condition as ‘the most

efficient condition' (*sādhakatama*) which being present the effect immediately follows. Now, one may claim that the Jaina logicians accept the Buddhists notion of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). The Jaina logicians explicitly argue that their notion of means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) is entirely different from the Buddhist notion of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). The Buddhist logicians hold that valid cognition (*pramā*) and means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is absolutely identical. Hence, the Buddhists explain the origin of valid cognition in a non-causal manner. The Jaina logicians, on the otherhand, endeavour to explain the origin of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) in terms of causal relation -- but the causality is not efficient causality and hence it is not temporal. The determinate (*vyavasthāpaka*) and the determinatum (*vyavasthāpya*) are not numerically different, but they are different in respect of function. There is no logical incompatibility in the something being its own determinant (*vyavasthāpaka*) and determinatum (*vyavasthāpya*). Realisation of the illumination of the object (*artha*) means 'the determination of it as the resultant.' Thus, the relation of means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) and resultant authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) partakes of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such it is consistent with the theory of non-absolutism (*syadvāda*).

Again, the Buddhist logicians definition of valid cognition cum its instrument is self-stultifying. They define means of valid cognition as that condition which is non-contradicted by subsequent cognition (*pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam*)<sup>38</sup>. They also claim that this instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is indeterminate in nature (*ālocana jñāna mātra*). But an indeterminate cognition (*ālocana jñāna*) cannot assert whether the cognition is contradicted by subsequent cognition or not. It would not be capable of generating

pragmatic consequences. That the indeterminate cognition is valid could be cognized only by a subsequent determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). Thus, the justification given to prove the validity of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), in Buddhism, is a borrowed one (*yācitakamaṇḍana Nyāya*). Again, the role of determinate cognition for stipulating the validity of a cognition cannot be denied even by a Buddhist logician. Hence, the Jaina logicians accept the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) as instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*).

The aim of authentic cognition (*samyak jñāna*) is to determine authentic object (*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam -- PM.Sūtra .2.*). Object of authentic cognition (*samyak artha*), in Jainism like *Nyāya*, is classified under three heads -- viz. what is to be avoided (*heya*), what is to be accepted (*upādeya*) and what is to be ignored (*upekṣanīya*). Ignorable (*upekṣanīya*) in *Nyāya*, Prof.R.N.Ghosh observes, could be subsumed under the avoidable (*heya*) on the ground of its being unfit for acceptance (*upādeya*)<sup>39</sup>. But, Hemchandra, the Jaina logician, observes that the ignorable (*upekṣanīya*), in Jainism, cannot be subsumed under the avoidable (*heya*). Because, if the ignorable is subsumed under the avoidable since it is not acceptable, by the same reason one may subsume it under the acceptable on the ground that it is not avoidable. Moreover, the category of ignorable has its overwhelming importance so far as the ascetics are concerned. Ignorable objects (*upekṣanīya viṣaya*), for the ascetics, are far greater than the desirable or avoidable objects (*na cānupādeyatvādupekṣanīya heya evāntarbhavati; aheyatvādupādeya evāntarbhāvaprakṣaṇe / Upekṣanīya eva ca mūrdhābhiṣikto 'rthaḥ, yogibhiṣṭasyaivaryamāṇatvat // asmādādināmapī heyopādeyabhyāṃ bhūyanevopekṣanīyo 'rthaḥ; tannayamupekṣitum kṣamaḥ*)<sup>40</sup>. But,

people other than ascetics have the attitude towards any object either to accept it or to avoid it. So, whether the objects of authentic or valid cognition are classified under three or two heads depends upon the desirability or undesirability of asceticism. Modern psychological studies reveal that asceticism ultimately cannot yield good result. The suppression of senses or desires in a rigorous way may cultivate ill mental health and thus it may be a hindrance for cognizing the true nature of an object (*artha*). Manikyanandin, another Jaina logician, has not entered to the problem whether asceticism should be allowed or not. He classified objects under two headings -- good (*hita*) and bad (*ahita*). This classification, in our opinion, is broader than the earlier one since it can accommodate both the attitude of ascetic peoples as well as people other than ascetics towards any object. If this classification is accepted then both the objects of desirable (*upādeya*) and objects of avoidable (*heya*), for the ascetics, are bad objects (*ahita*) and the ignorable objects are the only good objects (*hita*). Thus, the classification of objects of cognition under the headings of good and bad is more acceptable than the other classification. Manikyanandin thus rightly defines authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) as "*hitāhitaprapṛāptiparihārasamarthaṁ, tato jñānam eva tad iti*"<sup>41</sup>, i.e. an authentic cognition can guide us to do something which is good and to avoid something which is bad. Good and evil come from the objects of the world. Authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) identifies an object (*artha*) in its true nature. This revelatory identification helps the cognizer to accept what is good and reject what is bad.

Now, the question is : how the authenticity of cognition is revealed ? Those thinkers who believe that the condition of origination and the condition of authenticity is the same hold that the authenticity of cognition is revealed intrinsically (*svataḥ*) and

those thinkers who believe that the condition of origination and the condition of authenticity of cognition are different hold that the authenticity of cognition is revealed extrinsically (*parataḥ*). The Jaina logicians hold that cognition itself is self-revelatory. Because if it is not self-revelatory, it would not be capable of illumining external objects. But the condition of authenticity is external and yet there are some cases where the authenticity of cognition is revealed intrinsically.

On some occasions the authenticity is revealed through external senses -- such as primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) and in the case of Verbal Testimony (*śabdajñāna*). The authenticity in the case of primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) has not been ascertained at the time of its origination. Whether such primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) corresponds with the external relevant object or not is ascertained only by subsequent cognition. The same holds good in the case of Verbal Testimony (*śabdajñāna*). Its unfailing correspondence with the relevant object is not realisable by itself. Its authenticity is only determined by the external evidence furnished by verification.

The Jaina logician, Hemchandra like Gangeśa, again, holds that although the authenticity of cognition in most cases is determined extrinsically, yet there are some cases where the authenticity of cognition is self-validated. Such for instance is the case of habitual cognition (*abhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) of ones own palm induced by a repeated course of experience; or the direct intuition of results by verification offered by such tests as the acts of bathing, drinking, quench of thirst and like processes. The same holds good in some cases of inference when all the possibility of

doubt of the universal concomitance has been entirely eliminated. (prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ svataḥ yathābhyāśadaśāpanne svākārataladijñāne,  
snānapānavagāhanodanyopaśamadavarthakriyānirbhāse vā  
pratyakṣajñāne na hi tatra parikṣākāṅkṣāsti prekṣavataṃ, tathāhi --  
jalajñānaṃ, tato dāhapīpāsārtasya tatra pravṛttiḥ, tatastatprāptiḥ,  
tataḥ snānapānādini, tato dāhodanyopaśama ityetavataiva bhavati  
kṛti pramātā, na pūnardāhodnyopaśamajñānamapi parikṣate ityasya  
svataḥ prāmāṇyam / anumāne tu sarvasminnapi sarvathā  
nirastasamasta vyabhicāraśaṃke svate eva prāmāṇyaṃ,  
avyabhicāriliṅgasamuthātvāt; na liṅgakāraṃ jñānamliṅgaṃ vīnā, na  
ca liṅga liṅgināṃ vineti<sup>42</sup>

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- 1) “Pramākaraṇamevātra Pramāṇam tarkapakṣavat/ Pramācājñātatattvārthajñānamevātra bhidyate//”—  
MāṇamayaḍayaḥPramāṇapaṣicchedaḥ Sūtra -3.  
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Government of West Bengal, Published by the Principal,  
Sanskrit College; 1, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Cal-700073.
- 2) “Ajñātapadenatva jñātaviṣayoḥ smṛtyānuvādayornirāsaḥ.  
Tatra anuvādanamaPrāmāṇyam tārkkikādinām nānumatam.  
Vayaṁ tu brumaḥ—anuvādo hyasthaparicchede vyavahāre  
vā na pūrvaḥjñānāt kaścid viśeṣamadhatte. Ataḥ  
phalaviśeṣabhāvāt phalārtham ca Pramāṇānām svīkārāt  
smṛtyādivadanuvādoḥapi vahīkārya eveti.”-Pramāṇa  
Paricheda, Sūtra -4, P-6. Ibid.
- 3) “Nanu ajñātavagamasyaiva Pramātve ‘ghatohayam  
ghatohayāmi’ iti dhārāvāhikajñānesu dvitīyādinām  
apramātvam syat. Maivam. Tatrāpyayamayam iti  
uttarottareṣām kālāmśānāmajñātanāmavajamāt uttare  
kṣane ghatādisadbhāvasya ca pūrva jñānena anadhi  
gatatvat” - Sūtra 5 -P.7. Ibid.
- 4) “Nanu kālābhedaśyaupādhikatvat  
kenopādhinavacchinnānām kālāmśā na māṭṛavagama iti  
vaktavyam uccyate... ..” - Sūtra -6. P.8.

- 5) “..... *pūrvvapūrva-jñānanitanām prākṛtyanamuttarottarajñānaparyantamavasthānāt tadavacchinnānām kālānśānām tatratastravagama iti...*” - Sūtra -6. Ibid.
- 6) “*Na ca prākṛtyabhedānām sukṣatvat tadavacchinnānām katabhedānāmapi sukṣa tayā dūravagamatvamiti vācyam. Sukṣatve kamaladalaśātaṁ suchya yugapadabkinnamitivat sakṛdavavuddho ghata iti yougapadyabhimānaprasāṅgāt. Iha tuṣayam ayam iti punaḥ punaḥ kramānaiva pratiterdhārāvāhikasvabhāvasiddhatvat yougpadyabhimānasya virodha eva. Tasmāt prākṛtyābhedānām kālabhedanām ca na sukṣatvaṁ*”.-Sūtra -6. Ibid.
- 7) But it should be clearly borne in mind that all icchajanya inferences or knowledge-are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanya jñāna*—The concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in *Navya-Nyāya: Some Reflections*, Dr Raghunath Ghosh, JICPR, Vol.XV Number 1. Editor Baya Krishna. P-89, Sept-Dec. 1997.
- 8) “*Tattvapadena bhramasāśayādināmayatharthajñānānām nirāsaḥ. Tatra ayatharthajñānābhāvāt tattvapadaṁanarthakamiti prabhākaraḥ prāhuḥ. Evaṁ hi teṣāṁ matam, idaṁ rajatamityātra idamiti agr̥hitaviśeṣāṁ śūktisakalam gr̥hyate. Rajatamātram smāryate. Tayośca bhedagrahāt pūr̥vartini rajatārthinah pravṛtīḥ. Na tu*

*śuktisakalasya rajatattvena bhānamasti iti. Tattujjñānasya svaviṣaya eva pravṛttikāratva niyamadrajatejñānasyapi idaṁ viṣayatvabhāve tatra pravṛttiḥna sidhyet. Tathā idameva rajataṁṣiti sāmānādhikāraṇyaṁ tayorbhedapratitiṁ vīnā na sidhyet, ityādidisa nirākāraṇiyam”— Mānameyodaya.- Sutra -8. Ibid.*

- 9) “*tasmādanyathāgrahānarūpabhramādiḥjñānasadbhāvāt tannirāsarthaṁ tattvapadam. Tadevamajñātataṁvavagamarūpayah Pramāyāḥ karaṇatvena indriyasannikarṣādinām Pramāṇatvaṁ sūddham*”. Ibid.
- 10) “*Iha ca Pramāśabdena lakṣaṇaḥya tatkāryabhutasya prākṛtyasyapi pratipādānāt prākṛtyārūpaPramākaraṇatvena jñānasyāpi Pramāṇatvaṁḥahuh. Etāvata ca vyaṁ phalaPramāṇavādīnā iti giyamahe*”- Sūtra -9. Ibid.
- 11) “*Tārkikāstu Pramākaraṇam Pramāṇam, yathārathānubhavaḥ Pramā, anubhavaśca smṛtivyatiriktaṁ jñānam iti lakṣayanti. TadanuvādasyaPrāmāṇyasādhanāt tadvyavaratakasya ca padasyatrabhāvqativyaptaṁ”— Mānameyodaya- Pramāṇa paricchedaḥ Sūtra 10, Narayana Bhatta. Ibid.*
- 12) “*Anubhutiḥ Pramāṇam, smṛti vyatirikta ca sañvidanubhutiḥ. Iti prabhākaraḥ. Tadāpi bhramādiṇām sādhanāt teṣāmapi smṛtivyatiriktatvat tesvativyāptaṁ, kiñca sarvajñānesvapi ātmā jñānasvarūpaṁ viṣayaṁ viṣaya iti tritayāmapī prakāśate. Sarvatra cātmāsvātmānīśāyoh*

*Pramāṇtvaṃ pratyakṣatvamapyastite teṣāṃ matam. Tatāca smṛtivyāti- riktajñānasyaiva Pramāṇatve smṛterātmāsvātmāmsayoraPrāmāṇyaṃ, syadityavyaptimpyasti iti.”- Pramāṇa Paricchedaḥ- Sūtra 11. Ibid.*

13) “*Avisaṅvādi vijñānam pramāṇam. Avisāṅvāditvam ca arthakriyākāritvaṃ iti. Bouddhah. Tatra bhutabhabisyadiviṣayasyanumānasya arthakriyākāritvabhāvāt aprāmāṇyam syat smṛteśca kvacidarthakriyākāritvat prāmāṇyaṃ syaditi.” -Sūtra12. Ibid.*

14) “*Nanu arthakriyākāritvamāsyā arthatohativiprakaṣa bhāvāt daivagatameva, na svābhāvikam. Yathāhhuḥ— ‘manipradīpaprabhayormanibuddhyabhīdhāvatoḥ. Mithyājñānaviśeṣāpi viśeṣoharthakriyāṃ prati.” - pratyakṣa-Pramāṇam - Sūtra .15. Ibid.*

15) “*... vastutastvayaṃ vikalpo mithyā avastubhutasāmānyadiviṣayatvat, iti cenmeivam. Anumānavikalpasyapi a Prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt, sāmānyadervastutvasyā sadhayisyamanatvacca. Ataḥ Pramāṇeva savikalpakaṃ.”- pratyakṣa-Pramāṇam. Sūtra 15. Ibid.*

16) “*dhiyo ’msayor...kintu vyavasthāpya vyavasthāpakabhāvaḥ, sa ca tādātmye’pi aviruddha”.* *Pramāṇuvārttika of Dharmakīrti with commentary of Manorathanandi, P-194, Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.*

a) “*a cognition is metaphorically called pramāṇa”- Dignaga on perception, M. Hattori, p. 28.*

b) "... .. the basic identity of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, on close scrutiny, does not stand as an exclusive feature of the Buddhist theory of cognition along. The *Sāṃkhya-yoga*, the *Advaita-Vedānta* and *Mimāṃsakas* also despite their possible disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with this relation of identity in one way or other"- "The Buddhist Theory of Relation Between *Pramā* and *Pamāṇa*" *Jurnal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979), P 43-78.

- 17) "sarvasāmānyahetuvad akṣaṇam asti nedrśam / tadbhede'py abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat kuṭaḥ." *Pramāṇavārtika* of *Dharmakirti* with *Bhāṣya* of *Prajñākara*, K.J.R.I., 1953.
- 18) "sarvasya hi nīlapītadiviṣayasya sāmānyena hetuvad akṣam na bhedakam" .ibid.
- 19) "sarvātmānapi sambandham kaścīd evagamyate / dharmah, sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyaviśeṣataḥ" *Pramāṇavārttika* of *Dharmakirti* with commentary of *Manorathanandi*, 2/316, *Dwarika Das Sastri*, Benaras, 1968.
- 20) sarveṣām upayoge'pi kārakānām kriyām prati / yadantya bhedakam tasyaḥ tat sādhatamam matam."- Pv.B.3/312K.J.R.I.
- 21) "Ya kriyā yataḥ padārthād / avyavadhānena bhavati sa tasyah kāraṇamucyate, / tatascendriyādeḥ pramitiṃ pratyāvvyavahite / sādhatvabhāvān na pramāṇam" – *Pramāṇvārtika* of *Dharmakirti*; with commentary of *Manorathanandi*, *Tīkā on Pv.2/301*, *Dwarika Das Sastri*, Benaras, 1968.

- 22) “*katham tanhi cakṣusā paśyati iti, / kārane kāryopacārād evamucyate*” -- Pv.B.p.23 K.J.R.I
- 23) “*paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyanantarasya naḥ / pramāṇatvaṁ bhāvej, jñānepramāṇe tu param phalam*”. -- Sv.Chow.ed. Pratyakṣa p.118.
- 24) “*viṣayaikatvavat kriyākārayoḥ svarūpabhedo’pi lokasiddha eva*” – Pārthasarathi’s commentary on Sv.P.117, Chow. Ed.
- 25) “*prasuna ca vṛkṣades’cchidā nirūpyamāna / chedyadravyanupraveśalakṣaṇaivavatisthate, / sa cānupraveśaḥ parāśor ātmāgata eva dharma iti. / paramārthataśchidayā sahaikatvaṁ iti nāsti virodaḥ*” – kamalaśīla’s commentary on Ts;P399,G.O.S. Ed.
- 26) “*saśamvittaphalatvaṁ tu tanniśēdhān na yujyate /pramāṇe viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṁ prasajyate*”- Sv.Chow.ed. P.118.
- 27) “*idaṁ aparaṁ uktam kumārīlenaiva :- sasamvedanasya / niśēdhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvaṁ ayuktam, viṣayākārasya / ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalāyor bhinnaviṣayatvaṁ / prasajyate, tathā hi -- viṣayākāro vāhyaviṣayaḥ, / svasamvedanam tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayaṁ iti*”-- commentary on Ts;P400,G.O.S. Ed.
- 28) “*apratyokṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhati*” – Pramāṇavinis’caya, Dharmakarti;

- 29) “*na hi viśeṣyoparudharūpaṃ antarena viśeṣanatvaṃ nāma ,/ nāpi taduparudhatvagrahaṃ vīnā viśeṣānatvagrahanām / tadākāragrahane ca viśeṣyaṃ api grihitam evēti katham / tato viśeṣyādhir apara sādhyā syat ?*” – Prajñākara’s commentary on the verse of Pv.B.K.J.R.I.
- 30) “*tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*”—*Nyāyabindutīkā*, PP. 8-9.
- 31) “*bhrāntam hyanumānam. svapratibhāse ’nārthe ’dhyāvasāyena pravṛttvat*” –P.9. Ibid.
- 32) “*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhirti tad vyutpadyate*” —*Nyāyabindutīkā*, Ch.1,v1.
- 33) “Both perception and inference, acquaint us with the real *svalakṣaṇa*. Perception does it directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual constructs” – “Does *Dharmakīrti* Embrace A Pragmatic Theory of Truth in His Theory of Knowledge ?”, JICPR, VOL.XVI, NO.1, Sept – Dec 1998, P.95.
- 34) “*arthakriyā na yujyate nityakṣanikapakṣayoḥ / karmakramavyam bhāvānām sa lakṣaṇatayā mata*”-- *LT.II. 1.*(XV)
- 35) “*samyag ityaviparītarthavyam samaccaterva rūpaṃ*” *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā Tīkā* on Sūtra -11.

- 36) “*prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādi vyavacchedena miyate paricchidyate vastutattvaṁ yena tat pramāṇam prāmāyāṁ sādihakatamam*” -Tika on Sūtra -5. Ibid.
- 37) “*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam*”- P. M. sūtra 2.
- 38) “*pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam*” – Pv.II.1.
- 39) “*The sense in which upekṣābuddhi is admitted by the Naiyāyikas cannot be taken into account fully and I beg to differ from the Naiyāyikas in this respect. An object, I think is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for being indifferent. In my opinion the indifferent attitude towards an object which is described as upekṣā would fall under the category of rejection (hāna)*” – ‘Some Reflactions on the Nyāya Theory of Action’, Dr. Raghunath Ghosh, IPQ, Vol. XVIII. No. 4, October 1991.
- 40) “*na cānupadeyatvādupekṣanīya heya evāntarbhavati; aheyatvadupādeya evāntarbhāvaprakṛteḥ / Upekṣanīya eva ca mūrdhabhisikto'rthah, yogibhiṣṭasyaivaryamāṇatvat // asmādādināmapi heyopādeyabhyam bhuyanevopekṣanīyo'rthah; tannayamupekṣituṁ kṣamaḥ*”-- Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā Tika on Sūtra -10,
- 41) “*hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthaṁ, tato jñānam eva tad iti*”-- ParikṣāmukhaSūtra -Sūtra 2.
- 42) “*prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ svataḥ yathābhyasadaśāpanne svakaratalādijñāne, snānapānavagāhanodanyopaśamādavarthakriyānirbhāse vā*

*pratyakṣajñāne na hi tatra parikṣākāṅkṣasti prekṣavatam, tathāhi -- jalajñānam, tato dāhapipāsārtasya tatra pravṛtṭiḥ, tatastatprāptiḥ, tataḥ snānapānādini, tato dāhodanyopāśama ityetāvataiva bhavati kṛti pramātā, na punardāhodnyopāśamajñānamapi parikṣate ityasya svataḥ prāmāṇyam / anumāne tu sarvasminnapi sarvathā nirāstasamasta vyabhicāraśaṅke svate eva prāmāṇyam, avyabhicāriliṅgasamuthatvat; na liṅgakāram jñānamliṅgam vinā, na ca liṅga lingīnām vineti”—Ibid Tika on Sutra -22.*

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