

Every human action (human as a self-conscious being) has some definite purpose (*saprayojana*). Each and every human action presupposes some *prayojana* or end-in-view in his own. It has been stated - '*prayojanamamanudiśya na mando'pi pravartate*' i.e, even a blunt person does not engage himself to some activity until and unless the purpose of performing such action is spelt out. For this reason the knowledge of conduciveness to that what is desired (*iṣṭasādhānajñāna*) is considered as the cause of human inclination (*pravṛtti*). Human action is of three types : inclination (*pravṛtti*), refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and indifference (*upekṣā*). If some one has the knowledge of non-ṛāconduciveness to that which is desired (*aniṣṭhasādhanatājñāna*). When there is no inclination or refraining from, there arises the attitude of indifference or *upekṣā*. Now a days we find various persons from various walks of life to engage in different activities keeping a particular purpose or *prayojana* in mind. That is why, end-in-view or *prayojana* has been considered as one of the sixteen categories accepted in *Nyāya*. The definition of *prayojana* goes as follows : '*yamārthamadhikṛtya pravarttate tat prayojanam*'.¹ That is, the matter considering which an individual gets involved in action is called *prayojana* or end-in-view. To achieve that purpose right action is essential. Without the right cognition of the purpose, man cannot find out the means for achieving it. In Indian tradition, all most all the schools of Indian philosophy claim that even for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*),

the highest *sumum bonum* of life, right cognition of the real or reals (*tattvajñāna*) is essential. This right cognition in Sanskrit is technically called '*Pramā*'. The word '*Pramā*' derives from the suffix '*pra*' meaning excellent (*prakṛṣṭa*) and the root '*mā*' meaning measurement or sometimes means cognition. So, the etymological meaning of *pramā* is either 'cognition *par excellence*' or 'measurement *par excellence*'. These two expressions may have the same meaning, if 'measurement *par excellence*' is taken as a proper one for achieving the goal. In this context '*pramā*' has a double role in selecting the right purpose and the means for achieving that goal also.

There is a controversy regarding the synonymy of the Sanskrit words '*jñāna*', '*pramā*', '*apramā*' etc. The Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' sometimes translated as knowledge, because the Sanskrit word '*jñānīn*' means a knowledgeable person. Consequently, some lexicographers think that to select a synonymy for the word '*pramā*' an adjective is needed. Because, the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' includes any awareness like, imagination, doubt, cognition, error, illusion, *reductio-ad-absurdum* etc. Thus, the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' is a genus term of which '*pramā*' and '*apramā*' are the species. So, they translate *pramā* as 'valid knowledge' or 'true knowledge' and *apramā* is translated as 'invalid knowledge' or 'false knowledge'. But, in Western tradition 'knowledge' is by definition true and so the expression false knowledge is self-stultifying and the expression true knowledge is merely a tautology. To avoid such confusions J.N.Mohanty and B.K. Motilal have taken for granted that '*pramā*' can be translated as 'knowledge'². Again, K.H.Potter advocates that *pramā* can not be translated as knowledge, because in Western tradition knowledge is generally defined as justified true belief³. But, in Indian tradition we do not find any corresponding word of

belief. Moreover, in Indian tradition *pramā* is taken as aiming at fulfilling human desire (*puruṣārthasiddhi*). But in Western tradition knowledge is for knowledge sake. Some thinkers add an argument more. They hold that *pramā* is not justified true belief in Western sense, because *pramā*-related sentences (*vākya*) are prescriptive judgments (*kriyayā pravartakam vākya*) which leads to liberation (*mokṣa*). Hence, *pramā* related-sentences are suggestions (*vidhi*) and imperatives, they do not describe any state-of-affairs or facts. But, this view is not satisfactory, because all *pramā*-related sentences, at least in *Nyāya* system, are not prescriptive judgments. There are some descriptive judgments (*jñāpaka vākya*) also which are indirectly conducive to attain liberation (*nihśreyasa*).

K.H.Potter's argument has some justification that *pramā* cannot be translated as knowledge. Because the philosophy of each country (not necessarily politically confined country) possesses its uniqueness due to its own specific culture and tradition. Indian philosophy has also its own uniqueness. Hence, it is not easy to find out an exact synonym for the word '*pramā*'. But, thereby we do not mean that intertranslatability of language is an impossible task. Intertranslatability, for our opinion, of languages is possible only if some pre-conditions are fulfilled. To be master to some language means knowing the **form of life** ⁴ of that language users. Meaning cannot be grasped from the surface of grammar, but it can be grasped from the deep of grammar ⁵. The form of life can be realised only by participating to that culture and tradition. Margerate Noble's entrance to her new life as Bhagini Nivedita has some significance in that way. Therefore, to avoid any confusion, we may use the English word 'cognition' for '*jñāna*', 'true cognition' or 'valid cognition' for '*pramā*', 'false cognition' or 'invalid cognition' for '*apramā*' only for our functional purpose. One point

deserves a mention here that truth and validity in Indian tradition, unlike Western tradition, has been taken in the same sense.

Valid cognition (*pramā*) is an epistemological problem. Epistemology deals with the nature, scope, validity, origin, etc, of knowledge. Now-a-days, epistemology, in Western tradition, from the time of Kant, emerges as a special branch of philosophy. So, we have to find out the reason for its emergence as a special branch and if its emergence is necessary what role does it exactly play in modern philosophy and finally whether pure epistemology is possible in Indian tradition also.

The role of epistemology is to present metaphysics in a sound way. But, how does epistemology play this role? Metaphysics intends to study reality as such. It also studies the basic concepts of science, like existence, negation, space, time, matter, substance, energy, number, attribute, life, etc. Because, a particular science studies only a part of worldly objects (relevant objects to that science only). So, it has to depend upon some presuppositions. By presuppositions, here, we mean, whatever points, principles, topics, or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though they are, or may be studied elsewhere. But these presuppositions, upon which the conclusion of a particular science depends, remain unreflective. For example, economics presupposes that there are human beings with needs of certain kinds, that they behave in such and such instinctive way, etc. While these presuppositions are not studied in that discipline, studied in sciences, like psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. The latter is not, however, second level studies. They are as first level as economics itself. "Philosophy, thus, studies the presuppositions of

science as facts (reals) and yet facts of the second order, and that makes a difference between philosophy and science”⁶.

But modern thinkers, once again, raise the question : As metaphysics studies after all facts, though facts of second order, has to presuppose concepts which are relatively removed in another level, it also cannot guarantee both truth and falsity. So Kant like thinkers developed a meta-metaphysical study, which is called in modern terminology pure epistemology. Pure epistemology means epistemology without the commitment to any ontology. Pure epistemology studies the presuppositions of metaphysics or in Kant’s language ‘the conditions of factuality (= knowability = reality =existence)’, conditions which, therefore, are themselves no facts. “Meta-metaphysical propositions are not assertive. In modern language, they are not informative and analytic They are ontologically non-committal”⁷. Thus, pure epistemology is a non-committal study, a study of no facts. Yet obviously, it is a study, and a theoretical study for that. So pure epistemology means a study bereft of any ontological commitment. Therefore, this is the only discipline, for these modern thinkers, that can guarantee both truth and falsity.

In Indian tradition, if pure epistemology means a study bereft of any ontological commitment, it is found in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. They studied in detail how on different presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*), none of which could be logically defined, different metaphysics with different ontological commitments had developed, and how, therefore they preferred to keep mum with the non-committal meta-metaphysical study. This is why they claim that the universe is mere void (*śūnya*). But mere void (*śūnya*) does not mean absolutely void, rather it means that the real nature of the

universe is indescribable. As the universe is indescribable, they remain non-committal (*śūnyavādi*) towards the nature of the universe (reality). This absolute non-committal attitude, according to them, is the highest freedom attainable. As the universe is indescribable (*śūnya*), means of right cognition (*pramāṇa*) and objects of right cognition (*prameya*) both are unreal., and as such there is no need, from their point of view, to prove any object of right cognition (*prameya*) with the help of the means of right cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus the Madhyamikas, like Kant, hold that epistemology is only a study of the presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) of metaphysics and these presuppositions are all logically untenable, and unlike Kant they remain non-committal necessarily to the whole of metaphysics and identified this non-committal attitude with freedom proper (*nirvāṇa*). One point deserves a mention here that Kant regarded non-committal attitude with regards to a part of metaphysics, viz., the study of soul, first cause, freedom, God, etc., not with regard to what he has called 'metaphysics of nature'. Thus the above discussion shows that even in pure epistemology, in its strict sense, right cognition (*pramā*) takes a vital role. Because the Śūnyavādins have denied any ontological commitment regarding the universe, the reality of valid cognition (*pramā*), the reality of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but they cannot deny right cognition (*pramā*) as such.

Pure epistemology, except Madhyamika school, is not found to any other system or school of Indian philosophy. Classical Indian philosophers have consistently fought against any concept of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) that is not itself an object of valid cognition (*prameya*)⁸. Goutama, the author of *Nyāya sūtra* and Vatsayana in his *Ādibhāṣya* has established the non unique status of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid

cognition (*prameya*)⁹. This is evident from the fact that both means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid cognition (*prameya*) along with fourteen other categories are enumerated to the list of categories. It is categorically explained, in *Nyāya-sūtra*, that the same thing in different circumstances can really be both a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid cognition (*prameya*). Here, ontology (*prameya*) is inter-woven with epistemology (*pramāṇa*). Both are studied as a second level study.

Now the question is : Is the Sunyavādins claim not true that different basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) influenced in developing different metaphysics with different ontological commitments ? It cannot be denied that some basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) prevail in every school or system of philosophy and and that they also influence in developing different metaphysics along with different ontologies. But these basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) are the minimum for theorisation. Without these presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) theorisation is not possible and that these basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) are not neutral at all, rather they are based on the cultural ground (*sanskṛti*). We have already mentioned that due to this cultural ground, the philosophy of each country has its own uniqueness. So to build up a system of study which can guarantee both truth and falsity, it does not mean that it should be totally presuppositionless, rather our aim would be to minimize these basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*). Every system or school has its own basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) and epistemology (*pramāṇaśāstra*) presents it the logical form. These basic presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) are the special cause (*mukhya sādhana*) in realizing the truth. Let us now see how are these basic presuppositions of Indian Philosophy as a whole are determined by some salient features. The salient features of Indian Philosophy may be shown by the diagram in the next page.

: Salient features :

Orthodox /Heterodox	Liberation/Gross pleasure oriented	Theory of categories	Distinction between appearance vs reality or no distinction
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Thus in Indian tradition theory of means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) is interconnected with ontology or object of valid cognition (*prameya*). So, pure epistemology, in Western sense, is not possible in Indian tradition.

The *Nyāya*, like all other Indian schools of thinking, builds up its system of philosophy on the foundation of theory of knowledge. However, not all systems of Indian philosophy have given to the problem of the origin of cognition, its due importance. But the *Nyāya* found it very important. The *Nyāya* theory of knowledge, as we see, begins with a critique of the origin of true cognition (*pramāṇa*). This is why *Nyāya-śāstra* is ascribed as '*Pramāṇa-śāstra*'. "*Pramāṇādhinā prameyasiddhi*" is a received opinion of the *Nyāya*. The dictum means that the theory of reality follows upon the theory of valid cognition or right cognition. Hence the theory of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is but essential for its ontology (*prameya*). That is why, Gautama has placed *Pramāṇa* in the first in the list of sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (*apavarga*). *Prameya* is placed in the second position preceded by *pramāṇa* which signifies that the cognition of *prameya* depends on the cognition of *pramāṇa*. Actually highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) is of two types - seen (*dṛṣṭa*) and unseen (*adrṣṭa*). The cognition of *pramāṇa* along with other fourteen categories leads us to the attainment of seen welfare which is connected with mundane prosperity. On the other hand, the

cognition of the *prameyas* leads to the attainment of unseen welfare or highest good.

The Advaitins have presupposed that there is only one entity called *Brahman* or *Ātmān* covering the whole world. Each and every object of this world is covered by one Consciousness. The small individual manifestations of objects are the manifestations of the Consciousness. The Consciousness reflected in the phenomenal objects is called the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the same Consciousness. These limiting adjuncts are *Pramāṇa Caitanya* (consciousness limited by the means of knowledge), *Pramāṭṛ caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the knower) and *Viṣaya caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the object)¹⁰. To the Advaitins the perception is of two types - perception in respect of knowledge (*jñānagata pratyakṣa*) and perception in respect of object (*viṣayagata pratyakṣa*). They admit that a jar as well as the knowledge of a jar are perceived. In the case of former the amalgamation between *Pramāṇa caitanya* and *Viṣayacaitanya* is the cause of the perception of the knowledge when *pramātā* remains isolated giving scope to subject-object-relationship. In such case there is the perception of the knowledge of something. When these three types of consciousness are amalgamated, only *Pramāṭṛcaitanya* i.e, the knower in the form of consciousness remains, and the consciousness in the form of mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) which is technically called *Pramāṇacaitanya* and consciousness in the form of object are amalgamated in the knower who is also the form of consciousness (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*). Under the circumstances knower extends itself to the object and mental mode in the form of object. In this case the object is subjectified as we find in the case of aesthetic enjoyment. When some one realises the feelings of the dramatic characters, he shares the feeling of them being identified

with them which is described by Abhinavagupta as the 'melting of the subjective character' (*Pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*)¹¹. Such is the case with the spiritual realisation of the objects - in which objects become subjectified due to the identification which is called 'perception of an object' but not knowledge. As consciousness is the only entity which is real in this world, according to the Advaitins, the amalgamation of two or more limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of Consciousness is called perception which is otherwise known *Sākṣivedya*. They have to define perception in this way after keeping the presupposed entity-Consciousness in view.

In the same way, Dharmakīrti, a celebrated Buddhist logician, has defined perception as '*kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*'¹² i.e, perception is that which is non-erroneous and free from mental constructions (*kalpanā*). To him perception is defined in such a way that after bearing the presuppositions like theory of momentariness (*kṣanabhangavāda*), no soul theory (*nairātmyavāda*) etc. in mind. As a real object is momentary, it must be of unique nature (*svalakṣana*) which is free from mental constructions like language, universal etc. Such is the nature of perception of the Buddhists. Hence the definition of perception and other theories are given in such a way that their presuppositions are kept in tact.

Not only in the field of epistemology the influence of such presuppositions is noticed, but in the metaphysical level also. As all the systems of Indian Philosophy are liberation oriented, such liberation or freedom must be taken seriously as the ultimate value of man. Professor K.H.Potter thinks - "One necessary condition for faith in the ultimacy of freedom is the belief that freedom is not only logically possible, i.e, that at least one route is open which a man can find and travel to complete freedom. There must be one

route for every man, but not necessarily the same route. That is, either there is one route which each and every man can find and travel on to freedom, or else there are several routes on which men with different personality characteristics can travel - as long as for each and every man there is a route. But this belief in turn has its necessary conditions”¹³.

Various Indian thinkers are of different opinion in propagating the path of freedom according to their own presuppositions. There are various ways through which the attitude of non-attachment (*vairāgya*) can be acquired. Among the paths one is the path of activity (*karmayoga*). This path is characterised by the performance of some actions as the means to attainment of non-attachment. These actions are of three types - optional action (*kāmyakarma*), prohibited action (*pratisiddhakarma*) and required acts (*nitya and naimittika karma*). Some think that freedom can be attained just by avoiding first two types acts and practicing the third one. The actions belonging to third constitute various forms of worship etc.

The path of devotion (*bhaktiyoga*) : The path involves personal attitudes to devotion. The devotee is inspired to invent some spontaneous means for expressing devotion to the God. This is another path for God-realisation.

The path of knowledge (*jñānayoga*) : Freedom follows from the path of knowledge of God or Brahman. The realisation of Brahman Who is the form of knowledge is possible through hearing (*sravana*), reflecting (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyasana*) of what is described in the Upanisad etc. In Buddhism also one gathers insight (*prajñā*) which is nothing but knowledge.

It has been shown earlier that metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of valid cognition. Apart from this, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as '*khyātivāda*' (theories of error) are formulated after keeping parity with such meta-physical presuppositions. Let us see how such metaphysical presuppositions work in different theories of error.

When a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. The question in the following forms may generally arise. What is the factor which constitutes the falsity of the error ? Is the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to both apprehension and content ? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their different presuppositions.

As the false apprehension is possible due to having its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended and as there is the rejection of the content after correction, the nature of false apprehension concerns primarily to the objective content rather than subjective apprehension. Hence there lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda* and *Satkhyātivāda*.

The first view -- *Asatkhyātivāda* is propagated by the Buddhists who are the supporters of nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) who maintain voidness or absolute nothingness of all experiences and contents. Error, according to them, is the cognition of non-existent

i.e. *asat*. In the case of snake-rope illusion the snake which is falsely known is absolutely non-existent or *asat*. We should draw a distinction between absolute non-existence and relative non-existence. The former exists nowhere due to its unreality while the later is partially non-existent i.e. existing in one place and non-existing in other places. Sky-flower and hare's horn etc. are to be taken as absolutely non-existent objects. A jar may be a relatively non-existent entity. Because it may remain in one place and may not in other place. The imaginary or absurd entities (*alikapadhārtha*) do not exist anywhere. The imaginary fictions may be distinguished into two types -- the factually non-existent and the logical impossible. The hare's horn etc. belong to the first category as they do not exist as facts. A barren mother belongs to the second category i.e. it is not only non-existent but can not but be so. According to the nihilists, when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object in any of the two given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has expressed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but rope-snake. But a snake which is a rope as well is an absurdity. The snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

If the view of the *Vijñānavādins* which is known as *Ātmakhyātivāda* is reviewed carefully, it will be seen that they have totally rejected the view of the nihilists regarding error as a contentless cognition that cognises nothing. To the *Vijñānavādins* such cognition is nothing must also be itself nothing. An error which is identified with the nothingness must be nothing which is not at all an error in the true sense of the term. According to the *Ātmakhyātivāda* error arises from cognising the mental as an

extramental real. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but our mind in the case of error cognises it as the extramental blue. The mental fact is thus mistaken as a transcendent meaning. An object cognised is a subjective image, but this is mistakenly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The *Ātmakhyāti* which means the self cognition of the psychic fact is imagined to be cognition of the objective trans-psychic being. Hence error is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of sheer non-existent, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The Prabhakaras who advocate the view known as *Akhyāti* refute the *Asatkhyāti* and *Ātmakhyāti* views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence, error involves both representation and representation-something given or presented (*gr̥hita*) and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth (*smṛta*). The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory image (“*yatra yadadhyasastadvivekagrahanivandhano bhramaḥ*”)¹⁴. In other words, there is the non-apprehension of the distinction (*vivekagraha*) between presentation and representation which is called *akhyati*. In the case of snake-rope illusion the given element lies on the ‘rope’ and the remembered content is ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgment -- ‘this is snake’. The two facts -- the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence. The illusion is a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and duality. From this the

Prabhakaras believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction; it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.

The Naiyayikas who propound the *Anyathākhyātivāda* urge that the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from the negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things -- given and remembered -- are falsely confused and non-distinguished as Prabhakaras say. In the snake-rope illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the inference of the defects of sense, media etc. The illusion is a unitary composite presentation of this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (*laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also presented through the extraordinary (*alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extra-ordinary perceived 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake is perceived as a real snake, and the snake-character or feature perceived in it inheres in an elsewhere snake, i.e. not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere. This error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense organ viz., the eye, by natural contact of sense and objects.

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Now we may look at the metaphysical presuppositions as found in the formulation of the *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda* by Śamkara. Error, according to Samkarites, involves more than the experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. Samkara concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in *Asatkhyātivāda* nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the *Anyathakhyātivāda*. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely non-existent (*asat*) can not be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognised as a snake, the status of snake is not non-existent (*asat*) as we cognise it in this way and it is not existent (*sat*) also as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent valid cognition of rope. Hence, the snake is neither existent nor non-existent which is described as indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). This illusory cognition is taken as a real which is of apparent type (*prātibhāsika sattā*).

Ramanuja rejects the *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* of Samkara and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. Their theory is known as *Satkhyātivāda* according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. It is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when a rope is cognised as a snake, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope existing before him. He does not perceive nothing nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character nor again any indescribable snake. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or

unreal, but in considering the snake-character to be the only characteristics of the objects lying before. That is why, the cognition does not work in life and the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such imperfect cognition comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

Now the question is : If means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) belongs to the same level, so to say, if both of them are studied as a second order fact (reals) and if means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) itself is recognised as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*), why the dictum '*māṅādhīnā meya siddhi*' i.e. why the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) hits the list ? Does it not mean that the presuppositions of objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) are studied in the study of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa śāstra*) ? This is not a tenable question in *Nyāya* system. Because, a second order discipline means a critical or reflective discipline. The reals, here, are determined only if they fulfills three criteria of reality, viz. 'isness' (*astitva*), 'namability' (*abhidheyatva*), 'cognizability' (*jñeyatva*). The Naiyayikas, unlike Kant (knowability = reality = existence), have not equated these three criteria. These three criteria are not identical. Each term have different connotations, although they have the same extension. Thus, it is not merely a reflection of one's own thought and therefore, uninformative. These expressions, in *Nyāya* system, are not ontologically non-committal. They definitely refers to some external objects and their co-existence is understood reflectively. This is the reason to ascribe *Nyāya* as *ānvikṣikī*. The word '*ānvikṣikī*' derives from '*anu + ikṣā*'. The prefix '*anu*' means subsequent or critical and the root '*ikṣā*' means viewing or reflection. The literal meaning of *ānvikṣiki* is subsequent viewing or critical reflection. Thus there is no need of any third level study or pure epistemology in this system.

Here, epistemology is inter-woven with ontology. The study of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), in Indian tradition, does not deal with the presuppositions of metaphysical categories (*prameya*). Here, there are no presuppositions except outlooks (*dṛṣṭi*) at all, because objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) deals with facts or reals of second order. For this reason, it is possible in Indian tradition to accommodate means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*).

Now the question is : why the theory of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is considered as the pivot in the *Nyāya* system ? The means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is one of the sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*) . A problem may be raised in this context. How does the valid cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads us to the attainment of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*) ? A section of Indian thinkers has objected to the theory that the right cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads to this state of liberation. The problem is : how the right cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) has to be attained ? Is it through another means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) ? It is not possible due to the possibility of infinite regress (*anavastha*) and mutual dependence (*anyonyaśraya*). For cognizing the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) another one is resorted to and another one is also dependent on the present one.

Pramāṇa, to Goutama, is an instrument of valid cognition. When such awareness arises, it is very difficult to ascertain whether the awareness is right or not. Hence, the validity of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not at all possible. Hence, Goutamas' exercise on the *Nyāya-śāstra* is a futile one.

In response to the above Goutama is of the opinion that ascertainment of validity of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not an impossible affair. This job can be accomplished through inference which runs as follows. To him, means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is meaningful (*arthavat*) i.e. constantly connected with the object. This constant connection of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with an object (*artha*) is called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*). The nature or characteristics of an object revealed by the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which reveals the actual characteristics of an object, which is technically called non-deviatedness of the meaning revealed through the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If the reverse case is found, it is a case of illusion. When the cognition of snake is attained in the case of rope, it is a case of illusion. For, in such awareness there is the absence of the qualifier snakesness in the place of the qualificand i.e. rope. Hence, the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) will have its object of valid cognition (*prameya*) as its pervader (*vyapya*) which is otherwise called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*). In this form of syllogistic argument the property of being non-deviatedness with the object (*arthāvyabhicāritva*) is the probandum (*sādhyā*), the probans (*hetu*) is 'the capability of fulfilling successful activity' (*sāmartha pravṛtti janakatvāt*). As the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the cause of the successful inclination, it is non-deviated to its object. This non-deviatedness (*arthavyacāritva*) is explained later on as "*arthāvyabhicāryanubhavajanakatvamityanthah*"¹⁵. In fact, in this initial statement Vātsāyana tries to favour or propagate the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Through this argument someone can distinguish a *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition) from *pramāṇābhāsa* (*pseudo-pramāṇa*). From the fact of successful inclination (*pravṛtti sāmarthyā*) one can assume the reality of *pramāṇa* which is different from *pramāṇābhāsa*.

A man can acquire pleasure, pain, fun, etc. in a dream but as soon as he wakes up he starts repenting considering the pleasant incidents occurred in the dream are false. We may recall here Madhusudan Datta's poem – "*Nisār svapan sukhe sukṭi ye tār jage se kāṅdile*" i.e. the person who feels pleasure in a dream does not really feel pleasure after his waking up. As in the awakened state his pleasure is replaced by repentance. If we ponder over this, we shall be able to distinguish between what is real and what is unreal. Our feeling, activity, etc. are centered around the right cognition of the external world as well as wrong cognition of the same. The wrong cognition leads us to the world of pseudo-pleasure etc. that ultimately brings repentance. Hence, we should be aware rightly of the external world having right feeling of pleasure etc. We should have right cognition, right attitude, right activity to regulate our life. If we have real cognition, it can control everything. Hence, *Pramā* or right cognition is the primary factor in regulating our life. If there is *pramā* or right cognition then there is the source of knowing *pramā* called *pramāṅa*. Centering *pramāṅa* or source of right cognition *prameya*, *pramāta* and *pramiti* become meaningful. Hence, *pramā* or right cognition is taken as an important concept that covers the entire *Sastra*.

Though the concept of right cognition (*pramā*) of the Naiyayikas is desired to be substantiated, a comprehensive view on *pramā* given by different systems would be presented as opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) from which one would have an idea about the history of the concept. Following Philosophical problems which have not been raised so far are proposed to be investigated.

REFERENCES

1. 'yamārthamadhikṛtya pravarttate tat prayojanam' - --Nyāya Sūtra 24
2. "In fact, we might take some comfort here, for the intuitive concept of 'knowledge' by and large coincides with the intuitive sense of *pramā* in Sanskrit despite some minor discrepancies -- 'Knowledge, Truth and Pramātva' P-17, in the book – 'The philosophy of J.N.Mohanty' ed. by Daya Krishna and K.L.Sharma, ICPR Series in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, First published in 1991
3. "What this paper is arguing is that Indian Philosophy, not being wedded to a non-cognitivist approach, things it can talk of knowledge (or rather, of *pramā*), but in a sense of 'knowledge' different from current notions predicated on non, cognitivism".—'Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?' Karl H.Potter. P-140 Ibid
4. "So speaking a language – i.e. a speaking and understanding it – is engaging in certain modes of behaviour that exhibit a variety of abilities of skills. It is to engage in what Wittgenstein calls "form of life"—The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, George Pitcher, P-237 Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1985 (elucidated from P.I., Basin Blackwell, P-243)

5. "In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use – one might say- that can be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say the word "to mean" with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about".- Ibid (elucidated from P.I, sect. 664)
6. "Philosophy, thus, studies the presuppositions of sciences as facts (reals) and yet facts of the second order, and that makes a difference between Philosophy and Science".— Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays, P-19—Kalidas Bhattacharya, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1974
7. "Meta-metaphysical propositions are not assertive. In modern language, they are not informative and informative and analytic.....They are ontologically non-committal".—Ibid P-25
8. "*Pramāṇa-prameya-saṁśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntavayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitandā-hetvābhasacchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānām-tattvajñānaniḥśreyasadhigamaḥ*" Nyāya Sūtra 1/ 1/1.
9. "*Nirdeśe-yathāvacanam-vigrahaḥ/ sarvapadārtha-pradhāno dvandva samāsaḥ / pramāṇādīnām tattvamiti śaiṣiki sasti / tattvasya jñānam niḥśreyasasyadhigama iti karmāni sasthau / ta etāvanto vidyamānārthāḥ /*

*esāṁviparīta jñānārthamihopadeśaḥ / sohayamanavayavena
tantrārtha uddisto veditavyah*” Nyāya Darshan- Vol. 1 Ed.
by Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa PP 19-20, Pascimbanga Rajya
Pustaka Parsad, 1981

10. “...*Tathāhi trividham caitanyam viṣaya-caitanyam,
pramāṇa-caitanyam, pramāṭṛ-caitanyañeti / tatra
ghatādyavacchinna caitanyam, viṣaya-caitanyam,
antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnaṁ caitanyam pramāṇcaitanyam,
antaḥkaraṇavacchinnaṁ caitanyam pramāṭṛ-caitanyam*”
Vedānta Paribhāṣā (Bengali Version) P-10, ed. by Sarat
Chandra Ghosal
11. “*Pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*” – Kāvya Prakāśa, Vṛtti, 4/28
12. “*Kalpanapodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*” – Nyayabindu
Tīkā PP. 8-9
13. – “One necessary condition for faith in the ultimacy of
freedom is the belief that freedom is not only logically
possible, i.e, that at least one route is open which a man
can find and travel to complete freedom. There must be one
route for every man, but not necessarily the same route.
That is, either there is one route which each and every man
can find and travel on to freedom, or else there are several
routes on which men with different personality
charecterstics can travel – as long as for each and every
man there is a route. But this belief in turn has its
necessary conditions”- “Presoppositions of India’s
Philosophies”, K.H.Potter, Prentice Hall, New Delhi,
1965.

14. “*Yatra yadadhyasastudvivekāgraha-nivandhano bhramaḥ*”
– Prabhakara.
15. “*Arthavyabhicāryānunbhavajanakatvamityarthaḥ*” --
Tātparyapariśuddhi Tīka, P-95, Udayaṇācārya
