

CHAPTER-IV

THE THEORY OF ANUPALABDHI IN BHĀṬṬA SCHOOL OF
PŪRVAMĪMĀMSA.

The Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā accepts anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowing a negative fact. Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa, after following Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, has proved that anupalabdhi is a special source of knowledge (pramāṇa). He says in his Mānameyodaya that if there is the non-cognition of an absent object which is capable of being known, it is possible through the method called anupalabdhi. Here the pramāṇa called abhāva or anupalabdhi is the indicator to the knowledge of an absent entity. In spite of the fact that on the ground there is the capability of knowing the entities like a jar, they are not known. And from this non-cognition we get the knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. This phenomenon is known through abhāva which is accepted by the Bhāṭṭas as a separate pramāṇa. The knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. is the pramā attained through the application of pramāṇa called abhāva. It has been stated in the Bhāṣya of Śābara that the absent entity which is under the object of the knowledge of absence is not capable of being known through the five pramāṇas like perception etc.

(abhāvo'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstitysyārthasyāsanīkr̥ṣṭasya iti). In other words, the absence is generally expressed with the term 'nāsti'. The object of absence does not come into the contact of sense-organ etc. and it is not known through other pramāṇas. Hence it is known through different pramāṇa called anupalabdhi.¹

Now the problem arises : What is the criterion of anupalabdhi? In reply, it can be said that the criterion of anupalabdhi is the collection of causes of cognising an absentee excepting the absentee and contact with absentee.² when we have the knowledge of the absence of a jar, for example, on the ground, there the pratīyogī, i.e., the object in the form of a jar does not exist and there is the absence of the contact of eye with the jar but there are other causes like the opening of eye, the contact of mind with eye, sufficient light that are

1. "Athopalambhayogyatve satyapynupalambhanam/ Abhāvākhyam pramāṇam syādabhāvasyāvavodhakam// Atra hyanupalambhah karanam/ Tasya ca jñānā - bhāvarūpatvādabhāvah pramāṇamityucyate/"

- Mānameyodaya (Chapter - abhāvapramāṇam) by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, 1933.

2. "Viśayam tadadhīnāmśca sannikarsādīkān vinā/ Upalambhasya sāmagrīsampattih khalu yogyatā//"

- Ibid.

essential for cognising a jar. The assemblage of these causes (sāmagrī) is the criterion for the non-cognition of a jar. The absence of a jar becomes the object of valid knowledge (pramā) as it is a kind of yogyānupalabdhi.³ For having the knowledge of a negative fact it is to be known at the outset that there is the collection of causes for giving rise to the cognition of a jar. If it is not known, the knowledge of the absence of a jar would never be known. It will occur in an individual's mind that he is not cognising a jar on the ground and he has no contact of eye with a jar. In spite of that he will look for whether other causes for knowing a jar exist or not. If someone is not confirmed about the fact that the causes for knowing a jar exist or not, he will be in confusion about the existence of a jar on the ground. He will wonder whether a jar exists in that place or not. If someone bears such a doubt, he will not be able to know definitely the absence of a jar. Non-apprehension, if confirmed, can become the object of knowledge of an

3. "Tataśca viṣayabhūtam ghaṭam tadadhīnāmscendriyasannikar-
sādīn vinā yaccakṣurunmīlanālokaśampātamanah pranidhānādikaṃ
ghaṭopalambhakāraṇam tat sarvamidānīmeva sañjātamityavagame
sati tatsahakṛtaḥ saṅ ghaṭānupalambho ghaṭābhāvam vodhayati-
tyevam sarvatra draṣṭavyam/"

absence. In other words, if the capability of knowing the object of absence exists, it becomes the valid knowledge of absence.

The knowledge of non-cognition is not the instrument of the valid knowledge of absence. If it is so, the knowledge of non-cognition implies the knowledge of the absence of cognition. The knowledge of absence of cognition, being an object of valid knowledge of absence, depends on the absence of cognition as its instrument. This knowledge of anupalabdhi is again an object of valid knowledge of an absence and hence it will depend on another knowledge of anupalabdhi as its instrument which leads to the defect of infinite regress (Anavasthā).⁴ On account of this if anupalabdhi exists, it will be an instrument. Absence of cognition of a jar can give rise to the knowledge of absence of a jar if it is associated with the knowledge of capability. In order to know the absence of a subtle object we have to know the capability of the non-cognition of that subtle object. And again to know the capability of a subtle object. We have to put the eye-rays which can reveal the subtle object and for this effort is highly needed. For understanding the capability of anupalabdhi of a subtle object we have to contact our eyes with the subtle object with outmost care. Otherwise, the knowledge of absence of subtle object is not possible. Moreover if someone bears the doubt as to the capability

4. Mānameyodaya, Vol. I, Edited by Sri Dīnanāthā Tripāthī,
Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1989, pp. 212-213.

of anupalabdhi, he will have to doubt absence. In the same way, the absence becomes erroneous if the capability becomes so.⁵ The matter can be explained with the help of the following example.

A man might have lost his ring in the dark room. He tries to find out the ring with the help of his hand on the floor of the dark room, but in vein. At this stage he might have doubt whether he has touched the whole portion of the floor or not. As he bears such a doubt which can be described as doubt of yogyatva, he will also have doubt regarding the absence of the ring in the floor of the dark room. Another individual does not touch the whole floor on the dark room, but thinks that he has touched the whole floor. Being prompted by the erroneous knowledge of yogyatva he bears the illusory knowledge that there is no ring on the floor. But in fact the ring remains on the floor of the room. To think that there is no ring is the illusory know-

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5. "Yogyatvāvagamārthaṁ hi sūkṣmārthābhāvavedane/
Sūkṣmavodhakanetrāṁśūsampātārthaṁ prayatyate//
Yogyatvasya ca sandehe viparyāse'thavā sati/
Abhāve'pi hi sandeho bhramo vāstyeva tadyathā//"

- Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (Chapter -
abhāvapramānaṁ), Trivandrum Sanskrit series,
1912.

ledge of absence which is originated from the erroneous knowledge of yoqyatva. Hence, the ascertainment of yoqyatva becomes promoter to the valid knowledge of absence.⁶

Anupalabdhi is of two types : Absence of pramāna and absence of Smṛti.⁷ The absence of pramāna is equivalent to the absence of valid knowledge (pramā). Among the five types of valid knowledge like perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, testimonial knowledge, analogical knowledge and presumptuous knowledge the valid knowledge in the form of absence is anupalabdhi. That is, the absence of cognition of any of these valid cognitions comes through anupalabdhi. Due to the non-cognition of the perceptual knowledge of a jar we have the knowledge of the absence of a jar. In the same way, in the event of the knowledge of absence of an object known through inference, the absence of that object through inference is known through anupalabdhi.⁸ As for

6. "Tamasi bhraṣṭamanviṣyan karābhyāmangulīyakam/
Sarvorvīsparśasandehādabhāve'pyeti saṁśyam//
Tathaiva sarvato'sparśe matvā sarvābhimarśanam/
Sata evāngulīyasyāpyabhāvaṁ vudhyate bhramāt//"

- Ibid.

7. "Anupalambhastu dvividhaḥ, pramāṇābhāvarūpaḥ smaraṇābhāvarū-
paśca/".

- Ibid.

8. "Tatra pratyakṣapramāṇābhāvarūpādanupalambhād ghaṭādyabhā-

example, the inferential knowledge where gestures in the forms of inclination etc. serve as hetu becomes the pointer to the perception of the nature of an object. It is found in the phenomenal world that the animals after seeing the colour of the desired object inclines towards it. If they think it undesired, they refrain from accepting that object. In this way, they will have actions in the form of inclination to or refraining from. Each and every person can realise this phenomenon of action. If a person is seen to move forward for accepting an object or to refrain from that object, it is assumed - "This particular animal is endowed with the right knowledge of that object as he is endowed with this effort." In this way, 'having effort' serves as a hetu for inferring the knowledge of colour or nature of that object. If someone has got the knowledge of colour or nature, he will have an effort to get it. The inclination towards an object presupposes the knowledge of that object or particulars like colour etc. of that object. Again, inclination of an individual is known through his bodily gestures and movements. It is found in the daytime that owl sits silently and it will have no effort in his body even the enemies like crow etc. come towards it. From the absence of its bodily movement or effort it is known that the owl does not have

vajñānamuktam/ Evamanumānagamyārthānāmabhāvagrahane
yogyānumānānudayo voḍhako draṣṭavyah/"

- Ibid.

perceptual knowledge of the nature of an object.⁹ In the same way, due to the non-cognition in the form of absence of analogical knowledge, testimonial knowledge, presumptuous knowledge, the knowledge of the absence of these is to be understood.

Another type of knowledge of absence arises from the non-cognition in the form of the absence of recollection. As for example, in the evening time an individual has become aware of the fact that Maitra was absent in the morning. In this case, the knowledge of the absence of Maitra in the morning arises from the absence of recollecting Maitra in the evening. Maitra existing in the morning cannot be the object of perceptual awareness in the evening. But in the evening Maitra was capable of being recollected. In spite of this a particular individual does not have recollective knowledge of Maitra. The absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening time indicates or informs the absence of him in the morning.¹⁰

9. "Yathā rūpadarśanavodhakasya cestālingakānumānasyānutpattirulūkasya divā rūpadarśanābhāvaṃ bodhayati ityuktaṃ manorathamiśraih/"

- Ibid.

10. "Evamanyapramāṇeṣvapi iti/ Smaraṇābhāvād yathā - prātarīha Maitro nāsīditi sāyamkāle jñānam/ Tatra hi prātaḥkālavīsīstamaitrasya sāyamkāle darśanayogyatvābhāvāt smaraṇa-

The Naiyāyikas think that the abhāva of some objects is capable of being perceived and abhāva of some is capable of being inferred. They do not accept abhāva or anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna.¹¹ Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his Mānameyodaya has refuted this view in the following way. When there is the knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning is known in the evening then the absence of it existing in the morning cannot be perceived in the evening. For, the knowledge of absence existing in the morning is not caused through sense-organ in the evening. The knowledge of the present object only is always caused by sense-organ. The knowledge of absence existing in the morning when occurred in the evening relates to the object of the past. Hence, it cannot be caused by sense-organ. In order to justify such knowledge the Naiyāyikas, the Bhaṭṭas think, have to accept anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna.¹²

yogyatve sati asmaranameva tadānīm prātaḥkālavisiṣṭamaitrā-
bhāvasya vodhakamāsriyate iti /"

- Ibid.

11. "Tārkikāstu abhāvasya pratyakṣādi-gamyatvamācaksānā
anupalambhagamyatām na saṁmanyante/"

- Ibid.

12. "Tadayuktaṁ te'pi hi sāyamkāle prātaḥkālinābhāvajñānasya
indriyajanyatvābhāvādukta-prakāreṇānupalambhajatvameva

It may be argued by the Naiyāyikas that the knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning occurred in the evening is inferential. The absence existing in the morning is inferred with the help of hetu in the form of the absence of recollection in the evening. The form of inference is as follows : "Now this place is endowed with the absence of Maitra existing in the morning as there is the absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening".¹³

In response to this the Bhāṭṭas say that this view is not tenable. In the case of inferential knowledge the knowledge of hetu or probans is highly essential. If it is said that the absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening is hetu or probans, the knowledge of the absence of recollection is to be known. But according to the Bhāṭṭas, such knowledge of absence of recollection is not at all possible because the Naiyāyikas accept the absence of recollection as an object of mental perception, which is not also

balāṅgikurvīran/"

- Ibid.

13. "Nanu tatra smaraṇābhāvena lingena prātaḥkālinābhāvo' numiyate eva/"

- Ibid.

acceptable.¹⁴ For, recollection is also a kind of knowledge. If the knowledge in the form of recollection is perceived with the help of mind, its absence would also be perceived through mind, because the sense-organ which reveals a particular object can also reveal the universal existing in that particular object and the absence of that particular object just as the eye which reveals colour can also reveal the universal existing in colour (colourness) and the absence of colour. In the same way, if the knowledge in the form of recollection is known through mind, the absence of it should also be known through mind. But according to the Bhāttas, no knowledge has been accepted as the object of perception. Knowledge is inferred with the help of knowness (jñātata). Hence, knowledge is always inferential, but not perceptual. As the knowledge in the form of memory, according to this principle, does not come under the purview of perception or mental perception, its absence can not also be known with the help of mental perception. The absence of memory can neither be known perceptually nor inferentially. If it is accepted that the absence of memory is inferred, what will be its hetu? If it is said that the absence of awareness will be hetu here, the knowledge of the absence of awareness is possible through the absence of memory, while the knowledge of absence of memory will be possible through the absence

14. "Maivam/ smaraṇābhāvasya jñātumaśakyatvāt"/

of awareness, which leads to the defect of 'mutual dependence' (anyonyāśraya). In short, the knowledge of the absence of memory does not follow from perception, inference or any other sources of valid knowledge. Hence with the help of the hetu in the form of the absence of memory, the absence of an object existing in the morning time cannot be inferred. The knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning time attained in the evening is caused by a separate pramāna called anupalabdhi. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted the perceptuality of knowledge. From this, it also follows that the absence of knowledge is not perceived with the help of mind.¹⁵

Just as the Mīmāṃsakas admit that the absence is known through anupalabdhi, the Naiyāyikas establish that absence is known through perception. The Naiyāyikas have forwarded some reasons in favour of the perceptuality of knowledge with the help of a syllogistic argument.¹⁶ The Naiyāyikas have mentioned this in

15. "Smṛtyabhāvaṃ manogrāh^amicchanti kila tār^kkikāh/
Taccāyuktam vāyam tāvad jñānapratyaksavādinah//
Manahpratyaksagamyatvaṃ jñānānām vārayāmahe/
Tataśca tadabhāvo'pi manasā grhyate katham//"

- Ibid.

16. "Nanu abhāvasya pratyaksatvamanumimāmahe/"

- Ibid.

a kārikā of Nyāyakusumanjāli. According to Udayana, on account of the fact that the knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is immediate (Pratipatterapāroksyāt), the function of our sense-organ on the locus etc. does not become improminent (indriyasyānupakṣyāt), the knowledge of the absence of a jar is called ajñātakaranaka, i.e., the knowledge whose instrument is not known (ajñātakaranatvācca) and mind enters into positives (bhāvāveśacca cetasah), the knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is caused by sense-organ, i.e., perceptual.¹⁷

The syllogistic argument is : "Absence is perceptible because its cognition is immediate like a jar". In other words, the absence of a jar is perceptual as it is revealed to us immediately.¹⁸ This syllogistic argument, the Bhāṭṭas think, is fallacious as there is the fallacy called Svarūpāsiddhi. The Naiyāyikas

17. "Pratipatterapāroksyādindriyasyānupakṣayāt/
Ajñātakaranatvācca bhāvāveśacca cetasah//"

- Nyāyakusumanjāli of Udayana with commentary of
Haridāsa Bhāṭṭācārya, pt. M. C. Nyāyaratna, 3/20,
Translated & Edited by E. B. Cowell, Varanasi, 1980.

18. "Prayogastu abhāvaḥ pratyakṣaḥ aparokṣapratitātvād
ghaṭavaditi/"

accept that the abhāva is known immediately, which is not accepted by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas according to whom the abhāva is not known immediately. As in the sādhya in the form of absence there does not exist hetu in the form of "immediate knowness", the hetu is endowed with fallacy called Svarūpāsiddha.¹⁹ The locus like ground where the knowledge of the absence of a jar is known is apprehended immediately. The Naiyāyikas have imposed the immediacy of locus, i.e., ground on the absence which is not correct. So, the statement that the absence is known immediately is not true. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted the first argument of Udayana in favour of perceptuality of absence.²⁰

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa has refuted the second argument in favour of the perceptuality of absence forwarded by Udayana by applying the following syllogistic argument : "The knowledge of absence is perceptual as the sense-organ can produce the perceptuality of locus etc. without being inoperative, like the cognition of a jar".²¹

19. "Tatra abhāvasya aparokṣapratītatvābhāvāt svarūpāsiddho hetuḥ/"

- Ibid.

20. "Bhūtalādestvaparokṣatvādabhāvasyāpi tattva-bhramah eva āyusmatāmiti/"

- Ibid.

21. "Nanu abhāvajñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ anupakṣīṇendriyajanyatvād

Eye etc. are not inoperative in perceiving a jar and can produce the knowledge of a jar without being defunct. In the same way, eye etc., without being inoperative, can produce the absence of the knowledge of a jar. As the knowledge of a jar is perceptual, the knowledge of absence of it is also the same. This is what Udayana wants to say. But Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa says that the hetu in the form of 'being caused by the sense-organ which is not inoperative' (anupakṣīṇendriyajanyatva) is fallacious as there is a fallacy called viśeṣāsiddha. In other words, in this hetu the adjunct 'anupakṣīṇendriyatva' (i.e., not being inoperative in the knowledge of locus etc.) is not familiar. Hence there is the fallacy mentioned above.

Now the problem arises : Why the above-mentioned hetu suffers from the defect called viśeṣāsiddha? In reply, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa says that in order to know the yoqyatā (capability) of anupalabdhī the sense-organs are to be known as operative. It has been stated earlier that yoqyatā of an object always depends on the assemblage of the causes of the apprehension of the counterpositive excepting the counterpositive and the contact of sense-organ with it. Where there is the knowledge of the absence of a jar due to its non-cognition, there is the assemblage of all causes for realising a jar excepting the jar itself and the contact of

ghatajñānavaditi/ Tadapi viśeṣāsiddham"

the sense-organ with the jar. Hence, it is called yoqyanupalabdhi. In other words, yoqyatā lies in a place where there is the absence of a jar and the absence of the contact of sense-organ with the jar. The contact of the sense-organ is essential for the cognition of a jar, but not in the case of non-cognition of it. There is the absence of the contact of sense-organ in the case of the non-cognition of counterpositive. A counterpositive (i.e., absentee) is known through the operation of sense-organ. If there is the absence of the contact of sense-organ with an object, it is assumed that the object is not there. That is, from the absence of the contact of the sense-organ there arises the non-cognition of the counter-^{of absence is}positive. Hence, the knowledge_{caused by operative sense-organ but not caused by the sense-organ which is not operative.} On account of the non-familiarity of the anupakṣīnatva (i.e., inoperative character) of the sense-organ the hetu mentioned earlier suffers from the fallacy of viśeṣāsiddha. The Naiyāyikas have to accept the yoqyatā of non-cognition for the attainment of the knowledge of absence. The Naiyāyikas also accept the yoqyatā in the following hypothetical argument - "Had the jar been on the ground, it would have been perceived just like the ground". Now let us consider the meaning of the sentence - "Had there been a jar, it would have been cognised". If we accept the existence of a jar on it, it will be revealed that on the ground there are all the causes for the origination of the knowledge of a jar excepting the jar itself. When there is no jar, there is the absence of the contact of the sense-organ with the jar. The contact of the sense-organ is on

the locus in the form of the ground which entails that the sense-organ is operative in the knowledge of locus. Hence, the hetu in the form of anupakṣīnendriyajanyatva (i.e., being caused by sense-organ which is not inoperative) bears the fallacy called viśeṣāsiddha. The contact of the sense-organ with a jar is familiar to us. In this case the sense-organ becomes operative in the case of the knowledge of the locus which points to the knowledge of absence. The Hetu which is applied in the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is not at all familiar, as sense-organ can never be inoperative in respect of knowing absence. That is why, it involves a fallacy mentioned earlier. In this way, the Bhāttas have refuted the second argument of Udayana in favour of the perceptuality of absence.²²

The Naiyāyikas have applied the syllogistic arguments in the following way : "The knowledge of absence is perceptual as the instrumentality of it is not known, like the cognition of the jar etc." The perceptual knowledge arises from the sense-

22. "Pūrvoktayogyatā siddhāvupakṣīnamihendriyam/
Grāhyā cābhāvavodhārtham yogyatā tārkkikairapi//
Ghaṭo yadi bhavedatra tarhi drśyeta bhūmivat/
Iti tarkātmanā te'pi yogyatāmeva grhnate//
Asti cedupalabhyetetyasya to'rtho vicāryatām/"

organ which becomes the instrument of our perception without being known. Hence, perception is caused by an unknown instrument. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the non-cognition is the instrument of the knowledge of absence. Hence, if the knowledge of absence is caused by an unknown instrument, it is to be considered as perceptual. This is the view of the Naiyāyikas.²³

The Bhāṭṭas think that the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is fallacious as the hetu in the form of ājñātakaraṇatva is vitiated by the fallacy called anaikāntika or vyabhicāri. Impression is the instrument of memory or recollection.²⁴ Hence, the awareness dependent on the impression alone is called memory. The impression here becomes a cause of memory without being known. Here in memory there is the hetu called ājñātakaraṇatva (i.e., the property of being endowed with an unknown instrument). But there is no sādhya in the form of perceptuality. From this it does not follow that where there is ājñātakaraṇatva, there is perceptuality. In memory the perceptuality does not exist though there is ājñātakaraṇatva. From this it can be said that there is

23. "Yat punarabhāvājñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ājñātakaraṇatvād
ghaṭādiññānavaditi/"

- Ibid.

24. "Tatsmrtāvanaikāntikaṃ"

- Ibid.

the absence of sādhya in the form of the absence of perceptuality in memory though there is the hetu in the form of being endowed with an unknown instrument (ajñātakaranatva). A hetu becomes deviated anaikāntika or vyabhicārī if it exists in a place where sādhya does not exist. Hence, the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is fallacious.²⁵

According to Udayana, the cognition of absence is produced by the mind associated with the instrument of a positive nature like any other cognitions (abhāvajñānaṁ bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭamanojanyam jñānatvāt).²⁶ Here the term 'bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭa' means "being associated with the positive instruments like eye etc. or knowledge of vyāpti etc." In order to understand absence mind associated with the positive instruments is essential. To know absence there is the necessity of external sense-organ which can reveal the locus of absence. For, without knowing the locus of absence, absence can not be known. Mind becomes an instrument towards any type of knowledge. Where there is knowledge, it is

25. "Saṁskāro hi smṛtau hetuḥ sa cājñāto'vavodhakah/
Ajñātakaraṇāpyevaṁ smṛtirnādhyakṣatām gatā// Iti/"

- Ibid.

26. "Yatpunarabhāvajñānaṁ bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭamanojanyam
jñānatvāt jñānāntaravat/"

- Ibid.

always caused by mind associated with the positive instruments. That is, if the knowledge is caused by the mind associated with the positive instruments then it is perceptual as it is caused through the instrumentality of the sense-organ. As knowledge of absence is caused by the mind associated with the positive instruments (bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva), it would always be perceptual as the Naiyāyikas observed.

The Bhāttas have pointed out the fallacy called virodha in the hetu (i.e., bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva) as used by the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas have adopted a contradictory position after keeping bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva as a sādhya in one inference and keeping the same as hetu in another inference. The first inference is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused by mind associated with the positive instruments as it is a cognition (bhāvajñānaṁ bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyam jñānatvāt)". Here 'the knowledge of absence' is pakṣa, 'the property of being caused by mind associated with positive instruments' (bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva) is sādhya and 'jñānatva' is hetu. Afterwards, the Naiyāyikas have adopted another syllogistic argument which is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused through sense-organ as it is caused by mind associated with the positive instruments (abhāvajñānaṁ indriyakaranakam bhāvakaranāvistamanojanyatvāt)". In this inference, 'the property of being caused by sense-organ' is sādhya, and 'the property of being caused by mind associated

with positive instruments' (bhāvarūpakaranāviṣṭamanojanyatva) is the hetu.

The Bhāṭṭas think that the above-mentioned view is not correct, because the knowledge of absence can never be caused by sense-organ but it is caused by other factors excepting sense-organ (indriyetarakaranakatva). According to them, the existence of the fire on the mountain is inferred. The knowledge of the absence of the inferred (i.e., the knowledge of the absence of fire) is attained in a place where there is the absence of the inferred, i.e., fire. This place is lake etc. In other words, in lake etc. we have the knowledge of absence of fire which is not caused by sense-organ. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭas who do not think that the knowledge of absence is caused by sense-organ. According to them, the syllogistic argument is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused by the factors other than sense-organ, as it is the knowledge of an absence". Hence, in the inference shown by the Naiyāyikas there is the fallacy called 'virodha'. The Naiyāyikas think that the knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ, but actually it is not caused by the sense-organ according to the Bhāṭṭas. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted all the four arguments forwarded by Udayana in favour of the perceptuality of absence.²⁷

27. " ... anupalambhakaranakatvaṃ na yuktamiti tadapi na/

But Udayana is sticking to the point that the cognition of absence is caused by the instrumentality of sense-organ with the help of the following arguments. According to him, as sense-organ apprehends the counterpositive, it becomes the instrument of valid knowledge of absence (pratiyoqini samarthya). As sense-organ becomes operative in conveying the knowledge of the locus, it can also be the same in conveying the knowledge of an absence. Because in both the cases the sense-organ performs the same functions (vyāpārāvyavadhānatah). As the defect of hetu which is the cause of the illusory knowledge of absence lies in the sense-organ, the valid knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ. The sense-organ being defective becomes the cause of the illusory knowledge of absence (akṣāśrayatvāddoṣānām) and the sense-organ if in order or faultless becomes the cause of valid knowledge of absence. To Nyāya the defect of the sense-organ can give rise to an erroneous cognition ('doṣo'pramāyāḥ janakaḥ'). Hence, from the erroneous cognition of the absence the defect of the sense-organ is presumed. In the like manner, if there is a proper-cognition of an absence, it is presumed that our sense-organ is in order (not defective), which proves that the knowledge of absence is attained through sense-organ i.e., through perception. That is why, it is said that the knowledge of absence

Abhāva jñānamindriyeta raka rana kamabhāva jñānatvāt
 anumeyābhāva jñānavat ityapi vaktum śakyatvāt iti/"

- Ibid.

is caused by the sense-organ. As the knowledge of absence apprehends the qualificand (viśeṣya), qualifier (viśeṣana) and their relations (Samvandha), it is a kind of determinate (Savikalpaka) knowledge. That which is determinate must be caused by the sense-organ (indriyāṇi vikalpanāt). These are the four arguments by which Udayana has proved that the knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ.²⁸

Among these Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa has refuted the third argument in the following way. Udayana thinks that the defect of sense-organ which causes the illusory cognition becomes the instrument of that knowledge. The defect of eye which gives rise to the illusory cognition of colour becomes the instrument of that knowledge. This reasoning is defective according to the opinion of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa.²⁹ For, there is the fallacy called asiddha. The defect of sense-organ becomes the cause of the defective

28. "Pratiyogini sāmartyād vyāpārāvyavadhānataḥ/
Aksāśrayatvāddoṣāṇāmindriyāṇi vikalpanāt//"

- Nyāya Sūtram (with Vātsyāyanābhāṣyam & Vṛtti),
3/21 - by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, Anandāśrama,
Poona, 1922.

29. "Yattu abhāvajñānamindriyakaraṇakam indriyadoṣeṇa dūṣyamā-
natvāt, yathā caksurdoṣeṇa dūṣyamāṇam rūpajñānam
caksuḥkaraṇakamiti, tadapyasiddhameva/"

- Ibid.

cognition of absence, but it can never be the cause of illusion regarding absence. Because the illusion regarding the yogyatā of anupalabdhi alone becomes the instrument of the illusion of absence. If there is any illusion about the yogyatā of anupalabdhi, it can give rise to the illusory knowledge of absence. There is the existence of a jar, for example, in a place. In spite of that a knower thinks that there is no jar, and no contact of sense-organ with the jar but other factors for cognising a jar are there. This awareness is the illusion about yogyatā of anupalabdhi.³⁰ Due to this an individual will have the illusory cognition of the absence of a jar though a jar really exists. Here the knowledge of the absence of a jar is not defective due to the defect of the sense-organ. In this case of the knowledge of the absence of a jar which is pakṣa here, the hetu (i.e., being defective with the defect of sense-organ) does not exist. Hence, there is the defect called Svarūpāsiddha. The inference being defective can not prove the thesis that the knowledge of absence is caused by sense-organ. From this it can be concluded that the knowledge of absence is caused by the separate source of knowledge called anupalabdhi.

The Naiyāyikas further say that the eye is the cause of

30. "Na khalvindriyadoṣaḥ syādabhāvabhramakāraṇam/
Yogyatābhrama evātra tatkāranamitīritam//"

the knowledge of absence, i.e., the sense-organ is the cause through which the knowledge of absence can be known. This inference is also defective due to having fallacy called viśeṣaviruddha. The sense-organ can reveal that object only with which it is connected, i.e., eye can reveal those objects that are in proximity to it. But in this case the relation of sense-organ with absence cannot be accepted. For, the sense-organ cannot apprehend absence as it is not in proximity to it. This is the reason for which the hetu is called 'Indriyatva' and there is a fallacy called viśeṣaviruddha.³¹ The syllogistic argument forwarded by the Naiyāyikas is like this - "Eye can apprehend absence as it is a sense-organ (cakṣuḥ abhāvagrāhaka indriyatvāt)". In this inference the hetu is indriyatva and the sādhya is abhāvagrāhakatva. As the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the relation between absence and sense-organ, the sense-organ is not capable of apprehending absence. Rather in sense-organ there is the absence

31. "Yāni punaḥ - cakṣuḥ abhāvagrāhakamindriyatvāt manovadityādīnīnumānāni tāni sarvāni samvaddhasyai- vendriyasya grāhakatvāt, abhāvena sambandhāna bhyupagamāt viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvarūpasamvandhasya ca sambandhāntara-pūrvakatvaniyamāt viśeṣaviruddhāni/"

of apprehending an absence (abhāvagrāhakatvābhāva). Hence, there is the fallacy called viśeṣaviruddha.

If the perceptuality of absence is accepted, it cannot be substantiated through reasoning. Because, when an absence is known, it is known as being connected with counterpositive. The knowledge of absence presupposes the knowledge of the counterpositive. 'Absence' means 'absence of something'. It is not possible to have the knowledge of absence in the case of indeterminate perception due to the impossibility of recollecting the counterpositive. If the knowledge of pratiyogī is accepted as being present before the indeterminate knowledge, the knowledge of the counterpositive would become the indeterminate one and the knowledge arising after it will be determinate. Hence, the indeterminate perception of abhāva is not possible. For this reason the Naiyāyikas have to accept that abhāva can be known through determinate perception. But this is not possible according to the Bhāṭṭas. Because super-sensuous objects can not be perceived indeterminately. Hence, they cannot be known through determinate perception also. The objects that are super-sensuous can be known neither through indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) nor determinate (savikalpaka). The absence, according to the Bhāṭṭas, cannot be known through senses and hence, it is super-sensuous. The Bhāṭṭas forward the following syllogistic argument : "Absence is not capable of being perceived as it is not capable of being known through indeterminate perception as in the case of super-

sensuous object".³²

It has been shown that the Bhāttas have accepted anupa-
labdhi as a distinct means of cognition. Perception, inference
etc. cannot prove the existence of a negative fact as they are
applicable only in the case of positive facts. When the object
is negative, there is no contact of sense-organ with the nega-
tive fact as there is no corresponding modification of soul. But
when the objective fact is positive, the corresponding subjective
activity is also positive where we get the positive pramānas like
perception, inference etc. If the objective fact is negative, the
corresponding subjective activity, in the like manner, would also
be negative. The means of knowing this negative fact cannot also
be perception or inference which are applied for knowing a posi-
tive fact. In perception there is the contact of sense-organ with
the object. Here the contact is possible only between two exis-
ting (i.e., positive) objects. The sense-organs like eye etc. and
the objects like jar etc. are the existing (i.e., positive) objects.

32. "Pratiyogismrtirnasyādādito nirvikalpake/
Tataśca savikalpenaivābhāvajñānamicchasi//
Tasmādevamanumīyate - abhāvaḥ pratyakṣo na
bhavati nirvikalpakānarhatvāt atīndriyavastuvaditi/"

Hence through the contact of the sense-organ with object, there arises the knowledge of the particular object. But in order to know the negation of a jar on the ground, such type of contact is not possible. So it is not perceptual. When we have knowledge in the form - 'There is jar on the ground', the knowledge of the ground arises from perception and the knowledge of a jar is attained through memory. But if it is said that there is the absence of a jar on the ground then this absence cannot be known through perception or memory, but through a distinct means called anupalabdhi.

It cannot be said that negation is known through mental perception, because the soul and its qualities like pleasure, pain etc. are the objects of mental perception. Mental perception is otherwise called introspection. The negation which is taken to be an objective fact cannot be the object of introspection. In other words, the negation of a jar on the ground is a fact belonging to the outside world and hence, it has been accepted as padārtha or category by the Vaisesikas. If it is so, how can it be known through introspection? It has been stated by Kumārila that the non-apprehension is different from perception. From this it is proved that it is completely different from introspection which is nothing but a form of perception. We may recall here the remark by P. T. Rāju, viz., "The Mīmāṃsakas, for example, Kumārila hold that it (negation) is not perceived by our senses but by our mind, though it is real. It is an object of mānas

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pratyakṣa, not of indriya-pratyakṣa" is totally misleading. For it has been shown earlier that through perception the negation cannot be known and mental perception being a form of perception is not capable of apprehending absence. Hence Dr. Rāju's view that negation is an object of mental perception is not acceptable.

The purpose of accepting anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowledge lies in the fact that one thing cannot be mixed with another. The mixture of two things can be avoided through the application of anupalabdhi. Each and every object has got its own characteristic features which other objects do not possess, e.g., the characteristic feature of a jar is completely different from that of a pot. In other words, one object is distinct from another one and this distinction is called bheda. The bhedatva of an object with another one is known through the instrumentality of abhāva. Because bheda is nothing but mutual absence (anyonyābhāva). In the context of Mīmāṃsā the sacrificial performance or ritual of a particular set of sacrifice is completely different from that of another set. This distinction can be known through abhāva only.

According to Kumārila, abhāva, like the Advaitins, is

33. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1939, p. 64.

of four types : (i) the previous non-existence, e.g., the absence of curd in the fresh milk, (ii) abhāva by destruction, e.g., the non-existence of milk in milk-product, (iii) mutual abhāva, e.g., the abhāva of a cow in a horse and (iv) absolute absence, e.g., the absence of hare's horn. If abhāva were not accepted as a means of knowledge then the cognition of curd in milk, milk in curd, cloth in a jar, horns in an ass, smell in water etc. would not have been cognised. Like Vaiśeṣikas, Kumārila also says that abhāva is a real entity (vastu) and hence it is capable of being cognised. The object which is capable of being cognised or the object which is the object of cognition is prameya. Hence, the existence of abhāva cannot be denied.

It may be argued that non-existence is non-different from existence for having similarity between these. Though non-existence (abhāva) and existence (bhāva) are opposite to each other, there is a common character called vastutva or reality. As the existence or a positive fact represents the reality, a negative fact also does the same. Hence the sense-organ could have contact with the non-existence. The Bhāttas are of the opinion that it is not correct, because they do not admit the absolute identity between them. But what they admit is only comparative non-difference as in the case of colour etc. Colour, taste etc. are each different by themselves, but are considered as non-different as cohering in the same substance. In the like manner, non-existence is non-different from existence even when there is the identity of the object as in the case of

fruit, we admit certain differences among its properties like colour, taste etc. The comprehension of these existence and non-existence depends on the appearance of the one and disappearance of the other. Just as in the case of colour etc. there is difference of reality though there is an apparent identity, so also in the case of existence and non-existence. Though they are really different, they appear to be non-different on account of the fact that both of them inhere in the same object. The difference between the two is proved by the fact that one of them, i.e., existence is apprehended when it appears and others are non-existence when they disappear.³⁴

The ground of difference is found as follows :

In the comprehension of existence there is the contact of the sense-organ as an instrument. On the other hand, the apprehension of non-existence does not depend on such contact.

Some philosophers opine that colour etc. are to be apprehended as difference depending upon the difference in the means of their comprehension. Colour is cognised by the eye and smell by nose, and hence the difference of colour from smell is easily known just as the property of being a son is known with reference

34. Sharma, Dharendra, The Negative Dialectics,

Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

New Delhi, 1974, p. 34.

to father and the property of being father is known with reference to the son. In the same manner, we could have the difference between existence and non-existence.

But the Bhāṭṭas think that the difference among colour etc. is always based on the cognition only. In other words, the colour etc. is different, because they are cognised as different. This has been said by the Bhāṭṭas in connection with the objection by the opponents which runs as follows :

The opponents say if such be the case then we would have an eternal difference between colour and taste, existence and non-existence. The notion of identity can be explained by the fact of their existence in the one and the same place. In reply, the Bhāṭṭas say that this position is incorrect. Because an independent object being the locus of properties should be taken as an independent object having independent existence apart from its properties. If both difference and non-difference are accepted between existence and non-existence, we can not have the cognition of both its existence and non-existence based on its positive and negative forms. When there is a contact with the object, we have a cognition in the form : 'it is'. On the other hand, if there is the absence of contact with the object, we have the knowledge in the form : 'it is not'. The place where there is no jar is perceived by eye and the counterpositive i.e., a jar is remembered. After that the knowledge in the form 'The jar is not there' arises which is purely mental independent of sense-organ. In other

words, the place is seen by the eye and the jar which is not seen earlier and which could have been if it were present is remembered. After this a purely mental process which produces the notion of non-existence of a jar comes into being. This notion of non-existence is brought to our cognition by the aforesaid process. A person may be at a place in the morning and he notices that the place is bare. From this he does not apprehend anything. In the afternoon if he is asked whether there is a tiger in the morning, he recalls the place in the mind and comes to know that no tiger was seen there. Hence, his reply would be in a negative. So it is known to us from the above fact that the absence of the tiger has not been known by him in the morning. In other words, no idea of tiger occurs in his mind and hence he could not have realised its absence. From the above discussion it follows that the idea of absence of a tiger does not come from the operation of the sense-organ. It cannot also be said that it is purely caused by the non-perception of something which could have been perceived if it were present. This view will go against the Naiyāyikas. As a matter of fact the person was there and the idea of tiger did not occur in his mind. Hence, the non-perception of the perceptible cannot be the cause of the latter knowledge of the tiger's absence. The knowledge of absence must be admitted to be the result of pure and simple negation which is aided by the former perception of the place and the remembrance of it in the afternoon.³⁵

35. Slokavārtika, Translated by Gaṅgā nāth Jhā, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1983, p. 247, Foot Note. 28

The negation is not known through inferential cognition also due to the absence of the middle term (hetu). If it is said that the object whose existence is denied is described as middle term, it is not tenable. Because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time when it's non-existence was cognised. That which is not cognised cannot be regarded^{as} hetu.

It cannot be said that the positive form is the predicate of the minor premiss, because positivity cannot be pervaded by all negativity. We may get various instances where the existence of a particular object is accompanied by another. In spite of this we may get a deviated case, i.e., there might be some places where there is the non-existence of some objects. Though the presence of place is found in one case to be pervaded with the absence of a jar, yet there might be another time when we could find the jar existing in the same place. Hence no vyāpti-relation between the two is possible. If any restriction is not imposed on the relation of vyāpti between the existence of cloth with the absence of horse and if it is accepted as a means of obtaining the cognition of the absence of a jar then we would have the comprehension of everything in the world by means of such invariable concomitance. In each and every perception of a place we do not directly become the knower of the absence of everything else. Thus we find that no case of existence is invariably concomitant with absence in general. Hence, the cognition of existence cannot serve as hetu.

When a relation is known, it presupposes the knowledge of the relata, i.e., knowledge of related members. If it is admitted that the knowledge of non-existence is related by invariable concomitance to existence, how the knowledge of non-existence which is one of the relata can be known. The cognition of the member related before the comprehension of the relation could not be the cause by hetu, because it has not yet been cognised as such. Hence the cognition of absence must be known through some other means of knowledge, i.e., anupalabdhi besides perception, inference etc. Hence anupalabdhi has to be accepted as a separate source of valid cognition.