

**THE MEANS OF KNOWING A NEGATIVE FACT :
A CRITICAL STUDY ON THE THEORY OF ANUPALABDHI
IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY**

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ARTS (PHILOSOPHY)
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This is to certify that the subject matter of this thesis is the record of work done by Sri Amal Kumar Harh, Lecturer (Senior) in Philosophy, Cooch Behar College. The content of this thesis did not form a basis of the award of any previous degree to him, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else. The thesis is an intensive and critical study on the theory of anupalabdhi, which, I believe, bears the marks of originality. I am satisfied with the work done by him and hence, he may be allowed to submit his thesis for the award of the Ph. D. degree of the University of North Bengal.

Raghunath Ghosh

(DR. RAGHUNATH GHOSH)

Supervisor

DEDICATED

TO

MY BELOVED PARENTS

PREFACE

The present work entitled : 'The means of knowing a negative fact : A critical study on the theory of anupalabdhi in Indian Philosophy' is the result of an intensive and critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian Philosophy. Regarding the means of knowing a negative fact there is difference of opinion among the scholars belonging to different schools of Indian Philosophy which is highlighted here followed by some critical and evaluative remarks.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with some introductory remarks about the concept of negative fact and the means of knowing it as accepted by different systems of Indian Philosophy. In this connection the metaphysical presupposition of a particular system in advocating a particular theory as to the means of knowing a negative fact have been put forward. A clear distinction between a positive and a negative fact is made incidentally. The justification of describing the negation as a 'fact' is also given in short.

The second chapter deals with the concepts of Prama and Pramāna with special reference to Indian Philosophy. That the

knowledge of a negative fact is Pramā and the means of knowing it is a Pramāna cannot be known unless we have a vivid idea about these concepts.

In the third and fourth chapters the views of the Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding the theory of Anupalabdhi as a Pramāna have been put forth respectively. It is to be noted that only these two schools have accepted it is a distinct form of Pramāna.

The Siddhāntapakṣa or Uttarapakṣa which is given in third and fourth chapters is questioned by other systems of philosophy who do not accept Anupalabdhi as a Pramāna. These Pūrvapakṣins have got their own reasoning for not accepting it as a separate Pramāna, but to incorporate it under perception and inference. Hence, the arguments forwarded by the Pūrvapakṣins are elucidated in the fifth chapter. In Indian Philosophical methodology no Uttarapakṣa is established without refuting the view of the Pūrvapakṣins. Hence, in the concluding chapter the views of the Pūrvapakṣins are sometimes critically evaluated and sometimes logically refuted. An effort has been made in this chapter to substantiate Anupalabdhi as a distinct form of Pramāna by refuting the opponent's view. Mostly I have tried to establish the Advaitin's and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka's position through some independent arguments which could have been forwarded by them. I have tried to give some supplementary arguments in favour of Anupalabdhi as

a distinct means of knowing a negative fact from my own standpoint, which may not be accepted by all the scholars. These arguments, though not accepted by all, might have some logical excellence in them, which I think, will be liked by the scholars in the field. If it is understandable to others, I would consider my labour as rewarded. In philosophical tradition no theory is final. Hence, each and every scholar in this field will be in a position to criticise my standpoint, which should not also be considered as final. I would like to have constructive critical and evaluative remarks for the betterment of my position which is given in this dissertation. Because, I believe that the realisation of truth is possible only through logical encounter with others ('vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhah').

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CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

The term 'darsána' literally means 'seeing', as it originates from the root 'drs'' i.e., to see. Here mere 'seeing' is not Darsána. When an object is seen, it is not called Darsána on account of the fact that at this stage there is no confirmation of the knowledge of an object already seen. Hence, there is necessity of 'subsequent seeing' an object already seen, which is called critical observation. If a theory is given, one should critically ponder (manana) over the theory already given. This 'critical thinking' is the chief characteristic feature of Darsána. This 'seeing' may either be perceptual observation or intuitive experience. The phenomenon which is not experienced through ordinary means may be intuitively realised or intuitively seen, which is also darsána.

Before trying to reach a definite philosophical position it is essential to move towards it through the exchange of ideas or by putting forward a thesis as against its anti-thesis. In order to arrive at certain conclusion the method of argumentation called Vāda is indispensable. A Vāda is a form of debate which is inevitable as soon as the final ascertainment of conclusion is

reached. The Vāda has been accepted by each and every system to determine a tattva (i.e., thatness). For having tattvajñāna i.e., the knowledge of real nature of an object Vāda is to be resorted to. That is why, it is said in an Indian logical maxim - vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhdhah' (i.e., through vāda - method of argumentation we arrive at truth). For this reason each and every system has introduced the term 'Vāda' to each and every basic theory, e.g., Nirvikalpakavāda, Mokṣavāda, Karmavāda etc. It is to be taken as a common methodology available in all the systems of Indian philosophy.

In each and every system of Indian philosophy the method of critical analysis of a theory already put forth by other systems has been adopted and hence, all the system of Indian philosophy are darśanas in the true sense of the term. In each system there is a Pūrvapakṣa where the opponent's viewpoints are clearly stated. The opponent's standpoint is at first critically adjudged by the Uttarapakṣin. In the Uttarapakṣa a philosopher's own viewpoint is logically substantiated so that it becomes philosophically sound and firmfooted. This is the method adopted by all the classical Indian philosophers. Keeping this method in view the opponent's viewpoints regarding the concepts of pramā (valid cognition), pramāṇa (i.e., the source of having knowledge-proper), various forms of pramāṇas, the theory of anupalabdhi etc. have been taken into account.

All the systems of Indian philosophy accept negation or

accept the existence of a negative fact. So far as negation is concerned, there is no diversity of opinion among the philosophers as to its existence. But regarding the nature of negation there is difference of opinion among the schools. The nature of negation or the interpretation of negation varies from one system to another due to their different metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppositions have also prominent role in determining the means of knowing negation. According to some schools, the absence is known through perception, some believe that it is known through inference and some think that it is known only through a distinct means of knowing called Anupalabdhi, which is discussed in details afterwards.

Let us try to understand the significance of describing negation as a 'negative fact'. It may seem to us contradictory in terms. Because, a fact means 'something positive'. In other words, the reality or fact is understood in terms of positive judgement. But in the case of negative judgement there is no reality or fact reflected in it. In the expression - 'There is a jar on the ground' the presence of a jar on the ground is perceived as a positive fact. But if it is said - 'There is no jar on the ground', we do not find any corresponding object on the ground as the absence of a jar. Hence, the term 'negative fact' may seem to be contradictory in terms.

In reply, it may be said that just as the positive object corresponds to some reality, negative object is also the same. A

negative entity provides an appropriate object for a negative judgement. When there is a feeling of absence (viz., absence of jar, absence of near or clear ones, or absence of money etc.), it is an 'actual feeling' (i.e., it is really a 'feeling'). As this is a 'feeling', it can be described as a fact. Sometimes it happens that the feeling of absence is much more sensitive than that of a positive object. In other words, the feeling of pleasure which is a positive fact is not as much sensitive as in the case of feeling of pain (i.e., absence of pleasure). Here, this negative object makes us 'feel' in a particular situation. Hence, it is also a fact. For this reason the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas have accepted absence (abhāva) as a category (padārtha). Their concept of Apavarga i.e., emancipation is negative as this state is nothing but the absolute cessation of suffering.¹ Though they have accepted such a concept, they are not at all pessimistic. In fact, this doctrine of Apavarga or Niḥśreyas points to the fact that absence, according to these systems, is an ultimately real entity (padārtha). This theory is employed in order to elevate abhāva to the status of a category or entity which is a fact.

This non-existence is accepted for carrying to its logical extreme the view of realism that everything is objectively real. If all knowledge points to something outside it, so also

1. Tadatyantavimukto'pavargah.

should the knowledge of negation do and imply its existence apart from such knowledge. The absence has to be admitted as the object of the negative form of cognition (nāsti buddhi) which we possess. Without this such cognition cannot be explained. Just as the positive entities that are the contents of the positive forms of cognitions are accepted as objectively real, the negative entities that are the objects of negative cognitions must also be taken as objectively real or fact. Each and every cognition must have a corresponding object. The object remains in the external world even if it is not known by others. The cognition of an object presupposes the existence of the object in the external world. Had there been no object, there would not have been the cognition of the same. In the same way, we can say that, as we have negative forms of cognition, they must have some objects in the forms of negative entities or absence. From this it is admitted that there are, in fact, negative entities in the world. In other words, as there is a negative fact in the world, it can give rise to the cognition of it. We may quote here Dr. Hiriyanna's view in this connection :

"... negative facts are as much objects of knowledge as positive ones, knowledge of absence is not absence of knowledge. That is, the present view explains negative judgements by postulating negative facts as part of objective reality".²

2. Hiriyanna, M., The Indian Philosophical studies, p. 140, Mysore, 1957.

The Bhāṭṭas differ from Nyāya with regard to the method of apprehending negation. They believe that anupalabdhi or negation is the means pramāna for the cognition of a negative fact. Kumārila has refuted the view of those who think that negation is a non-entity (avastu) and without a self-character (niḥsvabhāva). To him abhāva or negation is a 'thing' just like any positive empirical entity. As a realist Kumārila also believes that all cognitions correspond to objects having positive and negative characters. A negative cognition has a relation with a positive cognition. To them each object has a double character. A particular object exists in its own form (i.e., a jar exists itself as a jar) and it does not exist with regard to the form of another object (i.e., a jar does not exist in the form of cloth).

The Prābhākaras and the Buddhists have propounded almost a similar view about a negative fact. They explain a negative fact in the light of the positive factors existing in it. They are reluctant to give an ontological status to abhāva. Because, to them the nonperception of a perceptible object (drśya) is the basis of a negative judgement.³ In short, negation is the property of exclusively positive things that are known with the help of both negative

3. drśyādarśanam hi abhāvāvagamakāraṇam.

- Prakaranapañcikā, p. 120, Edited by
Mukunda Śāstrī, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
series, Benaras, 1903.

and positive cognitions.

As the Prābhākaras and the Buddhists believe in this notion of abhāva, they do not think that there is necessity of accepting a distinct means of knowing called anupalabdhi. That is why, they admit that negation is known through inference, the hetu of which is the nonperception of a perceptible entity (drśyānupalabdhi), which will be discussed in details afterwards.

The realistic approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika towards the concept of abhāva accepted as one of the categories has already been discussed. Keeping parity with this notion, they advocate in favour of the perceptuality of a negative fact, for which they have invented a novel type of sense-object-contact (sannikarsa) called viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva, which is not accepted by the other systems like Advaita Vedānta etc.

The Advaitins accept that the negation is known through the distinct means of knowing called anupalabdhi. Because, without accepting this the multiplicity (nānātva) of the phenomenal world cannot be explained. That in Brahman there is the absence of three different types of Bhedas i.e., sajātiya, (homogeneous), vijātiya (heterogeneous) and svagatah (internal) is known through anupalabdhi. An individual can realise Brahman directly which is called Brahma-sāksātkāra or ātmasāksātkāra. Before arriving at this stage some methods like Śravaṇa (hearing of the instruction of the Śāstras), Manana (thinking or pondering on the theories already presented to

us through reasoning) and nididhyāsana (meditation) are to be adopted. In the Manana part we generally try to understand what our Śāstras or treatises on Advaita Vedānta try to say us. At the same time we try to see whether these theories are logically tenable or not. The thinkers on the field of Advaita Vedānta have tried to establish the basic theories of Advaita Vedānta with the help of some logic so that a logical mind can be convinced. The whole Tarkapāda chapter of Samkarabhāṣya is devoted to the substantiation of the Advaita Vedānta-position after refuting the views of other systems. The whole epistemological literature is centred around the establishment of the only one Reality which is Brahman. In order to establish that the whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman the Advaitins have taken recourse to logic which underlies whole epistemological literature also. It is a common maxim - 'Mānādhīnā meyasiddhi' i.e., the substantiation of a metaphysical entity (Prameya) is dependent on the means of knowing (Pramāna). If an individual wants to establish some Reality, he has to forward some proofs in favour of it so that a logical mind can be convinced. The main intention of the Advaitins is to prove that the multiplicity (nānātva) of this is illusory as it is covered by only one Reality i.e., Brahman. In other words, Brahman is Real and the world is illusory. The individual being is nothing but Brahman ("Brahma satyaṁ jagarmithyā, jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ"). In the phenomenal level this truth is not intelligible to ordinary human intellect. For the sake of philosophisation the whole epistemological literature is essential in Advaita Vedānta, which is evidenced from

their theory of perception etc. That Brahman is non-dual i.e., free from three types of difference as mentioned earlier is known through a particular means of knowing called Anupalabdhi. It has been accepted in order to establish the main thesis i.e., nonduality of this world (which is meya or prameya here). To establish this meya some distinct Pramāna is essential. This is not other than Anupalabdhi. This is the metaphysical presupposition of the Advaitins to accept anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowing i.e., Pramāna.

Indian Philosophers generally advocate in favour of the Law of persimony (Lāghava) for the sake of precision. In this connection some of the systems have tried to show that the knowledge of a negative fact can be known through perception or inference after keeping the theory of Lāghava in view. It is logically cumbrous to accept a separate Pramāna for the explanation of the knowledge of a negative fact. In spite of this there is some logic behind the acceptance of Anupalabdhi as a separate Pramāna. Though it leads us to the longer route or logical cumbrousness, it is highly essential for the explanation of an important epistemological fact i.e., negative fact. In philosophy logical precision is always invited if there is other ways for doing this. At the same time it is also to be noticed that in the name of precision or Lāghava there does not arise any vagueness or incompleteness in the idea or theory under discussion. If Anupalabdhi is not accepted as a separate means of knowing, the knowledge of a negative fact can never be explained. Hence, the Advaitins and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas are consistent in their positions.

CHAPTER-II

THE CONCEPTS PRAMĀ (VALID COGNITION) AND PRAMĀNA
 (SOURCE OF VALID COGNITION) IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Indian concepts of Pramā (valid cognition) and Pramāna (source of valid cognition) come under the purview of epistemological discussion. Hence before taking up the problem of the means of knowing a negative fact properly, it will not be uncalled for to discuss the theories of different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the valid cognition (pramā) and the means of valid cognition (pramāna), because negative facts are known through a distinct means of valid cognition called anupalabधि by some Indian thinkers.

All thinkers in general have given their attention to the problem of cognition for a long time. So their queries are confined to the following ; what is the nature of cognition? What is the criterion of the truth of cognition? What are the sources of acquiring it? These epistemological queries lead to the formulation of a theory of cognition. In the modern time, truly speaking, the whole battle of epistemology is centred round the possible distinction in the nature of cognition. Here we notice a difference between Western and Indian view on this point.

In Western philosophy there are generally two groups of epistemologists, namely, the sceptic and dogmatic regarding these issues. According to the sceptic, the problem of knowledge is beyond solution, but the dogmatists think that it is capable of being solved.

As is well known, Plato had to counter the sceptical and the Heraclitean tradition of knowledge in which, in fact, 'knowledge' was reduced to subjective, changing, sifting 'opinion' and 'beliefs'. The philosopher of Plato's conception, on the contrary, was concerned with 'knowledge' - Par excellence which was certain, unalterable beyond any sceptic doubt, which, i.e., was far different from what passes as 'knowledge' in ordinary parlance. Aside from the requirement that knowledge must be certain, the other requirement that Plato sets for knowledge was that it must be of object. While the first requirement would des-
pense with the sceptic doubt or uncertainty about knowledge, the second would obviate the subjectivity. Knowledge is of 'Ideas' grasped by Reason. The uncertainty, probability, variability etc. that in fact (so to speak) any sensationalistic, Heraclitean, sceptical account of knowledge are got rid of in Plato's Idealistic account according to which knowledge is fixed, certain and indubitable because it is oriented to Ideas which are fixed and permanent. Plato thus conceived knowledge within a rigid, fixed unalterable ontological structure, viz., the world of Ideas.

The Platonic tradition was contained in Aristotle, the

only difference being that as against Plato, Aristotle maintained that the Ideas (or 'Forms') of Plato's conception could be instantiated in sense-perception without their ideality being impaired through such an instantiation. Aristotle was as much an ontologist regarding his account of knowledge as was Plato. The rigid, structuralist ontology of knowledge was as much Aristotle's as it was Plato's, though Plato ought to be credited with conceiving it for the first time.

The Cartesian tradition too was the continuation of the Platonic heritage. What comes within the sweeping, all-embracing doubt of Descartes was the item of sense-perception and all that is related to it, i.e., history, tradition etc. Doubt comes to a halt with the 'Cogito ergo Sum' which was but the first truth of reason : my reason finds it impossible, i.e., contradictory to assert 'I think' and negate 'I exist'. And methodically, i.e., rationally advancing from the 'Cogito', Descartes proceeds to restore own belief in the world initially doubted. But then, the world that is restored to us is the world grasped by reason, i.e., the world of which the 'essences' or 'primary qualities' are conceived and not perceived. The Platonic ideal 'essences' are replicated in Descartes's world of 'primary qualities'. So the idealist philosophers hold that an object not only does things but also exists. When an object is capable of various actions and relations, the different aspects of object as doing and being is also accepted. But Indian thinkers analyse both these aspects of an object.

The Platonic, Rationalistic, Cartesian structuralistic conception of knowledge came to be challenged for the first time in the Empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Where Descartes had conceived of the primary qualities of Inatter as 'essences' grasped in reason (after Plato), Locke conceived of them as sensible qualities. Their only difference is from 'secondary' qualities being their invariance. Locke's description of the process of sensation is conformed by his realistic stand and also comparable with Nyāya definition of perception.¹ Where in the Platonic tradition 'esse' was 'concupi', in Berkeley "esse" was "percipi". Where in the Rationalistic tradition, the basic principle from which the entire structure of knowledge could be derived (Cp. Leibnitz), was the principle of 'ground' and 'consequent' in the Humian view the 'ground' - 'consequent' principle was of no avail in finding the discrete, atomic sense-impressions which could be 'associated' - not structured in a system - by the empirical law of 'invariable', 'antedecence' and 'consequence'. Hence the empirical thinkers accept that a thing is never known apart from what it does or apart from its relation to other things.

It is in Kant that the conception that knowledge is to be viewed within a determinate structure is re-assessed in a way which differs from the Empiricists' re-assessment of it and which

1. (§.46) TS. "Indriyārthasannikarsajanyam̐ jñānam̐ pratyaksam̐".

- Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta, Translated
by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1983.

From the above discussion it is seen that Western philosophers in general accept knowledge as valid knowledge, whereas invalid cognition is not knowledge at all. On the other hand, knowledge, according to Indian thinkers, means a true cognition, certain, uncontradicted or unfalsified which is distinct from a false one (mithyā-jñāna). In Indian philosophy, the word 'Jñāna' stands for both valid and invalid cognition. In this sense 'Jñāna' or cognition, which are synonyms, are divided into two classes : pramā (valid cognition) and apramā (invalid cognition). The above distinction was made by the old Naiyāyikas in order to analyse valid cognition in their own way and the sources of valid cognition (pramāna).

According to Nyāya, valid cognition (pramā) is a definite or certain (asandigdha), unerring (yathārtha) knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is.³ But a cognition is invalid which has, for its predicate, a character which is not possessed by the subject (of the cognition).⁴ Thus, pramā means

3. (§ 37) TS. "Tadvati tatprakārah anubhavah yathārthah.
(Yathā rajate 'idam rajatam' iti jñānam). Sa
eva pramā iti ucyate".

- Tarkasamgraha by Annambhaṭṭa, Trans. by
Gopinath Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1983.

4. (§ 38) TS. "Tadabhāvavati tatprakārah anubhavah ayathārthah;
yathā Śuktau 'idam rajatam' iti jñānam. Sā eva
'pramā' ityucyate".

- Ibid.

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yathārthānubhava (yathā + artha), i.e., not in the sense of similarity or resemblance, but in the sense of definite and assured knowledge of an object which is true presentational in character.⁵ In other words, true cognition is an expression whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object (Tadvati tatprakāraakatvaṁ).

Thus we may explain the cases where the above definition can be applied and where it cannot be. For example, 'I know a piece of silver as silver' - this knowledge has three qualifiers like 'thisness', 'silver' and 'silverness'. In this case, the object of knowledge is in to-to without any distortion and, therefore, is valid cognition. For, here the knowledge is one which has silverness as its qualifier (rajatatvaprakāraaka) and the 'this' (a real silver) possesses silverness. Hence, the knowledge possesses the property of rajatatvavati rajatatvaprakāraakatva which is the same as 'This is silver'. On the other hand, when we perceive 'a piece of shell as silver' then the cognition is invalid. For in this case the 'silverness' which functions as qualifier does not belong to the qualificandum 'this'. So this is not rajatatvavati, and this object of cognition is not tadvatitatprakāraaka.

Now we may conclude by citing two important points namely, one is the nature and another is the test of truth or validity. In

5. Pramā - Laksana (Bengali article),

- Pandit Biswa Bandhu Bhattacharyya, p. 99,
Research bulletin of Philosophy, Vol.I,
No. I, 1984, Jadavpur University, Calcutta.

the first point there is difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy. According to Jayanta, pramā is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion.⁶ Gaṅgeśa holds that pramā is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists.⁷ The Prābhākaras define pramā as immediate experience (anubhūti).⁸ Bhāṭṭas, under the influence of the Buddhists, hold that valid cognition (pramā) invariably pertains to a novel object.⁹ Dharmakīrti, the eminent Buddhist logician, defines true cognition as harmonious or non-discrepant (avisamvādī) in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity meant to obtain it.¹⁰ Moreover, he holds

6. "Avyabhicārinīmasandighāmarthopalabdhiṃ vidhadatī".

- Nyāyamañjarī, 1-20 (Pramāṇalakṣaṇam).

7. "Yatra yadastitatra tasyānubhavah".

- Tattvacintāmani (Pramāṇa Section).

8. "anubhūtiśca na pramāṇam".

- Brhatī 1.1.5.

9. "Sarvasyānupalabdhe'rthe prāmāṇyam"

- Ślokaṅkārtika (Madras University Edition),
p. 185.

10. "Pramāṇam avisamvādī jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ avisamvādanam".

- Pramāṇavārtika, 1.3.

that valid cognition is a new cognition, the cognition of an object not yet cognised earlier.¹¹ Among the Sāṃkhya Philosophers Kapila states that pramā is a determinate knowledge of an object which is not known before. The Advaitins hold that valid cognition consists in knowledge which is abādhita or unsublated. In this connection Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra gives two definitions of pramā where the first includes memory in it, and the second refers to novelty as an essential feature of valid cognition.¹²

With regard to the test of the truth of knowledge there are four well known theories in Western Philosophy : (a) Correspondence theory, (b) Coherence theory, (c) Pragmatic and (d) Self-evidence theory. According to the correspondence theory, a true proposition is one that corresponds (not in the sense of resemblance) to a fact, i.e., to an actual state of affairs. In general, the statement the P is true if and only if it is the case that P. In other words, a statement is true if it corresponds to facts. The upholders of this theory admit correspondence as the nature of truth, but they are silent when the test of truth is concerned there. The upholders of the pragmatic theory hold that a true proposition is one when it works satisfactorily in experience, that is to say, when it proves to be both intellectually and practically satisfying.

11. "ajñātārthaprakāśo vā".

- Ibid, 1.7.

12. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya (Adyar Library, 1932), 1.8.7 and Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyaksapariccheda).

Two aspects of this theory are important in this context : (i) A true proposition is one which works satisfactorily in experience, and its utility (i.e., workability) is the only test of truth. (ii) Truth is held to be something that happens to a proposition and a proposition is made true by being verified, apart from verification truth is a meaningless term. In this sense the test of truth is not different from the nature of truth. The coherence theory holds that the test of the truth of a proposition is to be sought in the consistency between the proposition whose truth is in question and other relevant propositions. The consistency upon which the coherence lays emphasis is of both sorts as the nature and test of truth. According to self-evidence, the test of truth of a judgement is self-certified which never depends for its certainty upon anything extraneous to the elements of a judgement. The basic principle of this theory is, therefore, constituted by intrinsic validity of the data of our knowledge. Thus we may say that what is self-evidence is, as Descartes Calls it, indubitable.

In Indian philosophy there is also a difference of opinion among the different schools concerning the nature and test or criterion of truth with regard to pramā. Regarding pramā, the Nyāya philosophers admit that the nature of truth is correspondence, i.e., Tadvatitatprakāraṇam which means the object of knowledge is in to-to without any distortion, whereas the test of truth is practical efficiency, i.e., arthakriyākāritva. The Buddhists regard it as the causal efficiency which forms the

test of truth. This view can be compared with pragmatic theory in the West. The analysis of Dharmakīrti also resembles the coherence theory of truth, because truth, according to him, should correspond to experience. With Advaita Vedānta too, it is the principle of non-contradiction which is the means of examining the truth.

So it is seen that generally all philosophers accept truth unanimously. They hold that truth should be the differentia of knowledge (pramā). But they express the mark of pramā according to the various meaning of truth. We may point out here the different views of different philosophical systems in Indian philosophy about truth.

The Nyāya definition of Pramā

The word 'Jñānam' is not same as the English word 'knowledge'. For the area of the word 'Jñānam' is wider than that of knowledge. The word 'pramā' which covers a specific area of 'jñānam' is permitted to translate as knowledge. But apramā which also covers a portion of jñānam, is not knowledge. Hence to translate any type of jñānam as knowledge is very much misleading or confusing. In a word, all individual manifestations of knowledge are jñānam, but not the vice-versa.

According to Nyāya, knowledge is the quality of self and jñānam receives the status of a guna. Every guna (quality) remains in a substance through the relation, called inherence and the subs-

tance is none other than the self. That jñāna is described as a guna remaining in self is known through the method called parīśesa. Jñāna can not remain in the substance like earth, water etc. as they have their specific qualities. Jñāna, being a quality, must remain in a substance which is self (ātman). In this sense, both 'pramā' and 'apramā' are the quality of the ātman depending upon self-mind-contact. But there lies a difference. In the former case we perceive the object of knowledge as such, whereas in the latter case we perceive such thing as otherwise.

So valid cognition, according to Nyāya, is defined as that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists, or which predicates of something a character really possessed by it.¹³ In other words, valid cognition is defined as presentational knowledge (yathārthānubhava).¹⁴ Four factors are involved in it, namely, the subject or the knower (pramātā), the object or the known (prameya), the method by which the subject knows the object (pramāna), and the resultant knowledge (pramiti).

13. "Yatra yad astitatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā, tadvatitatprakāraḥ 'nubhavo vā".

- Tattvacintāmani (Pratyakṣa Section),
Asiatic Society Ed., p. 401.

14. Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha by Annambhaṭṭa -
Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya,
Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1983, p. 148.

These four factors mutually constitute the whole truth. So it can be said that valid knowledge (pramā) is not possible if any one of these is absent. The Western philosophers in general use to distinguish between the three factors, namely, the subject, the object and the resultant knowledge. But the Indian thinkers add one in support of these three facts, i.e., pramānas or the sources of valid cognition.

Udayana defines the mark of pramā as proper discernment (Samyak paricchitti). According to him, it is the condition of the real nature of a thing and independent of a previous perception. From this definition it follows that Smṛti is not included herein. As Smṛti is not independent knowledge, its object is the same as that of the original perception which produced it. In order to exclude Smṛti from valid cognition Udayana uses the term 'anapeksa' (i.e., independent) in his definition.¹⁵

Among the commentators on the Nyāya-Sūtras, Vācaspati Miśra is the earliest who deals with the topic of validity and invalidity of knowledge. Udayana is influenced by Vācaspati and lends many

15. "Yathārthānubhavo mānaṁ anapeksatayesyate".

- Nyāya Kusumāñjali, IV, I.

&

Pramā-Laksana (Bengali article) by Pandit Biswa Bandhu
Bhattacharyya, Vol. I, No. I, March '84, Jadavpur University,
Calcutta, 1984, p. 102.

supports to his view. He introduces a detailed discussion by saying that validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic, i.e., due to some extraneous conditions.

Characteristic features of pramā in Jaina logic.

The Jainas define knowledge as 'Svaparavyavasāyi-jñānam' which means that the nature of knowledge is to be self-revealing as well as object-revealing. This very nature may be compared with a lamp. A lamp, like knowledge, reveals its object by virtue of revealing itself. According to the Jainas, the relation between the self and its knowledge is bhedābheda. In this sense they do not accept either complete difference or complete non-difference between knowledge and the self from their doctrine of anekāntavāda. So the Jainas' view in this regard is quite different from the both, i.e., the view of Nyāya and the view of Advaita also.

Thus knowledge or jñāna is taken to mean any cognition of an object, while the word pramā is used in the logical sense. That is to say, it is true-cognition. According to the Jainas, right or definite cognition about an object which is other than doubt, error, etc., is pramā.¹⁶ In other words, definiteness is essential mark of the validity of knowledge.¹⁷ The characteristic definiteness here,

16. Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Hemachandra, Translated into English by G. Jhā, Calcutta, 1946, p. 03.

17. Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, 1.2, Bombay, 1967.

however, does not differ essentially from the view of the Naiyāyikas, because definiteness is further stated by Jaina logicians themselves to be the determination of an object in the form in which it really exists.

In the Jaina philosophy the first great-logician, Siddhasena Divākara and Āchārya Samantabhadra define valid cognition (pramā) as having its nature to reveal itself as well as its object.¹⁸ Knowledge (jñāna), according to the Jainas, is divided into two kinds : Pramāna or means of knowledge proper and Naya or partial knowledge.

Pramāna refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is. The definition of pramāna is commonly given by the Jaina logicians as follows. The knowledge which reveals itself and its object, and which must be determinate is called pramāna. There are many logicians in Jaina philosophy who explain the definition of pramāna in different ways. But those are not very different in their meanings. Akalaṅka defines pramāna as knowledge which is uncontradicted and which manifests the unknown object.¹⁹ But Naya is the knowledge of a thing in a particular context or relationship of the

18. Pramāṇam Svaparābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam/ Svaparāvabhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhuvī buddhilakṣaṇam//

- Bṛhatsvayambhūstotra, 63.

19. "Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam anadhiḡgatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt".

- Aṣṭasāhasrī, p. 175.

knower.²⁰ In other words, Naya is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgement about a particular thing. As we are not omniscient, so it is not possible for ordinary people to know all the qualities of a thing. For what they know is relative and limited. For this reason our intention to explain the meaning of Naya in order to achieve the nature of valid knowledge.

Nayas also differ with difference of standpoints accepted by a particular school. Thus every Naya gives us relative knowledge and that can be hypothetically entertained. Since when it reveals the true nature of the object as it exists, it is true. On the contrary, when this is obstructed, it is not true. According to the Jainas, everything possesses an infinite number of qualities (dharma). When we affirm a thing by one of these manifold qualities, we apprehend Naya. But when we know a thing in different ways by different qualities, the knowledge comes through pramāna. Thus both pramāna and Naya are essential for valid knowledge of a thing.

Hence, there is no judgement which is completely true or completely false. This is known as the basic doctrine of the Jainas called 'Syādvāda' which means the doctrine of 'may be'. It signifies about absolute affirmation and absolute negation are impossible as all judgements are a partial application to reality, i.e., they are incapable of giving us a complete truth which can be grasped in to-to.

20. "Nīyate gamyate arthaikadeśo 'neneti nayah".

The Jainas again classify knowledge into two - immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa). As the Jainas admit Syādvāda, the first is here defined as a vivid and relative knowledge. Such knowledge can be known through the operation of the sense-organs or without their operation, i.e., mediumless. For these reasons immediate knowledge is of two kinds, viz., Vyavahārika (depends on medium like sense-organs) and pāramārthika (mediumless).

Immediate knowledge, according to them, is further divided into three, namely, Avadhi, Manahparyāya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into two, namely, Mati and Śruta.²¹ Among these five kinds, Kevala-jñāna is unlimited or the highest and absolute knowledge which requires no media of sense-organs and mind to grasp its object. For it cannot be described, but only be acquired by the liberated souls.

Mark of pramā in Sāṃkhya-yoga view.

According to Sāṃkhya-yoga, knowledge is the modification of Buddhi or citta and is located in Buddhi itself. In this connection they have admitted a difference between pure consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. (Vṛttijñāna). Pure consciousness, devoid of all relations and buddhi, is the real form of Śuddhapuruṣa. This Śuddhapuruṣa which is mere revealing consciousness is indifferent,

21. "Matiśrutāvadhimanahparyāyakevalāni jñānam".

neutral and a disinterested spectator of the world-show.²² It cannot be regarded as the material or efficient cause of the universe. On the other hand, Vṛtti-jñāna or phenomenal knowledge may be correct or wrong depending upon the phenomenal perspective when the absolute is viewed under the limited sphere of existence. In this sense Puruṣa falsely appears as the knower (viṣayī) of the object-knowledge (viṣaya-jñāna) caused through the operation of buddhi and this falsity is never felt in the phenomenal stage. So Puruṣa is not the real substratum of vṛtti-jñāna, whereas the real locus of object-knowledge is buddhi. It means the Vṛtti (mode) of the object which amounts to knowledge when consciousness is reflected through it. Like Advaita Vedānta, Sāṃkhya too, believes that knowledge through Vṛtti (mode) is the revelation of the object. Thus, this Vṛtti-jñāna, being a modification of buddhi, may be regarded as attributive in nature and consequently also may be regarded as substantive in nature in relation of identity between substance and attribute. This type of knowledge as propounded by the Sāṃkhya school is nearer to the ray-like substantive-attributive knowledge of Rāmānuja School so far as its object-revealing nature is concerned, but their only difference in this respect is the acceptance of the locus (ādhāra) of knowledge. For Sāṃkhya, buddhi or intellect is regarded as the locus of Vṛtti-jñāna, but Rāmānuja has accepted the existence of ray-like knowledge in the soul in place

22. "Na Prakṛtiḥ na vikṛtiḥ, Puruṣaḥ".

of Vṛtti-jñāna. In the sense of Rāmānuja, the soul, in its empirical state, is the locus of object-knowledge.

As the problem of validity and invalidity of knowledge is concerned, the first question is : Is knowledge self-valid or other-valid? In other words, does knowledge become valid by itself or by other? According to Sāṃkhya-yoga, knowledge is not only self-valid but invalidity also is intrinsic in knowledge. So both validity and invalidity are inherent in the cognition itself in regard to origination. In this sense both jñāna and ajñāna are inherent in buddhi. But ajñāna is not in the sense of negation of knowledge, but it is confused knowledge with regard to two non-discrimination between two different things. In this respect Sāṃkhya-yoga view is quite different from the view of Naiyāyikas as well as Buddhists for depending on extraneous conditions.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, knowledge is a variety of modification of the internal organ, directed towards the object known and is of the nature of the intelligence residing in the agent.²³ It is certainly discursive in character. In this sense he holds that knowledge is self-luminous and also represents the same as the self. No difference whatsoever exists between the self and consciousness. Consciousness illumines itself and by itself.

Padmapāda also maintains in his Pañcapādikā that the self

23. Bhāmati on Catussūtrī, p. 50.

is the nature of self-revealing pure consciousness.²⁴ Prakāśātman, in his Vivaraṇa, also counts the same thing of self-revealing consciousness. According to his opinion, self-revealing pure consciousness is nothing, but is the self-revealing by itself.²⁵

Vācaspati Miśra, like the Mimāṃsakas argues that knowledge is the means of its own validity and does not require anything else to establish its validity. He also criticises the view of practical efficiency and the inherence of reality as a genus (Sattā-Sāmānya-Samavāya) as the admission of these leads to duality by saying that manifestation (Prakāśa) alone has to be admitted as constituting the validity or truth. But Vācaspati differs from the position of the Mimāṃsakas regarding the conception of valid cognition (pramā). According to Vācaspati, valid cognition (pramā) is a cognition which is not previously known (anadhigata) and not contradicted.²⁶ It means that valid cognition or truth is abiding, eternal and non-contradictory. Thus he distinguishes false cognition from the conception of validity. On the other hand, Kumārila opines that pramā means cognition which instigates one to practical activity, but Vācaspati holds that there is no reference to action.

24. Post-Saṅkara, Edited by A. B. Śāstri, Oxford, 1980, p. 77.

25. Ibid.

26. "Avādhita-anadhigata-asandigdha bodhajanakatvam hi pramānatvaṁ pramānānām".

- Bhāmātī, 22, Ananthakrishna Śāstri's edition.

Here Vācaspati includes the word 'anadhigata' (not previously known) in his definition in order to exclude Smṛti, because through Smṛti we get an object which is already known. Another word 'avādhita' should also be taken to exclude wrong or false cognition or illusion, because false cognition is always contradicted. Here we find a similarity between Vācaspati and other Advaitins. According to Advaitins, non-contradictoriness is a mark of validity which Vācaspati also holds.

According to Vijnānabhikṣu, knowledge is related to buddhi and puruṣa knows the object through reflection only. He further argues that the object to be known is reflected into buddhi which received reflection of puruṣa as well. This Buddhi having the reflection of both puruṣa and object is again reflected in puruṣa. So knowledge appears as located in puruṣa through this reflection.²⁷ This is called 'double reflection theory' admitted by Vijnānabhikṣu which is the opposite to Vācaspati's 'single reflection theory'.

Vijnānabhikṣu defines pramā as reflection of buddhi having the form of object in puruṣa,²⁸ and pramāṇa as vṛtti of buddhi. He further argues that buddhivṛtti may also be taken as pramā. For when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in buddhi, pramā will be sense-object-contact, etc.; and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in puruṣa, pramā will be

27. Sāṅkhyapravācanabhāṣya, Ch. I, Calcutta Edition, 1360 B.S.

p. 305.

28. Ibid.

the function of buddhi. So purusa is not a real cogniser, but the witness of knowledge. In this connection, Vallabhācārya adds in the clarification of pramā-pramāna by saying that when both the function of buddhi and the apprehension of purusa are said to be pramā, pramāna will be both function of buddhi and function of sense-organ.²⁹

Mark of pramā according to Advaita-Viśiṣṭādvaita view.

According to the Advaita Vedānta, the word '~jnāna' is used to mean both knowledge : absolute knowledge and empirical or relative knowledge. The absolute knowledge means transcendental or non-rational knowledge, i.e., knowledge of Brahman which has no relation with empirical objects; whereas empirical knowledge is the creation of avidyā or māyā. The former knowledge is called Svarūpa or Brahma-~jnāna and the latter knowledge is called vṛtti-~jnāna or empirical ~jnāna. Here Svarūpa-~jnāna although absolutely unrelated to objects, yet somehow becomes connected with objects which it reveals. So Advaita epistemology will be discussed only in terms of vṛtti-~jnāna when we talk about relation between knower and known.

Vṛtti-~jnāna may either be true or false depending upon the fact at the empirical level. Thus vṛtti-~jnāna, according to Advaita, which may be true or false, is a form and hence an appearance of svārūpa-~jnāna, in as much as it is relative and condi-

29. Kiraṇā 1.7 (With Yogasūtra, Bhāṣya and Rājamārtanda),

tional. So Advaita suggests that the so-called vr̥tti-jñāna cannot be called as jñāna (knowledge) unless it is illumined by the principle of consciousness or Brahma-jñāna.

Now pramā, according to ^{the} Advaitins, is truth, i.e., valid cognition and which is opposed to it, called invalid cognition or apramā. Valid cognition (pramā) is defined by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, the author of Vedānta Paribhāṣā, as a cognition which is not previously known (anadhigata) and is not also contradicted.³⁰ It means that valid cognition of an object lies on the property of its being uncontradicted and novelty. The word anadhigata is used in the definition in order to exclude memory or Smṛti from the scope of valid cognition (pramā), because Smṛti is not accepted as knowledge proper. Now the question is : Should memory be admitted to have the status of knowledge? In reply, we can say that it is not. For memory is that which is already known, i.e., past experience. In other words, memory or past experience is to be true if it is reckoned as identical with the content of past experience which it claims to represent. But valid cognition is such that which is not already known (anadhigata). This is the reason for which memory is not a distinct source of knowledge, but it is a clear experience and given a separate name.

Another characteristic features of knowledge is non-contra-

30. "anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayaka-jñānatvaṃ pramātvam".

- Vedānta Paribhāṣā,

Calcutta University Edition, p. 15.

diction and novelty. The word 'non-contradiction' means the object which is not contradicted (ayādhitatva) which implies the exclusion of wrong cognition (as it is always contradicted). Anything that is contradicted or sublated can not be true. This view is very much similar to Hegel's own view of truth as resolving and reconciling all contradictions in itself. For the Advaitins, knowledge should be such as to incapable of being contradicted at all times. For this reason, they have rejected the pragmatic test of causal efficiency on the ground that sometimes even an invalid cognition may lead to the fulfilment of a purpose as when mistaking the brightness of a distant jewel for the jewel we approach and get the jewel. Hence it is clear that the invalidity of the initial cognition which caused our action is due to its being contradictedness.

Novelty means informativeness or newness (i.e., knowledge-proper) which is also included in the nature of truth in order to exclude Smṛti, because Smṛti is reproduced knowledge and hence, not a new knowledge.³¹ In this sense novelty is to be considered as an essential quality of knowledge. The British empiricist at the beginning of the development of modern philosophy also gave emphasis on 'novelty' as a unique character of knowledge. Sometime after we find the similarity between Kant and the Advaita School with regard to the mark of valid cognition. For Kant, knowledge as knowledge-proper, must be informative or new, i.e., synthetic in nature. Moreover, this view of the Advaitins also is

31. Bhāṣā-Pariccheda (Nirnaya Sagar Press Edn.), p. 232.

similar to that of Vācaspati who expresses in Bhāmati that novelty and non-contradiction are the marks of valid cognition (pramā).

Now it is, however, necessary to point out that some Advaitins do not exclude Smṛti from the scope of valid cognition. Naturally the following question arises from their standpoint : Can we say that in the case of a continuous process of knowledge (dhārāvāhika-jñāna) of the same object, our experience at every moment during that period (Kāla) is regarded as knowledge? Most of the ancient Indian philosophers answered the question in affirmative although on different grounds.

Some Advaitins admit that in the case of a continuous process of knowledge of a table it is not the same at different moment as we suppose ordinarily. For them, the object (the table) of our knowledge must be determined by both spatial and temporal properties to our consciousness. If we do not perceive the spatial property of an object (a table), we cannot judge that it is high or low, big or small. Again if we do not perceive temporal property of an object (a table), we will fail to judge it to be 'present'. Hence time-quality is a common element entering as a category in all judgements. But if we do not do so, it would be impossible for us to distinguish the present knowledge of a table from the past one. For this reason, we can say that the determination of a table by the first moment of a continuous process of knowledge is not the same as determined by the second moment, simply because the common factor, the time element, remains unknown. Every moment

of knowledge of an object is not the same as the previous moment which is also as good as a new object. In this sense, the definition of valid cognition (pramā) can be applied to that case where quality of novelty is also present. Moreover, real escape from this difficulty is possible if we take the term anadhigata in a technical sense. The knowledge of an object whose essential nature is previously unknown or unperceived is called pramā.³²

Some thinkers admit that the above argument is not a very happy answer to escape from the difficulty. They hold that memory or Smṛti is equally present in the case of a continuous process of knowledge. Hence it is not proper to argue that the time-quality of the object in a continuous process of knowledge is perceived as new at every moment.

The Naiyāyikas think that this problem can be solved by understanding the real sense of novelty which is present in the case of knowledge, but absent in the case of memory. As memory is the impression of past experience, so novelty is absent there. Hence, every moment of a continuous process of knowledge stands in its own right and claims to attain the status of independent validity. For the Advaitins, on the other hand, it is not a problem at all; be-

32. "Nirūpasyāpi kālasya indriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabuddhherapi pūrva pūrva jñānāviśaya-tattat-kṣaṇaviśeṣaviśaya-katvena na tatrāvyāptih".

cause knowledge persists so long as fresh knowledge does not come to replace it.³³ So valid cognition can be regarded as such if it's object is neither contradicted nor previously known. It may be argued that the whole world become vādhita just after the self-realisation as accepted by Advaitins. In reply, it has been said that here contradiction means the contradiction in the phenomenal level. The whole world becomes vādhita when there is the realisation of Brahman, which is not contradicted here.

The Advaitins admit that validity is intrinsic in nature (anti-thesis of the view of Buddhas) and invalidity is extrinsic. The intrinsic nature of validity consists in the non-requirement of anything other than that which originates or reveals cognition. On the other hand, invalidity is extrinsic in nature, since its origination is due to the defect (dosa) present in the cause of cognition. In this sense, true cognition is not only self-luminous, but also self-valid.

On the other hand, for the Viśiṣṭādvaita School of Uttarāmāṃsā, knowledge consists in both the faithfulness to the object and prompting in the fruitful activity. In other words, knowledge is that which reveals an object to its subject by virtue of its intrinsic capacity.³⁴ It can be compared to a lamp which

33. Vedānta-Paribhāṣā (Venkateśvar Press, 1911), p. 26.

34. "Sva-Sattayaiva svāśrayaṃ prati kasyacit viśayasya prakāśanam
hi samvedanam".

reveals the presence of an object around it but does not know it. It reveals the object to a conscious self. Thus, the function of knowledge is, therefore, the revelation of something outside it, i.e., it does not require another knowledge to reveal itself. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin defines valid knowledge (pramā) as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity.³⁵ As all knowledge, according to Ramānuja, is true for it's revealing some objects, there is no false knowledge, i.e., ajñāna.

Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins opine that knowledge is intrinsically valid and even wrong cognition is valid with regard to the substantive parts (this) of their objects but invalid with regard to their attributive parts (silver) in the case of the illusory knowledge as "this is silver".³⁶ Thus the validity of knowledge is intrinsic to it, whereas its invalidity is extrinsic due to the accidental condition of defects (dosa) which vitiate it.

This view is opposite to the Nyāya view according to which validity of knowledge is extrinsic. Hence, it may be said that there is no valid reason for the intrinsic invalidity of knowledge,

35. "Yathāvasthita-vyavahārānugunam jñānam pramā".

- Nyāyapariśuddhi (Veñkṭanātha),

Chowkhamba sanskrit series No. 249, p. 90.

36. Sarvārthasiddhi (Veñkṭanātha) a commentary on Tattvamuktākālāpa, Benaras, 1900, p. 554.

because all individual manifestations of knowledge are not invalid; but that there is a valid reason for the intrinsic validity of knowledge, viz., their universality. This also holds a position opposite to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of intrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge, because it is self-contradictory to assume the same knowledge both valid and invalid.

Definition of Pramāṇa and problem of accepting the means of knowing negative fact.

The word pramāṇa comes from the root mā (to measure) and signifies the means of measurement. Thus, we etymologically derive the expression pramāṇa from pramīyate anena iti pramāṇa. From this we know that the scope of pramāṇa lies in ascertaining the correctness of a cognition.

This view of pramāṇa based upon the etymology of the word - as the means of testing knowledge which is not a final one. Thus, the Indian thinkers regarded pramāṇa both as a means of discovering truth and verifying knowledge. In a word, pramāṇas, according to early Indian thinkers, were regarded as vouching for the certainty of knowledge; while the later philosophers consider them as those aspects of objects that are unknown hitherto.

Now we shall consider the general definition of pramāṇa in various schools of Indian philosophy and find that all the systems of Indian philosophy, more or less, agree in respect of literal meaning as well as the function or purpose of pramāṇa in

the sense that it is conducive to the valid knowledge (pramā). Pramāna is generally defined as the karāna of pramā, i.e., a special cause in producing a particular effect or pramā. But there is much diversity of opinion among Indian thinkers as regards the exact nature of the karāna of valid knowledge and also the scope of it.

In the first place, the Buddhists maintain that pramāna is knowledge that does not fail to agree with the objective reality, i.e., "avisamvādivijñānaṃ pramānaṃ". The expression avisamvāditva in respect of knowledge - 'non-failure to agree' means producing successful activity to obtain the object (arthakriyākāritvaṃ). This definition is not correct, because inferential cognitions relating to objects of past one and future do not prompt one towards any activity and so they cannot be treated to be valid.

The definition of pramāna given by the Prābhākaras is an immediate experience (anubhūti) which is different from memory or Smṛti. In this sense memory, although not a pramāna, cannot be treated to be erroneous in nature. This definition does not seem to be sound. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāyamañjarī while reviewing the Buddhists definition of pramāna states that experience is only the fruit of pramāna and it itself is not a pramāna. It is because the term pramāna is significative of the sense of an instrument when it is etymologically, derived as 'pramīyate anena iti pramānaṃ'. Even in ordinary experience it is only an instrument that is considered to be a pramāna as is known from experi-

ence such as 'we know this from a pramāna'. Hence to define a pramāna as of the nature of experience strains common-sense too much.³⁷ This criticism also is exactly applicable to the case of the definition given by the Prabhākara School. On the other hand, the Bhatta School of Mīmāṃsā defines pramāna as instrument of valid cognition of an object which is unknown hitherto and which is not sublated later on.³⁸

The Sāṅkhya-yoga also defines pramāna as that which is an instrument of valid cognition. Vācaspati Miśra is of the view that the buddhi-vṛtti and pauruseyabodha are to be considered as pramāna. In regard to the former, namely, buddhi-vṛtti which is of the form "This is pot" it is the aggregate of the sense-organs, manas and ahankāra which is the instrument or pramāna. And in regard to the latter, namely, pauruseyabodha which is of the form "I know the pot" it is the buddhi-vṛtti that is the instrument or pramāna. Thus the group of sense-organs, manas and ahankāra is to be viewed as pramāna in respect of pauruseyabodha only in an indirect manner. According to Vijnānabhikṣu, karana can be defined as the cause which is invariable and immediately followed by the product indirectly, because it implies intermediate operation (avāntaravyāpāra)

37. Nyāya-Maṅjarī, Vol. I, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, pp. 15-16.

38. Mānameyodaya, Vol. I, Edited by Sri Dīnanath Tripathi,

Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1989, p. 04.

as a karana.³⁹

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, there is no difference as to the definition of pramāṇa as this school also accepts pramāṇa to be the instrument of valid cognition, i.e., 'pramākaranaṃ pramāṇam. In Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā, Annambhaṭṭa holds that karana is the uncommon causal condition (asādhāraṇam kāraṇam).⁴⁰ It means that karana is understood as the uncommon or special cause through the operation of which a particular effect is produced. In a perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa pramā), e.g., a sense-organ (in the case of external perception) or Manas or mind (in the case of internal perception), is the instrumental cause (karana). Like these, there are many causes which are essential for the production of external perceptual knowledge. But soul or ātman is a cause which is common to all sorts of knowledge, whereas particular sense-organ is not common to all except perception, i.e., it is an uncommon cause to the external perception alone.

Here, the term asādhāraṇa distinguishes karana from other causes, while the term vyāpāravat excludes the other objects of its genus which are not operative at the time of producing the

39. Sāṃkhyasūtra with Sāṃkhyapravācānabhāṣya 1.87, Varanasi, 1966.

40. (§ 40) TS. Asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanaṃ.

- Tarkasaṃgraha, Edited by K. C. Mehondale,
Bharat-Bharati, Varanasi, 1980.

effect, but have the potentiality to do so. Thus, a cause is said to be karana that must not merely be uncommon (asādhāraṇa), but also possess active function (vyāpāra). The contact between the sense-organ and an object is an undoubtable cause of perception. In this sense, it is present in perception alone instrumentally, and hence uncommon. But still it is not the karana of perception, because it does not require a further function (vyāpāra). So it can be said that pramāṇa is such an active and uncommon cause of knowledge or pramā.

The Advaitins also following the Bhāṭṭa School define pramāṇa as the instrument of valid cognition which is uncommon and is not stultified later on. Viśiṣṭādvaita too defines pramāṇa as the instrument of valid knowledge. And valid knowledge is that which has for its content something that is adapted to practical needs of life. According to the Dvaita system of Uttaramīmāṃsā, pramāṇa is that which comprehends an object as it is, i.e., yathārtha pramāṇam.⁴¹

So it is seen that all thinkers of different schools in India as well as in the West are concerned with the question as

41. "anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayaka jñānam pramā, Ta karaṇam pramānam.

- Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Adyar Library, Madras, 1942.

and also

Pramāṇa Paddhati of Jayatīrtha, p. 9.

to the nature and number of ultimate sources of knowledge (pramāna) In the West, philosophers generally recognise only two sources of knowledge—perception and inference. Somehow the pramāna of testimony (Śabda) has been neglected. Because, during the middle ages, before the emergence of modern Western philosophy, Śabda - scripture, the Bible - was recognised as a source of valid knowledge about supra-sensible things. For Christians, the Bible continues to be a source of valid knowledge. By and large authority (āpta) as a source of knowledge has been neglected in modern secular philosophy. But in India there is diversity of opinion on this matter among the different schools. The Cārvākas admit that perception is the only source of knowledge. The Buddhas admit perception and inference as the two different sources of knowledge. The Sāṃkhya philosophers hold three sources of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, testimony. The Naiyāyikas admit four : perception, inference, testimony and comparison. The prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas again admit a fifth way of knowing - arthāpatti (postulation or assumption) in addition to these four. The Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins recognise six methods, viz., anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) in addition to the other five already mentioned. The Paurāṇikas add two more, namely, sambhava (probability) and aitihya (tradition). In the Maṇimekhalā it is said that, according to Vedavyasa and Jaimini, there are ten sources of knowledge, viz., two new methods known as Svabhāva and pariśeṣa apart from others already mentioned. Th. Stcherbatsky says : The followers of Caraka increase the number of the sources of knowledge upto

eleven.⁴²

Now concerning the means of knowing negative fact, the Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins accept sixth method of knowledge, viz., anupalabdhi as a pramāṇa. Now an effort will be made to discuss critically whether the means of knowing a negative fact as admitted by the Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins is really a separate source of knowledge (pramāṇa) or not. Although there is much controversy, some problems may arise on the way of understanding : Are there really negative facts? What is the source of knowing them?

Facts may be of two types : positive and negative. The positive facts are known through perception, inference etc., e.g., "This is a red book" or "This is P". This is known through perception which is the means of knowing the positive aspect of P. The sense-organs and manas act in some way. But in the case of negative facts there is no sense activity and the corresponding subject activity should be negative, e.g., 'There is no jar on the ground' or 'There is ~P!'. It is known through a separate source of knowledge, i.e., anupalabdhi. Thus in this context, an effort will be made to discuss the Advaita theory of Anupalabdhi which has been admitted as a separate source of knowing negative facts.

Some thinkers think that non-existence is cognised through perception while others through inference. But Advaitins do not

42. Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 72.

belong to the former as well as the later group. The Prābhākaras and Sāṃkhyas hold that negative fact or non-existence has a specific type of reality which is not found in the case of positive fact or existent thing. In spite of this non-existence can be known through perception like the positive fact or existent thing. The Naiyāyikas also have arrived at the same conclusion with the help of different line of arguments.

Advaita Vedānta recognizes six pramānas, all of which are taken over from the Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. According to them, anupalabdhi or non-apprehension can not be reduced to any of the other five pramānas. It would be wrong to presuppose that the non-existence of an object is inferred from its non-apprehension. For, inference requires a universal proposition asserting an invariable relation between major and minor terms, and there is no such proposition employed, for example, in the case of the cognition of the absence of something. So it is obvious that anupalabdhi cannot be known through perception, comparison, testimony, or postulation, For these reasons, the Advaitins regard anupalabdhi as an independent source of valid knowledge. So it can be said that the non-existence of a thing can be known through a separate source of knowledge or pramāna which is called anupalabdhi or yogyānupalabdhi. In other words, the anupalabdhi as a pramāna is the specific cause of such immediate knowledge of non-existence which is not attained through any of the known means of knowledge. The Advaitins have carefully argued that the fact of

knowing the absence of an entity can not be included in perception and inference. If something is the source of knowledge and if it cannot be included in perception, inference etc., it has to be accepted as an independent source of knowledge or pramāna.

CHAPTER-III

THE ADVAITA THEORY OF ANUPALABDHI

The Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept anupalabdhi as a separate source of valid cognition (pramāna), because it is the only way of knowing a negative fact. When the negation of a thing capable of being cognised is known, it is through anupalabdhi on account of the fact that other pramānas fail to provide the knowledge of absence. Its object is the non-existence of a thing, but not the non-existence itself. The five pramānas (except the sixth called anupalabdhi adopted by the Advaita Vedānta and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā) are not capable of apprehending a negative fact and hence the sixth one (i.e., anupalabdhi) is to be taken as a separate source of knowledge. If each pramāna leads to some knowledge not derivable from other sources, it can keep its exclusive character. Hence, non-existence cannot be grasped by perception, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti or Śabda. That is why, a separate source of valid cognition (pramāna) called anupalabdhi has to be accepted.

The Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins are of the opinion that the absence of an object and its attribute of its locus are known by the unique source of knowledge called non-apprehension. (anupalabdhi),

which means that the absence of an object is apprehended by its non-perception. Not seeing a jar in a place one can say that it is not there. In the same way in the cases like, "The teacher is not in the class room", "There is no sound here", "The apple is not round", "This flower has no fragrance", the knower becomes aware of the same object or its attribute by means of non-perception. The teacher's absence from the class-room is known by the non-apprehension of his presence there, but not by the perception of his absence. Teacher's absence is not known by the perception of the room or anything else in the room.

It may seem paradoxical that the non-apprehension of an object is a means to the apprehension of its non-existence (abhāva). But in fact both non-perception and perception become the means of knowledge, i.e., pramāna to the knower (pramātā). They lead to both positive and negative experiences. The knower knows both the presence and absence of things with the help of perception as well as non-perception respectively. It is known to us that there is a tree on the ground, because we see it. It is also known that there is no tree on the ground, because we do not see it. These two different cognitions are expressed in two different sentences. The one does not lead to the another. The knowledge of the absence of the bird on the tree is not a case of perception, because the sense-organ has no contact with the absence. It does not also follow from the perception of the tree. It proceeds directly from the non-apprehension of the bird.

In this connection, it is worthy to mention the metaphysical presuppositions behind the postulation of anupalabdhi as a pramāna. The Advaitins believe in the non-dual entity - Brahman. According to them, Brahman and ātman is one and the same. The phenomenal world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman. That the whole world is nothing but Brahman is known through the realisation of Brahman. One who realises Brahman can identify oneself with the whole world. To him, there is only one Reality, i.e., Brahman, which can be described as advaitāvasthā, i.e., a situation when someone is identified with Brahman. This situation, according to the Advaitins, is the state of liberation. But one who has not realised the self or Brahman is not able to understand the non-dual situation. Hence Śruti, Vedānta literature, Upaniṣad etc. give an account of a situation with the help of some descriptions. The epistemology as advocated by the Advaitins is goal-oriented. The ultimate goal is to lead an individual to the path of the realisation of the self. Anupalabdhi has been accepted as a pramāna to serve a very important purpose. To an ordinary man it is to be informed that in Brahman there is the absence of duality. Brahman is only one and ultimate reality. To realise Brahman entails the realisation of a Reality which is non-dual. That Brahman is Advaita means there is absence of duality. To gather an idea of Brahman as having absence of duality in the phenomenal stage is not possible until and unless anupalabdhi is accepted as a

pramāna.¹ That Brahman is Advaita or nondual signifies that the absence of duality is there as an adjunct of Brahman without which the non-dual character of Brahman is not ascertained in the phenomenal stage. In other words, that Brahman is indeterminate and non-dual is ascertained with the help of the adjunct - called 'the absence of duality'. If it is not ascertained that Brahman is indeterminate, the duality in the phenomenal world which is the result of nescience or illusion cannot be removed. Hence, the author has introduced the sixth pramāna-anupalabdhi which alone can ascertain the non-dual character of Brahman.²

According to Vedānta Paribhāṣā, the means of valid cognition as anupalabdhi is the extra-ordinary cause of the apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as instrument.³ In other words, anupalabdhi is an uncommon cause of awareness of absence which is not caused by other knowledge. The word 'the

1. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, p. 223, 1377 (B.S.).

2. Ibid.

3. Jñānakaraṇajanyābhāvānubhavāsādhāraṇakāraṇaṁ anupalabdirūpaṁ pramānaṁ

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. Anupalabdhi-pariccheda), Edited along with English Translation by S. Sūryanārāyana Śāstrī, Adyar Library, Madras, 1942.

apprehension' (anubhava) in the definition is incorporated in order to exclude memory where there may be the recollection of non-existence and the term used in such a way only to emphasis the direct awareness of non-apprehension. The means of the direct awareness of the absence is called anupalabdhi.⁴ Awareness is of two types : Smṛti (recollection) and anubhava (presentative cognition). When the object is directly known, it is a kind of presentative cognition. That is to say, when some objects are known, they can be verified through the presence of those objects. If we have the awareness of a jar, it can be verified through the physical presence of the jar. It is called presentative cognition or anubhava, because the object is physically present here. So far as recollective cognition or Smṛti is concerned, there is also awareness which is not of anubhava type. Because the object of recollective knowledge is not physically present. So far as the awareness of absence is concerned, it is of anubhava type. If we feel the absence of a jar, for example, on the ground, it is a kind of presentative cognition or anubhava. For, the absence of it can be verified. But when the absence of an object is recollected, it is not of anubhava type. When I was a student, for example, I had absence of money, But now as I am employed, I have no such

4. Abhāva - smṛtyasādhāraṇa - hetu - saṃskāre'tivyāptivāraṇā-
yānubhaveti viśeṣaṇam.

absence. Hence, the absence of money which I experienced in my student-life may be recollected now. This recollection of the absence of money is not a presentative cognition (anubhava), but smṛti. In order to exclude such type of knowledge Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, the author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā, has incorporated the word anubhava in the definition of anupalabdhi.⁵

The word 'which is not due to the instrumentality of knowledge' (jñānakaraṇājanya) is inserted in order to exclude other means of cognition like inference etc. that are caused through the instrumentality of knowledge.⁶ For, inference is caused through the instrumentality of the knowledge of hetu which has invariable concomitance with the thing to be inferred. When the nature of the thing is ascertained by itself as in the case of the knowledge of non-existence, the relation of any hetu to it cannot be determined. So there can be no inference due to not having appropriate hetu. Verbal testimony and presumption are all due to knowledge, viz., namely words conveying an intention and the things

5. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, p. 223, 1377 (B.S.).

6. Anumānādi - janyātīndriyābhāvānubhava - hetāvanumānādāvativyāpti - vāranāyā - janyāntam.

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi-pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

to be explained respectively. Hence, these are excluded from the purview of the definition. It is also to be noted that non-apprehension is the sole means for having the direct knowledge of non-existence of perceptible objects and their attributes, but the indirect knowledge of their non-existence can be attained by other means. In other words, the non-existence of objects capable of being cognised is known directly by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Moreover, if the adjunct 'jñānakaranājanya', i.e., not caused by instrumentality of knowledge, were not inserted in the definition, it would have been unduly extended to inference, verbal testimony etc. The term 'asādhāranakāraṇam', i.e., uncommon cause, is included in the definition in order to exclude the common causes like unseen factors etc. (adrsta etc.).⁷ Because the non-existence of dharma (merit) and adhama (demerit) are supposed to be known only through inference, but not through non-apprehension as they are supersensuous. Hence, the definition given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is free from all types of defects.

In this regard, it is necessary to point out that anupalabdhi is also without any vyāpāra (function or operation) like upamāna and arthāpatti. Here also karana (instrument) is not taken as that which is vyāpāravat, but it is understood as that which is

7. Adrṣṭādaṁ sādharāṇa - kāraṇe'ti - vyāpti - vāraṇāyāsādhā-
raneti/

vyāpārabhinna.⁸ If 'anupalabdhi' does not have 'karana', it would not have been considered as a pramāna as per definition of it (pramāyāh karanaṃ pramānaṃ). As anupalabdhi is a pramāna, it is to be presumed that there must be some karana in it. If the term 'karana' is taken in a traditional sense (i.e., vyāpāravat asā dhāraṇam kāraṇam karanaṃ meaning an uncommon cause having operative process is an uncommon cause), there is no karana in this sense. Hence, the term 'karana' is to be interpreted in a different way. In the case of perception etc. there is the uncommon cause associated with operative process, i.e., eye and its contact with eye (sannikarṣa). In the case of anumāna also there is uncommon cause, i.e., the knowledge of vyāpti which is connected with vyāpāra, i.e., parāmarśa. But in the case of anupalabdhi there is uncommon cause nodoubt, but there is no vyāpāra due to the impossibility of the operation of the sense-organ with the absence. Hence, here karana has to be taken as vyāpārabhinna, but not

8. (§ 40) TS - Asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karanaṃ.

&

TSD - Vyāpāravat kāraṇam karanaṃ iti mate parāmarśadvārā vyāptijñānaṃ.

- Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasamgraha by Annam Bhaṭṭa, Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1983.

vyāpāravat. So far as uncommon cause is concerned, it is obviously there. Hence, it is said that while perception etc. are endowed with uncommon cause as associated with vyāpāra (vyāpāravat), the non-apprehension is endowed with an uncommon cause having no vyāpāra at all (i.e., vyāpārabhinna).

The most important points of the above discussion can be shown in the following way :

- a) Anupalabdhi is an uncommon cause of awareness of the absence of something. In order to exclude common cause like adr̥ṣṭa etc., the term 'asādhāraṇa' is incorporated.
- b) It is direct or immediate and presentative, because memory of past non-existence is excluded from the purview of the definition.
- c) Here karana is not taken in the sense of vyāpāravat, but in the sense of vyāpārabhinna.
- d) It is not produced by the ordinary positive means of knowledge, viz., namely knowledge of invariable concomitance, knowledge of similarity, knowledge of the fact to be explained and knowledge of the words conveying intention respectively.

Now it would be much helpful for us to understand the Advaita concept of anupalabdhi if it is highlighted through the concept of anupalabdhi as advocated by Bhāṭṭas. In this connection it may be noted that there are striking resemblances between two theories or rather each theory is complementary to another.

Śabarāsvāmin⁹ holds that the absence of other means of knowledge is not itself due to the means of knowledge of non-existence in any sense. This sense is also clearly expressed by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa that if the five (positive) means of knowledge in the case of an object do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, we have negation as a pramāṇa for the non-existence of that object. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends upon the validity of negation as a way of knowing. Now the question is : How do we determine the validity of negation and what is the ground of its validity? In reply, the Bhaṭṭas refute the opponent's view by saying that the validity of negation is not established through perception or inference.¹⁰

Kumārila claims that there is no rule that pramāṇa must always be positive. Because pramāṇas dealing with positive entities cannot tell us anything about negative entities. According to Kumārila, the non-existence of an object in a particular locus is not identical with the locus itself. It is something more than the existence of the mere locus (adhīsthānātrīktaṃ tattvaṃ). Thus, existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) are two different

9. Śabara Bhāṣya on Jaimini Sūtra I.i.5.

10. Śloka-Vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, verse 45-46, Edited by Dr. C. Kunhan Rājā, Madras, 1946.

aspects, but not identical, i.e., one is not reducible to other. The process of cognising a negation is purely mental. It means that having perceived the presence of the bare locus and after remembering the counter-positive (pratiyogin), we arrive at a negative judgement that "it is not". Thus, neither perception nor inference can be valid in the case of a negative cognition, for there is no logical mark of a negative object. The positive objects are known through positive means of knowing. In the same way, negative objects are apprehended through Anupalabdhi. If positive objects were also apprehended through abhāva, all the objects would have been known by this, which is not possible.¹¹

The main contention of the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka is that if the negation of an object is known, it presupposes the knowledge of the locus on which the object of absence i.e., counterpositive (pratiyoqī) remains. Because, without the knowledge of the counterpositive absence can not be known. The absence cannot be known if pratiyoqī is not capable of being cognised. Though locus and pratiyoqī are known, there is no logical mark through which the absence can be known. Hence, absence is not capable of being perceived or inferred, but capable of being known through non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).

11. Kasyacid yadibhāvasya syād abhāvena kenācit samvandhadarśanam
tatra sarvamānam prasajyate/

So anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is a means of knowing non-existence (abhāva). Anupalabdhi is concerned with apprehending negative facts (abhāva) and hence it is connected with the non-existence. For example, the non-existence of an elephant in a room is known through the absence of my apprehension of an elephant in this room. Such non-apprehension is known as anupalabdhi.

It is also to be noted that the self should be known as different from non-self. In this connection, the question may be raised in the following way. Is this difference (bheda) a negative entity or absence (abhāva)? If absence, it has no relation with a sense-organ and it cannot, therefore, be grasped by any of the five pramānas. One can say that difference is known from non-cognition (anupalabdhi). But why? Bheda is a kind of anyonyābhāva (mutual absence). That is, when it is said that self is different from non-self, the form of absence will be : 'Self is not non-self'. Or in other cases, when it is said 'jar is not jar', there is the knowledge of the absence of a jar. This absence is somehow known to us. If there is any knowledge, there must be some sources of knowing. This source is not perception or inference etc. Hence, non-cognition or anupalabdhi must be the source of knowing the absence of it.

It may be argued whether anupalabdhi always gives rise to the knowledge of non-existence. If it is said that anupalabdhi does not lead always us to the knowledge of non-existence, another problem would crop up. The problem is : When can anupalabdhi be

regarded as the source of the knowledge of non-existence? In other words, it is a problem whether anupalabdhi is pramāna in each and every case of absence or in some specific cases.

In reply, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, the author of Vedānta-paribhāṣā is of the opinion that appropriate anupalabdhi (yogyā-nupalabdhi) can give rise to the knowledge of non-existence. As the imperceptible objects like merit, demerit etc. are not capable of being known through sense-organ, there is no certainty of knowing their non-existence. Hence, non-apprehension of those objects that are capable of being known (yogyānupalabdhi) is the instrument of the apprehension of non-existence. In fact, knowing an absence presupposes the knowledge of the counterpositive or absentee (pratiyogī). The knowledge of absentee again presupposes its capability of being known directly with the help of sense-organs. If there is a pratiyogī (i.e., absentee) which is not capable of being known, the absence of it cannot be ascertained.¹² Hence, the term 'yogyā' is attached to 'anupalabdhi'.

It may be argued that the absence which is said to be

12. Na cābhāvānumiti - sthale'pyanupalabdhyai vābhāvo grhyatām;
viśeṣābhāvāditi vācyam; dharmādharmādyanupalabdhi - sattve'pi
tadabhāvānisāyena yogyānupalabdhere vābhāva - grāhakatvāt/

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi-Pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

known through inference may be known with the help of non-apprehension also. Because there is no difference between the absence apprehended through anupalabdhi and absence attained through inference. If it is said that the absence of an object which is supersensuous is to be known through inference and absence of objects other than this type is to be known through anupalabdhi, there would be the defect of logical cumbrousness - called Gourava due to accepting various causes for knowing the knowledge of absence. Hence, it is the contention of the opponents that knowledge of all types of absence should be known through anupalabdhi.¹³

In order to refute the above standpoint the Advaitins forward the following arguments. If anupalabdhi is taken as a source of knowing all types of absence (negation), there would arise the possibility of knowing an absence of some incidents, or objects existing in dream due to having non-apprehension of them. Moreover, there would arise the possibility of knowing the absence of merit, demerit etc. at the waking state due to the same reason.¹⁴ But actually the knowledge of absence of merit and

13. Vivrti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattācārya, Calcutta, p. 224, 1377 (B.S.)

14. Dharmādharmādyanupalabdhi - sattve'pi tadabhāvāniścayena yogyānupalabdhirevābhāva - grāhakatvāt.

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi Pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

demerit is not known though there is anupalabdhi of them. Hence Anupalabdhi cannot be the source of knowing all types of absence (abhāva). On account of this only yogyānupalabdhi (i.e., absence of those that are capable of being perceived) is to be taken as pramāna of abhāva. Though at the waking state there is non-cognition of merit, demerit etc., yet it (i.e., absence of merit, demerit etc.) is not capable of being known through anupalabdhi due to having the absence of yogyānupalabdhi. The absence of merit, demerit etc. is known through inference, but not through anupalabdhi.¹⁵

Another problem may be raised in the following way : How is the yogyatā (appropriateness) of anupalabdhi to be ascertained? One reply can be given that yogyānupalabdhi is a kind of anupalabdhi whose absentee (pratiyoqī) is a perceptible object. As for example, if there is a absence of jar on the ground, the anupalabdhi of the jar is a kind of yogyānupalabdhi; because the jar which is the counterpositive of the absence is a perceptible object. So the non-perception of the jar on the ground necessarily indicates the knowledge of its non-existence.

The opponents argue that what may be the exact meaning of the term 'yogyānupalabdhi'. The meaning is of two types :

- i) The non-apprehension of a counterpositive which is capable of

15. Vivrti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, p. 226, 1377 (B.S.).

being perceived.

- ii) The non-apprehension of the counterpositive in the locus which is capable of being perceived.¹⁶

It may be said that the former is not correct. If yogyānupalabdhi is taken as non-apprehension of the perceptible object, there would not be the perception of the difference of spirit in a pillar, Because the counterpositive of the difference of spirit is the spirit itself which is not capable of being perceived. In that case though there is the non-apprehension of the counterpositive i.e., spirit, this non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is not yogyānupalabdhi although the difference of spirit is perceptible. Hence, the former meaning is not tenable.¹⁷

The second meaning is not also tenable. If yogyānupalabdhi is the non-apprehension of an object in a perceptible locus, there would arise the possibility of perceiving the absence of merit, demerit etc. in the self (ātman) as there is yogyānupalabdhi of the counterpositives like merit etc. in the perceptible-self. Here

16. Nanu keyam yogyānupalabdhiḥ? Kim yogyasya pratiyogino' nupalabdhiḥ? Uta yogye 'dhikarane pratiyogyanupalabdhiḥ?

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

17. Nādyah, stambhe piśācādi - bhedasyā - pratyakṣatvāpatteh/

- Ibid.

'perceptible self' means self existing in the body. There is also self which is not associated with body. This type of self is not perceptible, which is not taken here. In other words, here is the locus itself which is capable of being perceptually known there is the non-apprehension of the counterpositives like merit, demerit etc. From these it would follow that there would be the perceptibility of the absence of merit, demerit etc. in the self. In this case, the non-existence of dharma (virtue) and adharma (vice) in the self could not be known through anupalabdhi though the locus i.e., self is perceptible and hence it cannot be taken as an appropriate locus. But it has already been stated that the absence of dharma, adharma etc. can be known through inference only. From this it follows that the appropriateness (yogyatā) of anupalabdhi does neither mean the appropriateness of the absentee nor the appropriateness of the locus of absence.¹⁸

The appropriateness of a particular anupalabdhi can be known by applying a kind of hypothetical argument of the following type. When we can say that a particular object would have been known, had it been present there, there is yogyānupalabdhi. If there is a jar on the ground in a broad daylight, it would have been perceived. From the non-perception of the jar, the non-existence of it is

18. Nāntyaḥ, ātmani dharmādharmaḍyabhāvasya pratyakṣatvā-patteriti cet, na/

known.¹⁹ In other words, the non-existence of the jar on the ground is known through yogyānupalabdhi. But such type of hypothetical argument is not possible if there is the absence of a jar in a darkroom. The absence of a jar in a room which is sufficiently illumined can be apprehended. At that same time there may be the absence of a jar in a complete darkroom. In the latter case yogyānupalabdhi cannot be applied, because in this case it is not possible to apply hypothetical argument in the form - 'Had the jar been in the room, it would have been cognised'. As there is no light in the room a jar though present cannot be cognised. Hence, the knowledge of the absence of a jar in a darkroom is not known through yogyānupalabdhi.²⁰ Again, if there is a spirit in a pillar through the relation called identity (tādātmya), it

19. Anupalabdheriyogyatā ca tarkita - pratiyogisattva - prasāñjita - pratiyogikatvam/ Yasyābhāvo grhyate, tasya yah pratiyogī, tasya sattvenādhikarane tarkitena prasāñjitamāpādana - yogyam pratiyogi - upalabdhi - svarūpam yasyānupalambhasya tattvam, tadanupalabdheriyogatvamityarthah/

- Ibid.

20. Tathāhi sphītālokaṇvati bhūtale yadi ghaṭaḥ syāt, tadā ghaṭopalambhaḥ syādityāpādana - sambhavāt tādrśa - bhūtale ghaṭābhāvo 'nupalabdhiḡamyah, andhakāre tu tādrśāpādanābhāvanānupalabdhi - gamyatā/

- Ibid.

would have been perceptible by itself like the pillar. Hence, the absence of the spirit in a pillar is known through anupalabdhi. The matter can be explained in the following way : If spirit is different from the pillar and spirit remains in pillar through contact then the existence of the spirit in the pillar would not be known. But if spirit, without being different from the pillar, remains in the pillar through the relation called tādātmya, it's presence would have been cognised like the pillar. As pillar is cognised, the spirit which is identical with pillar is also to be cognised. Hence, the hypothetical argument of the previous type may also be applicable here. In this way, the non-apprehension of the spirit in a pillar is possible through yoqyā-nupalabdhi. Although dharma etc. exist in the self, we cannot apply the hypothetical argument in the form : 'If dharma etc. were in the self, they would have been perceived'. Hence, the absence of dharma etc. cannot be known through yoqyānupalabdhi.²¹

The Advaita concept of anupalabdhi can be explained with the help of the commentary known as Maṇiprabhā. According to Maṇiprabhā, a particular sense-organ does not give us the knowledge of an object bearing certain characteristic features and

21. Ata eva stambhe tādātmyena piśāca - sattve stambhavat
 pratyakṣatvāpattyā tadabhāvo'nupalabdhi - gamyah/ Ātmani
 dharmādharmasattve'pi tasyātīndriyatayā niruktopalambhā-
 pādanāsambhavāna dharmādharmādyabhāvasyānupalabdhi-gamyatvam/

existing in a particular locus. If the object is capable of being perceived, the absence of the knowledge is the means of conveying the knowledge that the object possessing those characteristic does not exist in that locus.²²

It may be argued by the opponents that, since the Advaitins admit that the apprehension of the absence of a jar on the ground is possible if there is some sense-activity, it follows that the knowledge of the non-existence like the non-existence of its locus is derived from sense-perception, but not a different source of knowledge called anupalabdhi. The main contention of the opponent is that in order to know the absence of an object we have to see the locus. Hence, sense-organs are operative even in the case of the knowledge of absence. As sense-organs are active, the knowledge of absence should be taken as perceptual, but not the knowledge attained through anupalabdhi.²³

In reply, the Advaitins argue that sense-activity is present in the immediate apprehension of both existence and non-existence, but anupalabdhi of the absent object is present only in the case of the apprehension of non-existence. It cannot be said that in each and every case of the apprehension of an object the sense-

22. Maniprabhā on Śikhāmani, p. 318.

23. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, p. 233, 1377 (B.S.)

activity is present. There are some peculiar cases of absence as in the case of ayogyānupalabdhi (about which the discussions have already been made) which cannot be known through anupalabdhi.²⁴

It may be asked that the non-existence is to be taken as the object of sense-perception if we admit that the perception is caused by non-existence as a capacity of content (artha). Without accepting the non-existence as an artha, how perception is possible. But it cannot be said that the non-existence is the object (artha) of sense-perception logically, because it does not come to the contact of the sense-organ as we find in the cases of a jar etc.

The above question does not stand by itself. It can be solved in the light of the previous arguments. We have already mentioned that the causes of the knowledge of an object are sense-activity, anupalabdhi etc. Here anupalabdhi alone is the unique cause of the knowledge of non-existence, but not the sense-activity. So anupalabdhi alone must be accepted as the special cause of apprehending non-existence, but not sense-activity etc. Hence, it may be said that the knowledge of non-existence under consideration cannot be apprehended through the operation of the sense-organs and it is not perceptual.

It may further be argued that both the knowledge of

24. Ibid, p. 234.

existence and non-existence bear the same character of immediacy. That is to say, if knowledge of existence is known directly with the help of sense-organ, the knowledge of non-existence also should be known with the help of the same means due to having the same character of immediacy.²⁵ Do the Advaitins want to say that ground is known through one means, i.e., perception and the knowledge of non-existence through another, i.e., anupalabdhi?

In reply, the Advaitins are of the opinion that though the apprehension of the object is attained through perception, the absence of an object is known through a different instrument called anupalabdhi which is a separate pramāna. It is not logical to say that the non-existence is to be known in the same line by which the ground is known. There is no certainty that the character of the produced knowledge determines the means of knowing it, but it is the character of the mental process or function (vr̥tti) that decides the method through which it is known. This method is not certainly a perceptual one though the knowledge is of immediate nature. Hence, it is known through a separate means called anupalabdhi.²⁶

25. The six ways of knowing, Edited by D. M. Datta,
Calcutta University Publication,
Calcutta, 1972, p. 173.

26. Vr̥tti- vaijātyamātreṇa pramāna- vaijātyopapattēh/
Tathā ca ghaṭābhāvākārā vr̥ttimendriya - janyā, indriyasya

There is no certainty about the theory that if one object is known through perception, other objects that are known immediately should also be known through the same process, i.e., perception. Because to the Advaitins the nature of the object determines the process through which it is to be known. Each and every mental form or function technically called vṛtti is according to the nature of the object. Hence the mental mode or vṛtti in the form of ground is different from that of absence of a jar. Though there is immediacy in both the cases, the mental mode is different in two cases. Hence, from the difference of mental mode the different way of knowing or pramāna has to be accepted. The mental mode in the form of the absence of a jar is not caused by the sense-organ (na indriyajanya), through the mental mode in the form of ground is caused by the sense-organs. Hence, perception cannot reveal both presence and absence of an object. For absence, we have to accept a separate source of knowledge called anupalabdhi.

Another serious objection may be raised against the Advaitins that the knowledge of the non-existence of a jar is immediate or direct. The Advaitins admit that the non-existence which is the product of cosmic illusion (Māyā) should be of

viṣayenā'sannikarsāt kintu ghaṭānupalabdhi - rūpa - mānāntara-
janyeti bhavatyānupalabdhermānāntaratvam/

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi
pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

immediate character. In other words, if the knowledge of the non-existence of a jar is perceptual, there would arise the possibility of perceptibility even in the case of the illusory knowledge of the non-existence of a jar when there is really a jar on the ground. It can be explained in the following way. When the real absence of a jar (but not erroneously) is known immediately, the illusory knowledge of the non-existence of a jar should be known directly. The Advaitins believe that in illusion the cause of illusory objects (i.e., Māyā) is of a positive character (bhāvārūpa). From this it follows that māyā is not merely a negation of knowledge, but indeterminable. The absence of a jar which forms in the content of illusory knowledge will be indeterminable and positive, but not a negation. Had it been a negation, the sense-contact would not have been possible. In order to avoid this difficulty if it is said that the absence of a jar in illusion does not have any māyā as its material cause, it will go against the basic position of Advaita Vedānta.²⁷

27. Nanvanupalabdhi - rūpa - mānāntara - pakṣe 'bhāvapratiṭeḥ
 pratyakṣatve ghaṭavati ghaṭābhāvabhramasyāpi pratyakṣa-
 tvāpattau tatrāpyanirvacaniya - ghaṭābhāvo 'bhyupagamyeta/
 Na cestāpattih, tasya māyopādānakatve 'bhāvatvānupapatteḥ,
 māyopādānakatvābhāve māyāyāḥ sakala - kāryyopādānatvānupapa-
 ttiriti cet/

Dharmarāja has tried to solve this difficulty with the following argument. The illusion of the absence of a jar is not indeterminable product of māyā. It is the case of cognition which is called anyathākhyāti, but not anirvacanīya-khyāti. The absence of a jar is cognised in the colour of the ground is to be cognised on the ground only. The jar is non-existing in the colour of the ground. When there is the illusory knowledge of the non-existence of a jar on the ground, there is the cognition which of different type, i.e., anyathākhyātivāda. It cannot be questioned how the Advaitins can propogate the doctrine of anyathākhyāti which is formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Because the Advaitins also accept anyathākhyātivāda in the case of illusion. In other words, if there is the illusory cognition of absence on the ground then it must be taken as anyathākhyātivāda,²⁸ because the absence of a jar is not really there. If there is the knowledge of the absence of a jar in a place where there is really the absence, it would be taken as anirvacanīyakhyātivāda.

28. Na, ghaṭavati ghaṭābhāva - bhramo na tatkalōtpanna -
 ghaṭābhāva - visayakah, kintu bhūtala - rūpādaū vidyamāno
 laukiko ghaṭābhāvo bhūtale āropyate ityanyathākhyātereva/
 Āropya - sannikarsasthale sarvatrānyathākhyātereva
 vyavasthāpanāt/

- Ibid.

Such knowledge of absence though produced through anupalabdhi is not mediate or indirect. There is the relation called Samjuktābhinna-viśeṣanātā (i.e., qualificerness identical with the conjoined) between sense-organ and absence of a jar existing in the colour on the ground. Hence, the object which is conjoined with the sense-organ may be known through a separate pramāna. Whatever pramāna it may be, there will always be immediacy of knowledge. There will not be uniformity if it is said that the object of illusion in some cases is phenomenally true and in some cases it is indescribable. This view is not correct according to the Advaitins, because it has been accepted that, where the imposed object is in connection with the sense-organ, there is always anyathākhyātivāda. On the other hand, where the imposed object is not conjoined with the sense-organ but direct, there the doctrine of anirvacanīyakhyāti has to be accepted. Hence, there is no problem.²⁹

The author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā admits four kinds of non-existence that can be known through anupalabdhi. Four kinds of non-existence are : Previous non-existence (prāgabhāva), non-existence as destruction (pradhvaṃsābhāva), absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) and mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva).

29. Astu vā pratiyogimati tadabhāva - bhramasthale tadabhāvasyānirvacanīyatvam, tathāpi tadupādānam māyaiva/

The first is defined as non-existence of an effect in its material cause previously before the effect is originated.³⁰ It is the object of an apprehension that the thing will come into being. The non-existence of a jar, for example, in its material cause (earth), prior to the production of the jar, would be called prāgabhāva. So the judgement, "The jar will exist",³¹ applies only to the case of prāgabhāva, whereas the judgement, "The jar does not exist", is common to all kinds of non-existence.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the definition of prāgabhāva is the absence which is destructible called prāgabhāva (vināśya-bhāvatva). Any absence, they opine, does not come to an end if prāgabhāva is not accepted. But the Vedāntins think that all the absences are destructible. Hence, they do not accept the Nyāya view and formulated the above mentioned definition. In other words, prāgabhāva does not have any beginning and it cannot remain in a different place other than material cause and time.³²

30. Kāraṇe kāryasya ghaṭāderutpatteḥ pūrvam yo 'bhāvaḥ,
sa prāgabhāvaḥ/

- Ibid.

31. Sa ca bhaviṣyatīti pratītiṣayaḥ/

- Ibid.

32. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by

The second is illustrated as follows. There is the absence of a jar, after it has been destroyed with a club. This non-existence as destruction is also certainly destroyed when its substratum, (i.e., the pieces of a jar) is destroyed.³³ This is contrary to the view of the logicians, according to whom it has a beginning but no end. It cannot be questioned how there can be a cessation of destruction where the substratum of the destruction is eternal. The Advaitins admit that when the locus of the non-existence created by destruction is destructible, the non-existence cannot be endless or indestructible. Moreover, when the locus, in question, is endless or eternal, the non-existence in question is eternal, viz., as in the case of an atom.³⁴

They also admit that Brahman is alone endlessly real or eternal entity, which follows that kind of non-existence which is endless and which has Brahman for its locus. An indirect proof

Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1377 (B.S.), p.237.

33. Tatraiva ghaṭasya mudgarapātānantaram yo'bhāvah, sa dhvamsābhāvah/

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

34. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1377 (B.S.), p. 238.

of the falsity of the statement, according to them, is that the destruction of the non-existence of an object created by its destruction necessarily implies the re-emergence of the object.³⁵

It is seen that the Naiyāyikas accept the destruction which has a beginning but no end. But the Vedāntins think that the destruction also comes to an end as all the objects excepting Brahman are non-eternal.³⁶ The locus of the destruction is only the material cause of the counterpositive. The object whose locus is its material cause would be destroyed due to the destruction of the material cause. Otherwise it has to be believed to remain without any locus. Nothing in the phenomenal world may remain without locus, because Brahman also has been accepted as having without locus. Hence, the destruction is capable of being destroyed with the destruction of its material causes. The contrary of the counterpositive is its destruction as the destruction remains after the destruction of the counterpositive (i.e., prati-yogī). There is no possibility of its coming back again. That is

35. Anyathā prāgabhāva - dhvamsātmake ghaṭasya - nāśe,
prāgabhāvonmajjanāpattih/

- Ibid.

36. Na caivamapi yatra dhvamsādhikaraṇam nityam, tatra katham
dhvamsa - nāśa iti vācyam, tādrśamadhikaraṇam yadi caitanya -
vyatiriktaṁ, tadā tasya nityatvamasiddham/

- Ibid.

why, it has been stated as if there is destruction of the destruction of a jar. The jar cannot reappear just as the jar is the counterpositive of the destruction of jar and the same jar is also counterpositive of the destruction of the destruction of a jar. It may be said that the destruction of a jar should be the counterpositive of the destruction of the destruction of a jar. But why is only jar taken as pratiyogī? It can be replied in the following way. Just as at the time of the destruction of a jar an individual does not have apprehension of a jar, so in the case of the destruction of the destruction of a jar the individual has the same feeling (the non-apprehension of a jar). In both the cases we have a common feeling that the jar is destroyed. Hence, the jar is taken as the counterpositive of the destruction of the destruction of a jar.³⁷

The third kind of non-existence literally means absolute non-existence. If a particular thing does not exist in past, present and future, it is to be taken as absolute non-existence of that thing in that locus.³⁸ The other three kinds of absence,

37. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1377(B.S.), p. 238.

38. Yatrādhikaraṇe yasya kālatraye 'pyabhāvah, so'tyantābhāvah/
— Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

i.e., prāgabhāva (prior absence), dhvamsābhāva (non-existence as destruction) and anyonyābhāva (mutual absence) do not remain at anytime. According to the Advaitins, after the production of the counterpositive there is prāgabhāva, at the destruction of the locus there is dhvamsābhāva and after the removal of nescience there is anyonyābhāva (i.e., mutual absence).³⁹ But the absolute absence remains as long as time remains. That is why, absolute negation remains pervading all times, e.g., there is ^{the} absence of colour in the air. It is a kind of absolute absence as it remains covering three times (i.e., colour does not exist in air in three times). This absolute absence becomes the counterpositive of destruction at the time of dissolution just like space etc. At the time of dissolution the locus of space etc. is destroyed just as space is destroyed. In the like manner, after the destruction of the locus of absolute negation, the absolute negation is destroyed.⁴⁰

If somebody says that the absolute absence of an absurd entity like the absolute absence of hare's horn etc. may be considered as a case of absolute absence, it is not tenable. For, though here the absence of hare's horn remains in past, present and future, it cannot taken as real atyantābhāva. Atyantābhāva of an entity which really exists can be taken as a real one. In

39. Vivṛti (a Bengali commentary) on Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1377 (B.S.), p. 241.

40. Ibid.

fact, the negation is possible if the counterpositive of it is a real object. If pratīyoqī is an absurd entity, it is not an atyantābhāva. This type of absence is called the absence, the counterpositive of which is an absurd entity (alīkapratīyoqī-kābhāva). The object which is prasakta (i.e., capable of being negated) can be negated only. According to this principle, the hare's horn etc. are not capable of being negated due to their non-existing or absurd character. Hence, their absence is not possible.

Lastly, mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva) is nothing but difference or separateness due to which, we generally say, "This is not such and such", "This is not that". The object of such awareness is a kind of absence which is called anyonyābhāva.⁴¹ This mutual absence is generally used by the terms difference (bheda), separateness (prthaktva) and classification in the following way - "This is different from that", "This is separated from that" and "This is classified from that". The Naiyāyikas have accepted the separateness and classification as qualification (guna). But the Vedāntins do not think so. Because, they do not think that classification, separateness and difference are not different from each other due to the identity of

41. Idamidam neti pratīti - visayo'nyonyābhāvah/

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt. anupalabdhi
pariccheda), Madras, 1942.

The Naiyāyikas think that the mutual absence is eternal, while the Vedāntins do not. According to the Vedāntins, a case of mutual absence becomes non-eternal if the locus and the counter-positive of the mutual absence are non-eternal. In the case of the mutual absence in the form "jar is not cloth", the locus and the counterpositive (i.e., jar and cloth) are produced object. Hence, this mutual absence is non-eternal. If these are eternal (i.e., anūyogī i.e., locus of absence and pratiyogī i.e., counter-positive are eternal), the mutual absence also becomes eternal. In the mutual absence "Jīva different from Brahman" or "Brahman is different from Jīva" the anūyogī i.e., the locus of absence and pratiyogī i.e., counterpositive of the absence are eternal. Hence, mutual absence is also eternal.⁴³

Difference is of two kinds - conditioned (sopādhika) and

42. Ayameva vibhāgo bhedaḥ prthaktvaṃ ceti vyapadiśyate,
bhedaṭirikta - vibhāgādaḥ pramāṇābhāvāt/

- Ibid.

43. Ayamcānyonyābhāvo 'dhikarāṇasya sādītve sādih/
Yathā ghaṭepaṭa - bhedaḥ/
Adhikarāṇasyānādītve 'nādireva/

- Ibid.

unconditioned (anupādhika). The conditioned mutual absence is that the existence of which is the vyāpya of the existence of its upādhi, while the unconditioned mutual absence is that which has not this kind of existence.⁴⁴ In other words, the mutual absence becomes sopādhika, i.e., endowed with limiting adjunct, if its existence is pervaded (vyāpya) by the existence of the limiting adjunct (upādhi). This type of mutual absence remains as long as its limiting adjunct upādhi remains. The existence of mutual absence is conditioned by the existence of upādhi. The first type of absence lies in the mutual absence of the space which is due to the difference of upādhi like jar etc. We can take another example, the same sun becomes different due to the difference of the container of water on which it is reflected. Though there is no difference of Ākāśa or space, yet it is a well-known fact that there is a difference between space limited by jar (ghatākāśa) and the space limited by mission (mathākāśa). The difference of same space appear to us due to the difference of upādhi (ghata or matha). In the same way, it can be said that there is no difference in the sun. In spite of that there is difference among the containers of water due to the difference of the container which are upādhis, the sun seems to be difference.

44. Punarapi bhedo dvividhah sopādhiko nirupādhikaśceti/
 Tatropādhi-sattā-vyāpya-sattā katvaṁ sopādhikatvaṁ,
 tacchūnyatvaṁ nirupādhikatvaṁ/

The unconditioned mutual absence lies in the difference of cloth in a jar (ghato no patah).⁴⁵

The differences as found in Brahman are illusory as they are produced by some nescience, The nescience is positive, but not the prior absence of knowledge. Hence, it can produce illusion of difference.

The anupalabdhi can, however, be proved as a separate pramāna with the method of reductio-ad-absurdum or tarka as found in Indian philosophy. In the case of knowledge, 'There is no jar on the ground' - the negation is known with the help of reductio-ad-absurdum or tarka which is generally adopted by us at the time of apprehension. The form of tarka will be like this, "Had there been a jar on the ground, it would have been perceived". As it is not perceived, it is not there. In the same way, when the jar is known as different from the pot, the mutual absence is known through the application of tarka again. That jar is different from pot is known through their non-identification (bheda). The tarka will go like this, "Had the jar been identified with pot,

45. Tatrādyo yathaikasyākāśasya ghatādyupādhibhedena bhedah/
 Yathā caikasya sūryasya jalabhājanabhedena bhedah/
 Yathā caikasya Brahmano'ntahkaranabhedād bhedah/
 Nirupādhikabhedo yathā ghaṭe paṭa-bhedah/

it would have been perceived as such". As jar is not revealed to us as an identical with a pot, it completely different from that. In this way, we are going on applying tarka in order to know an object correctly. When "the book", for example, is known, it is known as non-identified with non-book. In the same way, cow is known as different from other animals, i.e., non-cow, as cow is not identical with others. In this way, in our practical life we are applying tarka in order to get the knowledge of absence.

CHAPTER-IV

THE THEORY OF ANUPALABDHI IN BHĀṬṬA SCHOOL OF
PŪRVAMĪMĀMSA.

The Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā accepts anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowing a negative fact. Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa, after following Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, has proved that anupalabdhi is a special source of knowledge (pramāṇa). He says in his Mānameyodaya that if there is the non-cognition of an absent object which is capable of being known, it is possible through the method called anupalabdhi. Here the pramāṇa called abhāva or anupalabdhi is the indicator to the knowledge of an absent entity. In spite of the fact that on the ground there is the capability of knowing the entities like a jar, they are not known. And from this non-cognition we get the knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. This phenomenon is known through abhāva which is accepted by the Bhāṭṭas as a separate pramāṇa. The knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. is the pramā attained through the application of pramāṇa called abhāva. It has been stated in the Bhāṣya of Śābara that the absent entity which is under the object of the knowledge of absence is not capable of being known through the five pramāṇas like perception etc.

(abhāvo'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstitysyārthasyāsannikr̥ṣṭasya iti). In other words, the absence is generally expressed with the term 'nāsti'. The object of absence does not come into the contact of sense-organ etc. and it is not known through other pramāṇas. Hence it is known through different pramāṇa called anupalabdhi.¹

Now the problem arises : What is the criterion of anupalabdhi? In reply, it can be said that the criterion of anupalabdhi is the collection of causes of cognising an absentee excepting the absentee and contact with absentee.² when we have the knowledge of the absence of a jar, for example, on the ground, there the pratiyogī, i.e., the object in the form of a jar does not exist and there is the absence of the contact of eye with the jar but there are other causes like the opening of eye, the contact of mind with eye, sufficient light that are

1. "Athopalambhayogyatve satyapynupalambhanam/ Abhāvākhyam pramāṇam syādabhāvasyāvavodhakam// Atra hyanupalambhah karanam/ Tasya ca jñānā - bhāvarūpatvādabhāvah pramāṇamityucyate/"

- Mānameyodaya (Chapter - abhāvapramāṇam) by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, 1933.

2. "Viṣayam tadadhīnāmśca sannikarṣādikan vinā/ Upalambhasya sāmagrīsampattiḥ khalu yogyatā//"

- Ibid.

essential for cognising a jar. The assemblage of these causes (sāmagrī) is the criterion for the non-cognition of a jar. The absence of a jar becomes the object of valid knowledge (pramā) as it is a kind of yogyānupalabdhi.³ For having the knowledge of a negative fact it is to be known at the outset that there is the collection of causes for giving rise to the cognition of a jar. If it is not known, the knowledge of the absence of a jar would never be known. It will occur in an individual's mind that he is not cognising a jar on the ground and he has no contact of eye with a jar. In spite of that he will look for whether other causes for knowing a jar exist or not. If someone is not confirmed about the fact that the causes for knowing a jar exist or not, he will be in confusion about the existence of a jar on the ground. He will wonder whether a jar exists in that place or not. If someone bears such a doubt, he will not be able to know definitely the absence of a jar. Non-apprehension, if confirmed, can become the object of knowledge of an

3. "Tataśca viṣayabhūtaṃ ghaṭaṃ tadadhīnāṃścendriyasannikar-
sādīn vinā yaccakṣurunmīlanālokaśampātamaṇaḥ prañidhānādikaṃ
ghaṭopalambhakāraṇaṃ tat sarvamidānīmeva sañjātamityavagame
sati tatsahakṛtaḥ saṅ ghaṭānupalambho ghaṭābhāvaṃ vodhayati-
tyevaṃ sarvatra draṣṭavyaṃ/"

absence. In other words, if the capability of knowing the object of absence exists, it becomes the valid knowledge of absence.

The knowledge of non-cognition is not the instrument of the valid knowledge of absence. If it is so, the knowledge of non-cognition implies the knowledge of the absence of cognition. The knowledge of absence of cognition, being an object of valid knowledge of absence, depends on the absence of cognition as its instrument. This knowledge of anupalabdhi is again an object of valid knowledge of an absence and hence it will depend on another knowledge of anupalabdhi as its instrument which leads to the defect of infinite regress (Anavasthā).⁴ On account of this if anupalabdhi exists, it will be an instrument. Absence of cognition of a jar can give rise to the knowledge of absence of a jar if it is associated with the knowledge of capability. In order to know the absence of a subtle object we have to know the capability of the non-cognition of that subtle object. And again to know the capability of a subtle object. We have to put the eye-rays which can reveal the subtle object and for this effort is highly needed. For understanding the capability of anupalabdhi of a subtle object we have to contact our eyes with the subtle object with outmost care. Otherwise, the knowledge of absence of subtle object is not possible. Moreover if someone bears the doubt as to the capability

4. Mānameyodaya, Vol. I, Edited by Sri Dīnanāthā Tripāthī,
Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1989, pp. 212-213.

of anupalabधि, he will have to doubt absence. In the same way, the absence becomes erroneous if the capability becomes so.⁵ The matter can be explained with the help of the following example.

A man might have lost his ring in the dark room. He tries to find out the ring with the help of his hand on the floor of the dark room, but in vein. At this stage he might have doubt whether he has touched the whole portion of the floor or not. As he bears such a doubt which can be described as doubt of yogyatva, he will also have doubt regarding the absence of the ring in the floor of the dark room. Another individual does not touch the whole floor on the dark room, but thinks that he has touched the whole floor. Being prompted by the erroneous knowledge of yogyatva he bears the illusory knowledge that there is no ring on the floor. But in fact the ring remains on the floor of the room. To think that there is no ring is the illusory know-

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5. "Yogyatvāvagamārthaṁ hi sūkṣmārthābhāvavedane/
Sūkṣmavodhakanetrāṁsūsampātārthaṁ prayatyate//
Yogyatvasya ca sandehe viparyāse'thavā sati/
Abhāve'pi hi sandeho bhramo vāstyeva tadyathā//"

- Manameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (Chapter -
abhāvapramānaṁ), Trivandrum Sanskrit series,
1912.

ledge of absence which is originated from the erroneous knowledge of yoqyatva. Hence, the ascertainment of yoqyatva becomes promoter to the valid knowledge of absence.⁶

Anupalabdhi is of two types : Absence of pramāna and absence of Smṛti.⁷ The absence of pramāna is equivalent to the absence of valid knowledge (pramā). Among the five types of valid knowledge like perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, testimonial knowledge, analogical knowledge and presumptuous knowledge the valid knowledge in the form of absence is anupalabdhi. That is, the absence of cognition of any of these valid cognitions comes through anupalabdhi. Due to the non-cognition of the perceptual knowledge of a jar we have the knowledge of the absence of a jar. In the same way, in the event of the knowledge of absence of an object known through inference, the absence of that object through inference is known through anupalabdhi.⁸ As for

6. "Tamasi bhraṣṭamanviṣyan karābhyāmangulīyakam/
Sarvorvīsparśasandehādabhāve'pyeti saṁśyam//
Tathaiva sarvato'sparśe matvā sarvābhimarśanam/
Sata evāngulīyasyāpyabhāvaṁ vudhyate bhramāt//"

- Ibid.

7. "Anupalambhastu dvividhaḥ, pramāṇābhāvarūpaḥ smaraṇābhāvarū-
paśca/".

- Ibid.

8. "Tatra pratyakṣapramāṇābhāvarūpādanupalambhād ghaṭādyabhā-

example, the inferential knowledge where gestures in the forms of inclination etc. serve as hetu becomes the pointer to the perception of the nature of an object. It is found in the phenomenal world that the animals after seeing the colour of the desired object inclines towards it. If they think it undesired, they refrain from accepting that object. In this way, they will have actions in the form of inclination to or refraining from. Each and every person can realise this phenomenon of action. If a person is seen to move forward for accepting an object or to refrain from that object, it is assumed - "This particular animal is endowed with the right knowledge of that object as he is endowed with this effort." In this way, 'having effort' serves as a hetu for inferring the knowledge of colour or nature of that object. If someone has got the knowledge of colour or nature, he will have an effort to get it. The inclination towards an object presupposes the knowledge of that object or particulars like colour etc. of that object. Again, inclination of an individual is known through his bodily gestures and movements. It is found in the daytime that owl sits silently and it will have no effort in his body even the enemies like crow etc. come towards it. From the absence of its bodily movement or effort it is known that the owl does not have

vajñānamuktam/ Evamanūnagamyārthānāmabhāvagrahaṇe
yogyānūnānūdayo voḍdhako draṣṭavyah/"

- Ibid.

perceptual knowledge of the nature of an object.⁹ In the same way, due to the non-cognition in the form of absence of analogical knowledge, testimonial knowledge, presumptuous knowledge, the knowledge of the absence of these is to be understood.

Another type of knowledge of absence arises from the non-cognition in the form of the absence of recollection. As for example, in the evening time an individual has become aware of the fact that Maitra was absent in the morning. In this case, the knowledge of the absence of Maitra in the morning arises from the absence of recollecting Maitra in the evening. Maitra existing in the morning cannot be the object of perceptual awareness in the evening. But in the evening Maitra was capable of being recollected. In spite of this a particular individual does not have recollective knowledge of Maitra. The absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening time indicates or informs the absence of him in the morning.¹⁰

9. "Yathā rūpadarśanavodhakasya ceṣṭālingakānumānasyānutpattirulūkasya divā rūpadarśanābhāvaṃ bodhayati ityuktaṃ manorathamiśraih/"

- Ibid.

10. "Evamanyapramāṇeṣvapi iti/ Smaraṇābhāvād yathā - prātarīha Maitro nāsīditi sāyamkāle jñānam/ Tatra hi prātaḥkālavīśiṣṭamaitrasya sāyamkāle darśanayogyatvābhāvāt smaraṇa-

The Naiyāyikas think that the abhāva of some objects is capable of being perceived and abhāva of some is capable of being inferred. They do not accept abhāva or anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna.¹¹ Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his Mānameyodaya has refuted this view in the following way. When there is the knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning is known in the evening then the absence of it existing in the morning cannot be perceived in the evening. For, the knowledge of absence existing in the morning is not caused through sense-organ in the evening. The knowledge of the present object only is always caused by sense-organ. The knowledge of absence existing in the morning when occurred in the evening relates to the object of the past. Hence, it cannot be caused by sense-organ. In order to justify such knowledge the Naiyāyikas, the Bhaṭṭas think, have to accept anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna.¹²

yogyatve sati asmaranameva tadānīm prātaḥkālavisiṣṭamaitrā-
bhāvasya vodhakamāsriyate iti /"

- Ibid.

11. "Tārkikāstu abhāvasya pratyakṣādi-gamyatvamācaksānā
anupalambhagamyatām na saṁmanyante/"

- Ibid.

12. "Tadayuktaṁ te'pi hi sāyamkāle prātaḥkālinābhāvajñānasya
indriyajanyatvābhāvādukta-prakāreṇānupalambhajativameva

It may be argued by the Naiyāyikas that the knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning occurred in the evening is inferential. The absence existing in the morning is inferred with the help of hetu in the form of the absence of recollection in the evening. The form of inference is as follows : "Now this place is endowed with the absence of Maitra existing in the morning as there is the absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening".¹³

In response to this the Bhāṭṭas say that this view is not tenable. In the case of inferential knowledge the knowledge of hetu or probans is highly essential. If it is said that the absence of recollection of Maitra in the evening is hetu or probans, the knowledge of the absence of recollection is to be known. But according to the Bhāṭṭas, such knowledge of absence of recollection is not at all possible because the Naiyāyikas accept the absence of recollection as an object of mental perception, which is not also

balāṅgikurvīran/"

- Ibid.

13. "Nanu tatra smaraṅabhāvena lingena prātaḥkālinābhāvo' numiyate eva/"

- Ibid.

acceptable.¹⁴ For, recollection is also a kind of knowledge. If the knowledge in the form of recollection is perceived with the help of mind, its absence would also be perceived through mind, because the sense-organ which reveals a particular object can also reveal the universal existing in that particular object and the absence of that particular object just as the eye which reveals colour can also reveal the universal existing in colour (colourness) and the absence of colour. In the same way, if the knowledge in the form of recollection is known through mind, the absence of it should also be known through mind. But according to the Bhāttas, no knowledge has been accepted as the object of perception. Knowledge is inferred with the help of knowness (jñātata). Hence, knowledge is always inferential, but not perceptual. As the knowledge in the form of memory, according to this principle, does not come under the purview of perception or mental perception, its absence can not also be known with the help of mental perception. The absence of memory can neither be known perceptually nor inferentially. If it is accepted that the absence of memory is inferred, what will be its hetu? If it is said that the absence of awareness will be hetu here, the knowledge of the absence of awareness is possible through the absence of memory, while the knowledge of absence of memory will be possible through the absence

14. "Maivam/ smaraṇābhāvasya jñātumaśakyatvāt"/

of awareness, which leads to the defect of 'mutual dependence' (anyonyāśraya). In short, the knowledge of the absence of memory does not follow from perception, inference or any other sources of valid knowledge. Hence with the help of the hetu in the form of the absence of memory, the absence of an object existing in the morning time cannot be inferred. The knowledge of the absence of an object existing in the morning time attained in the evening is caused by a separate pramāna called anupalabdhi. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted the perceptuality of knowledge. From this, it also follows that the absence of knowledge is not perceived with the help of mind.¹⁵

Just as the Mīmāṃsakas admit that the absence is known through anupalabdhi, the Naiyāyikas establish that absence is known through perception. The Naiyāyikas have forwarded some reasons in favour of the perceptuality of knowledge with the help of a syllogistic argument.¹⁶ The Naiyāyikas have mentioned this in

15. "Smṛtyabhāvaṃ manogrāh^amicchanti kila tār^kkikāh/
Taccāyuktaṃ vayaṃ tāvad jñānāpratyakṣavādinah//
Manahpratyakṣagamyatvaṃ jñānānāṃ vārayāmahe/
Tataśca tadabhāvo'pi manasā grhyate kathāṃ//"

- Ibid.

16. "Nanu abhāvasya pratyakṣatvamanumimāmahe/"

- Ibid.

a kārikā of Nyāyakusumāñjali. According to Udayana, on account of the fact that the knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is immediate (Pratipatterapāroksyāt), the function of our sense-organ on the locus etc. does not become improminent (indriyasyānupakṣyāt), the knowledge of the absence of a jar is called ajñātakaranaka, i.e., the knowledge whose instrument is not known (ajñātakaranatvācca) and mind enters into positives (bhāvāveśacca cetasaḥ), the knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is caused by sense-organ, i.e., perceptual.¹⁷

The syllogistic argument is : "Absence is perceptible because its cognition is immediate like a jar". In other words, the absence of a jar is perceptual as it is revealed to us immediately.¹⁸ This syllogistic argument, the Bhāṭṭas think, is fallacious as there is the fallacy called Svarūpāsiddhi. The Naiyāyikas

17. "Pratipatterapāroksyādindriyasyānupakṣayāt/
Ajñātakaranatvācca bhāvāveśacca cetasaḥ//"

- Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayana with commentary of
Haridāsa Bhāṭṭācārya, pt. M. C. Nyāyaratna, 3/20,
Translated & Edited by E. B. Cowell, Varanasi, 1980.

18. "Prayogastu abhāvaḥ pratyakṣaḥ aparokṣapratitātvād
ghaṭavaditi/"

- Ibid.

accept that the abhāva is known immediately, which is not accepted by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas according to whom the abhāva is not known immediately. As in the sādhya in the form of absence there does not exist hetu in the form of "immediate knowness", the hetu is endowed with fallacy called Svarūpāsiddha.¹⁹ The locus like ground where the knowledge of the absence of a jar is known is apprehended immediately. The Naiyāyikas have imposed the immediacy of locus, i.e., ground on the absence which is not correct. So, the statement that the absence is known immediately is not true. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted the first argument of Udayana in favour of perceptuality of absence.²⁰

Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa has refuted the second argument in favour of the perceptuality of absence forwarded by Udayana by applying the following syllogistic argument : "The knowledge of absence is perceptual as the sense-organ can produce the perceptuality of locus etc. without being inoperative, like the cognition of a jar".²¹

19. "Tatra abhāvasya aparokṣapratītatvābhāvāt svarūpāsiddho hetuḥ/"

- Ibid.

20. "Bhūtalādestvaparokṣatvādabhāvasyāpi tattva-bhramah eva āyusmatāmiti/"

- Ibid.

21. "Nanu abhāvajñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ anupakṣiṇendriyajanyatvād

Eye etc. are not inoperative in perceiving a jar and can produce the knowledge of a jar without being defunct. In the same way, eye etc., without being inoperative, can produce the absence of the knowledge of a jar. As the knowledge of a jar is perceptual, the knowledge of absence of it is also the same. This is what Udayana wants to say. But Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa says that the hetu in the form of 'being caused by the sense-organ which is not inoperative' (anupakṣīṇendriyajanyatva) is fallacious as there is a fallacy called viśeṣāsiddha. In other words, in this hetu the adjunct 'anupakṣīṇendriyatva' (i.e., not being inoperative in the knowledge of locus etc.) is not familiar. Hence there is the fallacy mentioned above.

Now the problem arises : Why the above-mentioned hetu suffers from the defect called viśeṣāsiddha? In reply, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa says that in order to know the yogyatā (capability) of anupalabधि the sense-organs are to be known as operative. It has been stated earlier that yogyatā of an object always depends on the assemblage of the causes of the apprehension of the counter-positive excepting the counterpositive and the contact of sense-organ with it. Where there is the knowledge of the absence of a jar due to its non-cognition, there is the assemblage of all causes for realising a jar excepting the jar itself and the contact of

ghatajñānavaditi/ Tadapi viśeṣāsiddham"

the sense-organ with the jar. Hence, it is called yogyānupalabdhi. In other words, yogyatā lies in a place where there is the absence of a jar and the absence of the contact of sense-organ with the jar. The contact of the sense-organ is essential for the cognition of a jar, but not in the case of non-cognition of it. There is the absence of the contact of sense-organ in the case of the non-cognition of counterpositive. A counterpositive (i.e., absentee) is known through the operation of sense-organ. If there is the absence of the contact of sense-organ with an object, it is assumed that the object is not there. That is, from the absence of the contact of the sense-organ there arises the non-cognition of the counter-^{of absence is}positive. Hence, the knowledge_{caused} by operative sense-organ but not caused by the sense-organ which is not operative. On account of the non-familiarity of the anupakṣīnatva (i.e., inoperative character) of the sense-organ the hetu mentioned earlier suffers from the fallacy of viśeṣāsiddha. The Naiyāyikas have to accept the yogyatā of non-cognition for the attainment of the knowledge of absence. The Naiyāyikas also accept the yogyatā in the following hypothetical argument - "Had the jar been on the ground, it would have been perceived just like the ground". Now let us consider the meaning of the sentence - "Had there been a jar, it would have been cognised". If we accept the existence of a jar on it, it will be revealed that on the ground there are all the causes for the origination of the knowledge of a jar excepting the jar itself. When there is no jar, there is the absence of the contact of the sense-organ with the jar. The contact of the sense-organ is on

the locus in the form of the ground which entails that the sense-organ is operative in the knowledge of locus. Hence, the hetu in the form of anupakṣīnendriyajanyatva (i.e., being caused by sense-organ which is not inoperative) bears the fallacy called viśeṣāsiddha. The contact of the sense-organ with a jar is familiar to us. In this case the sense-organ becomes operative in the case of the knowledge of the locus which points to the knowledge of absence. The Hetu which is applied in the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is not at all familiar, as sense-organ can never be inoperative in respect of knowing absence. That is why, it involves a fallacy mentioned earlier. In this way, the Bhāttas have refuted the second argument of Udayana in favour of the perceptuality of absence.²²

The Naiyāyikas have applied the syllogistic arguments in the following way : "The knowledge of absence is perceptual as the instrumentality of it is not known, like the cognition of the jar etc." The perceptual knowledge arises from the sense-

22. "Pūrvoktayogyatā siddhāvupakṣīnamihendriyaṃ/
Grāhyā cābhāvavodhārthaṃ yogyatā tārkkikairapi//
Ghaṭo yadi bhavedatra tarhi drśyeta bhūmivat/
Iti tarkātmanā te'pi yogyatāmeva grhnate//
Asti cedupalabhyetetyasya to'rtho vicāryatām/"

organ which becomes the instrument of our perception without being known. Hence, perception is caused by an unknown instrument. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the non-cognition is the instrument of the knowledge of absence. Hence, if the knowledge of absence is caused by an unknown instrument, it is to be considered as perceptual. This is the view of the Naiyāyikas.²³

The Bhāṭṭas think that the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is fallacious as the hetu in the form of ājñātakaraṇatva is vitiated by the fallacy called anaikāntika or vyabhicārī. Impression is the instrument of memory or recollection.²⁴ Hence, the awareness dependent on the impression alone is called memory. The impression here becomes a cause of memory without being known. Here in memory there is the hetu called ājñātakaraṇatva (i.e., the property of being endowed with an unknown instrument). But there is no sādhya in the form of perceptuality. From this it does not follow that where there is ājñātakaraṇatva, there is perceptuality. In memory the perceptuality does not exist though there is ājñātakaraṇatva. From this it can be said that there is

23. "Yat punarabhāvājñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ājñātakaraṇatvād
ghaṭādiññānavaditi/"

- Ibid.

24. "Tatsmrtāvanaikāntikaṃ"

- Ibid.

the absence of sādhya in the form of the absence of perceptuality in memory though there is the hetu in the form of being endowed with an unknown instrument (ajñātakaranatva). A hetu becomes deviated anaikāntika or vyabhicāri if it exists in a place where sādhya does not exist. Hence, the above-mentioned syllogistic argument is fallacious.²⁵

According to Udayana, the cognition of absence is produced by the mind associated with the instrument of a positive nature like any other cognitions (abhāvajñānaṃ bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭamanojanyaṃ jñānatvāt).²⁶ Here the term 'bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭa' means "being associated with the positive instruments like eye etc. or knowledge of vyāpti etc." In order to understand absence mind associated with the positive instruments is essential. To know absence there is the necessity of external sense-organ which can reveal the locus of absence. For, without knowing the locus of absence, absence can not be known. Mind becomes an instrument towards any type of knowledge. Where there is knowledge, it is

25. "Saṃskāro hi smṛtau hetuḥ sa cājñāto'vavodhakah/
Ajñātakaraṇāpyevaṃ smṛtirnādhyakṣatām gatā// Iti/"

- Ibid.

26. "Yatpunarabhāvajñānaṃ bhāvarūpakaraṇāviṣṭamanojanyaṃ
jñānatvāt jñānāntaravat/"

- Ibid.

always caused by mind associated with the positive instruments. That is, if the knowledge is caused by the mind associated with the positive instruments then it is perceptual as it is caused through the instrumentality of the sense-organ. As knowledge of absence is caused by the mind associated with the positive instruments (bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva), it would always be perceptual as the Naiyāyikas observed.

The Bhāttas have pointed out the fallacy called virodha in the hetu (i.e., bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva) as used by the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas have adopted a contradictory position after keeping bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva as a sādhya in one inference and keeping the same as hetu in another inference. The first inference is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused by mind associated with the positive instruments as it is a cognition (bhāvajñānaṃ bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyam jñānatvāt)". Here 'the knowledge of absence' is pakṣa, 'the property of being caused by mind associated with positive instruments' (bhāvarūpakaranāvistamanojanyatva) is sādhya and 'jñānatva' is hetu. Afterwords, the Naiyāyikas have adopted another syllogistic argument which is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused through sense-organ as it is caused by mind associated with the positive instruments (abhāvajñānaṃ indriyakaranakam bhāvakaranāvistamanojanyatvāt)". In this inference, 'the property of being caused by sense-organ' is sādhya, and 'the property of being caused by mind associated

with positive instruments' (bhāvarūpakaranāvīṣṭamanojanyatva) is the hetu.

The Bhāṭṭas think that the above-mentioned view is not correct, because the knowledge of absence can never be caused by sense-organ but it is caused by other factors excepting sense-organ (indriyetarakaranakatva). According to them, the existence of the fire on the mountain is inferred. The knowledge of the absence of the inferred (i.e., the knowledge of the absence of fire) is attained in a place where there is the absence of the inferred, i.e., fire. This place is lake etc. In other words, in lake etc. we have the knowledge of absence of fire which is not caused by sense-organ. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭas who do not think that the knowledge of absence is caused by sense-organ. According to them, the syllogistic argument is as follows : "The knowledge of absence is caused by the factors other than sense-organ, as it is the knowledge of an absence". Hence, in the inference shown by the Naiyāyikas there is the fallacy called 'virodha'. The Naiyāyikas think that the knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ, but actually it is not caused by the sense-organ according to the Bhāṭṭas. In this way, the Bhāṭṭas have refuted all the four arguments forwarded by Udayana in favour of the perceptuality of absence.²⁷

27. " ... anupalambhakaranakatvaṃ na yuktamiti tadapi na/

But Udayana is sticking to the point that the cognition of absence is caused by the instrumentality of sense-organ with the help of the following arguments. According to him, as sense-organ apprehends the counterpositive, it becomes the instrument of valid knowledge of absence (pratiyoqini samarthya). As sense-organ becomes operative in conveying the knowledge of the locus, it can also be the same in conveying the knowledge of an absence. Because in both the cases the sense-organ performs the same functions (vyaparavyavadhānatah). As the defect of hetu which is the cause of the illusory knowledge of absence lies in the sense-organ, the valid knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ. The sense-organ being defective becomes the cause of the illusory knowledge of absence (akṣāśrayatvāddoṣānām) and the sense-organ if in order or faultless becomes the cause of valid knowledge of absence. To Nyāya the defect of the sense-organ can give rise to an erroneous cognition ('doṣo'pramāyāḥ janakaḥ'). Hence, from the erroneous cognition of the absence the defect of the sense-organ is presumed. In the like manner, if there is a proper-cognition of an absence, it is presumed that our sense-organ is in order (not defective), which proves that the knowledge of absence is attained through sense-organ i.e., through perception. That is why, it is said that the knowledge of absence

Abhāva jñānamindriyeta raka rana kamabhāva jñānatvāt
 anumeyābhāva jñānavat ityapi vaktum śakyatvāt iti/"

- Ibid.

is caused by the sense-organ. As the knowledge of absence apprehends the qualificand (viśeṣya), qualifier (viśeṣana) and their relations (Samvandha), it is a kind of determinate (Savikalpaka) knowledge. That which is determinate must be caused by the sense-organ (indriyāṇi vikalpanāt). These are the four arguments by which Udayana has proved that the knowledge of absence is caused by the sense-organ.²⁸

Among these Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa has refuted the third argument in the following way. Udayana thinks that the defect of sense-organ which causes the illusory cognition becomes the instrument of that knowledge. The defect of eye which gives rise to the illusory cognition of colour becomes the instrument of that knowledge. This reasoning is defective according to the opinion of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa.²⁹ For, there is the fallacy called asiddha. The defect of sense-organ becomes the cause of the defective

28. "Pratīyogini sāmāthyād vyāpārāvyaavadhānataḥ/
Aksāśrayatvāddoṣāṇāmindriyāṇi vikalpanāt//"

- Nyāya Sūtram (with Vātsyāyanābhāṣyam & Vṛtti),
3/21 - by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, Anandāśrama,
Poona, 1922.

29. "Yattu abhāvajñānamindriyakaraṇakam indriyadoṣeṇa dūṣyamā-
natvāt, yathā caksurdoṣeṇa dūṣyamāṇam rūpajñānam
caksuḥkaraṇakamiti, tadapyasiddhameva/"

- Ibid.

cognition of absence, but it can never be the cause of illusion regarding absence. Because the illusion regarding the yogyatā of anupalabdhi alone becomes the instrument of the illusion of absence. If there is any illusion about the yogyatā of anupalabdhi, it can give rise to the illusory knowledge of absence. There is the existence of a jar, for example, in a place. In spite of that a knower thinks that there is no jar, and no contact of sense-organ with the jar but other factors for cognising a jar are there. This awareness is the illusion about yogyatā of anupalabdhi.³⁰ Due to this an individual will have the illusory cognition of the absence of a jar though a jar really exists. Here the knowledge of the absence of a jar is not defective due to the defect of the sense-organ. In this case of the knowledge of the absence of a jar which is pakṣa here, the hetu (i.e., being defective with the defect of sense-organ) does not exist. Hence, there is the defect called Svarūpāsiddha. The inference being defective can not prove the thesis that the knowledge of absence is caused by sense-organ. From this it can be concluded that the knowledge of absence is caused by the separate source of knowledge called anupalabdhi.

The Naiyāyikas further say that the eye is the cause of

30. "Na khalvindriyadoṣaḥ syādabhāvabhramakāraṇam/
Yogyatābhrama evātra tatkāranamitīritam//"

the knowledge of absence, i.e., the sense-organ is the cause through which the knowledge of absence can be known. This inference is also defective due to having fallacy called viśeṣaviruddha. The sense-organ can reveal that object only with which it is connected, i.e., eye can reveal those objects that are in proximity to it. But in this case the relation of sense-organ with absence cannot be accepted. For, the sense-organ cannot apprehend absence as it is not in proximity to it. This is the reason for which the hetu is called 'Indriyatva' and there is a fallacy called viśeṣaviruddha.³¹ The syllogistic argument forwarded by the Naiyāyikas is like this - "Eye can apprehend absence as it is a sense-organ (cakṣuḥ abhāvagrāhaka indriyatvāt)". In this inference the hetu is indriyatva and the sādhya is abhāvagrāhakatva. As the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the relation between absence and sense-organ, the sense-organ is not capable of apprehending absence. Rather in sense-organ there is the absence

31. "Yāni punaḥ - cakṣuḥ abhāvagrāhakamindriyatvāt manovadityādīnīnumānāni tāni sarvāni samvaddhasyai- vendriyasya grāhakatvāt, abhāvena sambandhāna bhyupagamāt viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvarūpasamvandhasya ca sambandhāntara-pūrvakatvaniyamāt viśeṣaviruddhāni/"

of apprehending an absence (abhāvagrāhakatvābhāva). Hence, there is the fallacy called viśesaviruddha.

If the perceptuality of absence is accepted, it cannot be substantiated through reasoning. Because, when an absence is known, it is known as being connected with counterpositive. The knowledge of absence presupposes the knowledge of the counterpositive. 'Absence' means 'absence of something'. It is not possible to have the knowledge of absence in the case of indeterminate perception due to the impossibility of recollecting the counterpositive. If the knowledge of pratiyogī is accepted as being present before the indeterminate knowledge, the knowledge of the counterpositive would become the indeterminate one and the knowledge arising after it will be determinate. Hence, the indeterminate perception of abhāva is not possible. For this reason the Naiyāyikas have to accept that abhāva can be known through determinate perception. But this is not possible according to the Bhāṭṭas. Because super-sensuous objects can not be perceived indeterminately. Hence, they cannot be known through determinate perception also. The objects that are super-sensuous can be known neither through indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) nor determinate (savikalpaka). The absence, according to the Bhāṭṭas, cannot be known through senses and hence, it is super-sensuous. The Bhāṭṭas forward the following syllogistic argument : "Absence is not capable of being perceived as it is not capable of being known through indeterminate perception as in the case of super-

sensuous object".³²

It has been shown that the Bhāttas have accepted anupa-
labdhi as a distinct means of cognition. Perception, inference
etc. cannot prove the existence of a negative fact as they are
applicable only in the case of positive facts. When the object
is negative, there is no contact of sense-organ with the nega-
tive fact as there is no corresponding modification of soul. But
when the objective fact is positive, the corresponding subjective
activity is also positive where we get the positive pramānas like
perception, inference etc. If the objective fact is negative, the
corresponding subjective activity, in the like manner, would also
be negative. The means of knowing this negative fact cannot also
be perception or inference which are applied for knowing a posi-
tive fact. In perception there is the contact of sense-organ with
the object. Here the contact is possible only between two exis-
ting (i.e., positive) objects. The sense-organs like eye etc. and
the objects like jar etc. are the existing (i.e., positive) objects.

32. "Pratiyogismrtirnasyādādito nirvikalpake/
Tataśca savikalpenaivābhāvajñānamicchasi//
Tasmādevamanumīyate - abhāvaḥ pratyakṣo na
bhavati nirvikalpakānarhatvāt atīndriyavastuvaditi/"

Hence through the contact of the sense-organ with object, there arises the knowledge of the particular object. But in order to know the negation of a jar on the ground, such type of contact is not possible. So it is not perceptual. When we have knowledge in the form - 'There is jar on the ground', the knowledge of the ground arises from perception and the knowledge of a jar is attained through memory. But if it is said that there is the absence of a jar on the ground then this absence cannot be known through perception or memory, but through a distinct means called anupalabdhi.

It cannot be said that negation is known through mental perception, because the soul and its qualities like pleasure, pain etc. are the objects of mental perception. Mental perception is otherwise called introspection. The negation which is taken to be an objective fact cannot be the object of introspection. In other words, the negation of a jar on the ground is a fact belonging to the outside world and hence, it has been accepted as padārtha or category by the Vaisesikas. If it is so, how can it be known through introspection? It has been stated by Kumārila that the non-apprehension is different from perception. From this it is proved that it is completely different from introspection which is nothing but a form of perception. We may recall here the remark by P. T. Rāju, viz., "The Mīmāṃsakas, for example, Kumārila hold that it (negation) is not perceived by our senses but by our mind, though it is real. It is an object of mānas

pratyakṣa, not of indriya-pratyakṣa" is totally misleading. For it has been shown earlier that through perception the negation cannot be known and mental perception being a form of perception is not capable of apprehending absence. Hence Dr. Rāju's view that negation is an object of mental perception is not acceptable.

The purpose of accepting anupalabdhi as a distinct means of knowledge lies in the fact that one thing cannot be mixed with another. The mixture of two things can be avoided through the application of anupalabdhi. Each and every object has got its own characteristic features which other objects do not possess, e.g., the characteristic feature of a jar is completely different from that of a pot. In other words, one object is distinct from another one and this distinction is called bheda. The bhedatva of an object with another one is known through the instrumentality of abhāva. Because bheda is nothing but mutual absence (anyonyābhāva). In the context of Mīmāṃsā the sacrificial performance or ritual of a particular set of sacrifice is completely different from that of another set. This distinction can be known through abhāva only.

According to Kumārila, abhāva, like the Advaitins, is

33. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1939, p. 64.

of four types : (i) the previous non-existence, e.g., the absence of curd in the fresh milk, (ii) abhāva by destruction, e.g., the non-existence of milk in milk-product, (iii) mutual abhāva, e.g., the abhāva of a cow in a horse and (iv) absolute absence, e.g., the absence of hare's horn. If abhāva were not accepted as a means of knowledge then the cognition of curd in milk, milk in curd, cloth in a jar, horns in an ass, smell in water etc. would not have been cognised. Like Vaiśeṣikas, Kumārila also says that abhāva is a real entity (vastu) and hence it is capable of being cognised. The object which is capable of being cognised or the object which is the object of cognition is prameya. Hence, the existence of abhāva cannot be denied.

It may be argued that non-existence is non-different from existence for having similarity between these. Though non-existence (abhāva) and existence (bhāva) are opposite to each other, there is a common character called vastutva or reality. As the existence or a positive fact represents the reality, a negative fact also does the same. Hence the sense-organ could have contact with the non-existence. The Bhāttas are of the opinion that it is not correct, because they do not admit the absolute identity between them. But what they admit is only comparative non-difference as in the case of colour etc. Colour, taste etc. are each different by themselves, but are considered as non-different as cohering in the same substance. In the like manner, non-existence is non-different from existence even when there is the identity of the object as in the case of

fruit, we admit certain differences among its properties like colour, taste etc. The comprehension of these existence and non-existence depends on the appearance of the one and disappearance of the other. Just as in the case of colour etc. there is difference of reality though there is an apparent identity, so also in the case of existence and non-existence. Though they are really different, they appear to be non-different on account of the fact that both of them inhere in the same object. The difference between the two is proved by the fact that one of them, i.e., existence is apprehended when it appears and others are non-existence when they disappear.³⁴

The ground of difference is found as follows :

In the comprehension of existence there is the contact of the sense-organ as an instrument. On the other hand, the apprehension of non-existence does not depend on such contact.

Some philosophers opine that colour etc. are to be apprehended as difference depending upon the difference in the means of their comprehension. Colour is cognised by the eye and smell by nose, and hence the difference of colour from smell is easily known just as the property of being a son is known with reference

34. Sharma, Dharendra, The Negative Dialectics,

Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

New Delhi, 1974, p. 34.

to father and the property of being father is known with reference to the son. In the same manner, we could have the difference between existence and non-existence.

But the Bhāṭṭas think that the difference among colour etc. is always based on the cognition only. In other words, the colour etc. is different, because they are cognised as different. This has been said by the Bhāṭṭas in connection with the objection by the opponents which runs as follows :

The opponents say if such be the case then we would have an eternal difference between colour and taste, existence and non-existence. The notion of identity can be explained by the fact of their existence in the one and the same place. In reply, the Bhāṭṭas say that this position is incorrect. Because an independent object being the locus of properties should be taken as an independent object having independent existence apart from its properties. If both difference and non-difference are accepted between existence and non-existence, we can not have the cognition of both its existence and non-existence based on its positive and negative forms. When there is a contact with the object, we have a cognition in the form : 'it is'. On the other hand, if there is the absence of contact with the object, we have the knowledge in the form : 'it is not'. The place where there is no jar is perceived by eye and the counterpositive i.e., a jar is remembered. After that the knowledge in the form 'The jar is not there' arises which is purely mental independent of sense-organ. In other

words, the place is seen by the eye and the jar which is not seen earlier and which could have been if it were present is remembered. After this a purely mental process which produces the notion of non-existence of a jar comes into being. This notion of non-existence is brought to our cognition by the aforesaid process. A person may be a place in the morning and he notices that the place is bare. From this he does not apprehend anything. In the afternoon if he is asked whether there is a tiger in the morning, he recalls the place in the mind and comes to know that no tiger was seen there. Hence, his reply would be in a negative. So it is known to us from the above fact that the absence of the tiger has not been known by him in the morning. In other words, no idea of tiger occurs in his mind and hence he could not have realised its absence. From the above discussion it follows that the idea of absence of a tiger does not come from the operation of the sense-organ. It cannot also be said that it is purely caused by the non-perception of something which could have been perceived if it were present. This view will go against the Naiyāyikas. As a matter of fact the person was there and the idea of tiger did not occur in his mind. Hence, the non-perception of the perceptible cannot be the cause of the latter knowledge of the tiger's absence. The knowledge of absence must be admitted to be the result of pure and simple negation which is aided by the former perception of the place and the remembrance of it in the afternoon.³⁵

35. Slokavārtika, Translated by Gaṅgā nāth Jhā, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1983, p. 247, Foot Note. 28

The negation is not known through inferential cognition also due to the absence of the middle term (hetu). If it is said that the object whose existence is denied is described as middle term, it is not tenable. Because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time when it's non-existence was cognised. That which is not cognised cannot be regarded^{as} hetu.

It cannot be said that the positive form is the predicate of the minor premiss, because positivity cannot be pervaded by all negativity. We may get various instances where the existence of a particular object is accompanied by another. In spite of this we may get a deviated case, i.e., there might be some places where there is the non-existence of some objects. Though the presence of place is found in one case to be pervaded with the absence of a jar, yet there might be another time when we could find the jar existing in the same place. Hence no vyāpti-relation between the two is possible. If any restriction is not imposed on the relation of vyāpti between the existence of cloth with the absence of horse and if it is accepted as a means of obtaining the cognition of the absence of a jar then we would have the comprehension of everything in the world by means of such invariable concomitance. In each and every perception of a place we do not directly become the knower of the absence of everything else. Thus we find that no case of existence is invariably concomitant with absence in general. Hence, the cognition of existence cannot serve as hetu.

When a relation is known, it presupposes the knowledge of the relata, i.e., knowledge of related members. If it is admitted that the knowledge of non-existence is related by invariable concomitance to existence, how the knowledge of non-existence which is one of the relata can be known. The cognition of the member related before the comprehension of the relation could not be the cause by hetu, because it has not yet been cognised as such. Hence the cognition of absence must be known through some other means of knowledge, i.e., anupalabdhi besides perception, inference etc. Hence anupalabdhi has to be accepted as a separate source of valid cognition.

CHAPTER-V

LOGIC BEHIND NON-ACCEPTANCE OF ANUPALABDHI AS
A PRAMĀNA BY THE NAIYĀYIKAS AND OTHERS.

It has already been discussed in the previous chapter that absence or abhāva, which is not identical with its locus but something additional to it (adhiṣṭhānātiriktaṁ tattvaṁ), can be known through a unique source of knowledge called anupalabdhi according to Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins. The other philosophers like Naiyāyikas, Buddhists do not accept absence as a separate source of knowledge. According to them, absence can be known either through perception or inference. These philosophers constitute the pūrva pakṣa of the Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins. They have developed their own reasoning in favour of non-accepting abhāva as a separate pramāna.

Let us first concentrate on the view of the Naiyāyikas and their logical excellence in connection with the means of knowing abhāva. Afterwards, the tenability of their arguments will be considered.

The Naiyāyikas accept that the non-apprehension or anupalabdhi merely facilitates the appropriate sense-organ in cogni-

sing the absence of an object. When there is no jar on the ground, the visual sense-organ, i.e., eye, being assisted by appropriate negation, determines the absence of the jar on the ground. Thus the relation of absence to the locus is adjectivity. The awareness of negation may be called as causally connected, because it is based on the joint method of agreement and difference anvaya-vyatirekī. Hence the negative awareness is visual i.e., perceptual.

Gautama, the founder of Nyāya school, has opined that abhāva is not a separate source of knowledge or pramāna, but it is an object of true cognition (prameya). It is established on the basis of the normal experience that water existing in the cloud is not coming down in spite of having its weight. The object which has got weight always comes downward. In this case water has got some weight. Hence it should have come down. But actually we do not find it. From this it is assumed that there must be some hindrance which stands on the way of its coming down. This hindrance is nothing but the connection of cloud with air which counters the downward^u of the water inhered in the cloud. In this case the cognition of abhāva of the result which is naturally expected gives rise to another piece of cognition of the presence of the connection of it with air. Gautama has realised the importance of such cognition which, according to him, is a form of inference. There is no justification behind accepting it as a separate source of knowing.¹

1. "Śabda aitiḥyānarthāntarabhāvanūmāne'rthāpatti -

That negation is not an object of knowledge—proper has been opposed by Gautama also. In the list of the categories accepted by Gautama, abhāva is not included. But one can feel the importance of it if one goes through his literature developed afterwards. Among the sixteen categories or padārthas which are essential for having this-worldly and other-worldly wellbeing (niḥśreyas), abhāva is not mentioned. But the role of abhāva has to be accepted if one has a complete idea of apavarga or liberation. It is true that apavarga is the final goal in the Nyāya system. This has to be realised in terms of abhāva, because the complete cessation of suffering is apavarga.² Though he does not mention abhāva directly, yet he accepts that some fundamental concepts cannot be explained without the help of abhāva. Hence abhāva is not neglected so far as its conceptual framework is concerned. When Gautama argues that liberation or apavarga is the complete cessation of suffering, he accepts the concept of liberation which entails the concept of non-eternality (anityatva)³ of material

sambhavābhāvānarthāntarabhāvāccā-pratiśedhaḥ"

- Nyāya Sūtra, 2-2-2.

2. "bādhānalakṣaṇam duḥkham/"

"tad - atyanta - vimokṣo'pavargah/"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.21 & 1.1.22.

3. Gautama here has taken a common sense view of the theory of

objects which can be explained with the help of negation. In other words, to accept non-eternality of an object amounts to suggest the acceptance of abhāva without which absence of eternality cannot be explained.

That this absence is the object of knowledge can be explained with the help of the following metaphor. Among several marked cloths there are some unmarked also. By virtue of being unmarked the absence of marked comes to our awareness, i.e., the absence of marked gives rise to the knowledge of its absence.⁴ Here the absence of marks is the cause of an individual's awareness. Hence it is called pramāna. The absence which is the true cognition here is the object known through this pramāna.

It may be argued by the opponents that the question of absence arises in that place where an object is originated and destroyed. But in the case of unmarked cloths, it cannot be said that marks were originated there and destroyed afterwards. On account of this, it is very difficult to say that there is absence of mark. Gautama meets this point with the help of the following arguments. The above-mentioned view is not acceptable, because marks are found in other objects. Just as a man realises the presence of

causation which is the opposite to the those of the Buddhist or the Vedāntin.

4. "lakṣitesv-alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvād alakṣitānām

marks in a cloth, he sees the absence of it also in an unmarked cloth. After observing the absence of marks he realises that cloths are unmarked.⁵

The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that the object which is not connected with proper sense-organ is not visually perceived. That which is perceived visually is a positive object. But the Naiyāyikas have shown their logical excellence in establishing the fact that a negative fact being unconnected with proper sense-organ may also be visualised. In other words, a sense-organ reveals only an object which is in proximity to it and in contact with it. From this, it follows that it is related only to the positive objects.⁶ But the Naiyāyikas have shown their novelty in saying that a negative fact is also visualised without the help of visual sense-organ. In this connection, a problem will crop up. If a negative fact being unconnected with eyes is perceived, all the

tatprameyasiddheh"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 2.2.8.

5. "asatyarthe nābhāva iti cen nānya-lakṣaṇopapattēh"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 2.2.9.

6. Bhaṭṭācārya, J. V., Nyāya-mañjarī, Vol. I, p. 109,

Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1978.

negative facts belonging to a remote time and place should also be perceived. But it is not possible, because perception cannot give rise to the knowledge of an object existing in remote places and in future. In reply, it can be said that such problem does not arise at all. For, the awareness of a negative fact does not come from the void, but it is determined by the perception of its locus. The perception of the locus serves as a medium for perceiving a negative fact. So the locus of a negative fact which is within the range of a sense-organ is to be perceived only.

Annambhaṭṭa, the eminent Naiyāyikas, does not believe in the above-mentioned suggestion. According to him, there is no necessity of admitting the cognition of a negative fact through the perception of its locus. He believes that a negative fact is directly perceived through the contact of sense-organ which is called viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva sannikarṣa, i.e., a contact in which there is the relation between qualifier and qualificand. In order to justify it the Naiyāyikas have taken the following example : 'There is no jar on the ground.'⁷ The same negative fact may be expressed as

7. "Abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah sannikarṣah ca/
Ghaṭābhāvavadbhūtaḥ śāntamityatra cakṣuḥsamyukte bhūtale
ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣaṇatvād/

- Tarkasaṃgraha, Edited by Shri Narayana
Chandra Goswami (Bengali edition), p. 331,
Samskrita Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.

- "The ground is endowed with the absence of a jar (ghaṭābhāvat bhūtaḥ)". Here the 'ground' is viśeṣya or qualificand and 'endowed with the absence of a jar' is viśeṣaṇa or qualifier. The knowledge which is attained with the help of such type of contact or Sannikarṣa must come under the purview of the perceptual knowledge. Because the perceived objects like viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya are the media through which the absence is known. In this case the peculiar relation called viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva has been invented by the Naiyāyikas after keeping a particular view in their mind. The view of the Naiyāyikas can be more firmfooted if their metaphysical presuppositions are reviewed carefully. According to them, non-existence of an object in a particular locus is not identical with the locus, but adjectival to it. For, we generally say that the ground is characterised or qualified by the absence of a jar. Hence the absence of a jar is conceived as a character or viśeṣaṇa of the ground just as the attributes of the ground like colour, size etc. are perceived. The absence of a jar is also perceived not as an independent object, but as a qualifier of the ground. It comes to our awareness as soon as we look at the ground.⁸ When the ground is known perceptually, the bareness or

8. "bhūtaḥ viśeṣyam/ ghaṭābhāvo viśeṣaṇam/ 'bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti'ityatra abhāvasya viśeṣyatvaṁ draṣṭavyam/ tena anupalabdheḥ pramāṇāntaratvaṁ nirastaṁ/ 'yadyatra ghaṭo'- bhaviṣyat tadā bhūtaḥmivādrakṣyāt darśanābhāvānnāsti' iti

emptiness of the ground caused by the absence of something i.e., jar etc., also known simultaneously. Only the difference is colour, size etc. of the ground are revealed by a different type of Sannikarsa which cannot reveal the absence of a jar existing in it. For this the Naiyāyikas have adopted a peculiar type of contact or sannikarsa which is called viśeṣya-viśeṣanabhāva sannikarsa.

The judgement through which a negative fact is expressed, e.g., 'The pot is not red' can be divided by Nyāya into the qualifier and qualificand which are related by a quantification relation. To Nyāya, a judgement, affirmative or negative, indicates that the qualifier is expressed in ordinary language by a positive phrase like 'is blue' in the sentence "The pot is blue" or by a negative phrase such as "is not red" in the sentence "The pot is not red". In the first case the qualifier is the property of being blue, whereas in the second case the qualifier is the property of not being red or the absence of red colour. The Nyāya contention is that if red colour is the name of a property that characterises some object then by the same logic 'the absence of red colour' is the name of another property which qualifies some other locus. A judgement merely asserts that a qualifier qualifies a qualificand.

tarkitapratyogisattvavirodhyanupalabdheḥ saha kr̥tne —
ndriyeḥ naiva abhāva jñānopapattau anupalabdheḥ prāmāṇā —
nratvāsambhavāt/"

- Dīpikā on Ibid, p. 332.

It should be noted that the Nyāya concept of negation does not cover the act of negating or denying a judgement which is a psychological fact.⁹

It may be asked that why an absence of red colour should be considered as a real or genuine property like red colour, but not a pseudo one. The Nyāya replies in a very simple way. A property becomes real or genuine if there is some locus which it characterises. Such a property can be used in all logical and philosophical discussions. If red colour qualifies the things that are red, absence of red colour qualifies things that are not red. If there were no objects that are red, our talk about the absence of red colour would be unjustified. And hence the property called the absence of red colour would have been considered as an unreal property which cannot be used in logical and philosophical discourse. The Nyāya carefully avoids the entity which can be considered as aprasiddha or unreal property. If they were parts of some logical problems, the whole sentence would have to be considered as unreal or aprasiddha by Nyāya. On account of this Gaṅgeśa rejects all the five definitions of Vyāpti based on the concept

9. Motilal, Bimal Krishna, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 93, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1968.

of non-deviation (avyabharitattva) in his Tattvacintāmaṇi.¹⁰ Because all of them have some unexampled property. For Nyāya, all things are knowable in character, and hence knowability exists in each and everything of the world, which implies that there is nothing characterised by the absence of knowability. Thus, the absence of knowability is an unreal property just as the property of being rabbit's horn. Such a property cannot be used to characterise some objects nor can it be negated.

It may be pointed out that the properties like absence of red colour etc. are always dependent on some counterpositive. Some properties are called positive, and hence they are independent, which means that they can be expressed in language without using a negative particle 'not' (nañ). There are also some properties that are not positive, and hence dependent. They are called dependent on account of the fact that they can be expressed in language with the negative particle. Moreover, an absence is always dependent on its counterpositive. This characteristic of being dependent upon a counterpositive is urged or emphasised

10. "Nanu anumiti-hetu-vyāpti jñānekā vyāptih? Na tāvad -

avyabharitattvaṃ/

Tad hi na - sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam - sādhyavad-bhinna-
sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvaṃ, - sādhyavat - pratiyogikānnyo-
nnyābhāvā - sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ, - sakala sādhyā bhāvavanniṣṭhā-

by Gaṅgeśā as a necessary feature of absence.¹¹ Depending on this argument, Gaṅgeśā rejects the Prabhākara's view that the absence of red colour is nothing, but the locus itself, i.e., not red substance.

It may be argued by the opponents that an empty table or cognition of some empty table does not always depend upon the notion of a counterpositive. According to them, an absence must be described as having a substratum by all who accept absence as an additional entity. Because we can speak of an absence in connection with some place etc. So there must be a special property (viśeṣa) on the ground which is the substratum of the absence. The mere ground cannot be the special property. For, it may occur in a ground that has a pot on it. It cannot be identical with a ground having an absence. Therefore, it would lead to the defect called circularity. The absence of an object is known in terms of

bhāva - pratiyogitvaṃ, - sādhyavat - anyāvṛttitvaṃ vā,
kevalānvayini abhāvāt."

- Tattvacintāmaṇi (anumāna khanda),
Chapt. Vyāpti pañcaka.

11. Siddhāntastu sapratyogiko 'bhāvo 'nubhūyate ghaṭo na paṭo
netyambhavāt, na tu tanmātraṃ/
Ato 'bhāvovittivedyatvaṃ pratiyoginah, pratiyogijñānādhi-

the special property existing in the locus. Again, the special property existing in the locus is known in terms of the absence. In this way, one could raise the defect of circularity. The opponent tries to bring this problem against the Naiyāyikas. It is true that there is some special property on the ground lacking a pot. But how the ground be distinguishable from the ground possessing a pot?

The Nyāya's reply would be as follows. The property of having no pot has no special character over and above that of its dharmīn (i.e., possessor of property). Hence, one cannot establish the above mentioned relation between an absence and special property. To Nyāya there does not arise any question of establishing a relation between an absence and the special property. If an absence is taken as a 'dharma' or character, it is nothing but the character of its dharmī, i.e., the object bearing this character. Hence, if there is at all a relation, it is between dharma (property) and the possessor of property (dharmī) i.e., between an absence and the locus of it, but not between an absence and special property. In stead of this one can establish it between the absence and independently existing locus of

najñānatvañcābhāva - syānubhavasākṣikam
gosādṛśyavat/

- Ibid (Abhāva-vāda khanda), 29.

the absence, i.e., the ground.¹²

The Naiyāyikas have tried to prove the cognition of absence as perceptual through the method of Tarka, i.e., reductio-ad-absurdum which runs as follows : "If jar were present on the ground, it would have been perceived. As it is not seen, there is the absence of a jar". Depending on this method of Tarka one could say that the cognition of absence is perceptual, which is evidenced from the Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. It has been stated by Vātsyāyana that one should know the reality (Tattva or thatness) which means the positivity of the positive (Sataśca Sadbhāvah) and negativity of the negative (asataśca asadbhāvah). The negativity of the negative should be known through perception.¹³ If there is really an object in the room, it would have been seen. From the non-perception of it, the absence is apprehended. Hence the negative entity also comes under the purview that Tattva or reality or padārtha which is capable of being known through a distinct pramāṇa which is perception.

In this connection one problem can be raised in the follow-

12. Ibid, 39.

13. Kim punastattvaṃ? Sataśca sadbhāvo'sataścāsadbhāvah/ Sat saditi grhyamāṇam yathābhūtamaviparītam tattvaṃ bhavati/ Asaccāsaditi grhyamāṇam yathābhūtamaviparītam tattvaṃ bhavati/

- Vātsyāyanabhāṣya (Introduction).

ing way. It is a well known fact that the sound is perceived with the help of the ear. What would be the operative relation between ear as the sense-organ and sound as the object? As the relation between them cannot easily be cognised, one might think of having an absence of relation between them. Had there been any relation, it would have been easily cognised. If so, one might think of a separate source of knowledge called anupalabdhi in this place due to the absence of cognition of the operative relation or process. In response to it the Naiyāyikas say that an ear as a sense-organ is nothing but the space (Ākāśa) enclosed by auditory passage (karnaśāskulyavacchinnaṃ nabhaḥ śrotraṃ). It has already been accepted that sound is a quality of Ākāśa. So the relation between the two is Samavāya or inherence as it persists between dravya (substance) and guna (quality). The Naiyāyikas accept the relation called Samavāya (i.e., inherence) which exists between two objects which are not separable. Inseparability which exists between quality (guna) and substance (dravya) between a part (avayava) and a whole (avayavi) etc. is called Samavāya. Here we find an inseparable relation between quality and substance. For, the space limited by ear is only a limitation (avacchedaka) of the space as a whole and hence it is Ākāśa, one of the nine categories accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. From this it follows that there is no necessity of accepting any absence of relation in this place. Due to the acceptance of relation in the form of sannikarsa (contact) between them the question of anupalabdhi does not arise.

The Naiyāyikas hold that the absence of a perceptible object is itself perceptible, which is based on the following arguments :

First, we can apprehend the absence directly without depending on other factors just as the positive entities like colour, size etc. are directly known. As immediacy lies in knowing the positive and negative entities, the absence can be described as perceptible.

Secondly, it is an undeniable fact that, when the absence is known, the locus of absence is also known. When we gather the knowledge in the form : 'There is no jar on the ground', we have the knowledge of the ground and the knowledge of absence simultaneously. Hence it can be said that like locus of the absence the absence is also perceptible.

Thirdly, perceptual knowledge can be expressed directly without depending on some other judgements as in the case of Parārthanu-māna etc. In order to prove the fire is on mountain we have to take recourse to various steps or judgements in order to convince others about the truth of inferential conclusion. But in the case of the perceptual knowledge no such demonstration is needed. As the experience of absence does not depend on the demonstration of any judgement, it may be called as perceptual.

Fourthly, as the counterpositive of absence is perceptible with the help of sense-organ, the absence of it is also perceptible by the same sense-organ. If the counterpositive is a perceptible

object, it would be known through perception and its absence would also be known through the same means. For, it is the same sense-organ which can reveal the counterpositive and the absence.

Fifthly, when someone has the sensory knowledge of absence on the ground, he does not have feeling that his sense-organ cannot apprehend something which is not there. But in stead of this he has a feeling that something is on the ground or locus where absence is located. The main spirit of the statement is that the absence of something in a place is not the creation of an imaginative mind, but it is really there which is capable of being cognised with the sense-organ.

Sixthly, there is a chance of committing mistake in cognising absence. But non-apprehension cannot be mistaken, because in the case of non-apprehension there is nothing which may give rise to any defect. If there is any illusory knowledge, there must be some defects as its cause.¹⁴ To Nyāya, if sense-organ is involved in generating some knowledge, it may be defective. As there is chance of defective sense-organ or some defects in perception, there may arise some erroneous judgements. Hence mistake is possible in cognising absence also. It can be said that knowledge of absence is perceptual. As there is a chance of having erroneous knowledge in respect of some positive objects and absence,

14. 'doṣo'pramāyā janakah'

- Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse No. 131.

it is presumed that there is some wrong either in the sense-organ or in the object itself. From the fact of having erroneous cognition, it is presumed that absence is perceptual. There is a chance of having erroneous cognition of an absence, which entails the existence of some defects in the sense-organ. A cognition connected with sense-organ is always perceptual.

Lastly, the judgements conveying that something is absent can be expressed in two ways : (a) Where locus is the subject and the absence is predicated, e.g. The ground possesses the absence of a jar, and (b) Where absence is subject and the locus is predicated, e.g. The absence of a jar is on the ground. There is only one instrument of valid knowledge which can reveal both subject and predicate of this judgement. It is not possible to accept that a particular pramāṇa reveals the subject and another reveals the predicate which is logically cumbrous (Gourava). Hence the opponent's view that the perception apprehends the ground or locus and non-perception apprehends the absence is not correct. Both should be known with the help of perception.

Udayana, the celebrated Naiyāyikas, does not accept anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowledge. In the case of absence, according to him, sense-organs are the prime factors though anupalabdhi serves as a cocurrent cause of the perception of abhāva. In knowing abhāva sense-organ plays a vital role which is assisted by anupalabdhi. This anupalabdhi is an

accessory to the perception of abhāva.¹⁵ He has proved the perceptuality of abhāva with the help of the following arguments.

According to him, perception is a kind of knowledge whose cause is not cognised (ajñātakāraṇakaṃ). As for example, the vision does not perceive its cause, i.e., eye. Like other Naiyāyikas, he also admits that the sense-organs are the instrumental causes of perception of the absence of a jar. One can merely assume that the knowledge of the absence of an object is produced by sense-organ, because it is the knowledge which is produced by an instrumental cause, and which itself is not cognised. The perception of an external object is produced by internal sense-organ, i.e., mind with the help of the instrumental cause, i.e., sense-organ.¹⁶ In the like manner, mind is capable of conveying the perceptual knowledge of the absence of a jar with the help of external sense-organ. To him, from the fact of having power to perceive negation the sense-organ can be accepted as the instrumental cause in the perception of abhāva.

15, Cowell, E. B., The Kusumāñjali of Udayana Ācārya with commentary of Hari Dāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, p. 32, Bharati-Bharati Publishers, Varanasi, 1980.

16. Pratipatterapāroksyādindriyasyā-jñātakāraṇatvācca bhāvāveśacca cetasaḥ//

- Nyāyakusumāñjali, 111.20.

A pramāna which apprehends the existence of a thing is capable of apprehending its non-existence also.

A section of philosophers, who accepts anupalabdhi as an independent pramāna, has some metaphysical presuppositions. Behind the acceptance of anupalabdhi as a pramāna, the hidden intention of them is to prove the non-existence of the Divine through perception. Their argument is as follows : 'God does not exist. Had He been existed, He would have been perceived. As He is not perceived, He does not exist.'

The above-mentioned argument is refuted by Udayana by saying that the mere non-apprehension of a thing does not prove its non-existence, but the non-apprehension of a thing which is capable of being perceived proves its absence. The negation of an object is meaningful if it is understood with reference to its counterpositive capable of being perceived. One can argue that there is no jar on the ground, because he knows that if it were present, it would have been seen. Since it is not perceived, it does not exist there. This method is known as Reductio-ad-absurdum. Such method cannot be applicable to the case of God, because God is not amenable to perception, which entails that the non-perception of God does not prove His non-existence.

It may be argued by the opponents that if the non-apprehension of an object which is not perceived does not prove its non-existence, the non-apprehension of hare's horn cannot

guarantee about its negation for its incapability of being perceived. In other words, if non-apprehension is not the cause of absence then the non-apprehension of hare's horn etc. will not be taken as the cause of its absence. If so, how can we know then the non-existence of these entities?

In reply, Udayana says that though hare's horn is not capable of being perceived, both a hare and a horn are capable of being perceived separately. It is the horn belonging to hare which is denied as perceptual. According to him, non-apprehension cannot deny the existence of self, because it is the nature of self that it will be perceived when it is characterised by some cognitions.¹⁷ So far as God is concerned, He is not capable of being known perceptually. Hence He is ayogya in this case. For this reason, non-apprehension of God cannot prove its non-existence.

There is another problem in accepting the perceptuality of an absence. An absence is perceptible being qualified by its counterpositive. So for the sake of perception of an absence, the sense-organ must have the operative relation in both the absence and its counterpositive. But it is a well known fact that there is opposition (virodha) between absence and its counterpositive as both of them cannot exist in the same place simul-

17. Cowell, E. B., The Kusumāñjali of Udayana Ācārya with commentary of Hari Dāsa Bhattācārya, pp. 33-34, Bharati-Bharati Publishers, Varanasi, 1980.

taneously. When the absence of a thing exists in a locus, its counterpositive cannot exist there and the vice-versa. As the sense-organ cannot have operative relation with an object which is not present and not proximate, it can have such relation either with the absence or with the counterpositive. How can it be possible to perceive the non-existence as qualified by its counterpositive?

In response to it, the Naiyāyikas are of the view that sense-organ may have the two types of operative relation with the object : laukika (normal) and alaukika (super-normal). The first type is called laukika (normal), because the relation between the sense-organ and the object is physical. The other is alaukika (super-normal), because there is a super-normal relation of the sense-organ with an object which is not easily apprehended or which is not under the purview of normal operative relation. This alaukikasannikarṣa (i.e., the super-normal contact) is of three types : ñāna-lakṣaṇa, sāmānya lakṣaṇa and yogaja. Through these super-normal operative relations the above-mentioned problem of perceiving both the absence and its counterpositive at the same time can be solved. When the knowledge of an object serves as an operative relation between the sense-organ and the object, it is called ñāna-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. But when the absence of an object is perceived, there is no ordinary operative relation between the sense-organ and absent object, i.e., counterpositive. Though the absent object is not

known through ordinary sannikarṣa, it can be presented to our sense-organ through the lane of recollective knowledge. With the help of jñāna-lakṣaṇa the counterpositive of an absence is known while absence is known through normal process. In this way, we are in a position to perceive an absence as qualified by its counterpositive.

Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Buddhist logicians also believe in the phenomenon of abhāva or absence. As they accept abhāva as a fact, they invent some methods of knowing it also. To them, perception is the method which can manifest an object having svalakṣaṇa or unique character and hence perception can reveal an object for a moment only. As absence is not momentary in character, it cannot be perceived. Thus it is known through inference which is sāmānyalakṣaṇa in character.

The Buddhists have accepted anupalabdhi as one of the hetu for inferential knowledge. According to them, hetu is of three types : svabhāva hetu (natural hetu), kārya hetu (hetu in the form of effect) and anupalabdhi (hetu in the form of non-apprehension). Through the relation of identity (Tādātmya) which is connected with the svabhāva, something is inferred. Sometimes a cause is inferred through the effect which is called kāryahetu connected with law of causation (Tadutpatti). With the help of these two (i.e., law of identity and law of causation) the absence of an entity cannot be known. Hence the Buddhists have to admit a different type of hetu called anupalabdhi in order to

explain the absence of an object. If the absence of a jar on the ground, for example, is known, it is not possible through identity and causation. It is also a fact that there is the awareness of absence. How is this awareness be explained? According to them, there are two ways of knowing : perception and inference. The absence cannot be included in the former, because perception is svalakṣaṇa. That is, an object which is capable of being perceived remains only for a moment. As absence is not at all momentary, it cannot come under perception. As it is an awareness, it must come under inference which is sāmānyalakṣaṇa in character. If it is inferential, there must be some hetu other than svabhāva and kārya. It is nothing but anupalabdhi.

The Buddhists hold that negation is known through an inferential judgement based on the non-apprehension of a perceptible object. But it is not a direct attitude of mind what pure sensation always is. Existence is the ultimate reality of a point-instant and the cognition of it is the corresponding pure-sensation. Hence, non-existence is imaginary but not real. When we say, for example, 'there is no jar on the ground', the visual sensation is produced by the bare ground but not by the absent jar. The absent jar is not perceived by the sense-organs, but this is a representation of the memory which is also constructed by the intellect.¹⁸ Hence thr cognition of the absent thing (i.e., non-

18. Stcherbatsky, F. Th., Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 363,

existence of a jar) means its presence is imagination.¹⁹ It means that if it (jar) were present, it would have been perceived; as it were not, it is imagined. In the like manner, we may be able to imagine the presence of such an entity like the hare's horn which refers to also non-existence. Thus, the previously known jar as well as hare's horn which is never experienced may both be negated equally.

According to the Buddhists, negation is an indirect way of cognising reality which is included under inference. Thus the knowledge in the form 'there is no jar' is preceded by an inferential process. The inference can be stated as follows. The existence of a perceptible thing is invariably accompanied by its perception; the jar which is a perceptible entity is perceived. Dharmakīrti admits that abhāva or negation is the process through which either the absence of something or some practical application of the idea of an absent object is deduced. Whether the facts be denied by way of an affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc.; everywhere

Dover Publication, Inc. New York, 1962.

19. Atha yo yatra nāsti sa katham tatra drśyah

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, Edited with
Dharmottara's Tīkā by Th. Stcherbatsky, p. 101,
Bibliotheca Buddhica 7, 1918.

negation, on analysis, refers to possibilities of senseperception.²⁰ Thus, there is no relation such as conjunction, inherence etc. which can unite negation with them. It means that non-existence is never known as an independent object. It is here necessary to mention that the Buddhists are divided in their opinion regarding the content of negative judgement. The Dinnāga school believes that it is a mere mental construction, where Yogācāra admits it as the modification of the soul.

The Buddhists are of the opinion that negation is not judged as the perception of the locus rather it is the perception of the 'bare locus'. Here the term 'bare' which implies the locus alone becomes the object of perception but not the negation existing in locus. When we intend to perceive the jar but see only the ground, it is the perception of bare locus. For them, we apprehend only one thing where we intend to apprehend two. The cognition of the bare ground determines the absence of the intended objects. The intended perception of the absence in a particular locus is the necessary condition. The absence of

20. Sarvatra cāsyām abhāvābhāva-vyavahārasā-dhanyām
anupalabdhou yeṣām svabhāva-viruddhā-dīnām upalabdhyā
kāraṇādīnām anupalabdhyā ca pratiṣedha uktasteṣām-
anupalabdhiśca-veditavyā.

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti ll., Trans. by
Stcherbatsky, Vol. II, p. 102.

an object and the perception of the locus are not sufficient grounds for knowing an absence.²¹ For example, there might be many things such as pen, book, paper etc. which are absent from my study table. I may not be aware of absence of all these things until and unless my attention is drawn to a particular thing. The absence of a pen would come to our awareness when I am desirous of the pen. In this case, the cognition of the bare locus, i.e., empty table not bearing a pen, gives rise to negative argument in the form 'the pen is not on the table'. Hence the Buddhists will say that the perception of the bare locus having no pen and the apprehension of this fact are the basis of the non-cognition.

The realists may raise some objections to the view that the real absence is nothing but the assertion of the bare locus.

21. "ghaṭagrāhakatvasya bhūtalagrāhākasya caikajñānasamsargitvād yadā bhūtalagrāhākam eva tajjñānam bhavati, tadā ghaṭagrāhakatvā-bhāvam niścāyayatiṭe."

- Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Ṭikā' by Karnakagomin on Dharmakīrti's auto commentary 'svavrtti'.

or

- Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with commentary of 'Svavrtti-tikā' by Karnakagomin.

What is to be understood by the term 'bareness' (Kaivalya)? If it means the self-identity of the locus, it will lead to another problem. For, when we perceive the object, we perceive it together with its locus. The ground can be known along with the jar and without the jar. Therefore, if absence is identified with the bare locus, it would also be apprehended even when the object is present.

Secondly, if the bareness of the locus is considered as the locus separated from the object (atirikta), absence is accepted as referring to the real entity (abhāva) in different terms. Because separateness and negation refer to the same context.

Thirdly, if there is no absence, how can there be the knowledge of the bare locus where there was first a relational knowledge between the locus and a jar? This statement becomes sensible if posterior absence (dhamśābhāva) is accepted. But realists would not accept this, because, according to them, posterior absence is possible only through the destruction of the object. Just as we can say 'the jar is produced', we can also say 'the absence of the jar, i.e., the destruction is produced.'²²

22. Yady abhāvo nāsti katham tarhi yatra prāk samsṛṣṭabuddhir āsīt tatra tad ekaviśayābuddhir āvirbhavati? Pradhvam-sābhāvābhyupagame tu sā syād/

- Prakaranapañcikā of Śālikanāth Mīśra, p. 121,

The Buddhists do not accept the above mentioned objections. The terms 'bareness of the locus (bhūtalakaivalya)' and 'devoidness or non-associateness' refer to a knowledge of an independent fact. 'Independent' means it is the negative attribute which is independent, i.e., not depending on the ascription of a locus which contains an object. We cannot describe the ground bearing a jar as "it is the bare locus or the floor is without a jar". On the other hand, the ground which contained a jar cannot be described as the locus of a jar just after its destruction or removal. For, this bare ground is completely different from the previous ground bearing a jar due to its different causal efficacy (arthakriyākāritva). Ratnakīrti says that devoidness of the object and independent entity is here denoted by the term 'bareness'. This denotation is produced by its own causes, and different thing from the locus of the jar. This ground is an object which does not bear the attribute of being the locus of the jar.²³

Edited by Mukunda Śāstri, Chowkhamba sanskrit series,
Banaras, 1903.

23. Kaivalyam tadviviktatvam asankīrnatvam ityādibhiḥ padaiḥ
pradeśasya ghaṭampraty anāpannādhārahāvāsya svahetuta
utpannasya ghaṭapradeśād anyaevātmābhidhīyate/

- Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalī, Edited with

From the above statement it is clear that the relation between the object, i.e., the counterpositive and the locus is not real but imagined. The relation between the counterpositive and the locus is mentally constructed. Though the object is not present in the locus, it is assumed as being present. In order to deny its presence, the relation between the object and locus is mentally constructed. Because it is not the reality which is denied, but its relation which is a logical construction is denied.²⁴

In response to the above position of the Buddhists the opponents say that in the above-mentioned case both existence and non-existence are to be considered as equal. In the proposition 'there is no jar on the ground' the presence of a jar, i.e., existence is not real but imagined and subsequently denied. In the same way, we may imagine the existence of the unreal (absurd) entities, e.g., the hare's horn etc. In the same logic there is possibility of constructing a true negative proposition in the form : - "there is no hare's horn". There will be no

introduction by A. Thakur, p. 97, Tibetan
sanskrit works series, Vol. III, Patna,
Kāsi prasād Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

24. "ekajñānasamsargy atra vikalpya eva" -

- Ibid, p. 85.

difference between two statements - 'there is no jar on the ground' and 'there is no hare's horn'. But actually a jar is previously known and hare's horn is not at all experienced. Both cannot be negated in the same way.²⁵ According to Dharmakīrti, through negation the absence of some objects or some practical application of the idea of an absent object is deduced. "Whether the facts denied by way of affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc., everywhere negation on analysis refers to possibilities of sensation (senseperception)".²⁶ According to the Buddhists, there are various types of negative judgements. But the negative condition

25. "... pūrvāvagatasya ghaṭasya śaśaviśānasya cā - navagatasya dvayor-api tulyaṃ kvacit pratiśedhe ..."

- Nyāyāvatāra-Sūtra-Vārttikavṛtti of Shānti Sūri, edited with notes by Dalsukh Mālavaniya, p. 68, (Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1949).

26. "Sarvatra cāsyāṃ abhāvābhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanyāṃ - anupalabdhou yeṣāṃ svabhāva-virudhā-dīnāṃ upalabdhyā kāraṇādīnāṃ anupalabdhyā ca pratiśedha uktas teṣāṃ upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptānāṃ evopalabdhiranupalabdhiśca veditavyā".

- Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti (with commentary of Dharmottara), ll. p. 46.

which is the basis of all the negative statements always refers to sensations actually. Dharmattara opines that the concrete content of every simple case of contradiction is provided by an experience. The causal laws must have an application to the sensible objects only. In order to establish the causal relation between two facts and also to know the cause of contradiction in these relations, there must be some experience of them. In other words, for establishing the relation between two releta and for knowing the cause of contradiction in these, we must have some perception of the presence of the two facts or releta. The objects which are sometimes perceptible or sometimes non-perceptible should surely be taken as perceptible. Hence, non-perception or anupalabdhi is acceptable in the relation of the releta which have been perceived before.

According to the Buddhists, the absence or negation is of two types : (i) non-perception of some non-perceptible (adrśya), (ii) non-perception of some perceptible (drśya). The second type of non-perception is regarded as valid, because the object which can be denied is always perceptible. The non-perception of a thing always refers to an object which is capable of being perceived, i.e., the only perceptible objects can be denied. Dharmakīrti also is of the opinion that the non-perception of a non-perceptible object does not yield us certain knowledge and hence the negativity of it cannot be determined.²⁷ Buddhist's theory of negation

27. "anīśāyaphalā hy-eśā nalam vyāvṛtti-sādhanē".

can be taken as a consequence of their theory of judgement. Their perceptual judgement involves two factors : (i) self-identity of the object (svabhāva) through which it is distinct from other things and (ii) its perception. If these two factors are present then we cognise a thing as the object of our judgement. If an object is distinct from others, it will be necessarily perceived provided there remains the condition of perceptuality. An object becomes imperceptible in a particular place or time if that object has no distinct reality (svabhāva) even though all the conditions of perceptibility are present. The Buddhists are of the view that the negation of an entity is cognised if and only if the object is an empirical reality. Though the causes of its perception are present yet it is not perceived. Thus non-perception or anupalabdhi is of two types : (i) The non-cognition of a thing having its svabhāva or reality remaining in spatial and temporal relation but not perceived now. Though it is not perceived now, it can be perceived in some other place and time due to having its perceptible character which is evidenced from previous experience. (ii) The second type is the non-perception of an object which has no svabhāva, i.e., own nature. Although all conditions of perception are there, it is not perceived. In such a case non-perception follows as the object is not perceived due to absence of its particular nature.

The cognition of the bare-locus, the Buddhists opine, implies the negation of the jar which is known from the relation between related object and the locus. The judgement known as A is derived from the cognition of another term B. Had there been no B, no knowledge of non-A could have been possible. The negation of an object is cognised because of the presence of other entity (anyasattayāsattā). The negative judgement or negative deduction is not a tautology of the form - "there is no jar because there is none", but it is deduced from the form "there is no jar because there is a bare place".²⁸ This Buddhist doctrine of apoha is highly essential, because the affirmation of an entity is possible through the exclusion (vyavrtti) of other entities. In the negative judgement "there is no hare's horn", the cognition of the bare-head of the hare is the main factor in formulating the negative judgement. The assertion of the bare-head entails the exclusion of the horn.

The above principle is not applicable to the non-perception of non-perceptible object or non-empirical object. A non-empirical object cannot be asserted in any locus. The assertion of a non-empirical, super-sensuative or metaphysical object does not involve the principle of dichotomy. In the phenomenal

28. Sharma, Dharendra, The Negative Dialectics, pp. 52-53, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1974.

level the assertion of super-sensuous object is not possible. Without assertion there does not arise any question of differentiation or apoha. We can say about non-B if we want to assert A.

It may be argued that as there is no ground to deny the existence of super-sensuous or metaphysical object, mere non-perception of them is not to be taken as proof for denying their existence. There are many things that are non-perceptible and super-sensuous, e.g., the result of charity and religious practices, i.e., heaven (nisreyas (imancipation or liberation)). As there is no apparent ground for opposing these, mere non-perception cannot be taken as the ground of their non-acceptance. This standpoint may be firmfooted if Udayana's view is taken into account here. Udayana in his Nyāya Kusumāñjali has mentioned that only perceptible objects are non-existent in some particular place and time, because they are not perceived as such. But God who is not capable of being perceived cannot be denied on the ground of His non-perception.²⁹

In the phenomenal level a metaphysical being may exist without being perceived, because perception has nothing to do with the metaphysical propositions. Hence, Dharmakīrti says that each and every super-sensuous object is rejected as an object which has self-existing distinct character, because it has no logical indica-

29. Nyāya Kusumāñjali 1.2.

tion or mark (linga).³⁰ It is true that, when our sense-organs fail to cognise an object, we take recourse to inference on the basis of the logical mark or linga. As non-empirical entities bear no such mark, they are taken to be non-cognisable entities. In other words, they cannot be cognised either through direct or indirect ways of knowing. The negation of objects which does not come under the range of our experience cannot be cognised. Hence, its essence is to be taken as exclusive. These objects are called by them as viprakrṣṭa (meaning of the objects which are not knowable in specio-temporal relation) and hence they are treated as non cognisable.³¹

To the Buddhists negation is not capable of being perceived and hence it is included under inference of which

30. Yo'pi jñāpakṣya lingasyābhāvāt atīndriyārthaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣo
vā pratikṣipyate/

- Pramāna-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with the
auto commentary 'Svavṛtti', Edited by
Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana, p. 374,
Bihar & Orissa Research Society, 1938-1940.

31. Viprakrṣṭa-viśayanupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇā
samsāyahetuh/

- Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti, 11. p. 48,
(Translated by Stcherbatsky, p. 107).

anupalabdhi or non-perception is the hetu or līnga. The hetu, according to the Buddhists, are of three types : causation (kāryahetu), identity (svabhāva hetu) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) as told earlier. The first two hetus are meant for establishing the real objects while the third one, i.e., non-perception is the ground for cognising negation (pratiśedhahetu). We have already stated that this non-perception becomes the reason of negation in order to know the absence of an object which is perceptible, but not the absence of non-perceptible. The Buddhists like Naiyāyikas have classified anumāna into two types : Inference for oneself (svārthanumāna) and inference for others (parārthanumāna).³² Svārthanumāna or inference for oneself remains in the thought level which need not be described in language whereas what remains in thought level is described in linguistic form in parārthanumāna. The negative mark (pratiśedhahetu) can be described as of three types : (i) The absence of the perceptible object distinct from other objects or existential simple negation (svabhāvānupalabdhi), (ii) Causal negation (kāraṇānupalabdhi) and (iii) the absence of a term which is pervader or which remains in more places (vyāpakānupalabdhi). The absence

32. Anumānaṃ dvidhā svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca//

- Nyāya-bindu, 2/1,

&

- Nyāya-binduṭīkā on the same.

of an object which is perceptible in character is known through the first type of negation. When there is the knowledge of the absence of an effect (kāryānupalabdhi), it is known through the second type of hetu. This can be explained in terms of the following examples : "There are no efficient causes for producing smoke, because there is no smoke."³³ In this case the absence of an effect is inferred from the absence of cause (kāraṇānupalabdhi).

The third formula is the negation of a term which is vyāpaka which can be exemplified in the following way : "There is no mango-tree here, because there are no trees". In this case 'here' is the subject or pakṣa, 'no mango trees', i.e., the absence of such trees is the predicate or sādhyā and 'because there are no trees' is the hetu or reason which is of the greater extension. This formula of negation is used when the less extensive term like mango-tree is not perceived.³⁴

Apart from those three, the anupalabdhihetu is classified into various forms. As absence is ascertained exclusively on the basis of non-apprehension, anupalabdhi is

33. Kāryānupalabdhir yathā, nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni
dhūmakāraṇāni santi, dhūmābhāvāt/

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, II.33.

34. Vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā na atra śimsapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti/
-Nyāya-bindu, 2/31 & Nyāyabindutīkā on the same.

regarded as a hetu of the inferential cognition. The first form, i.e., svabhāvanupalabdhi is already mentioned. This svabhāvanupalabdhi indicates the non-apprehension of the nature (svabhāva), i.e., the essential property of an object, e.g., smoke does not exist here. In this case the absence of smoke is inferred, because there is the non-apprehension of the conditions of the cognisability of smoke which is perceptible in character. The second and third, i.e., Kāryānupalabdhi and vyāpakānupalabdhi have already been discussed. The fourth form of anupalabdhi is svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of the incompatible (svabhāva-viruddha). It indicates the apprehension of what is opposed to nature. If it is said, for example, "The sensation of cold does not exist here because there is fire", the reason is "because there is fire" and the rest is sādhya. Fire and sensation of cold are incompatible with each other and hence cold-touch is negated by the existence of fire.³⁵

The fifth form of anupalabdhi is viruddha-kāryopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an effect which is produced by the opposite object. As for example, the sensation of cold does not

35. Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra śītasparśah agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/32

&

- Ibid on the same.

exist here, because there is smoke. In this case fire is opposite to the sensation of cold and smoke is the product of fire. Therefore, where there is smoke, there is fire. In other words, if a place is associated with smoke then it will be associated with fire. 'There is smoke' means 'there is fire also'. Then how can sensation of cold exist in a place where fire exists? That is, in a place of fire sensation of cold can not remain.³⁶

The sixth form is viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi i.e., the apprehension of invariable concomitance with the opposite. As for example, the destruction of even a produced entity is not something constant (dhruvabhāvin), because it depends on a further cause. The term 'constant' means the object which is always existent. The word 'even of a produced entity' means 'even of an entity which bears the character of being originated'. Here it is asserted that the destruction of a produced entity is not something constant. The reason is 'it depends on a further cause'. What is dependent on a further cause is not necessarily constant, e.g., red colour in a piece of cloth is made of cotton. The characteristic of "being dependent on a further cause" entails 'the property of not being constant'. In other words, the object which is dependent on a further cause cannot be regarded as constant.³⁷

36. Viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na atra sītasparśo dhūmād iti/

- Ibid, 2/33.

37. Viruddha-vyāptopalabdhir yathā na dhruvabhāvi bhūtasya

The seventh form is kārya-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the effect. As for example, "The efficient cause of cold does not exist here because there is fire". In this case the efficient causes of cold give rise to the effect, i.e., sensation of cold which is opposed to fire. It is impossible to have the sensation of cold if there is fire. The efficient causes of cold can never be present in a case where the sensation of cold does not exist. Because if such causes were there, the sensation of cold would have been perceived.³⁸

The eighth form of anupalabdhi is vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the pervader (i.e., the object existing in more places). As for example, 'The touch existing in ice does not exist here because there is fire'. It is a wellknown fact that sensation of cold in general is the pervader of the touch existing in ice and fire is opposed to sensation of cold. Therefore, it is impossible to think of the existence of the sensation of cold in a place where there is fire. We do not get any touch existing in ice which is not covered by

api bhāvasya vināśo hetvantarāpekṣanād iti/

- Ibid, 2/34.

38. Kārya-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na iha apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni Śītakāranāni santi agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/35.

sensation in general.³⁹

Kāranānupalabdhi is the ninth form of anupalabdhi which means the non-apprehension of the cause. Smoke, as for example, does not exist here because there is no fire. Between smoke and fire there is the relation called kāryakāranabhāva (cause and effect relation). As smoke in this case is the effect of fire, smoke can never exist in a place where fire does not exist.⁴⁰

Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the cause is the tenth form of anupalabdhi. As for example, "This person does not possess the special symptoms of having cold, namely, having erect hair etc., because there is a specific fire nearby". The expression 'romaharsādiviśeṣa' means 'the special symptoms like having erect hair etc.' The term 'special' is given here only to exclude other causes of erecting hair like fear, joy etc. In order to indicate that the erecting hair etc. are due to the cold wind, the word 'special' has been mentioned. The hetu is 'sannihitadahanaviśeṣa', i.e., a specific form of fire existing nearby. In this case also the term

39. Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra tuṣārasparsāḥ
agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/36.

40. Kāranānupalabdhir yathā na atra dhūmaḥ agnyabhāvād iti/

- Ibid, 2/37.

'specific form of fire' means 'the presence of that type of fire which is capable of removing cold which is opposed to the cause of cold'. If the sensation of cold is removed with the help of fire, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. can never exist.⁴¹

The last form of anupalabdhi is kāraṇa-viruddhakāryopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of the effect by something which is opposed to the cause. As for example, this place is not qualified by person who has the special symptoms of having cold such as erect hair etc., because there is smoke. In this case also the cause of special symptoms of having erect hair etc., is the sensation of cold which is opposed to fire and 'smoke' is the effect of the cause 'fire'. If a place is endowed with smoke, it is endowed with fire. On the other hand, where there is fire, there is no sensation of cold. If the sensation of cold does not exist, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. would not be possible there. Because these are nothing but the effects of the sensation of cold.⁴²

41. Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na asya romaharsādi-
viśeṣāḥ sannihita-dahana-viśeṣatvād iti/

- Ibid, 2/38.

42. Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na romaharsādi-viśeṣa-
yukta-puruṣavānayaṃ pradeśo dhūmād iti/

- Ibid, 2/39.

From the above discussions, it is found that each and every case of anupalabdhi is known through the syllogistic form of argument. Whatever may be the hetu it is the form of anupalabdhi giving rise to the knowledge of absence. In other words, anupalabdhi is considered as one of the hetus accepted in Buddhist logic. Hence the knowledge of negation which is sādhya here is attained through the hetu in the form of anupalabdhi. The knowledge of negation is regarded as the product of the knowledge of hetu which is inferential in character.

Like the Buddhists the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā does not accept negation as a distinct source of knowledge. Though Jaimini and Śābara have mentioned the negation as a sixth pramāṇa, Kumārila and Prabhākara have given their different interpretations. In course of interpretation Kumārila was in favour of accepting absence as a pramāṇa while Prabhākara does not accept it, because Prabhākara does not believe in the metaphysical reality of negation. On account of this the epistemological problems concerning it do not occur in his view. To him, negation is nothing but the absence of an object which is knowable in character. The knowledge of negation concerns only the absence of the knowledge of the fact. The sentence, 'There is no jar on the ground' indicates that the jar which is considered as an objective fact is not present. As a result of this the knowledge of the jar does not arise. It may be argued that though the jar is not present, the absence of it exists. In order to know the absence which is

also an objective fact like the jar, there must be some means (viz., senseorgan etc.) is essential for having the perceptual knowledge. Prabhākara's attitude is completely different. He says that the absence of cognition is a positive cognition and the absence of a fact is a presence of a fact. The absurdity of this fact becomes obvious at the same time. Hence, there is no necessity of accepting negation as a different source of knowledge.

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā has given importance on the differences in the method of knowing which is the cause adopting different conclusion. The Bhāṭṭas, as it has been stated, accept that the negation of a particular object is nothing but the perception of the locus which is not completely distinct from the absence. Though the absence is not completely distinct from locus, it can be regarded as a character of it which is different from its positive character. Each and every object which is real may either be positive or negative. The negative aspect is generally known with reference to perceptible object which is not cognised in the locus. On the other hand, the positive object is independent. So the causes of the cognition of a negative fact vary from those of a positive one. For this they are bound to invent a different method of knowing called anupalabdhi.

In response to it the Prabhākara says that the above view is not tenable. Differences in the method of knowing cannot be said to be a sufficient cause of accepting a separate pramāṇa

called anupalabdhi until and unless the corresponding variation in the object is not shown. The variation in the objective order is not accepted by the Prabhākara. Hence, there is no necessity of accepting anupalabdhi as a pramāna.

It may be argued that a negative judgement is formed in the mind when the locus of negation is known. At the second stage the pratiyoqi of absence is remembered which gives rise to the knowledge of absence. It is due to mental activity but not connected with sense-organ. Hence, Kumārila says that the knowledge of absence is never perceptual, but always mental.⁴³

This view is not acceptable. For, non-perception is not mere absence of perception. It refers to the absence of perception of such an object which is purely competent for the job. When the substratum is perceived and the counterpositive is remembered, the non-perception induces activity in mind as a result of which it can produce the knowledge of absence just as sense-organ works in order to reveal some objects. Prabhākara also does not accept that the knowledge of absence is purely mental but it is purely perceptual on account of the fact that at the

43. "grhītvā vastusadbhāvam smrtvā ca pratiyoginām/
mānasam nāstitājnānam jāyate'kṣānapekṣanāt/

- Slokavārttika (Chapt. on abhāva), verse. 27,
Chowkhamba Sanskrit series 11, 1898.

time of knowing absence our sense-organs are in operation. Moreover, according to the Bhāṭṭas, what is not cognised by means of five accepted pramānas like perception etc. is cognised through sixth pramāna called abhāva. In this respect Prabhākara will say that this statement does not prove abhāva as a different means of knowledge. Because to him, a pramāna will be regarded as such when it can bring about its effect, i.e., definite cognition of its object. This definite cognition is generally in the form of 'this'. When we use the term 'this', it implies that 'this' is excluded from the rest. The object which is known through five pramānas like perception etc. can be referred with the help of 'this'. But in the case of absence in the form 'this does not exist', we do not get the idea of 'this' as the effect of pramāna. As we do not get the effect in the form of 'this' it cannot be treated as a separate source of knowledge, because it cannot provide us with a definite cognition. Due to not having the concrete object of cognition in the case of absence it is very much childish to accept absence as a different source of knowledge. According to the Prabhākaras, the cognition of absence is of two types : (i) we cognise an object along with other objects and (ii) we cognise an object by itself alone. The second type of cognition is known independently, i.e., without the help of other objects. In other words, this type of cognition is attained with the help of the objects that are actually not there. If these objects were present, they would have been cognised. In other

words, in this case there is an apprehension of an object and non-apprehension of other objects that would have been known, had they been there. In the case of the statement - 'The jar is not here', we mean as follows : The bare place is perceived in this case, but the jar would have been perceived if it were really present. This type of cognition is purely positive cognition attained through perception. Hence, the Prabhākara concludes that there is nothing in this world which can be known through anupalabdhi or non-apprehension and therefore it is not a different source of knowledge.

It has already been said that the negation is always explained in terms of the positive factor which is involved in it. Prabhākara admits the similar position adopted by the Bauddha philosophers. The Buddhists think that each and every negative judgement has got two factors : the knowledge of the locus and the knowledge of the object which is perceptible in the locus. Both the objects are capable of being seen with the help of sense-organ if the preconditions of the perception exist there. If only one of the above-mentioned two, i.e., mere ground (bhūtala) is perceived, the absence of another object which is expected or suggested (jar etc., for instance) is inferred. We may here recall the view of Dharmottara according to which, when any of them is perceived, we imagine the other one as present. In this way we should perceive it due to having the necessary condition for perception.

Prabhākara has supported the above-mentioned view. He says that through the perception of the ground which is endowed with perceptible jar, the absence of that jar is cognised.⁴⁴ The problem arising from negation can easily be solved if it is accepted that negation is nothing but the perception of locus alone where we intend to see the counterpositive perceptible in character.⁴⁵ From this it follows that the non-perception of an object which is capable of being perceived is also the ground of making negative statements.

Even if it is accepted this, some difficulties may come on the way of our understanding. It is very difficult to describe

44. Eka-jñāna-samsargiṇi drśyamāne satyekasminnitarāt samagra-darśana-sāmagrikam yadi bhaved drśyam eva bhaved iti sambhavitam drśyam āropyate

- Nyāya-bindutīkā, (13-15), p. 22, Edited by Th. Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 11, p. 63, The Academy of science of the USSR, Leningrad, 1918.

45. Tulyopalambha-yogyasya cārthāntaradarśenena drśyānupalambho'vadhāryate/ Ato drśya-pratīyogi-viśayā-tad-ekopalabdhir eva varam abhāvo'stu/

- Prakarāna-pañcīkā of Śālikanāth Miśra,

an object which is not present in the locus as perceptible. The Prabhākaras have tried to solve the difficulty in a way which is supported by the Buddhist logicians. In fact, the Buddhists and the Prabhākaras have propounded the same view for solving these philosophical problems. We can answer the problem following the line of Dharmottara which is also unopposed by the Prabhākaras. The Buddhists argue that, though an object is absent, it is perceptible, because perceptibility is the result of imagination which goes in the following way - "If the particular objects were present in a particular locus, it would have been surely be perceived". In this case the object, though absent, is superimposed as being visible.

The Prabhākaras generally accept the cognition of an object having two characteristic features : (i) as related with some other things and (ii) as not related with other things. When we say 'The book is on the table', we express the cognition of the co-relation between the book and the table. On the other hand, when we have knowledge in the form 'the book is not on the table', the mere table is seen and through it we cognise the absence of relation between the book and the table. In this theory negation is nothing but the absence of perception of

edited by Mukunda Shāstri, p. 121,

Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, Benaras, 1903.

positive things (anupalabdhirhibhāvanām abhāvah).⁴⁶ In other words, 'to know a positive entity' means 'the perception of an object'. Negation, on the other hand, is devoid of this affirmation. Hence it is nothing but the mere presence of void locus having no relation with other objects.⁴⁷

46. Pramāna-vārttikasvavṛtti, edited by Rāhula-Sāṅkṛityāyana, p. 30, Kital Mahal, Allahabad, 1943.

47. Darśanam upalabdhis-tasya nivṛttir abhāvas-tuccharūpah
saiva tanmātram vastv-antara-samsarga-virahah

- Dharmottarapradīpa of Durveka Miśra, edited by Dalsukha Mālavānīa, p. 103, Kāshi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955.

CHAPTER-VI

SOME CRITICAL AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

It has been shown earlier chapter that the opponents have not accepted anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowledge and they have given some arguments behind it. It is true that the phenomenon of anupalabdhi is not denied by the opponents also. They have agreed in a common point that negation is capable of being known, i.e., prameya. By virtue of admitting it as a prameya, it comes to our mind that negation is knowable. That which is knowable is expressible. Before expressing the knowledge of the absence in the form - 'There is no jar', it presupposes the knowledge of absence. Hence, knowing is a primary factor of expressing. But how this knowledge of absence is possible. On this account the opponents express their difference of opinions, According to some, it is known through perception or some believe that it is known through inference, which has already been discussed.

The Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas agree on the point that absence is knowable. According to them, it is known through a different source of knowledge called anupalabdhi which

is neither perception nor inference. In order to highlight their own standpoints they have formulated some arguments of their own, which may not be adequate for establishing their standpoints. Hence, in supporting their position we may adduce some arguments which may substantiate their philosophical positions. Though these arguments are not mentioned by them directly, yet they could have been forwarded following their lines.

At the outset we may develop some arguments in favour of not-accepting the Nyāya position who does not accept anupalabधि as a separate pramāna. To them, knowledge of absence is generated through perception as there is the specific type of sannikarṣa called viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva. In order to show that the knowledge of absence is perceptual, they have to formulate a peculiar rather unfamiliar type of sannikarṣa as already mentioned. The knowledge of absence of an object in a particular locus arises in one's mind through perception where the locus becomes qualificand (viśeṣya) and the absence of an object is qualifier (viśeṣana). The grasp of the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand is the instrument for generating the perceptual knowledge of absence.¹

This view of the Naiyāyikas is not acceptable from the standpoint of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins. This argument is not also tenable rather intelligible to the common man. By

1. Vide Chapter-V, pp. 123-124 (of this dissertation).

way of showing the knowledge of absence as perceptual the Naiyāyikas have invented a sannikarṣa which has complicated the method of understanding. The common people generally express their knowledge of absence in a very straight-cut manner like 'there is no jar on the ground'. The man to whom it is communicated also understands what the speaker wants to say and hence there does not arise any communication-gap as it is the conventional way of representing it (i.e., knowledge of absence). The Naiyāyikas have unnecessarily complicated this method after giving the knowledge in a shape of viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva. If a simple thing can be conveyed in a simple way, what is the use of arranging it as having relation between qualifier and qualificand? Though the knowledge - 'There is no jar on the ground' can be expressed as 'The ground is endowed with the absence of a jar' (ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtaḥ), there is, we think, no necessity of representing it in such a way. A common man does not incline to do any work if there is no necessity. Even the blunt person does not engage himself in performing any job if there is no end in view (prayojanaṃ anuddiśya na mando'pi pravarttate). Hence, intelligent persons do not find any logic in accepting such unusual and artificial representation of the knowledge of absence. The Naiyāyikas have intentionally represented the knowledge of absence in such artificial language in order to show the structure prominent in it. If we analyse the language - "There is no jar on the ground", the relation between the qualificand and qualifier follows, no doubt, from the above language. But the

problem remains as to what motive is achieved by using such a language. It may be essential for intellectual purpose which is not much connected with our day to day behaviour. If this be the case, how an individual will grasp the said relation between the absence and the locus. It is true that without the knowledge of the locus absence cannot be known. In this case the knowledge of locus is perceptual, but not the absence. Further, we are not habituated in perceiving the locus as qualificand and the absence as qualifier. Hence we do not think, like locus, absence is also perceptual. So Naiyāyikas's standpoint does not find a firm footing on this issue. Even intellectually if we accept the relation between the qualifier and qualificand (i.e., the absence of the jar and the locus), the locus, i.e., ground is perceptually known as qualificand (viśeṣya) and the absence of a jar (ghatābhāva) is also perceptually known as qualifier (viśeṣaṇa). If the absence of a jar is already perceptually known as qualifier, how can it be used as instrument or sannikarṣa of knowing absence? That is, as the absence of a jar (ghatābhāva) is known as an adjective, what is the utility of using it as a cause or medium for knowing the absence of a jar which is already known as viśeṣaṇa? If there is an effort of proving as established object by means of the same established object then it is fallacious as per principle - na śilā tādayat śilām (i.e., a piece of stone cannot hit another piece of stone). In other words, as a piece of stone cannot hit another piece of stone or rather it is nonsensical to hit a stone with another piece of

stone, it is also nonsensical to say that the established object is established by the same established object. If an object is already established, there is no necessity of establishing it. If someone does it, it is nothing but futile exercise. Not only this the effort of an establishing of an established object with the help of other means is also fallacious. This fallacy is known as siddha-sādhana, i.e., establishment of an object already established. This fallacy will crop up if viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa is accepted.

It has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that water existing in the cloud does not come down though weighty, because the air is acting as an obstacle to its falling down. Here they want to say that as this knowledge of absence gives rise to another knowledge, it is perceptual. In other words, the knowledge of the absence of falling down of the cloud is known perceptually.²

This view is not tenable. For, the absence of falling down of cloud is not known as perceptual, but it is known through the perceptual knowledge of the cloud which is floating in the sky. From the fact of the perceptual knowledge of the floating cloud, it is known that it does not come down. That cloud is not falling down is not known perceptually, but it is known through perception of the cloud roaming about the sky. In this perception

2. Ibid, p. 119.

the object is the cloud which implies indirectly the absence of its coming down. The knowledge of absence, as indirect in character, must be other than perceptual. From this, it follows that the knowledge of absence is not perceptual as recommended by the Naiyāyikas. Moreover, if some knowledge is attained through the instrumentality of another knowledge (jñāna-karāṇa-kām jñānam), it is of mediate character. The knowledge which is not attained through the instrumentality of another knowledge (jñānakarāṇakām jñānam) is immediate or perceptual. In this case the knowledge of the absence of falling down of cloud routed through the knowledge of floating cloud and hence it is not perceptual.

In the same way, the argument that from the unmarked cloths the absence of mark is known perceptually can be refuted.³ One point could be added here that the word 'unmarked' means the absence of 'mark'. It is not true that the absence of mark is known through the word 'unmarked'. It is the lexical meaning of the term 'unmarked'. If the absence of mark is followed from the word 'unmarked', there would have been the indicator - indicated relation (jñāpya-jñāpaka sambandha), but actually here there is no such relation. The said relation may exist between smoke and fire. On account of the fact that the knowledge of smoke becomes the pointer or indicator (jñāpaka) to the knowledge

3. Ibid, pp. 121-122.

of fire which is indicated or pointed (ināpya) here. Such type of relation does not persist in between unmarked and the absence of marked. On the other hand, the phenomenon of being unmarked is known in terms of being marked which is perceptual. Like previous case this is also known indirectly and hence it is not perceptual.

It is rightly pointed out by the Naiyāyikas that the concept of apavarga is defined in terms of abhāva. So far as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is concerned, liberation is nothing but absolute cessation of sufferings. When a man becomes free from sufferings, the absence of pain is felt nodoubt.⁴ It is not purely the feeling of the absence of pain, but it is associated with the feeling of relief also. That is why the Vedāntins and Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas have described liberation as not merely the absence of pain but attainment of bliss also. In this case the feeling of absence is over-shadowed by the feeling of bliss. To them, liberation is not negative freedom, but a positive one. Hence, the view of the Naiyāyikas that we feel the absence of pain in liberation, is not considered as a real state by others. Here duḥkhābhāva is not an isolated phenomenon, but it is suppressed by boundless joy. So the concept of Mukti given by the Nyāya-

4. "Tadatyantavimukto'pavargah

Vaiśeṣika is not acceptable to Vedānta and Bhāṭṭa - Mīmāṃsā. Even the absence of pain is accepted logically, but it is known, I think, indirectly through the realisation of bliss or sense of relief. The absence of pain as known indirectly through bliss or through relief is not perceptual.

The Naiyāyikas have given an argument that a negative fact being unconnected with proper sense-organ is also visualised.⁵ This statement leads to various problems. If a negative fact is not connected with proper sense-organ, it cannot be visualised. There does not arise any question of visualization if there is no sannikarṣa of the proper sense-organ with the object. Moreover, if a negative fact is not connected with the sense-organ, according to the Naiyāyikas, how is the phenomenon of non-connection known? The negative fact is explained in terms of the non-connection of the sense-organ with the object. This 'non-connection' is also a negative fact. Hence, in order to understand a negative fact, another negative fact (in the form of non-connection) is resorted to which may need the help of another negative fact leading to the defect called infinite regress (anavasthā doṣa). We may at best say that the negative fact is not visualised, but realised indirectly with the help of a positive one.

If somehow it is accepted that a negative fact is

5. Ibid, pp. 122-123.

perceived through the unconnection of eye with it, there would arise a question of perceiving all the negative facts existing in a remote time and place, which is absurd. The Naiyāyikas have tried to answer this question by saying that the perceptual awareness of negative fact is determined by the perception of its locus. In other words, a perception of the locus serves as an instrument for perceiving a negative fact. If it be the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas, it will justify the Advaitins' position that a negative fact is known indirectly, but not perceptually. The statement that the perception of locus serves as an instrument of perceiving the negation clearly shows that the knowledge of absence is always mediate, and hence it is not perceptual as said earlier.

It has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that when the ground is known perceptually, the bareness of the ground caused by the absence is also known through perception simultaneously.⁶ This view is not correct on account of the fact that when the ground is known through perception, the bareness of the ground is not perceived automatically if the knowledge of the counterpositive is not in our mind. If I look for something like a jar etc., I shall feel the absence of it on the ground. If there is no such intention in our mind, we do not feel the bareness of the ground.

6. Ibid, pp. 124-125.

For having the feeling of bareness of the locus the knowledge of the counterpositive like a jar etc. should have been in one's mind. Otherwise how can I feel the absence. Hence, bareness is relative or rather subjective. The ground which seems to be barren to a particular person may not be as such by another. Hence, the feeling of absence of bareness is subjective. From this it can be said that the bareness of the ground is not always perceptual to all, but ground is perceptual. So the Naiyāyikas are not correct on this account.

The Naiyāyikas have argued that the positive properties are called independent. The negative properties are called dependent on account of the fact that they can be expressed in language with negative particle (nañ).⁷ This view of the Naiyāyikas is also questionable. The statement that each and every negative property is dependent is not true. For, each and every linguistic expression is dependent on its meaning. Each and every word, positive or negative, is dependent on its denotation. The understanding of each and every positive word always depends on its denotation (abhidheya). Can it be said as dependent? If it is dependent, the Naiyāyika's position will be weak. Because, they admit that positive statements are independent. When a negative fact is expressed with the word 'nañ', it is called dependent, because the word itself is dependent on the denotation (abhidheya).

7. Ibid, pp. 127-128.

Each and every linguistic expression always depends its meaning. The linguistic expression becomes sensible if it can refer to some meaning or if it can give verbal understanding. Otherwise, language or word becomes non-sensical, not to speak of linguistic expression with the particle 'nañ'. As a word expressing a positive fact is dependent on the fact of capability of proving right meaning, or negative expression is also dependent on its capability of conveying right meaning and also on the knowledge of the counterpositive. If this be the case, both are dependent. So the Nyāya contention that negative expression is only dependent is not true.

It has also been pointed out by the Naiyāyikas that the property of having no pot has no special character over and above that of its dharmin (i.e., possessor of property).⁸ It is not intelligible to the common people that how the Naiyāyikas have identified the property of the absence of something and the property of the locus where it exists (dharmī). It is not understandable that there is identity between the absence of red colour and the property of the locus where it exists, i.e., non-red substance. How can superstratum (ādheya) be the property of the substratum (ādhāra)? If something is taken as a property (dharma), it is not proper to describe as a possessor of property (dharmin), because dharma and dharmī are different. Hence,

8. Ibid, p. 129.

the Naiyāyika's contention that dharmā in the form of negation of an object has not special character over and above that of its Dharmīn is not correct. The knowledge of dharmī is not always known in terms of dharmā. Moreover, whether the absence of a jar is a dharmā of the locus or not is to be decided at first. It has been said earlier that the absence of something cannot be taken as a qualifier (viśeṣana) of the locus for which the sannikarṣa called viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva is not possible.

The Naiyāyikas have tried to prove the absence with the help of the application of Tarka which is as follows : Had the object been there, it would have been perceived. As it is not perceived, it is not there.⁹ In response to it we can say that the hypothetical argument (Tarka) is a kind of indirect proof. Had the absence been perceived, there would not have been necessity of applying Tarka. In Nyāya the Tarka is applied in order to remove doubt of deviation (vyabhicāra śamkā) or any other type of confusion. If there is no confusion, there is no necessity of applying Tarka. Tarka is defined in Nyāya as 'vyāpyā-ropeṇa vyāpakāropastarkah', i.e., Tarka is the imposition of the pervader through the imposition of the pervaded. In this definition understanding of the terms 'vyāpya' (pervaded) and 'vyāpaka' (pervader) presuppose the concept of vyāpti which is the root of or the instrument of inference. Hence, the application

9. Ibid, p. 130.

of Tarka is not perceptual, as it is a kind of indirect method. This indirect method is the promoter to the inferential cognition mainly. It is called accessory to the pramāna (pramānānugrahaka). It is the method through which pramāna can reveal its object. It indirectly helps a pramāna to reveal an object. It being indirect in character cannot be taken as a direct one. As the knowledge of absence is attained through the indirect means of Tarka, it loses its immediacy. As it is not immediate, it cannot be perceptual.

An objection may be raised from the Advaita point of view on the statement made by the Naiyāyikas that between Ākāśa which remains in the ear and the sound there is the relation called Samavāya (inherence) but not absence of relation as demanded by the opponents.¹⁰ The objection is raised by the Advaitins who do not accept Samavāya or inherence as a relation. Due to some metaphysical presuppositions and logic the Advaitins are reluctant to accept Samavāya as a logical relation. Hence, the Nyāya view cannot be accepted by the Advaitins.

The Naiyāyikas have argued that perceptual knowledge can be expressed directly without depending on some other judgements as in the case of parārthanumāna etc. As the knowledge of absence does not depend on the demonstration of any judgement, it is

10. Ibid, pp. 130-131.

called perceptual.

This is incorrect. From the fact that something is not capable of being expressed through any judgement like parārthānumāna (inference for others) it is not proved that it is perceptual. Demonstration about the existence of an object is essential if there is any doubt about some fact, positive or negative. Even in the case of Anumāna the demonstration is not always essential as in the case of svārthānumāna (inference for oneself). We always draw our inferential cognitions automatically without mentioning steps until and unless some justification is asked for. In the same way, the knowledge of absence is known indirectly, but it is not demonstrated as there is no necessity. If someone asks about the validity of this knowledge, the demonstration can be given. From this it proves that the knowledge of absence can be demonstrated. It is not true that the knowledge capable of not being demonstrated is perceptual.

It has been stated by the Naiyāyikas that, when someone sees absence, he does not have feeling that he is not grasping something which is not there. Instead there is a feeling that absence is really on ground, but not imaginary.¹¹ The absence of an object is really felt there on the strength

11. Ibid, p. 133.

of its non-apprehension. Hence, non-apprehension is the means through which absence is known. This happens in our mind so promptly and spontaneously that it may seem to us as immediate, but actually it is through a separate pramāna called Anupalabdhi. Even in the case of inference also sometimes we have spontaneous knowledge of sādhya (major term) through Hetu (middle term). It sometimes becomes so prompt that it may seem to us immediate. But if an intellectual analysis is given to it, it will be revealed to us that the knowledge is derived through inference. Such is the case with the knowledge of absence, but actually it is through a separate pramāna called Anupalabdhi.

The defect existing in sense-organ may generate defective cognition or erroneous judgement. Due to this defect the cognition of absence may also be defective. Hence, the knowledge of absence is perceptual.¹² This view of the Naiyāyikas is not correct. It is not reasonable to think that the knowledge of absence should be considered as perceptual by virtue of the fact that there may arise defective cognition of it. For, the defect of the sense-organ gives rise to erroneous cognition. The sense-organ is involved not only in the case of perception but other forms of pramānas also. As for example, in inference perception of Hetu and vyāpti (invariable concomitance), in

12. Ibid, pp. 133-134.

comparison the perception of similarity and in verbal testimony auditory perception of term etc. are essential. If defect lies in the sense-organ, it may lead us to the erroneous inferential knowledge, erroneous knowledge attained through comparison etc. In the same way, if there is any defect in the sense-organ, it may lead to the defective or erroneous knowledge of absence. From this it does not follow that the knowledge of absence is perceptual only. Hence, anupalabdhi may be considered as a separate pramāna. But it cannot be included under perception.

Lastly it has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that if it is accepted that only one sense-organ can generate the perceptual knowledge of ground and absence there is Lāghava (i.e., it comes under the 'Law of parsimony'). This view, I think, is not tenable. The Gaurava (i.e., logical cumbrousness) sometimes is virtuous if it is, used for the logical clarity. In other words, if Gaurava leads us to the attainment of the desired result (Phalamukha-gaurava), it is virtuous. If it is admitted that the ground is known through perception and absence existing in it is known through anupalabdhi, there is no harm. Sometimes, we have adopted a longer route to reach the destination without any trouble or without any difficulties. Hence, if it is admitted that both ground and absence are known perceptually, it would unduly create logical confusion, because both the object of perception (i.e., ground and absence) are not of same type. Hence, in order to avoid complications (i.e., logical complications) it is better

to accept anupalabdhi as a means of knowing absence though it leads us to Gaurava to some extent.

The view forwarded by Udayana in favour of the perceptuality of absence can be refuted in the light of the arguments mentioned so far. One point may further be mentioned here. It is quite admissible that perceptual knowledge is a kind of knowledge whose instrumental cause is not cognised (ajñatakaranaka). If eye is the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge, it is not cognised.¹³ What do they mean by the word 'Ajñatakaranaka'? Does it mean that instrument is not cognised or cognisable? In the case of former it is not cognised because there is no necessity of cognising it. But in the latter case it (i.e., eye etc.) is cognisable. It is true that eye is not capable of being seen, but it is cognised through tactual sense-organ. It is not true that it is not cognisable on account of the fact that it is known through tactual sense-organ. Hence, the view of the Naiyāyikas is not acceptable. So the knowledge of absence cannot be taken to be perceptual as it is produced through instrumentality of the sense-organ as observed by the Naiyāyikas. Because, it is stated earlier that sense-organ serves as an instrument in each and every pramāna including anupalabdhi, but not in the case of perception alone.

13. Ibid, p. 135.

That the non-perception of an object does not always lead to its non-existence is supported by Udayana. According to him, there is no ground of denying the existence of the super-sensuous metaphysical objects. Because, mere non-perception of them is not taken as a proof for denying their existence. Following the line of Udayana it can be said that mere non-perception cannot prove an object's non-existence. For knowing an absence the mere non-cognition may be the pointer. But 'non-cognition' or anupalabdhi has to be taken as a different source of knowledge.

The view that the knowledge of the absence of an object is known through super-normal connection through the knowledge called jñānalakṣaṇā¹⁴ is not also tenable. Because, the jñānalakṣaṇā, though accepted as super-normal connection, is not accepted as perception by a section of philosophers, i.e., the Advaitins. To them, jñānalakṣaṇā is nothing but a form of inference. From this it follows that when the absence of some object which is in memory is known through the perception of the ground, it is a kind of inference, but not perception. By virtue of accepting it as inferential the claim of the Naiyāyikas that it is perceptual is denied. We may be permitted to support the Advaitins in respect of the non-perceptuality of the knowledge of absence.

14. Ibid, pp. 138-139.

The Buddhists have included anupalabdhi under inference. It is quite natural that the Buddhists would describe anupalabdhi as inferential. Because, to them, the objects existing only one moment having svalaksana character are perceptual. Other than these all other individual manifestations of knowledge which are known through kalpanā or ascription i.e., name, universal etc. are called Sāmānya-laksanas which come under inference. To us Anupalabdhi cannot be included under inference due to its distinct character. There are a few problems in including anupalabdhi in inferential form of knowledge.

Anupalabdhi cannot be included under inference because the very definition of it is found completely different from inference. The definition of it is given in the following way : 'The means of valid knowledge known as anupalabdhi is the uncommon cause of that apprehension of absence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument' (Jñānakaranājanyaābhāvānubhavāsādhāraṇam kārāṇam anupalabdhirūpaṁ pramāṇam).¹⁵ Here the term 'jñānakaranājanya' is inserted in the definition of anupalabdhi in order to exclude it from inference etc. In other words, this very particular term has been used so that the definition of anupalabdhi does not unduly extend to inference etc. Inference,

15. Vedāntaparibhāṣā. (Chapt. anupalabdhi pariccheda),

Madras, 1942.

verbal testimony, presumption etc. are due to the instrumentality of other knowledge, namely, the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñānaṁ), the knowledge of similarity (sādrśya-jñānaṁ), the knowledge of words possessing an intention (tātparya-jñānaṁ) and the thing to be explained (upapādaka-jñānaṁ) respectively. All these individual manifestations of knowledge generate other forms of knowledge like inference etc. That is why, they are called jñanakaranajanya. When an absence is known, there is no instrumentality of other knowledge though it has been accepted as a mediate one.

It may be argued that if it is not caused through the instrumentality of another knowledge, why is it called a mediate one? It can be replied that one will have the knowledge through the instrumentality of the apprehension of the absence. Here, the awareness of absence (abhāvānubhava) is taken as an instrument of anupalabdhi. Hence, there is also some medium of awareness in the form of absence. In the case of anupalabdhi there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñāna). How can it be described as an inferential one? The instance of anupalabdhi is given as follows - 'There is no jar due to its non-apprehension' (Nāsti ghaṭo'nupalabdheh). In this case of argument we do not find any invariable relation called vyāpti between non-apprehension and absence. From the fact of non-apprehension it does not follow that there is absence of something, because there might be many things in the world that are still non-apprehended. Hence, 'where

there is non-apprehension of something, there is the absence of the same' - this cannot be taken as invariable nondeviated relation (avyabhicāri sambandha). I may not know a particular object due to my limitations, but from this I cannot say that it is not there.

In the above-mentioned argument, anupalabdhi is a Hetu, the sādhya is anastitva (non-existence) and the vyāpti-relation should be in the form : 'Where there is absence of cognition (anupalabdhi), there is absence (anastitva)'. Between anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) and anastitva (non-existence) there cannot remain a non-deviated relation. For, anupalabdhi does not always entail its absence as told earlier. Hence, due to the absence of vyāpti-relation it cannot be the case of inference, but a distinct means of knowing. Because, in some cases the absence of some objects like jar etc. is known through their non-apprehension. Though the rule 'where there is non-apprehension, there is absence' cannot be established, yet at the same time it cannot be denied that from the fact of non-apprehension of an object the absence of the same is definitely known. This is possible only through anupalabdhi.

The Buddhists accept anumāna as sāmānyalakṣaṇa, because they admit all which are not svalakṣaṇas as inferential. The object existing for a moment is perceptual. Excepting this all are inferential. The Advaitins, however, would not be in a

position to accept this view. Hence, what seems to be inferential to the Buddhists may not be accepted as same by the Advaitins due to having a different notion of inference (anumāna). The metaphysical presuppositions of the Buddhists and the Advaitins are not the same. For, the former believes in the theory of momentariness while the latter does not. Hence, the Advaita theory of inference is different from that of the Buddhists. In the Advaita-scheme of inference there is no scope of incorporating the knowledge of absence. The arguments have already been put forth in favour of this. Hence, anupalabdhi is accepted a different source of knowledge

That anupalabdhi cannot be included under inference may be supported by the following argument. According to the Buddhists, the inferential form- 'There is the absence of a jar, as there is non-appearance of sense-perception' (nāsti ghaṭo'-anupalabdheḥ). In this case one problem may be raised. In this syllogistic argument 'The non-appearance of sense-perception' (anupalabdhi) is taken as a Hetu. But the problem is that there can be no relation between this non-appearance and any particular case of non-existence. There would be a distinct relation between this and non-existence in general. But this non-existence-in-general is not capable of providing any cognition. On account of the non-committance of this non-appearance with particular cases, these cases could not be comprehended through the non-appearance.

The above mentioned point may be elaborated in the following way. If someone has got the knowledge of non-existence-in-general, it will signify nothing. Non-existence comes to our awareness if there is the awareness of the counterpositive (prati-yogī). The non-existence-in-general, not being related to some counterpositives, does not come to our awareness. That is, non-existence-in-general does not mean the 'non-existence of something'. If there is non-appearance of something and non-existence-in-general, there cannot be the relation of Vyāpti (universal concomitance) between them. On account of this inference which is drawn on the strength of the argument is not justifiable due to the absence of universal concomitance.

The Buddhists have taken non-perception as a Hetu (probans) and the knowledge of negation is described as a result available on the strength of the Hetu. Kumāṛila has criticised this inferential means of knowing a negative fact as accepted by the Buddhists. If the negative fact is known through inference, there must be some Hetu or probans. In the typical case of negative judgement - 'There is no jar on the ground', which part of this sentence is to be taken as a Hetu. The 'jar' cannot be taken as a Hetu, as the cognition of jar is not possible. The object which is not at all cognised cannot be taken as a Hetu of inferring something. Moreover, the cognition of a jar, on the other hand, cannot give rise to its non-cognition and hence, the negative judgement would not be possible at all. The locus, i.e., ground cannot serve the

purpose of Hetu, because the locus cannot be understood as the qualifier of the negation, if negation is not known to be present. If the negation is known in this case of inference, there will be no object at all, as the negation which is going to be established (sādhya) through hetu is already known to us. Moreover, the universal concomitance or vyāpti is not possible, as the invariable concomitance between the locus and negation is not proved. The ground or locus may be associated with a jar or may not be. But the locus remains unaffected for this. Hence, the relation of the locus with the absence of a particular object is purely accidental and variable. On account of this the cognition of the locus cannot be mentioned as the Hetu of the negation. Hence, anupalabdhi is to be taken as a different source of knowing.

The Buddhists are in favour of the view that the previously known jar and hare's horn which is never experienced may be negated equally.¹⁶ This view, I think, is not supportable. The absence of a jar is intelligible because its counterpositive (pratīyogī) is well-known to us. But the absence of hare's horn is beyond the range of our understanding. In other words, the absence is meaningless or non-sensical if the counterpositive of it is an absurd entity which is technically called Alīkapratī-

16. Ibid, pp. 146-147.

yogikābhāva (i.e., an absence, the counterpositive of which is an absurd entity). It is not very clear to us why the Buddhists have made both types of negation as equal. Moreover, the type of anupalabdhi should be considered as a real one if the counterpositive of it is capable of being cognised (yogyānupalabdhi). As the counterpositive of the absence of a hare's horn is not capable of being cognised, it should not be taken as a real anupalabdhi.

It has been argued by the Buddhists that the perception of 'bare ground' determines 'the absence of the intended object'.¹⁷ This standpoint is also not logically sound. Because, the perception of bare-ground cannot always give us the idea of the absence of the intended object. Some idea exists in the mind of an individual which is the cause of the feeling of absence in some particular locus. As for example, there might be the absence of a jar, a pot, a pen etc. But when we feel that there is the absence of a jar, it will be presumed that the idea of a jar which we are looking for must exist in our mind. It is true that on the same ground there are many other objects which we do not look for. In this case the locus, i.e., ground is not known as an absence of a particular object which we do not know. Hence, when the mere

17. Ibid, pp. 142-143.

bareness of ground is seen, we have something in our mind (which is purely imaginary). The knowledge of pratiyogī (counterpositive) leads us to ascertain the absence of a particular object. From this it does not follow that the knowledge of bare locus automatically gives rise to the knowledge of absence of the objects. The 'bare locus' can generate the knowledge of absence if someone bears the idea of some object which he looks for. Hence, through anupalabधि the absence of a particular object (but not all other objects with which we are not concerned) is known. This knowledge cannot be derived if Anupalabdhi is not taken as a source of valid knowledge.

That the real absence is nothing but the bare locus is not accepted by the realists. Following their line the Buddhists view may be refuted. What is to be understood by the term 'bareness' (kaivalya)? It may mean the self-identity of the locus. If it is accepted, it will give rise to another problem. Because, when we perceive an object, we perceive it together with its locus. The ground can be known as containing a jar or not containing a jar. If it is admitted that absence is identified with the bare locus, it would be apprehended when the object is present. But as a matter of fact, object, if present in a particular locus, cannot ^{be} denied. From this it is presumed that 'bareness' does not mean the self-identity of the locus (i.e., absence is identified with locus). If the bareness of the locus is considered as separated from the absence (atirikta), the absence which is nothing

but a real entity can be described in other ways viz., as separateness and negation. That is to say, as absence is separated from the locus, there is both separateness and negation. The same abhāva may be described by both the terms, but not purely as negation, which is undesirable.

The Buddhists, however, have some points in favour of admitting bare ground as distinct from other ground having a jar, because they believe in the theory of Svalakṣaṇa. The Svalakṣaṇa object is alone Sat having arthakriyākāritva (i.e., causal efficacy). Due to having a distinct character in terms of causal efficacy the bare locus and the locus having a jar are taken to be different. From the standpoint of the other systems of philosophy, this is not reasonable, because they do not believe in such theory of Svalakṣaṇa and arthakriyākāritva (causal efficacy). In this way, the objections raised against the Buddhists can be substantiated. Moreover, the relation between the locus of the absence and the counterpositive (pratīyogī) is, according to the Buddhists, not ultimately real (paramārthasat), because it is treated as Kalpana or ascription which has got phenomenal reality. This dichotomy of truth has not been accepted by others. To the non-Buddhists relation, language etc. are the real. Hence, the earlier objections against the Buddhists are justified.

According to the Buddhists, the perceptual judgement involves two factors : (a) self-identity of the objects (svabhāva)

through which it is distinct from other things and (b) its perception. That is to say, an object is distinct from others as it is identical with itself i.e., existing in its own essence. To remain in its essence is not the sole factor, but its perception is also essential for the perceptual judgement.¹⁸

In response to this, one could say that the first one is the main cause for perception. That is, an object is known as distinct from others, as it has been perceived as self-identical. The phenomenon of self-identity is not known unless it is perceived. To say that an object is in its svabhāva is to admit that it is perceptible. There is no need of accepting another criterion of 'being perceptible' in this case. As in the case of anupalabdhi there is the absence of the said svabhāva, it is inferential in nature, which is not acceptable to other philosophers due to the reasons mentioned earlier. Hence, anupalabdhi is to be accepted as a different source of knowing.

That anupalabdhi is a distinct source of knowledge can be substantiated following the line of Pārtha sārathī Mīśra. He says in his commentary called Ślokaṽartika that negation is the absence of relation called contact (samyogābhāva). He opines that for knowing an absence it is not purely essential to perceive the locus. The object of negative judgement does not depend on

18. Ibid, p. 149.

the knowledge of locus. When an object, i.e., a jar is associated with the sense-organ, we form the judgement - 'The jar is present on the ground'. On the other hand, when an object, i.e., the same object 'jar' does not come into contact of the sense-organ, it is known as being non-present which is expressed in the judgemental form - 'The jar is not present here'. In this case the conjunction of the jar with the locus is denied here. In other words, a jar is denied as having conjunction with the ground or locus. In this case the only jar (but not the ground) is cognised. On the other hand, the locus is apprehended as not being associated with the jar or as not being the locus of the conjunction of the jar, which is expressed as 'The locus is without the jar'. The difference between these two types of negative statement is known through the expression of two different statements. When a jar is known as not being in conjunction with the locus, it is expressed as Bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti (i.e., The jar is not on the ground) in which the jar is taken as a subject and the locus is indicated with the locative case-ending (saptamī). In the second case the locus is taken as a subject 'ghaṭaśūnyam bhūtalam!', i.e., the locus without a jar. The negation may be expressed in any form. But the truth of this negative expression will depend on the denial of the conjunction of an object, i.e., a jar and the locus, i.e., ground.¹⁹

19. " ... tatra sadrūpatayā pratiyate asti ghaṭa iti, yadā yatra asattayā pratiyate nāstīti ghaṭa iti yatra bhūtalasamyogā-

Pārthasārathi Mishra, after keeping this view in mind, has explained prāgabhāva (prior absence) as antecedent denial of conjunction. In other words, when the conjunction is not produced with the jar, it is called antecedent denial of the conjunction. When the conjunction being produced is destroyed, it is described as posterior absence (dhvaṃsābhāva). When the conjunction between a hare and horn is denied eternally, it refers to the entity called atyantābhāva (eternal absence). It is a fact that prāgabhāva is different from Dhvaṃsābhāva and the vice-versa. Any of these absences is constant absence (atyantābhāva). Hence, the denial of identity is called mutual absence (anyonyābhāva). When it is said - 'A horse is not a cow', it would mean 'there is no cowness in a horse'.²⁰

bhāvātmanā ghaṭa eva pratiyate na bhūtaḥ ghaṭasūnyatayā
bhūtalasya saptamya paraviśeṣaṇatvāt, yadā tadeva viśeṣyate
tadā ghaṭasūnyam bhūtaḥ iti pratitih ghaṭasamyogitvena
avidyamānam 'ityarthah".

- Nyāyaratnākara on Sloka-vārttika, Edited by
Rāma Śāstrī Tailanga, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
series, Benaras, 1898, p. 481.

20. "Tasminnabhāvātraye 'pyanyasyānya-sambandhitvanishedhaḥ,
itaretarābhāvā-nyasyānyatādātmyanishedhaḥ, gaur na
bhavatyasva iti gavātmatvam asvasya na vidyata ityarthah"

- Ibid.

Such type of argument was forwarded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also. His argument was that when an object comes into contact with sense-organ, the judgement is perceptual. But when there is an absence of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, we get the judgement - 'The jar is not here'. Hence the validity of absence (abhāva) as the means of knowledge in this case as opposed to perception is to be accepted.²¹

The attitude of the Prābhākaras who do not accept the metaphysical reality of negation is not supportable. To them negation is nothing but the absence of an object which is knowable in nature.²² When it is said - 'There is no jar on the ground', it would mean - 'The jar which is taken as an objective fact is not present'. What the Prābhākaras want to say by way of denying negation is nothing but the acceptance of negation in a different word. Those who believe in the existence of negation believe that some objective fact is not present. There is no novelty in approach by the Prābhākaras. We do not understand what fundamental difference lies in the usages like 'some objective fact is not present' and 'some objective fact is absent'. I think

21. "tat sambandhe sad-ityevam tad-rūpatvaṃ pratiyate, nāsty-atredam itīdam tu tadasamyogahetukam".

- Śloka-vārttika, verse 26.

22. Ibid, p. 160.

that the difference lies in the field of terminology, but not in reality. In the real world both denote the absence of some object. Hence, the negation has been accepted by the Prābhākaras also. As negation is there, there must be some means to know it, which is nothing but anupalabdhi.

The Bhāṭṭas have accepted that the negation of a particular object is nothing but the perception of the locus which is not completely distinct from the absence. Hence, the absence can be regarded as a character of the locus which is different from its positive character. The negative aspect is known through the noncognition of the perceptible object in the locus. On the other hand, the positive object is known independently. From this it follows that the way of knowing a negative fact varies from that of knowing a positive one. Hence, the Prābhākaras are bound to invent a special way of knowing a negative fact which is called Anupalabdhi. The variation in the objective order, though verbally not accepted by Prābhākaras, is materially accepted by them as shown earlier. Hence, they have to accept anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna.

The Prābhākaras say that Anupalabdhi is not a separate source of knowledge, because the knowledge of absence is not purely mental, but perceptual as sense-organs are in operation. In other words, when the substratum is perceived, and the counter-positive is remembered, the non-perception gives rise to some

activity in mind which can produce the knowledge of absence. As the sense-organ are in operation, it may be accepted as perceptual.²³

This view is not accepted. For, what is not cognised by the five accepted pramānas like perception etc. is cognised through the sixth pramāna called Anupalabdhi.

Prābhākaras, however, do not agree on this point. To them, a pramāna will be regarded as such when it can bring about its effect, i.e., definite cognition of its object. This definite cognition is in the form of 'this'. The object which is known through five pramānas can be referred to with the help of 'this'. But in the case of absence in the form 'This does not exist', we do not get the idea of 'this' as an effect of pramāna. On account of this it cannot be treated as a source of knowledge.

The above mentioned view of the prābhākaras may, I think, be refuted in the following manner. The knowledge of the absence in the form : 'This does not exist' may be had as an effect of pramāna. Because, the term 'this' refers to some object by virtue of its being pronoun. If the term 'this' stands for something which is in user's mind, it can give a definite knowledge. Hence, in this case also there is the concrete object of cognition

23. Ibid, pp. 162-163.

conveyed by the term 'this'. Generally the term 'this' refers to some particular object existing in front which is clearly known by the user. As this concrete object of cognition is not available through the accepted five sources of knowledge, there is a separate source of knowledge called Anupalabdhi.

The Prābhākaras have argued that negation is nothing but the absence of the perception of positive things. This has been explained in the following way. 'To know a positive entity' means 'the perception of an object'. Negation is nothing but devoid of this affirmation. Hence it is nothing but the mere presence of void locus having no relation with other objects.²⁴

The above mentioned view can be refuted in the following manner. To describe the absence as 'mere presence of void locus having no relation with other objects' is tantamount to the acceptance of absence as such. How does the awareness of mere presence of void locus having no relation with other object come to one's awareness? First, the mere presence of locus is known. Secondly, it is known as void. Thirdly, it is known as void because it has no relation with other object which is called 'vastvantarasamsarga-virah'. The term 'virah' here refers to absence. The term 'viraha' has been used by the Naiyāyikas also as absence in connection with the definition of vyāpti which runs as follows :

24. Ibid, pp. 166-167.

"Athavā hetumannīṣṭha virahāpratiyoginā/
Sādhyena hetoraikādhikaranyam vyāptih//"

That is, vyāpti is the co-existence between Hetu with Sādhyā which is the non-counterpositive of the absence (viraha) existing in the locus of the Hetu. In this case 'viraha' has been used in the sense of absence. In literature this term is generally used in the sense of pangs of separation which arises from the absence of the lover or lady love. Hence, the term in the sense of absence is not new in Indian tradition.

As the Prābhākaras have described the locus as void due to having the absence of relation with other objects (vastvāntarasam-sarga viraha), they have to believe in the existence of abhāva. Otherwise how can they ascertain the devoidness of the locus? Or how can they become sure regarding the ground free from any relation with other objects. Hence, there, I believe, is sufficient reason behind accepting negation as a fact. If negation is a fact, there must be some distinct way of knowing it which is anupalabdhi.

Dhvamsābhāva (posterior absence) is described as one of the abhāvas (absence). It has been defined earlier as follows : It is an absence which is revealed after the destruction of some objects. In this connection a problem may be raised in the following way. The posterior absence (dhvamsābhāva) is accepted by the Naiyāyikas also which is capable of being perceived. In other

words, this type of absence is perceptible on account of the fact that jar remains in the destructed condition in front of our eyes. One may argue that after seeing the destructed parts of a jar the posterior absence is inferred. To the Naiyāyikas, it is perceptual, because any type of absence is known through viśeṣaṇa-viśesyābhāva sannikarṣa (i.e., a contact abiding in between qualifier and qualificand).

If the nature of this type of abhāva is same in both Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta, there would arise the possibility of the attainment of the knowledge of absence through perception. As the nature of this absence which is similar to Nyāya-view is accepted as in Advaita Vedānta, it would have been cognised through perception. Hence, there is no necessity of accepting anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa.

In response to the above problem the Advaitins are of the view that though posterior absence is accepted in both the systems, the nature of posterior absence accepted by the Advaitins is completely different from that of the Naiyāyikas. The points of difference may be elaborated in the following way. The Naiyāyikas do not admit the cessation of destruction. According to them, the destruction has a beginning, but not end, but the Advaitins accept the end of it. To the latter the destruction of a jar becomes ended as soon as there is the destruction of Kapāla (upper half of a jar), which is the locus of the destruction of

a jar. When a jar is destroyed, it turns into Kapāla (upper half of a jar) etc. The total annihilation of a jar is possible due to the destruction of the Kapāla (upper half of a jar). This total annihilation of jar gives rise to its end of destruction, because there is nothing to destruct further.

It may be argued that if there is the destruction of the destruction of a jar, there may arise the possibility of the re-origination of the jar. This is not also true, because the counterpositive of the destruction of the destruction of a jar is the jar itself, just as jar becomes counterpositive of the destruction of a jar. If it is not admitted, there would arise a logical problem. It has already been accepted that a jar is equivalent to the destruction of its prior absence (prāgabhāva). If the destruction of its prior absence (prāgabhāva) is accepted, there would arise the contingency of the reorigination of the prāgabhāva (prior absence). A jar is taken as equivalent to the destruction of its prior absence, because a jar is originated as soon as the prior absence of the jar is destroyed. That is why, any effect (kārya) is described as the counterpositive of the prior absence (kāryaṃ prāgabhāvapratiyogī). Hence, the counterpositive (pratiyogī) of the destruction of the destruction of the jar is jar only. On account of this posterior absence (dhvaṃsābhāva) accepted by the Advaitins is completely different from that of the Naiyāyikas. As the nature is not the same, it would not be perceived. This can be known only a different means called

Anupalabdhi.

From the foregoing discussion it is proved that anupalabdhi is an important pramāna, because it is the way of knowing a negative fact. The knowledge attained through perception, inference etc., I think, is incomplete or rather impossible without the help of anupalabdhi. When a jar is perceived, it is possible due to the knowledge of non-jar associated with it. That is, when a jar is known, it is known as differentiated from non-jar (aghatavyāvṛtta). Without having an idea of non-jar a jar cannot be known. In the same way, the cow is known in terms of the knowledge of non-cow. Without having the knowledge of Bheda (distinction), an object cannot be known as such. In our day to day life when an object is perceived, the bheda (the distinct character) of this particular object from others is also known. This knowledge of bheda (distinction) is otherwise known as knowledge of anyonyābhāva (mutual absence) which is one among four types of anupalabdhi. Even in the case of inferential knowledge of fire there is the necessity of the knowledge of some bheda, i.e., non-fire which is also known through anupalabdhi. That is why, Buddhists have accepted the importance of apoha. Apoha is the negative way of pointing out of some object which is accepted by the Buddhists. As they do not accept universal or sāmānya, there may arise the question of knowing a cow as such. They are of the opinion that a cow is known as such not because there is a universal, but because there is the absence of 'non-cow' (agovyāvṛtti).

In this way, a horse is known in term of the absence of non-horse etc. Thus, each and every object is known. Hence, apohavāda is such a theory which can be known through anupalabdhi alone

The above argument may further be elaborated in the following way. We may have the knowledge of bheda (i.e., difference) and abheda (identity). When someone says - 'A jar is a jar or ghata is a kalāśa', it conveys us the knowledge of identity between ghata and kalāśa. It is identical because in one (i.e., ghata) there is no absence of the other (i.e., kalāśa) and the vice-versa. In other words, in ghata there is the absence of the mutual absence (the absence of the anyonyābhāva) of kalāśa. Hence there is abheda or the absence of bheda. On the other hand, if someone says - 'A stone is different from a flower', it conveys us the sense of bhedatva or difference of a stone from a flower. How does this sense of distinctness come to us? This sense of difference or distinctness of one object from another comes from the absence of the latter to the former. That is, a flower is different or distinct (bhinna) from a stone because in a flower there is the bheda or mutual absence of a stone and the vice-versa. One object is different from another due to having bheda. This is why, an object is bhinna, i.e., an object having bheda from another. Our day to day behaviour is possible as there is the distinctness of each and every object from others. Otherwise, there would have been the fallacy of over-lapping, communication problem etc. For the sake of the knowledge of the distinctness

of an object there is necessity to know the absence of the mutual absence of other object, which is possible only through Anupalabdhi. Hence, the role of anupalabdhi as a pramāna cannot be ignored in our practical life.

Anupalabdhi has to be accepted as a pramāna because it is the only means through which the knowledge of abhāva or absence is possible. That is why, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has described it as an uncommon cause or instrument of the awareness of absence (abhāvānubhava), which is not caused through the instrumentality of another knowledge (jñānakaranājanya). This property of not being caused by the instrumentality of knowledge is introduced to exclude inference etc. from anupalabdhi. It is true that the awareness of absence is not caused through the instrumentality of other knowledge. From this one could think that the awareness of absence is perceptual due to its having the property of not being caused by the instrumentality of another knowledge. In order to exclude it from perception 'abhāvānubhavāsādhāraṇam karanam' (i.e., the uncommon cause of the presentative awareness of absence) is included. All other awareness excepting that of absence is perceptual. But the awareness of absence, though not caused through the instrumentality of other knowledge, is not perceptual, but a special source of knowledge called anupalabdhi.

The main intention of the Advaita Vedāntins of introducing philosophical discourse is to show that in this world there is only one Reality which is Brahman. This has been mentioned by

them as one and undual (ekameva advitīyam). It may be argued by the opponents that why the terms 'ekam' (one) and 'advitīyam' (nondual) have been introduced by them when only one word 'one' or 'nondual' can serve the purpose. In reply, the Advaitins have given justification for the use of both the terms 'ekam' and 'advitīyam'. This is used in order to show that Brahman is essentially non-dual. That is, Brahman is not having three types of distinction (bheda). In other words, in Brahman there is the absence of the three types of bheda (distinction) viz., sajātīya (i.e., distinction from others belonging to similar class, e.g., a tree is distinct from another tree), vi-jātīya bheda (distinction from other belonging to different class i.e., a tree is distinct from a stone) and svagatobheda (distinction from others existing in the same locus, i.e., a tree is different from its leaves, fruits etc.).²⁵ These three may be called as homogeneous, heterogeneous and internal or self-existing distinctions. In Brahman there is the absence of these distinctions. In order to prove this the Advaitins have introduced the sentence - Ekameva

25. Vrksasya svagato bhedaḥ patrapuṣpaphalādibhiḥ/
Vrksāntarāt sajātīyo vijātīyaḥ śilāditaḥ//

- quoted by Panchanan Bhattacharya in
Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Bengali version) Foot note 1,
 p. 29, Calcutta, 1377 (B.S.)

etc. The fundamental thesis of the Advaita-Vedānta is to be understood in terms of absence of the absence which is of mutual type (bhedābhāva). This knowledge of absence has occupied a prominent role in the whole Advaita-Vedānta literature. For the sake of highest realisation this sense of absence is highly essential, which is to be known only through anupalabdhi.

When an individual realises this Reality, he becomes identified with Brahman which is described as a liberated state. In the phenomenal level an ordinary human being can come to know of this Reality as one and non-dual in terms of the absence of the three types of distinctions. For this awareness of absence it is essential for the Advaitins to accept anupalabdhi as a pramāṇa. The other pramāṇas like perception, inference etc. are admitted in Advaita-Vedānta for the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. Though these are accessory to the Truth, they cannot convey the sense of absence. Hence, anupalabdhi is the last way through which the knowledge of absence is known. Moreover, the Upaniṣadic seers had introduced a novel means of attaining self-knowledge which is of abstract character. The Ultimate Reality or self is to be known in terms of negation (neti neti).²⁶ In ordinary stage an individual may not be able to conceptualise Brahman. For this he is given some initial conception about

26. "Sa eṣa neti netyātmāguhyo ... "

- Brhadāranyakopaniṣad, 4/4/22.

Brahman or self through negative way. It is said to him that self is not body, not sense-organ, not mind, not jar etc. In this way, he would be in a position to realise that each and every object of this world is the manifestation of Brahman. For, the Neti Neti method (negative way of pointing out to the Truth) is required. For this understanding anupalabdhi is to be taken as a separate way of knowing.

The knowledge of absence is not attained through perception as observed by the Naiyāyikas. To the Advaitins the perceptuality of knowledge is possible if there is the identification between the consciousness limited by the mental modes (antahkaranavṛtti which is technically called pramāṇa-caitanya) and the consciousness limited by the object (viśaya-caitanya). For the perceptual knowledge of a jar, for example, the identification of pramāṇacaitanya (which is nothing but the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of a jar) and Viśayacaitanya i.e., consciousness limited by the object or, jar is essential. Here by the term 'object' or 'viśaya', the object which is capable of being perceived (yogyā) is to be taken into account.²⁷

27. Pramāṇacaitanyasya viśayāvacchinnacaitanyābheda iti brumah.
Tathāhicaityaṃ viśayacaitanyaṃ pramāṇacaitanyaṃ
pramāṇacaitanyaṃ ceti. Tatra ghaṭādyavacchinnaṃ caitanyaṃ
viśayacaitanyaṃ, antahkaranavṛttya-vacchinnaṃ caitanyaṃ
pramāṇa-caitanyaṃ ... Yogyatvasyāpi viśayaviśeṣanatvāt".

In the present case the knowledge of absence cannot be taken as perceptual, because it does not fulfil the criteria of its being perceptual according to the Advaita-Vedāntins. There is no corresponding consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of absence of some object and also no consciousness limited by the object in the form of absence. There may be the mental modes in the forms of the positive objects like jar, pot etc. and also corresponding consciousness limited by those objects. But in case of absence such consciousness limited by mental mode in the form of absence and also the consciousness limited by the object in the form of absence is not possible because it is not capable of being perceived (ayogya) to the Advaitins. As the identification of pramānacaitanya with visayacaitanya in the form of absence is not possible the knowledge of absence cannot be perceptual. Hence, it is to be attained through a different means of knowing called anupalabdhi.

- Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Chapt.
Pratyakṣa pariccheda).

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