

## CHAPTER-V

LOGIC BEHIND NON-ACCEPTANCE OF ANUPALABDHI AS  
A PRAMĀNA BY THE NAIYĀYIKAS AND OTHERS.

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It has already been discussed in the previous chapter that absence or abhāva, which is not identical with its locus but something additional to it (adhiṣṭhānātiriktaṁ tattvaṁ), can be known through a unique source of knowledge called anupalabdhi according to Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins. The other philosophers like Naiyāyikas, Buddhists do not accept absence as a separate source of knowledge. According to them, absence can be known either through perception or inference. These philosophers constitute the pūrva pakṣa of the Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins. They have developed their own reasoning in favour of non-accepting abhāva as a separate pramāna.

Let us first concentrate on the view of the Naiyāyikas and their logical excellence in connection with the means of knowing abhāva. Afterwards, the tenability of their arguments will be considered.

The Naiyāyikas accept that the non-apprehension or anupalabdhi merely facilitates the appropriate sense-organ in cogni-

sing the absence of an object. When there is no jar on the ground, the visual sense-organ, i.e., eye, being assisted by appropriate negation, determines the absence of the jar on the ground. Thus the relation of absence to the locus is adjectivity. The awareness of negation may be called as causally connected, because it is based on the joint method of agreement and difference anvaya-vyatirekī. Hence the negative awareness is visual i.e., perceptual.

Gautama, the founder of Nyāya school, has opined that abhāva is not a separate source of knowledge or pramāna, but it is an object of true cognition (prameya). It is established on the basis of the normal experience that water existing in the cloud is not coming down in spite of having its weight. The object which has got weight always comes downward. In this case water has got some weight. Hence it should have come down. But actually we do not find it. From this it is assumed that there must be some hindrance which stands on the way of its coming down. This hindrance is nothing but the connection of cloud with air which counters the downward<sup>u</sup> of the water inhered in the cloud. In this case the cognition of abhāva of the result which is naturally expected gives rise to another piece of cognition of the presence of the connection of it with air. Gautama has realised the importance of such cognition which, according to him, is a form of inference. There is no justification behind accepting it as a separate source of knowing.<sup>1</sup>

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1. "Śabda aitiḥyānarthāntarabhāvanūmāne'rthāpatti -

That negation is not an object of knowledge—proper has been opposed by Gautama also. In the list of the categories accepted by Gautama, abhāva is not included. But one can feel the importance of it if one goes through his literature developed afterwards. Among the sixteen categories or padārthas which are essential for having this-worldly and other-worldly wellbeing (niḥśreyas), abhāva is not mentioned. But the role of abhāva has to be accepted if one has a complete idea of apavarga or liberation. It is true that apavarga is the final goal in the Nyāya system. This has to be realised in terms of abhāva, because the complete cessation of suffering is apavarga.<sup>2</sup> Though he does not mention abhāva directly, yet he accepts that some fundamental concepts cannot be explained without the help of abhāva. Hence abhāva is not neglected so far as its conceptual framework is concerned. When Gautama argues that liberation or apavarga is the complete cessation of suffering, he accepts the concept of liberation which entails the concept of non-eternality (anityatva)<sup>3</sup> of material

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sambhavābhāvānarthāntarabhāvāccā-pratiśedhaḥ"

- Nyāya Sūtra, 2-2-2.

2. "bādhānalakṣaṇam duḥkham/"

"tad - atyanta - vimokṣo'pavargah/"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.21 & 1.1.22.

3. Gautama here has taken a common sense view of the theory of

objects which can be explained with the help of negation. In other words, to accept non-eternality of an object amounts to suggest the acceptance of abhāva without which absence of eternality cannot be explained.

That this absence is the object of knowledge can be explained with the help of the following metaphor. Among several marked cloths there are some unmarked also. By virtue of being unmarked the absence of marked comes to our awareness, i.e., the absence of marked gives rise to the knowledge of its absence.<sup>4</sup> Here the absence of marks is the cause of an individual's awareness. Hence it is called pramāna. The absence which is the true cognition here is the object known through this pramāna.

It may be argued by the opponents that the question of absence arises in that place where an object is originated and destroyed. But in the case of unmarked cloths, it cannot be said that marks were originated there and destroyed afterwards. On account of this, it is very difficult to say that there is absence of mark. Gautama meets this point with the help of the following arguments. The above-mentioned view is not acceptable, because marks are found in other objects. Just as a man realises the presence of

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causation which is the opposite to the those of the Buddhist or the Vedāntin.

4. "lakṣitesv-alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvād alakṣitānām

marks in a cloth, he sees the absence of it also in an unmarked cloth. After observing the absence of marks he realises that cloths are unmarked.<sup>5</sup>

The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that the object which is not connected with proper sense-organ is not visually perceived. That which is perceived visually is a positive object. But the Naiyāyikas have shown their logical excellence in establishing the fact that a negative fact being unconnected with proper sense-organ may also be visualised. In other words, a sense-organ reveals only an object which is in proximity to it and in contact with it. From this, it follows that it is related only to the positive objects.<sup>6</sup> But the Naiyāyikas have shown their novelty in saying that a negative fact is also visualised without the help of visual sense-organ. In this connection, a problem will crop up. If a negative fact being unconnected with eyes is perceived, all the

tatprameyasiddheh"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 2.2.8.

5. "asatyarthe nābhāva iti cen nānya-lakṣaṇopapatteh"

- Nyāya-Sūtra, 2.2.9.

6. Bhaṭṭācārya, J. V., Nyāya-mañjarī, Vol. I, p. 109,

Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1978.

negative facts belonging to a remote time and place should also be perceived. But it is not possible, because perception cannot give rise to the knowledge of an object existing in remote places and in future. In reply, it can be said that such problem does not arise at all. For, the awareness of a negative fact does not come from the void, but it is determined by the perception of its locus. The perception of the locus serves as a medium for perceiving a negative fact. So the locus of a negative fact which is within the range of a sense-organ is to be perceived only.

Annambhaṭṭa, the eminent Naiyāyikas, does not believe in the above-mentioned suggestion. According to him, there is no necessity of admitting the cognition of a negative fact through the perception of its locus. He believes that a negative fact is directly perceived through the contact of sense-organ which is called viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva sannikarṣa, i.e., a contact in which there is the relation between qualifier and qualificand. In order to justify it the Naiyāyikas have taken the following example : 'There is no jar on the ground.'<sup>7</sup> The same negative fact may be expressed as

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7. "Abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah sannikarṣah ca/  
Ghaṭābhāvavadbhūtalamityatra cakṣuḥsamyukte bhūtale  
ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣanātvād/

- Tarkasaṃgraha, Edited by Shri Narayana  
Chandra Goswami (Bengali edition), p. 331,  
Samskrita Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.

- "The ground is endowed with the absence of a jar (ghaṭābhāvat bhūtaḥ)". Here the 'ground' is viśeṣya or qualificand and 'endowed with the absence of a jar' is viśeṣana or qualifier. The knowledge which is attained with the help of such type of contact or Sannikarṣa must come under the purview of the perceptual knowledge. Because the perceived objects like viśeṣana and viśeṣya are the media through which the absence is known. In this case the peculiar relation called viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāva has been invented by the Naiyāyikas after keeping a particular view in their mind. The view of the Naiyāyikas can be more firmfooted if their metaphysical presuppositions are reviewed carefully. According to them, non-existence of an object in a particular locus is not identical with the locus, but adjectival to it. For, we generally say that the ground is characterised or qualified by the absence of a jar. Hence the absence of a jar is conceived as a character or viśeṣana of the ground just as the attributes of the ground like colour, size etc. are perceived. The absence of a jar is also perceived not as an independent object, but as a qualifier of the ground. It comes to our awareness as soon as we look at the ground.<sup>8</sup> When the ground is known perceptually, the bareness or

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8. "bhūtaḥ viśeṣyam/ ghaṭābhāvo viśeṣanam/ 'bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti'ityatra abhāvasya viśeṣyatvaṃ draṣṭavyam/ tena anupalabdheḥ pramāṇāntaratvaṃ nirastam/ 'yadyatra ghaṭo'- bhaviṣyat tadā bhūtaḥmivādrakṣyāt darsānābhāvānnāsti' iti

emptiness of the ground caused by the absence of something i.e., jar etc., also known simultaneously. Only the difference is colour, size etc. of the ground are revealed by a different type of Sannikarṣa which cannot reveal the absence of a jar existing in it. For this the Naiyāyikas have adopted a peculiar type of contact or sannikarṣa which is called viśeṣya-viśeṣanabhāva sannikarṣa.

The judgement through which a negative fact is expressed, e.g., 'The pot is not red' can be divided by Nyāya into the qualifier and qualificand which are related by a quantification relation. To Nyāya, a judgement, affirmative or negative, indicates that the qualifier is expressed in ordinary language by a positive phrase like 'is blue' in the sentence "The pot is blue" or by a negative phrase such as "is not red" in the sentence "The pot is not red". In the first case the qualifier is the property of being blue, whereas in the second case the qualifier is the property of not being red or the absence of red colour. The Nyāya contention is that if red colour is the name of a property that characterises some object then by the same logic 'the absence of red colour' is the name of another property which qualifies some other locus. A judgement merely asserts that a qualifier qualifies a qualificand.

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tarkitapratiyogisattvavirodhyanupalabdheḥ saha kr̥tene-  
ndriyeṇaiva abhāvajñānopapattau anupalabdheḥ prāmāṇā-  
ntratvāsambhavāt/"

- Dīpikā on Ibid, p. 332.



It should be noted that the Nyāya concept of negation does not cover the act of negating or denying a judgement which is a psychological fact.<sup>9</sup>

It may be asked that why an absence of red colour should be considered as a real or genuine property like red colour, but not a pseudo one. The Nyāya replies in a very simple way. A property becomes real or genuine if there is some locus which it characterises. Such a property can be used in all logical and philosophical discussions. If red colour qualifies the things that are red, absence of red colour qualifies things that are not red. If there were no objects that are red, our talk about the absence of red colour would be unjustified. And hence the property called the absence of red colour would have been considered as an unreal property which cannot be used in logical and philosophical discourse. The Nyāya carefully avoids the entity which can be considered as aprasiddha or unreal property. If they were parts of some logical problems, the whole sentence would have to be considered as unreal or aprasiddha by Nyāya. On account of this Gaṅgeśa rejects all the five definitions of Vyāpti based on the concept

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9. Motilal, Bimal Krishna, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 93, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1968.

of non-deviation (avyabharitattva) in his Tattvacintāmani.<sup>10</sup> Because all of them have some unexampled property. For Nyāya, all things are knowable in character, and hence knowability exists in each and everything of the world, which implies that there is nothing characterised by the absence of knowability. Thus, the absence of knowability is an unreal property just as the property of being rabbit's horn. Such a property cannot be used to characterise some objects nor can it be negated.

It may be pointed out that the properties like absence of red colour etc. are always dependent on some counterpositive. Some properties are called positive, and hence they are independent, which means that they can be expressed in language without using a negative particle 'not' (nañ). There are also some properties that are not positive, and hence dependent. They are called dependent on account of the fact that they can be expressed in language with the negative particle. Moreover, an absence is always dependent on its counterpositive. This characteristic of being dependent upon a counterpositive is urged or emphasised

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10. "Nanu anumiti-hetu-vyāpti jñānekā vyāptih? Na tāvad -

avyabharitattvañ/

Tad hi na - sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvam - sādhyavad-bhinna-  
sādhyābhāvavad-avṛttitvañ, - sādhyavat - pratiyogikānnyo-  
nnyābhāvā - sāmānādhikaranyañ, - sakala sādhyā bhāvavanniṣṭhā-

by Gaṅgeśā as a necessary feature of absence.<sup>11</sup> Depending on this argument, Gaṅgeśā rejects the Prabhākara's view that the absence of red colour is nothing, but the locus itself, i.e., not red substance.

It may be argued by the opponents that an empty table or cognition of some empty table does not always depend upon the notion of a counterpositive. According to them, an absence must be described as having a substratum by all who accept absence as an additional entity. Because we can speak of an absence in connection with some place etc. So there must be a special property (viśeṣa) on the ground which is the substratum of the absence. The mere ground cannot be the special property. For, it may occur in a ground that has a pot on it. It cannot be identical with a ground having an absence. Therefore, it would lead to the defect called circularity. The absence of an object is known in terms of

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bhāva - pratiyogitvaṃ, - sādhyavat - anyāvṛttitvaṃ vā,  
kevalānvayini abhāvāt."

- Tattvacintāmaṇi (anumāna khanda),  
Chapt. Vyāpti pañcaka.

11. Siddhāntastu sapratyogiko 'bhāvo 'nubhūyate ghaṭo na paṭo  
netyambhavāt, na tu tanmātraṃ/  
Ato 'bhāvovittivedyatvaṃ pratiyoginah, pratiyogijñānādhi-

the special property existing in the locus. Again, the special property existing in the locus is known in terms of the absence. In this way, one could raise the defect of circularity. The opponent tries to bring this problem against the Naiyāyikas. It is true that there is some special property on the ground lacking a pot. But how the ground be distinguishable from the ground possessing a pot?

The Nyāya's reply would be as follows. The property of having no pot has no special character over and above that of its dharmīn (i.e., possessor of property). Hence, one cannot establish the above mentioned relation between an absence and special property. To Nyāya there does not arise any question of establishing a relation between an absence and the special property. If an absence is taken as a 'dharma' or character, it is nothing but the character of its dharmī, i.e., the object bearing this character. Hence, if there is at all a relation, it is between dharma (property) and the possessor of property (dharmī) i.e., between an absence and the locus of it, but not between an absence and special property. In stead of this one can establish it between the absence and independently existing locus of

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najñānatvañcābhāva - syānubhavasākṣikam  
gosādṛśyavat/

- Ibid (Abhāva-vāda khanda), 29.

the absence, i.e., the ground.<sup>12</sup>

The Naiyāyikas have tried to prove the cognition of absence as perceptual through the method of Tarka, i.e., reductio-ad-absurdum which runs as follows : "If jar were present on the ground, it would have been perceived. As it is not seen, there is the absence of a jar". Depending on this method of Tarka one could say that the cognition of absence is perceptual, which is evidenced from the Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. It has been stated by Vātsyāyana that one should know the reality (Tattva or thatness) which means the positivity of the positive (Sataśca Sadbhāvah) and negativity of the negative (asataśca asadbhāvah). The negativity of the negative should be known through perception.<sup>13</sup> If there is really an object in the room, it would have been seen. From the non-perception of it, the absence is apprehended. Hence the negative entity also comes under the purview that Tattva or reality or padārtha which is capable of being known through a distinct pramāṇa which is perception.

In this connection one problem can be raised in the follow-

12. Ibid, 39.

13. Kim punastattvaṃ? Sataśca sadbhāvo'sataścāsadbhāvah/ Sat saditi grhyamāṇam yathābhūtamaviparītam tattvaṃ bhavati/ Asaccāsaditi grhyamāṇam yathābhūtamaviparītam tattvaṃ bhavati/

- Vātsyāyanabhāṣya (Introduction).

ing way. It is a well known fact that the sound is perceived with the help of the ear. What would be the operative relation between ear as the sense-organ and sound as the object? As the relation between them cannot easily be cognised, one might think of having an absence of relation between them. Had there been any relation, it would have been easily cognised. If so, one might think of a separate source of knowledge called anupalabdhi in this place due to the absence of cognition of the operative relation or process. In response to it the Naiyāyikas say that an ear as a sense-organ is nothing but the space (Ākāśa) enclosed by auditory passage (karnaśaṣkulyavacchinnaṃ nabhaḥ śrotraṃ). It has already been accepted that sound is a quality of Ākāśa. So the relation between the two is Samavāya or inherence as it persists between dravya (substance) and guna (quality). The Naiyāyikas accept the relation called Samavāya (i.e., inherence) which exists between two objects which are not separable. Inseparability which exists between quality (guna) and substance (dravya) between a part (avayava) and a whole (avayavi) etc. is called Samavāya. Here we find an inseparable relation between quality and substance. For, the space limited by ear is only a limitation (avacchedaka) of the space as a whole and hence it is Ākāśa, one of the nine categories accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. From this it follows that there is no necessity of accepting any absence of relation in this place. Due to the acceptance of relation in the form of sannikarṣa (contact) between them the question of anupalabdhi does not arise.

The Naiyāyikas hold that the absence of a perceptible object is itself perceptible, which is based on the following arguments :

First, we can apprehend the absence directly without depending on other factors just as the positive entities like colour, size etc. are directly known. As immediacy lies in knowing the positive and negative entities, the absence can be described as perceptible.

Secondly, it is an undeniable fact that, when the absence is known, the locus of absence is also known. When we gather the knowledge in the form : 'There is no jar on the ground', we have the knowledge of the ground and the knowledge of absence simultaneously. Hence it can be said that like locus of the absence the absence is also perceptible.

Thirdly, perceptual knowledge can be expressed directly without depending on some other judgements as in the case of Parārthānumāna etc. In order to prove the fire is on mountain we have to take recourse to various steps or judgements in order to convince others about the truth of inferential conclusion. But in the case of the perceptual knowledge no such demonstration is needed. As the experience of absence does not depend on the demonstration of any judgement, it may be called as perceptual.

Fourthly, as the counterpositive of absence is perceptible with the help of sense-organ, the absence of it is also perceptible by the same sense-organ. If the counterpositive is a perceptible

object, it would be known through perception and its absence would also be known through the same means. For, it is the same sense-organ which can reveal the counterpositive and the absence.

Fifthly, when someone has the sensory knowledge of absence on the ground, he does not have feeling that his sense-organ cannot apprehend something which is not there. But instead of this he has a feeling that something is on the ground or locus where absence is located. The main spirit of the statement is that the absence of something in a place is not the creation of an imaginative mind, but it is really there which is capable of being cognised with the sense-organ.

Sixthly, there is a chance of committing mistake in cognising absence. But non-apprehension cannot be mistaken, because in the case of non-apprehension there is nothing which may give rise to any defect. If there is any illusory knowledge, there must be some defects as its cause.<sup>14</sup> To Nyāya, if sense-organ is involved in generating some knowledge, it may be defective. As there is chance of defective sense-organ or some defects in perception, there may arise some erroneous judgements. Hence mistake is possible in cognising absence also. It can be said that knowledge of absence is perceptual. As there is a chance of having erroneous knowledge in respect of some positive objects and absence,

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14. 'doṣo'pramāyā janakah'

- Bhāṣāpariccheda, verse No. 131.



it is presumed that there is some wrong either in the sense-organ or in the object itself. From the fact of having erroneous cognition, it is presumed that absence is perceptual. There is a chance of having erroneous cognition of an absence, which entails the existence of some defects in the sense-organ. A cognition connected with sense-organ is always perceptual.

Lastly, the judgements conveying that something is absent can be expressed in two ways : (a) Where locus is the subject and the absence is predicated, e.g. The ground possesses the absence of a jar, and (b) Where absence is subject and the locus is predicated, e.g. The absence of a jar is on the ground. There is only one instrument of valid knowledge which can reveal both subject and predicate of this judgement. It is not possible to accept that a particular pramāṇa reveals the subject and another reveals the predicate which is logically cumbrous (Gourava). Hence the opponent's view that the perception apprehends the ground or locus and non-perception apprehends the absence is not correct. Both should be known with the help of perception.

Udayana, the celebrated Naiyāyikas, does not accept anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowledge. In the case of absence, according to him, sense-organs are the prime factors though anupalabdhi serves as a cocurrent cause of the perception of abhāva. In knowing abhāva sense-organ plays a vital role which is assisted by anupalabdhi. This anupalabdhi is an

accessory to the perception of abhāva.<sup>15</sup> He has proved the perceptuality of abhāva with the help of the following arguments.

According to him, perception is a kind of knowledge whose cause is not cognised (ajñātakāraṇakam). As for example, the vision does not perceive its cause, i.e., eye. Like other Naiyāyikas, he also admits that the sense-organs are the instrumental causes of perception of the absence of a jar. One can merely assume that the knowledge of the absence of an object is produced by sense-organ, because it is the knowledge which is produced by an instrumental cause, and which itself is not cognised. The perception of an external object is produced by internal sense-organ, i.e., mind with the help of the instrumental cause, i.e., sense-organ.<sup>16</sup> In the like manner, mind is capable of conveying the perceptual knowledge of the absence of a jar with the help of external sense-organ. To him, from the fact of having power to perceive negation the sense-organ can be accepted as the instrumental cause in the perception of abhāva.

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15, Cowell, E. B., The Kusumāñjali of Udayana Ācārya with commentary of Hari Dāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, p. 32, Bharati-Bharati Publishers, Varanasi, 1980.

16. Pratipatterapāroksyādindriyasyā-jñātakāraṇatvācca bhāvāveśacca cetasaḥ//

- Nyāyakusumāñjali, 111.20.

A pramāna which apprehends the existence of a thing is capable of apprehending its non-existence also.

A section of philosophers, who accepts anupalabdhi as an independent pramāna, has some metaphysical presuppositions. Behind the acceptance of anupalabdhi as a pramāna, the hidden intention of them is to prove the non-existence of the Divine through perception. Their argument is as follows : 'God does not exist. Had He been existed, He would have been perceived. As He is not perceived, He does not exist.'

The above-mentioned argument is refuted by Udayana by saying that the mere non-apprehension of a thing does not prove its non-existence, but the non-apprehension of a thing which is capable of being perceived proves its absence. The negation of an object is meaningful if it is understood with reference to its counterpositive capable of being perceived. One can argue that there is no jar on the ground, because he knows that if it were present, it would have been seen. Since it is not perceived, it does not exist there. This method is known as Reductio-ad-absurdum. Such method cannot be applicable to the case of God, because God is not amenable to perception, which entails that the non-perception of God does not prove His non-existence.

It may be argued by the opponents that if the non-apprehension of an object which is not perceived does not prove its non-existence, the non-apprehension of hare's horn cannot

guarantee about its negation for its incapability of being perceived. In other words, if non-apprehension is not the cause of absence then the non-apprehension of hare's horn etc. will not be taken as the cause of its absence. If so, how can we know then the non-existence of these entities?

In reply, Udayana says that though hare's horn is not capable of being perceived, both a hare and a horn are capable of being perceived separately. It is the horn belonging to hare which is denied as perceptual. According to him, non-apprehension cannot deny the existence of self, because it is the nature of self that it will be perceived when it is characterised by some cognitions.<sup>17</sup> So far as God is concerned, He is not capable of being known perceptually. Hence He is ayogya in this case. For this reason, non-apprehension of God cannot prove its non-existence.

There is another problem in accepting the perceptuality of an absence. An absence is perceptible being qualified by its counterpositive. So for the sake of perception of an absence, the sense-organ must have the operative relation in both the absence and its counterpositive. But it is a well known fact that there is opposition (virodha) between absence and its counterpositive as both of them cannot exist in the same place simul-

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17. Cowell, E. B., The Kusumāñjali of Udayana Ācārya with commentary of Hari Dāsa Bhattācārya, pp. 33-34, Bharati-Bharati Publishers, Varanasi, 1980.

taneously. When the absence of a thing exists in a locus, its counterpositive cannot exist there and the vice-versa. As the sense-organ cannot have operative relation with an object which is not present and not proximate, it can have such relation either with the absence or with the counterpositive. How can it be possible to perceive the non-existence as qualified by its counterpositive?

In response to it, the Naiyāyikas are of the view that sense-organ may have the two types of operative relation with the object : laukika (normal) and alaukika (super-normal). The first type is called laukika (normal), because the relation between the sense-organ and the object is physical. The other is alaukika (super-normal), because there is a super-normal relation of the sense-organ with an object which is not easily apprehended or which is not under the purview of normal operative relation. This alaukikasannikarṣa (i.e., the super-normal contact) is of three types : ĵñāna-lakṣaṇa, sāmānya lakṣaṇa and yogaja. Through these super-normal operative relations the above-mentioned problem of perceiving both the absence and its counterpositive at the same time can be solved. When the knowledge of an object serves as an operative relation between the sense-organ and the object, it is called ĵñāna-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. But when the absence of an object is perceived, there is no ordinary operative relation between the sense-organ and absent object, i.e., counterpositive. Though the absent object is not

known through ordinary sannikarṣa, it can be presented to our sense-organ through the lane of recollective knowledge. With the help of jñāna-lakṣaṇa the counterpositive of an absence is known while absence is known through normal process. In this way, we are in a position to perceive an absence as qualified by its counterpositive.

Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Buddhist logicians also believe in the phenomenon of abhāva or absence. As they accept abhāva as a fact, they invent some methods of knowing it also. To them, perception is the method which can manifest an object having svalakṣaṇa or unique character and hence perception can reveal an object for a moment only. As absence is not momentary in character, it cannot be perceived. Thus it is known through inference which is sāmānyalakṣaṇa in character.

The Buddhists have accepted anupalabdhi as one of the hetu for inferential knowledge. According to them, hetu is of three types : svabhāva hetu (natural hetu), kārya hetu (hetu in the form of effect) and anupalabdhi (hetu in the form of non-apprehension). Through the relation of identity (Tādātmya) which is connected with the svabhāva, something is inferred. Sometimes a cause is inferred through the effect which is called kāryahetu connected with law of causation (Tadutpatti). With the help of these two (i.e., law of identity and law of causation) the absence of an entity cannot be known. Hence the Buddhists have to admit a different type of hetu called anupalabdhi in order to

explain the absence of an object. If the absence of a jar on the ground, for example, is known, it is not possible through identity and causation. It is also a fact that there is the awareness of absence. How is this awareness be explained? According to them, there are two ways of knowing : perception and inference. The absence cannot be included in the former, because perception is svalakṣaṇa. That is, an object which is capable of being perceived remains only for a moment. As absence is not at all momentary, it cannot come under perception. As it is an awareness, it must come under inference which is sāmānyalakṣaṇa in character. If it is inferential, there must be some hetu other than svabhāva and kārya. It is nothing but anupalabdhi.

The Buddhists hold that negation is known through an inferential judgement based on the non-apprehension of a perceptible object. But it is not a direct attitude of mind what pure sensation always is. Existence is the ultimate reality of a point-instant and the cognition of it is the corresponding pure-sensation. Hence, non-existence is imaginary but not real. When we say, for example, 'there is no jar on the ground', the visual sensation is produced by the bare ground but not by the absent jar. The absent jar is not perceived by the sense-organs, but this is a representation of the memory which is also constructed by the intellect.<sup>18</sup> Hence the cognition of the absent thing (i.e., non-

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18. Stcherbatsky, F. Th., Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 363,

existence of a jar) means its presence is imagination.<sup>19</sup> It means that if it (jar) were present, it would have been perceived; as it were not, it is imagined. In the like manner, we may be able to imagine the presence of such an entity like the hare's horn which refers to also non-existence. Thus, the previously known jar as well as hare's horn which is never experienced may both be negated equally.

According to the Buddhists, negation is an indirect way of cognising reality which is included under inference. Thus the knowledge in the form 'there is no jar' is preceded by an inferential process. The inference can be stated as follows. The existence of a perceptible thing is invariably accompanied by its perception; the jar which is a perceptible entity is perceived. Dharmakīrti admits that abhāva or negation is the process through which either the absence of something or some practical application of the idea of an absent object is deduced. Whether the facts be denied by way of an affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc.; everywhere

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Dover Publication, Inc. New York, 1962.

19. Atha yo yatra nāsti sa katham tatra drśyah

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, Edited with  
Dharmottara's Tīkā by Th. Stcherbatsky, p. 101,  
Bibliotheca Buddhica 7, 1918.



negation, on analysis, refers to possibilities of senseperception.<sup>20</sup> Thus, there is no relation such as conjunction, inherence etc. which can unite negation with them. It means that non-existence is never known as an independent object. It is here necessary to mention that the Buddhists are divided in their opinion regarding the content of negative judgement. The Dinnāga school believes that it is a mere mental construction, where Yogācāra admits it as the modification of the soul.

The Buddhists are of the opinion that negation is not judged as the perception of the locus rather it is the perception of the 'bare locus'. Here the term 'bare' which implies the locus alone becomes the object of perception but not the negation existing in locus. When we intend to perceive the jar but see only the ground, it is the perception of bare locus. For them, we apprehend only one thing where we intend to apprehend two. The cognition of the bare ground determines the absence of the intended objects. The intended perception of the absence in a particular locus is the necessary condition. The absence of

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20. Sarvatra cāsyām abhāvābhāva-vyavahārasā-dhanyām  
anupalabdhou yeṣām svabhāva-viruddhā-dīnām upalabdhyā  
kāraṇādīnām anupalabdhyā ca pratiṣedha uktasteṣām-  
anupalabdhiśca-veditavyā.

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti 11., Trans. by  
Stcherbatsky, Vol. II, p. 102.

an object and the perception of the locus are not sufficient grounds for knowing an absence.<sup>21</sup> For example, there might be many things such as pen, book, paper etc. which are absent from my study table. I may not be aware of absence of all these things until and unless my attention is drawn to a particular thing. The absence of a pen would come to our awareness when I am desirous of the pen. In this case, the cognition of the bare locus, i.e., empty table not bearing a pen, gives rise to negative argument in the form 'the pen is not on the table'. Hence the Buddhists will say that the perception of the bare locus having no pen and the apprehension of this fact are the basis of the non-cognition.

The realists may raise some objections to the view that the real absence is nothing but the assertion of the bare locus.

21. "ghaṭagrāhakatvasya bhūtalagrāhākasya caikajñānasamsargitvād yadā bhūtalagrāhākam eva tajñānam bhavati, tadā ghaṭagrāhakatvā-bhāvam niścāyayati." "

- Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Tīkā' by Karṇakagomin on Dharmakīrti's auto commentary 'svavrtti'.

or

- Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with commentary of 'Svavrtti-tīkā' by Karṇakagomin.

What is to be understood by the term 'bareness' (Kaivalya)? If it means the self-identity of the locus, it will lead to another problem. For, when we perceive the object, we perceive it together with its locus. The ground can be known along with the jar and without the jar. Therefore, if absence is identified with the bare locus, it would also be apprehended even when the object is present.

Secondly, if the bareness of the locus is considered as the locus separated from the object (atirikta), absence is accepted as referring to the real entity (abhāva) in different terms. Because separateness and negation refer to the same context.

Thirdly, if there is no absence, how can there be the knowledge of the bare locus where there was first a relational knowledge between the locus and a jar? This statement becomes sensible if posterior absence (dhamśābhāva) is accepted. But realists would not accept this, because, according to them, posterior absence is possible only through the destruction of the object. Just as we can say 'the jar is produced', we can also say 'the absence of the jar, i.e., the destruction is produced.'<sup>22</sup>

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22. Yady abhāvo nāsti katham tarhi yatra prāk samsṛṣṭabuddhir āsīt tatra tad ekaviśayābuddhir āvirbhavati? Pradhvaṃ-sābhāvābhyupagame tu sā syād/

- Prakaraṇapañcika of Śālikanāth Mīśra, p. 121,

The Buddhists do not accept the above mentioned objections. The terms 'bareness of the locus (bhūtalakaivalya)' and 'devoidness or non-associateness' refer to a knowledge of an independent fact. 'Independent' means it is the negative attribute which is independent, i.e., not depending on the ascription of a locus which contains an object. We cannot describe the ground bearing a jar as "it is the bare locus or the floor is without a jar". On the other hand, the ground which contained a jar cannot be described as the locus of a jar just after its destruction or removal. For, this bare ground is completely different from the previous ground bearing a jar due to its different causal efficacy (arthakriyākāritva). Ratnakīrti says that devoidness of the object and independent entity is here denoted by the term 'bareness'. This denotation is produced by its own causes and different thing from the locus of the jar. This ground is an object which does not bear the attribute of being the locus of the jar.<sup>23</sup>

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Edited by Mukunda Śāstri, Chowkhamba sanskrit series,  
Banaras, 1903.

23. Kaivalyam tadviviktatvam asankīrnatvam ityādibhiḥ padaiḥ  
pradeśasya ghaṭampraty anāpannādhārabhāvasya svahetuta  
utpannasya ghaṭapradeśād anyaevātmābhidhīyate/

- Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalī, Edited with

From the above statement it is clear that the relation between the object, i.e., the counterpositive and the locus is not real but imagined. The relation between the counterpositive and the locus is mentally constructed. Though the object is not present in the locus, it is assumed as being present. In order to deny its presence, the relation between the object and locus is mentally constructed. Because it is not the reality which is denied, but its relation which is a logical construction is denied.<sup>24</sup>

In response to the above position of the Buddhists the opponents say that in the above-mentioned case both existence and non-existence are to be considered as equal. In the proposition 'there is no jar on the ground' the presence of a jar, i.e., existence is not real but imagined and subsequently denied. In the same way, we may imagine the existence of the unreal (absurd) entities, e.g., the hare's horn etc. In the same logic there is possibility of constructing a true negative proposition in the form : - "there is no hare's horn". There will be no

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introduction by A. Thakur, p. 97, Tibetan  
sanskrit works series, Vol. III, Patna,  
Kāsi prasād Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

24. "ekajñānasamsargy atra vikalpya eva" -

- Ibid, p. 85.

difference between two statements - 'there is no jar on the ground' and 'there is no hare's horn'. But actually a jar is previously known and hare's horn is not at all experienced. Both cannot be negated in the same way.<sup>25</sup> According to Dharmakīrti, through negation the absence of some objects or some practical application of the idea of an absent object is deduced. "Whether the facts denied by way of affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc., everywhere negation on analysis refers to possibilities of sensation (senseperception)".<sup>26</sup> According to the Buddhists, there are various types of negative judgements. But the negative condition

25. "... pūrvāvagatasya ghaṭasya śaśaviṣānasya cā - navagatasya dvayor-api tulyaṃ kvacit pratiśedhe ..."

- Nyāyavatāra-Sūtra-Vārttikavṛtti of Shānti Sūri, edited with notes by Dalsukh Mālavaniya, p. 68, (Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1949).

26. "Sarvatra cāsyāṃ abhāvābhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanāyāṃ - anupalabdhyā yeṣāṃ svabhāva-virudhā-dīnāṃ upalabdhyā kāraṇādīnāṃ anupalabdhyā ca pratiśedha uktas teṣāṃ upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptānāṃ evopalabdhiranupalabdhiśca veditavyā".

- Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti (with commentary of Dharmottara), ll. p. 46.

which is the basis of all the negative statements always refers to sensations actually. Dharmattara opines that the concrete content of every simple case of contradiction is provided by an experience. The causal laws must have an application to the sensible objects only. In order to establish the causal relation between two facts and also to know the cause of contradiction in these relations, there must be some experience of them. In other words, for establishing the relation between two releta and for knowing the cause of contradiction in these, we must have some perception of the presence of the two facts or releta. The objects which are sometimes perceptible or sometimes non-perceptible should surely be taken as perceptible. Hence, non-perception or anupalabdhi is acceptable in the relation of the releta which have been perceived before.

According to the Buddhists, the absence or negation is of two types : (i) non-perception of some non-perceptible (adrśya), (ii) non-perception of some perceptible (drśya). The second type of non-perception is regarded as valid, because the object which can be denied is always perceptible. The non-perception of a thing always refers to an object which is capable of being perceived, i.e., the only perceptible objects can be denied. Dharmakīrti also is of the opinion that the non-perception of a non-perceptible object does not yield us certain knowledge and hence the negativity of it cannot be determined.<sup>27</sup> Buddhist's theory of negation

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27. "anīśāyaphalā hy-eśā nalam vyāvṛtti-sādhanē".

can be taken as a consequence of their theory of judgement. Their perceptual judgement involves two factors : (i) self-identity of the object (svabhāva) through which it is distinct from other things and (ii) its perception. If these two factors are present then we cognise a thing as the object of our judgement. If an object is distinct from others, it will be necessarily perceived provided there remains the condition of perceptuality. An object becomes imperceptible in a particular place or time if that object has no distinct reality (svabhāva) even though all the conditions of perceptibility are present. The Buddhists are of the view that the negation of an entity is cognised if and only if the object is an empirical reality. Though the causes of its perception are present yet it is not perceived. Thus non-perception or anupalabधि is of two types : (i) The non-cognition of a thing having its svabhāva or reality remaining in spatial and temporal relation but not perceived now. Though it is not perceived now, it can be perceived in some other place and time due to having its perceptible character which is evidenced from previous experience. (ii) The second type is the non-perception of an object which has no svabhāva, i.e., own nature. Although all conditions of perception are there, it is not perceived. In such a case non-perception follows as the object is not perceived due to absence of its particular nature.



The cognition of the bare-locus, the Buddhists opine, implies the negation of the jar which is known from the relation between related object and the locus. The judgement known as A is derived from the cognition of another term B. Had there been no B, no knowledge of non-A could have been possible. The negation of an object is cognised because of the presence of other entity (anyasattayāsattā). The negative judgement or negative deduction is not a tautology of the form - "there is no jar because there is none", but it is deduced from the form "there is no jar because there is a bare place".<sup>28</sup> This Buddhist doctrine of apoha is highly essential, because the affirmation of an entity is possible through the exclusion (vyavrtti) of other entities. In the negative judgement "there is no hare's horn", the cognition of the bare-head of the hare is the main factor in formulating the negative judgement. The assertion of the bare-head entails the exclusion of the horn.

The above principle is not applicable to the non-perception of non-perceptible object or non-empirical object. A non-empirical object cannot be asserted in any locus. The assertion of a non-empirical, super-sensuatiuous or metaphysical object does not involve the principle of dichotomy. In the phenomenal

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28. Sharma, Dharendra, The Negative Dialectics, pp. 52-53, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1974.

level the assertion of super-sensuous object is not possible. Without assertion there does not arise any question of differentiation or apoha. We can say about non-B if we want to assert A.

It may be argued that as there is no ground to deny the existence of super-sensuous or metaphysical object, mere non-perception of them is not to be taken as proof for denying their existence. There are many things that are non-perceptible and super-sensuous, e.g., the result of charity and religious practices, i.e., heaven (nisreyas (imancipation or liberation)). As there is no apparent ground for opposing these, mere non-perception cannot be taken as the ground of their non-acceptance. This standpoint may be firmfooted if Udayana's view is taken into account here. Udayana in his Nyāya Kusumāñjali has mentioned that only perceptible objects are non-existent in some particular place and time, because they are not perceived as such. But God who is not capable of being perceived cannot be denied on the ground of His non-perception.<sup>29</sup>

In the phenomenal level a metaphysical being may exist without being perceived, because perception has nothing to do with the metaphysical propositions. Hence, Dharmakīrti says that each and every super-sensuous object is rejected as an object which has self-existing distinct character, because it has no logical indica-

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29. Nyāya Kusumāñjali 1.2.

tion or mark (linga).<sup>30</sup> It is true that, when our sense-organs fail to cognise an object, we take recourse to inference on the basis of the logical mark or linga. As non-empirical entities bear no such mark, they are taken to be non-cognisable entities. In other words, they cannot be cognised either through direct or indirect ways of knowing. The negation of objects which does not come under the range of our experience cannot be cognised. Hence, its essence is to be taken as exclusive. These objects are called by them as viprakrṣṭa (meaning of the objects which are not knowable in specio-temporal relation) and hence they are treated as non cognisable.<sup>31</sup>

To the Buddhists negation is not capable of being perceived and hence it is included under inference of which

30. Yo'pi jñāpakṣya lingasyābhāvāt atīndriyārthaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣo  
vā pratikṣipyate/

- Pramāna-vārttika of Dharmakīrti with the  
auto commentary 'Svavṛtti', Edited by  
Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana, p. 374,  
Bihar & Orissa Research Society, 1938-1940.

31. Viprakrṣṭa-visāyanupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇā  
saṃśayahetuh/

- Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti, 11. p. 48,  
(Translated by Stcherbatsky, p. 107).

anupalabdhi or non-perception is the hetu or linga. The hetu, according to the Buddhists, are of three types : causation (kāryahetu), identity (svabhāva hetu) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) as told earlier. The first two hetus are meant for establishing the real objects while the third one, i.e., non-perception is the ground for cognising negation (pratiśedhahetu). We have already stated that this non-perception becomes the reason of negation in order to know the absence of an object which is perceptible, but not the absence of non-perceptible. The Buddhists like Naiyāyikas have classified anumāna into two types : Inference for oneself (svārthanumāna) and inference for others (parārthanumāna).<sup>32</sup> Svārthanumāna or inference for oneself remains in the thought level which need not be described in language whereas what remains in thought level is described in linguistic form in parārthanumāna. The negative mark (pratiśedhahetu) can be described as of three types : (i) The absence of the perceptible object distinct from other objects or existential simple negation (svabhāvānupalabdhi), (ii) Causal negation (kāraṇānupalabdhi) and (iii) the absence of a term which is pervader or which remains in more places (vyāpakānupalabdhi). The absence

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32. Anumānaṃ dvidhā svārthaṃ parārthaṃ ca//

- Nyāya-bindu, 2/1,

&

- Nyāya-binduṭīkā on the same.

of an object which is perceptible in character is known through the first type of negation. When there is the knowledge of the absence of an effect (kāryānupalabdhi), it is known through the second type of hetu. This can be explained in terms of the following examples : "There are no efficient causes for producing smoke, because there is no smoke."<sup>33</sup> In this case the absence of an effect is inferred from the absence of cause (kāranānupalabdhi).

The third formula is the negation of a term which is vyāpaka which can be exemplified in the following way : "There is no mango-tree here, because there are no trees". In this case 'here' is the subject or pakṣa, 'no mango trees', i.e., the absence of such trees is the predicate or sādhyā and 'because there are no trees' is the hetu or reason which is of the greater extension. This formula of negation is used when the less extensive term like mango-tree is not perceived.<sup>34</sup>

Apart from those three, the anupalabdhihetu is classified into various forms. As absence is ascertained exclusively on the basis of non-apprehension, anupalabdhi is

33. Kāryānupalabdhir yathā, nehāpratibaddhasāmāthyāni  
dhūmakāranāni santi, dhūmābhāvāt/

- Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, II.33.

34. Vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā na atra śimsapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti/  
-Nyāya-bindu, 2/31 & Nyāyabindutīkā on the same.

regarded as a hetu of the inferential cognition. The first form, i.e., svabhāvanupalabdhi is already mentioned. This svabhāvanupalabdhi indicates the non-apprehension of the nature (svabhāva), i.e., the essential property of an object, e.g., smoke does not exist here. In this case the absence of smoke is inferred, because there is the non-apprehension of the conditions of the cognisability of smoke which is perceptible in character. The second and third, i.e., Kāryānupalabdhi and vyāpakānupalabdhi have already been discussed. The fourth form of anupalabdhi is svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of the incompatible (svabhāva-viruddha). It indicates the apprehension of what is opposed to nature. If it is said, for example, "The sensation of cold does not exist here because there is fire", the reason is "because there is fire" and the rest is sādhya. Fire and sensation of cold are incompatible with each other and hence cold-touch is negated by the existence of fire.<sup>35</sup>

The fifth form of anupalabdhi is viruddha-kāryopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an effect which is produced by the opposite object. As for example, the sensation of cold does not

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35. Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra śītasparśah agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/32

&

- Ibid on the same.

exist here, because there is smoke. In this case fire is opposite to the sensation of cold and smoke is the product of fire. Therefore, where there is smoke, there is fire. In other words, if a place is associated with smoke then it will be associated with fire. 'There is smoke' means 'there is fire also'. Then how can sensation of cold exist in a place where fire exists? That is, in a place of fire sensation of cold can not remain.<sup>36</sup>

The sixth form is viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi i.e., the apprehension of invariable concomitance with the opposite. As for example, the destruction of even a produced entity is not something constant (dhruvabhāvin), because it depends on a further cause. The term 'constant' means the object which is always existent. The word 'even of a produced entity' means 'even of an entity which bears the character of being originated'. Here it is asserted that the destruction of a produced entity is not something constant. The reason is 'it depends on a further cause'. What is dependent on a further cause is not necessarily constant, e.g., red colour in a piece of cloth is made of cotton. The characteristic of "being dependent on a further cause" entails 'the property of not being constant'. In other words, the object which is dependent on a further cause cannot be regarded as constant.<sup>37</sup>

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36. Viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na atra sītasparśo dhūmād iti/

- Ibid, 2/33.

37. Viruddha-vyāptopalabdhir yathā na dhruvabhāvi bhūtasya

The seventh form is kārya-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the effect. As for example, "The efficient cause of cold does not exist here because there is fire". In this case the efficient causes of cold give rise to the effect, i.e., sensation of cold which is opposed to fire. It is impossible to have the sensation of cold if there is fire. The efficient causes of cold can never be present in a case where the sensation of cold does not exist. Because if such causes were there, the sensation of cold would have been perceived.<sup>38</sup>

The eighth form of anupalabdhi is vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the pervader (i.e., the object existing in more places). As for example, 'The touch existing in ice does not exist here because there is fire'. It is a wellknown fact that sensation of cold in general is the pervader of the touch existing in ice and fire is opposed to sensation of cold. Therefore, it is impossible to think of the existence of the sensation of cold in a place where there is fire. We do not get any touch existing in ice which is not covered by

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api bhāvasya vināśo hetvantarāpekṣaṇād iti/

- Ibid, 2/34.

38. Kārya-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na iha apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni Śītakāranāni santi agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/35.



sensation in general.<sup>39</sup>

Kāranānupalabdhi is the ninth form of anupalabdhi which means the non-apprehension of the cause. Smoke, as for example, does not exist here because there is no fire. Between smoke and fire there is the relation called kāryakāranabhāva (cause and effect relation). As smoke in this case is the effect of fire, smoke can never exist in a place where fire does not exist.<sup>40</sup>

Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of an object which is opposed to the cause is the tenth form of anupalabdhi. As for example, "This person does not possess the special symptoms of having cold, namely, having erect hair etc., because there is a specific fire nearby". The expression 'romaharsādiviśeṣa' means 'the special symptoms like having erect hair etc.' The term 'special' is given here only to exclude other causes of erecting hair like fear, joy etc. In order to indicate that the erecting hair etc. are due to the cold wind, the word 'special' has been mentioned. The hetu is 'sannihitadahanaviśeṣa', i.e., a specific form of fire existing nearby. In this case also the term

39. Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na atra tuṣārasparsāḥ  
agner iti/

- Ibid, 2/36.

40. Kāranānupalabdhir yathā na atra dhūmaḥ agnyabhāvād iti/

- Ibid, 2/37.

'specific form of fire' means 'the presence of that type of fire which is capable of removing cold which is opposed to the cause of cold'. If the sensation of cold is removed with the help of fire, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. can never exist.<sup>41</sup>

The last form of anupalabdhi is kāraṇa-viruddhakāryopalabdhi, i.e., the apprehension of the effect by something which is opposed to the cause. As for example, this place is not qualified by person who has the special symptoms of having cold such as erect hair etc., because there is smoke. In this case also the cause of special symptoms of having erect hair etc., is the sensation of cold which is opposed to fire and 'smoke' is the effect of the cause 'fire'. If a place is endowed with smoke, it is endowed with fire. On the other hand, where there is fire, there is no sensation of cold. If the sensation of cold does not exist, the special symptoms like having erect hair etc. would not be possible there. Because these are nothing but the effects of the sensation of cold.<sup>42</sup>

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41. Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhir yathā na asya romaharsādi-  
viśeṣāḥ sannihita-dahana-viśeṣatvād iti/

- Ibid, 2/38.

42. Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhir yathā na romaharsādi-viśeṣa-  
yukta-puruṣavānayaṃ pradeśo dhūmād iti/

- Ibid, 2/39.

From the above discussions, it is found that each and every case of anupalabdhi is known through the syllogistic form of argument. Whatever may be the hetu it is the form of anupalabdhi giving rise to the knowledge of absence. In other words, anupalabdhi is considered as one of the hetus accepted in Buddhist logic. Hence the knowledge of negation which is sādhya here is attained through the hetu in the form of anupalabdhi. The knowledge of negation is regarded as the product of the knowledge of hetu which is inferential in character.

Like the Buddhists the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā does not accept negation as a distinct source of knowledge. Though Jaimini and Śābara have mentioned the negation as a sixth pramāṇa, Kumārila and Prabhākara have given their different interpretations. In course of interpretation Kumārila was in favour of accepting absence as a pramāṇa while Prabhākara does not accept it, because Prabhākara does not believe in the metaphysical reality of negation. On account of this the epistemological problems concerning it do not occur in his view. To him, negation is nothing but the absence of an object which is knowable in character. The knowledge of negation concerns only the absence of the knowledge of the fact. The sentence, 'There is no jar on the ground' indicates that the jar which is considered as an objective fact is not present. As a result of this the knowledge of the jar does not arise. It may be argued that though the jar is not present, the absence of it exists. In order to know the absence which is

also an objective fact like the jar, there must be some means (viz., senseorgan etc.) is essential for having the perceptual knowledge. Prabhākara's attitude is completely different. He says that the absence of cognition is a positive cognition and the absence of a fact is a presence of a fact. The absurdity of this fact becomes obvious at the same time. Hence, there is no necessity of accepting negation as a different source of knowledge.

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā has given importance on the differences in the method of knowing which is the cause adopting different conclusion. The Bhāṭṭas, as it has been stated, accept that the negation of a particular object is nothing but the perception of the locus which is not completely distinct from the absence. Though the absence is not completely distinct from locus, it can be regarded as a character of it which is different from its positive character. Each and every object which is real may either be positive or negative. The negative aspect is generally known with reference to perceptible object which is not cognised in the locus. On the other hand, the positive object is independent. So the causes of the cognition of a negative fact vary from those of a positive one. For this they are bound to invent a different method of knowing called anupalabdhi.

In response to it the Prabhākara says that the above view is not tenable. Differences in the method of knowing cannot be said to be a sufficient cause of accepting a separate pramāṇa

called anupalabdhi until and unless the corresponding variation in the object is not shown. The variation in the objective order is not accepted by the Prabhākara. Hence, there is no necessity of accepting anupalabdhi as a pramāna.

It may be argued that a negative judgement is formed in the mind when the locus of negation is known. At the second stage the pratiyoqi of absence is remembered which gives rise to the knowledge of absence. It is due to mental activity but not connected with sense-organ. Hence, Kumārila says that the knowledge of absence is never perceptual, but always mental.<sup>43</sup>

This view is not acceptable. For, non-perception is not mere absence of perception. It refers to the absence of perception of such an object which is purely competent for the job. When the substratum is perceived and the counterpositive is remembered, the non-perception induces activity in mind as a result of which it can produce the knowledge of absence just as sense-organ works in order to reveal some objects. Prabhākara also does not accept that the knowledge of absence is purely mental but it is purely perceptual on account of the fact that at the

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43. "grhītvā vastusadbhāvam smrtvā ca pratiyoginām/  
mānasam nāstitājnānam jāyate'kṣānapekṣanāt/

- Slokavārttika (Chapt. on abhāva), verse. 27,  
Chowkhamba Sanskrit series 11, 1898.

time of knowing absence our sense-organs are in operation. Moreover, according to the Bhāṭṭas, what is not cognised by means of five accepted pramānas like perception etc. is cognised through sixth pramāna called abhāva. In this respect Prabhākara will say that this statement does not prove abhāva as a different means of knowledge. Because to him, a pramāna will be regarded as such when it can bring about its effect, i.e., definite cognition of its object. This definite cognition is generally in the form of 'this'. When we use the term 'this', it implies that 'this' is excluded from the rest. The object which is known through five pramānas like perception etc. can be referred with the help of 'this'. But in the case of absence in the form 'this does not exist', we do not get the idea of 'this' as the effect of pramāna. As we do not get the effect in the form of 'this' it cannot be treated as a separate source of knowledge, because it cannot provide us with a definite cognition. Due to not having the concrete object of cognition in the case of absence it is very much childish to accept absence as a different source of knowledge. According to the Prabhākaras, the cognition of absence is of two types : (i) we cognise an object along with other objects and (ii) we cognise an object by itself alone. The second type of cognition is known independently, i.e., without the help of other objects. In other words, this type of cognition is attained with the help of the objects that are actually not there. If these objects were present, they would have been cognised. In other

words, in this case there is an apprehension of an object and non-apprehension of other objects that would have been known, had they been there. In the case of the statement - 'The jar is not here', we mean as follows : The bare place is perceived in this case, but the jar would have been perceived if it were really present. This type of cognition is purely positive cognition attained through perception. Hence, the Prabhākara concludes that there is nothing in this world which can be known through anupalabdhi or non-apprehension and therefore it is not a different source of knowledge.

It has already been said that the negation is always explained in terms of the positive factor which is involved in it. Prabhākara admits the similar position adopted by the Bauddha philosophers. The Buddhists think that each and every negative judgement has got two factors : the knowledge of the locus and the knowledge of the object which is perceptible in the locus. Both the objects are capable of being seen with the help of sense-organ if the preconditions of the perception exist there. If only one of the above-mentioned two, i.e., mere ground (bhūtala) is perceived, the absence of another object which is expected or suggested (jar etc., for instance) is inferred. We may here recall the view of Dharmottara according to which, when any of them is perceived, we imagine the other one as present. In this way we should perceive it due to having the necessary condition for perception.

Prabhākara has supported the above-mentioned view. He says that through the perception of the ground which is endowed with perceptible jar, the absence of that jar is cognised.<sup>44</sup> The problem arising from negation can easily be solved if it is accepted that negation is nothing but the perception of locus alone where we intend to see the counterpositive perceptible in character.<sup>45</sup> From this it follows that the non-perception of an object which is capable of being perceived is also the ground of making negative statements.

Even if it is accepted this, some difficulties may come on the way of our understanding. It is very difficult to describe

44. Eka-jñāna-samsargiṇi drśyamāne satyekasminnitarāt samagradarśana-sāmagrikam yadi bhaved drśyam eva bhaved iti sambhavitam drśyam āropyate

- Nyāya-bindutīkā, (13-15), p. 22, Edited by Th. Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 11, p. 63, The Academy of science of the USSR, Leningrad, 1918.

45. Tulyopalambha-yogyasya cārthāntaradarśenena drśyānupalambho'vadhāryate/ Ato drśya-pratīyogi-viśayā-tad-ekopalabdhir eva varam abhāvo'stu/

- Prakarāna-pañcīkā of Śālikanāth Miśra,



an object which is not present in the locus as perceptible. The Prabhākaras have tried to solve the difficulty in a way which is supported by the Buddhist logicians. In fact, the Buddhists and the Prabhākaras have propounded the same view for solving these philosophical problems. We can answer the problem following the line of Dharmottara which is also unopposed by the Prabhākaras. The Buddhists argue that, though an object is absent, it is perceptible, because perceptibility is the result of imagination which goes in the following way - "If the particular objects were present in a particular locus, it would have been surely be perceived". In this case the object, though absent, is superimposed as being visible.

The Prabhākaras generally accept the cognition of an object having two characteristic features : (i) as related with some other things and (ii) as not related with other things. When we say 'The book is on the table', we express the cognition of the co-relation between the book and the table. On the other hand, when we have knowledge in the form 'the book is not on the table', the mere table is seen and through it we cognise the absence of relation between the book and the table. In this theory negation is nothing but the absence of perception of

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edited by Mukunda Shāstri, p. 121,

Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, Benaras, 1903.

positive things (anupalabdhirhibhāvanām abhāvah).<sup>46</sup> In other words, 'to know a positive entity' means 'the perception of an object'. Negation, on the other hand, is devoid of this affirmation. Hence it is nothing but the mere presence of void locus having no relation with other objects.<sup>47</sup>

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46. Pramāna-vārttikasvavṛtti, edited by Rāhula-Sāṅkṛityāyana, p. 30, Kital Mahal, Allahabad, 1943.

47. Darśanam upalabdhis-tasya nivṛttir abhāvas-tuccharūpaḥ  
saiva tanmātram vastv-antara-samsarga-virahah

- Dharmottarapradīpa of Durveka Miśra, edited by  
Dalsukha Mālavānīa, p. 103, Kāshi Prasad  
Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955.