

Nyāya and *Vedānta* both are authoritarian rationalistic systems of philosophy, since both believe in the authority of the *Vedas*. Consequently, both the systems have given more emphasis on suffering of man rather than the change of worldly objects or the distinction between appearance and reality. The subject matters like the distinction between appearance and reality, also change or evolution of worldly objects, specially in *Vedānta*, come under the purview of philosophical discussion secondarily as they are primarily akin to explain the end of suffering and goal of liberation (*mokṣa*). Although both the systems have the common goal, the approaches of explaining the Universe as a whole (*dr̥ṣṭi*) being different they come in conflict in each other regarding the concepts and also technical terms (*paribhāṣā*) of the *Vedas*. Interestingly, inspite of these conflicts the *Nyāya*, so far the classical texts are concerned, has not taken *Vedānta* as opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) seriously. *Vedānta*, among the authoritarian systems, had an important place in the history of Indian philosophy. But the emergence of the Neo-Naiyayikas have shadowed the glamour of *Vedānta*. *Navya-Nyāya* becomes the lamp or search light of studies (*pradīpasarvavidyānamupayaḥ*)¹. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra follows the *Nyāya* logic for explaining *Advaita-Vedānta* in his monograph (*prakaraṇa*) "*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*" and presents a fitted answer to the Naiyayikas. But the Naiyayikas have yet to respond to

Adhvarindra. Thus re-examination of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, for explaining *Nyāya* epistemology in modern times, becomes an essential one.

The term '*advaita*' means non-dualism. By 'non-dualism', some thinkers understood monism. But 'non-dualism' and 'monism' are not synonymous. The term 'monism' signifies the trend towards definite description. But the Advaitins seem to describe Brahman in an obscure way. Brahman, in this system is described in a negative way (by the method of '*neti ... neti*'). It is described as attributeless (*nirguṇa*), having no limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*), having no limited existence i.e. all pervading (*vibhu*), not capable of being described (*anirvacanīya*). The Advaitins, however, have accepted three types of reality, viz. transcendental (*pāramārthika*), phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) and apparent (*prātibhāṣika*) as a starting point of theorization only. The transcendental reality (*pāramārthika sattā*) is the ultimate goal of life. And, this transcendental reality is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). Hence, the term '*advaita*' should be understood as 'non-dualism' rather than 'monism'.

This Absolute Reality is Pure Consciousness (*Viśuddha Caitanya*) i.e. something positive and at the same time it is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). It is not just an apex of thought which signifies the unattainability of that imaginary object. Absolute Reality of the *Advaitins* is very much attainable and enjoyable but this enjoyment cannot be described by words. As the enjoyment of the Absolute Reality (*Brahman*) cannot be incarnated by words, it is not within the purview of epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*). Now, the question is : what is the need of epistemology in *Advaita Vedānta*? It is earlier mentioned that epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*) presents meta-physics in a sound way. Now the question is : How does epistemology play this role in this system? Real, in this system, in

our opinion, is a unified substratum underlying many, but not one, because it is indescribable. Hence, without the acceptance of diversity one cannot say that within these apparent diversities there is harmony. This harmony is in terms of *Brahman* or *Ātmān*.

Common people cannot cognize this attributeless *Brahman* without its conception. This is why the *Vedāntins* advocates for theorization that Brahman has two types of characteristic feature -- essential (*svarūpa*) and secondary (*tataṣṭha*). The essential characteristics of an object remains as long as the object remains ("*Yavallakṣyakala manavasthitatve sati yadsyavartakam*"²). But the secondary characteristic feature is essential to give a panorama of reality so that one becomes acquainted with it. These secondary features are true only in the phenomenal level but false in the transcendental level. After cognizing the true nature of phenomenal objects a tendency to transcend these arises in one's mind. Unless one cognizes the phenomenal world, one cannot reach the transcendental world. Thus epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), in Advaita *Vedānta*, vouches for falsity only but not for truth. Phenomenal world is just the ladder for the origination of a tendency to acquire the Absolute Reality. Hence the Upanisadic seers have suggested three methods of the self-realization – hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*) and meditation (*nidhidhyasana*). The Gita also suggests to adopt the best method of learning "*paripātena paripraśnena sevayā*". Thus, epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), in this system also, is essential to present the metaphysical part in a sound way.

Advaitins hold that non-contradiction (*avādhita*) is the crucial mark (*lakṣana*) of valid cognition (*pramā*). Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is in a little bit of doubt, in the first chapter of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, whether non-contradiction (*avādhita*) is taken as the only mark of

valid cognition. Because some Indian thinkers also advocate that 'prior unknown' (*anadhigata*) is also one of the mark of valid cognition (*pramā*). If memory (*smṛti*) comes under the purview of valid cognition then that cognition lacks the property of novelty, since memory originates from bare mental impressions only (*saṁskāra mātra*) cognized before. So these thinkers exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). But, some thinkers argue that even in memory there is novelty. Because, in the case of memory the object is past experience itself and it is known as different in different moments and the objects are not tautologies. Adhvarindra does not enter into the controversy whether in the case of memory there is novelty or it is a mere repetition of the same. So, he puts two definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*) in the first chapter of his monograph - '*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*' of which one definition includes memory (*smṛti*) as valid cognition (*pramā*) and the other definition excludes memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition³.

The first definition which excludes memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition runs thus :- a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition and which is not known before (*tatra smṛti vyavrttam pramātvamanadhigatavādhitarthavisayakajñatvam*). Here the term 'unacquired' (*anadhigata*) excludes memory from the purview of valid cognition. And, the second definition includes memory which runs thus :- a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition (*smṛti sādharānantu avādhitarthavisayakajñatvam*).

If the second definition is accepted then there is no problem in explaining persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñana*). But, if the first

definition is accepted, some thinkers hold, then the definition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Because, while someone is percieving an object more then one moment then the perception of the object of second moment and the rest only repeats the same object and consequently, there is no novelty in subsequent moments. But in Advaita-*Vedānta* persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) is considered as an instance of valid cognition -- hence, a paradox follows.

Adhvarindra presents two solutuions to get rid of this objection. One is borrowed from the Bhatta Mimamsakas and the other is from the Advaitins point of view.

From the Bhatta's point of view, it is argued that in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) time (*kāla*) is also involved to that object of cognition. Although, time has no colour (*rūpa*), it is an undeniable fact that different time moments are perceptible through our senses. So in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), though the bare object is the same, different time moments make the content of the object novel. So, the perception of the object, in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), at the first moment is different from the perception of object at subsequent moments. So, 'novelty' remains in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) also.

Secondly, from the point of view of the Advaitins ontological set up it is argued that in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), we cognize the same object. Because here the same modification of mind (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) persists through different time moments. A modification of mind (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) for Advaitins, persists till another counter modification of mind (*antahkaranavṛtti*) originates. As the modification of mind is the

same, the corresponding cognition is also the same. From the Advaitins point of view, we have only one mental modification (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) vis-a-vis one cognition in different time moments of persistent cognition also. So the question of repetition of cognition does not arise at all in this system⁴.

Let us justify the crucial mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), viz., non-contradiction (*avādhita*). It is said that a cognition would be valid if and only if it is not contradicted by subsequent cognition. But the Advaitins have recognised three types of reality (*satta*) -- viz., transcendental (*pāramārthika*), phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) and apparent (*prātibhāsika*). Cognition of 'rope as snake' is apparent (*prātibhāsika*), because such cognitions have no use to lead our practical life and also contradicted by cognitions which serve our practical (*vyavahārika*) life. So apparent cognitions are instances of invalid cognition (*apramā*). And when we perceive 'a snake as a snake', then our cognition is a valid one (*pramā*). Because such cognitions are not contradicted (*vādhita*) by subsequent mundane (*vyavahārika*) cognitions. But, the Advaitins consider transcendental reality (*pāramārthika sattā*) or cognition of Pure Consciousness (*Brahman*) only as the only Ultimate Reality. When one realizes Pure Consciousness, all the so called useful cognitions of common sense become meaningless (*mithyā*) to him. The phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are also contradicted by transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition. So, some thinkers hold that the Advaita definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Adhvarindra, here, argues that phenomenal or mundane (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are only contradicted (*vādhita*) by transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition and not by any phenomenal cognition (*Ātmāniścayat Brahma sākṣātkāraparyantam ityārtha*)⁵. So the definition of valid cognition

(*pramā*) does not suffer from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

Now one may argue that apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*) may also not be contradicted by other apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*). Apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*) are only contradicted by phenomenal one (*vyavahārika*). So the Advaitins definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Hence, the answer of Adhvarindra would be that conditions (epistemic / non-epistemic) for the emergence of transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition and the conditions for the emergence of mundane or phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are totally different. But the conditions for the emergence of both mundane (*vyavahārika*) as well as apparent (*prātibhāsika*) cognitions are the same. Having the similar conditions (epistemic / non-epistemic) apparent cognition is contradicted by mundane or phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognition. Hence, the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) does not suffer from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*).

Validity (*prāmāṇya*), for Adhvarindra, persists both in memory (*smṛti*) and immediate experience (*anubhuti*). What is a valid cognition (*pramā*)? Adhvarindra finally presents his own definition of valid cognition in Chapter-VI of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* as - 'when something is cognized as having some property where that property actually exists and is the efficacious to successful inclination which originates either from memory or from immediate experiences is called valid cognition (*tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādāhāranam samvādipravṛtṭyānukūlam tadvati tatprakarakam jñatvam prāmāṇyam*)⁶.

Visvanatha holds that valid cognition (*pramā*) is attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*), because the general conditions (*jñanasāmānyasāmagrīprayojyam*) remains both in the case of valid cognition as well as invalid cognition. Adhvarindra does not find any justification for supporting Visvanatha's view. If valid cognition, for him, is considered as attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*); there would be eternal relation (*nitya sambandha*) between valid cognition (*pramā*) and attribute (*guṇa*). But no such relation is found between valid cognition (*pramā*) and attribute (*guṇa*). Visvanatha further holds that sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), consideration i.e. the cognition of probans existing on the subject (*liṅga parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*atparyajñana*) and cognition of similarity (*sadrśyajñana*) is the attribute (*guṇa*) of perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison respectively. But, Adhvarindra shows that if sense-object-contact be the attribute of perception, then in each and every case of perceptual cognition the sense-object-contact would exist. But, for the perception of colour etc., (*rūpādi*) and for the perception of the soul such contact is not possible. Because for sense-object-contact our sense-organ might contact with the part (*avayava*) of the object, viz., colour, etc., (*rūpādi*), the soul (*ātmā*) is having no part (*avayava*). But, inspite of the absence of the part (*avayava*) we percieve such objects. Therefore sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is not the necessary condition for perceptual cognition. Hence, perceptual valid cognitions (*pratyakṣapramā*) are not attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*)⁷.

The same holds good in the case of inference, verbal testimony and comparison also. For Visvanatha, cognition of the actual existence of the probans in the subject (*salliṅga parāmarśa*) is the attribute of inference (*anumāna*). But Adhvarindra shows that

inspite of the existence of defective probans in the subject (*asalinga paramarśa*) some inferences are taken as valid which is not contradicted by getting the desired object (*asalinga paramarśadisthabhapi visayavādhena anumityadeh pramātvat*)⁸. Moreover, the Naiyayikas also consider two types of argument viz., bad argument (*kutarka*) and good argument (*sutarka*). A bad argument (*kutarka*) is that which contradicts with the assertions of the *Vedas* i.e. sometimes the proper logical form i.e the actual existence of the probans on the subject (*salinga paramarśa*) which has been taken as the attribute of inference, has been denied and its contradictory assertion is accepted. Thus there is no need to consider any attribute more and above the general conditions for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Again, inspite of the presence of the sense-object-contact for perceptual cognition, we sometimes mistake the white conchshell as the yellow one. This instance at least shows that the presence of attribute (*guna*) is not the special condition (*asadharana karana*). Because, we have seen in Chapter-II of this thesis that Visvanatha supports the Old-Naiyayika's view of instrumental condition (*karana*). The Old-Naiyayikas defines instrumental condition in the sense that which being present the effect immediately follows (*phalayoga vyavacchinnam asadharanam karanam karanam*). This inconsistency, perhaps, is felt by Visvanatha himself. This is why he also considers himself that the presence of attribute (*guna*) and the absence of defects (*dosa*) taken together is the cause for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence, Adhvarindra, in the first argument shows that the acceptance of attribute is not necessary for explaining the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*) and concludes that the presence of the general conditions

(*sādhārana kārana*) along with the absence of defects (*doṣa*) is the cause for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now, the opponents may argue that the acceptance of general conditions (*sādhārana kārana*) as the cause of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Because, the general conditions present both in the case of valid cognitions as well as invalid cognitions. Adhvarindra, here, argues that for the emergence of valid cognitions the mere presence of general conditions is not sufficient, but the absence of defects (*dosabhava*) is also necessary. Thus he concludes that invalid cognition is due to the presence of defective general conditions and valid cognition is due to the presence of general conditions which are not affected by any defect (*na caivam apramāpi pramā syat jñanasāmānyasāmagryaviśesaditi vācyam/ doṣābhāvasyapi hetutvāṅgikārāt*)⁹.

Now the question is : how validity (*prāmāṇya*) of a certain cognition, for Vedantins, be cognized or be apprehended ? Is the validity (*prāmāṇya*) be cognized simultaneously along with the origination of that cognition in question ? The Advaitins, unlike the Naiyayikas, answer it positively, i.e. they believe in the intrinsic validity of cognition (*svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*). A cognition would be intrinsically valid only if the validity of cognition is conditioned by the very conditions which condition the cognition itself (*yāvatsvāśrayagrāhakaśāmagrīgrāhyatvam*).

The Advaitins, generally, define validity (*prāmāṇya*) with regard to non-contradictory character (*avādhitatva*). But for the ascertainment of a particular cognition whether it is contradictory or not, we have to depend upon subsequent cognition. Because it is absurd to suppose that a cognition is from within as incapable of

contradiction in future. Gouḍabrahmānandi like thinkers here suggest that contradictory character (*avādhitatva*) has to be explained as ‘the property of being a cognition of anything which has not been to be contradictory so far (*prāmāṇyam vyavahāarakālavacchinnasya mithyātvaniścayaviṣayatvasya yā āś-
rayaḥ tadviṣayakadhisvarūpam*)¹⁰. If validity is taken in this sense even then the cognition is intrinsically true only from the point of view of apprehension (*jñāpti*) and not from the point of view of origination (*utpatti*). So, Madhusudana Sarasvati argues that non-contradictedness (*avādhitatva*) refers not merely to the absence of contradiction at the time of knowing (*vyavahāarakālabādhyatva*), but also to the absence of contradiction in future.

Madhusudana goes a further step and suggests that the term ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*), to keep the Advaita theory on the track of phenomenal demand, has a prime value. He upholds that validity (*prāmāṇya*) is ‘the property of being a certain apprehension of an object which was previously unknown (*ajñatarhaniścayatmakatvameva prāmāṇyamasmātpakṣe*)¹¹. Truth in this sense, Mohanty’s observation on Madhusudana’s claim, “satisfies three needs : it is capable of being apprehended svataḥ as the theory demands, and further it can account for unwavering activity (*niścampa pravṛtti*) as the phenomenal demand . it does not belong to error, for the content of erroneous apprehension, e.g the snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is been perceived and therefore has no unknown existence (*ajñāta sattā*)”¹²

It is true that this explanation saves the Advaita theory from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*) with regards to doubt (*saṁśaya*), because for the perception of ‘rope as snake’ prior perception of rope and snake is needed and the above definition excludes prior cognition (*adhigata*) from the purview of valid

cognition. It is also true that such prior unacquired cognitions are only cognized by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*).

But the definition fails to distinguish between error (*viparyaya*) and valid cognition (*pramā*). Because, prior unacquired error cognition may have the certainty also confirmed by the Witness-consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*) from the very beginning of the origination of that cognition. To save the theory from this change Madhusudana equates valid cognitionhood (*pramātvā*) with cognitionhood (*jñānatva*). Truth (*prāmāṇya*), for him, predicated to cognition only. Error is not a species of cognition at all. Error (*viparyaya*) is totally excluded from the purview of cognition (*jñāna*), and, yet he defines cognition in terms of error and vice-versa. Consequently, the fallacy of circularity (*cakrakadoṣa*) follows.

Adhvarindra does not think that error (*viparyaya*) and right cognition (*pramā*) are two parallel concepts, rather he thinks like the Naiyayikas that error and right cognition are the two species of cognition in general. Because both the species of cognition originate from the general conditions (*jñānasāmānyasāmagrī prayojyam*). This is why Adhvarindra finally, unlike Madhusudana, in Chapter-VI of his Monograph (*prakaraṇa*) “*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*”, supports the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) which excludes the term ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*) and to save it from the charge of psychological ascertainment only (*svataḥ jñāpti mātra*), he supplements the term ‘the cognition of a determinate property which actually exists to that determinandum’ (*tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatvam*)¹³.

Now, one may argue that even in phenomenal level (*vyavahārikadaśā*) some cognitions may form a coherent system in

such a way that the component cognitions of that system mutually support each other i.e. non-contradicted (*avādhita*) among themselves but is contradicted (*vādhita*) by another phenomenal coherent system and also both the system are useful to lead our practical life -- in such a situation both the systems could not be true at the same time and therefore, only one system could be accepted. This is the reason, perhaps, that the term 'efficacious to successful inclination' (*samvādipravṛtṭyānukūlam*) has been asserted and it has to be measured in terms of the Transcendental Truth (*pāramārthika sat*). 'Efficacious to successful inclination' may be taken as the linking point between Transcendental Truth (*pāramārthika sat*) and phenomenal truth (*vyavahārika sat*). This could be the reason of Adhvarindra's assertion that the instruments of valid cognition has two types of validity -- phenomenal and Transcendental (... *pramānānām prāmāṇyam dvividham, vyavahārika tattvavedakatvam pāramārthika tattvavedakatvañceti*)¹⁴. Otherwise, from the same condition two types of effect are not possible which once again, proves that phenomenal truths might have some link with the Transcendental Truth. Hence, contradictory coherent systems of valid cognition, in Advaita theory, are not possible. The Advaita theory of valid cognition, therefore, aims at reaching an ever-expanding, all-inclusive method of cognition. Hence, there is no scope of grades of truth in phenomenal level in this system. Besides, the system is capable of accomodating invalid cognitions also.

The Advaitins believe in the intrinsic truth of valid cognition (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*). Now the question is : if cognitions are intrinsically valid, why there is doubt regarding the validity of some cognitions. A cognition would be intrinsically valid if the truth of cognition also is vouched for and cognized by the inherent

conditions of the cognition itself. Now one may argue that Adhvarindra's concept of valid cognition does not arise from the inherent conditions only. Because, valid cognition (*pramā*), for him, is due to the presence of general conditions as well as due to the absence of defects and, of course, these absence of defects are not inherent conditions. Therefore, these external conditions are not grasped by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣi-caitanya*) at the time of origination of the cognition. Here, Adhvarindra's answer is that validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) would be extrinsic only if its origination is conditioned by some adventitious positive entity (*āgantukabhāvakāranapekṣayāmeva paratastavāt*). But the absence of defects (*doṣābhāva*) is a negative entity. Therefore, the cognition is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). And as the invalidity is conditioned by adventitious positive entity i.e. presence of some defects (*doṣa janya*) along with the presence of the general conditions, it is extrinsically valid (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*)¹⁵.

REFERENCES

- 1) “Pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānāmupayaḥ sarvakarmanām/āśrayaḥ sarvadharmānām sasavādānvikṣake mata”- Arthśāstra, Kautilya.
- 2) “Yavallakṣyakalā māṇavasthitatve sati yadsyavartakam” Dharmaraja Adhivarindra racita *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Viṣaya paricchada*, translated and elucidated by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, ed by Dr. Karunasindhu Das Sanskrit Pustka Bhandar 1995.
- 3) “ Tatra pramāyāḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam. Tatra smṛti-vyavṛttam pramātvamanadhigatavādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ, smṛtisādhāranantu avādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ”- *Viṣaya paricchada*- P-3. Ibid.
- 4) “.... Nirupasyapi kālasya indriyavedyatva bhyupagamana, dhārāvāhika-buddherapi pūrva pūrvajñānaviṣaya-tattatkṣane- viśeṣaviṣayākatvena na tatra avyaptiḥ. Kiñca siddhānte dhārvāhika buddhisthale na jñānabhedah, kintu yāvad ghatasphuraṇām tāvadghatakārantah kāranavṛtith, ekaiva, na tu nana, vṛttech svavirodhi- vṛttutpattiparyanta- sthāyitvābhyupagmāt, tathaca tatpratiphalita caitanyarūpaṁ ghatadijñānamapi tatra tāvatkālīnām ekameva iti na avyaptisaṁkāpi”. *Viṣaya paricchada*- P3. Ibid.
- 5) “Nanu siddhānte ghatādemirthyatvena vādhitatvat katham tajjñām pramā? Ucyate. Brahmasākṣātkārantaram hi ghata-dinam bādhaḥ, “yatra trasya sarvātmaivabhut tat kena kam pasyet” iti śruteḥ. Na tu saṁsāradaśāyām vādhaḥ, “yatra hi

dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati,” iti śruteḥ. Tathāva avādhita-padena saṁsārdaśāyamavādhitatvaṁ vivakṣitam, iti ghatadipramāyām na avyaptiḥ. Taduktam—
dehātomapratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ/
laukikam tadvadevedam pramāṇantvĀtmāniśvayāt//
iti. Ā Ātmāniścāyāt Brahmasākṣātkāraparyantam ityārthaḥ. Laukikam iti ghatadijñānam ityarthaḥ.” Viśaya paricchada – P 4-5. Ibid.

6) “*Evamuktānām pramāṇamām prāmāṇyam svata eva utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādhāranam samvādipravṛtṭyānukūlam taḥvati tat prakāra-kajñānatvam prāmāṇyam. Tacca jñānasāmānyasāmāgrī prayojyam, na tu adhikam guṇamapekṣate, pramāmātre anugata-guṇabhāḍt”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.*

7) “*Nāpi pratyakṣapramāyām bhuyo’avayavendriyasannikarṣah, rupādi-pratyakṣe ātmapratyakṣe ca tadbhāvāt, satyapi tasmin “pītaḥ sāmikha” iti pratyakṣasya bhramātvācca”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.*

8) “*Ataeva na sattīṅgaparāmāśādikamapi anumityādipramāyām guṇah, asallīṅgaparāmarsādisthalepi viśayabādhena anumityadeḥ pramātvat” Ibid.*

9) “*Na caivam apramāpi pramā syat jñānasāmānyasamagryāviśedaditi vācyam. Doṣābhavasyapi hetutrāṅgekārāt. Na caivam paratastvam, āgantukabhāvakāraṇa pekṣayaḥ jñeva paratastavat.” Ibid.*

- 10) “Prāmāṇyam vyavahāra-katavacchinnasya mithyātva-niścaya-viśaya-tvasya ya āśrayaḥ ta-kviśaya-dadhisvarūpaṁ”. Again, “Mithyātvena ajñātam yat tadviśayaka-jñānatvarūpapramatvasya jñānasāmānyagrāhaka-sākṣigrāhyatva rūpasvatogrāhyatvasambhāvāt” Advaitasiddhi, P.351-352, Gauḍabrahma-nandi. Advaitasiddhi edn.
- 11) “Ajñātārtha niścaya-tmakatvameva prāmāṇyamasmātpakṣe”-Advaitaratna-rakṣaṇam, Madhusudan Sarasvati, Advaitasiddhi edn. P.32.
- 12) “Truth in this sense, Madhusudan claims, satisfies three needs it serves to distinguish right knowledge from error, it is capable of being apprehended svataḥ as the theory demands, and further it can account for unwavering activity (niṣkampa pravṛtti) as the phenomena demand. It does not belong to error, for the content of erroneous apprehension, eg. The snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is being perceived and therefore has no unknown existence (ajñāta sattā).” Gangesa’s Theory of Truth, Introduction, P. 18, J.N.Mohanty.
- 13) “Evamuktanām pramāṇānām prāmāṇyam svata eva utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādhāraṇam samvādi-pravṛttyānukulam ta-kvati tat prakāra-kajñānatvam prāmāṇyam. Tacca jñānasāmānyasāmagrī prayojyam, na tu adhi-kam guṇa-mapekṣate, pramāṇātre anuga-ta-guṇabhāṣāt”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.
- 14) “Evam nirūpitānām pramāṇānām prāmāṇyam dvividhaṁ nyavathārika-tattva- -veda- -katvam pāramārthika-

tattvavedakatra-ñceti. Tatra Brahmasvarūpavagāhi
 pramaṇavyatiriktānām sarvapramāṇanāmadyam prāmāṇyam
 tadviṣayānām vyavahāra-dāsāyām bādhabhāvāt. Dvitiyantu
 jīvabrahamaikyaparanam” sadeva someyedamagra asit”
 ityevamadenām “Fattvamasi”ityantanam, tadviṣayasya
 jevabrahmaikyasya kālatrayavādhyatvat. Taccaikyam
 “Tattvam”—Padārthajñānadhīnaḡñānam iti prathamam
 “Tat”—padārtho lakṣama-pramāṇabhyam nirūpyate.” Vedānta
 paribhāṣāprameyakāndatmākah, Ch- 7th. P. 91 Ibid.

15) “Jñāyate ca prameyam svataḥ. Sratogrāhyatvañca
 doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāśrayagrāhakasāmagregrāhyatvaṃ.
 Svāśrayo vṛttigñānam tadgrāhakam sakṣijñānam. Tenāpi
 vṛttigñāne gr̥hyamāne tadgatam prāmāṇyamapi gr̥hyate.

Na caivam prāmāṇyasamśāyanupapattiḥ, Tatra
 sanisayanurodhena doṣayapi sattvena doṣābhāva-ghatita-
 svasāśrayagrāhakabhānena tatra prāmāṇyasyaiva agrahāt.
 Yadva yāvatsvāśrayagrāhakagrāhyayogyatvam svatastvaṃ
 samśāyāsthale prāmāṇyasya uktayogyatā sattvehapi
 doṣāvāseṇa agrahāt na samśāyanupapattiḥ.

Aprāmānyantu na jñāna-sāmānya-
 sāmagreproyogyam prāmāyāmaprāmānyapatteh. Kintu
 doṣāprayogyam. Napyaprāmānyam yāvats-
 svāśrayagrāhakagrāhyam aprāmānyaghataka-“Tadbhāvavattva”
 devṛttijñānānupanītattvena sākṣinā grāhitumaskyatvat. Kintu
 visamvādipravṛttyādiliṅgakānumityadiviṣaya iti parata eva
 aprāmānyam utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Ch. 6, P. 89. Ibid
