

THE NYĀYA CONCEPT OF PRAMĀ : A CRITICAL STUDY

Thesis Submitted For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the
University of North Bengal
2001

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Preface

The thesis entitled : " The Nyaya Concept of Pramā : A critical study " is the result of my research on Pramāṇāsāstra (Epistemology in Indian Philosophy). I started work on the thesis from 15th March 1996 as a Junior Research Fellow (UGC). One of the lasting effect in studying Nyāya is the opening of my outlook towards the larger perspective of my teacher, Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Dept of Philosophy, North Bengal University, W.B. He has undertaken serious study of some unique problems of Nyāya system, such as problems of indeterminate cognition (*nirvilāpaka Jñāna*), Some reflections on the Nyāya theory of action, Āhāryajñāna, etc. and has presented novel solutions.

The thesis contains five chapters. The outlook in general, the need of epistemology to present metaphysics in a sound way, the influence of ontological presuppositions for theorisation and the need of valid cognition (*Pramā*) have been discussed in chapter-I.

A number of definitions are found in Nyāya system itself. In the second chapter of my thesis the background of these definitions is given in order to highlight which one of these definitions is more consistent and suitable with the ontological presuppositions of this system.

A comprehensive view on Pramā given by different systems has been presented as opponents (*Pūrvapakṣa*) so that one would get a general idea of the history of the concept. Thereby the view of the Naiyāyikas can be further substantiated.

In so far as the classical texts are concerned, the Naiyayikas have not taken the Advaitins as opponents. But Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra presents Advaita view following the Navya-Nyāya logic, and challenges Visvanatha in defining valid cognition (*pramā*). But the Naiyayikas are yet to respond to this challenge. Hence, the Advaitins view with special reference to Dharmaraja Adhvarīndra has been discussed in chapter- III.

There are strong opponents (*Pūrvapakṣa*) of the Naiyayikā in which we find the Buddhist concept of *pramā*, the Mīmāṃsā concept of *pramā*, the Jaina concept of *samyagjñāna* etc. Some of the definitions given by the opponents have been logically rejected by the Naiyayikas. But there are a few more definitions given by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Dharmakīrtī, Hemchandra etc. which are not taken into account or rejected by the Naiyayikas in the works available so far. All these views are discussed in chapter- IV.

Finally, the specific task of this dissertation is to encounter these problems and reject them with the help of some independent arguments provided by the Nyāya system. By doing this a strong defence of the system is undertaken in the last chapter.

Research work, to my opinion, is the result of the fruitful dialogue with various Research Personnel. I take this occasion to offer my heartfelt thanks to my teacher, Prof. Ghosh, without whose guidance and supervision it would not have been possible for me to write this thesis. In fact, the conclusion is the outcome of a

dialogue between him and me. My thanks are due to all my colleagues and teachers of the Dept. of philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati and the Dept of philosophy North Bengal University, Darjeeling, W.B. Special thanks are due to Dr. Pabitra Kumar Roy, NBU, Prof. Rita Gupta, Dr. Asha Mukharjee, Dr. Sabujkoli Sen, Dr. Bijoy Mukharjee, Dr. George Pattery, S.J., Visva-Bharati with whom I have discussed some of these problems and obtained suggestions and support. My sincere thanks are also due to Prof. Pradyot Kr. Mandal, Burdwan University, who was kind enough to give a patient hearing to my synopsis and gave further suggestions. I would like to thank to all my family members and my friends Sri Salil Mukharjee N.B.U., Bhaskan Jha (JRF), Dept of philosophy, N.B.U, Bichitrabirya Mandal (JRF), Dept of Zoology, NBU who were always ready to lend me their helping hands.

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Every human action (human as a self-conscious being) has some definite purpose (*saprayojana*). Each and every human action presupposes some *prayojana* or end-in-view in his own. It has been stated - '*prayojanamamanudiśya na mando'pi pravartate*' i.e, even a blunt person does not engage himself to some activity until and unless the purpose of performing such action is spelt out. For this reason the knowledge of conduciveness to that what is desired (*iṣṭasādhānajñāna*) is considered as the cause of human inclination (*pravṛtti*). Human action is of three types : inclination (*pravṛtti*), refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and indifference (*upekṣā*). If some one has the knowledge of non-ṛāconduciveness to that which is desired (*aniṣṭhasādhanatājñāna*). When there is no inclination or refraining from, there arises the attitude of indifference or *upekṣā*. Now a days we find various persons from various walks of life to engage in different activities keeping a particular purpose or *prayojana* in mind. That is why, end-in-view or *prayojana* has been considered as one of the sixteen categories accepted in *Nyāya*. The definition of *prayojana* goes as follows : '*yamārthamadhikṛtya pravarttate tat prayojanam*'.¹ That is, the matter considering which an individual gets involved in action is called *prayojana* or end-in-view. To achieve that purpose right action is essential. Without the right cognition of the purpose, man cannot find out the means for achieving it. In Indian tradition, all most all the schools of Indian philosophy claim that even for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*),

the highest *sumum bonum* of life, right cognition of the real or reals (*tattvajñāna*) is essential. This right cognition in Sanskrit is technically called '*Pramā*'. The word '*Pramā*' derives from the suffix '*pra*' meaning excellent (*prakṛṣṭa*) and the root '*mā*' meaning measurement or sometimes means cognition. So, the etymological meaning of *pramā* is either 'cognition *par excellence*' or 'measurement *par excellence*'. These two expressions may have the same meaning, if 'measurement *par excellence*' is taken as a proper one for achieving the goal. In this context '*pramā*' has a double role in selecting the right purpose and the means for achieving that goal also.

There is a controversy regarding the synonymy of the Sanskrit words '*jñāna*', '*pramā*', '*apramā*' etc. The Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' sometimes translated as knowledge, because the Sanskrit word '*jñānīn*' means a knowledgeable person. Consequently, some lexicographers think that to select a synonymy for the word '*pramā*' an adjective is needed. Because, the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' includes any awareness like, imagination, doubt, cognition, error, illusion, *reductio-ad-absurdum* etc. Thus, the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' is a genus term of which '*pramā*' and '*apramā*' are the species. So, they translate *pramā* as 'valid knowledge' or 'true knowledge' and *apramā* is translated as 'invalid knowledge' or 'false knowledge'. But, in Western tradition 'knowledge' is by definition true and so the expression false knowledge is self-stultifying and the expression true knowledge is merely a tautology. To avoid such confusions J.N.Mohanty and B.K. Motilal have taken for granted that '*pramā*' can be translated as 'knowledge'². Again, K.H.Potter advocates that *pramā* can not be translated as knowledge, because in Western tradition knowledge is generally defined as justified true belief³. But, in Indian tradition we do not find any corresponding word of

belief. Moreover, in Indian tradition *pramā* is taken as aiming at fulfilling human desire (*puruṣārthasiddhi*). But in Western tradition knowledge is for knowledge sake. Some thinkers add an argument more. They hold that *pramā* is not justified true belief in Western sense, because *pramā*-related sentences (*vākya*) are prescriptive judgments (*kriyayā pravartakam vākya*) which leads to liberation (*mokṣa*). Hence, *pramā* related-sentences are suggestions (*vidhi*) and imperatives, they do not describe any state-of-affairs or facts. But, this view is not satisfactory, because all *pramā*-related sentences, at least in *Nyāya* system, are not prescriptive judgments. There are some descriptive judgments (*jñāpaka vākya*) also which are indirectly conducive to attain liberation (*nihśreyasa*).

K.H.Potter's argument has some justification that *pramā* cannot be translated as knowledge. Because the philosophy of each country (not necessarily politically confined country) possesses its uniqueness due to its own specific culture and tradition. Indian philosophy has also its own uniqueness. Hence, it is not easy to find out an exact synonym for the word '*pramā*'. But, thereby we do not mean that intertranslatability of language is an impossible task. Intertranslatability, for our opinion, of languages is possible only if some pre-conditions are fulfilled. To be master to some language means knowing the **form of life** ⁴ of that language users. Meaning cannot be grasped from the surface of grammar, but it can be grasped from the deep of grammar ⁵. The form of life can be realised only by participating to that culture and tradition. Margerate Noble's entrance to her new life as Bhagini Nivedita has some significance in that way. Therefore, to avoid any confusion, we may use the English word 'cognition' for '*jñāna*', 'true cognition' or 'valid cognition' for '*pramā*', 'false cognition' or 'invalid cognition' for '*apramā*' only for our functional purpose. One point

deserves a mention here that truth and validity in Indian tradition, unlike Western tradition, has been taken in the same sense.

Valid cognition (*pramā*) is an epistemological problem. Epistemology deals with the nature, scope, validity, origin, etc, of knowledge. Now-a-days, epistemology, in Western tradition, from the time of Kant, emerges as a special branch of philosophy. So, we have to find out the reason for its emergence as a special branch and if its emergence is necessary what role does it exactly play in modern philosophy and finally whether pure epistemology is possible in Indian tradition also.

The role of epistemology is to present metaphysics in a sound way. But, how does epistemology play this role? Metaphysics intends to study reality as such. It also studies the basic concepts of science, like existence, negation, space, time, matter, substance, energy, number, attribute, life, etc. Because, a particular science studies only a part of worldly objects (relevant objects to that science only). So, it has to depend upon some presuppositions. By presuppositions, here, we mean, whatever points, principles, topics, or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though they are, or may be studied elsewhere. But these presuppositions, upon which the conclusion of a particular science depends, remain unreflective. For example, economics presupposes that there are human beings with needs of certain kinds, that they behave in such and such instinctive way, etc. While these presuppositions are not studied in that discipline, studied in sciences, like psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. The latter is not, however, second level studies. They are as first level as economics itself. "Philosophy, thus, studies the presuppositions of

science as facts (reals) and yet facts of the second order, and that makes a difference between philosophy and science”⁶.

But modern thinkers, once again, raise the question : As metaphysics studies after all facts, though facts of second order, has to presuppose concepts which are relatively removed in another level, it also cannot guarantee both truth and falsity. So Kant like thinkers developed a meta-metaphysical study, which is called in modern terminology pure epistemology. Pure epistemology means epistemology without the commitment to any ontology. Pure epistemology studies the presuppositions of metaphysics or in Kant’s language ‘the conditions of factuality (= knowability = reality =existence)’, conditions which, therefore, are themselves no facts. “Meta-metaphysical propositions are not assertive. In modern language, they are not informative and analytic They are ontologically non-committal”⁷. Thus, pure epistemology is a non-committal study, a study of no facts. Yet obviously, it is a study, and a theoretical study for that. So pure epistemology means a study bereft of any ontological commitment. Therefore, this is the only discipline, for these modern thinkers, that can guarantee both truth and falsity.

In Indian tradition, if pure epistemology means a study bereft of any ontological commitment, it is found in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. They studied in detail how on different presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*), none of which could be logically defined, different metaphysics with different ontological commitments had developed, and how, therefore they preferred to keep mum with the non-committal meta-metaphysical study. This is why they claim that the universe is mere void (*śūnya*). But mere void (*śūnya*) does not mean absolutely void, rather it means that the real nature of the

universe is indescribable. As the universe is indescribable, they remain non-committal (*śūnyavādi*) towards the nature of the universe (reality). This absolute non-committal attitude, according to them, is the highest freedom attainable. As the universe is indescribable (*śūnya*), means of right cognition (*pramāṇa*) and objects of right cognition (*prameya*) both are unreal., and as such there is no need, from their point of view, to prove any object of right cognition (*prameya*) with the help of the means of right cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus the Madhyamikas, like Kant, hold that epistemology is only a study of the presuppositions (*dṛṣṭi*) of metaphysics and these presuppositions are all logically untenable, and unlike Kant they remain non-committal necessarily to the whole of metaphysics and identified this non-committal attitude with freedom proper (*nirvāṇa*). One point deserves a mention here that Kant regarded non-committal attitude with regards to a part of metaphysics, viz., the study of soul, first cause, freedom, God, etc., not with regard to what he has called 'metaphysics of nature'. Thus the above discussion shows that even in pure epistemology, in its strict sense, right cognition (*pramā*) takes a vital role. Because the Śūnyavādins have denied any ontological commitment regarding the universe, the reality of valid cognition (*pramā*), the reality of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but they cannot deny right cognition (*pramā*) as such.

Pure epistemology, except Madhyamika school, is not found to any other system or school of Indian philosophy. Classical Indian philosophers have consistently fought against any concept of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) that is not itself an object of valid cognition (*prameya*)⁸. Goutama, the author of *Nyāya sūtra* and Vatsayana in his *Ādibhāṣya* has established the non unique status of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid

cognition (*prameya*)⁹. This is evident from the fact that both means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid cognition (*prameya*) along with fourteen other categories are enumerated to the list of categories. It is categorically explained, in *Nyāya-sūtra*, that the same thing in different circumstances can really be both a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and object of valid cognition (*prameya*). Here, ontology (*prameya*) is inter-woven with epistemology (*pramāṇa*). Both are studied as a second level study.

Now the question is : Is the Sunyavādins claim not true that different basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) influenced in developing different metaphysics with different ontological commitments ? It cannot be denied that some basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) prevail in every school or system of philosophy and and that they also influence in developing different metaphysics along with different ontologies. But these basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) are the minimum for theorisation. Without these presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) theorisation is not possible and that these basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) are not neutral at all, rather they are based on the cultural ground (*sanskṛti*). We have already mentioned that due to this cultural ground, the philosophy of each country has its own uniqueness. So to build up a system of study which can guarantee both truth and falsity, it does not mean that it should be totally presuppositionless, rather our aim would be to minimize these basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*). Every system or school has its own basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) and epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*) presents it the logical form. These basic presuppositions (*dr̥ṣṭi*) are the special cause (*mukhya sādhana*) in realizing the truth. Let us now see how are these basic presuppositions of Indian Philosophy as a whole are determined by some salient features. The salient features of Indian Philosophy may be shown by the diagram in the next page.

: Salient features :

Orthodox /Heterodox	Liberation/Gross pleasure oriented	Theory of categories	Distinction between appearance vs reality or no distinction
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Thus in Indian tradition theory of means of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) is interconnected with ontology or object of valid cognition (*prameya*). So, pure epistemology, in Western sense, is not possible in Indian tradition.

The *Nyāya*, like all other Indian schools of thinking, builds up its system of philosophy on the foundation of theory of knowledge. However, not all systems of Indian philosophy have given to the problem of the origin of cognition, its due importance. But the *Nyāya* found it very important. The *Nyāya* theory of knowledge, as we see, begins with a critique of the origin of true cognition (*pramāṇa*). This is why *Nyāya-śāstra* is ascribed as '*Pramāṇa-śāstra*'. "*Pramāṇādhinā prameyasiddhi*" is a received opinion of the *Nyāya*. The dictum means that the theory of reality follows upon the theory of valid cognition or right cognition. Hence the theory of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is but essential for its ontology (*prameya*). That is why, Gautama has placed *Pramāṇa* in the first in the list of sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (*apavarga*). *Prameya* is placed in the second position preceded by *pramāṇa* which signifies that the cognition of *prameya* depends on the cognition of *pramāṇa*. Actually highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) is of two types - seen (*dṛṣṭa*) and unseen (*adrṣṭa*). The cognition of *pramāṇa* along with other fourteen categories leads us to the attainment of seen welfare which is connected with mundane prosperity. On the other hand, the

cognition of the *prameyas* leads to the attainment of unseen welfare or highest good.

The Advaitins have presupposed that there is only one entity called *Brahman* or *Ātmān* covering the whole world. Each and every object of this world is covered by one Consciousness. The small individual manifestations of objects are the manifestations of the Consciousness. The Consciousness reflected in the phenomenal objects is called the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the same Consciousness. These limiting adjuncts are *Pramāṇa Caitanya* (consciousness limited by the means of knowledge), *Pramāṭṛ caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the knower) and *Viṣaya caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the object)¹⁰. To the Advaitins the perception is of two types - perception in respect of knowledge (*jñānagata pratyakṣa*) and perception in respect of object (*viṣayagata pratyakṣa*). They admit that a jar as well as the knowledge of a jar are perceived. In the case of former the amalgamation between *Pramāṇa caitanya* and *Viṣayacaitanya* is the cause of the perception of the knowledge when *pramātā* remains isolated giving scope to subject-object-relationship. In such case there is the perception of the knowledge of something. When these three types of consciousness are amalgamated, only *Pramāṭṛcaitanya* i.e, the knower in the form of consciousness remains, and the consciousness in the form of mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) which is technically called *Pramāṇacaitanya* and consciousness in the form of object are amalgamated in the knower who is also the form of consciousness (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*). Under the circumstances knower extends itself to the object and mental mode in the form of object. In this case the object is subjectified as we find in the case of aesthetic enjoyment. When some one realises the feelings of the dramatic characters, he shares the feeling of them being identified

with them which is described by Abhinavagupta as the 'melting of the subjective character' (*Pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*)¹¹. Such is the case with the spiritual realisation of the objects - in which objects become subjectified due to the identification which is called 'perception of an object' but not knowledge. As consciousness is the only entity which is real in this world, according to the Advaitins, the amalgamation of two or more limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of Consciousness is called perception which is otherwise known *Sākṣivedya*. They have to define perception in this way after keeping the presupposed entity-Consciousness in view.

In the same way, Dharmakīrti, a celebrated Buddhist logician, has defined perception as '*kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*'¹² i.e, perception is that which is non-erroneous and free from mental constructions (*kalpanā*). To him perception is defined in such a way that after bearing the presuppositions like theory of momentariness (*kṣanabhangavāda*), no soul theory (*nairātmyavāda*) etc. in mind. As a real object is momentary, it must be of unique nature (*svalakṣana*) which is free from mental constructions like language, universal etc. Such is the nature of perception of the Buddhists. Hence the definition of perception and other theories are given in such a way that their presuppositions are kept in tact.

Not only in the field of epistemology the influence of such presuppositions is noticed, but in the metaphysical level also. As all the systems of Indian Philosophy are liberation oriented, such liberation or freedom must be taken seriously as the ultimate value of man. Professor K.H.Potter thinks - "One necessary condition for faith in the ultimacy of freedom is the belief that freedom is not only logically possible, i.e, that at least one route is open which a man can find and travel to complete freedom. There must be one

route for every man, but not necessarily the same route. That is, either there is one route which each and every man can find and travel on to freedom, or else there are several routes on which men with different personality characteristics can travel - as long as for each and every man there is a route. But this belief in turn has its necessary conditions”¹³.

Various Indian thinkers are of different opinion in propogating the path of freedom according to their own presuppositions. There are various ways through which the attitude of non-attachment (*vairāgya*) can be acquired. Among the paths one is the path of activity (*karmayoga*). This path is charecterised by the performence of some actions as the means to attainment of non-attachment. These actions are of three types - optional action (*kāmyakarma*), prohibited action (*pratisiddhakarma*) and required acts (*nitya and naimittika karma*). Some think that freedom can be attained just by avoiding first two types acts and practicing the third one. The actions belonging to third constitute various forms of worship etc.

The path of devotion (*bhaktiyoga*) : The path involves personal attitudes to devotion. The devotee is inspired to invent some spontaneous means for expressing devotion to the God. This is another path for God-realisation.

The path of knowledge (*jñānayoga*) : Freedom follows from the path of knowledge of God or Brahman. The realisation of Brahman Who is the form of knowledge is possible through hearing (*sravana*), reflecting (*manana*) and maditation (*nididhyasana*) of what is described in the Upanisad etc. In Buddhism also one gathers insight (*prajñā*) which is nothing but knowledge.

It has been shown earlier that metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of valid cognition. Apart from this, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as '*khyātivāda*' (theories of error) are formulated after keeping parity with such meta-physical presuppositions. Let us see how such metaphysical presuppositions work in different theories of error.

When a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. The question in the following forms may generally arise. What is the factor which constitutes the falsity of the error ? Is the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to both apprehension and content ? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their different presuppositions.

As the false apprehension is possible due to having its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended and as there is the rejection of the content after correction, the nature of false apprehension concerns primarily to the objective content rather than subjective apprehension. Hence there lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda* and *Satkhyātivāda*.

The first view -- *Asatkhyātivāda* is propagated by the Buddhists who are the supporters of nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) who maintain voidness or absolute nothingness of all experiences and contents. Error, according to them, is the cognition of non-existent

i.e. *asat*. In the case of snake-rope illusion the snake which is falsely known is absolutely non-existent or *asat*. We should draw a distinction between absolute non-existence and relative non-existence. The former exists nowhere due to its unreality while the later is partially non-existent i.e. existing in one place and non-existing in other places. Sky-flower and hare's horn etc. are to be taken as absolutely non-existent objects. A jar may be a relatively non-existent entity. Because it may remain in one place and may not in other place. The imaginary or absurd entities (*alikapadhārtha*) do not exist anywhere. The imaginary fictions may be distinguished into two types -- the factually non-existent and the logical impossible. The hare's horn etc. belong to the first category as they do not exist as facts. A barren mother belongs to the second category i.e. it is not only non-existent but can not but be so. According to the nihilists, when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object in any of the two given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has expressed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but rope-snake. But a snake which is a rope as well is an absurdity. The snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

If the view of the *Vijñānavādins* which is known as *Ātmakhyātivāda* is reviewed carefully, it will be seen that they have totally rejected the view of the nihilists regarding error as a contentless cognition that cognises nothing. To the *Vijñānavādins* such cognition is nothing must also be itself nothing. An error which is identified with the nothingness must be nothing which is not at all an error in the true sense of the term. According to the *Ātmakhyātivāda* error arises from cognising the mental as an

extramental real. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but our mind in the case of error cognises it as the extramental blue. The mental fact is thus mistaken as a transcendent meaning. An object cognised is a subjective image, but this is mistakenly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The *Ātmakhyāti* which means the self cognition of the psychic fact is imagined to be cognition of the objective trans-psychic being. Hence error is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of sheer non-existent, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The Prabhakaras who advocate the view known as *Akhyāti* refute the *Asatkhyāti* and *Ātmakhyāti* views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence, error involves both representation and representation-something given or presented (*gr̥hita*) and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth (*smṛta*). The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory image (“*yatra yadadhyasastadvivekagrahanivandhano bhramaḥ*”)¹⁴. In other words, there is the non-apprehension of the distinction (*vivekagraha*) between presentation and representation which is called *akhyati*. In the case of snake-rope illusion the given element lies on the ‘rope’ and the remembered content is ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgment -- ‘this is snake’. The two facts -- the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence. The illusion is a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and duality. From this the

Prabhakaras believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction; it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.

The Naiyayikas who propound the *Anyathākhyātivāda* urge that the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from the negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things -- given and remembered -- are falsely confused and non-distinguished as Prabhakaras say. In the snake-rope illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the inference of the defects of sense, media etc. The illusion is a unitary composite presentation of this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (*laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also presented through the extraordinary (*alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extra-ordinary perceived 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake is perceived as a real snake, and the snake-character or feature perceived in it inheres in an elsewhere snake, i.e. not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere. This error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense organ viz., the eye, by natural contact of sense and objects.

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Now we may look at the metaphysical presuppositions as found in the formulation of the *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda* by Śamkara. Error, according to Samkarites, involves more than the experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. Samkara concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in *Asatkhyātivāda* nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the *Anyathakhyātivāda*. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely non-existent (*asat*) can not be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognised as a snake, the status of snake is not non-existent (*asat*) as we cognise it in this way and it is not existent (*sat*) also as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent valid cognition of rope. Hence, the snake is neither existent nor non-existent which is described as indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). This illusory cognition is taken as a real which is of apparent type (*prātibhāsika sattā*).

Ramanuja rejects the *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* of Samkara and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. Their theory is known as *Satkhyātivāda* according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. It is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when a rope is cognised as a snake, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope existing before him. He does not perceive nothing nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character nor again any indescribable snake. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or

unreal, but in considering the snake-character to be the only characteristics of the objects lying before. That is why, the cognition does not work in life and the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such imperfect cognition comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

Now the question is : If means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) belongs to the same level, so to say, if both of them are studied as a second order fact (reals) and if means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) itself is recognised as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*), why the dictum '*māṅādhīnā meya siddhi*' i.e. why the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) hits the list ? Does it not mean that the presuppositions of objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) are studied in the study of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa śāstra*) ? This is not a tenable question in *Nyāya* system. Because, a second order discipline means a critical or reflective discipline. The reals, here, are determined only if they fulfills three criteria of reality, viz. 'isness' (*astitva*), 'namability' (*abhidheyatva*), 'cognizability' (*jñeyatva*). The Naiyayikas, unlike Kant (knowability = reality = existence), have not equated these three criteria. These three criteria are not identical. Each term have different connotations, although they have the same extension. Thus, it is not merely a reflection of one's own thought and therefore, uninformative. These expressions, in *Nyāya* system, are not ontologically non-committal. They definitely refers to some external objects and their co-existence is understood reflectively. This is the reason to ascribe *Nyāya* as *ānvikṣikī*. The word '*ānvikṣikī*' derives from '*anu + ikṣā*'. The prefix '*anu*' means subsequent or critical and the root '*ikṣā*' means viewing or reflection. The literal meaning of *ānvikṣiki* is subsequent viewing or critical reflection. Thus there is no need of any third level study or pure epistemology in this system.

Here, epistemology is inter-woven with ontology. The study of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), in Indian tradition, does not deal with the presuppositions of metaphysical categories (*prameya*). Here, there are no presuppositions except outlooks (*dṛṣṭi*) at all, because objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) deals with facts or reals of second order. For this reason, it is possible in Indian tradition to accommodate means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as an object of valid cognition (*prameya*).

Now the question is : why the theory of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is considered as the pivot in the *Nyāya* system ? The means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is one of the sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*) . A problem may be raised in this context. How does the valid cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads us to the attainment of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*) ? A section of Indian thinkers has objected to the theory that the right cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads to this state of liberation. The problem is : how the right cognition of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) has to be attained ? Is it through another means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) ? It is not possible due to the possibility of infinite regress (*anavastha*) and mutual dependence (*anyonyaśraya*). For cognizing the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) another one is resorted to and another one is also dependent on the present one.

Pramāṇa, to Goutama, is an instrument of valid cognition. When such awareness arises, it is very difficult to ascertain whether the awareness is right or not. Hence, the validity of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not at all possible. Hence, Goutamas' exercise on the *Nyāya-śāstra* is a futile one.

In response to the above Goutama is of the opinion that ascertainment of validity of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not an impossible affair. This job can be accomplished through inference which runs as follows. To him, means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is meaningful (*arthavat*) i.e. constantly connected with the object. This constant connection of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) with an object (*artha*) is called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*). The nature or characteristics of an object revealed by the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which reveals the actual characteristics of an object, which is technically called non-deviatedness of the meaning revealed through the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If the reverse case is found, it is a case of illusion. When the cognition of snake is attained in the case of rope, it is a case of illusion. For, in such awareness there is the absence of the qualifier snakesness in the place of the qualificand i.e. rope. Hence, the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) will have its object of valid cognition (*prameya*) as its pervader (*vyāpka*) which is otherwise called non-deviatedness (*avyabhicāritva*). In this form of syllogistic argument the property of being non-deviatedness with the object (*arthāvyabhicāritva*) is the probandum (*sādhyā*), the probans (*hetu*) is 'the capability of fulfilling successful activity' (*sāmartha pravṛtti janakatvāt*). As the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the cause of the successful inclination, it is non-deviated to its object. This non-deviatedness (*arthavyacāritva*) is explained later on as "*arthāvyabhicāryanubhavajanakatvamityanthah*"¹⁵. In fact, in this initial statement Vātsāyana tries to favour or propagate the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Through this argument someone can distinguish a *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition) from *pramāṇābhāsa* (*pseudo-pramāṇa*). From the fact of successful inclination (*pravṛtti sāmarthyā*) one can assume the reality of *pramāṇa* which is different from *pramāṇābhāsa*.

A man can acquire pleasure, pain, fun, etc. in a dream but as soon as he wakes up he starts repenting considering the pleasant incidents occurred in the dream are false. We may recall here Madhusudan Datta's poem – "*Nisār svapan sukhe sukṭi ye tār jage se kāṅdile*" i.e. the person who feels pleasure in a dream does not really feel pleasure after his waking up. As in the awakened state his pleasure is replaced by repentance. If we ponder over this, we shall be able to distinguish between what is real and what is unreal. Our feeling, activity, etc. are centered around the right cognition of the external world as well as wrong cognition of the same. The wrong cognition leads us to the world of pseudo-pleasure etc. that ultimately brings repentance. Hence, we should be aware rightly of the external world having right feeling of pleasure etc. We should have right cognition, right attitude, right activity to regulate our life. If we have real cognition, it can control everything. Hence, *Pramā* or right cognition is the primary factor in regulating our life. If there is *pramā* or right cognition then there is the source of knowing *pramā* called *pramāṅa*. Centering *pramāṅa* or source of right cognition *prameya*, *pramāta* and *pramiti* become meaningful. Hence, *pramā* or right cognition is taken as an important concept that covers the entire *Sastra*.

Though the concept of right cognition (*pramā*) of the Naiyayikas is desired to be substantiated, a comprehensive view on *pramā* given by different systems would be presented as opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) from which one would have an idea about the history of the concept. Following Philosophical problems which have not been raised so far are proposed to be investigated.

REFERENCES

1. 'yamārthamadhikṛtya pravarttate tat prayojanam' - --Nyāya Sūtra 24
2. "In fact, we might take some comfort here, for the intuitive concept of 'knowledge' by and large coincides with the intuitive sense of *pramā* in Sanskrit despite some minor discrepancies -- 'Knowledge, Truth and Pramātva' P-17, in the book – 'The philosophy of J.N.Mohanty' ed. by Daya Krishna and K.L.Sharma, ICPR Series in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, First published in 1991
3. "What this paper is arguing is that Indian Philosophy, not being wedded to a non-cognitivist approach, things it can talk of knowledge (or rather, of *pramā*), but in a sense of 'knowledge' different from current notions predicated on non, cognitivism".—'Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?' Karl H.Potter. P-140 Ibid
4. "So speaking a language – i.e. a speaking and understanding it – is engaging in certain modes of behaviour that exhibit a variety of abilities of skills. It is to engage in what Wittgenstein calls "form of life"—The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, George Pitcher, P-237 Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1985 (elucidated from P.I., Basin Blackwell, P-243)

5. "In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use – one might say- that can be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say the word "to mean" with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about".- Ibid (elucidated from P.I, sect. 664)
6. "Philosophy, thus, studies the presuppositions of sciences as facts (reals) and yet facts of the second order, and that makes a difference between Philosophy and Science".— Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays, P-19—Kalidas Bhattacharya, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1974
7. "Meta-metaphysical propositions are not assertive. In modern language, they are not informative and informative and analytic.....They are ontologically non-committal".—Ibid P-25
8. "*Pramāṇa-prameya-saṁśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntavayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitandā-hetvābhasacchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānām-tattvajñānaniḥśreyasadhigamaḥ*" Nyāya Sūtra 1/ 1/1.
9. "*Nirdeśe-yathāvacanam-vigrahaḥ/ sarvapadārtha-pradhāno dvandva samāsaḥ / pramāṇādīnām tattvamiti śaiṣiki sasti / tattvasya jñānam niḥśreyasasyadhigama iti karmāni sasthayau / ta etāvanto vidyamānārthāḥ /*

*esāṁviparīta jñānārthamihopadeśaḥ / sohayamanavayavena
tantrārtha uddisto veditavyah*” Nyāya Darshan- Vol. 1 Ed.
by Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa PP 19-20, Pascimbanga Rajya
Pustaka Parsad, 1981

10. “...*Tathāhi trividham caitanyam viṣaya-caitanyam,
pramāṇa-caitanyam, pramāṭṛ-caitanyañcēti / tatra
ghatādyavacchinna caitanyam, viṣaya-caitanyam,
antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnaṁ caitanyam pramāṇcaitanyam,
antaḥkaraṇavacchinnaṁ caitanyam pramāṭṛ-caitanyam*”
Vedānta Paribhāṣā (Bengali Version) P-10, by Sarat
Chandra Ghosal
11. “*Pramāṭṛbhāvavigalana*” – Kāvya Prakāśa, Vṛtti, 4/28
12. “*Kalpanapodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*” – Nyayabindu
Tīkā PP. 8-9
13. – “One necessary condition for faith in the ultimacy of
freedom is the belief that freedom is not only logically
possible, i.e, that at least one route is open which a man
can find and travel to complete freedom. There must be one
route for every man, but not necessarily the same route.
That is, either there is one route which each and every man
can find and travel on to freedom, or else there are several
routes on which men with different personality
charecterstics can travel – as long as for each and every
man there is a route. But this belief in turn has its
necessary conditions”- “Presoppositions of India’s
Philosophies”, K.H.Potter, Prentice Hall, New Delhi,
1965.

14. “*Yatra yadadhyasastudvivekāgraha-nivandhano bhramaḥ*”
– Prabhakara.
15. “*Arthavyabhicāryānunbhavajanakatvamityarthaḥ*” --
Tātparyapariśuddhi Tīka, P-95, Udayaṇācārya

The main task of this chapter is to highlight the Nyāya concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) in detail. We have already seen in the earlier chapter that each and every concept has to be studied within that conceptual scheme. The word '*pramā*' is used in Sanskrit literature in a very technical sense. It is one of the species of the genus term 'cognition' (*jñāna*). The concept cognition (*jñāna*) in Indian tradition, specially in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is wider than the western concept of knowledge (JTB), and hence, it receives a deep significance. The word '*jñāna*' and '*buddhi*' is taken as synonymous in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system (*'Buddhirupalabdhi jñānametyanarthantaram'*)¹. *Buddhi*, *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* belong to the same metaphysical category (*prameya padārtha*). It is the fifth among the twelve metaphysical categories (*prameya padārtha*). Cognition of these metaphysical categories (*padārtha*) is necessary for liberation. Human beings suffer or fall in bondage due to the wrong cognition of these categories. Cognition (*buddhi*) is an accidental quality of the self. Though it is an accidental quality of the self, yet it possesses some speciality than other twenty three qualities (*gunas*). Its existence is proved by our experience (*anubhuti*). It is the root of our all behaviour viz. desire to get (*Upādāna*), desire to leave (*hāna*) and indifference (*upekṣanīya*). (*"sarva vyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhi jñānam"*)². The word "*guṇaḥ*" is used to prevent the definition from the fallacy of

over coverage (*ativyapti*) in terms of space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), etc. And the word 'hetuḥ' signifies that it is the special condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) of all our behaviour.

But the above definition is not a perfect one, since the definition is unable to accommodate indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which has no behavioural usage. Thus the said definition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Annambhatta suggests that "*sarva vyavahāra hetuḥ*" is not the defining characteristics of cognition. Cognition (*buddhi*) is a special type of abstract concept. It cannot be defined by any synonymous words. There are other objects also which cannot be defined by synonymous word, but they can be defined, at least, ostensively. For example, the colour blue or red etc. cannot be defined by any synonymy, but one may present them before the hearer and thereby the hearer may be acquainted with the object in question. But, cognition can neither be defined by any synonymous words, nor, it can be defined ostensively. Yet, we have the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. So Indian thinkers have advocated that illumination of object (*arthaprakāśa*) is cognition. Annambhatta holds as "*sarvavyavahāra hetuḥ guṇah*" suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*), it is cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*) which is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of cognition (*jñāna*). Cognition (*jñāna*) is the locus of cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*). There cannot be any cognition if it is not related with cognitionhood. The existence (*sattā*) of cognitionhood (*jñānatvajāti*) is cognized by subsequent cognition (*Jānāmi iti anuvyavasayagamya jñatvaṁ*)³.

Having the definition of cognition (*jñāna*), it is classified under two heads-- viz. recollection (*smṛti*) and presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Recollection (*smṛti*) is that cognition which originates from the bare mental impression (*saṁskāra-mātra-*

janyam- jñānam). Presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is defined negatively, i.e. it is that cognition which is other than recollection (*tadbhinnam jñānam*). Thus recollection (*smṛti*) is excluded from the definition of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). Presentative cognition, again, is of two types -- valid presentative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) and invalid presentative cognition (*ayathārtha anubhava*). *Pramā* is presentative valid cognition.

Udayanacharya defines valid cognition as “*yathārthānubhavo māṇam*”⁴ and suggests to accept the etymological meaning of *yathārthānubhava* i.e. (*yathā + artha*). The etymological meaning of *yathārtha* signifies the similarity or correspondence. *Yathārtha* is the determinans (*viśesana*) of presentative cognition (*anubhava*). A presentative cognition (*anubhava*) is valid or true (*yathārtha*) only if it corresponds with the external object i.e other than the subject (self) having some content. But what types of correspondence ? Is the correspondence partial or in full? If it is conceived as a partial one, then the definition is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Because in the case of invalid presentative cognition (*ayathārthānubhava*) also there is partial similarity or correspondence between presentative cognition (*anubhava*) and the object having some content in question. For example, in the case of perceiving a rope as a snake, there is some kind of similarity in terms of common characteristics (*sādhāraṇa dharma*) between the object in question (*artha*) and the presentative cognition (*anubhava*). On the other hand, if the meaning of correspondence or similarity is accepted in full, then no presentative cognition (*anubhava*) would be valid (*yathārtha*).

As both the above mentioned views are extreme, and therefore, unacceptable, some thinkers hold that the correspondence would be determined by subsequent cognition (*jñānāntara*). This explanation

of the definition also affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*) in terms of illusory cognition (*bhrama*). Since, our illusory cognition (*bhrama*) is corrected only by a subsequent veridical cognition, but, before that veridical cognition our illusory cognition may be supported by immediate subsequent invalid cognition.

Once again, presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) could not even be defined as a cognition which leads to successful activity (*saphala pravṛttijanakatva*). Because, the Naiyayikas, unlike the Buddhists, accept three types of cognition, viz., desire to accept (*hāna*), desire to leave (*heya*) and indifferent attitude (*upekṣanīya*). Indifferent cognitions (*upekṣanīya jñāna*), for them, does not serve any purpose. So, the cognition of such object does not lead to any successful activity. So, if it is defined in terms of successful activity (*saphala- pravṛtti-janakatva*), it would be affected by the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

However, before going to explain the nature of presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*), let us examine the similarity or dissimilarity between Indian concept of *pramā* and western concept of knowledge. It is already mentioned in the earlier chapter that there is a controversy among the modern thinkers regarding the exact western epistemological synonymy of the Indian concept of *pramā*. Generally, knowledge in the sense of justified true belief is taken as a synonymy of *pramā*. Sutapa saha argues that since 'yathārtha' is the equivalent of 'true' and 'anubhava' is equivalent to 'justified belief', *pramā* may be taken as the synonymy of knowledge⁵. But, before going to have a decision, we have to examine each component word.

In western tradition, there are mainly two views regarding the definition of knowledge. Traditional philosophers generally defined knowledge in terms of belief. Belief, for them, may turn into knowledge if the belief is true and the believer has some justification for his / her belief. There are some other philosophers, on the other hand, like Cookwillson, Prichard, etc., who maintain that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief, because the nature of belief and knowledge is totally different. Knowledge, for Prichard, is by definition true. So, to ascribe 'knowledge is true' is a tautology. Truth and falsity is predicated to belief only. As knowledge is necessarily true, its propositions are *a-priori* and as belief is only contingently true / false -- its propositions are *a-posteriori*. Thus, the object of knowledge is totally different from the objects of belief. Therefore, knowledge cannot be defined in terms of belief.

Let us examine whether *pramā* is equivalent to knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. The first objection is that in Indian epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*) we do not encounter with such concepts like belief which is a form of life of Western epistemology. J.N.Mohanty shows that there is some kind of hints of the concept of belief in Indian tradition also⁶. He argues that *pramā* is a non-dubious cognition (*niścaya jñāna*). A non-dubious cognition (*niścaya jñāna*) may be either valid cognition (*pramā*) or invalid cognition (*apramā*), just as a belief may be true or false and immediately he concludes that the Indian concept of *niścaya jñāna* and the Western concept of belief are synonymous. The comparison, to our opinion, is a misleading one. The Sanskrit word '*niścaya*' means 'being confident of'. Mohanty comes to the conclusion only from the similarity that truth and falsity are predicated to both in the case of the Western concept of belief and in the Indian concept

of *niścaya jñāna*. But Mohanty's logic in this regard is not so sound. Truth and falsity are not the exclusive essential characteristics of belief or *niścaya jñāna*. So from the observation of the applicability of some accidental characteristics it does not follow that the locus of these characteristics are essentially identical. For example, red and white colour may be predicated to clothes as well as flowers, thereby we cannot say that cloth and flower is identical. Moreover, it is already mentioned that some Western thinkers have not defined knowledge in terms of belief. But, 'being confident of' is a necessary condition of knowledge even to these thinkers, hence 'belief' and 'being confident of' are not synonymous. Again, a *niścaya jñāna* in Indian tradition, as Mohanty observes, may be either valid or invalid. Although, being confident of is a necessary condition of the western concept of knowledge, yet these Western thinkers like Cookwillson, Prichard, etc., are of the opinion that truth and falsity can not be predicated to knowledge. Because knowledge is by definition true, hence to ascribe knowledge as true results a tautology and to ascribe knowledge as false results a self-stultifying position. Hence our opinion is that being confident (*niścaya jñāna*) is merely a mental attitude towards a cognition. A mental attitude cannot be predicated as either true or false. When being confident (*niścaya jñāna*) is predicated as true or false -- it is merely a case of transferred epithet. So *niścaya jñāna* should not be translated as belief. But Mohanty is right in saying that "western concept of belief is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścaya jñāna*, if *savikalpaka*, i.e. a conceptual has a propositional structure".

The above discussion shows that the concept of belief has been neglected in Indian epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*). Recent Western thinkers also feel that the concept of belief in defining knowledge is not so important. Chisholm and Keith Lehrer, thus,

introduce the concept of 'acceptance' instead of belief. Belief, for them, is associated with our emotions, desire, etc. So if knowledge is defined in terms of belief, then the so-called knowledge may be affected by the defect of one-eyedness and hence may be an obstacle in knowing the object as such. Ayer also instead of using the concept of belief, introduces the concept of 'being sure' and treats it as a special state of mind.

Although recent Western thinkers also avoid the concept of belief in defining knowledge, there is another point of difference between knowledge and *pramā*. Western thinkers hold knowledge either as an act or as a disposition. If it is explained as an act, then it cannot explain all sorts of knowledge which are recognised in common usage. So some Western thinkers explain knowledge as a disposition. Because, if knowledge be an act, for them, it would cease to exist after some time. But the nature of knowledge is not of that sort. For example, I may claim that I know the date of great Ashoka's coronation as a king, although, I cannot for the time being recollect it and it may also happen that after some time although I am not thinking about Ashoka now, yet all on a sudden I may correctly recollect the said date. So, knowledge, for them, is a disposition. *Pramā*, in Nyāya, is neither a disposition nor a pure act in Western sense. *Pramā* is propositional or determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). Western thinkers distinguish between a proposition and a sentence. A sentence can neither be true nor be false; a sentence is either grammatically correct or incorrect. What a sentence means is a proposition. A proposition is said to be a neutral entity, since it is neither purely subjective, nor purely objective. It subsists beyond space and time. So, some Western thinkers hold that it is the proposition which is either true or false. But, the problem is : if such neutral entity is conceived, we have to

consider infinite numbers of proposition corresponding to each state of affairs. So, Austine like thinkers hold that it is the judgment, which is either true/ false. Because in judgment there is a mental act directed to the correlative proposition which we believe or disbelieve. Nyāya system does not distinguish between an act and a proposition., because a proposition, in the above mentioned sense, certainly is not a quality (*guṇa*) of the self. But cognition, in this system, is considered as a quality, though accidental, of the self. J.N.Mohanty rightly observes that “ a *savikalpaka* knowledge is propositional though not a proposition I call it ‘propositional’ for it is a logical complex analysable into constituent elements and relations”⁷. *Pramā* is used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense. The Sanskrit term ‘*saṁskāra*’ is taken as a synonymy for disposition. But what originates from the bare mental impression (*saṁskāra mātra janyam*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Some opponents, once again, advocate that the Nyāya concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) cannot even be spoken as an episodic occurrence. Since God’s cognition is eternal (*nitya jñāna*). Whatever is eternal cannot be ascribed as having origination. God is the creator of the world, omniscience, and therefore, it would not be rational to say that once He lacked cognition of something. This objection may be overcome by a clear distinction between a metaphysical problem and an epistemological problem. The notion of God’s cognition is a metaphysical problem and not an epistemological problem.

Now, the last but not least objection in equating knowledge with *pramā* is the concept of justification or evidence. If some one claims having knowledge, in general, we enquire for evidence to

justify his / her claim. We use the word '*pramāna*', in our day-to-day life, for the word 'evidence' or 'justification'. But a serious observation shows that the word '*pramāṇa*' has been used in a very technical sense. Here, *pramāṇa* does not mean evidence, rather it is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramā*) . And as valid cognition (*pramā*) means presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*), the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is the yardstick of verification (*yathārtha*). The word '*pramāṇa*', again, is sometimes translated as proof. The Western thinkers generally distinguishes between evidence supported by reason and evidence supported by senses. Evidence guided by reason, for them, gives the apedictic or absolute certainty, where as evidence guided by the senses can give us to its best effort the maximum probability. So the word 'justification' in Western tradition is used in two senses -- viz. in the strong sense and in the weak sense . Justification, in the strong sense, means 'truth-ensuring' and in the weak sense it means 'truth-conducive'⁸. But the question is : is reason really infallible ? Even if reason is regarded as 'the Divine element in man', it is as imperfect as any other human faculty. This is why Western epistemology suffers from Gettier like problem. Gettier has shown that it may happen that there may be justification in the strong sense (justification by applying the rules of logic, viz.--Existential Generalization and the rule of Addition), yet some cognitions may not be ascribed as knowledge. This shows that the Western concept of justification is not always truth hitting.

The Indian concept of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*), on the other hand, is always truth hitting. No such concepts of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) guided by reason is found in Indian tradition. There is no distinction of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) in the strong sense i.e guided by reason and instrumental

justify his / her claim. We use the word '*pramāna*', in our day-to-day life, for the word 'evidence' or 'justification'. But a serious observation shows that the word '*pramāṇa*' has been used in a very technical sense. Here, *pramāṇa* does not mean evidence, rather it is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramā*) . And as valid cognition (*pramā*) means presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*), the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is the yardstick of verification (*yathārtha*). The word '*pramāṇa*', again, is sometimes translated as proof. The Western thinkers generally distinguishes between evidence supported by reason and evidence supported by senses. Evidence guided by reason, for them, gives the apedictic or absolute certainty, where as evidence guided by the senses can give us to its best effort the maximum probability. So the word 'justification' in Western tradition is used in two senses -- viz. in the strong sense and in the weak sense . Justification, in the strong sense, means 'truth-ensuring' and in the weak sense it means 'truth-conducive'⁸. But the question is : is reason really infallible ? Even if reason is regarded as 'the Divine element in man', it is as imperfect as any other human faculty. This is why Western epistemology suffers from Gettier like problem. Gettier has shown that it may happen that there may be justification in the strong sense (justification by applying the rules of logic, viz.--Existential Generalization and the rule of Addition), yet some cognitions may not be ascribed as knowledge. This shows that the Western concept of justification is not always truth hitting.

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condition in the weak sense i.e. guided by the senses. Pure mathematics and empirical sciences, in Indian tradition, have the same logical status. Even the concept of Universal (*jāti*), in Nyāya, is cognized through perception, though through super natural perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). The Naiyayikas have accepted the *samanyalakṣana* as a super-normal connection (*pratyāsatti*). To the Naitayikas the cognition of *vyapti* is to be attained through the cognition of all individual manifestations of probans and probandum which is acquired by *samanyalakṣana*. Hence it is a connection or *pratyāsatti*. The inference of fire from smoke is possible when the *vyapti* relation is apprehended between smoke in general (*dhumasāmānya*) and fire in general (*vahnisāmānya*). Such type of cognition is not possible by ordinary process of perception, because an individual can know only the co-existence of a particular smoke with a particular fire in a normal way. Hence the method of the supernormal connection through universal (*sāmānyalakṣanapratyāsatti*) is to be resorted to for acquiring the cognition of *vyapti* between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general (“*sāmānyapratyāsattya sarvoposaṁhārād avinabhavagrahaḥ*”-- T.C., ‘*sāmānyasya hi pratyāsattitvaṁ lāghavat, na tu sāmānyatayā jñātasya*’⁹. We find constant reference to the very general principles of logic in Navya-Nyāya, but these principles are not regarded as self-evident. They are usually justified by a direct reference to experience (*pratiti*). Thus in no way *pramā* be equated with knowledge.

Pramā, for the Naiyayikis, is presentative veridical cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*). Recollection (*smṛti*) may be veridical also (*pramā janya yathārtha, apramā janya ayathārtha*)¹⁰, yet it is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). It is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*), since the

nature of presentative veridical cognition (*anubhava*) is explained as that which originates after the intermediary (*vyāpara*) of the instrumental condition (*anu pramānavyāparat param bhavati yah saḥ anubhavaḥ*)¹¹. But, there is no such intermediary condition for the origination of recollection (*smṛti*). Recollection (*smṛti*) originates from the bare mental impression only (*saṃskāra mātra janyam jñānam*).

Presentative cognition (*anubhava*), in TS, is defined negatively, i.e. 'other than recollection' (*tadbhinnaṃ jñānam*) and its nature is associated with the concept of the instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*), in Nyāya, are inter-related terms. Hence the Naiyayikas give a causal definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) -- the result of the instrumental condition is the effect - valid cognition (*pramāyāḥ karaṇam pramāṇam...*)¹².

What is a instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) ? From the point of view of important in producing the effect, there are two types of conditions in Nyāya-Vaisesika system --viz. common one (*sādhārana kāraṇa*) and uncommon one (*asādhārana kāraṇa*). By common conditions (*sādhārana kāraṇa*) means those conditions which are necessary for the production of any effect. For example, God (*iśvara*), space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), the unseen power (*adr̥ṣṭa*), will of God (*iśvarecchā*), in Nyāya ontology, are the common conditions. Beside these common conditions (*sādhārana kāraṇa*), there are some uncommon or special conditions (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) which are only necessary for the origination of a particular effect. These type of conditions are called uncommon or special conditions (*asādhārana kāraṇa*). Annambhatta defines instrumental condition (*kāraṇa*) as “ *asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam* ”¹³. For example, sense-object-contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*),

consideration (*parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*tātparyajñāna*) and cognition of similarity (*sādrśya jñāna*) is the instrumental condition of perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and comparison (*upamāna*) respectively. A question may be raised why they are called instruments (*karana*). Generally the uncommon causes along with operative process (*vyāparavadasādhāranam kāranam karanam*). Consideration or *paramarśa* is called *vyāpāra* and the cognition of *Vyapti* is an uncommon causes (*karaṇa*). The former is called operative process or *Vyāpāra* because this cognition being caused by the cognition of *Vyapti* becomes the generator of the inferential cognition. In the form of consideration or *parāmarśa* -- '*vahnivyapyadhūmavān ayam parvataḥ*' i.e. the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire, this piece of cognition is caused by the previous cognition of *Vyapti* reflected in the portion -- *vahnivyapya* (pervaded by fire) and generates the inferential cognition -- '*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*' (the mountain is fire-possessing). Hence the definition of *Vyāpara* in the form -- '*tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyāparaḥ*' can easily be applicable here. In this way, the existence of an uncommon cause along with operative process can be admitted in other forms of inferential cognitions.

One point may be mentioned in this connection. The perceptual cognition alone is called *jñānakāranaka* i.e. a cognition not caused through the instrumentality of other cognitions. When a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognitions to have direct awareness of it. In other words, another cognition does not serve as an instrument to this perceptual cognition and hence it is called independent. But other forms of cognition are called *jñānakāranaka* i.e. caused through the instrumentality of another cognition. These cognitions are not independent by virtue of the fact

that they depend on some other cognitions for being the means of valid cognition. Inferential cognition (*anumiti*), cognition through comparison (*upamiti*) and testimonial cognition (*śabda*) are generated through the instrumentality of other cognitions like the cognition of invariable relation (*vyaptijñāna*), cognition of similarity (*sadrśyajñāna*) and cognition of word (*padajñānam*). In the case of perceptual cognition the sense organ etc. are alone taken as instrument, but not any cognition. It is said in the Nyāyabodhini commentary on *Tarkasamgraha* -- “*jñānam vyaptijñānam sadrśyajñānam padajñānam ca. Tadeva karanam yasem tāni jñānakaranakāni anumityapamitis’abdāni. Tadbhinnamityarthah. Pratyakṣendriyanāmeva karanatvam, na jñānasya. Tathā ca jñānakaranakajñānatvasya pratyakṣasāmānya eva vidyamānatvallakṣanasangatiḥ.*”¹⁴.

Now, the question is: what is the mark of selecting an uncommon or specific condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). The Naiyayikas differ in maintaining the defining mark of uncommon conditions (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). The ancient Naiyayikas criterion for selecting the uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is -- “*phalāyogavyavacchinnaṁ asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanam*”¹⁵. This means that an uncommon condition is that condition which being present the effect originates without delay. Perception, for example, takes place only when our sense-organ comes in contact with the object. Hence the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the condition which being present the effect immediately follows. Sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*). So, the ancient Naiyayikas indicate that instrumental condition might be a non-inherent one (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*).

The Neo-Naiyayikas criterion, on the other hand, for selecting an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is : “*vyāparavat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanam*”¹⁶. What is a intermediary condition (*Vyāpara*) ? A intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is that factor which being produced by something becomes the producer of that entity produced by earlier one (*Tajjanyate sati tajjanya janako*)¹⁷. Let us take a symbolic example of X, Y and Z. Y is a intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) because Y being caused by X becomes the producer of Z caused by X. Let us take a concrete example, sense-object-contact, in the case of perception, is caused by the sense-organ produces the effect perception. Hence, sense-object-contact is the intermediary condition (*vyāpara*). An intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is always either a quality (*guna*), or an action (*karma*), but never a substance (*dravya*) -- “*dravyetara*”. But the instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) is defined as the locus of the intermediary condition (*vyāparavat*). The suffix ‘*vat*’ of the Sanskrit word “*vyāparavat*” means that occupies. The intermediary condition (*vyāpara*) is occupied by substance (*dravya*). So, a special condition (*karaṇa*), for the Neo-Naiyayikas, might be a substance or an inherent condition (*samavāyī karaṇa*).

A third view, once again, is found in Jayanta Bhatta who presents another criterion for selecting an uncommon condition (*karaṇa*) taking clue from the famous grammarian Panini. Panini defines an uncommon condition (*karaṇa*) as “*sādhakatama*”¹⁸. The word ‘*sadhakatama*’ derives from the root ‘*sādhaka*’ meaning the instrumental and the suffix (*pratyā*) ‘*tama*’ meaning excellence (*atiśaya*). The excellence of a condition, according to Jayanta, neither prevails in an inherent condition (*samavāyī kāraṇa*) nor in a non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*), rather it prevails in the conglomeration of conditions (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*).

Both the Old and Neo-Naiyayikas accept instrumentality (*karana~~t~~va*) as an uncommon condition (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). But there are several uncommon conditions. For example, the presence of the perciever (*draṣṭā*), sense-organ (*indriya*), the object (*artha*) and the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) -- all are necessary conditions for perception. Independently, each and every condition has its own speciality or uniqueness (*asādhāraṇatva*). There is no specific stipulation in Sanskrit literature regarding the use of the third case-ending (*ṭṛtīyā vibhakti*). It depends upon the speaker's intention (*Vaktā-vivakṣādhīna*). The only stipulation is that the third case-ending is neither used to the subject (*kartā*), nor to the object (*karma*). The Old-Naiyayikas emphasise upon the extreme condition (*carama kāraṇa*) whose presence is immediately followed by the emergence of effect. The Old-Naiyayikas, therefore, think that the excellence (*atiśaya*) remains to this condition.

But the Neo-Naiyayikas advocate that the excellence (*atiśaya*) cannot remain in the intermediary condition (*vyāpara*), because, it cannot produce the effect without taking co-operation from other conditions. Uddyotkara, hence, admits the locus of intermediary condition (*vyāpara-viśiṣṭa kāraṇa*) as an instrument (*karana*). But, this view also does not hold good, because, there are at least some cases where intermediary condition is more important than the locus of intermediary condition (*vyapārī*), i.e. the excellence remains in the intermediary condition. Memory, for example, occurs in the presence of mental trace alone (*saṃskāra mātra*). These mental impressions, of course, are dependent upon the past experiences (*pūrvānubhava*) that are destroyed at that time. Or, a sacrificial rites (*yāgādi kriyā*) may be destroyed, yet the unseen power (*adrṣṭa*) arising out of these sacrificial rites is regarded as the excellent condition of heaven (*svarga*). Thus, both the views accept excellence

(*atiśaya*) only in a subjective sense, because, the determination for selecting the excellence depends upon the speaker (*vakta*) and, hence unacceptable.

Jayanta tries to come out from the subjective determination for selecting the excellence (*atiśayatva*). He accepts the instrumental condition in the extreme property of sense and expressed it in the superlative degree (*sādhakatama*). An instrument, for him, is that which is most efficient or operative to the origination of an effect. The collocation of condition is collectively essential for it . If one condition is absent, the effect does not take place. No credit is to be given to any individual condition. It may be argued that though all conditions are essential, yet one condition whose immediate presence makes the cognition possible is to be taken as distinct. Jayanta, to refute the above objection, cites an example. In darkness flash of lighting, in the traditional sense, is the instrumental condition of illumining a women. But had there been no women, she would not have been seen, hence she is no less important as object. Hence, collocation (*sāmagrī*) is instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). It acts not by independent status but by the process of the condition included in it. When there is assemblage each and every condition will not lose its own identity. The Old-Naiyayikas concept of instrumentality (*karanatva*) fails to explain the independent excellence (*svādhīna atiśaya*) of each condition. The Neo-Naiyayikas concept of instrumental condition (i.e. as the locus of intermediary condition), on the other hand, fails to explain the immediate emergence of the effect. Jayanta, as a consequence, advocates that the collocation (*sāmagrī*) alone can claim instrumentality (*karaṇatva*), because it can overcome both the demerits of the Old-Naiyayikas and the Neo-Naiyayikas.

Now, one may raise the question that instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) as the collocation of all conditions (*sādhakasāmagrī*) also possesses the status of relative excellence (*atiśaya*). Because the collocation is nothing but all conditions taken together. Hence the excellence of the collocation of conditions is dependent upon the excellence of the individual conditions. Because the relation between the collocation of conditions and an individual condition separately is not the relation between part (*avayava*) and whole (*avayavī*). Part, in Nyāya system, is completely different (*atyantabhinna*) from the whole. But, individual conditions are not completely different (*atyantabhinna*) from the collocation of condition. Being united the individual conditions form the collocation and yet these conditions do not lose their uniqueness. Jayanta would answer this problem in the following way. The individual conditions separately could not possess excellence (*atiśayatva*), because the individual conditions separately are common conditions (*karana*) but not an uncommon condition (*karana*). There is a difference between uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*) and excellence (*atiśayatva*). The individual condition in isolation possesses uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*), but when these conditions get together and form the collocation, it acquires the additional property of excellence (*atiśayatva*) in relation to the isolated members. Jayanta, hence, defines instrumentality of valid cognition as an aggregate of certain conscious and unconscious conditions which together make the apprehension of non-erroneous (*avyabhicārinim*) and non-doubtful (*asandigdham*) cognition possible (*avyabhicārinim asndigdham arthopalabdhim vidadhati vodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇam*)¹⁹. The two adjectives of non-erroneous (*avyabhicārinim*) and non-doubtful (*asandigdham*) constitute the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and the collocation of conscious

and unconscious conditions constitute the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now a question raised by Jayanta himself from the point of view of Grammarians. Instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) in Sanskrit literature, for the Grammarians, is not used in the case of collocation (*sāmagrī*). Nobody says that he is seeing with the collocation of conditions (*samagryā paśyati*); but it is the common usage that he sees with the eyes. Hence collocation is not an instrument and if instrumentality is taken as the most effective condition (*sādhakatama*), then the common sense of instrumentality would be useless. Because, instrumental case, in common usage, is only used to an individual condition.

This objection, for Jayanta, is not a serious one. Because he never suggest to use instrumental case (*karaṇa*) to a collocation of condition (*sāmagrī*). He only indicates that an instrumental case ending (*ṭṛīṭyā vibhakti*) is used to an individual condition only when a isolated condition gets together for the production of an effect. So, collocation of condition is only a pre-condition for the use of instrumental case or third case-ending (*ṭṛīṭyā vibhakti*).

Once again, if collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions is taken as instrument in the sense of most effective for producing an effect (*sādhakatama*), then even the subject (*kartā*) and object (*karma*) of cognition are also included to that collocation (*sāmagrī*). In darkness, for example, flash of lighting is the cause of illuminating a women. But had there been no women, she would not have been seen, hence, she is no less important as object. But, in collocation the presence of the women and the perciever is also taken together. Consequently, we have to say that there is no cognizer and cognition without a cognizer is inconcievable. Again,

if the object is also included into the collocation of condition which is taken as an instrument (*sādhakatama*), then the cognition would be without any object. If this is accepted, the Nyāya epistemology will lose its epistemic status. Jayanta in order to avoid this problem, defines instrumentality (*sādhakatama*) as the collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions other than the subject and object (*tasmāt kartṛ karma vilakṣanā*) which is excluded from doubt and error (*tasmāt kartṛkarmavilakṣanāsamśayaviparyarahitārthāvodhavidhayinivodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇamiti yuktam*)²⁰.

Let us note the following observations on Jayanta's theory of the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) :-

(a) Instrumental condition in general means an unconscious condition, even if it be conscious to some cases, it acts just as an unconscious condition, because an instrument by itself has no active role for the origination of an effect. But, Jayanta's concept of instrument of valid cognition is not solely unconscious. Because by instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) Jayanta means the collocation of condition taking both the conscious and unconscious conditions.

(b) The general concept of instrument is that it is an uncommon condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) and refers to an isolated condition. But Jayanta's concept of instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is most effective condition for the origination of an effect (*sādhakatama*), besides this concept does not contradict with the stipulation of the Grammarians. The Grammarians suggest that the third case-ending is always used to a isolated condition. Jayanta has not opposed to this

stipulation. He only suggests that the collocation makes the ground for such usages.

(c) Though all conditions, in collocation, get together and acquires the property of most excellence (*atiśayatva*) than the individual isolated condition, yet the isolated conditions are not modified. Hence, each and every isolated condition is capable of retaining its own uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*).

(d) The isolated individual member has only its own uniqueness (*viśeṣatva*), but these isolated conditions never acquire the property of excellence (*atiśaya*). It is the collocation which acquires the property of excellence (*atiśayatva*).

But the question arises now is that though Jayanta is capable of justifying that it is the collocation of condition which acquires the property of most excellence (*atiśayatva*), yet why he excluded the subject (*kartā*) and object (*karma*) from the collocation of condition in his concluding remark. Secondly, if the subject (*karta*) and the object (*karma*) is excluded from the collocation of condition (*kāraṇa sāmagrī*), is it possible to maintain the nature of both conscious and unconscious in the concept of instrument of cognition (*pramāna*) ?

If the subject and object is excluded from the collocation of condition then from the point of view of both the Old-Naiyayikas and Neo-Naiyayikas it would lose its property of being most excellent. Because, such collocation being present fails to originate the effect immediately i.e. without any temporal gap. Besides such collocation has to depend upon the subject and object. Secondly, we have to examine another crucial point also that if subject and object

is excluded from the collocation of the condition then is it possible to maintain the nature of the instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*) as the nature of both conscious and unconscious at all? Because, Jayanta explicitly maintains that the four, viz. the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), the object of valid cognition (*prameya*), the act cognition (*pramiti*) and the cognizer (*pramātā*) are the main components of Nyāya epistemology (*pramāṇa śāstra*). If the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) becomes meaningful, other factors like cognizer (*pramātā*), cognizable entity (*prameya*), and right cognition (*pramiti*) becomes meaningful. All these are always *pramāna*-centre ('*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityārthavanti bhavanti*')²¹. An individual who has got desire of attaining or forsaking something is called cognizer (*pramātā*). The object which becomes an object of right cognition is called *prameya*. The right cognition regarding some object is called *pramiti*. Any type of cognition involves these four ("*Tatra yasya sājihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā. Sa yenartham praminoti tat pramānam. Yo'rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam. Yadarthavijñānam sa pramitiḥ. Catusṛṣvevaṁvaidhasu tattvaṁ parisamāpyate*")²². There may be other conditions also which are not so important.

Visvanatha's approach in explaining the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāna*) is very much straight forward. He has not entered into the difficulty of the instrumental condition (*karana*). He defines invalid cognition (*apramā*) as 'tacchunye' and 'tacchunye' is explained 'if something is cognized as having some property, where as it does not have that property, it is called invalid cognition (*apramā*)' (*tadbhavavati tatprakarakam jñānam bhrama ityārtha*). Invalid cognition (*apramā*) is of two types -- viz. error (*viparyaya*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*)²³. For

example, if I cognize my self as my body - such invalid cognition is called error (*viparyaya*). But if something is cognized as having both the opposite properties is called doubt (*saṁśaya*). For example, in percieving something at a distance as having the property manhood and treehood, I may cognize -- is it a man or a tree (*sthanurvā puruṣo vā*) ?

Having the classification of invalid cognition (*apramā*), the nature of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect generated (*doṣa-janya*) and the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) is explained as attribute generated (*guṇa-janya*)²⁴. What is a defect (*doṣa*) ? There are innumerable defects and as there is no generic character (*anugata dharma*) among these, it has not been defined in terms of any unique character. It could not even be defined as a special condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) of invalid cognition (*apramā*), since, a special condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) is, in Nyāya system, either an inherent condition (*samavāyī kāraṇa*), a non-inherent condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*) or a collocation of condition (*kāraṇa sāmagrī*). But, defect (*doṣa*) always belongs to the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*) . So, defect in the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is the cause of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is only extensionally true.

Though, defects (*doṣa*) are innumerable, yet Gopinath Bhattacharya observes that in the case of perceptual cognition the defect fall under three headings viz., environmental, pathological and psychical or cognitive²⁵. Defects in the environment includes haze, the object being very distant and bad lighting; pathological defects are faults in the visual apparatus, such as jaundice; psychical defects include the mental state of the perciever, such as being angry or inattentive. But Jonardan Ganery observes that Bhattacharya's explanation of environmental faults are 'local'

defects only, in that they are possible faults in the environment of operation of the instrument to a particular occasion. So, Ganery also includes the 'global' environmental defects, when the environment in its totality in some way defeats the operation of the instrument²⁶. He cites an example -- a person trying to see things at the bottom of the ocean fails, not because of any local defect in the lighting, but because the human visual system is not suited for such environments. In such cases there is no capability of being seen (*darśanayogyatva*). The question of visualisation comes if and only if the particular object has got the capability of seeing. If there is something which is not humanly possible to visualise (*pratyakṣayogyā*), it is not seen due to having some global defect. Human vision has got some limit. It can illumine those that are in proximity with our sense-organs. If the objects are far away or under some obstacle, they would not be seen.

The nature of valid cognition (*pramā*), on the other hand, is explained as attribute generated (*guṇa-janya*). If invalid cognition (*apramā*) is defined as defect generated (*doṣa janya*), why valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be defined as due to the absence of defect (*dosābhāvajanya*) ? Because, it is already mentioned that the Naiyayikas consider three types of conditions for the production of any effect, viz., inherence (*samavāyī*), non-inherence (*asamavāyī*) and efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*). So the absence of defect in the efficient conditions (*nimitta kāraṇa*) does not imply the presence of other causal conditions, viz., inherence (*samavāyī*) and non-inherence (*asamavāyī*). So, Visvanatha, for the economy of thought, rightly advocates that valid cognition (*pramā*) is due to attribute (*guṇa*). If there is absence of defect in the efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*), then the presence of a particular attribute (*guṇa*) to a particular cognition is sufficient in producing valid or veridical

cognition (*pramā*). There is, for Visvanatha, only one attribute to each type of cognition. For example, sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), consideration (*parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*tātparya jñāna*) and cognition of similarity (*sādṛśya jñāna*) is the attribute of perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda jñāna*) and comparison (*upamāna*) respectively. Thus, it seems that by attribute Visvanatha means the non-inherence condition (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*), hence, he supports the concept of instrumental condition of the Old-Naiyayikas.

Again, if valid cognition (*pramā*) is defined as absence of defect (*doṣābhāva janya*), then a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) comprising component cognitions of which one component is true (*yathārtha*) and the remaining component / components is /are false (*ayathārtha*), could not be explained. For example, when some one cognizes a white conchcell (*śvetośamkhyah*) as a yellow conchcell (*pītaśamkhyah*) due to jaundice, here the cognition of the yellow colour is false (*ayathārtha*), but the cognition of the conchcell as a conchshell is true (*yathārtha*) inspite of the presence of some defect in efficient condition (*nimitta kāraṇa*). Here the components of a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) are not in relation of conjunction which would mean that the falsity of either components logically entails the falsity of the whole qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). The relation of component parts, here, is in relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence (*samavāya*) is a special type of relation in Nyāya-Vaisesika system in the sense that though here the components are related by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), yet each component is capable of keeping its own uniqueness. Once again, if valid cognition is defined as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), then we have to cite innumerable defects, which

is an impossible task. So the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be explained in terms of absence of defects (*doṣābhāvajanya*).

Moreover, although the nature (*svarūpa*) of invalid cognition (*apramā*) is explained as defect-generated (*doṣājjanya*), the nature of valid cognition (*pramā*) could not be explained as due to absence of defect (*doṣābhāvajanya*), because valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) are not the whole of cognitions. Besides these two types of cognitions there are other types of cognitions also, e.g. indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) which is neither considered by the Naiyayikas as valid cognition nor as invalid cognition. Indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) since it is not cognized as having any property by any relation (*prakaratādi śūnyam hi samvandhanavagāhī tat*)²⁷.

Attribute (*guṇa*) is the instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is justified by inference (*anumāna*). The argument runs thus :- the common conditions (*sadharana karana*), viz., self-mind-contact (*ātma-manah-samyoga*) etc. are present both in the case of valid cognitions (*pramā*) and invalid cognitions (*apramā*). Therefore, valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognitions (*apramā*) is due to some conditions other than common conditions (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa bhinna*). Now valid cognition (*pramā*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) is not of the same nature. Hence, valid cognition (*pramā*) is due to attributes (*guṇajanya*) and invalid cognition (*apramā*) is due to defects (*doṣajanya*). This type of pervaded relation (*vyapti sambandha*) is ascertained by the method of agreement and disagreement (*anvayi-vyatireki*) which runs thus -- where there is defect there is invalid cognition (*apramā*) and where there is attribute (*guṇa*) there is valid cognition (*pramā*). (*pramā*

jñāna sāmānyakāranabhinna kāranajanya janyajñatvat apramāvat). Hence, the presence of attribute (*guṇa*) along with the absence of defects (*doṣa*), for Visvanatha, makes the sufficient ground for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now , one may raise the question that if the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) and the presence of attribute (*guṇa*) makes the ground for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*), then the definition is affected by the fallacy of overcoverage (*ativyapti*). Because the above mentioned criterion is fulfilled in the case of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), but it is not recognised as valid cognition (*pramā*) in Nyāya system. One point deserves a mention here that Visvanatha presents the above mentioned criterion in the context of explaining the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), but not in the context of defining it. So, the above mentioned criterion merely explains the nature (*svarūpa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), but not a definition (*lakṣana*) at all. Visvanatha defines valid cognition initially as “*bhramabhinnamiti*”, and finally “*tatprakarakamyajatamtadviśeṣyakam*”. This expression, Visvanatha himself holds, is similar to “*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ*”²⁸. Gangesa also initially supports this definition and finally presents a logical modified version of it. Hence, “*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*” become the centrifugal force of the Nyāya definition of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Let us explain the meaning of this definition. The word ‘*tat*’ means the determinate property (*prakāra*) which is the yard stick of measuring valid cognition (*pramā*), and the word ‘*tadvati*’ (the suffix ‘*vat*’ means the locus) means the determinandum or the locus of the determinate property (*viśeṣya*). Thus, the meaning of the definition is :- a cognition is valid (*yathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actualy

exists. Naturally, a cognition would be invalid (*ayathārtha*) if we cognize something as having some determinate property where it actually does not exist. For example, when someone cognizes a rope as a rope and expressed it in the form of ‘this is a rope’ (*idaṁ rajju*) -- here ‘this’ (*idaṁ*) is determinandum (*viśeṣya*) and ‘rope’ (*rajju*) is the determinate property (*prakāra / viśesana*) i.e. he /she is cognizing the rope as having the property ropeness, hence the cognition is a valid one (*yathārtha*). Since ropeness actually exist in rope and not to any other object. When someone, on the other hand, cognizes the rope as a snake and expressed it in the form ‘this is a snake’ (*ayaṁ sarpaḥ*) -- here he / she is cognizing the rope as having the property of snakesness which actually does not exist, hence, his / her cognition is an invalid one (*ayathārtha*).

One point deserves a mention here that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system when someone cognizes an individual (*vyakti*) side by side he / she cognizes the universal (*jāti*) also of that individual by super natural perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). the above mentioned example has mainly two components, viz., ‘this’ (*idaṁ - viśeṣya*) and ‘rope having the property ropeness’ (*rajjutva - viśeṣaṇa / prakāra*).

Professor J.N.Mohanty shows in explaining this ‘real definition’²⁹ (*tadvati tatprakāraka anubhavaḥ*) has two parts -- viz., epistemological and ontological. “The expression ‘*tatprakāratva*’ refers to an epistemological situation, namely to the fact that the knowledge under consideration has ‘that’ (*tat*) as its qualifier. The expression ‘*tadvati*’ refers to a correlative ontological situation, namely to the fact that that which is a qualifier of the knowledge under consideration (also) really belongs to the object of that knowledge”. The cognition “*tadvati tatprakāratva*”, for him, is a “hybrid” entity. Truth or validity (*prāmāṇya*), for the Naiyayikas,

could not be the exclusive property of cognition alone, side by side it is designation of real property. This is the reason that word "tat" has been used twice in the definition. And as truth (*prāmāṇya*) is a hybrid entity beside these two components, namely the determinandum (*viśeṣya*) and the determinate property (*viśeṣaṇa*), there is another component viz., relation (*sambandha*) which is technically called 'saṁsarga'. The above mentioned definition of valid cognition (*pramā*), hence, fails to accommodate relation (*saṁsargatā*) explicitly. Any cognition of the form "X is Y", here, 'X' is the determinandum (*viśeṣya*), 'is' is a relation (*saṁsarga*) and 'Y' is the determinate property (*prakāra*) -- this cognition though apparently has only three components actually has six components, viz., 'the cognition of X', 'the cognition of X-ness', 'the cognition of is', 'the cognition of Is-ness', 'the cognition of Y' and 'the cognition of Y-ness'. Hence, the explicit logical form of the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) would be "tanniṣṭha viśeṣyatā nirūpīta samavāya sambandhavacchinna prakāratāniṣṭha prakāratā viśiṣṭa anubhavaḥ yathārtha"³⁰.

Gangesa concludes that if the truth is apprehended intrinsically, there would not have the doubt about it in the valid cognition in the non-familiar cases. As soon as a cognition is apprehended, its truth would also be apprehended. If the truth is not surely apprehended, the ascertainment of truth cannot be taken as intrinsic. If the valid cognition is not apprehended at all, there is no question of doubt due to not having the cognition of something having attributes (*dharmijñānabhāvāt*). (*siddhantastu prāmāṇyasya svato grahe 'nabhyasadaśotpannajñāne tatsaṁśayo na syat, jñānagrahe prāmāṇyanicayat. Anisācaye vā na svataḥ prāmāṇyagrahaḥ. Jñānagrahe dharmijñānabhāvāt na saṁśayaḥ.*")³¹.

In the unfamiliar cases we, after having a cognition, ask – ‘Is this cognition true or not’. But so far as familiar cases are concerned, there does not arise doubt as the previous experience serves as an assurance, which is supported by Vacaspati Mishra in the *Tātparyatīkā* (‘*abhyāsadaśāpannasya tajjātīyatvena prāmāṇyanumānam*’).

Doubt presupposes (a) cognition of the substantive (*dharmi*) (b) remembering two which are mutually contradictory as alternative qualifiers and (c) lack of the perception of any specific feature through which either of the alternatives is universally concomitant. (“*samānanekadharmopapattervipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyav yavasthatascaviśeṣapekṣo vimarsāḥ saṁśayaḥ*”³²)

The doubt in the form – ‘Is this cognition true or not?’ presupposes (a) cognition of the qualificand or substantive which in the present context is the cognition whose truth-value is doubted, (b) remembering two mutually contradictory properties like truth and falsity and (c) the absence of the perception of any specific character which can establish one specific character i.e. true after excluding another.

According to the presupposition (a), the above mentioned cognition (*dharmijñāna*) must be apprehended, because a cognition, according to the Mimāṃsakas, is apprehended together with its truth. Hence, there is no possibility of doubt. As one of the alternative qualifiers is known before, doubt about it cannot come. The certainty in the initial stage about truth can remove doubt in the following moment only. This doubt remains in the subsequent moment.

There may be three possible situations. Either cognition is apprehended along with its truth or cognition is apprehended without its truth or cognition is not apprehended at all. In the first case doubt is not at all possible. The intrinsic theory of validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*) has to be given up if the second alternative is possible. In the concluding stage doubt is not also possible due to the ignorance of the substantive.

Gangesa concludes that the possibility of doubt about truth cannot be explained by the Mimamsakas. For the Mimamsakas the conditions that generate the apprehension of a cognition are also the conditions of the apprehension of the truth of the cognition. These conditions are present and hence they like the apprehension of truth would ward off the possibility of doubt about the truth.

It may be argued that in the case of inference the truth is apprehended extrinsically in as much as it is free of doubt about all kinds of error. In an inference the property of the valid cognition of fire in the locus of smoke is determined by the rule accompanied by truth and it is cognized through apperception (*anuvyavasāya*). As this is specifically seen, there is no doubt of its non-validity. As there prevail the certainty of the truth, which is again, ascertained through the absence of doubt of its non-validity, one has an unwavering inclination (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) towards an object. It is possible because one has the correct inferential cognition of an object. In fact, as per the theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥ*) the ascertainment of truth is not the cause of activity in the form of inclination. In the same way, there cannot be the doubt of validity in the case of apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) due to having truth as per rule. One who does not really cognize does not have the awareness – 'I cognize'. In another way it can be said that no body can acquire

the valid cognition of a cloth in the case of the valid cognition of a jar in the form – ‘I really cognize a cloth’.

This is true as per rules of extrinsic validity but not intrinsic one. We generally express in our introspection those that are really known. It is not possible to say an object as known though it is unknown. Hence, there is no reason for doubt. Even when a shell is enormously known as silver, its introspection is so i.e. erroneous. It describes an object existing in the primary cognition. Though silverness does not remain in a shell, we have introspection as a silver as being a content of primary cognition. In other words, silverness has become a qualifier of the initial cognition (*vyavasāya*) and hence there is no bar of having its apperception or introspection in the same form.

Gangesa has also considered the view of Vacaspati regarding the intrinsic apprehension of truth of the cognition arising in the state of habitual cognition (*abhyāsadaśā*). In this context the validity or truth is apprehended *ab initio*, as our unwavering inclination is possible very swiftly³³. In the cases other than these there is the extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ*). This view of Vacaspati is not acceptable. Gangesa is of the opinion that the truth or validity is ‘the property of not being limited by the chief qualifier which is the absentee of the absolute negation existing in a qualificand’ (*viśeṣya-niṣṭhatyantābhāva-pratīyogiprakāraṇavacchinna-tvadikaṁ prāmāṇyam*), which is not possible in an intrinsic validity of truth. It may be explained with the help of a concrete example. In the case of the knowledge of a jar, the truth of it is the property of not being limited by the qualifier i.e. a cloth which is an absentee of the absolute negation of a cloth remaining in the qualificand i.e jar. In a simple way, when a jar is known as such but not as otherwise is a truth which is not

available through extrinsic cognition (*parataḥ*). The quick inclination is possible due to having initial cognition free from the doubt of invalidity and it is possible through the apprehension of its by introspection of the qualificand possessing the property of being a knowledge of body having hands, legs etc. Even if one has the knowledge of truth (*prāmāṇya*), it does not incline us to activity.

The quick inclination to an individual's own work depends on his own causes. Gangesa gives his own explanation as to how there could be such spontaneous activity in the case of habitual cognition through the truth is not intrinsically apprehended. Mathuranath explains the matter in the following manner and has given two suggestions. The first goes as follows. The introspection (*anuvyavasāya*) apprehends the initial cognition – 'this is a body' as characterised by a cognition of body having limbs. The latter part or character is the mark through which the truth of the knowledge is apprehended. Perception of something pervaded by truth leads to the inference of the truth which accounts for our activities. The second suggestion goes like this. The initial cognition, if not disturbed by any doubt about its falsity directly leads us to the world of activity. In such a case the knowledge of truth does not lead to activity.

It may be asked how could there be a quick inferential cognition of truth. Gangesa is of the opinion that the circumstances are favourable to the quick inference of truth. A thirsty person has an immediate and unailing tendency to quench thirst on the perception of water. From this it does not follow that the thirsty person has a perceptual cognition of the power of water to quench thirst. In another way it is not necessary to apprehend the truth of his knowledge of water for him. Before the involvement in an activity he had perceives it as something having the characteristics of having the property of being similar with others. It is the mark of

removing doubt and due to the absence of doubt the appropriate activity follows without any delay. From this it can be concluded that in the case of extrinsic validity of truth there no cause for apprehending truth is found (*vastutastu parataḥ pakṣe na kacidapi prāmāṇyagrahaḥ pravartakāḥ*)³⁴ if there is prior doubt in the truth of the knowledge.

REFERENCES

- 1) “*Buddhirupalabdhi Jñāna metyanarthāntaram*”- Nyāya Sūtra – 1/1/15, Goutama.
- 2) “*Sarva Vyavahāra hetuḥ guṇaḥ Bhddhi Jñānam*” – *Tarka Saṅgraha*, Sūtra34, Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 3) “*Jānāmi iti anuvyavasāyagamyagñānatvam*”- *Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka* on *sūtra* Sūtra34, Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 4) “*Yathārthānu-bhavomānam*”- Nyāya *Kusumāñjalī* 4/1, Udayana.
- 5) “In this connection we would like to refer to the definition of *pramā* as *yathārthambhāva*. If we treat knowledge as justified true belief and if *pramā* is to be understood as a parallel here of knowledge, then *yathārthānubhava* must correspond to JTB.”- Evidence and Truth- Responses to the gether problem, Sutapa Saha – Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy- second series- Alfred Publishers Ltd in collaboration with Jadavpur University, Calcutta – 1994.
- 6) “I do not know of any Sanskrit synonym for belief”. But *pramā* is a *niścayajñāna*, a non-dubious cognition. A *niscayajñāna* may be either *pramā* or a-*pramā*, just as a belief may be true or false. But belief is belief in a proposition, whereas a *niścayajñāna*, is *savikalpaka*, i.e. conceptual, has a propositional structure, though its object is not a proposition. We know, however, that a

theory of belief is possible, in which belief that-p is one unanalyzed structure. If all this is true, there is some sense in saying that niścayajñāna and 'belief' mean just about the same." "Recollections and Resonse" in the article- 'Pramā, Justified True Belief Theory and the Gattier-Type Cases' in the Book, The Philosophy of J.N Mohanty ICPR series in contemporary Indian Philosophy, General Editor R.Sundar Rajan. Edited by Daya Krishna K.L.Sharma. PP.216-217 (First Published-1991).

- 7) "-a savikalpaka knowledge is prpositional though not a proposition. I call it prepositional for it is a logical complex analyseable into constituent elements and Relation"., Gangesa's Theory of Truth- in the Introduction P.31, J.N.Mohanty, Santiniketan, Visva-Bharati 1966.
- 8) " The western concept of proof owes its origin to plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion or between reason and sense. According to plato, reason not merely knows objects having ontological reality, but also yields a knowledge which is logically superior to opinion to which the senses can aspire. On this distinction is based the distinction is based the distinction between contingent and necessary truth, between material truth and formal truth, between rational knowledge which can be proved and empirical knowledge which can only be verified"- - Doubt, Belief and Knowledge. P. 193, Sibjiban Bhattacharya, ICPR in association with Allied Publishers. 1987.

- 9) “*sāmānyapratyāsattiyā sarvoposamhārād avinabhavagraha*” – T.C.
‘*sāmānyasya hi pratyāsattitram lāghavat, na tu sāmānyatayā jñātasya*’- T.C.
- 10) “*Pramā janya yathārtha, apramā ganya ayathārtha*”
Tarka Saṅgraha, Sūtra- 74, Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 11) “*Anupramāṇavyāpārat param bhavati yaḥ saḥ anubhavaḥ*”- *Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ, Adhyāpanāśahitaḥ, P.224, Bengali version by Narayana Chandra Goswami – Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar. (2nd revised Edition – 1390 Bangabda).*
- 12) “*yathānthāmubhavam vibhāgate – ‘yalhārtha’ iti prasaṅgāt pramākaraṇam vibhajate – ‘tatkāranam iti; ‘pramākāraṇam’ ityārthaḥ. Pramāyāḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam iti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam. Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka on Sūtra39, Ibid.*
- 13) ‘*asādhāranam kāranam kōranam*’— *Tarkasaṅgraha Tīka on Sūtra 40, Ibid.*
- 14) *Jñānam vyaptiḥ jñānam sādṛśyajñānam padaḥ jñānam ca. Tadeva kāranam yesam tāni jñānakaramakāni anumityupamitisābdāni. Tadbhinnaṁ ityārthaḥ. Pratyekṣendriyanāmeva karanatvāni, na jñānasya. Tathā ca Jñānakaranak a jñānatvasya pratyakṣa- sāmānya eva vidyamanatvallakṣanasangatiḥ.”—*
Nyāyabodhini on T.S. P.42, Ed. by Satkari Sharma, Bangiya, Chocokhambha, 1976.

- 15) “Phalāyoga-vyavacchinnaṃ kāranam
karanamityuddiyotakarādimate tu parāmarśa
evanumiti karanamanumanamiti dhyem”- Mukṭāvalī
samgraha, Bhāṣā-paricchedaḥ, anumānakhandam, P-
311, Viśvanāth by Pañcānana Bhattācharya, Sanskrit
Pustaka Bhandar, 1377 Bangabda.
- 16) “ Vyāparavat karantvṃ karantvṃ.Vyāparavat-Kāranam
karanamiti manikṛṇmate parāmarśa-dvārā vyapti
jñānam karanam.Tādevānumānam pramāṇam” Ibid .
- 17) “Tajjanyatve sati tajjanya-janakatvaṃ vyāpāratvaṃ” –
Ibid.
- 18) “Sādhakatama”- Pāṇiṇisūtra, 1.4.42.
- 19) Avyabhicārinim asandigdham arthopalabdhiṃ vidadhati
vodhāvodhasvabha vā sāmagrē
pramāṇam, Nyāya Mañjari –Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.
- 20) Tasmāt kartṛkarmavilakṣanā saṃsayaviparyayaarahita
vodhavidhayini vodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagrī pramāṇa-
iti yuktam. Ibid.
- 21) ‘arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā pramāyāni
pramitirityārthavanti bhavanti’ – Nyāya-bhāṣya on sūtra
1.1.1
- 22) “Tatra yasyepsājīhāṣāprayuktasya pravṛtitiḥ sa pramātā.
Sa yenartham praminoti tat pramāṇam. Yo'rthaḥ

*pramiyate tat prameyaṃ. Yadarthaviḡñānaṃ
parisamāpyate” Ibid.*

23) *“Tatra apramāṃ nitupayati – tacchunya ēti.
Tadbhāvavati tatprakāraṃ jñānaṃ bhrama ityārthaḥ.
Tatprapaccaḥ—apramāprapaccaḥ. Ādya iti. Viparyāsa
ityārthaḥ. Śārīrādi niścayarūpaṃ yadātmavaprakāraṃ
jñānaṃ gouriha- mityakarakam. Evaṃ śamkhadou pītaḥ
śamkhya ityakarakam yāg jñānāni niścayarūpaṃ, tad
bhrama iti. Kiṃściditi vitarke. Nisvayasya
lakṣaṇamāha—tadbhāveti. Tadbhāvaprakāraṃ
tatpradaṃakam jñānaṃ niścayaḥ” – Bhāsā-Pariccheda
Tīka on Sūtra 125-129, Ibid.*

24) *Doṣa iti. Apramāḥ prati doṣa kāraṇam, pramā prati
guṇaḥ kāraṇam. Tatrāpi pittādirūpa doṣa ananugataḥ,
teṣāṃ karanatvamanvaya –vyatirekavyaṃ siddham.
Guṇasya pramāḡanakatvaṃanumānāt siddham. Yathā –
pramā jñānasāmānyatkāraṇa bhinna – karanāḡanya
ḡanyaḡñānatvāt apramāvat. Na ca doṣābhava eva
karanamastiviati vācyam... ..”- Ibid, Tika on Sūtra-
131.*

25) *“In false perception for example, the ‘dosa’ is
constituted by environmental, pathological or physical
conditions as the case may be . In illustration of
‘environmental doṣa’, we may cite the phenomenon of
‘must’ or ‘distance’ which distorts our perception of a
physical object; ‘pathological doṣa’ would be
exemplified by the myopic condition of the visual organ
or again by the phenomenon of jaundice, ‘psychical*

doṣa' is constituted expectant attention or 'passions of the soul' or such condition has been about distortions of perception.”- Tarkasamgraha Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta, translated and elucidated by Gopināth Bhattacharya, P- 332 Progressive publishers, 2nd revised edition 1983.

- 26) “..... the ‘global’ environmental defects, when the environment in its totality in some way defeats the operation of the instrument”- Semantic Powers- Meaning and Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy, P-69, Janardan Ganery, Clarendon Press, Oxford- 1999.
- 27) “Athavā tatprakāraḥ yajajñānaṁ tadviśeṣyakam / tatpramā, na pramā nāpi bhramah syannirvikalpakaṁ // prakāratādisūnyam hi sambandhanavagāhī tat / Pramātvam na svato grāhyam saṁśāyanupapattaḥ” *Bhāṣā Pariccheda Tika on Sūtra 135-136, Ibid.*
- 28) “Nanu yatra sukṭi-rajatayorime rajate itijñānam jatam, tatra rajatāṁśe pramāne syat, tajjñānasya bhramabhinnatvabhāvāt, atah āha- arthaveti. Tadvatviśeṣyakaṭve sati tatprakāraḥ jñānaṁ prametyārthaḥ.....” *Ibid.*
- 29) “Definitions in the Nyāya are not merely nominal definition but real definition in the same that they are designation of real properties that serve to distinguish the difiniendum from all that is other than it. Hence a definiens may be said to designate an entity. In present case it may be said to designate an entity only when the

variable has been , given a value,"--- Gangesa's theory of Truth --- Introduction- P.43. (Footnote 35), J.N.Mohanty, Santiniketan, V.B 1966.

- 30) “*Tanniṣṭha viśeṣyatā nirūpīta samarvaya sambandhāvacchinna prakarātāniṣṭha prakaratā viśiṣṭa anubhavah yathārtha.*” Tarkasamgraha- adhyapanasahitaḥ, P-223 (Bengali version), Narayan Chandra Goswami Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, 2nd revised edition 1390 Bangabda.
- 31) Siddhāntastu pramānyasya svato grahe nabhyāsadaśotpannaññāne tatsamśayo na syat, jñānagrahe prāmānyanisṭayāt. *Aniṣṭaye vā na svataḥ prāmānyagrahaḥ. Jñānagrahe dharmijñānabhāvāt na samśayaḥ.*” Gangesa’s Prāmānya (jñāpti) vāda, Para No. 22.
- 32) “samananekadharmopapatte- rvipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdyavyavasthātaśca viścesapekṣovimarṣaḥ samśayaḥ”- N.S. 1.1.23.
- 33) “Yattvānumānasya nirastasamastavibhramasandasya svata eva prāmānyagraha ityuktam, tat- dhūmavati vahniññānatvamanumiteḥ pramānyaniyatamanuvyavasāyenopanitam, ato viśeṣadarsananna tatrprāmānyasanketi, prāmānyanisṭayādevapramānyasankavirahadarthaṁ *niṣṭcityaniṣṭkampavyavahāra ityabhiprayah. Vastutastu parataḥpakṣe na kvacidapi prāmānyagrahaḥ pravartaka iti. Evamanuvyavasāyasya prāmānyaniyatatvat na*

prāmāṇyas'āṅkā. Na hyajanan Jānāmiti pratyeti, no vā
ghatajñāne patam Jānāmiti. Bhramepi anuvyavasayena
rajatatvādikaṁ vyavasāyaparakāratvenollikhyate tacca
tathaiva. Yattvabhayasadaśāyāṁ jhatiti
pracurataraniṣkampa pravṛttidarsānāt prāmāṇyam svata
eva gṛhyate, anyatra tu parata iti." Gangesa's
Prāmāṇya(jñāpti)vāda Para No 55.

- 34) ".....tanna-
visēṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogiparakārānavacchinnatvā
dikam prāmāṇyam svatograhitumaśakyamiti parata eva
gṛhyate. Jhatiti pravṛttistu karacaraṇādīmatī
śārīrajñānatvā derviśēṣasyānuvyavasāyena
grahādaprāmāṇyas'āṅkāśūnyādvvyavasāyādeva, na
prāmāṇyajñānam pravartakamityuktam. Jhatiti
tatsamavadhānantu svakāraṇādhinām. Na hi pipāsūnām
jhatiti pracuratarā samarthā ca pravṛttirambhasīti,
pipāśopaśamanas'aktirasya pratyakṣa iti. Ibid, This part
is also elucidated by J.N. Mohanty in his book
'Gangesa's Theory of Truth' P-227-229.

Nyāya and *Vedānta* both are authoritarian rationalistic systems of philosophy, since both believe in the authority of the *Vedas*. Consequently, both the systems have given more emphasis on suffering of man rather than the change of worldly objects or the distinction between appearance and reality. The subject matters like the distinction between appearance and reality, also change or evolution of worldly objects, specially in *Vedānta*, come under the purview of philosophical discussion secondarily as they are primarily akin to explain the end of suffering and goal of liberation (*mokṣa*). Although both the systems have the common goal, the approaches of explaining the Universe as a whole (*dr̥ṣṭi*) being different they come in conflict in each other regarding the concepts and also technical terms (*paribhāṣā*) of the *Vedas*. Interestingly, inspite of these conflicts the *Nyāya*, so far the classical texts are concerned, has not taken *Vedānta* as opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) seriously. *Vedānta*, among the authoritarian systems, had an important place in the history of Indian philosophy. But the emergence of the Neo-Naiyayikas have shadowed the glamour of *Vedānta*. *Navya-Nyāya* becomes the lamp or search light of studies (*pradīpasarvavidyānamupayaḥ*)¹. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra follows the *Nyāya* logic for explaining *Advaita-Vedānta* in his monograph (*prakaraṇa*) "*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*" and presents a fitted answer to the Naiyayikas. But the Naiyayikas have yet to respond to

Adhvarindra. Thus re-examination of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, for explaining *Nyāya* epistemology in modern times, becomes an essential one.

The term '*advaita*' means non-dualism. By 'non-dualism', some thinkers understood monism. But 'non-dualism' and 'monism' are not synonymous. The term 'monism' signifies the trend towards definite description. But the Advaitins seem to describe Brahman in an obscure way. Brahman, in this system is described in a negative way (by the method of '*neti ... neti*'). It is described as attributeless (*nirguṇa*), having no limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*), having no limited existence i.e. all pervading (*vibhu*), not capable of being described (*anirvacanīya*). The Advaitins, however, have accepted three types of reality, viz. transcendental (*pāramārthika*), phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) and apparent (*prātibhāṣika*) as a starting point of theorization only. The transcendental reality (*pāramārthika sattā*) is the ultimate goal of life. And, this transcendental reality is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). Hence, the term '*advaita*' should be understood as 'non-dualism' rather than 'monism'.

This Absolute Reality is Pure Consciousness (*Viśuddha Caitanya*) i.e. something positive and at the same time it is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). It is not just an apex of thought which signifies the unattainability of that imaginary object. Absolute Reality of the *Advaitins* is very much attainable and enjoyable but this enjoyment cannot be described by words. As the enjoyment of the Absolute Reality (*Brahman*) cannot be incarnated by words, it is not within the purview of epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*). Now, the question is : what is the need of epistemology in *Advaita Vedānta*? It is earlier mentioned that epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*) presents meta-physics in a sound way. Now the question is : How does epistemology play this role in this system? Real, in this system, in

our opinion, is a unified substratum underlying many, but not one, because it is indescribable. Hence, without the acceptance of diversity one cannot say that within these apparent diversities there is harmony. This harmony is in terms of *Brahman* or *Ātmān*.

Common people cannot cognize this attributeless *Brahman* without its conception. This is why the *Vedāntins* advocates for theorization that Brahman has two types of characteristic feature -- essential (*svarūpa*) and secondary (*tataṣṭha*). The essential characteristics of an object remains as long as the object remains ("*Yavallakṣyakala manavasthitatve sati yadsyavartakam*"²). But the secondary characteristic feature is essential to give a panorama of reality so that one becomes acquainted with it. These secondary features are true only in the phenomenal level but false in the transcendental level. After cognizing the true nature of phenomenal objects a tendency to transcend these arises in one's mind. Unless one cognizes the phenomenal world, one cannot reach the transcendental world. Thus epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), in Advaita *Vedānta*, vouches for falsity only but not for truth. Phenomenal world is just the ladder for the origination of a tendency to acquire the Absolute Reality. Hence the Upanisadic seers have suggested three methods of the self-realization – hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*) and meditation (*nidhidhyasana*). The Gita also suggests to adopt the best method of learning "*paripātena paripraśnena sevayā*". Thus, epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), in this system also, is essential to present the metaphysical part in a sound way.

Advaitins hold that non-contradiction (*avādhita*) is the crucial mark (*lakṣana*) of valid cognition (*pramā*). Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is in a little bit of doubt, in the first chapter of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, whether non-contradiction (*avādhita*) is taken as the only mark of

valid cognition. Because some Indian thinkers also advocate that 'prior unknown' (*anadhigata*) is also one of the mark of valid cognition (*pramā*). If memory (*smṛti*) comes under the purview of valid cognition then that cognition lacks the property of novelty, since memory originates from bare mental impressions only (*saṁskāra mātra*) cognized before. So these thinkers exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). But, some thinkers argue that even in memory there is novelty. Because, in the case of memory the object is past experience itself and it is known as different in different moments and the objects are not tautologies. Adhvarindra does not enter into the controversy whether in the case of memory there is novelty or it is a mere repetition of the same. So, he puts two definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*) in the first chapter of his monograph - '*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*' of which one definition includes memory (*smṛti*) as valid cognition (*pramā*) and the other definition excludes memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition³.

The first definition which excludes memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition runs thus :- a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition and which is not known before (*tatra smṛti vyavrttam pramātvamanadhigatavādhitarthavisayakajñatvam*). Here the term 'unacquired' (*anadhigata*) excludes memory from the purview of valid cognition. And, the second definition includes memory which runs thus :- a valid cognition is that cognition having some object as its content which is not contradicted by any other cognition (*smṛti sādharānantu avādhitarthavisayakajñatvam*).

If the second definition is accepted then there is no problem in explaining persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñana*). But, if the first

definition is accepted, some thinkers hold, then the definition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Because, while someone is perceiving an object more than one moment then the perception of the object of second moment and the rest only repeats the same object and consequently, there is no novelty in subsequent moments. But in Advaita-*Vedānta* persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) is considered as an instance of valid cognition -- hence, a paradox follows.

Adhvarindra presents two solutions to get rid of this objection. One is borrowed from the Bhatta Mimamsakas and the other is from the Advaitins point of view.

From the Bhatta's point of view, it is argued that in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) time (*kāla*) is also involved to that object of cognition. Although, time has no colour (*rūpa*), it is an undeniable fact that different time moments are perceptible through our senses. So in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), though the bare object is the same, different time moments make the content of the object novel. So, the perception of the object, in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), at the first moment is different from the perception of object at subsequent moments. So, 'novelty' remains in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) also.

Secondly, from the point of view of the Advaitins ontological set up it is argued that in the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), we cognize the same object. Because here the same modification of mind (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) persists through different time moments. A modification of mind (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) for Advaitins, persists till another counter modification of mind (*antahkaranavṛtti*) originates. As the modification of mind is the

same, the corresponding cognition is also the same. From the Advaitins point of view, we have only one mental modification (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) vis-a-vis one cognition in different time moments of persistent cognition also. So the question of repetition of cognition does not arise at all in this system⁴.

Let us justify the crucial mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*), viz., non-contradiction (*avādhita*). It is said that a cognition would be valid if and only if it is not contradicted by subsequent cognition. But the Advaitins have recognised three types of reality (*satta*) -- viz., transcendental (*pāramārthika*), phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) and apparent (*prātibhāsika*). Cognition of 'rope as snake' is apparent (*prātibhāsika*), because such cognitions have no use to lead our practical life and also contradicted by cognitions which serve our practical (*vyavahārika*) life. So apparent cognitions are instances of invalid cognition (*apramā*). And when we perceive 'a snake as a snake', then our cognition is a valid one (*pramā*). Because such cognitions are not contradicted (*vādhita*) by subsequent mundane (*vyavahārika*) cognitions. But, the Advaitins consider transcendental reality (*pāramārthika sattā*) or cognition of Pure Consciousness (*Brahman*) only as the only Ultimate Reality. When one realizes Pure Consciousness, all the so called useful cognitions of common sense become meaningless (*mithyā*) to him. The phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are also contradicted by transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition. So, some thinkers hold that the Advaita definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*). Adhvarindra, here, argues that phenomenal or mundane (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are only contradicted (*vādhita*) by transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition and not by any phenomenal cognition (*Ātmāniscayat Brahma sākṣātkāraparyantam ityārtha*)⁵. So the definition of valid cognition

(*pramā*) does not suffer from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

Now one may argue that apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*) may also not be contradicted by other apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*). Apparent cognitions (*prātibhāsika*) are only contradicted by phenomenal one (*vyavahārika*). So the Advaitins definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Hence, the answer of Adhvarindra would be that conditions (epistemic / non-epistemic) for the emergence of transcendental (*pāramārthika*) cognition and the conditions for the emergence of mundane or phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognitions are totally different. But the conditions for the emergence of both mundane (*vyavahārika*) as well as apparent (*prātibhāsika*) cognitions are the same. Having the similar conditions (epistemic / non-epistemic) apparent cognition is contradicted by mundane or phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) cognition. Hence, the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) does not suffer from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*).

Validity (*prāmāṇya*), for Adhvarindra, persists both in memory (*smṛti*) and immediate experience (*anubhuti*). What is a valid cognition (*pramā*)? Adhvarindra finally presents his own definition of valid cognition in Chapter-VI of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* as - 'when something is cognized as having some property where that property actually exists and is the efficacious to successful inclination which originates either from memory or from immediate experiences is called valid cognition (*tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādhāranam samvādipravṛttyānukūlam tadvati tatprakarakam jñatvam prāmāṇyam*)⁶.

Visvanatha holds that valid cognition (*pramā*) is attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*), because the general conditions (*jñanasāmānyasāmagrīprayojyam*) remains both in the case of valid cognition as well as invalid cognition. Adhvarindra does not find any justification for supporting Visvanatha's view. If valid cognition, for him, is considered as attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*); there would be eternal relation (*nitya sambandha*) between valid cognition (*pramā*) and attribute (*guṇa*). But no such relation is found between valid cognition (*pramā*) and attribute (*guṇa*). Visvanatha further holds that sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), consideration i.e. the cognition of probans existing on the subject (*liṅga parāmarśa*), cognition of significance (*tatparya jñana*) and cognition of similarity (*sadrśya jñana*) is the attribute (*guṇa*) of perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison respectively. But, Adhvarindra shows that if sense-object-contact be the attribute of perception, then in each and every case of perceptual cognition the sense-object-contact would exist. But, for the perception of colour etc., (*rūpādi*) and for the perception of the soul such contact is not possible. Because for sense-object-contact our sense-organ might contact with the part (*avayava*) of the object, viz., colour, etc., (*rūpādi*), the soul (*ātmā*) is having no part (*avayava*). But, inspite of the absence of the part (*avayava*) we percieve such objects. Therefore sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is not the necessary condition for perceptual cognition. Hence, perceptual valid cognitions (*pratyakṣa pramā*) are not attribute-generated (*guṇajanya*)⁷.

The same holds good in the case of inference, verbal testimony and comparison also. For Visvanatha, cognition of the actual existence of the probans in the subject (*salliṅga parāmarśa*) is the attribute of inference (*anumāna*). But Adhvarindra shows that

inspite of the existence of defective probans in the subject (*asalinga paramarśa*) some inferences are taken as valid which is not contradicted by getting the desired object (*asalinga paramarśadisthabhapi visayavādhena anumityadeh pramātvat*)⁸. Moreover, the Naiyayikas also consider two types of argument viz., bad argument (*kutarka*) and good argument (*sutarka*). A bad argument (*kutarka*) is that which contradicts with the assertions of the *Vedas* i.e. sometimes the proper logical form i.e the actual existence of the probans on the subject (*salinga paramarśa*) which has been taken as the attribute of inference, has been denied and its contradictory assertion is accepted. Thus there is no need to consider any attribute more and above the general conditions for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Again, inspite of the presence of the sense-object-contact for perceptual cognition, we sometimes mistake the white conchshell as the yellow one. This instance at least shows that the presence of attribute (*guna*) is not the special condition (*asadharana karana*). Because, we have seen in Chapter-II of this thesis that Visvanatha supports the Old-Naiyayika's view of instrumental condition (*karana*). The Old-Naiyayikas defines instrumental condition in the sense that which being present the effect immediately follows (*phalayoga vyavacchinnam asadharanam karanam karanam*). This inconsistency, perhaps, is felt by Visvanatha himself. This is why he also considers himself that the presence of attribute (*guna*) and the absence of defects (*dosa*) taken together is the cause for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence, Adhvarindra, in the first argument shows that the acceptance of attribute is not necessary for explaining the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*) and concludes that the presence of the general conditions

(*sādhārana kārana*) along with the absence of defects (*doṣa*) is the cause for the origination of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now, the opponents may argue that the acceptance of general conditions (*sādhārana kārana*) as the cause of valid cognition (*pramā*) is affected by the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). Because, the general conditions present both in the case of valid cognitions as well as invalid cognitions. Adhvarindra, here, argues that for the emergence of valid cognitions the mere presence of general conditions is not sufficient, but the absence of defects (*dosabhava*) is also necessary. Thus he concludes that invalid cognition is due to the presence of defective general conditions and valid cognition is due to the presence of general conditions which are not affected by any defect (*na caivam apramāpi pramā syat jñanasāmānyasāmagryaviśesaditi vācyam/ doṣābhāvasyapi hetutvāṅgikārāt*)⁹.

Now the question is : how validity (*prāmāṇya*) of a certain cognition, for Vedantins, be cognized or be apprehended ? Is the validity (*prāmāṇya*) be cognized simultaneously along with the origination of that cognition in question ? The Advaitins, unlike the Naiyayikas, answer it positively, i.e. they believe in the intrinsic validity of cognition (*svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*). A cognition would be intrinsically valid only if the validity of cognition is conditioned by the very conditions which condition the cognition itself (*yāvatsvāśrayagrāhakaśāmagrīgrāhyatvam*).

The Advaitins, generally, define validity (*prāmāṇya*) with regard to non-contradictory character (*avādhitatva*). But for the ascertainment of a particular cognition whether it is contradictory or not, we have to depend upon subsequent cognition. Because it is absurd to suppose that a cognition is from within as incapable of

contradiction in future. Gouḍabrahmānandi like thinkers here suggest that contradictory character (*avādhitatva*) has to be explained as ‘the property of being a cognition of anything which has not been to be contradictory so far (*prāmāṇyam vyavahāarakālavacchinnasya mithyātvaniścayaviṣayatvasya yā āś-
rayaḥ tadviṣayakadhisvarūpam*)¹⁰. If validity is taken in this sense even then the cognition is intrinsically true only from the point of view of apprehension (*jñāpti*) and not from the point of view of origination (*utpatti*). So, Madhusudana Sarasvati argues that non-contradictedness (*avādhitatva*) refers not merely to the absence of contradiction at the time of knowing (*vyavahāarakālabādhyatva*), but also to the absence of contradiction in future.

Madhusudana goes a further step and suggests that the term ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*), to keep the Advaita theory on the track of phenomenal demand, has a prime value. He upholds that validity (*prāmāṇya*) is ‘the property of being a certain apprehension of an object which was previously unknown (*ajñatarhaniścayatmakatvameva prāmāṇyamasmātpakṣe*)¹¹. Truth in this sense, Mohanty’s observation on Madhusudana’s claim, “satisfies three needs : it is capable of being apprehended svataḥ as the theory demands, and further it can account for unwavering activity (*niścampa pravṛtti*) as the phenomenal demand . it does not belong to error, for the content of erroneous apprehension, e.g the snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is been perceived and therefore has no unknown existence (*ajñāta sattā*)”¹²

It is true that this explanation saves the Advaita theory from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*) with regards to doubt (*saṁśaya*), because for the perception of ‘rope as snake’ prior perception of rope and snake is needed and the above definition excludes prior cognition (*adhigata*) from the purview of valid

cognition. It is also true that such prior unacquired cognitions are only cognized by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*).

But the definition fails to distinguish between error (*viparyaya*) and valid cognition (*pramā*). Because, prior unacquired error cognition may have the certainty also confirmed by the Witness-consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*) from the very beginning of the origination of that cognition. To save the theory from this change Madhusudana equates valid cognitionhood (*pramātvā*) with cognitionhood (*jñānatva*). Truth (*prāmāṇya*), for him, predicated to cognition only. Error is not a species of cognition at all. Error (*viparyaya*) is totally excluded from the purview of cognition (*jñāna*), and, yet he defines cognition in terms of error and vice-versa. Consequently, the fallacy of circularity (*cakrakadoṣa*) follows.

Adhvarindra does not think that error (*viparyaya*) and right cognition (*pramā*) are two parallel concepts, rather he thinks like the Naiyayikas that error and right cognition are the two species of cognition in general. Because both the species of cognition originate from the general conditions (*jñānasāmānyasāmagrī prayojyam*). This is why Adhvarindra finally, unlike Madhusudana, in Chapter-VI of his Monograph (*prakaraṇa*) “*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*”, supports the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) which excludes the term ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*) and to save it from the charge of psychological ascertainment only (*svataḥ jñapti mātra*), he supplements the term ‘the cognition of a determinate property which actually exists to that determinandum’ (*tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatvam*)¹³.

Now, one may argue that even in phenomenal level (*vyavahārikadaśā*) some cognitions may form a coherent system in

such a way that the component cognitions of that system mutually support each other i.e. non-contradicted (*avādhita*) among themselves but is contradicted (*vādhita*) by another phenomenal coherent system and also both the system are useful to lead our practical life -- in such a situation both the systems could not be true at the same time and therefore, only one system could be accepted. This is the reason, perhaps, that the term 'efficacious to successful inclination' (*samvādipravṛtṭyānukūlam*) has been asserted and it has to be measured in terms of the Transcendental Truth (*pāramārthika sat*). 'Efficacious to successful inclination' may be taken as the linking point between Transcendental Truth (*pāramārthika sat*) and phenomenal truth (*vyavahārika sat*). This could be the reason of Adhvarindra's assertion that the instruments of valid cognition has two types of validity -- phenomenal and Transcendental (... *pramānānām prāmāṇyam dvividham, vyavahārika tattvavedakatvam pāramārthika tattvavedakatvañceti*)¹⁴. Otherwise, from the same condition two types of effect are not possible which once again, proves that phenomenal truths might have some link with the Transcendental Truth. Hence, contradictory coherent systems of valid cognition, in Advaita theory, are not possible. The Advaita theory of valid cognition, therefore, aims at reaching an ever-expanding, all-inclusive method of cognition. Hence, there is no scope of grades of truth in phenomenal level in this system. Besides, the system is capable of accomodating invalid cognitions also.

The Advaitins believe in the intrinsic truth of valid cognition (*svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*). Now the question is : if cognitions are intrinsically valid, why there is doubt regarding the validity of some cognitions. A cognition would be intrinsically valid if the truth of cognition also is vouched for and cognized by the inherent

conditions of the cognition itself. Now one may argue that Adhvarindra's concept of valid cognition does not arise from the inherent conditions only. Because, valid cognition (*pramā*), for him, is due to the presence of general conditions as well as due to the absence of defects and, of course, these absence of defects are not inherent conditions. Therefore, these external conditions are not grasped by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣi-caitanya*) at the time of origination of the cognition. Here, Adhvarindra's answer is that validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) would be extrinsic only if its origination is conditioned by some adventitious positive entity (*āgantukabhāvakāranapekṣayāmeva paratastavāt*). But the absence of defects (*doṣābhāva*) is a negative entity. Therefore, the cognition is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). And as the invalidity is conditioned by adventitious positive entity i.e. presence of some defects (*doṣa janya*) along with the presence of the general conditions, it is extrinsically valid (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*)¹⁵.

REFERENCES

- 1) “Pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānāmupayaḥ sarvakarmanām/āśrayaḥ sarvadharmānām sasavādānvikṣake mata”- Arthśāstra, Kautilya.
- 2) “Yavallakṣyakalā māṇavasthitatve sati yadsyavartakam” Dharmaraja Adhivarindra racita *Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Viṣaya paricchada*, translated and elucidated by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, ed by Dr. Karunasindhu Das Sanskrit Pustka Bhandar 1995.
- 3) “ Tatra pramāyāḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam. Tatra smṛti-vyavṛttam pramātvamanadhigatavādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ, smṛtisādhāranantu avādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ”- *Viṣaya paricchada*- P-3. Ibid.
- 4) “.... Nirupasyapi kālasya indriyavedyatva bhyupagamana, dhārāvāhika-buddherapi pūrva pūrvajñānaviṣaya-tattatkṣane- viśeṣaviṣayākatvena na tatra avyaptiḥ. Kiñca siddhānte dhārāvāhika buddhisthale na jñānabhedah, kintu yāvad ghasphuraṇām tāvadghatakārantah kāranavṛtth, ekaiva, na tu nana, vṛtteh svavirodhi- vṛttutpattiparyanta- sthāyitvābhyupagmāt, tathaca tatpratiphalita caitanyarūpaṁ ghatadijñānamapi tatra tāvatkālīnām ekameva iti na avyaptisaṁkāpi”. *Viṣaya paricchada*- P3. Ibid.
- 5) “Nanu siddhānte ghatādemirthyatvena vādhitatvat katham tajjñām pramā? Ucyate. Brahmasākṣātkārantaram hi ghata-dinam bādhaḥ, “yatra trasya sarvātmaivabhut tat kena kam pasyet” iti śruteḥ. Na tu saṁsāradaśāyām vādhaḥ, “yatra hi

dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati,” iti śruteḥ. Tathāva avādhita-padena saṁsārdaśāyamavādhitatvaṁ vivakṣitam, iti ghatadipramāyām na avyaptiḥ. Taduktam—
dehātomapratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ/
laukikam tadvadevedam pramāṇantvĀtmāniśvayāt//
iti. Ā Ātmāniścāyāt Brahmasākṣātkāraparyantam ityārthaḥ. Laukikam iti ghatadijñānam ityarthaḥ.” Viśaya paricchada – P 4-5. Ibid.

6) “*Evamuktānām pramāṇamām prāmāṇyam svata eva utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādhāranam samvādipravṛttyānukūlam tākvati tat prakāraḥjñānatvam prāmāṇyam. Tacca jñānasāmānyasāmāgrī prayojyam, na tu adhikam guṇamapekṣate, pramāṁtre anugataguṇabhāḍt”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.*

7) “*Nāpi pratyakṣapramāyām bhuyo’avayavendriyasannikarṣah, rupādi-pratyakṣe ātmapratyakṣe ca tadbhāvāt, satyapi tasmin “pītaḥ sāmikha” iti pratyakṣasya bhramātvācca”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.*

8) “*Ataeva na sattinṅaparāmāṣādīkamapi anumityādipramāyām guṇah, asallinṅaparāmarsādīsthalepi viśayabādhena anumityadeḥ pramātvat” Ibid.*

9) “*Na caivam apramāpi pramā syat jñānasāmānyasamagryāviśedaditi vācyam. Doṣābhavasyapi hetutrāṅgekārāt. Na caivam paratastvam, āgantukabhāvakāraṇa pekṣayaḥjñeva paratastavat.” Ibid.*

- 10) “Prāmāṇyam vyavahāra-katavacchinnasya mithyātvamis̄cayaviśayatvasya ya āśrayaḥ taḥviśayādadhīśvarūpaṁ”. Again, “Mithyātvena ajñātam yat tadviśayakaḥjñānatvarūpapramatvasya jñānasāmānyagrāhakaśāksigrāhyatva rūpasvatogrāhyatvasambhāvāt” Advaitasiddhi, P.351-352, Gauḍabrahmaṇandi. Advaitasiddhi edn.
- 11) “Ajñātārtha niścayatmakatvameva prāmāṇyamasmātpakṣe”-Advaitaratnarakṣaṇam, Madhusudan Sarasvati, Advaitasiddhi edn. P.32.
- 12) “Truth in this sense, Madhusudan claims, satisfies three needs it serves to distinguish right knowledge from error, it is capable of being apprehended svataḥ as the theory demands, and further it can account for unwavering activity (niṣkampa pravṛtti) as the phenomena demand. It does not belong to error, for the content of erroneous apprehension, eg. The snake in rope-snake illusion, exists only when it is being perceived and therefore has no unknown existence (ajñāta sattā).” Gangesa’s Theory of Truth, Introduction, P. 18, J.N.Mohanty.
- 13) “Evamuktanām pramāṇāmām prāmāṇyam svata eva utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Tathāhi smṛtyānubhavasādhāraṇam samvādi-pravṛttyānukulam taḥkvati tat prakāra-kajñānatvam prāmāṇyam. Tacca jñānasāmānyasāmagrī prayojyam, na tu adhikam guṇamapekṣate, pramāṇāt্রে anugata-guṇabhāṣīt”- Ch VI P-87. Ibid.
- 14) “Evam nirūpitānām pramāṇānām prāmāṇyam dvividham nyavathārika-tattva- -veda- -katvam pāramārthika-

tattvavedakatra-ñceti. Tatra Brahasvarūpavagāhi
 pramaṇavyatiriktānām sarvapramāṇanāmadyam prāmāṇyam
 tadviṣayānām vyavahāra-dāsāyām bādhabhāvāt. Dvitiyantu
 jīvabrahamaikyaparanam” sadeva someyedamagra asit”
 ityevamadenām “Fattvamasi”ityantanam, tadviṣayasya
 jevabrahmaikyasya kālatrayavādhyatvat. Taccaikyam
 “Tattvam”—Padārthajñānadhīnaḡñānam iti prathamam
 “Tat”—padārtho lakṣama-pramāṇabhyam nirūpyate.” Vedānta
 paribhāṣāprameyakāndatmākah, Ch- 7th. P. 91 Ibid.

15) “Jñāyate ca prameyam svataḥ. Sratogrāhyatvañca
 doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāśrayagrāhakasāmagregrāhyatvam.
 Svāśrayo vṛttigñānam tadgrāhakam sakṣijñānam. Tenāpi
 vṛttigñāne gr̥hyamāne tadgatam prāmāṇyamāpi gr̥hyate.

Na caivam prāmāṇyasamīśāyanupapattiḥ, Tatra
 sanīśayanurodhena doṣayapi sattvena doṣābhāva-ghatita-
 svasāśrayagrāhakabhānena tatra prāmāṇyasyaiva agrahāt.
 Yadva yāvātsavāśrayagrāhakagrāhyayogyatvam svatastvam
 samīśāyāsthale prāmāṇyasya uktayogyatā sattvehapi
 doṣāvāśena agrahāt na sanīśayanupapattiḥ.

Aprāmāṇyantu na jñāna-sāmānya-
 sāmagreproyogyam prāmāyāmapī aprāmāṇyapatteh. Kintu
 doṣāprayogyam. Napyaprāmāṇyam yāvāt-
 svāśrayagrāhakagrāhyam aprāmāṇyaghataka-“Tadbhāvavattva”
 devṛttijñānānupanītattvena sākṣinā grāhitumaskyatvat. Kintu
 visamvādipravṛttyādiliṅgakānumityadiviṣaya iti parata eva
 aprāmāṇyam utpadyate, jñāyate ca. Ch. 6, P. 89. Ibid

Mimamsa is also an orthodox (*āstika*) system and emphasises on liberation (*mokṣa*). Liberation, in this system, is attained by the joint effort of valid cognition of the self or self realization (*ātmājñāna*) and moral action (*karma*). Self-realization (*ātmājñāna*) is possible only if the subject can distinguish it from the valid cognition of not-self (*anātmājñāna*). The concept of valid cognition, thus has an important role. The Bhatta concept of valid cognition finds its room in discussion in explaining *Nyāya* concept of valid cognition, because both the theories believe that cognition itself is apprehended extrinsically (*parataḥ prakāśa*) and yet they differ each other regarding the apprehension of truth of cognition. The Bhatta's advocate that the truth of cognition is ascertained intrinsically (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*), whereas the Naiyayikas advocate that the truth of cognition is apprehended extrinsically (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Narayana Bhatta cites the Naiyayikas first as opponent and holds that the concept of justification (*pramāṇa*) in both the systems are alike but the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) is different. Both the systems define justification (*pramāṇa*) as the instrument of valid cognition (*pramākaraṇamevātra pramāṇam tarkapakṣavat*). But the Naiyayikas define valid cognition (*pramā*) as immediate experience (*anubhava*) of object having some property as its content where this property actually exist, whereas Narayana Bhatta defines it as 'the prior unacquired cognition of object having some property as its

content where this property actually exists' (*pramā ca ajñāta tattvārtha jñānamevātra vidyate*). For example, when a prior unacquired conchcell is cognized as having the property of conchcellness is called valid cognition. Thus, the Naiyayikas emphasise on immediate experience (*anubhava*) of object as it is and the Mimamsakas emphasise on prior unacquired cognition of object as it is.

The word 'unacquired' (*ajñāta*) excludes memory (*smṛti*) and repeated version (*anuvāda*) from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Memory is excluded from the purview of valid cognition because in memory the content of cognition is identical with the content of that past immediate experience (*pūrvānubhava*) whose impression is the cause of the present memory cognition. Hence, memory cognition only repeats the content of past experiences. Repeated version (*anuvāda*) is also excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) for the same reason. By repeated version (*anuvāda*), here, means either previously uttered word or the cognition of previously uttered word. Such cognitions of previously uttered words don't convey any novelty to the content of its meaning. So, repeated version (*anuvāda*) is unable to yeild any new result apart from the cognition of the original utterence of the word / words. What fails to yield any new result has been discarded, by the Mimamsakas, from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Naiyayikas only exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) but consider the validity of repeated version (*anuvāda*). The Mimamsakas hold, on the other hand, that if memory is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) since there is no novelty in the content of memory cognitions, the repeated version (*anuvāda*) also has to be excluded from the purview of valid cognition since such cognitions also don't convey any new content

to the meaning of the word or sentence (*anuvādo hyarthaparicchede vyavahāre vā na purvajñānāt kañcid viśeṣamadhatte. ataḥ phalaviśeṣabhāvāt phalartham ca pramānānām svikārāt smṛtyādivādanuvādho hapi vahiṣkārya eveti*).

Now the opponents may argue that the subsequent moments of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) also repeats the same content of object and yet persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) is considered as valid cognition (*pramā*). It is argued that the time moments (*kālamśa*) make the content of cognition novel. So, what is grasped at the first moment is not the same as what is grasped at the second moment and subsequent moments.

The opponents, now, may argue that time (*kāla*), both for the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas, is one in number and the so called different time moments are imposed properties made out of extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) and what is limited by the extraneous adjunct (*upādhi*) could not be taken as real. So, what is grasped in the so called different time moments could not be different or novel from what is grasped earlier.

Narayana Bhatta, here, answers that the Mimamsakas believe in three apex of reality (*tripuṭī*) for the cognition of object in epistemology, viz., cognition (*jñāna*), the object (*viśaya*) and the condition for the manifestation of the object (*prākātya*). Though, cognition is cognized by inference and not by direct perception i.e. it is cognized by subsequent moment only, the manifestation (*prākātya*) is cognized by direct perception and is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ pramānya*), because the manifestation (*prākātya*) originates in the object (*viśaya*) which is perceptible. So, the manifestation (*prākātya*), in Bhatta theory, is different in each moment. And, as these manifestations (*prākātya*) are perceptible in different time

moments (*kālāṁśa*) which are limited (*avacchinna*) by these manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are also perceptible. Therefore, the time moments limited by that manifestation only containing in the object, viz., pot, is the content of cognition. The manifestation (*prākāṭya*) is unacquired (*anadhigata*) to previous time moments. Hence, we percieve a new content in each time moment (*pūrvapūrvajñānanitanām prākāṭyānumuttarottarajñānaparyantamavasthānāt tadavacchinnānām kālāṁśanām tatra tatravagama iti*).

The opponents, once again, may argue that the manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are too subtle (*sukṣma*) to percieve and so also the time moments limited (*avacchinna*) by these manifestations (*prākāṭya*) are also too subtle to percieve. Narayana Bhatta, here, argues that the manifestations (*prākāṭya*) as well as time moments (*kālāṁśa*) limited by these manifestations are not too subtle to percieve (*na ca prākāṭyabhedānām sukṣmatvāt tadavacchinnānām kālābhedānāmapi sukṣmatayā durvajamatvamiti vācyam*). If this is the case then the object viz., the pot, in the case of persistent cognition would be illumined to us just once as if we are percieving hundred subtle lotus leaves simultaneously incarnated by the needle (*sukṣmatve kamaladalaśatam sucya yugapadbhinnamitvat sakṛḍavavuddhvo ghata iti yougapadyabhimānaprasajñāt*). In the case of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*), rather, we percieve the pot in the first moment and in subsequent moments distinctly. Therefore, manifestations (*prākāṭya*) and time moments (*kālāṁśa*) limited (*avacchinna*) by corresponding manifestations are not too subtle to percieve (*tasmāt prākāṭyabhedānām kālābhedānām ca na sukṣmatvaṁ*).

The second term 'real' (*tattva*) of the definition of valid cognition is used to exclude invalid cognitions like error (*bhrama*),

doubt (*samśaya*), reductio-ad-absurdum (*tarka*), etc. The erroneous cognition of 'rope as snake' is not real (*tattva*), because here the determinant (*snake*) does not actually exist to the determinandum (rope). So, we do not the object as it is in erroneous cognitions (*bhrama/ viparyaya*). Again, there are two contradictory determinans in the case of doubt cognitions (*samśaya*) of which one cognition might be false (*atattva*). Here also we don't cognize the object as it is. The same holds good in the case of reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*). The reductio-ad-absurdum method proceeds by the counter hypothetical proposition which is nothing but imaginary (*āhāryajñāna*) and subsequently shows the contradiction in accepting the hypothetical proposition which indirectly proofs the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the proposition in question. As the hypothetical argument by which the reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*) proceeds are imaginary (*āhārya*) are not real (*tattva*). So the term 'real' (*tattva*) excludes error (*viparyaya*), doubt (*samśaya*), reductio-ad-absurdum method (*tarka*), etc. from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*).

Now, Prabhakara Mimamsakas argue that the term 'real' (*tattva*) does not serve any purpose. Because, all cognitions by virtue are real (*tattva*). There is no erroneous cognition at all. So the term 'real' (*tattva*) is only a tautology of the term 'valid cognition' (*pramā*). Cognition, for them, is self-manifested (*svaprakāśa*) and illumined its object. As each and every cognition illuminates its object, it is valid. So, there is no scope of invalid cognition in this system. Immediate experiencehood (*anubhūtiva*) is the mark or defining charecterstic (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā*). Immediate experience (*anubhūti*) is defined as other than memory (*smṛtibhinna*). Even the so called erroneous cognitions are valid. Because, the so called erroneous cognition, like 'rope as snake' is

expressed in the form of 'this is snake'. We have, for them, two cognitions in such cases. The one is 'this' (*idam*) which is directly perceived and does not refer to individual property of ropeness but refers to the universal property of 'thisness' (*idantva*). The other cognition is the 'snake' which we get from the memory-cognition of 'this is snake' (*ayam sarpah*). But we fail to recognise it as a memory-cognition (*smṛti janya jñāna*) because the memory is not fully recollected i.e. 'this' (*idam*) of the recollected cognition is not recognised. The content of the erroneous cognition like 'rope as snake' is the perceptual cognition of 'this' (*idam*) along with its property ropeness and the memory cognition 'snake' along with its property snakesness. So the hybrid illusory cognition which emerges due to the absence of grasping the difference of the perceptual cognition and the memory-cognition. As both cognition can illumine the part of its own content separately, hence, both cognitions are valid.

Narayana Bhatta argues that each and every cognition has the inclination towards its own object. When a thirsty man who has the cognition 'it is water' leads him to get the water so that he could quench his thirst. When one has illusory cognition of 'the reflection of sunlight on the sands in the desert' as 'it is water', it would not be wise to say that in such cases we have two cognitions of which both are separately true. Because, if it would be so, then we should have, in that case, two distinct inclinations of getting two distinct objects, as a rule, corresponding to two cognitions. As illusory cognitions originate only one inclination of getting one object, hence, it follows that in the case of illusory cognition there is only one cognition and not two.

Finally, the word 'cognition' (*jñāna*) is justified. The word 'cognition' (*jñāna*) has been used to exclude 'the prior absence of cognition' (*jñāna prāgbhāva*) and non-cognition (*ajñāna*).

Though, both *Nyāya* and Bhatta Mimamsakas hold that the same concept of the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*), they differ in each other regarding the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Bhatta, as mentioned earlier, considers three apex of epistemic reality (*triputī*). The word 'valid cognition' (*pramā*) is used to denote both the cognition (*jñāna*) as well as manifestation (*prākāṣya*). They further hold that sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of cognition (*jñāna*), and, again, cognition itself (*jñāna*) is the instrumental condition (*karāṇa*) of manifestation (*prākāṣya*). Thus, cognition itself is the effect (*phala*) of sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), which, again, is also the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa /karāṇa*) for the origination of manifestation (*prākāṣya*). The Bhatta, for this reason, is also called effect-instrumentalist (*phala pramāṇavādī*).

Narayana Bhatta, after showing the justification of each term of his definition of valid cognition (*pramā*), also establishes his own theory by showing either some paradox or self-stultifying statements to other systems.

The definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of the Naiyayikas, for him, is suffering from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*), because the Naiyayikas have not put any term to exclude repeated version (*anuvāda*) in the definition. Recollection (*smṛti*), in *Nyāya* system, has been excluded from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*) because memory-cognition (*smṛti*) only repeats the content of immediate experience (*anubhuti*). Repeated-version (*anuvāda*)

also repeats the content of the original-version and yet its validity (*prāmāṇya*) is considered by the Naiyayikas. Hence, either the definition of the Naiyayikas is affected by the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*), or, the theory is self-stultifying.

The Prabhakar Mimamsaka also excludes recollection (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) is defined, in this system, as the cognition other than recollection (*smṛtibhinna*). The view of Prabhakara is unacceptable to Narayana Bhatta for two reasons :-

(a) It can't be denied that erroneous cognitions (*viparyaya*) and doubtful cognitions (*samśaya*) are invalid cognitions (which are established earlier). But the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of Prabhakara includes erroneous cognitions (*viparyaya*) and doubtful cognition (*samśaya*) within the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence, the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) of Prabhakara is affected by the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*).

(b) Although, Prabhakara hold 'immediate experiencehood' (*anubhūtitva*) as the defining mark (*lakṣaṇa*), the criterion of valid cognition is given as the capacity of illuminating the object (*viśaya*), the cognition (*svātmā*) and the self (*ātmā*) (*kiñca sarvajñanesvapi ātmā jñanasvarūpam viśaya iti tṛtiyāmapī prakāśati*). Immediate experiencehood (*anubhūtitva*) means other than memory (*smṛtibhinna*). But, memory-cognition (*smṛti*) also illuminates the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*). Now, if memory-cognitions (*smṛti*) are invalid, the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*) illumined by memory-cognition (*smṛti*) would also be invalid. But, the illumination of the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*)

through memory-cognition (*smṛti*) is considered by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas as valid and perceptible. Hence, the definition of valid cognition is affected by the fallacy of under-coverage (*avyapti*) in terms of the recollective cognition of the self (*ātmā*) and the cognition (*svātmā*).

Lastly, the Buddhists hold that the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*) is identical. Because, the real unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣana*) are momentary (*kṣanika*). Valid cognition (*pramā*) grasps these unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). As the objects of valid cognition are momentary, the corresponding cognition, for being real, might be momentary also. Generally, it is conceived that corresponding to the valid cognition (*pramā*) there might be some instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) also. But this concept of instrumentality (*karanatva*) would not fit in the Buddhist system, since, for being an instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) a prior moment of origination of the effect is needed. Hence, the Buddhist conceive that the concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) is imaginary (*kalpanā*). Thus, the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) is the defining characteristics of valid cognition-cum-instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*). this part will be explained later on.

Again, the Buddhist logicians hold that the nature of cognition is intrinsically revealed (*svataḥ prakāśa*), but the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the cognition is revealed by subsequent cognition (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Hence, the criterion for determining the validity of cognition is :- it is non-contradicted by subsequent cognition and has the causal efficacy to produce something (*avādhita ca arthakriyākāritvaṃ*). For example, a thirsty man cognize something as 'it is water'. The validity of the cognition is determined on the ground that it is not contradicted by subsequent

moment and has the capacity to quench his thirst. But, Narayana Bhatta wrongly treats it as a defining characteristics (*lakṣana*) of valid cognition and proceeded criticizing it. But, his points have some value for critical study. Let us suppose that Bhatta treats it as a criterion for determining the validity of cognition. And, if it is taken as a criterion for determining the validity of cognition then the Buddhist theory, from the point of view of Bhatta, has the following shortcomings :-

(a) The Buddhist logicians consider two sources of valid cognition, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). There are some inferential cognitions (*anumāna*) regarding past facts and future possibilities which are valid since they are under the ken of inference (*anumāna*). But, the Buddhist logicians criterion for determining these cognitions can't be applied in such cognitions, since the causal efficacy either already perishes or it is yet to occur. Dinanath Tripathi cites an example, suppose a man infers the existence of fire, of a remote past fact, beneath a tree from the black smoky spots on the leaves of that tree. Here, the inferential cognition of fire is valid, though, the causal efficacy of fire in no way be proved at present. Hence, the criterion for determining the validity of cognition suffers from the fallacy of under coverage (*avyapti*).

(b) Secondly, recollection (*smṛti*) is excluded from the purview of valid cognition in Buddhist system also. But, there are at least some recollective cognitions (*smṛti*) which have the efficacy to produce something and yet these cognitions, in Buddhist system, are regarded as invalid. For example, the recollection of spiritual experiences (*bhagvat viṣayaka smṛti*) produces pleasure to the cognizer (*jñāta*). Hence, the criterion

for determining the validity of cognition of the Buddhist logician suffers from the fallacy of over coverage (*ativyapti*). So, the Buddhist criterion for determining the validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) is unacceptable to Bhatta.

The Buddhist logicians, again, may argue that all determinate cognitions (*savikalpaka jñāna*) are thought constructed (*kalpita*) and hence unreal. Determinate cognitions (*savikalpaka jñāna*) apparently seems to be having the property of causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) due to the close proximity (*naikatya*) with the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*). Thus, the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the accidental property (*āgantuka dharma*) to any determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). (*nanu arthakriyākāritvamasya arthatohtiviprakarsabhāvat daivagatameva, na svābhāvikam*). Causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) may be the criterion of determining the validity of cognition only to those cases where it is the essential property of the cognition in question. For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond and eventually he gets the diamond. Again, seeing the diamond another man runs to get it and he gets it. Now, in the first instance, the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the accidental property of the first person's cognition, whereas the causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the essential property of the second person's cognition. Hence the criterion of the Buddhist for determining the validity does not suffer from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*).

The Buddhist logicians denied the validity of determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) on the ground that they are thought constructed. If thought construction (*kalpanā*) is the only ground for canceling the validity, then inference (*anumāna*) can't be taken as a valid source of cognition (*pramāṇa*) since inferential cognitions are

derived mainly by thought construction. But the Buddhist logicians have taken inference as a valid source of cognition. Hence the Buddhist theory is in a self-stultifying position. Moreover, the Buddhist logician denied the validity of determinate cognition, since they think that determinate cognition or judgmental cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) is a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the qualified elements of a determinate cognition is either a universal (*jāti*), name (*nāma*), definition (*samjñā*), action (*kriyā*) or quality (*guṇa*) of which none is real. But the Bhattas argue that the reality of these elements can't be denied. To show that all these elements are real the Bhattas refute the arguments the arguments of the Buddhist logicians. The Buddhist logicians denied the reality (*sattā*) of universal (*jāti*) on the following grounds: If universal (*jāti*) is a real entity then it might exist either each of the individual (*vyakti*) separately or its existence is all-pervading (*vibhu*) so that each and every individual can participate to that universal. It can not be said that the existence of universal (*jāti*) is all-pervading. If that is the case then we would percieve it even other than the individuals of that class also. But, we do not percieve the universal everywhere. We only percieve it to a individual of that class only. For example, we percieve the cowness to individual cows only, but not to a goat or any other creature. It can not even be said that it exists to each individual (*vyakti*) of that class only. Because, if it is the case, then we have to say that a new born individual of that class acquires the property of universal from another individual i.e. the property of universal is transferred from one individual to another. Hence, we have to consider that the universal has an active role. But, those thinkers who maintain that universal (*jāti*) as a real entity think it to be inactive (*niṣkriya*). Again, it can not be said that the universal (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*) emerges simultaneously, because they consider universal as eternal (*nitya*) and individual (*vyakti*) as a

time binding entity (*anitya*). Hence, the concept of existence of universal is inconcievable.

Now the Bhatta Mimamsakas advocate that there is no contradiction in holding that the existence of universal is all-pervading as well as it exists to the individuals of that class only. Because, the relation between universal (*jāti*) and individual (*vyakti*), according to them, is in relation of illumined (*abhivyañja*) and illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*). An illumined entity (*abhivyañja*) can not be felt without a illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*). Now, the Buddhist logicians may argue that if the universal (*jāti*) exists to individuals of that class only, then it can not be eternal (*nitya*) because individual s (*vyakti*) exist only for a period of time. So, when individual or individuals will perish, it might hamper that existence of universal also. The Bhattas argue that the perishability of individuals will not affect the existence of the universal. It is already mentioned that the existence of universal is all pervading and eternal and the relation between the individual and universal is the relation of illuminator (*abhivyañjaka*) and illumined (*abhivyañja*). Thus, when an individual of that universal emerges and illumines the universal, it indicates that the illumination of the universal takes place through some conditions. So, the emergence of a new-born individual and the emergence of the conditions for the illumination of the universal is simultaneous. It is not the case that the emergence of a new-born individual and universal is simultaneous. Likewise when an undividual perishes, it only indicates that the condition or conditions of illumination of the universal through that individual also perishes not that the universal also perishes. And, the question of transferability of universal from one individual to another does not arise because the Mimamsakas believe that the relation between universal and individual is

identity-cum-difference (*tādātmya*). The question of transferability of a certain property arises only to those cases where the two entities were distinct at the time of their emergence and then comes in relation. Moreover, though the Buddhist logicians don't consider the reality of universal, yet they maintain that we construct the concept of universal out of imagination by the method of exclusion (*apoha*). But the question is: how the method of exclusion (*apoha*) takes place? The method of exclusion (*apoha*) can take place only if the cognition of some positive entity takes place. I can exclude some creatures from the class of cow only if I actually cognized cowness. Thus the Buddhist logicians indirectly accept the universal as real. Likewise, all the components of determinate cognition are also real. Therefore, the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) might be taken as a valid one.

Valid cognition (*pramā*), in Indian system, has been explained mainly by two ways, viz., (a) either having a causal explanation, or, (b) having a non-causal explanation. The causal explanation derives its root from the common sense view that every effect or product must have some instrumental condition. Valid cognition (*pramā*) being an effect must have some instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). The instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) must precede the effect (*pramā*) and is most predominant condition (*atiśayatva*) among other conditions as well and which being present the effect immediately follows. The Naiyayikas are the main upholders of such explanation of valid cognition (*pramā*) and the Mimamsakas also explicitly support such explanation of instrumental condition of cognition (*pramāṇa*) although they differ regarding the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*). The Buddhists, on the other hand, explain the notion of valid cognition in a non-causal manner, because the notion of causality entails the notion of sequence, so that the subject / doer (*karta*) or the instrument (*karana*) could function (*vyapara*) for the origination of the effect. But, the Buddhists consider only the momentary unique particulars (*svalakṣana*) to be real (*sat*). A momentary unique particular (*svalakṣana*) could not intermediate between the subject (*kartā*) and the instrument (*karāṇa*) and also produce the effect (*phala*) within a moment. So, the classical notion of causality is considered by the buddhist logicians as imaginary

and hence, unreal (*kalpitaḥ karmakarṭṛādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate*). To have some causal relation between two realities (*sattā*) remaining at least for two moments - one moment for its origination and the next moment is for its relation to other is a pre-condition. So, the Buddhist logicians don't stick to the etymological meaning of instrumental condition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) i.e. with the grammatical derivation of the word '*pramāṇa*' (*pra + mā + aṇat*). Even if one would like to stick to the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) along with the concept of its instrument (*pramāṇa*), the Buddhist logicians would suggest that they are in relation of identity (*tādātmya*).

"*dhiyo 'msayor...*

kintu vyavasthapyā vyavasthāpakabhavaḥ, sa ca tadātmye 'pi aviruddha".¹⁶

Dinnaga points out that 'a cognition is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*^{16a}'. Nandita Bandopadhyaya observes that the trend towards the relation of identity between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*) prevails even in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, the *Advaita*, the *Mimāṃsakas* and the *Jaina* theories^{16b}. But, before going to have such a big claim, let us examine the Buddhist theory of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*).

Each and every cognition, for the Buddhist logicians, has an intentionality towards some object (*viṣayonmukhatā*) and thus illuminates a momentary particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The object being cognized means the illumination of consciousness with a certain form having some content. In such a situation we may only metaphorically conceive that when we cognize an object, viz., 'blue', our consciousness takes the form of the object blue

(*viṣayākāra*). When we perceive blue a corresponding form of the object 'blue' is stamped upon our cognition. It is this objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) that determines or measures the limit of the perceptual judgment -- 'this is blue', and thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the ken of perception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called *paricchedyā*, and the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) of that cognition which acts as the measure or determinant is called *paricchadaka*. When one makes a distinct judgment 'it is blue', the cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is fixed to a particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination (to a particular object) is called *vyavasthāpanā* by the Buddhists. The cognition which is thus fixed is described as *vyavasthāpya*. Now the question is -- which does fix the cognition to a particular object (*vyavasthāpaka*) ? The Buddhists establish that the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /meyarūpatā*) is the fixer (*vyavasthāpaka*) or instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*).

Buddhists, specially Dharmakīrti and his followers, establish the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā/ viṣayasārūpya*) by showing the opponents view, specially the Naiyayikas and their followers the Bhatta Mīmāṃsakas, of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) as unacceptable. The Naiyayikas define and explain instrument (*karana*) as either (a) "*phalāyogavyavacchinnaṃ asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam*" i.e. an instrument is that condition which being present the effect immediately originates. Sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), for example, is that condition which being present the effect perception (*pratyakṣa*) takes place. Or, (b) "*vyapāravat asādhāranam kāraṇam karaṇam*" i.e. an instrument is that uncommon condition (*asādhārana kāraṇa*) which is the locus of of

the intermediary condition (*vyapāra*). The sense-organ (*indrīya*), in this sense, is the instrument (*karaṇa*) for perception. Or, (c) “*sādhkatamam kāraṇam karaṇam*” i.e. an instrument is that condition which is most pre-dominant or most effective for the origination of the effect. Sumtotal of conditions except the subject and object is the instrumental condition (*karaṇa*) in this sense. But, none of these definitions of instrument (*karaṇa*), from the Buddhists point of view, is acceptable.

Although, Dharmakīrti and his commentator Prajñākara refute the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of sense-organ (*indrīya*) only by showing some self-stultifying arguments of the Naiyayikas, the same hold good the other two definitions also. The term ‘uncommon condition’ (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) is the general feature of all the three mentioned definitions of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of the Naiyayikas. How can the uncommonness (*asādhāraṇatva*) be determined ? The uncommonness is determined by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*). The sense-organ (*indrīya*), for the Neo-Naiyayikas, is the uncommon condition which being present the uniqueness of perceptible objects is illumined and this sense-organ (*indrīya*) is present to all cases of perception and if the sense-organ does not present then such cognitions are excluded from the ken of perceptual cognition. But, the Buddhist logicians hold that although visual- sense-organ (*caḥṣu-indrīya*), tactual sense organ (*sparśendriya*), auditory sense organ (*sravanendriya*), to some extent, sizes up or fix only the visible perceptible objects, tactual objects, audible objects respectively and so on and so forth, yet the sense-organ fails to size up or fix the respective object in a very specific way.

“*sarvasāmānyahetuvad akṣaṇām asti nedrśam*

tadbhede 'py abhinnasya tasyedaṁ iti tat kūtaḥ.”¹⁷

The eye, for example, is present to all visual perceptions, so to say, for the perception of blue patch, yellow patch, red patch etc. The eye can't be called the differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*) of the different perceptual cognitions in relation to the different perceptible objects (*sarvasya hi nilapītādiviṣayasya sāmānyena hetuvad akṣaṁ na bhedakam*)¹⁸. It is, rather, the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) which size up or fix the object and is capable of individuating and illumining that particular cognition.

The *Nyāya* logicians, now, may argue that the sense-organ (*indrīya*) is not sufficient condition of cognition. Apart from the sense-organ there are other conditions also, so the uniqueness of a particular cognition may be explained by revealing the nature of other conditions. The same sense-organ as an instrument contacts with different types of objects with six types of relations. So, the uniqueness of a particular cognition may be individuated either by the different object or by the different types of relations or by both.

The Buddhist logicians, here, argue that even the reality (*satta*) of different objects as well as the reality of different types of relations (*sambandha*) are cognized through the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*). Different forms of objects figuring in cognition lead one to ascertain that there is contact with different objects (*arthasannikarso'pi nakaram anabhipatya jñāyate*). Objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is more basic than the different types of external objects (including relations). So, the consideration of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as instrument is more reasonable and economy of thought which can size up or fix the object of cognition accordingly and thus illumines the object. Sense-organs (*indrīya*) or sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), on the other hand, has only secondary significance in epistemology.

“sarvātmānapi sambandham kaścīd evagamya-

dharmah, sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyavisesatah”.¹⁹

The Naiyayikas may argue that the Buddhist concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) goes against the common usage as well as the grammatical notion (*pra + mā + aṇaṭ*) of instrumentality. Sense-organ (*indrīya*) is usually taken as instrument of perceptual cognition in common usage. The Buddhist logicians, on this regard, may hold that their usage of instrumentality has its root to the famous grammarian Panini. By ‘instrument’ (*karaṇa*) Panini means that condition which is most effective or most predominant for the origination of the effect (*sādhakatamam kāraṇam karaṇam*) and which being present the effect follows immediately. Objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) is most effective than the sense-organ (*indrīya*) or the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*). Because, sometimes the sense-organ being present the effect perceptual cognition does not take place. But, if there is objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*) then the cognition is bound to manifest immediately. So, the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*), for Dharmakīrti, is the last differentiator (*antya bhedaka*).

“sarveṣāṃ upayoge ’pi kārakānām kriyāṃ prati

*yadantya bhedakam tasyas tat sādhakatamaṃ
matam.”*²⁰

Common peoples speak like ‘I see with the eyes’ (*cakṣusā rūpaṃ pasyāmi*), because they fail to distinguish between a cognition (*jñāna*) and the objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā*).

“Yā kriyā yataḥ padārthād avyavadhānena

bhavati sa tasyah karaṇamucyate,

tataścendriyādeh pramitim pratyavyavahite

sādhakatvabhavān na pramāṇam"²¹

Objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*), in Buddhist logic, is the instrument of cognition of object and sense-organ, etc. are the instrument only in the secondary sense i.e. they are the instrument for the origination of objective equiformity. Instrumentality (*karanatva*), for Dharmakīrti, is only imposed to sense-organ as a transferred epithet.

"katham tanhi cakṣusā pasyati iti,

kāraṇe kāryopacārād evamucyate"²²

Kumarila Bhatta, now, raises a serious objection showing a self-stultifying position in Buddhist explanation regarding the relation between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*). The Buddhist logicians, in one hand, consider the objective equiformity (*arthyasārūpya*) as the last differentiator (*antya-bhedaka* / *antya-paricchedaka*) which is nothing but cognition itself, and eliminates the instrumentality of sense-organ in the prime sense which is in a distance from the point of view of time. the differentiator (*paricchedaka*), in Buddhist system, is itself the effect.

"paricchedaphalatveṇa vṛttāyanantarasya naḥ

*pramāṇatvaṃ bhavet, jñānepramāṇe tu param
phalam*"²³

But, this so called last differentiator (*antya bhedaka*) which is identical with the cognition itself is caused by the senses. This view is also accepted by Dharmakīrti. The so called last differentiator

(*antya bhedaka*) is an imposed reality (*kalpita*). Hence, even in Buddhist system the senses (*indrīyādi*) are the real differentiator (*paricchedaka*). The Buddhist logicians, in this situation, have two options -- either (a) they may consider objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as the last differentiator (*antya bhedaka*) only in the sense that there is a real time gap between the differentiator (*paricchedaka /vyavasthāpaka*) and the differentiated (*paricchedya /vyavasthāpya*), or, (b) that the sense organs are the real differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*) for perceptual cognition. If the Buddhists hold that there is time gap between objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) and bare cognition (*jñānamātra*) and the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is caused by the senses (*indrīyādi*), then the view is not different from the Mimamsaka's concept of three epistemic apex of reality (*triputī*), viz., sense-organ (*indrīya*), cognition (*jñāna*) and manifestation (*prākāṣya*). But, then the view would contradict the basic ontology of momentariness (*kṣāṇikavāda*) of the Buddhists. Therefore, they have to accept the second option i.e. the reality of the senses as instrumental condition or differentiator (*vyavasthāpaka*). Thus, Kumarila establishes the causal relation between the senses (*indrīyādi*) and perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*). This view is also supported by common people (*viśayaikatvavat kṛiyākarakayoḥ svarupabhedo 'pi lokasiddha eva*)²⁴.

The Buddhist may argue that they have established that the concept of instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) which is the prime sense to fit in the Buddhist ontology is taken only as a conceptual construction or as an imposition (*kalpita*). The imposed distinction between an effect and its corresponding instrument is made so that using the analysis as a ladder or stepping stone common people could realize that although

the said two notions are different from the pragmatic point of view but they are identical by virtue. If the instrumentality of the objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*), which is the prime sense of instrument in Buddhist system, is also virtually refuted, the instrumentality of the senses (*indrīyādi*) where the instrumentality (*karaṇatva*) is only imposed as a case of transferred epithet could easily be refuted. Even if one would like to stick to the instrumentality of the sense-organ for perceptual cognition, the Buddhist logicians would argue that the instrumentality of sense-organ could be refuted even from the significance of the experiences of common people. For example, when one cuts a mango tree with the help of an 'axe', thereby he is excluding the possibility of cutting a gueva tree at the same time with the same 'axe'. Hence, it follows that 'the cutting (of a tree)' is an essential and intrinsic feature of that 'axe'. Thus, the so called effect and its corresponding instrument are necessarily identical.

"prasuna ca vṛkṣades'cchidā nirūpyamāṇa

chedyadravyānupraves'alakṣaṇaivavatiṣṭhate,

sa cānupraves'aḥ parāśor ātmāgata eva dharma iti.

*paramarthataś'chidaya sahaikatvam iti nāsti virodaḥ"*²⁵

Kumarila raises another objection against the Buddhist logicians that the apprehension of cognition (*sa-saṁvedana*) and objective equiformity (*meya rūpatā /viṣayākāra*) as instrument cannot go simultaneously.

"sasaṁvittaphalatvam tu tanniṣedhān na yujyate

*pramāṇe viṣayakāre bhinnarthatvaṁ prasajyate"*²⁶

Cognition, for the Buddhist, is apprehended intrinsically (*sasaṁvedana*), because the so-called instrumental condition on which the origination of the effect depends in is intrinsic and essential feature of cognition. Kamalasila explains in detail Kumarila's position that cognition can't be apprehended intrinsically, because objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya /viṣayākāra*), for the Buddhist, is an object of direct perception. This objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) solely depends upon the external object (*viṣayakaro vāhyaviṣayaḥ*). It is also mentioned earlier that consciousness has an intention towards object (*visayonmukhatā*) and Kumarila thinks that this object might be an external object having some content. If this is the case then the cognition manifesting the object as its content (*vyavasthāpya*) is not the essential feature of cognition itself, because it is not independent of external objects. Intrinsic apprehension (*sasaṁvedana*), on the other hand, means that cognition reveals itself. But, this intrinsic apprehension of cognition, however, is not like the second order cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the Naiyayikas which reveals the nature of antecedent cognition. So the momentary unique cognition having some content as its object can't reveal itself intrinsically.

*“idaṁ aparāṁ uktam kumarilenaiva :- sasaṁvedanasya
niṣedhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvaṁ ayuktam, viṣayākārasya
ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalayoḥ bhinnaviṣayatvaṁ
prasajyate, tathā hi -- viṣayakāro vāhyaviṣayaḥ,
svasaṁvedānām tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayam iti”²⁷*

So it follows that if objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) is taken as an instrument, the intrinsic apprehension (*svasaṁvedana*) could not be established to the same cognition because the object having some content in objective equiformity (*viṣayākāra*) is different from the required content of cognition for intrinsic apprehension (*svasaṁvedana*).

The Buddhist logicians, again, advocate that cognition which illumines other objects is by law necessarily illumines itself also. Because, a real (*sattā*) being itself non-illumined could not illumine other objects. So a cognition which illumines other objects at the same time it is bound to illumine itself also (*apratyokṣopalambhasya narthadrstih prasiddhati*)²⁸. They also hold that the Mimamsakas have misunderstood the Buddhist concept of instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*). The 'form of an object' (*viṣayākāra*) which is supposed to be different from cognition itself, as the Mimamsakas understood, is not instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*), but it is the form of an object as being stamped upon cognition is taken, though metaphorically only, to be the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) which is not different by virtue from cognition itself and is said to be originate by the same content (*svavidapyarthavin mata*). Hence both objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) as the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and intrinsic apprehension of cognition (*svasaṁvedana*) could go simultaneously.

The Mimamsakas, again, argue that cognition, for the Buddhist logicians, illumines in a distinct or specific way such that the object in question is revealed to us differentiating it from other objects. An indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) can't illumine an object distinctly. Hence, valid cognition (*pramā*), in Buddhist system, is determinate or judgmental (*savikalpaka*) and

indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*) is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). Because, determinate or judgmental cognition logically entails the existence of indeterminate cognition (*viśiṣṭajñānam viśeṣanajñānapūrvakam*). For example, when one cognizes 'this is blue' the adjective 'blue' can be predicated only if the cognition of 'blueness' preceeds that cognition. If such basic indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*) does not preceed then one can't ascribe something as blue.

The Buddhist logicians refuted valid cognition (*pramā*) as judgmental first and then they refuted the instrumentality of indeterminate cognition also. The determinate judgment (*vikalpa-adhyavasāya*), in Buddhist system, can't be valid cognition since it contradicts with the concept of momentariness (*kṣanikatvavāda*). Determinate cognition (*vikalpa-adhyāvasāya*) are thought constructed, hence need subsequent moment for its construction. But the unique real particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) exist only for one moment. Therefore, the unique real particular no more exists at the time of judgmental construction. Hence, judgmental cognition (*vikalpa-adhyāvasāya*) can't grasp the unique real particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*).

Could indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka /alocanajñāna*) be instrument-cum-valid cognition ? Dharmakīrti answers in a negative way. Usually it is believed that a determinate cognition must be preceeded by an indeterminate cognition where cognition of pure adjective is directly revealed. But Dharmakīrti and his commentator Prajñākara advocates that there is no need of the cognition of the pure adjective at indeterminate level. Because, cognition of adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) is a relative fact in the sense that its cognition would be meaningless if it is not related with the substantive (*viśeṣya*).

*“na hi viśeṣyoparudharūpaṃ antarena viśeṣanatvamnāma,
nāpi taduparudhatvagraham vinā viśeṣanatvagrahaṇam
tadākaragrahane ca viśeṣyam api grihitam eveti katham
tato viśeṣyadhir apara sādhyā syat ?”²⁹*

Moreover, indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) can't illumine the object in a specific way. The objective difference of different cognitions can't be ascertained at the stage of indeterminate cognition (*alocanajñāna*). It is the objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) which can only illumine the object without delay in a distinct way. Thus objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) stands as the basis of determining the objective difference of cognition.

The Buddhist logicians finally establishes that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the instrumental condition-cum-valid cognition which is capable of making a cognition specific. Indeterminate cognition is incapable of making a cognition specific. Judgmental cognition, on the other hand, has been denied as valid cognition. Thus, the status of objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is kept equidistant from both indeterminate and determinate cognition. This is an inconcievable position. Yet, some Buddhist loyalists argue that indeterminate cognition said to be instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) only in the sense that the real source of the power of making a cognition specific resides in the original pure sensation. The argument is not tenable, because it presupposes that the power of making a cognition specific begins at the first moment and it only explicitly makes a cognition specific in the second moment which goes against the ontological presuppositions of momentariness.

One point deserves mention here that the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) or its instrument (*pramāṇa*) are neither the fundamental category to achieve (*nirvāṇa*), nor even the fundamental categories for theorisation, whereas the Naiyayikas take the instrumental condition for cognition (*pramāṇa*) as a fundamental category for theorisation, but valid cognition (*pramā*) is not taken as a fundamental category even for theorisation. Thus the distinction between instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*), in Buddhist system, holds good only from the analytical and logical point of view. It is also advocated that momentary unique cognition is of the nature of self-revealing (*sasamvedana/ svaprakāśa*). Again, as the cognition reveals some external object (*visayonmukhatā*), hence, the validity or truth of the cognition is extrinsic (*parataḥ prāmānya*). The validity or truth, for the Buddhists logicians, can be ascertained only if it leads to successful activity (*saphalapravṛttipravartaka*). Thus, the origination of a cognition can reveal its own bare content which is not vitiated with mental ascription (*kalpanā*) without depending upon another subsequent cognition, but whether the content of cognition really corresponds with the external object has to be determined by another subsequent cognition.

There are, for the Buddhists, two sources of valid cognition, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). There is, again, a controversy among the Buddhist logicians regarding the level or status of these two sources of valid cognition. Some thinkers, like Stchebatsky, hold that the level or status of perception is higher than inference. Perception, for Stchebatsky, is the source of valid cognition from the transcendental level and inference is the source of valid cognition only from the phenomenal level. This claim arises because Dharmakīrti's definition of perception as that

cognition which is non-erroneous and free from imagination (*tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*)³⁰, whereas inference is defined as that cognition, which is erroneous, and grasps the object through the mental ascriptions (*bhrāntam hyanumānam. svapratibhāse 'narthe 'dhyavasāyena pravṛttvat*)³¹. The Buddhist logicians, unlike the Naiyayikas who differentiate between perception and inference mainly in terms of sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*), differentiate between perception and inference in terms of non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) and erroneous (*bhrānta*) respectively. Perception, for them, is non-erroneous because it alone can directly grasps the momentary unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). Inference, on the other hand, can't directly grasps the momentary unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The immediate object of inference is a concept which is imaginary (*kalpanā*) and hence, illusory. Concepts correspond to universal characteristics. But, this universal is not like the Naiyayikas concept of Universal which is taken as real, rather, it is imaginarily constructed by the method of exclusion (*apoha*). Thus, inference, for Stchebatsky, is the source of valid cognition only in the phenomenal level.

But, Stchebatsky's claim can't be accepted, because the object of perception i.e. the momentary unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are not transcendental reality. These particulars are also reals of the phenomenal level. Liberation (*nirvāṇa*) is the only transcendental reality. Epistemology (*pramāṇasāstra*), not only in Buddhist system but to any system of Indian philosophy, has nothing to do directly with the Transcendental Reality. So some recent thinkers think that both perception and inference belong to the same level of the phenomenal world. The seed of such claim is found in *Nyabindu* itself -- '*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapurusārthasiddhirti tad*

*vyutpadyate*³² i.e. valid cognition aims at fulfilling all human purpose. Rita Gupta, therefore, observes that 'objective equiformity' (*meyarūpatā*) is the instrumental condition of both perceptual and inferential cognition. "Both perception and inference", in her opinion, "acquaint us with the real *svalakṣana*. Perception does it directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual constructs"³³. But this explanation is not satisfactory also. Because, if it is accepted that both perception and inference acquaint us with the momentary particulars (*svalakṣana*), then it goes against the Buddhist theory of *pramāna-vyavasthā*. According to this theory, each and every instrumental condition has its own object which can be cognized exclusively by that instrumental condition only. The object of perception can't be cognized by inference and vice-versa.

Finally, the Buddhist logicians may argue that objective equiformity (*meyarūpatā*) is the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid cognition (*pramā = pramāṇa*) and non-contradiction and causal efficacy is the criterion for determining the truth of cognition. So, it would not be right to determine the validity of a particular condition merely from its non-contradictory character and causal efficacy. Rather, when both the criteria are fulfilled then the cognition in question could be said to be valid. Even this explanation can't save the theory from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyapti*). For example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to get the diamond and he gets it. Here both the criteria are fulfilled, because though he misunderstood 'the reflection of light on the diamond as diamond', the cognition assumes the form of that diamond (*meyarūpatā*) and luckily get the diamond also. On the other hand, seeing the diamond the other man runs to get the diamond and gets it. Here, also both the criteria are fulfilled. Hence, the explanation fails to distinguish between error and valid

cognition. So the Buddhist logicians definition of valid cognition along with the criterion of determining the truth of cognition can't distinguish between error and valid cognition. It is the "*tadvati tatprakāra anubhava*" which alone can distinguish between error and valid cognition.

The Jaina is a heterodox liberation oriented system. The Jaina logicians developed their epistemology extracting different concepts from different systems and adjusted them with their own ontological set up. The Jaina logicians, like the *Nyāya* logicians, hold that consciousness is the attribute of the self, but the difference is that the *Nyāya* logicians accept consciousness as the accidental attribute, whereas the Jaina logicians accept the self as a variable constant through and is of the nature of continuous running through the succession of modes in which the cessation of the predecessor is synchronous with the origination of the successor. Advaitins, on the otherhand, accept the self (*ātman*) as the permanent static substance and the Buddhist logicians denied the existence of self (*anātmavāda*) and hold that the unique momentary particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are the only reality. But, the Jainas hold that the permanent static substance cannot explain the causal relation of the changing world. Similarly, the Buddhist logicians also fail to explain the causal efficiency, since all the unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) are absolutely momentary. So, the Jaina logicians established that the entity where the causal efficiency as a causal characteristic could exercise would be such that that admits both sequence and non-sequence (*arthakriyā na yujyate nityakṣanikapakṣayoh / karmākramavyam bhāvānām sa lakṣaṇatayā mata³⁴*). Though, both the *Nyāya* logicians and Jaina logicians

explain cognition in terms of causal relation, yet the Jaina logicians do not accept the concept of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of the *Nyāya* logicians. They argue, on the contrary, like the Buddhist logicians that it is the cognition itself which is the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) in its true sense and yet the nature of the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is not indeterminate (*ālocana jñāna*), rather it is the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) which can lay claim as an instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). Again, the Jaina logicians, specially Hemchandra, agrees with Gangeśa that most of the cognitions are extrinsically valid (*parataḥ-pramāṇa*), and some cognitions such as habit etc. (*abhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) are intrinsically valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*). Hence, the discussion on the Jaina view of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) is necessary for the critical study of valid cognition (*pramā*) in *Nyāya*. We shall try to explain the Jaina view of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) with special reference to Hemchandra in this regard.

Valid cognition, in Jaina terminology, is called '*samyakjñāna*' (authentic cognition). The term '*samyak*' derives from the root '*añc*' with the prefix '*sam*' (*sam + añc*). The term '*samyak*' means what is not contrary to fact and is indeclinable (*samyag ityaviparītārthavyam samaccatervā rūpaṁ*)³⁵. The adjective 'authentic' (*samyak*) excludes doubt, indecision and error from the purview of authentic cognition. doubt is not authentic because it fully touches both the opposite characters with reference to an object which does not actually possess such a dual character. For example, when someone cognizes 'whether it is a stem of a tree or a man ?' (*sthānurvā puruṣo vā ?*) -- is called doubt. Indecision is excluded from the purview of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) since it fails to grasp the specific characteristics of its object owing to distance, darkness and the like. Indeterminate cognition

(*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), the Jaina logicians unlike the Buddhist logicians hold, is a case of indecision since it also lacks consideration of specific characteristics. Error is excluded from the purview of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) since in this case one who cognizes something as having some character which actually does not exist. Thus authentic cognition is defined as “*prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādi vyavacchedeṇa miyate paricchidyate vastutattvaṁ yena tat pramāṇam pramāyāṁ sādhatamaṁ*”³⁶

Now, the question is : how the authentic cognition is acquired ? The Jaina logicians are of the opinion that it is acquired through the instrumental condition (*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam*)³⁷ We have shown, in our earlier discussion, that there are mainly two opposite views regarding the origination of valid cognition / authentic cognition (*pramā/samyakjñāna*). Hemchandra, The Jaina logician, partially rejected and partially accepted both the views. The *Nyāya* logicians define means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as causal condition in general (*arthopalabdhi hetuḥ pramāṇam*). The Sanskrit word ‘*hetu*’ means the causal condition in general. But, causal condition in general (*hetu*), for Hemchandra, is the common attribute of all conditions. Consequently, if this definition is accepted, besides the sense-organ or sense-object-contact -- the subject, object, etc. would also lay claim as the causal condition. But, the subject or object is not the instrument of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*). Moreover, if this definition is accepted then even a remotely conducive condition lay claim to the recognition of causal condition. Thus the definition of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) of the Naiyayikas suffers from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyāpti*).

The Jaina logicians accept the instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) to avoid any remotely conducive condition as ‘the most

efficient condition' (*sādhakatama*) which being present the effect immediately follows. Now, one may claim that the Jaina logicians accept the Buddhists notion of instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*). The Jaina logicians explicitly argue that their notion of means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) is entirely different from the Buddhist notion of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). The Buddhist logicians hold that valid cognition (*pramā*) and means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is absolutely identical. Hence, the Buddhists explain the origin of valid cognition in a non-causal manner. The Jaina logicians, on the otherhand, endeavour to explain the origin of authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) in terms of causal relation -- but the causality is not efficient causality and hence it is not temporal. The determinate (*vyavasthāpaka*) and the determinatum (*vyavasthāpya*) are not numerically different, but they are different in respect of function. There is no logical incompatibility in the something being its own determinant (*vyavasthāpaka*) and determinatum (*vyavasthāpya*). Realisation of the illumination of the object (*artha*) means 'the determination of it as the resultant.' Thus, the relation of means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) and resultant authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) partakes of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such it is consistent with the theory of non-absolutism (*syadvāda*).

Again, the Buddhist logicians definition of valid cognition cum its instrument is self-stultifying. They define means of valid cognition as that condition which is non-contradicted by subsequent cognition (*pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam*)³⁸. They also claim that this instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*) is indeterminate in nature (*ālocana jñāna mātra*). But an indeterminate cognition (*ālocana jñāna*) cannot assert whether the cognition is contradicted by subsequent cognition or not. It would not be capable of generating

pragmatic consequences. That the indeterminate cognition is valid could be cognized only by a subsequent determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*). Thus, the justification given to prove the validity of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), in Buddhism, is a borrowed one (*yācitakamaṇḍana Nyāya*). Again, the role of determinate cognition for stipulating the validity of a cognition cannot be denied even by a Buddhist logician. Hence, the Jaina logicians accept the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*) as instrumental condition (*pramāṇa*).

The aim of authentic cognition (*samyak jñāna*) is to determine authentic object (*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam -- PM.Sūtra .2.*). Object of authentic cognition (*samyakartha*), in Jainism like *Nyāya*, is classified under three heads -- viz. what is to be avoided (*heya*), what is to be accepted (*upādeya*) and what is to be ignored (*upekṣanīya*). Ignorable (*upekṣanīya*) in *Nyāya*, Prof.R.N.Ghosh observes, could be subsumed under the avoidable (*heya*) on the ground of its being unfit for acceptance (*upādeya*)³⁹. But, Hemchandra, the Jaina logician, observes that the ignorable (*upekṣanīya*), in Jainism, cannot be subsumed under the avoidable (*heya*). Because, if the ignorable is subsumed under the avoidable since it is not acceptable, by the same reason one may subsume it under the acceptable on the ground that it is not avoidable. Moreover, the category of ignorable has its overwhelming importance so far as the ascetics are concerned. Ignorable objects (*upekṣanīya viṣaya*), for the ascetics, are far greater than the desirable or avoidable objects (*na cānupādeyatvādupekṣanīya heya evāntarbhavati; aheyatvādupādeya evāntarbhāvaprakṣaṅgā / Upekṣanīya eva ca mūrdhābhiṣikto'rthaḥ, yogibhiṣṭasyaivaryamāṇatvat // asmādādināmapī heyopādeyabhyāṃ bhūyanevopekṣanīyo'rthaḥ; tannayamupekṣitum kṣamaḥ*)⁴⁰. But,

people other than ascetics have the attitude towards any object either to accept it or to avoid it. So, whether the objects of authentic or valid cognition are classified under three or two heads depends upon the desirability or undesirability of asceticism. Modern psychological studies reveal that asceticism ultimately cannot yield good result. The suppression of senses or desires in a rigorous way may cultivate ill mental health and thus it may be a hindrance for cognizing the true nature of an object (*artha*). Manikyanandin, another Jaina logician, has not entered to the problem whether asceticism should be allowed or not. He classified objects under two headings -- good (*hita*) and bad (*ahita*). This classification, in our opinion, is broader than the earlier one since it can accommodate both the attitude of ascetic peoples as well as people other than ascetics towards any object. If this classification is accepted then both the objects of desirable (*upādeya*) and objects of avoidable (*heya*), for the ascetics, are bad objects (*ahita*) and the ignorable objects are the only good objects (*hita*). Thus, the classification of objects of cognition under the headings of good and bad is more acceptable than the other classification. Manikyanandin thus rightly defines authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) as "*hitāhitaprapṛāptiparihārasamarthaṁ, tato jñānam eva tad iti*"⁴¹, i.e. an authentic cognition can guide us to do something which is good and to avoid something which is bad. Good and evil come from the objects of the world. Authentic cognition (*samyakjñāna*) identifies an object (*artha*) in its true nature. This revelatory identification helps the cognizer to accept what is good and reject what is bad.

Now, the question is : how the authenticity of cognition is revealed ? Those thinkers who believe that the condition of origination and the condition of authenticity is the same hold that the authenticity of cognition is revealed intrinsically (*svataḥ*) and

those thinkers who believe that the condition of origination and the condition of authenticity of cognition are different hold that the authenticity of cognition is revealed extrinsically (*parataḥ*). The Jaina logicians hold that cognition itself is self-revelatory. Because if it is not self-revelatory, it would not be capable of illumining external objects. But the condition of authenticity is external and yet there are some cases where the authenticity of cognition is revealed intrinsically.

On some occasions the authenticity is revealed through external senses -- such as primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) and in the case of Verbal Testimony (*śabdajñāna*). The authenticity in the case of primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) has not been ascertained at the time of its origination. Whether such primal perceptual cognition (*anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) corresponds with the external relevant object or not is ascertained only by subsequent cognition. The same holds good in the case of Verbal Testimony (*śabdajñāna*). Its unfailing correspondence with the relevant object is not realisable by itself. Its authenticity is only determined by the external evidence furnished by verification.

The Jaina logician, Hemchandra like Gangeśa, again, holds that although the authenticity of cognition in most cases is determined extrinsically, yet there are some cases where the authenticity of cognition is self-validated. Such for instance is the case of habitual cognition (*abhyāsadaśāpannajñāna*) of ones own palm induced by a repeated course of experience; or the direct intuition of results by verification offered by such tests as the acts of bathing, drinking, quench of thirst and like processes. The same holds good in some cases of inference when all the possibility of

doubt of the universal concomitance has been entirely eliminated. (prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ svataḥ yathābhyāsadaśāpanne svākāratadijñāne,
snānapānavagāhanodanyopaśamadavarthakriyānirbhāse vā
pratyakṣajñāne na hi tatra parikṣākāṅkṣāsti prekṣavataṃ, tathāhi --
jalajñānaṃ, tato dāhapīpāsārtasya tatra pravṛttiḥ, tatastatprāptiḥ,
tataḥ snānapānādini, tato dāhodanyopaśama ityetavataiva bhavati
kṛti pramātā, na pūnardāhodnyopaśamajñānamapi parikṣate ityasya
svataḥ prāmāṇyam / anumāne tu sarvasminnapi sarvathā
nirastasamasta vyabhicāraśaṃke svate eva prāmāṇyaṃ,
avyabhicāriliṅgasamuthātvāt; na liṅgakāraṃ jñānamliṅgaṃ vīnā, na
ca liṅga liṅgināṃ vineti⁴²

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Sanskrit College; 1, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Cal-700073.
- 2) “Ajñātapadenatva jñātaviṣayoḥ smṛtyānuvādayornirāsaḥ.
Tatra anuvādanamaPrāmāṇyam tārkkikādinām nānumatam.
Vayaṁ tu brumaḥ—anuvādo hyasthaparicchede vyavahāre
vā na pūrvaḥjñānāt kaścid viśeṣamadhatte. Ataḥ
phalaviśeṣabhāvāt phalārtham ca Pramāṇānām svīkārāt
smṛtyādivadanuvādohapi vahikārya eveti.”-Pramāṇa
Paricheda, Sūtra -4, P-6. Ibid.
- 3) “Nanu ajñātavagamasyaiva Pramātve ‘ghatohayam
ghatohayāmi’ iti dhārāvāhikajñānesu dvitīyādinām
apramātvaṁ syat. Maivam. Tatrāpyayamayam iti
uttarottareṣām kālāmśanāmajñātanāmavajamāt uttare
kṣane ghatādisadbhāvasya ca pūrva jñānena anadhi
gatatvat” - Sūtra 5 -P.7. Ibid.
- 4) “Nanu kālābhedaśyaupādhikatvat
kenopādhinavacchinnānām kālāmśa na māṭṛavagama iti
vaktavyam uccyate... ..” - Sūtra -6. P.8.

- 5) “..... *pūrvvapūrva-jñānanitanām*
prākṛtyanamuttarottarajñānaparyantamavasthānāt
tadavacchinnānām kālānśānām tatratastravagama iti...” -
 Sūtra -6. Ibid.
- 6) “*Na ca prākṛtyabhedānām sukṣatvat tadavacchinnānām*
katabhedānāmapi sukṣa tayā dūravagamatvamiti vācyam.
Sukṣatve kamaladalaśātaṁ suchya yugapadabhinnavitvat
sakṛdavavuddho ghata iti yugapadyabhimānaprasāṅgāt.
Iha tuṣayam ayam iti punaḥ punaḥ kramānaiva
pratiterdhārāvāhikasvabhāvasiddhatvat
yougpadyabhimānasya virodha eva. Tasmāt
prākṛtyābhedānām kālabhedanām ca na sukṣatvaṁ”.-Sūtra
 -6. Ibid.
- 7) But it should be clearly borne in mind that all icchajanya inferences or knowledge-are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanya jñāna*—The concept of *Āhāryajñāna* in *Navya-Nyāya*: Some Reflections, Dr Raghunath Ghosh, JICPR, Vol.XV Number 1. Editor Baya Krishna. P-89, Sept-Dec. 1997.
- 8) “*Tattvapadena bhramasāśayādināmayatharthajñānānām*
nirāsaḥ. Tatra ayatharthajñānābhāvāt
tattvapadaṁanarthakamiti prabhākaraḥ prāhuḥ. Evaṁ hi
teṣāṁ matam, idaṁ rajatamityātra idamiti agrhitaviśeṣāṁ
śūktisakalam gr̥hyate. Rajatamātram smāryate. Tayośca
bhedagrahāt pūrṇavartini rajatārthinah pravṛtīḥ. Na tu

śuktisakalasya rajatattvena bhānamasti iti. Tattujjñānasya svaviṣaya eva pravṛttikāratva niyamadrajatejñānasyapi idaṁ viṣayatvabhāve tatra pravṛttiḥna sidhyet. Tathā idameva rajatamṛiti sāmānādhikāraṇyaṁ tayorbhedapratitiṁ vīnā na sidhyet, ityādidisa nirākāraṇyam” — Mānameyodaya.- Sutra -8. Ibid.

- 9) “*tasmādanyathāgrahānarūpabhramādiḥjñānasadbhāvāt tannirāsarthaṁ . tattvapadam. Tadevamajñātataattvavagamarūpayah Pramāyāḥ karaṇatvena indriyasannikarṣādinām Pramāṇatvaṁ sūddham” . Ibid.*
- 10) “*Iha ca Pramāśabdena lakṣaṇaḥ tatkāryabhutasya prākṛtyasyapi pratipādānāt prākṛtyārūpaPramākaraṇatvena jñānasyāpi Pramāṇatvaṁahuh. Etāvata ca vyaṁ phalaPramāṇavādīnā iti giyamahe”- Sūtra -9. Ibid.*
- 11) “*Tārkikāstu Pramākaraṇam Pramāṇam, yathārathānubhavaḥ Pramā, anubhavaśca smṛitivyatiriktaṁ jñānam iti lakṣayanti. TadanuvādasyaPrāmāṇyasādhanāt tadvyavaratakasya ca padasyatrabhāvavṛativyaptaṁ” — Mānameyodaya- Pramāṇa paricchedaḥ Sūtra 10, Narayana Bhatta. Ibid.*
- 12) “*Anubhutiḥ Pramāṇam, smṛti vyatirikta ca saṁvidanubhutiḥ. Iti prabhākaraḥ. Tadāpi bhramādiṇām sādhanāt teṣāṁapi smṛitivyatiriktatvat tesvativyāptaṁ, kiñca sarvajñānesvapi ātmā jñānasvarūpaṁ viṣayaṁ viṣaya iti tritayāṁapi prakāśate. Sarvatra cātmāsvātmānīśayoh*

Pramāṇtvaṃ pratyakṣatvamapyastite teṣāṃ matam. Tataca smṛtivyāti- -riktajñānasyaiva Pramāṇatve smṛterātmāsvātmāmsayoraPrāmānyaṃ, syadityavyaptimpyasti iti.”- Pramāṇa Paricchedaḥ- Sūtra 11. Ibid.

13) “*Avisaṃvādi vijñānam pramāṇam. Avisamvāditvam ca arthakriyākāritvaṃ iti. Bouddhah. Tatra bhutabhabisyadiviṣayasyanumānasya arthakriyākāritvabhāvāt aprāmāṇyam syat smṛteśca kvacidarthakriyākāritvat prāmāṇyaṃ syaditi.” -Sūtra12. Ibid.*

14) “*Nanu arthakriyākāritvamāsyā arthatohativiprakaṣa bhāvāt daivagatameva, na svābhāvikam. Yathāhhuḥ— ‘manipradīpaprabhayormanibuddhyabhīdhāvatoḥ. Mithyājñānaviśeṣāpi viśeṣoharthakriyāṃ prati.” - pratyakṣa-Pramāṇam - Sūtra .15. Ibid.*

15) “*... vastutastvayaṃ vikalpo mithyā avastubhutasāmānyadiviṣayatvat, iti cenmeivam. Anumānavikalpasyapi a Prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt, sāmānyadervastutvasya sadhayisyamanatvacca. Ataḥ Pramāṇeva savikalpakaṃ.”- pratyakṣa-Pramāṇam. Sūtra 15. Ibid.*

16) “*dhiyo ’msayor...kintu vyavasthāpya vyavasthāpakabhāvaḥ, sa ca tādātmye’pi aviruddha”.* *Pramāṇuvārttika of Dharmakīrti with commentary of Manorathanandi, P-194, Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.*

a) “*a cognition is metaphorically called pramāṇa”- Dignaga on perception, M. Hattori, p. 28.*

b) “... ..the basic identity of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, on close scrutiny, does not stand as an exclusive feature of the Buddhist theory of cognition along. The *Sāṃkhya-yoga*, the *Advaita-Vedānta* and *Mimāṃsakas* also despite their possible disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with this relation of identity in one way or other”- “The Buddhist Theory of Relation Between *Pramā* and *Pamāṇa*” *Jurnal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979), P 43-78.

- 17) “*sarvasāmānyahetuvad akṣaṇam asti nedrśam / tadbhede'py abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat kuṭaḥ.*” *Pramāṇavārtika of Dharmakirti with Bhāṣya of Prajñākara*, K.J.R.I., 1953.
- 18) “*sarvasya hi nīlapītadiviṣayasya sāmānyena hetuvad akṣam na bhedakam*” .*ibid.*
- 19) “*sarvātmānapi sambandham kaścīd evagamyate / dharmah, sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyaviśeṣataḥ*” *Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakirti with commentary of Manorathanandi*, 2/316, Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.
- 20) *sarveṣām upayoge'pi kārakānām kriyām prati / yadantya bhedakam tasyaḥ tat sādhatamam matam.*”- Pv.B.3/312K.J.R.I.
- 21) “*Ya kriyā yataḥ padārthād / avyavadhānena bhavati sa tasyah kāraṇamucyate, / tatascendriyādeḥ pramitiṃ pratyāvvyavahite / sādhatvabhāvān na pramāṇam*” – *Pramāṇvārtika of Dharmakirti; with commentary of Manorathanandi, Tīkā on Pv.2/301*, Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.

- 22) “*katham tanhi cakṣusā paśyati iti, / kārane kāryopacārād evamucyate*” -- Pv.B.p.23 K.J.R.I
- 23) “*paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyanantarasya naḥ / pramāṇatvaṁ bhāvej, jñānepramāṇe tu paraṁ phalam*”. -- Sv.Chow.ed. Pratyakṣa p.118.
- 24) “*viṣayaikatvavat kriyākārayoḥ svarūpabhedo’pi lokasiddha eva*” – Pārthasarathi’s commentary on Sv.P.117, Chow. Ed.
- 25) “*prasuna ca vṛkṣades’cchidā nirūpyamāna / chedyadravyanupraveśalakṣaṇaivavatisthate, / sa cānupraveśaḥ parāśor ātmāgata eva dharma iti. / paramārthataśchidayā sahaikatvaṁ iti nāsti virodaḥ*” – kamalaśīla’s commentary on Ts;P399,G.O.S. Ed.
- 26) “*saśamvittaphalatvaṁ tu tanniśēdhān na yujyate /pramāṇe viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṁ prasajyate*”- Sv.Chow.ed. P.118.
- 27) “*idaṁ aparaṁ uktam kumārīlenaiva :- sasamvedanasya / niśēdhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvaṁ ayuktam, viṣayākārasya / ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalāyor bhinnaviṣayatvaṁ / prasajyate, tathā hi -- viṣayākāro vāhyaviṣayaḥ, / svasamvedanam tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayaṁ iti*”-- commentary on Ts;P400,G.O.S. Ed.
- 28) “*apratyokṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhati*” – Pramāṇavinīścaya, Dharmakartī;

- 29) “*na hi viśeṣyoparudharūpaṃ antarena viśeṣanatvaṃ nāma ,/ nāpi taduparudhatvagrahaṃ vīnā viśeṣānatvagrahanāṃ / tadākāragrahane ca viśeṣyaṃ api grihitam evēti katham / tato viśeṣyādhir apara sādhyā syat ?*” – Prajñākara’s commentary on the verse of Pv.B.K.J.R.I.
- 30) “*tatra kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*”—Nyāyabindutīkā, PP. 8-9.
- 31) “*bhrāntam hyanumānam. svapratibhāse ’nārthe ’dhyāvasāyena pravṛttvat*” –P.9. Ibid.
- 32) “*samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhirti tad vyutpadyate*” —Nyāyabindutīkā, Ch.1,v1.
- 33) “Both perception and inference, acquaint us with the real *svalakṣaṇa*. Perception does it directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual constructs” – “Does Dharmakīrti Embrace A Pragmatic Theory of Truth in His Theory of Knowledge ?”, JICPR, VOL.XVI, NO.1, Sept – Dec 1998, P.95.
- 34) “*arthakriyā na yujyate nityakṣanikapakṣayoḥ / karmakramavyaṃ bhāvānām sa lakṣaṇatayā mata*”-- LT.II. 1.) (XV)
- 35) “*samyag ityaviparītarthavyaṃ samaccaterva rūpaṃ*” Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā Tikā on Sūtra -11.

- 36) “*prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādi vyavacchedena miyate paricchidyate vastutattvaṁ yena tat pramāṇam prāmāyāṁ sādihakatatamam*” -Tika on Sūtra -5. Ibid.
- 37) “*samyak artha nirṇayam pramāṇam*”- P. M. sūtra 2.
- 38) “*pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam*” – Pv.II.1.
- 39) “*The sense in which upekṣābuddhi is admitted by the Naiyāyikas cannot be taken into account fully and I beg to differ from the Naiyāyikas in this respect. An object, I think is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for being indifferent. In my opinion the indifferent attitude towards an object which is described as upekṣā would fall under the category of rejection (hāna)*” – ‘Some Reflactions on the Nyāya Theory of Action’, Dr. Raghunath Ghosh, IPQ, Vol. XVIII. No. 4, October 1991.
- 40) “*na cānupadeyatvādupekṣanīya heya evāntarbhavati; aheyatvadupādeya evāntarbhāvaprakṛteḥ / Upekṣanīya eva ca mūrdhabhisikto'rthah, yogibhiṣṭasyaivaryamāṇatvat // asmādādināmapi heyopādeyabhyaṁ bhuyanevopekṣanīyo'rthah; tannayamupekṣituṁ kṣamaḥ*”-- Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā Tika on Sūtra -10,
- 41) “*hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthaṁ, tato jñānam eva tad iti*”-- ParikṣāmukhaSūtra -Sūtra 2.
- 42) “*prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ svataḥ yathābhyasadaśāpanne svakaratalādijñāne, snānapānavagāhanodanyopaśamādavarthakriyānirbhāse vā*

pratyakṣajñāne na hi tatra parikṣākāṅkṣasti prekṣavatam, tathāhi -- jalajñānam, tato dāhapipāsārtasya tatra pravṛttiḥ, tatastatprāptiḥ, tatah snānapānādini, tato dāhodanyopaśama ityetāvataiva bhavati kṛti pramātā, na punardāhodnyopaśamajñānamapi parikṣate ityasya svataḥ prāmāṇyam / anumāne tu sarvasminnapi sarvathā nirāstasamasta vyabhicāraśaṅke svate eva prāmāṇyam, avyabhicāriliṅgasamuthatvat; na liṅgakāram jñānamliṅgam vinā, na ca liṅga lingīnām vineti”—Ibid Tika on Sutra -22.

Some of the definitions of valid cognition (*pramā* /*samyagjñāna*) given by the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) have been logically rejected by the Naiyayikas, but there are a few more definitions given by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, Dharmakirti, Narayana Bhatta, Hemchandra etc which are not taken into account or rejected by the Naiyayikas in the works available so far. In this chapter our noble task is to encounter these problems and reject them with the help of some independent arguments and an attempt is made to have their probable solutions from the Nyaya point of view.

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his definition of *pramā* has used two terms – ‘uncontradicted’ (*avādhita*) and ‘unacquired’ (*anadhigata*) as adjuncts of the content of *pramā*. He has used the term ‘*arthaviṣayaka*’ as an adjective of cognition which means that the valid cognition must have some object as its content (*arthaviṣayaka*). It indicates that it is the definition of epistemic cognition of the phenomenal world. This object must be uncontradicted or non-sublated by the later cognition. To judge the acquired cognition corresponds to the fact (*avādhita*) or not – depends on the verification. If it is really raining outside, it is to be taken as uncontradicted (*avādhita*). In other words, whether the acquired cognition of water is really in the case of water or in the case of mirage can be determined through the pragmatic utility of it. If the cognition of water really serves the purpose i.e. quenching the

thirst etc. the acquired cognition may be taken as contradicted. Hence, the phenomenon of uncontradictedness always depends on the external factor, which goes in favour of extrinsic validity of truth (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). How can the intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) be substantiated? This question is not replied in the Advaita frame-work given by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. On the one hand, the Advaitins propogate the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) and prescribe uncontradictedness (*avādhitatva*) as an adjunct of the object of valid cognition, which seems to be paradoxical. This paradox cannot easily be removed if the Advaitins do not accept the extrinsic validity of truth so far as phenomenal objects are concerned. The theory of intrinsic validity of truth (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) can easily be admitted in the case of metaphysical truth, which is depended on the Agamic statements. The Vedic statements are always true and hence they are intrinsically true. Other than these the *avadhitatva* can be determined extrinsically.

Dharmaraja Adhvarindra has raised earlier a problem against the Nyaya concept of *pramā*. This view needs a through review. To Dharmaraja the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*), consideration or *parāmarśa*, cognition of similarity (*sādrśyajñāna*) and awareness of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyajñāna*) are taken as an attribute (*guṇa*) of the perceptual, inferential, cognition through comparison and testimonial cognition respectively. They think if sense-object-contact is the attribute or *guṇa* of perceptual cognition, it would have been remain permanently due to the eternality of the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) remaining between attribute (*guṇa*) and the possessor of the attribute (*gunī*)⁴. But in the actual world perception is possible without sense-object-contact as in the case of the perception of self. Again, the cognition

of the colour etc. is cognized though there is no sense-object-contact.

In response to the above mentioned view of the Advaitins the Naiyayikas may add the following arguments in favour of their own conclusion. To Nyaya a cognition becomes *apramā* if there is any defect either in the sense organ or in other parts essential for generating cognition (*doṣa'prāmānyaḥ janakaḥ*)². If there are defects *kaca* etc in the eye etc, or too much proximity (*atisāmpya*) or too much remoteness (*atidūratva*) or having some obstacles (*pratibandhaka*) etc, there arises a false cognition. If, on the other hand, there is no such defects (*doṣābhāva*) i.e. eye is free from defects like *kaca* etc, having no other defects like too much proximity etc, it achieves the status of attribute (*guṇa*) by way of being free from defects (*doṣābhāva*). Having normal vision is an attribute of visual sense-organ. If it is endowed with defect, it will lose its normal character. Hence *guṇa* suggests two sides: negative side in the form of the absence of defect and positive side in the form of achievement of quality of having normal vision etc. The meaning of the term "*guṇa*" has to be taken in this sense which is not taken by the Advaitins. The *guṇa* has been taken as in an extended sense, while the Naiyayikas have taken it as a restricted or technical sense. So the description of sense-object-contact, *parāmarśa*, cognition of similarity, and cognition of *tātparya* as an attribute or *guṇa* does not grasp the accurate meaning of the term used by the *Naiyayikas*. They have taken these *sannikarṣa*, *parāmarśa* etc as an uncommon cause (*asādharanakāraṇa*) associated with operative process (*vyapāra*) which is technically called *karaṇa* or instrumental factor. We may at best say that between this *karaṇa* and result i.e. perceptual or inferential cognition there is cause and effect relationship but not *guṇa* and

gunī (attribute and possessor of the attribute). The *karaṇa* and *kāraṇa* are the generating factors of a valid cognition if and only if there is the absence of defect or presence of attribute. Hence the instrumental factors like sense-object-contact cannot be taken as *guṇa* or attribute as taken by the *Advaitins*.

Further, even of sense-object-contact is taken as an attribute, it cannot be said that there is absence of it to apprehend colour etc of an object. The *Naiyayikas* are very much clear when they enumerate different *sannikarṣas* or contacts. When a jar is conjoined with the eye, there is a specific contact called *samyoga*. A man by nature cannot remain satisfied with mere cognition of a jar and hence he afterwards tries to see the colour inhered in the particular jar, which is also a kind of sense-object-contact called *samyuktasamavāya* (conjoined inherence). In the like manner, the property called colourness inhered in colour is apprehended with the help of the sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*) called *samyukrtasamaveta-samavāya* (i.e. inherence inhered in the conjoined). Hence, colourness, colour etc are apprehended through the sense-object-contact called *samavetasamavāya* etc. So it is not true that when colour is apprehended, *sannikarṣa* is not there. The view of the *Advaitins* is not tenable. Even the cognition of self, according to *Nyaya* is also possible through some extra-ordinary means of perceptual cognition (*alaukikapratyakṣa*) which is called *yogaja*. Though the self is not cognized directly through sense-object-contact, yet there is an indirect means where sense-organ becomes operative. Generally sense-organ have got two types of power-gross (*sthūla*) and subtle (*sukṣma*). Normally a sense organ can reveal an object proximate to it, but it has got some extraordinary `surplus power'³ (as coined by Rabindranath Tagore) which can reveal those existing in past, present and future. Hence, it is not true that sense-

organ remain operative with the help of the power of self. Moreover whenever the colour etc of an object is cognized, sense-organ i.e. the eye is directly connected with the object i.e. jar and indirectly to the colour of it. Direct relation is called *sākṣāt* and indirect relation is called *paramparā*. Both are accepted in the *Nyaya* system of Philosophy. So it is not true that the sense object-contact is not found in the case of the apprehension of colour etc. It is completely a misunderstanding for the part of the *Advaitins* to the *Nyaya* view.

The second problem is raised by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in the case of *asallingakaparāmarśa*^A (i.e. consideration where *liṅga* or sign is falsely apprehended). The *Advaitins* think that the cognition in the form of *parāmarśa* or consideration has been taken as an attribute (*guṇa*) of the inferential cognition (*anumiti*) which is a *gunī* and hence there must be an eternal relation. The *Advaitins* have shown an exception in the case of *parāmarśa* where there is actually no sign or probans, but *anumiti* is possible. That is, inspite of not having proper *parāmarśa* there is an inferential cognition, which may be taken as an impediment of the eternal relation between *guṇa* and *gunī*.

In reply it may be argued by the Naiyayikas that *parāmarśa* is not an attribute, but an operative process (*vyapāra*) in the *Nyaya* terminology. If there is a case where there is not proper *parāmarśa*-by virtue of not having the proper cognition of probans. It may happen that there is a false cognition of a *hetu* which gives rise to the proper cognition of *sādhya* in the subject. In this case though there is no *parāmarśa* yet the attainment of *sādhya* or inferential cognition is accidental or *yādr̥cchiki* as coined by the Carvakas. Generally a right cognition of *hetu* gives rise to a proper cognition of *sādhya*. But sometimes the attainment of right *sādhya* through a

wrong *hetu* may be accidental or *kākatālīya* which has no causal connection. The causal connection lies between *parāmarśa* and *anumiti*, but not the relation between *guṇa* and *gunī* as accepted by the Advaitins. Such type of accidental achievement of result from a false probans or non-existent probans is just like *manimantravat* (like gem and *mantra*). Sometimes we get a good result from wearing a gem or uttering a *mantra* but this may be taken as accidental or *kadācit* which is devoid of causalities.

So far as the Buddhist definition of valid cognition (*pramā = pramāṇa*) is concerned, it is not free from some problems. That which corresponds to reality (*avisamvādakam*) is called valid cognition (*pramā*). If this definition is taken for granted, it leads to several problems.

First, to the Buddhists there is no distinction between valid cognition (*pramā*) and its instrument (*pramāṇa*). This valid cognition cum instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*) is of two types – perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). Perception (*pratyakṣa*) captures an object which is of unique-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) i.e. having some unique character remaining for a single moment. *Svalakṣaṇa* is inexpressible as it is beyond conceptualisation. *Svalakṣaṇa* enjoys a non-linguistic ontology. If someone attempts to communicate the experience of *svalakṣaṇa* then it will involve mental construction (*kalpanā*). Such constructions (*kalpanā*) have to persist through more than one moment. In order to disclose the unique singular that *svalakṣaṇa* is. It flashes across the consciousness in a twinkle. That which exists is momentary in character (*yat sat tat kṣanikam*). An object remaining for more than one moment must be unreal (*asat*). An object known in terms of theoretic construction is a *post eventum* affair and it is not any

longer the singular apprehended earlier. Moments pass between apprehending a singular and its judgmental awareness through the use of concepts and relations. The Buddhists call it inference (*anumāna*). When it is said that something corresponding to reality is called valid cognition (*pramā*), it may be asked whether its correspondence to the fact is known within a moment or not. Whether an object corresponds to the fact or not needs at least a few moments to judge. After a few moments when we come to know that our previous knowledge corresponds to the fact, it is no more unique in character (*svalakṣaṇa*), but it becomes a universal character (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). Hence the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) in terms of unfailing correspondence (*avisamvādaka*)⁵ cannot cover unique real (*svalakṣaṇa*) or perception which is the real truth or absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). Moreover, an object is to be taken as existent (*sat*) if it has causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritva*). An object having unique-momentary-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) cannot be known as having causal efficacy with in moment and hence its unfailing correspondence to the reality (*avisamvādatva*) cannot be judged within a moment.

The concept of unique momentary real (*svalakṣaṇa*) is so explicated that it is free from theoretic construction or *kalpanā* and as such it is said to be self-revealing and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti holds the view of momentariness of the reals and at the same time asserts that the non-erroneous character of a unique singular be ascertained extrinsically (*parataḥ*). The datum of awareness is credible if it is causally efficacious in terms of attaining some aim. If this is accepted, the unique-momentary-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) of an entity cannot be protected. For example, the awareness of water would be veridical if it leads to quenching thirst. It is called unfailing correspondence which is not

applicable to perceptual unique particular object which has got primary status in Buddhist epistemology. Jayanta has vehemently criticized this Buddhist notion of valid-cognition- cum-instrument (*pramā = pramāṇa*) in his Nyaya-Mañjari. Jayanta raises a question to the Buddhists – (a) Does a source of cognition (*pramāṇa*) lead an individual to avail an object endowed with the unique singular ? or (b) Does it lead to the availability of an object bearing mental ascription ? The second one is not possible as inference is not a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) so that it can be directly apprehended. A direct awareness is not possible through conceptualisation which is an inference. So far as the first question is concerned, an object is revealed but cannot be attained due to its existence for a moment which is too inadequate to be grasped. They themselves admit that the object apprehended through concept is unreal and hence it is not possible to attain. If an individual gets something accidentally, it does not come under the purview of perceptual and inferential cognition. That is, the attainment of an object is not result of perception or inference. Hence, the unfailing correspondence to the reality is not possible at all. (“*yattrānumāne pradarśanameva nāsti, kā kathā tatprapanasya. Pratyakṣe tu bādham pradarśanamasti; na tu pradarśitam prāpyate; kṣanikatvenatikrāntatvat ... mūlābhūtavastupraptistu kākatālīyameva. Na tu tadanyatarenāpi pramāṇenāpi sprṣṭam yādgatva prapuate*”⁶).

The entity apprehended through pure sensation is real and uniquely singular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as told earlier. It is impossible to attain the momentary entity, but the series of the momentary entities can be grasped. Hence it is the determinate perception (*savikalpaka*) which is formed through the series of momentary entities leading to the successful inclination (*saphalapravṛtti*). Though the object

which is cognized through imagination (*kalpanā*) is based on the series of momentary real entities, an individual gets a real entity even though he is adopting inference. The grasp of real object by inference is accidental just as an individual having illusory cognition of something really gets an object. Though the inferential cognition or determinate cognition is unreal to the Buddhists, yet real is sometimes can be grasped, as the source of mental ascriptions is real. Hence an instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) leads to the attainment of an object having conceptual ascriptions. Hence, if there is any unfailing correspondence to the reality, it is possible in the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* level which is phenomenal reality (*samvrtisatya*) but not absolute reality (*paramārtha satya*). (“*Yatra pratyakṣa vastu svalakṣaṇavisayatvāt tasya ca kṣanikatvenaprāptyasambhave ’pi tat santānaprāptiḥ santānādhyāvasāyajananameva prāpakatvam. Anumānasya tvaropitārtha visayatve ’pi mūlābhūta vastukṣanaparampāryaprabhāvadvātmaniprabhāmaṇibuddhivat tatprāptya prāpakatvam*”⁷

So far as the Mīmāṃsā view is concerned, it is not tenable. To them the prior unacquired cognition (*ajñātataṭtvārthajñānam*) is called valid cognition. They think that the term ‘unacquired’ (*ajñāta*) has been used in order to exclude memory (*smṛti*) and repeated version (*anuvāda*)⁸. The exclusion of memory (*smṛti*) from the purview of valid cognition can be supported through. But the reasoning for exclusion of repeated version from the purview of valid cognition cannot be taken for granted. Though they admit that cognition (*jñāna*), the object (*viśaya*) and the condition for manifestation of the object (*prākāṣya*), it is very difficult to understand the distinction between object (*viśaya*) and the manifestation of an object (*prākāṣya*). To them the manifestation of

an object is different in different moments. It is very difficult to understand the difference between an object and its manifestation (*prākāṭya*). A question may be raised in this connection – whether an object is known without its manifestation or not. I think an object is known without its manifestation. It is not conceivable that an object is known but not manifested. If it is said that an object and its manifestation is not different, it is not tantamount to say that fire and its lumination are different, which is not correct. The fact that the fire exists is proved through its luminous character. Hence, object and its manifestation cannot be different. Moreover, the cognition is generally compared with a lamp by virtue of its function of revelation. As the Mimamsaka believe the cognition (*jñāna*) and its object, it proves that the cognition reveals the object. As cognition reveals an object, there is no necessity of accepting another factor called *prākāṭya* for its revelation. There is no point in accepting both cognition and manifestation for the revelation of an object.

Normally different manifestations (*prākāṭya*) and time moments (*kālāmsā*) limited by the corresponding manifestations are very subtle to understand though the Mimamsakas claim that it is not so. If an individual manifestation remains in a particular moment of time, the time-particle is very difficult to perceive due to its extreme subtleness. When we keep looking towards an object for a particular period of time, do we really feel that an object existing in a particular moment is different from that existing in another particular moment ? Normally it is not experienced. Though an object remains changing at every moment, there is a logical necessity of accepting it. But an object is not generally cognised as different in the persistent cognition. If an object existing in the first moment, there would arise the possibility of the absence of

recognitive cognition. An object cognized for five moments cannot be cognized as different apparently. If the repeated version of a cognition does not come under the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*), the recognitive cognition (*pratyābhijñā*) would not come under the purview of valid cognition. But they are called Valid cognition (*pramā*). Hence the repeated version excepting the case of memory must be taken as valid cognition.

The Jaina logicians are of the opinion that authentic cognition (*pramā*) is '*svaparavyavasāyījñānam*'. It means that the nature of authentic cognition (*pramā*) is to be self-revealing as well as object disclosing. Just as a lamp reveals its object as well as itself, a cognition reveals both itself and its content. To them, the relation between self and the cognition is explained as both different and non-different (*bhedābheda*), which is in consonance with their principle of *anekāntavāda*.

This cognition or *jñāna* is generally taken as any cognition of an object while the term '*pramā*' is used in a strict logical sense. To them the definite cognition about an object which is completely different from doubt, error etc. is *pramā*. In other words, the definiteness is an essential feature of the validity of cognition.⁹ The characteristic of being definite is not different from the view of the Naiyayikas who believe that the definite cognition can alone be *pramā*. But the term 'definiteness' is explained in a slight different way by the Jainas. To them definiteness lies in the determination of an object in the mode (*naya*) in which it really exists.

Other Jaina logicians like Divakara, Siddhasena etc. define *pramā* as having capacity to reveal itself and its content as said earlier which remains uncontradicted (*pramāṇam svaparabhāsi*

*jñānam bādhavivarjitam / svaparabhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhūvi buddhilakṣaṇam).*¹⁰

Akalanka, a Jaina thinker, defines means of authentic cognition (*pramāṇa*) as cognition which is uncontradicted and which manifests the unknown object (“*Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam anadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvat*”)¹¹. But *naya* is the cognition of a thing in a particular context or it is the relationship of a thing with the cognizer. *Naya* is a particular standpoint from which we can make our judgment about a particular thing (*nīyate gamyate arthaikadeśo’neneti nayaḥ*). As human beings are not omniscient by virtue of the fact that they possess limited authentic cognition and capacity, they cannot cognize all the properties of an object at a time or in different times. They can cognize something which is limited and relative. The Jainas have taken recourse to the principle of *naya* to cognize this relative nature which is true of an object. This is the nature of authentic cognition (*pramā*). When a particular property of an object is definitely cognized, it is through particular mode (*naya*). When the various properties of an object are cognized or diverse properties are authentically cognized at a time, it is through *pramāṇa*. Hence, both *naya* and *pramāṇa* are essential for having a true nature of an object. That is *pramā* of an object presupposes both. But it should always be kept in mind that in Jaina logic absolute affirmation and absolute negation is not possible due to their belief in *Syadvāda* which suggests that everything is of ‘may be’ in character. All judgments are partial ascription to reality which cannot be grasped ‘wholly’.

The above mentioned thesis of the Jainas is not beyond question. First, the definition of definiteness is very vague. It is said as definite if an object is determined in the mode in which it exists

really. If it is accepted, the determination of an object in a particular mode in which it really exists becomes very difficult in sometimes, though not always. When a jar is determined in a particular mode i.e. having real colour in which it really is, it is said to be definite or right. But it is quite natural that when a jar is authentically cognized as having colour, it is cognized as having shape, having power containing water etc. which the jar really possess. According to the Jainas, these two aspects of a jar (having shape and power containing water) would not come under the purview of our cognition, which is not acceptable. As soon as one aspect of an entity is cognized, others are also cognized simultaneously without any effect, which cannot be denied. I do not know how would they explain such cognition ?

Secondly, *Pramāṇa* and *pramā* is not clearly distinguished when it is said – ‘*pramāṇam svaparabhāsijñānam bādhavivarjitam*’ etc. in this context *pramāṇa* is described as a cognition revealing self as well as its context. If cognition which is uncontradicted become a *pramāṇa*, what is the distinction between *pramā* and *pramāṇa* ? Perhaps like Buddhists they do make a clear distinction between *pramā* and *pramākarāṇa*. To the Buddhists it is natural because they believe in the theories of momentariness (*kṣanabhaṅgavāda*), unique momentary existence of real entity (*svalakṣaṇa*) etc. according to which both may remain in the same point of time. But to the Jainas there is no sufficient argument in favour of such non-distinction, which is again substantiated from the following definition – ‘*pramāṇam avisamvādiññānam*’ etc.

Keeping this problem in view Hemchandra has made some patch works on this non-distinction and tried to say that the authentic cognition (*samyak jñāna*) is acquired through the

instrumental cognition (*samyagarthanirṇayam pramāṇam*)¹². From this it is not clear what is the nature of instrument of authentic cognition (*pramākarāṇa*) is.

Lastly, it is said by the Jaina logicians that when a property of an object is cognized it is through *naya*. When various aspects of an entity is cognized, they are cognized through *pramāṇa*. To cognize an object generally and specifically both *naya* and *pramāṇa* are required and hence *pramā* needs both. If this view is accepted, one could raise the questions – (a) If *naya* functions as revealer of some entity, why is it not a *pramāṇa* ? If *naya* reveals something, it serves the function of a *pramāṇa*. Why is it distinguished from a *pramāṇa* ? If it is not *pramāṇa*, what is the status of it ? Does it have instrumental value like mind, sense-organ etc ? All these questions remain unresolved if the Jaina view is accepted. (b) If *naya* is an essential factor for revelation of an object and it is not a *pramāṇa*, how can it provide us a relative cognition of an object ? The route of relative cognition and absolute cognition may be the same. One can at least say that perception is the route of absolute cognition. But if *naya* can provide us a cognition, it must be taken as a separate *pramāṇa* or *pramā-yielding* means, which is not accepted in their logic. If there is any conflict in the data of the given object, which one is to be taken as supreme ? Many properties of an object may be cognized through *pramāṇa* no doubt. If some one says that the four properties are cognized one by one through the help of *naya*, would be taken as *pramā*. As these are acquired through *naya*, it must be *pramā*. If some other person cognize the same through *pramāṇa*, which one will be superior? All these problems may arise on the path of our understanding if such Jaina views are accepted.

If all units of cognition are taken as relative, there would arise the problem of human behaviour. When we have the cognition of a jar, all aspects of jar do not come to our awareness. A few aspects cognized rightly can provide us the cognition of the object. On that basis we have inclination (*pravṛtti*), refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and indifference (*upekṣā*) towards this. If everything is taken as relative, the determining cognition would never come to our mind leading to its non-recognition. Due to this non-recognition *pravṛtti* etc are not possible. Hence, the Jaina theory cannot explain our daily behaviour.

That is why, Vatsayana has forwarded a syllogistic argument in the following manner – ‘*pramāṇam arthavat pravṛttisamarthyat*’ i.e. *pramāṇa* becomes meaningful or efficacious, as it leads us to the successful inclination. The capacity of leading to successful inclination (*pravṛttisāmarthyat*) is the probans (*hetu*) through which the meaningfulness or reality or efficaciousness (*arthavattā*) is inferred. This efficaciousness (*arthavattā*) remains in *pramāṇa* which is *pakṣa* here. The form of invariable concomitance (*vyapti*) would be framed as follows : ‘*yatra yatra pravṛttisāmarthyam tatra tatra arthavattā*’ i.e. wherever there is the capability of leading to successful inclination there is the efficaciousness or reality of *pramāṇa*. It is possible as alone *pramāṇa* has got the power of apprehending an object. (‘*Pramāṇato ’rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyat arthavat pramāṇam*’)¹³

It may be argued that how is the right cognition of *pramāṇa* is possible ? It is the contention of Vatsayana that the right cognition of the sixteen categories in which *pramāṇa* is the first leads us to the attainment of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*)¹⁴. If the right

cognition of the first category i.e. *pramāṇa* is not possible, how it (*pramāṇa*) can illumine other categories.

Considering the importance of *pramāṇa* Vatsayana has explained its various function in his *Bhāṣya* at the very outset. Without the proper cognition of *pramāṇa* the object cannot be properly grasped. If it is not grasped properly, no one can have successful inclination towards the object. The cognizer, after cognizing an object with the help of *pramāṇa* (means of knowing), wants to avail or forsake the object. The effort in the form of availing or forsaking is called volition. Whether our volition is successful or not depends on the result of the inclination. The object is in the form of happiness or the cause of happiness. It may also be in the form of misery or the cause of misery. These objects of *pramāṇa* are infinite in number as the persons adopting these are infinite in number. (*"Pramāṇamantarena nārthapratipattiḥ nārthapratipattimantarena pravṛttisāmarthyam. Pramāṇam khalvam jñātārthamūpalabhya tamārthamabhipsati jihāsati vā. Tasyepsajihāsā-prayuktasyasamīha pravṛttirityheyate. Sāmarthyam pūnarasyaḥ phalenabhisambandhaḥ. Samīhamanastamarthamabhipsān jihāsan vā tamārthamāpnoti jahati vā. Arthastu sukham sukhaheṭuśca, dukkham dukkhaheṭuśca. So'yam pramāṇartho 'parisamkheyah pranabhṛdbhedasyaparisamkheyatvāt"*)¹⁵

According to the nihilists sceptics, the right cognition (*tattvajñāna*) of the category called *pramāṇa* is not at all possible and hence there is no possibility of having right cognition of other objects. To Goutama the real means of the right cognition is called *pramāṇa*. When we have an awareness, it is very difficult to detect the rightness of the awareness. That is why, the determination of the rightness of *pramāṇa* which is called *prāmāṇya* is beyond our

capacity. For this reason Goutama's Nyaya Philosophy would turn into a *Sastra* which is full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. In order to avoid such problems and to refute such views of the nihilists and sceptics, Vatsayana at the very outset begins with the determination of the validity or rightness of *pramāṇa* with the texts – *pramāṇato'rthapratipattaū* etc.

The phrase '*pramāṇam arthavat*' means *pramāṇa* is nondeviated to the object (*arthavyabhicārī*). In other words, the nature and essential characteristics of an object as revealed by *pramāṇa* coincide with its real nature which is technically called *arthavyabhicārī*. The function of *pramāṇa* is to reveal the real nature of an object. From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of *pramāṇa* is proved. The suffix *matup* added to *artha* (*arthavat*) denotes 'an eternal connection' (*nityayoga*) which indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (*avyabhicāritā*). It is called *Sādhyā* of the inference which is inferred on the strength of the argument or *hetu* – '*pravṛttisāmarthyā*' i.e capacity of leading to successful inclination.

If an individual attains right cognition of an object through *pramāṇa*, he will be able to incline or reject something if he is desirous of doing so. If otherwise, it will not be taken as *pramāṇa*, but as *pseudo-pramāṇa*. The illusory cognition must be taken as a pseudo- *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāsa*), as it cannot lead someone to the successful activity. If someone attains the cognition of snake in place of rope, his inclination or rejection does not become successful. As in the pseudo cognition of snake there is no snake at all, the inclination etc becomes meaningless. That is why, the fact of being non-deviatedness to the object (*arthavyabhicāritva*) is the uncommon property of *pramāṇa* which is called *prāmāṇya*. It is also

endorsed by Jayanta Bhatta who says – ‘*tasya svaprameyavyabhicāritvaṃ nāma prāmāṇyaṃ*’.

Though Vatsayana has tried to refute the nihilists and sceptics in this way and to establish the *prāmāṇya* of *pramāṇa* through some inferential procedure as shown above, one may ask another question as to how can the *pramāṇya* of the above mentioned inference be determined ? If *pramāṇya* of the above inference is dependent on another inference, how can the *pramāṇya* be determined of the second one ? If there is the doubt of the *pramāṇya*, there cannot be the ascertainment of the same.

In response to this the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that there does not always arise the doubt of *prāmāṇya* in each and every case of inference or inferential cognition. Innumerable works have been done depending on time which is inferred from the watch. Many theories have been discovered depending on the mathematical calculations. But there does not always arise the doubt of *prāmāṇya*. Daily business is continued on the basis of the weight taken through the scales, which is not always doubted. Moreover, if there is doubt, the cause of it must be shown. If someone adduces some arguments in favour of some doubt, he has to take recourse to inference whose validity must be admitted. If there is no argument in favour of doubt, it would be taken as unreal. As there is innumerable pieces of inference through which our life is moving forward, there is no question of such doubt. Otherwise, there would not have been inclination towards some activities or objects. Even the sceptics are inclined to some actions out of having some sort of certainty on these. If the phenomenon of successful inclination becomes deviated from object, it would remain in the pseudo-*pramāṇa* also. If the unfailing inclination remains in something

which is deviated from an object, it may remain in the *pramāṇābhāsa* also, which is not at all possible.

Those who are the believers of absolute nihilism think that there is no real object like *pramāṇa*, because to them the usages of *pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc. are imaginary. Hence, to them, all cognitions are false cognitions. From this it follows that all *pramāṇas* are nothing but *pramāṇābhāsa*. If it is taken for granted, the nihilists would not be in position to explain an individual's inclination towards something. If it is taken that water if cognized as such is illusory, why does an individual incline to have water? From the syllogistic argument in the form : 'this piece of cognition is valid, as it leads to a successful inclination' (*idaṁ jñānaṁ yathārtham saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt*), it is proved that the cognition of water is valid.

Vacaspati Misra is of the opinion that that terms '*pramānam arthavat*' would mean that *pramāṇa* is necessary factor in the phenomenon of valid cognition (*pramā*). That is why, it is maintained by Goutama at the very beginning. If *pramāṇa* becomes non-deviated from the object (*arthavyabhicārī*), cognizer (*pramātā*), cognizable entity (*prameya*), cognition (*pramiti*) become meaningful or non-deviated to the object (*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityārthārthavanti bhavanti*).¹⁶ If *pramāṇa* cannot reveal an object, the *pramātā* etc would become meaningless (*anyatama-paye'rthasya anupapatteḥ*). An individual who inclines to accept or reject is called a cognizer (*pramātā*). The means of proving an object is *pramāṇa* (*Tatra yasyepsajihāsāprayuktasya pravṛttih sa pramātā. Sa yenārtham praminoti tat pramāṇam*). The object which is being proved is called *prameya* (*yo'rthah pramiyate tat prameyam*). The valid cognition regarding some object is called

pramiti (*yadāṛthavijñānam sa pramitih*). All types of human behaviour are centered around these four (*catasṛsu caivambidhasu arthatattvam parisamāpyate*).¹⁷

Reality (*tattva*) is cognized through *Pramāṇa* and something is accepted if it is conducive to happiness. If the object is not accepted due to having some obstacles, there is at least an acceptability of the same. If an object seems to be the cause of misery, it is rejected or there is the possibility of rejection. The object which is not acceptable or rejectable comes under indifference (*upekṣā*). *Pramāṇābhāsa* cannot provide the cognition of reality (*tattva*), but *pramāṇa* can easily provide.

What is called reality ? Reality is the positivity of the positive and negativity of the negative. (*Kim panastttvaṁ ? Sataśca sadbhāvah astaścāsadbhāva*).¹⁸ When an object is cognized as *sat* it is to be taken as 'as it really is', i.e. to cognize something in its true form. (*Sat saditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtama-viparītaṁ tattvam bhavati. Asaccasaditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtamavīparītaṁ tattvaṁ bhavati*).¹⁹

Though reality is explained as having two qualities – positive and negative. How is a negative fact cognized ? In reply it is said that just as a positive object is revealed through lamp, the negative object is not revealed. The negativity of something is cognized through the non-apprehension of an object. An object is cognized to be absent from the non-apprehension of it. Had it been there, it would have been seen (*“satyupalabhyamāne tadanupalabdheh pradīpavat. Yathā darśakena dīpena drśye gṛhyamāne tadiva yanna gṛhyate tannāsti, yadyabhaviṣyādidamiva vyañjasyatā vijñānabhavannāstīti”*).²⁰

Udayana defines *pramā* as proper discernment (*sammyak paricchitti*). According to him, it is the condition of the real nature of a thing, and it is independent of any previous perception. From this it follows that memory-cognition does not come under the purview of valid cognition (*pramā*). As memory is not an independent cognition, the object of it is the same as that of the original perception which generated it. In order to exclude memory (*smṛti*) from valid cognition (*pramā*) Udayana uses the term – ‘*anapekṣā*’ (independent) in this definition which runs as follows : “*Yathārthānubhavo māṇam anapekṣatayesyate*”.²¹

It is well known that the Naiyayikas have accepted the extrinsic validity of truth. (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*) i.e. the truth of our awareness also depends on the successful inclination (*saphalapravṛtti*) of the cognition. In terms of successful inclination the truth of a cognition is always determined i.e. a cognition is to be taken as true if it leads us to get something which is in our mind. This validity is inferred in the following way: ‘*pratyakṣānubhutiḥ pramā saphala pravṛttijanakatvāt*’ i.e. the perceptual cognition would be true if it leads us to the successful inclination. The cognition of water can be taken as true if it really quenches our thirst. In the like manner the falsity of a cognition is determined on the unsuccessful inclination (*visamvāḍipravṛtti*). If the cognition of water does not quench our thirst, it is to be taken as false.

Now the problem may be raised how the truth of *nirvikalpaka* cognition can be determined. It is admitted that the indeterminate cognition is a kind of cognition having no name, universal etc. and hence there is no relation between qualificand and qualifier. The means applied to determine the cognition in the form of determinate

(*savikalpaka*) cannot be applied to the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) one. Because the criteria like successful inclination (*saphalapravṛttijanakatva*) etc. are relevant to the determinate cognition. But the cognition having no characteristic features of an object is in void and it has got no causal efficacy through which validity (*prāmāṇya*) can be determined.

The question may be raised how an object can exist without having its characters. By virtue of being a cognition the indeterminate cognition must have some object or content of its own as cognition without content (*aviṣayaka*) is an inconceivable idea. To the Naiyayikas the content of cognition is of three fold: *Prakāratā*, *Viṣayatā* and *Saṃsargatā*. In the case of indeterminate cognition there remains a special type of objectivity (*visayata*) called the fourth type of objectivity (*Tūriya Viṣayatā*)²² which is inexplicable in nature. In spite of this the problem of extrinsic validity will remain the same as before. In other words, the validity of indeterminate cognition will remain undetermined. Keeping all these complication in view Viśvanātha does not accept the perceptibility of indeterminate cognition. The cognition in the form of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) which has no relation between qualificand and qualifier can not be grasped through sense organ (*jñānam yannirvikalpakyam tadatindrīyamisyate*).²³ It implies that the indeterminate cognition is beyond sense perception.

If a cognition is beyond the reach of sense-organ, how can it be cognized? Is there any cognition in the ordinary word (*laukika*) which is not connected with sense-organ? Even the super normal cognitions are somehow related to external sense-organ and inner sense-organ (*mānas*). However, a cognition without the operation of

sense-organ is impossible for a cognizer. If indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition is a cognition, it must be related to some instruments like sense-organ etc. If such cognition is *atन्द्रिया* as per the view of Visvanatha, it cannot be cognition at least in the phenomenal level. There is a possibility of such cognition, however, in the transcendental level about which the Naiyayikas are not concerned so far as the theory of perception in the ordinary stage (*laukika*) is concerned.

It should be borne in mind that right presentative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*) is classified into four – perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) cognition, inferential cognition (*anumiti*), cognition through comparison (*upamiti*) and verbal cognition (*śabda*). The uncommon instrumental factors of such cognitions are perception, inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Among these the eldest one is *Pratyakṣa* or perception which is again subdivided into two – determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). As indeterminate perception is a form of perception, it must be the object of definition (*lakṣya*) of the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) which runs as follows : “*indriyārtha-sannikaṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam*”. If it is so, *nirvikalpaka* must be generated through the sense-object-contact. Otherwise it can not be a subdivision of *Pratyakṣa*. If a cognition is described as *Pratyakṣa* and if the definition given for *Pratyakṣa* can not be applied to it, then it is not at all a perceptual cognition. If it is not a subdivision of perception, a cognition must be true or false. If such indeterminate becomes true, it must be either of the four sources of cognizing. The *Naiyayikas* have incorporated it under *Pratyakṣa* but definition of *Pratyakṣa* can not be applied and the method of extrinsic validity of truth can not be applied to it.

The description of *nirvikalpaka* cognition as neither true nor false leads to another sort of paradox which is not expected from the realistic thinkers like Nyaya for the following reasons. In the Nyaya System of logic two value-system is always accepted and hence there is no scope for inducing multi-valued logic. Hence a cognition must be either true or false and like Jaina there is no scope of being indescribable (*avyaktavya*). In the Adaita Vedanta Logic there is the scope of multi-valued logic as a cognition may be true or false or different from these called *anirvacanīya* or indescribable. When they accept illusion, they think that the cognition is neither existent nor non-existent, but indescribable (*sadasda-vilakṣanaḥ anirvacanīya*). If some-thing is both existent and non-existent, it is called indescribable which is the third value accepted in Vedanta. In Nyaya a cognition must either be true or false, but not indescribable. Hence, *nirvikalpaka* cognition by virtue of being a cognition must be true or false, but there does not arise any question of being indescribable, the third alternative. Hence it is very difficult to assess the validity of such indeterminate cognition which has got some logical justification for its acceptance but it is beyond the range of determining its validity. We do not know the status of a cognition which is beyond the determination of its validity. Hence the Nyaya position can never be justified so far as the *prāmāṇya* is concerned.

Excepting the case of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the Naiyayakas, in our opinion, are consistent in their views. As there are a few defects in all most all of the definitions of *pramā* given by the opponents the Nyaya concept of *pramā* which is very much logical and well guarded has to be accepted as a perfect one.

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2. “*doṣa’pramāyā janakaḥ pramāyāstu guṇo bhavet. Pittadūrattādirūpo doṣo nānābidho matah.*” – *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, verse no.131, Viśvanāth.
3. “Just as our eyesight enables us to include the individual fact of ourselves in surrounding view, our imagination makes us intensely conscious of life we must live which transcends the individual life and contradicts the biological meaning of the instinct of self-preservation. It works at the surplus, and extending beyond the reservation plots of our daily life, builds there the guest chambers of priceless value to offer hospitality to the world spirit of Man.” – “Religion of Man” in the article subtitled “The Surplus in Man,” p.55, Rabindranath Tagore, Unwin, London, 1975.
4. “*Ataeva na sallīṅgaparamarśādīkamapi anumityādīpramāyām guṇaḥ, asallīṅgaparāmarśādīsthalehapi visayavādhena anumityādeḥ pramātvāt*” – *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, ibid.
5. “*Avisaṁvādi vijñānaṁ pramāṇam. avisaṁvāditvaṁ ca arthakriyākāritvaṁ iti Bouddhah*” – *Manameyodāya, Pramāṇa-paricchedaḥ*, verse no.12, Narayana Bhatta, edited by Sri Dinanath Tripathi Navatirtha, First Part, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No.CXXXVIII, Published under the auspices of the Govt. of west Bengal, Texts No. 43.
6. “*yatrāmūṇe pradarśanameva nāsti, kā kathā tatprapanasya. Pratyakṣe tu bādham pradarśanamasti; na tu pradarśitam prāpyate; kṣanikatvenatikrāntatvāt ... mūlābhūtavastuprāptistu kākatālyameva. Na tu tadanyatarenapi pramanenāpi sprṣtam yadgatva prāpyate*” – *Nyayamañjarī*, The oriental Research Institute, University of Mysore, p.62, 1969.
7. “*Yatra pratyakṣe vastu svalakṣaṇavisayatvāt tasya ca kṣanikatvenaprāptyasambhave’pi tat santānaprāptiḥ santānādhyavasāyananameva prāpakatvam. Anumānasyatvāropitārtha visayatve’pi mūlābhūta vastukṣaṇaparamaryaprabhavatvatmaniprabhamanibuddhivat tatprāptya prāpakatvaṁ*” – *Nyayamañjarī*, p.63, Ibid.

8. “*Ajñātapadenātra jñātaviṣayoḥ smṛtyāmvādāyornirāsaḥ*” – *Mānameyodaya, Pramāṇaparicchedaḥ*, Verse no.4,p.6, Ibid
9. “... the definiteness is an essential feature of the validity of cognition” – *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* – introduction and *Pramāṇanayatattvaloka*,1.2. Bombay 1967.
10. “*Pramāṇam svarabhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjītam/ svaparabhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhūvi buddhilakṣaṇam*” – *Bṛhatsvayambhustrotam* – no.63.
11. “*pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam anadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt*” – *Aṣṭasahasri* –p.175.
12. “*Samyagarthanirṇayam pramāṇam*” – *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* – verse no. 2
13. “*Pramāṇato rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam*” – *Nyāya-bhāṣya* – quoted from *Nyāya-darśana*, p.1, ed. By Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa.
14. “*Pramāṇa-prameya-saṁśaya-prayojana- dṛṣṭānta-siddhānta- tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitandā-hetvābhāsacchala-jāti-nigrahasṭhānam tattvajñānaniḥśreyasadhigamaḥ*” – *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1/1/1.
15. “*Pramāṇamantarena nārthapratipattiḥ nārthapratipattimānterana pravṛttisāmarthyam. Pramāṇam khalvam jñātārthamupalabhya tamārthamabhipṣati jñāsatī vā. Tasyepsajñāsa-prayuktasyasamīha pravṛttirṭhyate. Sāmarthyam pūnarasyaḥ phalenabhisambandhaḥ. Samīhamanastamārthamabhipṣan jñāsan vā tamārthamprōti jahati vā. Arthastu sūkham sukhahetuśca, dukham dukhahetuśca. So'yam pramāṇarṭho 'parisamkheyah pranabhrdbhedasyaparisaṁkheyatvāt*” – *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* (introduction).
16. “*arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā-prameyam pramitirityārthavanti bhavanti*”- *Nyāya-Bhāṣya, Nyāya-darśana*, ed. By Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa, p.11.

17. “*Catasrsu caivambidhasu arthatattvaṃ parisamāpyate*” – *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, Ibid, p.12.
18. “*Kim punastattvaṃ? Sataśca sadbhāvaḥ asadaścāsadbhāva*” –*Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, Ibid.p.14.
19. “*Sat saditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtaṃ-viparītaṃ tattvaṃ bhavati. Asaccasaditi gṛhyamāṇam yathābhūtamaviparītaṃ tattvam bhavati*” – *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, Ibid.p.14.
20. “*Satyūpalabhyamāṇe tadanupalabdheḥ pradīpavat. Yathādarśakena dīpena dr̥ṣṭe gṛhyamāṇe tadiva yanna gṛhyate tannāsti, yadyabhaviṣyādidadamiva vyañjasyata vijñānabhavannāstīti*” – *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*,Ibid. p.15.
21. “*yathārthanubhavo māṇam anapeksatayesyate*” – *Nyāyakusumañjalī*, IV/1.
22. “*Nanu trividha ceha jñānavisayataprakaratā viśesyatāsam̐sargatābhedāt. Tatra jñānamatrasya saviśayakatvena nirvikalpake pi kacid visayatāpeksiteticet. Tūrīyaviśayatayā eva tatrabhupagamāt*” – *Mūktavali-saṁgrahaḥ on siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Edited by Pandit Pañcānan Bhattāchārya, p.280.
23. “*Jñānaṃ yannirvikalpakyam tadatindrīyamisyate*” – *Bhāṣā-paricchedaḥ*, Verse no. 57.

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