

The main task of this chapter is to highlight the Nyāya concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) in detail. We have already seen in the earlier chapter that each and every concept has to be studied within that conceptual scheme. The word '*pramā*' is used in Sanskrit literature in a very technical sense. It is one of the species of the genus term 'cognition' (*jñāna*). The concept cognition (*jñāna*) in Indian tradition, specially in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is wider than the western concept of knowledge (JTB), and hence, it receives a deep significance. The word '*jñāna*' and '*buddhi*' is taken as synonymous in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system (*'Buddhirupalabdhi jñānametyanarthantaram'*)¹. *Buddhi*, *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* belong to the same metaphysical category (*prameya padārtha*). It is the fifth among the twelve metaphysical categories (*prameya padārtha*). Cognition of these metaphysical categories (*padārtha*) is necessary for liberation. Human beings suffer or fall in bondage due to the wrong cognition of these categories. Cognition (*buddhi*) is an accidental quality of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self, yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities (*gunas*). Its existence is proved by our experience (*anubhuti*). It is the root of our all behaviour viz. desire to get (*Upādāna*), desire to leave (*hāna*) and indifference (*upekṣanīya*). (*"sarva vyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhi jñānam"*)². The word "*guṇaḥ*" is used to prevent the definition from the fallacy of

over coverage (*ativyapti*) in terms of space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), etc. And the word 'hetuḥ' signifies that it is the special condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) of all our behaviour.

But the above definition is not a perfect one, since the definition is unable to accommodate indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which has no behavioural usage. Thus the said definition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Annambhatta suggests that "*sarva vyavahāra hetuḥ*" is not the defining characteristics of cognition. Cognition (*buddhi*) is a special type of abstract concept. It cannot be defined by any synonymous words. There are other objects also which cannot be defined by synonymous word, but they can be defined, at least, ostensively. For example, the colour blue or red etc. cannot be defined by any synonymy, but one may present them before the hearer and thereby the hearer may be acquainted with the object in question. But, cognition can neither be defined by any synonymous words, nor, it can be defined ostensively. Yet, we have the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. So Indian thinkers have advocated that illumination of object (*arthaprakāśa*) is cognition. Annambhatta holds as "*sarvavyavahāra hetuḥ guṇah*" suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*), it is cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*) which is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of cognition (*jñāna*). Cognition (*jñāna*) is the locus of cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*). There cannot be any cognition if it is not related with cognitionhood. The existence (*sattā*) of cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*) is cognized by subsequent cognition (*Jānāmi iti anuvyavasayagamya jñānavam*)³.

Having the definition of cognition (*jñāna*), it is classified under two heads-- viz. recollection (*smṛti*) and presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Recollection (*smṛti*) is that cognition which originates from the bare mental impression (*saṃskāra-mātra-*

janyam- jñānam). Presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is defined negatively, i.e. it is that cognition which is other than recollection (*tadbhinnam jñānam*). Thus recollection (*smṛti*) is excluded from the definition of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Presentative cognition, again, is of two types -- valid presentative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) and invalid presentative cognition (*ayathārtha anubhava*). *Pramā* is presentative valid cognition.

Udayanacharya defines valid cognition as “*yathārthānubhavo māṇam*”⁴ and suggests to accept the etymological meaning of *yathārthānubhava* i.e. (*yathā + artha*). The etymological meaning of *yathārtha* signifies the similarity or correspondence. *Yathārtha* is the determinans (*viśesana*) of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). A presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is valid or true (*yathārtha*) only if it corresponds with the external object i.e other than the subject (self) having some content. But what types of correspondence ? Is the correspondence partial or in full? If it is conceived as a partial one, then the definition is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Because in the case of invalid presentative cognition (*ayathārthānubhava*) also there is partial similarity or correspondence between presentative cognition (*anubhava*) and the object having some content in question. For example, in the case of perceiving a rope as a snake, there is some kind of similarity in terms of common characteristics (*sādhāraṇa dharma*) between the object in question (*artha*) and the presentative cognition (*anubhava*). On the other hand, if the meaning of correspondence or similarity is accepted in full, then no presentative cognition (*anubhava*) would be valid (*yathārtha*).

As both the above mentioned views are extreme, and therefore, unacceptable, some thinkers hold that the correspondence would be determined by subsequent cognition (*jñānāntara*). This explanation

of the definition also affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*) in terms of illusory cognition (*bhrama*). Since, our illusory cognition (*bhrama*) is corrected only by a subsequent veridical cognition, but, before that veridical cognition our illusory cognition may be supported by immediate subsequent invalid cognition.

Once again, presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) could not even be defined as a cognition which leads to successful activity (*saphala pravṛttijanakatva*). Because, the Naiyayikas, unlike the Buddhists, accept three types of cognition, viz., desire to accept (*hāna*), desire to leave (*heya*) and indifferent attitude (*upekṣanīya*). Indifferent cognitions (*upekṣanīya jñāna*), for them, does not serve any purpose. So, the cognition of such object does not lead to any successful activity. So, if it is defined in terms of successful activity (*saphala- pravṛtti-janakatva*), it would be affected by the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

However, before going to explain the nature of presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*), let us examine the similarity or dissimilarity between Indian concept of *pramā* and western concept of knowledge. It is already mentioned in the earlier chapter that there is a controversy among the modern thinkers regarding the exact western epistemological synonymy of the Indian concept of *pramā*. Generally, knowledge in the sense of justified true belief is taken as a synonymy of *pramā*. Sutapa saha argues that since 'yathārtha' is the equivalent of 'true' and 'anubhava' is equivalent to 'justified belief', *pramā* may be taken as the synonymy of knowledge⁵. But, before going to have a decision, we have to examine each component word.

In western tradition, there are mainly two views regarding the definition of knowledge. Traditional philosophers generally defined knowledge in terms of belief. Belief, for them, may turn into knowledge if the belief is true and the believer has some justification for his / her belief. There are some other philosophers, on the other hand, like Cookwillson, Prichard, etc., who maintain that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief, because the nature of belief and knowledge is totally different. Knowledge, for Prichard, is by definition true. So, to ascribe 'knowledge is true' is a tautology. Truth and falsity is predicated to belief only. As knowledge is necessarily true, its propositions are *a-priori* and as belief is only contingently true / false -- its propositions are *a-posteriori*. Thus, the object of knowledge is totally different from the objects of belief. Therefore, knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief.

Let us examine whether *pramā* is equivalent to knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. The first objection is that in Indian epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*) we do not encounter with such concepts like belief which is a form of life of Western epistemology. J.N.Mohanty shows that there is some kind of hints of the concept of belief in Indian tradition also⁶. He argues that *pramā* is a non-dubious cognition (*niścaya jñāna*). A non-dubious cognition (*niścaya jñāna*) may be either valid cognition (*pramā*) or invalid cognition (*apramā*), just as a belief may be true or false and immediately he concludes that the Indian concept of *niścaya jñāna* and the Western concept of belief are synonymous. The comparison, to our opinion, is a misleading one. The Sanskrit word '*niścaya*' means 'being confident of'. Mohanty comes to the conclusion only from the similarity that truth and falsity are predicated to both in the case of the Western concept of belief and in the Indian concept

of *niścaya jñāna*. But Mohanty's logic in this regard is not so sound. Truth and falsity are not the exclusive essential characteristics of belief or *niścaya jñāna*. So from the observation of the applicability of some accidental characteristics it does not follow that the locus of these characteristics are essentially identical. For example, red and white colour may be predicated to clothes as well as flowers, thereby we cannot say that cloth and flower is identical. Moreover, it is already mentioned that some Western thinkers have not defined knowledge in terms of belief. But, 'being confident of' is a necessary condition of knowledge even to these thinkers, hence 'belief' and 'being confident of' are not synonymous. Again, a *niścaya jñāna* in Indian tradition, as Mohanty observes, may be either valid or invalid. Although, being confident of is a necessary condition of the western concept of knowledge, yet these Western thinkers like Cookwillson, Prichard, etc., are of the opinion that truth and falsity can not be predicated to knowledge. Because knowledge is by definition true, hence to ascribe knowledge as true results a tautology and to ascribe knowledge as false results a self-stultifying position. Hence our opinion is that being confident (*niścaya jñāna*) is merely a mental attitude towards a cognition. A mental attitude cannot be predicated as either true or false. When being confident (*niścaya jñāna*) is predicated as true or false -- it is merely a case of transferred epithet. So *niścaya jñāna* should not be translated as belief. But Mohanty is right in saying that "western concept of belief is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścaya jñāna*, if *savikalpaka*, i.e. a conceptual has a propositional structure".

The above discussion shows that the concept of belief has been neglected in Indian epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*). Recent Western thinkers also feel that the concept of belief in defining knowledge is not so important. Chisholm and Keith Lehrer, thus,

introduce the concept of 'acceptance' instead of belief. Belief, for them, is associated with our emotions, desire, etc. So if knowledge is defined in terms of belief, then the so-called knowledge may be affected by the defect of one-eyedness and hence may be an obstacle in knowing the object as such. Ayer also instead of using the concept of belief, introduces the concept of 'being sure' and treats it as a special state of mind.

Although recent Western thinkers also avoid the concept of belief in defining knowledge, there is another point of difference between knowledge and *pramā*. Western thinkers hold knowledge either as an act or as a disposition. If it is explained as an act, then it cannot explain all sorts of knowledge which are recognised in common usage. So some Western thinkers explain knowledge as a disposition. Because, if knowledge be an act, for them, it would cease to exist after some time. But the nature of knowledge is not of that sort. For example, I may claim that I know the date of great Ashoka's coronation as a king, although, I cannot for the time being recollect it and it may also happen that after some time although I am not thinking about Ashoka now, yet all on a sudden I may correctly recollect the said date. So, knowledge, for them, is a disposition. *Pramā*, in Nyāya, is neither a disposition nor a pure act in Western sense. *Pramā* is propositional or determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). Western thinkers distinguish between a proposition and a sentence. A sentence can neither be true nor be false; a sentence is either grammatically correct or incorrect. What a sentence means is a proposition. A proposition is said to be a neutral entity, since it is neither purely subjective, nor purely objective. It subsists beyond space and time. So, some Western thinkers hold that it is the proposition which is either true or false. But, the problem is : if such neutral entity is conceived, we have to

consider infinite numbers of proposition corresponding to each state of affairs. So, Austine like thinkers hold that it is the judgment, which is either true/ false. Because in judgment there is a mental act directed to the correlative proposition which we believe or disbelieve. Nyāya system does not distinguish between an act and a proposition., because a proposition, in the above mentioned sense, certainly is not a quality (*guṇa*) of the self. But cognition, in this system, is considered as a quality, though accidental, of the self. J.N.Mohanty rightly observes that “ a *savikalpaka* knowledge is propositional though not a proposition I call it ‘propositional’ for it is a logical complex analysable into constituent elements and relations”⁷. *Pramā* is used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense. The Sanskrit term ‘*saṁskāra*’ is taken as a synonymy for disposition. But what originates from the bare mental impression (*saṁskāra mātra janyam*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Some opponents, once again, advocate that the Nyāya concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) cannot even be spoken as an episodic occurrence. Since God’s cognition is eternal (*nitya jñāna*). Whatever is eternal cannot be ascribed as having origination. God is the creator of the world, omniscience, and therefore, it would not be rational to say that once He lacked cognition of something. This objection may be overcome by a clear distinction between a metaphysical problem and an epistemological problem. The notion of God’s cognition is a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological problem.

Now, the last but not least objection in equating knowledge with *pramā* is the concept of justification or evidence. If some one claims having knowledge, in general, we enquire for evidence to

justify his / her claim. We use the word '*pramāna*', in our day-to-day life, for the word 'evidence' or 'justification'. But a serious observation shows that the word '*pramāṇa*' has been used in a very technical sense. Here, *pramāṇa* does not mean evidence, rather it is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramā*). And as valid cognition (*pramā*) means presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*), the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is the yardstick of verification (*yathārtha*). The word '*pramāṇa*', again, is sometimes translated as proof. The Western thinkers generally distinguishes between evidence supported by reason and evidence supported by senses. Evidence guided by reason, for them, gives the apedictic or absolute certainty, where as evidence guided by the senses can give us to its best effort the maximum probability. So the word 'justification' in Western tradition is used in two senses -- viz. in the strong sense and in the weak sense. Justification, in the strong sense, means 'truth-ensuring' and in the weak sense it means 'truth-conducive'⁸. But the question is : is reason really infallible ? Even if reason is regarded as 'the Divine element in man', it is as imperfect as any other human faculty. This is why Western epistemology suffers from Gettier like problem. Gettier has shown that it may happen that there may be justification in the strong sense (justification by applying the rules of logic, viz.--Existential Generalization and the rule of Addition), yet some cognitions may not be ascribed as knowledge. This shows that the Western concept of justification is not always truth hitting.

The Indian concept of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*), on the other hand, is always truth hitting. No such concepts of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) guided by reason is found in Indian tradition. There is no distinction of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) in the strong sense i.e guided by reason and instrumental

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condition in the weak sense i.e. guided by the senses. Pure mathematics and empirical sciences, in Indian tradition, have the same logical status. Even the concept of Universal (*jāti*), in Nyāya, is cognized through perception, though through super natural perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). The Naiyayikas have accepted the *samanyalakṣana* as a super-normal connection (*pratyāsatti*). To the Naitayikas the cognition of *vyapti* is to be attained through the cognition of all individual manifestations of probans and probandum which is acquired by *samanyalakṣana*. Hence it is a connection or *pratyāsatti*. The inference of fire from smoke is possible when the *vyapti* relation is apprehended between smoke in general (*dhumasāmānya*) and fire in general (*vahnisāmānya*). Such type of cognition is not possible by ordinary process of perception, because an individual can know only the co-existence of a particular smoke with a particular fire in a normal way. Hence the method of the supernormal connection through universal (*sāmānyalakṣanapratyāsatti*) is to be resorted to for acquiring the cognition of *vyapti* between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general (“*sāmānyapratyāsattya sarvoposaṁhārād avinabhavagrahaḥ*”-- T.C., ‘*sāmānyasya hi pratyāsattitvaṁ lāghavat, na tu sāmānyatayā jñātasya*’⁹. We find constant reference to the very general principles of logic in Navya-Nyāya, but these principles are not regarded as self-evident. They are usually justified by a direct reference to experience (*pratiti*). Thus in no way *pramā* be equated with knowledge.

Pramā, for the Naiyayikis, is presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*). Recollection (*smṛti*) may be veridical also (*pramā janya yathārtha, apramā janya ayathārtha*)¹⁰, yet it is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). It is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*), since the

nature of presentative veridical cognition (*anubhava*) is explained as that which originates after the intermediary (*vyāpara*) of the instrumental condition (*anu pramānavyāparat param bhavati yah saḥ anubhavaḥ*)¹¹. But, there is no such intermediary condition for the origination of recollection (*smṛti*). Recollection (*smṛti*) originates from the bare mental impression only (*saṁskāra mātra janyam jñānam*).

Presentative cognition (*anubhava*), in TS, is defined negatively, i.e. 'other than recollection' (*tadbhinnaṁ jñānam*) and its nature is associated with the concept of the instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*), in Nyāya, are inter-related terms. Hence the Naiyayikas give a causal definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) -- the result of the instrumental condition is the effect - valid cognition (*pramāyāḥ karaṇam pramāṇam...*)¹².

What is a instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) ? From the point of view of important in producing the effect, there are two types of conditions in Nyāya-Vaisesika system --viz. common one (*sādhārana kārana*) and uncommon one (*asādhārana kārana*). By common conditions (*sādhārana kārana*) means those conditions which are necessary for the production of any effect. For example, God (*iśvara*), space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), the unseen power (*adr̥ṣṭa*), will of God (*iśvarecchā*), in Nyāya ontology, are the common conditions. Beside these common conditions (*sādhārana kārana*), there are some uncommon or special conditions (*asādhārana kārana*) which are only necessary for the origination of a particular effect. These type of conditions are called uncommon or special conditions (*asādhārana kārana*). Annambhatta defines instrumental condition (*kārana*) as " *asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam*"¹³. For example, sense-object-contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*),

consideration (*parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*tātparyajñāna*) and cognition of similarity (*sādrśya jñāna*) is the instrumental condition of perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and comparison (*upamāna*) respectively. A question may be raised why they are called instruments (*karana*). Generally the uncommon causes along with operative process (*vyāparavadasādhāranam kāranam karanam*). Consideration or *paramarśa* is called *vyāpāra* and the cognition of *Vyapti* is an uncommon causes (*karaṇa*). The former is called operative process or *Vyāpāra* because this cognition being caused by the cognition of *Vyapti* becomes the generator of the inferential cognition. In the form of consideration or *parāmarśa* -- '*vahnivyapyadhūmavān ayam parvataḥ*' i.e. the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire, this piece of cognition is caused by the previous cognition of *Vyapti* reflected in the portion -- *vahnivyapya* (pervaded by fire) and generates the inferential cognition -- '*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*' (the mountain is fire-possessing). Hence the definition of *Vyāpara* in the form -- '*tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyāparaḥ*' can easily be applicable here. In this way, the existence of an uncommon cause along with operative process can be admitted in other forms of inferential cognitions.

One point may be mentioned in this connection. The perceptual cognition alone is called *jñānakāranaka* i.e. a cognition not caused through the instrumentality of other cognitions. When a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognitions to have direct awareness of it. In other words, another cognition does not serve as an instrument to this perceptual cognition and hence it is called independent. But other forms of cognition are called *jñānakāranaka* i.e. caused through the instrumentality of another cognition. These cognitions are not independent by virtue of the fact

that they depend on some other cognitions for being the means of valid cognition. Inferential cognition (*anumiti*), cognition through comparison (*upamiti*) and testimonial cognition (*śabda*) are generated through the instrumentality of other cognitions like the cognition of invariable relation (*vyaptijñāna*), cognition of similarity (*sadrśyajñāna*) and cognition of word (*padajñānam*). In the case of perceptual cognition the sense organ etc. are alone taken as instrument, but not any cognition. It is said in the *Nyāyabodhini* commentary on *Tarkasamgraha* -- “*jñānam vyaptijñānam sadrśyajñānam padajñānam ca. Tadeva karanam yasem tāni jñānakaranakāni anumityapamitis’abdāni. Tadbhinnamityarthah. Pratyakṣendriyanāmeva karanatvam, na jñānasya. Tathā ca jñānakaranakajñānatvasya pratyakṣasāmānya eva vidyamānatvallakṣanasangatiḥ.*”¹⁴.

Now, the question is: what is the mark of selecting an uncommon or specific condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). The Naiyayikas differ in maintaining the defining mark of uncommon conditions (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). The ancient Naiyayikas criterion for selecting the uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is -- “*phalāyogavyavacchinnaṁ asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanam*”¹⁵. This means that an uncommon condition is that condition which being present the effect originates without delay. Perception, for example, takes place only when our sense-organ comes in contact with the object. Hence the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the condition which being present the effect immediately follows. Sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*). So, the ancient Naiyayikas indicate that instrumental condition might be a non-inherent one (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*).

The Neo-Naiyayikas criterion, on the other hand, for selecting an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is : “*vyāparavat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanam*”¹⁶. What is a intermediary condition (*Vyāpara*) ? A intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is that factor which being produced by something becomes the producer of that entity produced by earlier one (*Tajjanyate sati tajjanya janako*)¹⁷. Let us take a symbolic example of X, Y and Z. Y is a intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) because Y being caused by X becomes the producer of Z caused by X. Let us take a concrete example, sense-object-contact, in the case of perception, is caused by the sense-organ produces the effect perception. Hence, sense-object-contact is the intermediary condition (*vyāpara*). An intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is always either a quality (*guna*), or an action (*karma*), but never a substance (*dravya*) -- “*dravyetara*”. But the instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) is defined as the locus of the intermediary condition (*vyāparavat*). The suffix ‘*vat*’ of the Sanskrit word “*vyāparavat*” means that occupies. The intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is occupied by substance (*dravya*). So, a special condition (*karaṇa*), for the Neo-Naiyayikas, might be a substance or an inherent condition (*samavayi karaṇa*).

A third view, once again, is found in Jayanta Bhatta who presents another criterion for selecting an uncommon condition (*karaṇa*) taking clue from the famous grammarian Panini. Panini defines an uncommon condition (*karaṇa*) as “*sādhakatama*”¹⁸. The word ‘*sadhakatama*’ derives from the root ‘*sādhaka*’ meaning the instrumental and the suffix (*pratyā*) ‘*tama*’ meaning excellence (*atiśaya*). The excellence of a condition, according to Jayanta, neither prevails in an inherent condition (*samavāyī kāraṇa*) nor in a non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*), rather it prevails in the conglomeration of conditions (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*).

Both the Old and Neo-Naiyayikas accept instrumentality (*karana*†*tva*) as an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). But there are several uncommon conditions. For example, the presence of the perciever (*draṣṭā*), sense-organ (*indriya*), the object (*artha*) and the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) -- all are necessary conditions for perception. Independently, each and every condition has its own speciality or uniqueness (*asādhāraṇatva*). There is no specific stipulation in Sanskrit literature regarding the use of the third case-ending (*ṭṛtīyā vibhakti*). It depends upon the speaker's intention (*Vaktā-vivakṣādhīna*). The only stipulation is that the third case-ending is neither used to the subject (*kartā*), nor to the object (*karma*). The Old-Naiyayikas emphasise upon the extreme condition (*carama kāraṇa*) whose presence is immediately followed by the emergence of effect. The Old-Naiyayikas, therefore, think that the excellence (*atiśaya*) remains to this condition.

But the Neo-Naiyayikas advocate that the excellence (*atiśaya*) cannot remain in the intermediary condition (*vyāpara*), because, it cannot produce the effect without taking co-operation from other conditions. Uddyotkara, hence, admits the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpara-viśiṣṭa kāraṇa*) as an instrument (*karana*). But, this view also does not hold good, because, there are at least some cases where intermediary condition is more important than the locus of intermediary condition (*vyapārī*), i.e. the excellence remains in the intermediary condition. Memory, for example, occurs in the presence of mental trace alone (*saṁskāra mātra*). These mental impressions, of course, are dependent upon the past experiences (*pūrvānubhava*) that are destroyed at that time. Or, a sacrificial rites (*yāgādi kriyā*) may be destroyed, yet the unseen power (*adrṣṭa*) arising out of these sacrificial rites is regarded as the excellent condition of heaven (*svarga*). Thus, both the views accept excellence

(*atiśaya*) only in a subjective sense, because, the determination for selecting the excellence depends upon the speaker (*vakta*) and, hence unacceptable.

Jayanta tries to come out from the subjective determination for selecting the excellence (*atiśayatva*). He accepts the instrumental condition in the extreme property of sense and expressed it in the superlative degree (*sādhakatama*). An instrument, for him, is that which is most efficient or operative to the origination of an effect. The collocation of condition is collectively essential for it . If one condition is absent, the effect does not take place. No credit is to be given to any individual condition. It may be argued that though all conditions are essential, yet one condition whose immediate presence makes the cognition possible is to be taken as distinct. Jayanta, to refute the above objection, cites an example. In darkness flash of lighting, in the traditional sense, is the instrumental condition of illumining a women. But had there been no women, she would not have been seen, hence she is no less important as object. Hence, collocation (*sāmagrī*) is instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). It acts not by independent status but by the process of the condition included in it. When there is assemblage each and every condition will not lose its own identity. The Old-Naiyayikas concept of instrumentality (*karanatva*) fails to explain the independent excellence (*svādhīna atiśaya*) of each condition. The Neo-Naiyayikas concept of instrumental condition (i.e. as the locus of intermediary condition), on the other hand, fails to explain the immediate emergence of the effect. Jayanta, as a consequence, advocates that the collocation (*sāmagrī*) alone can claim instrumentality (*karaṇatva*), because it can overcome both the demerits of the Old-Naiyayikas and the Neo-Naiyayikas.

Now, one may raise the question that instrumentality (*karāṇatva*) as the collocation of all conditions (*sādhakasāmagrī*) also possesses the status of relative excellence (*atiśaya*). Because the collocation is nothing but all conditions taken together. Hence the excellence of the collocation of conditions is dependent upon the excellence of the individual conditions. Because the relation between the collocation of conditions and an individual condition separately is not the relation between part (*avayava*) and whole (*avayavī*). Part, in Nyāya system, is completely different (*atyantabhinna*) from the whole. But, individual conditions are not completely different (*atyantabhinna*) from the collocation of condition. Being united the individual conditions form the collocation and yet these conditions do not lose their uniqueness. Jayanta would answer this problem in the following way. The individual conditions separately could not possess excellence (*atiśayatva*), because the individual conditions separately are common conditions (*karana*) but not an uncommon condition (*karana*). There is a difference between uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*) and excellence (*atiśayatva*). The individual condition in isolation possesses uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*), but when these conditions get together and form the collocation, it acquires the additional property of excellence (*atiśayatva*) in relation to the isolated members. Jayanta, hence, defines instrumentality of valid cognition as an aggregate of certain conscious and unconscious conditions which together make the apprehension of non-erroneous (*avyabhicārinim*) and non-doubtful (*asandigdham*) cognition possible (*avyabhicārinim asndigdham arthopalabdhim vidadhati vodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇam*)¹⁹. The two adjectives of non-erroneous (*avyabhicārinim*) and non-doubtful (*asandigdham*) constitute the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and the collocation of conscious

and unconscious conditions constitute the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now a question raised by Jayanta himself from the point of view of Grammarians. Instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) in Sanskrit literature, for the Grammarians, is not used in the case of collocation (*sāmagrī*). Nobody says that he is seeing with the collocation of conditions (*samagryā paśyati*); but it is the common usage that he sees with the eyes. Hence collocation is not an instrument and if instrumentality is taken as the most effective condition (*sādhakatama*), then the common sense of instrumentality would be useless. Because, instrumental case, in common usage, is only used to an individual condition.

This objection, for Jayanta, is not a serious one. Because he never suggest to use instrumental case (*karaṇa*) to a collocation of condition (*sāmagrī*). He only indicates that an instrumental case ending (*trītyā vibhakti*) is used to an individual condition only when a isolated condition gets together for the production of an effect. So, collocation of condition is only a pre-condition for the use of instrumental case or third case-ending (*trītyā vibhakti*).

Once again, if collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions is taken as instrument in the sense of most effective for producing an effect (*sādhakatama*), then even the subject (*kartā*) and object (*karma*) of cognition are also included to that collocation (*sāmagrī*). In darkness, for example, flash of lighting is the cause of illuminating a women. But had there been no women, she would not have been seen, hence, she is no less important as object. But, in collocation the presence of the women and the perciever is also taken together. Consequently, we have to say that there is no cognizer and cognition without a cognizer is inconcievable. Again,

if the object is also included into the collocation of condition which is taken as an instrument (*sādhakatama*), then the cognition would be without any object. If this is accepted, the Nyāya epistemology will lose its epistemic status. Jayanta in order to avoid this problem, defines instrumentality (*sādhakatama*) as the collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions other than the subject and object (*tasmāt kartṛ karma vilakṣanā*) which is excluded from doubt and error (*tasmāt kartṛkarmavilakṣanāsamśayaviparyarahitārthāvodhavidhayinivodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇamiti yuktam*)²⁰.

Let us note the following observations on Jayanta's theory of the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) :-

(a) Instrumental condition in general means an unconscious condition, even if it be conscious to some cases, it acts just as an unconscious condition, because an instrument by itself has no active role for the origination of an effect. But, Jayanta's concept of instrument of valid cognition is not solely unconscious. Because by instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) Jayanta means the collocation of condition taking both the conscious and unconscious conditions.

(b) The general concept of instrument is that it is an uncommon condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) and refers to an isolated condition. But Jayanta's concept of instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is most effective condition for the origination of an effect (*sādhakatama*), besides this concept does not contradict with the stipulation of the Grammarians. The Grammarians suggest that the third case-ending is always used to a isolated condition. Jayanta has not opposed to this

stipulation. He only suggests that the collocation makes the ground for such usages.

(c) Though all conditions, in collocation, get together and acquires the property of most excellence (*atiśayatva*) than the individual isolated condition, yet the isolated conditions are not modified. Hence, each and every isolated condition is capable of retaining its own uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*).

(d) The isolated individual member has only its own uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*), but these isolated conditions never acquire the property of excellence (*atiśaya*). It is the collocation which acquires the property of excellence (*atiśayatva*).

But the question arises now is that though Jayanta is capable of justifying that it is the collocation of condition which acquires the property of most excellence (*atiśayatva*), yet why he excluded the subject (*kartā*) and object (*karma*) from the collocation of condition in his concluding remark. Secondly, if the subject (*karta*) and the object (*karma*) is excluded from the collocation of condition (*kāraṇa sāmagrī*), is it possible to maintain the nature of both conscious and unconscious in the concept of instrument of cognition (*pramāna*) ?

If the subject and object is excluded from the collocation of condition then from the point of view of both the Old-Naiyayikas and Neo-Naiyayikas it would lose its property of being most excellent. Because, such collocation being present fails to originate the effect immediately i.e. without any temporal gap. Besides such collocation has to depend upon the subject and object. Secondly, we have to examine another crucial point also that if subject and object

is excluded from the collocation of the condition then is it possible to maintain the nature of the instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*) as the nature of both conscious and unconscious at all? Because, Jayanta explicitly maintains that the four, viz. the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), the object of valid cognition (*prameya*), the act cognition (*pramiti*) and the cognizer (*pramātā*) are the main components of Nyāya epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*). If the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) becomes meaningful, other factors like cognizer (*pramātā*), cognizable entity (*prameya*), and right cognition (*pramiti*) becomes meaningful. All these are always *pramāna*-centre ('*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityārthavanti bhavanti*')²¹. An individual who has got desire of attaining or forsaking something is called cognizer (*pramātā*). The object which becomes an object of right cognition is called *prameya*. The right cognition regarding some object is called *pramiti*. Any type of cognition involves these four ("*Tatra yasya sājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā. Sa yenartham praminoti tat pramānam. Yo'rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam. Yadarthavijñānam sa pramitiḥ. Catusṣṭvevaṁvidhasu tattvaṁ parisamāpyate*")²². There may be other conditions also which are not so important.

Visvanatha's approach in explaining the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāna*) is very much straight forward. He has not entered into the difficulty of the instrumental condition (*karana*). He defines invalid cognition (*apramā*) as 'tacchunye' and 'tacchunye' is explained 'if something is cognized as having some property, where as it does not have that property, it is called invalid cognition (*apramā*)' (*tadbhavavati tatprakarakam jñānam bhrama ityārtha*). Invalid cognition (*apramā*) is of two types -- viz. error (*viparyaya*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*)²³. For

example, if I cognize my self as my body - such invalid cognition is called error (*viparyaya*). But if something is cognized as having both the opposite properties is called doubt (*saṁśaya*). For example, in percieving something at a distance as having the property manhood and treehood, I may cognize -- is it a man or a tree (*sthanurvā puruṣo vā*) ?

Having the classification of invalid cognition (*apramā*), the nature of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect generated (*doṣa-janya*) and the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) is explained as attribute generated (*guṇa-janya*)²⁴. What is a defect (*doṣa*) ? There are innumerable defects and as there is no generic character (*anugata dharma*) among these, it has not been defined in terms of any unique character. It could not even be defined as a special condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) of invalid cognition (*apramā*), since, a special condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is, in Nyāya system, either an inherent condition (*samavāyī kāraṇa*), a non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*) or a collocation of condition (*kāraṇa sāmagrī*). But, defect (*doṣa*) always belongs to the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*) . So, defect in the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is the cause of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is only extensionally true.

Though, defects (*doṣa*) are innumerable, yet Gopinath Bhattacharya observes that in the case of perceptual cognition the defect fall under three headings viz., environmental, pathological and psychical or cognitive²⁵. Defects in the environment includes haze, the object being very distant and bad lighting; pathological defects are faults in the visual apparatus, such as jaundice; psychical defects include the mental state of the perciever, such as being angry or inattentive. But Jonardan Ganery observes that Bhattacharya's explanation of environmental faults are 'local'

defects only, in that they are possible faults in the environment of operation of the instrument to a particular occasion. So, Ganery also includes the 'global' environmental defects, when the environment in its totality in some way defeats the operation of the instrument²⁶. He cites an example -- a person trying to see things at the bottom of the ocean fails, not because of any local defect in the lighting, but because the human visual system is not suited for such environments. In such cases there is no capability of being seen (*darśanayogyatva*). The question of visualisation comes if and only if the particular object has got the capability of seeing. If there is something which is not humanly possible to visualise (*pratyakṣayogyā*), it is not seen due to having some global defect. Human vision has got some limit. It can illumine those that are in proximity with our sense-organs. If the objects are far away or under some obstacle, they would not be seen.

The nature of valid cognition (*pramā*), on the other hand, is explained as attribute generated (*guṇa-janya*). If invalid cognition (*apramā*) is defined as defect generated (*doṣa janya*), why valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be defined as due to the absence of defect (*dosābhāvajanya*) ? Because, it is already mentioned that the Naiyayikas consider three types of conditions for the production of any effect, viz., inherence (*samavāyī*), non-inherence (*asamavāyī*) and efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*). So the absence of defect in the efficient conditions (*nimitta kāraṇa*) does not imply the presence of other causal conditions, viz., inherence (*samavāyī*) and non-inherence (*asamavāyī*). So, Visvanatha, for the economy of thought, rightly advocates that valid cognition (*pramā*) is due to attribute (*guṇa*). If there is absence of defect in the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*), then the presence of a particular attribute (*guṇa*) to a particular cognition is sufficient in producing valid or veridical

cognition (*pramā*). There is, for Visvanatha, only one attribute to each type of cognition. For example, sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), consideration (*parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*tātparya jñāna*) and cognition of similarity (*sādṛśya jñāna*) is the attribute of perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda jñāna*) and comparison (*upamāna*) respectively. Thus, it seems that by attribute Visvanatha means the non-inherence condition (*asamavāyī kārana*), hence, he supports the concept of instrumental condition of the Old-Naiyayikas.

Again, if valid cognition (*pramā*) is defined as absence of defect (*doṣābhāva janya*), then a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) comprising component cognitions of which one component is true (*yathārtha*) and the remaining component / components is / are false (*ayathārtha*), could not be explained. For example, when some one cognizes a white conchcell (*śvetośamkhyah*) as a yellow conchcell (*pītaśamkhyah*) due to jaundice, here the cognition of the yellow colour is false (*ayathārtha*), but the cognition of the conchcell as a conchshell is true (*yathārtha*) inspite of the presence of some defect in efficient condition (*nimitta kārana*). Here the components of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) are not in relation of conjunction which would mean that the falsity of either components logically entails the falsity of the whole qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). The relation of component parts, here, is in relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence (*samavāya*) is a special type of relation in Nyāya-Vaisesika system in the sense that though here the components are related by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), yet each component is capable of keeping its own uniqueness. Once again, if valid cognition is defined as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), then we have to cite innumerable defects, which

is an impossible task. So the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be explained in terms of absence of defects (*doṣābhāvajanya*).

Moreover, although the nature (*svarūpa*) of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect-generated (*doṣājjanya*), the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be explained as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), because valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) are not the whole of cognitions. Besides these two types of cognitions there are other types of cognitions also, e.g. indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which is neither considered by the Naiyayikas as valid cognition nor as invalid cognition. Indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) since it is not cognized as having any property by any relation (*prakaratādi śūnyam hi samvandhanavagāhī tat*)²⁷.

Attribute (*guṇa*) is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is justified by inference (*anumāna*). The argument runs thus :- the common conditions (*sadharana karana*), viz., self-mind-contact (*ātma-manah-samyoga*) etc. are present both in the case of valid cognitions (*pramā*) and invalid cognitions (*apramā*). Therefore, valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognitions (*apramā*) is due to some conditions other than common conditions (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa bhinna*). Now valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) is not of the same nature. Hence, valid cognition (*pramā*) is due to attributes (*guṇajanya*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) is due to defects (*doṣajanya*). This type of pervaded relation (*vyapti sambandha*) is ascertained by the method of agreement and disagreement (*anvayi-vyatireki*) which runs thus -- where there is defect there is invalid cognition (*apramā*) and where there is attribute (*guṇa*) there is valid cognition (*pramā*). (*pramā*

jñāna sāmānyakāranabhinna kāranajanya janyajñatvat apramāvat). Hence, the presence of attribute (*guṇa*) along with the absence of defects (*doṣa*), for Visvanatha, makes the sufficient ground for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now , one may raise the question that if the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) and the presence of attribute (*guṇa*) makes the ground for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*), then the definition is affected by the fallacy of overcoverage (*ativyapti*). Because the above mentioned criterion is fulfilled in the case of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), but it is not recognised as valid cognition (*pramā*) in Nyāya system. One point deserves a mention here that Visvanatha presents the above mentioned criterion in the context of explaining the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), but not in the context of defining it. So, the above mentioned criterion merely explains the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), but not a definition (*lakṣana*) at all. Visvanatha defines valid cognition initially as “*bhramabhinnamiti*”, and finally “*tatprakarakamyajatamtadviśeṣyakam*”. This expression, Visvanatha himself holds, is similar to “*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ*”²⁸. Gangesa also initially supports this definition and finally presents a logical modified version of it. Hence, “*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*” become the centrifugal force of the Nyāya definition of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Let us explain the meaning of this definition. The word ‘*tat*’ means the determinate property (*prakāra*) which is the yard stick of measuring valid cognition (*pramā*), and the word ‘*tadvati*’ (the suffix ‘*vat*’ means the locus) means the determinandum or the locus of the determinate property (*viśeṣya*). Thus, the meaning of the definition is :- a cognition is valid (*yathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actualy

exists. Naturally, a cognition would be invalid (*ayathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually does not exist. For example, when someone cognizes a rope as a rope and expressed it in the form of ‘this is a rope’ (*idaṁ rajju*) -- here ‘this’ (*idaṁ*) is determinandum (*viśeṣya*) and ‘rope’ (*rajju*) is the determinate property (*prakāra / viśesana*) i.e. he /she is cognizing the rope as having the property ropeness, hence the cognition is a valid one (*yathārtha*). Since ropeness actually exist in rope and not to any other object. When someone, on the other hand, cognizes the rope as a snake and expressed it in the form ‘this is a snake’ (*ayaṁ sarpaḥ*) -- here he / she is cognizing the rope as having the property of snakesness which actually does not exist, hence, his / her cognition is an invalid one (*ayathārtha*).

One point deserves a mention here that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system when someone cognizes an individual (*vyakti*) side by side he / she cognizes the universal (*jāti*) also of that individual by supernatural perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). the above mentioned example has mainly two components, viz., ‘this’ (*idaṁ - viśeṣya*) and ‘rope having the property ropeness’ (*rajjutva - viśeṣaṇa / prakāra*).

Professor J.N.Mohanty shows in explaining this ‘real definition’²⁹ (*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*) has two parts -- viz., epistemological and ontological. “The expression ‘*tatprakāratva*’ refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that the knowledge under consideration has ‘that’ (*tat*) as its qualifier. The expression ‘*tadvati*’ refers to a correlative ontological situation, namely to the fact that that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge”. The cognition “*tadvati tatprakāratva*”, for him, is a “hybrid” entity. Truth or validity (*prāmāṇya*), for the Naiyayikas,

could not be the exclusive property of cognition alone, side by side it is designation of real property. This is the reason that word "tat" has been used twice in the definition. And as truth (*prāmāṇya*) is a hybrid entity beside these two components, namely the determinandum (*viśeṣya*) and the determinate property (*viśeṣaṇa*), there is another component viz., relation (*sambandha*) which is technically called 'saṁsarga'. The above mentioned definition of valid cognition (*pramā*), hence, fails to accommodate relation (*saṁsargatā*) explicitly. Any cognition of the form "X is Y", here, 'X' is the determinandum (*viśeṣya*), 'is' is a relation (*saṁsarga*) and 'Y' is the determinate property (*prakāra*) -- this cognition though apparently has only three components actually has six components, viz., 'the cognition of X', 'the cognition of X-ness', 'the cognition of is', 'the cognition of Is-ness', 'the cognition of Y' and 'the cognition of Y-ness'. Hence, the explicit logical form of the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) would be "*tanniṣṭha viśeṣyatā nirūpīta samavāya sambandhavacchinna prakāratāniṣṭha prakāratā viśiṣṭa anubhavaḥ yathārtha*"³⁰.

Gangesa concludes that if the truth is apprehended intrinsically, there would not have the doubt about it in the valid cognition in the non-familiar cases. As soon as a cognition is apprehended, its truth would also be apprehended. If the truth is not surely apprehended, the ascertainment of truth cannot be taken as intrinsic. If the valid cognition is not apprehended at all, there is no question of doubt due to not having the cognition of something having attributes (*dharmijñānabhāvāt*). (*siddhantastu prāmāṇyasya svato grahe 'nabhyasadaśotpannajñāne tatsaṁśayo na syat, jñānagrahe prāmāṇyanicayat. Anisṭcaye vā na svataḥ prāmāṇyagrahaḥ. Jñānagrahe dharmijñānabhāvāt na saṁśayaḥ.*")³¹.

In the unfamiliar cases we, after having a cognition, ask – ‘Is this cognition true or not’. But so far as familiar cases are concerned, there does not arise doubt as the previous experience serves as an assurance, which is supported by Vacaspati Mishra in the *Tātparyatīkā* (‘*abhyāsadaśāpannasya tajjātīyatvena prāmāṇyanumānam*’).

Doubt presupposes (a) cognition of the substantive (*dharmi*) (b) remembering two which are mutually contradictory as alternative qualifiers and (c) lack of the perception of any specific feature through which either of the alternatives is universally concomitant. (“*samānanekadharmopapattervipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyav yavasthatascaviśeṣapekṣo vimarsāḥ saṁśayaḥ*”³²)

The doubt in the form – ‘Is this cognition true or not?’ presupposes (a) cognition of the qualificand or substantive which in the present context is the cognition whose truth-value is doubted, (b) remembering two mutually contradictory properties like truth and falsity and (c) the absence of the perception of any specific character which can establish one specific character i.e. true after excluding another.

According to the presupposition (a), the above mentioned cognition (*dharmijñāna*) must be apprehended, because a cognition, according to the Mimāmsakas, is apprehended together with its truth. Hence, there is no possibility of doubt. As one of the alternative qualifiers is known before, doubt about it cannot come. The certainty in the initial stage about truth can remove doubt in the following moment only. This doubt remains in the subsequent moment.

There may be three possible situations. Either cognition is apprehended along with its truth or cognition is apprehended without its truth or cognition is not apprehended at all. In the first case doubt is not at all possible. The intrinsic theory of validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*) has to be given up if the second alternative is possible. In the concluding stage doubt is not also possible due to the ignorance of the substantive.

Gangesa concludes that the possibility of doubt about truth cannot be explained by the Mimamsakas. For the Mimamsakas the conditions that generate the apprehension of a cognition are also the conditions of the apprehension of the truth of the cognition. These conditions are present and hence they like the apprehension of truth would ward off the possibility of doubt about the truth.

It may be argued that in the case of inference the truth is apprehended extrinsically in as much as it is free of doubt about all kinds of error. In an inference the property of the valid cognition of fire in the locus of smoke is determined by the rule accompanied by truth and it is cognized through apperception (*anuvyavasāya*). As this is specifically seen, there is no doubt of its non-validity. As there prevail the certainty of the truth, which is again, ascertained through the absence of doubt of its non-validity, one has an unwavering inclination (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) towards an object. It is possible because one has the correct inferential cognition of an object. In fact, as per the theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥ*) the ascertainment of truth is not the cause of activity in the form of inclination. In the same way, there cannot be the doubt of validity in the case of apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) due to having truth as per rule. One who does not really cognize does not have the awareness – 'I cognize'. In another way it can be said that no body can acquire

the valid cognition of a cloth in the case of the valid cognition of a jar in the form – ‘I really cognize a cloth’.

This is true as per rules of extrinsic validity but not intrinsic one. We generally express in our introspection those that are really known. It is not possible to say an object as known though it is unknown. Hence, there is no reason for doubt. Even when a shell is enormously known as silver, its introspection is so i.e. erroneous. It describes an object existing in the primary cognition. Though silverness does not remain in a shell, we have introspection as a silver as being a content of primary cognition. In other words, silverness has become a qualifier of the initial cognition (*vyavasāya*) and hence there is no bar of having its apperception or introspection in the same form.

Gangesa has also considered the view of Vacaspati regarding the intrinsic apprehension of truth of the cognition arising in the state of habitual cognition (*abhyāsadaśā*). In this context the validity or truth is apprehended *ab initio*, as our unwavering inclination is possible very swiftly³³. In the cases other than these there is the extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ*). This view of Vacaspati is not acceptable. Gangesa is of the opinion that the truth or validity is ‘the property of not being limited by the chief qualifier which is the absentee of the absolute negation existing in a qualificand’
(*viśeṣya-niṣṭhatyantābhāva-pratīyogiprakāraṇavacchinna-tvadikaṁ prāmāṇyam*), which is not possible in an intrinsic validity of truth. It may be explained with the help of a concrete example. In the case of the knowledge of a jar, the truth of it is the property of not being limited by the qualifier i.e. a cloth which is an absentee of the absolute negation of a cloth remaining in the qualificand i.e jar. In a simple way, when a jar is known as such but not as otherwise is a truth which is not

available through extrinsic cognition (*parataḥ*). The quick inclination is possible due to having initial cognition free from the doubt of invalidity and it is possible through the apprehension of its by introspection of the qualificand possessing the property of being a knowledge of body having hands, legs etc. Even if one has the knowledge of truth (*prāmāṇya*), it does not incline us to activity.

The quick inclination to an individual's own work depends on his own causes. Gangesa gives his own explanation as to how there could be such spontaneous activity in the case of habitual cognition through the truth is not intrinsically apprehended. Mathuranath explains the matter in the following manner and has given two suggestions. The first goes as follows. The introspection (*anuvyavasāya*) apprehends the initial cognition – 'this is a body' as characterised by a cognition of body having limbs. The latter part or character is the mark through which the truth of the knowledge is apprehended. Perception of something pervaded by truth leads to the inference of the truth which accounts for our activities. The second suggestion goes like this. The initial cognition, if not disturbed by any doubt about its falsity directly leads us to the world of activity. In such a case the knowledge of truth does not lead to activity.

It may be asked how could there be a quick inferential cognition of truth. Gangesa is of the opinion that the circumstances are favourable to the quick inference of truth. A thirsty person has an immediate and unfailing tendency to quench thirst on the perception of water. From this it does not follow that the thirsty person has a perceptual cognition of the power of water to quench thirst. In another way it is not necessary to apprehend the truth of his knowledge of water for him. Before the involvement in an activity he had perceives it as something having the characteristics of having the property of being similar with others. It is the mark of

removing doubt and due to the absence of doubt the appropriate activity follows without any delay. From this it can be concluded that in the case of extrinsic validity of truth there no cause for apprehending truth is found (*vastutastu parataḥ pakṣe na kacidapi prāmāṇyagrahaḥ pravartakāḥ*)³⁴ if there is prior doubt in the truth of the knowledge.

REFERENCES

- 1) “*Buddhirupalabdhi Jñāna metyanarthāntaram*”- Nyāya Sūtra – 1/1/15, Goutama.
- 2) “*Sarva Vyavahāra hetuḥ guṇaḥ Bhddhi Jñānam*” – *Tarka Saṅgraha*, Sūtra34, Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 3) “*Jānāmi iti anuvyavasāyagamyagñānatvam*”- *Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka* on ~~sūtra~~ Sūtra34, Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 4) “*Yathārthānu-bhavomānam*”- Nyāya *Kusumāṅgalī* 4/1, Udayana.
- 5) “In this connection we would like to refer to the definition of *pramā* as *yathārthambhāva*. If we treat knowledge as justified true belief and if *pramā* is to be understood as a parallel here of knowledge, then *yathārthānubhava* must correspond to JTB.”- Evidence and Truth- Responses to the gether problem, Sutapa Saha – Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy- second series- Allied Publishers Ltd in collaboration with Jadavpur University, Calcutta – 1994.
- 6) “I do not know of any Sanskrit synonym for belief”. But *pramā* is a *niścayajñāna*, a non-dubious cognition. A *niscayajñāna* may be either *pramā* or a-*pramā*, just as a belief may be true or false. But belief is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścayajñāna*, is *savikalpaka*, i.e. conceptual, has a propositional structure, though its object is not a proposition. We know, however, that a

theory of belief is possible, in which belief that-p is one unanalyzed structure. If all this is true, there is some sense in saying that niścayajñāna and 'belief' mean just about the same." "Recollections and Resonse" in the article- 'Pramā, Justified True Belief Theory and the Gattier-Type Cases' in the Book, The Philosophy of J.N Mohanty ICPR series in contemporary Indian Philosophy, General Editor R.Sundar Rajan. Edited by Daya Krishna K.L.Sharma. PP.216-217 (First Published-1991).

- 7) "-a savikalpaka knowledge is prpositional though not a proposition. I call it prepositional for it is a logical complex analyseable into constituent elements and Relation"., Gangesa's Theory of Truth- in the Introduction P.31, J.N.Mohanty, Santiniketan, Visva-Bharati 1966.
- 8) " The western concept of proof owes its origin to plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion or between reason and sense. According to plato, reason not merely knows objects having ontological reality, but also yields a knowledge which is logically superior to opinion to which the senses can aspire. On this distinction is based the distinction is based the distinction between contingent and necessary truth, between material truth and formal truth, between rational knowledge which can be proved and empirical knowledge which can only be verified"- - Doubt, Belief and Knowledge. P. 193, Sibjiban Bhattacharya, ICPR in association with Allied Publishers. 1987.

- 9) “*sāmānyapratyāsattiyā sarvoposamhārād avinabhavagraha*” – T.C.
‘*sāmānyasya hi pratyāsattitraṃ lāghavat, na tu sāmānyatayā jñātasya*’- T.C.
- 10) “*Pramā janya yathārtha, apramā ḡanya ayathārtha*”
Tarka Saṅgraha, Sūtra- 74, Annaṃbhaṭṭa.
- 11) “*Anupramāṇavyāpārat param bhavati yaḥ saḥ anubhavaḥ*”- *Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ, Adhyāpanāśahitaḥ, P.224, Bengali version by Narayana Chandra Goswami – Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar. (2nd revised Edition – 1390 Bangabda).*
- 12) “*yathānthāmubhavam vibhāgate – ‘yalhārtha’ iti prasaṅgāt pramākaraṇam vibhajate – ‘tatkāranam iti; ‘pramākāraṇam’ ityārthaḥ. Pramāyāḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam iti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam. Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka on Sūtra39, Ibid.*
- 13) ‘*asādhāranam kāranam kōranam*’— *Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka on Sūtra 40, Ibid.*
- 14) *Jñānam vyaptiḡñānam sādrśyajñānam padaḡñanam ca. Tadeva kāranam yesāṃ tāni ḡñānakaramakāni anumityupamitisābdāni. Tadbhinnaṃityārthaḥ. Pratyekṣendriyanāmeva karanatvāni, na ḡñānasya. Tathā ca Jñānakaranak a jñānatvasya pratyakṣa- sāmānya eva vidyamanatvallakṣanasangatiḥ.”—*
Nyāyabodhini on T.S. P.42, Ed. by Satkari Sharma, Bangiya, Chocokhambha, 1976.

- 15) “*Phalāyoga-vyavacchinnaṃ kāranam
karanamityuddiyotakarādimate tu parāmarśa
evanumiti karanamanumanamiti dhyem*”- *Muktāvalī
samgraha, Bhāṣā-paricchedaḥ, anumānakhandam, P-
311, Viśvanāth by Pañcānana Bhattayacharya, Sanskrit
Pustaka Bhandar, 1377 Bangabda.*
- 16) “*Vyāparavat karantvṃ karantvṃ. Vyāparavat-Kāranam
karanamiti manikṛṇmate parāmarśa-dvārā vyapti
jñānam karanam. Tadevānumānam pramāṇam*” Ibid .
- 17) “*Tajjanyatve sati tajjanya-janakatvaṃ vyāpāratvaṃ*” –
Ibid.
- 18) “*Sādhakatama*”- *Pāṇiṇisūtra, 1.4.42.*
- 19) *Avyabhicārinim asandigdham arthopalabdhiṃ vidadhati
vodhāvodhasvabha vā sāmagrā
pramāṇam, Nyāya Mañjari –Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.*
- 20) *Tasmāt kartṛkarmavilakṣanā saṃsayaviparyayaarahita
vodhavidhayini vodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇa-
iti yuktam. Ibid.*
- 21) ‘*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā pramāyāni
pramitirityārthavanti bhavanti*’ – *Nyāya-bhāṣya on sūtra
1.1.1*
- 22) “*Tatra yasyepsājihāsāprayuktaṣya pravṛtitiḥ sa pramātā.
Sa yenarthaṃ praminoti tat pramāṇam. Yo'rthaḥ*

*pramiyate tat prameyaṃ. Yadarthaviḡñānaṃ
parisamāpyate” Ibid.*

23) *“Tatra apramāṃ nitupayati – tacchunya ēti.
Tadbhāvavati tatprakāraḡam jñānaṃ bhrama ityārthaḡ.
Tatprapaccaḡ—apramāprapaccaḡ. Ādya iti. Viparyāsa
ityārthaḡ. Śārīrādi niścayarūpaṃ yadātmavaprakāraḡam
jñānaṃ gouriha- mityakarakam. Evaṃ śamkhadou pītaḡ
śamkhya ityakarakam yāḡ jñānāni niścayarūpaṃ, tad
bhrama iti. Kiṃściditi vitarke. Nisvayasya
lakṣaṇamāha—tadbhāveti. Tadbhāvaprakāraḡam
tatpradaḡakam jñānaṃ niścayaḡ” – Bhāsā-Pariccheda
Tīka on Sūtra 125-129, Ibid.*

24) *Doṣa iti. Apramāḡ prati doṣa kāraṇam, pramā prati
guṇaḡ kāraṇam. Tatrāpi pittādirūpa doṣa ananugataḡ,
teṣāṃ karanaḡtvamanvaya –vyatirekavyaṃ siddham.
Guṇasya pramāḡanakatvaṃmanumānāt siddham. Yathā –
pramā jñānasāmānyatkāraṇa bhinna – karanaḡanya
ḡanyaḡñānatvāt apramāvat. Na ca doṣābhava eva
karaṇamastiviati vācyam... ..”- Ibid, Tika on Sūtra-
131.*

25) *“In false perception for example, the ‘dosa’ is
constituted by environmental, pathological or physical
conditions as the case may be . In illustration of
‘environmental doṣa’, we may cite the phenomenon of
‘must’ or ‘distance’ which distorts our perception of a
physical object; ‘pathological doṣa’ would be
exemplified by the myopic condition of the visual organ
or again by the phenomenon of jaundice, ‘psychical*

doṣa' is constituted expectant attention or 'passions of the soul' or such condition has been about distortions of perception.”- Tarkasamgraha Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta, translated and elucidated by Gopināth Bhattacharya, P- 332 Progressive publishers, 2nd revised edition 1983.

- 26) “..... the ‘global’ environmental defects, when the environment in its totality in some way defeats the operation of the instrument”- Semantic Powers- Meaning and Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy, P-69, Janardan Ganery, Clarendon Press, Oxford- 1999.
- 27) “Athavā tatprakāraḥ yajajñānaṁ tadviśeṣyakam / tatpramā, na pramā nāpi bhramah syannirvikalpakaṁ // prakāratādisūnyam hi sambandhanavagāhī tat / Pramātvam na svato grāhyam saṁśāyanupapattaḥ” *Bhāṣā Pariccheda Tika on Sūtra 135-136, Ibid.*
- 28) “Nanu yatra sukṭi-rajatayorime rajate itijñānam jatam, tatra rajatāmsē pramāne syat, tajjñānasya bhramabhinnatvabhāvāt, atah āha- arthaveti. Tadvatviśeṣyakaṭve sati tatprakāraḥ jñānaṁ prametyārthah.....” *Ibid.*
- 29) “Definitions in the Nyāya are not merely nominal definition but real definition in the same that they are designation of real properties that serve to distinguish the difiniendum from all that is other than it. Hence a definiens may be said to designate an entity. In present case it may be said to designate an entity only when the

variable has been , given a value,”--- Gangesas theory of Truth --- Introduction- P.43. (Footnote 35), J.N.Mohanty, Santiniketan, V.B 1966.

- 30) “*Tanniṣṭha viséṣyatā nirūpīta samarvaya sambandhāvacchinna prakarātāniṣṭha prakaratā viśiṣṭa anubhavah yathārtha.*” Tarkasamgraha-
adhyapanasahitaḥ, P-223 (Bengali version), Narayan Chandra Goswami Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, 2nd revised edition 1390 Bangabda.
- 31) Siddhāntastu pramānyasya svato grahe nabhyāsadaśotpannajñāne tatsamśayo na syat, jñānagrahe prāmānyanisćayāt. *Aniścaye vā na svataḥ prāmānyagrahaḥ. Jñānagrahe dharmijñānabhāvāt na samśayaḥ.*” Gangesa’s Prāmānya (jñāpti) vāda, Para No. 22.
- 32) “samananekadharmopapatte-
rvipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdyavyavasthātaśca viścesapekṣovimarṣaḥ samśayaḥ”- N.S. 1.1.23.
- 33) “Yattvānumānasya nirastasamastavibhramasandasya svata eva prāmānyagraha ityuktam, tat- dhūmavati vahniñānatvamanumiteḥ
pramānyaniyatamanuvyavasāyenopanitam, ato viśeṣadarsananna tatrprāmānyasanketi,
prāmānyanisćayādevapramānyasankavirahadarthaṁ
niścityaniṣkampavyavahāra ityabhiprayah. Vastutastu parataḥpakṣe na kvacidapi prāmānyagrahaḥ pravartaka iti. Evaṁanuvyavasāyasya prāmānyaniyatatvat na

prāmāṇyas'āṅkā. Na hyajanan Jānāmiti pratyeti, no vā
ghatajñāne patam Jānāmiti. Bhramepi anuvyavasayena
rajatatvādikaṁ vyavasāyaparakāratvenollikhyate tacca
tathaiva. Yattvabhyasadaśāyāṁ jhatiti
pracurataraniṣkampa pravṛttidarsānāt prāmāṇyam svata
eva gr̥hyate, anyatra tu parata iti." Gangesa's
Prāmāṇya(jñāpti)vāda Para No 55.

- 34) ".....tanna-
visēṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogiparakārānavacchinnatvā
dikam prāmāṇyam svatograhitumaśakyamiti parata eva
gr̥hyate. Jhatiti pravṛttistu karacaraṇādīmati
śārīrajñānatvā derviśēṣasyānuvyavasāyena
grahādaprāmāṇyas'āṅkāśūnyādvvyavasāyādeva, na
prāmāṇyajñānam pravartakamityuktam. Jhatiti
tatsamavadhānantu svakāraṇādhinām. Na hi pipāsūnām
jhatiti pracuratarā samarthā ca pravṛttirambhasīti,
pipāsōpaśamanas'aktirasya pratyakṣa iti. Ibid, This part
is also elucidated by J.N. Mohanty in his book
'Gangesa's Theory of Truth' P-227-229.
