

Synopsis of the chapter-V

A comparative study and some critical remarks.

Similarities and dissimilarities among the views (regarding concept, nature and function of mind) given by Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Schools. Some logical problems arising in connection with the acceptance of the abovementioned views and their probable solutions along with some critical remarks. The role of Mind for forming a maliceless society as discussed by the contemporary philosophers like Aurobindo, Vivekānanda etc.

Chapter-V

A Comparative study and some critical remarks

We have noticed that the Naiyāyikas unanimously accepted the existence of mind as a sense organ. According to them, mind is a distinct substance which is eternal. Though the existence of mind has not been proved by perceptual knowledge yet with the help of inference Naiyāyikas proved the existence of it and by various arguments they proved it as an internal sense-organ. The Vaiśeṣika theory of mind (manas) is almost similar to that of the Naiyāyikas. Both the systems mentioned that the sense-organ might be in contact with the object and the mind with the soul, but if there remains the absence of the contact between mind and sense-organ then knowledge is not possible. For this reason inspite of the availability of objects sometimes the soul becomes unable to cognize them. But when mind starts functioning i.e., when mind associates itself with the object only, the object is cognized by the soul. It has also

been said by them that the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. are direct experiences which do not come through external sense-organs but through mind which functions as an internal sense-organ.

But so far we discussed the view of Advaita Vedāntins, we noticed that there is a diversity of opinion among them regarding the question whether mind is a sense-organ or not? A section of Advaitins strongly opposed the Naiyāyikas theory of mind (i.e., mind is an internal sense-organ). According to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra and the author of Vivarana, mind cannot be regarded as sense-organ. But another section of Vedantins like Vidyāranya, Vācaspati Mīśra, Govidananda admitted mind or antahkarana as a sense-organ.

The existence of mind or antahkarana finds support in the Brahmasūtra No. 2.3.32. The attempt to prove the existence of mind in the Brahmasūtra is substantially same with Kaṇāda. It has been said in the Brahmasūtra that though the self, sense-organs and the objects are always present, yet we do not get knowledge. If the presence of these factors become sufficient for giving rise to knowledge then we would be able to get knowledge for all times. But as these factors are incapable of producing knowledge, the existence of some other factor i.e.,

mind is to be admitted.

Vidyāranya supported the above view and said that without accepting the existence of mind discrimination between merit and demerit of an object is not possible at all. According to him, mind is the ruler of ten organs - five sense organs and five organs for action.

A perceptual knowledge of an object, as Naiyāyikas explained, is possible when the object comes in contact with its particular sense-organ which again be connected with mind and mind with the self. They do not believe in any intermediary in the form of sākṣīcāitanya between the mind and its object. But ^dAvaita thinkers explained a perceptual knowledge from a different point of view. Though they accepted the existence of mind or antahkarana in the field of perception yet the function of mind or antahkarana, as explained, earlier is completely different from that of Naiyāyikas. According to them, mind has got the capacity of being modified. Sense-organs cannot reveal an object until and unless mind is there. But as mind is material object it, according to the Advaitins, cannot reveal object by itself. Hence, they accepted intermediate process in between antahkarana and object. It is the light of sākṣīcāitanya by which mind can reveal

the object.

The Naiyāyikas said that mind is atomic in magnitude. Because, if mind were all-pervading or vibhu then simultaneous cognition would have been possible. All sense-organs may come in contact with their objects at the same time. but due to atomic character of mind it cannot attain all sense-organs at a time. It can move one sense-organ to another within a very short period of time. On the otherhand, the Advaita Vedāntins accepted mind as having a medium dimension and from this they explained the possibility of simultaneous cognitions. They said that when a man takes food like cake he knows the colour, taste, smell etc. of the cake at the same time. So, we see that from the standpoint of dimension the concept of mind is different in two different systems.

Again, it has been found in course of discussion in the previous chapters that manas or mind, as accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is a total entity while according to the Vedāntins it is one of the four subtypes of antahkarana which are manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vijñāna (consciousness) and citta (mind stuff).

This type of division has also been accepted

by Śaṅkara. The Advaitins' mind can grasp a specific type of mental state. That is why, they have accepted different subtypes of antahkarana. But the Naiyāyikas' mind, on the other hand, can reveal all the mental phenomena like pleasure, pain, intention, knowledge etc.

Again, both the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins have accepted mind as ^a material object. But so far as the function is concerned, they are different in opinion. The Naiyāyikas opine that mind is operated when our self is associated with it. The Advaitins admit a different view accepting the material characteristic features of mind.

The special emphasis is given on the function of mind by the Advaita Vedāntins by way of pointing out that our antahkarana with the help of external sense-organ goes out of the body and reaches the object which is, of course, not accepted by Naiyāyikas.

It has been discussed in the first chapter that liberation is of two forms—mediate (parā) and immediate (aparā). The second type of liberation is called immediate (aparā) because it comes immediately after tattvajñāna. This form of liberation comes during life time. Hence, it is called jīvanmukti. The preceptor, after attaining this form of liberation, carries physical body to exhaust his

prārabdha karma (i.e., both merits and demerits of past actions) which are producing result. But if the range of prārabdha karma is so maximum that cannot be exhausted in a single life, the preceptor has to take rebirth again and again to enjoy the result of his past actions. Of course, the preceptor who is unwilling to endure delay due to rebirth, can create several bodies at a time (which is technically called as Kāvavyūha) by the power of his yoga for exhausting his prārabdha karma within a short period of time and can attain ultimate liberation¹. But a question may be raised here that how a body without mind can enjoy the result of past actions. A body must be associated with mind for enjoying anything. But as mind is eternal in character it cannot be created. So how a body (created by the yogī) be associated with mind? In response to this, it is, however, said that the persons who have already attained liberation are free from bondage

1. Nyāyadarśana (with Vātsyāyanabhāṣya), Vol. I, Edited by Phanibhūṣana Tarkavāgīśa, P. 65 (Pāścim Vāṅga Rājya Pustak Parsad, 1981).

and their minds being detached from the bodies are floating in the air. Such types of mind can be associated with those several bodies created by yogī. This type of association can be done by only a yogī who achieved this power by virtue of his yoga. In this way the yogī can exhaust his prārabdha karma through Kāyavyūha (i.e., creating several bodies at a time) and can expedite his liberation. So the conception of Kāyavyūha is not contrary to the theory of the eternity of mind¹.

The mind of a liberated person is of superior type to that of a person of bondage. When a man becomes liberated, he is endowed with a mind of a superior type which is free from malice, hatred, narrow desire etc. When the man becomes liberated and body is destroyed, the status of a mind will be the same. This superior mind may remain without body for the time being. But this cannot make it inferior as it is already free from malice etc. If this mind enters into the body of an ordinary person created by yoga, it is not capable of

1. Amarendra Mohun Bhattacharya : Nyāya Praveśa,

enjoying the prārabdha karma of that individual. As soon as an inferior body attains a superior mind, the body will be transformed to the superior one. Hence, there is no question of enjoying the result of karma already commenced. Here mind is not the helper of making one enjoy the result of karma but it becomes the cause of transformation and it will give rise to another problem of the law of karma. Here an individual though having some karma to be enjoyed is getting liberation by virtue of having a superior mind, which leads to the fallacy called Akrtābhyāgama¹.

So far as the characteristic features of mind like non-simultaneity of cognition (Yugapat jñānānutpattih) etc are concerned, these are the accidental property of mind. These are described 'accidental' because these characteristic features do not remain as long as mind remains. In other words, as mind is eternal, these

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1. If one gets the superior result without doing superior activities, it is called the akrtābhyāgama which is a kind of fallacy.

properties are not to be taken as eternal. When mind is associated with body, it is endowed with these characteristic features. After the destruction of body mind remains on account of its eternal character. But this time it will not have those characteristic features. That is why, these are called accidental propert^{ies} of mind.

The importance of mind is more firm-footed if the role of 'knowledge' is reviewed carefully. In many cases 'knowledge' becomes the medium of attaining another knowledge. Excepting the Nirvikalpaka knowledge all Savikalpaka knowledge including perceptual, inferential etc is based on another knowledge. When some knowledge is attained through another one, it is due to the existence of mind. In the case of inferential knowledge, the knowledge of Hetu and invariable concomitance between a Hetu and a Sādhya becomes the instrument of the knowledge of Sādhya which is inferred. The inference has got a prominent role in the epistemic world and we very much depend on the source of knowledge in our everyday life. In the same way, the knowledge of similarity gives rise to the knowledge attained through upamāna. In other words, the knowledge of similarity is the instrument of the knowledge called upamiti. In the same way, the knowledge of particular word and its meaning, and the percep-

tual cognition of the words are the instruments of the verbal apprehension (śābdabodha)¹. In this way, each and every source of knowledge is dependent on another knowledge if it is savikalpaka in character. That is why, the indirect means of knowing like Inference, comparison, verbal testimony etc are described as Jñānakaranakajñāna i.e., the knowledge attained through another knowledge or knowledge which is attained through the instrumentality of another knowledge.

It may be argued that such instrumentality prevails even in the case of perceptual knowledge. But how is it described as jñānakaranakajñāna i.e, knowledge which is not originated through the instrumentality of another knowledge? According to this view, the knowledge of an object which is perceived is directly known without the help of another knowledge. But so far as I think, the

1. "Jñānam vyāptijñānam sādṛśyajñānam padajñānam ca. Tadeva karanam yeṣāṃ tāni jñānakaranakāṇi anumityupamitiśābdāni".

Nyāyabodhini on Tarkasaṅgraha, P. 42, Edited by Sātkāriśarma Vaṅgīya (Chowkhamba - 1976).

savikalpaka knowledge of an object presupposes the previous knowledge of the same. Without having the previous knowledge of a jar, the perceptual knowledge of a jar is not possible. Hence, the savikalpaka perceptual knowledge of an object depends on the previous knowledge of the same. Hence, it is also a kind of jñānakaranakajñāna. The only jñānakaranakajñāna is possible in the case of Nirvikalpaka perception, as there does not arise any question of knowing an object through name etc. The Nirvikalpaka knowledge is not efficacious for our Loka-vyavahāra. Other than this, all forms of knowledge are connected with the vyavahāra of our daily life. If there were no mind as a factor for originating knowledge, no knowledge would be possible. The knowledge which is jñānakaranaka must be originated through the 'instrumentality' of mind. Hence, the role of mind in leading a smooth life cannot be ignored.

In the case of Sāmānya lakṣaṇā and jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti, the universal and jñāna become the instruments of giving rise to these types of alaukika pratyakṣa respectively (i.e., the super normal connection through Sāmānya and jñāna). The apprehension of universal and knowledge become possible if there is the operation of

mind¹.

Keeping this importance in view perhaps Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has incorporated the term 'Bodhābodhasvabhāvasāmagrī' as an adjunct of Sāmagrī in the definition of Pramāna. That the previous knowledge is presupposed for having the knowledge of an object is indicated by word 'Bodhasvabhava' incorporated as an adjunct of sāmagrī. That is, for having Pramāna the causal conditions in the form of knowledge (bodha) as existing previously and in the form of non-knowledge like eye, object, absence of obstacle etc. are essential. The causal condition in the form of Bodha is originated due to the association of mind².

Though the Naiyāyikas and a section of Advaitin have accepted mind as sense-organ, a section of the Advaita Vedāntin does not accept it as a sense-organ. The arguments in favour of this standpoint have been put forward.

1. Bhāṣāpariccheda, pratyaksakhanda on verse no. 64.

2. "Avyabhicārinīmasandigdhamarthopalabdhim vidadhati bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramānaṁ ... tasmātsā-

Mind, I think, should always be taken as a sense-organ. Without the instrumentality of mind no knowledge is possible. Though some Advaita thinkers like Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra etc. have denied mind as sense-organ, this view, I think, is not much supportable. Dharmarāja has denied the indriyatva of mind basing upon some statements on the nature of mind in the scriptures. The Śruti-texts are written after hearing the words traditionally from the Ācāryas. The direct meaning of the text will not do much for our philosophical discourse. The commentarial literature on the same gives us a philosophical implication of the same. Hence, the commentarial literature is more powerful than what is written originally in the Śruti-text. So far as Śruti-text is concerned, there is no diversity. The difference

magryanupraviṣṭabodha-viśeṣapajñānamiva kvacitpratyakṣe
 līṅgapajñānamiva līṅgipramitau sārūpyadarśanamivopamāne
 śabdaśravanamiva tadarthapajñāne pramāṇatām pratipadyate,
 ata eva bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇamityuktam*.

Nyāyamāñjarī, Edited by Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla,
 PP. 12-14 (Chowkhām̄ba - 1971).

of opinion starts when the interpretation of the same begins. The subjective elements involve when some text is being interpreted. The same Śruti-text has been described by Śaṅkara and Rāmaṅja in a different way after keeping their own philosophical background in view. Hence, the Śruti-text cited in support of the anindriyatva of mind may be interpreted as otherwise. Apart from the reference given to the Śruti-text, there is no independent argument through which a logical mind can be convinced.

So far as common understanding of Antahkarana is concerned, it is logically convincing to accept it as a sense-organ. It is true that mind always serves as an instrument in conveying the knowledge of an object existing in the external and internal world. How the knowledge of the external object like fire etc. and the internal phenomena like pleasure etc. is possible without the association of mind as a sense-organ.

It has been said by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra that there is no necessity of admitting mind as an internal sense-organ for having the knowledge of God. Because, the knowledge of God comes without the help of any sense-organ.

But the above view of Adhvarīndra does not stand on a solid ground. For having any perceptual knowledge a particular sense-organ first comes in contact with its particular object, then that sense-organ unites with the mind and finally mind with the self. Without following this process no perceptual cognition can be produced. In the case of internal perception like pleasure, pain etc also the mind is an internal sense-organ. Otherwise the knowledge of pleasure, pain etc can not be regarded as perceptual one. So perceptual knowledge of any object whether external or internal must come through an instrument i.e., sense-organ.

Similarly the knowledge of God can not be regarded as perceptual knowledge if there is no sense-organ ^{as} an instrument. So in this regard also mind functions as a sense-organ. It may be said that the perception of external object is normal perception but the perception of God is the supernormal perception. In the case of normal perception an ordinary mind functions as an instrument, but in the case of perception of God a refined mind (not ordinary mind) functions as the same.

It may be argued by the Advaitins that it becomes the conveyer of knowledge of an object without being a sense-organ. For this, the existence of Sāksi is to be admitted in between mind and object as stated earlier. Here mind can reveal an object through the instrumentality of Sāksi existing between two poles. Hence, instrumentality lies in Sāksi but not in mind. On account of this, there is no reason to admit mind as a sense-organ.

The above mentioned view is not tenable. Because, the acceptance of a third factor like Sāksi between mind and an object is against the law of parsimony. Why should we unnecessarily accept Sāksi for having the knowledge of an object? For the sake of 'logical simplicity' or to avoid the 'technical heaviness' (gaurava), it is better to accept mind as sense-organ.

The propagation of Sāksi by the Advaitins may find support in this point. If we carefully review the theories of knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas and Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, we shall have some justification for accepting Sāksi. When an object is perceived, it is, according to Nyāya, a 'perceptual

object through the association of mind. The same object is described by the Advaitins as a 'realised object'. To the Advaitins 'perception' means unification of two types of Gaitanya like Pramānacaitanya and Visayacaitanya etc. According to them, Gaitanya is everywhere and hence, Visaya-caitanya etc are the limiting adjuncts of the same. Hence, when there is perception, there is relation also due to having the unification of the Gaitanya. To look at an object without connecting it with Gaitanya is mere perception which is possible through the instrumentality of mind (i.e., mind as a sense-organ). But to look at the object as connecting it with Gaitanya is not merely perception in the sense mentioned above, but it is realisation which is rendered into sanskrit as Saksīvedyatva. This type of perception is not possible without the operation of Saksī between mind and object. In this sense Dharmarāja is correct.

Moreover, the validity of knowledge (Prāmānya) is intrinsic (svatah) to an Advaitin. As soon as knowledge arises, it becomes true and hence one should not look at the outside world for determining the truth of that what is known. From this standpoint it is better to have Saksī in between mind and object. According to the Advaitins (a section), that which is known must

be true instantly. Hence, there is no question of falsity if the theory of Svatahprāmānya accepted by them is strictly adhered to. On the otherhand, the knowledge which is attained through sense-organ, mind etc. is not taken as true according to the Nyāya till it is confirmed through experience. As for example, the knowledge of 'water' which is originated through sense-organ, mind etc. should not be taken as true. It will be taken as true when it really quenches our thirst. Hence, this theory is known as paratah Prāmānyaveda. From this it follows that mere mind cannot give us the confirmed knowledge. To the Naiyāyikas mind is sense-organ as it gives rise to non-confirmed knowledge. In other words, the knowledge attained through mind may be false. But knowledge attained through Sākṣī existing between mind and object is confirmed intrinsically, and hence, there is no question of the falsity of knowledge. Hence, the role of Sākṣī in Advaita Vedānta is very much important.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra's arguments in favour of not describing mind as sense-organ may, however, be interpreted in a different way. Though Dharmarāja is reluctant to describe mind as Indriya, it follows from his arguments that he has accepted the instrumentality of the same.

Vātsyāyana gives some arguments to establish mind as a sense-organ. He says that all direct cognitions are the result of the connection between a sense-organ and an object. In the case of cognition like pleasure or pain it is only mind which functions as a sense-organ. Without accepting mind as a sense organ the cognition of pleasure or pain cannot be regarded as direct cognition. But on the other hand, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra gives his arguments against Vātsyāyana. He does not admit mind as a sense organ¹. He points out that, if mind be regarded as sense organ, the valid cognition which comes through inference would also be regarded as perceptual, because in case of inference also mind functions as a sense organ. The knowledge of God is immediate one but such type of knowledge is not due to the contact of any sense organ. If the contact of sense organ is essential for having direct cognition then the cognition of God which is not due to sense organ (anindriyajanya) can never be regarded as direct cognition. But this view

1. "Na tāvat antahkaranam indriyam ityatra manam asti".

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Musalgaonkar (Hindi), 1277, P. 31.

can not be taken for granted¹. So according to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, if mind is accepted as non-indriya then there would arise no difficulty.

Vātsyāyana accepts mind as an indriya i.e., sense organ, because he takes it as an instrument of direct cognition of God, pleasure, pain etc. But Adhvarīndra does not use the word indriya to indicate mind but what he wants to mean by mind is the same. Though Adhvarīndra has reservation for the term 'indriya' so far as mind is concerned yet he, if his view is reviewed carefully, gives it the status of an instrument of pleasure, pain etc. What Vātsyāyana calls mind as an indriya he wants to describe it as an instrument of having the direct knowledge of pleasure, pain etc. This observation is supported by the following evidences :

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1. Na caivam manaso 'nindriyatve sukhādipratyaksasya saksāttvam na syādindriyājanyatvāditi vācyam. Na hīndriyājanyatvena jñānasya saksāttvam, Anumityāderapi manojanyatayā saksāttvāpatteh, īśvarajñānasyānidriyājanyasya saksāttvānāpatteśca. -

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Previous edition, P. 35.

Let us try to review carefully his argument given earlier. In the statements like 'manah-sasthānī-ndriyāni', 'yajamānapañcamā idām bhakṣayanti', and 'vedān-adhyāpayamāsa Mahābhāratapañcamān', Manas, yajamāna and Mahābhārata take the sixth, fifth and fifth place without being an indriya, a rtvik and a Veda respectively. From the statements it follows that mind and external sense organ, rtvik and yajamāna and Veda and the Mahābhārata are similar to each other i.e., tantamount to each other. It is the claim of Adhvarīndra that manas, yajamāna and the Mahābhārata would have been mentioned particularly in the Sruti text if they were considered as an indriya, rtvik and Veda respectively. From their separate mention they should be taken as purely different.

The above mentioned argument of Dharmarāja, I think, is not tenable. If they were purely different from the groups with which they were mentioned, they would not have been mentioned at all. As they are mentioned with a particular group or groups, there must have been some similarities with the groups. In the same way, there must have been some differences also for which they are mentioned particularly in that group.

To eat idā in a sacrifice is the common feature between the yajamāna and the rtviks. But yajamāna is different from rtviks from many aspects and hence it cannot be described as rtvik. In order to point out this fact the word 'yajamāna' is mentioned particularly. In the second example to teach some śāstra covers both the Vedas and the Mahābhārata. The Mahābhārata is to be studied at first for the better understanding of the Vedas. In other words, to study the Mahābhārata is the precondition of reading Veda and hence it is mentioned in their groups. Though it is not the Veda in the true sense of the term¹.

In the like manners 'manah - saṣṭhānīndriyāni', is to be explained. For the same reason mind is mentioned in the sixth place which is associated with five sense organs, because both of them are the instruments of direct cognition. In other words, by way of giving the direct illumination of an object mind is near to other

1. "Sa hovāca ṛgvedam bhagabo 'dhyemi yajurvedam sāmavedātharvaṇam caturthamitiḥsapurāṇam pañcamam vedānāmdedam". - Chānd. Up. 7.1.1.

five instruments of direct cognition. But as mind is an internal instrument of cognition, it is different from the rest five also that are capable of illumining the external objects only. As the status of mind is different and higher in character, it deserves a separate mention. From this it does not follow that mind is not an instrument of direct cognition. The above mentioned view is supported by Vāsyāyana also. He opines that the higher status of mind is revealed from Gautama's aphorism where mind is not included in the list of indriyas and it is mentioned separately among the prameyas¹. He observes that as mind is the instrument of having direct cognition of pleasure, pain etc, it is virtually a sense organ. But why is it mentioned separately? The reason is that it has got peculiarity of its own as a sense organ, but not because it is not a sense organ. Mind has got some peculiar features which the other external sense organs do not possess.

1. "Ātmasarīrendriyārthabudhimanahprevrattidosapre-
tyabhāvaphaladukhāpavargāstu prameyam" -

All the other sense organs are constituted by five elemental substances but mind is not. This point has been discussed earlier.

The external sense organs have got limited capacity and hence they can reveal their objects which are in contact with them. But mind has got no such limitation and hence it is capable of revealing all kinds of objects.

External sense organs can be operated as organs as endowed with certain qualities, While mind is capable of working as an organ without being endowed with any quality¹. On account of these reasons Gītā mentions mind separately. From this it does not follow that it is not a sense organ but a sense organ of superior type.

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1. "Indriyasya vai sato manasa indriyebhyah prthagupadeso dharmabhedāt. Bhautikāni indriyāni niyataviṣayāni saguṇānām ca eṣām indriyabhāva iti. Manasatvabhautikam sarvaviṣayam ca nāsyā saguṇasya indriyabhāva iti".

Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya - on 1.1.4.

Another difficulty as pointed out by Adhvarīndra in accepting mind as an indriya does not stand on the way of logic. Inference ^tec. cannot be regarded as direct perception even though mind is accepted as a sense organ. Because Adhvarīndra's notion that Vātsyāyana advocates that the direct knowledge is produced from sense organs only is not fully true. Direct knowledge arises when there is contact between sense organ and object¹. In the case of inferential knowledge though there is operation of mind as a sense organ, it cannot have the said pratyakṣatva or direct perception. Because it is knowledge of different type. There is a gulf of difference between direct perception like pleasure, pain etc and inferential knowledge of fire in the mountain though in both the cases mind is in operation. In the first case there is a contact between mind as sense organ and pleasure etc i.e., object. Hence, there is

1. "Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyatmakam pratyakṣam"

direct cognition of pleasure etc. But in the second case the mind, sense organ, is not directly concerned with fire (the object) which is inferred through the knowledge of the probāns (i.e., smoke) and the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Here though mind is involved yet it cannot be described as a direct one due to not having direct contact of it with the fire (i.e., object). From this it can be concluded that any knowledge generated through the operation of mind, the sense organ, would always be perceptual one. Hence Adhvarīndra's standpoint in this particular issue is not acceptable.

The Nyāya thinkers will have the same opinion with Adhvarīndra on the fact that the knowledge of God is not generated by the sense organ or indriyajanya. But here the meaning of the term 'indriya' is to be taken as vahirindriya or external sense organ i.e., eye etc. Adhvarīndra has misinterpreted the view of Naiyāyikas when it is said that the knowledge of God is not caused by sense-organ. It is to be understood that God cannot be perceived by five external sense organs but by internal one. When the term 'indriya' is used by the Naiyāyikas it actually means a vahirindriya i.e., external sense organ which is evidenced by Gaṅgeśa's definition of

indriyatva which is as follows. That which is the locus of the contact with mind which is the cause of knowledge and which does not give rise to memory is called indriya¹. The above mentioned characteristics exist only in five external sense organs. If it is said that the cognition of God is not caused by sense organs, it means that God cannot be known by external sense-organs. Hence, that mind is not a sense organ is not established. It is a wellknown fact that God is not perceived by an external sense organ, but it is inferred that there must be some internal sense organ to perceive Him². From this it follows that while external sense organs fail to give rise to the knowledge of God, the internal sense organ

1. "Smṛtyajanaka jñānakāraṇa-manah samyogāśrayatvam"
Tattvacintā-maṇi, Edited by N. S. R. Tātācārya,
 1973, Pratyakṣalakṣaṇavāda, P. 587.

2. The concept of yogī pratyakṣa which is dealt with
 in Prasasta-Pādabhāṣya, Nyāya-Kandallī, Kiranavallī,
 Nyāya-siddhāntanuktāvallī etc - is referred to here.

i.e., mind becomes the promoter to it¹. From the above discussion it seems that according to Adhvarīndra mind can be an internal instrument (antahkarana) for the direct cognition of God etc but it cannot be an internal sense organ. But a question may arise that what does the word 'antahkarana' (internal instrument) mean? Is it different from the meaning of the word 'antarindriya' (internal sense organ) which is used by Vātsyāyana to indicate mind? According to Naiyāyikas, the term 'indriya' means external sense organ. But by the term 'mind' Vātsyāyana means in the sense of internal organ without explicitly saying it as antarindriya. But it is clear in the context of mind that whenever Vātsyāyana would use 'indriya' he would use it in the sense of internal organ, not in the sense of external one. So the arguments

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1. Smṛtyanumānāgamasamśayapṛati bhāsvapnaññānāh sukha-
dipratyaksamicchādayasca manaso liṅgāni anindriyani-
mitta smṛtyādayaḥ maraṇāntaranimittā bhavitumarhanti.

Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya on 1.1.16.

given by Adhvarīndra in favour of mind as a non-indriya can never be established on solid ground.

It has been accepted by the Advaitins specially Dharmarāja that mind after coming from the body through eyes goes to the object and takes the shape of the same. It is unthinkable that how mind goes out of one's body through the eye. Though the modification (parināma) of mind is accepted by Dharmarāja but it is difficult to understand the going out of mind through eye. If we take literal meaning of the same, it seems to us that mind may go outside of the body and takes the form of the object and the phenomenon is explained with the help of metaphor of liquid substances like water etc. This phenomenon is difficult to understand or this cannot convince a logical mind. Does mind possess the power of going out of the body? Does it have liquidity? These are not clear to us.

I think, the phenomenon is taken as a metaphor. Mind has got the power of modification or it is capable of being modified. It can take the form of any object existing in the outside world. Mind can grasp all objects. The main purpose of such description is to inform others that mind has got elasticity. That is, it has got the power of being extended to the object

without leaving the body. Just as an elastic can be extended up to other end from the starting point, mind can be extended to the object from the body. Mind can reach to the object after retaining its substratum i.e., body. The portion of mind existing between two ends i.e., body and object is called mental mode which is a different entity accepted in Advaita Vedānta. In order to make us understand this type of function of mind, the Advaitins have put forward this function metaphorically i.e., mind after going through eye etc takes the shape of an object. If the literal meaning of this is taken into the account, it may be misleading to us or it seems to be illogical to us. But actually it is not so. As mind is capable of being modified to the shape of an object, it is compared to the liquid substances like water etc. Hence the characteristics of mind are represented to us metaphorically for our easy understanding.

It has been discussed in Gaudapāda Kārikās on the Māndukya Upanisad that Samādhi is contactless concentration. It is full of light and without fear. In the stage of Samādhi mind becomes free from all thoughts about object, so the awareness rests in itself and attains equanimity. But the attainment of

Samādhi, which is very difficult, is possible through the control of mind (manasonigraha) and the only way by which mind can be controlled is constant remembrance that all is duhkha¹.

This point, I think, is very much important in the Advaita theory of mind. This concept of duhkha or pain is such an important concept that it underlies in all most all system of Indian Philosophy. In Buddhism duhkha is one of the four noble truths. The Buddhist has given much emphasis on this concept and hence it is described as 'noble'. The philosophy starts with this concept and ends with the cessation of it. The Sāṅkhya philosophy also opens with this concept and in the beginning of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā and Tattvakaumudī. The question of duhkha and the way of getting rid of it have been discussed². The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also have

1. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Edited by Karl H. Potter.

2. *Duhkhatrayābhighātājijñāsā tadapaghātake hetau. Dr̥ṣṭe sā'pārthacennaikāntātyantaho 'bhāvāt".

Sāṅkhyakārikā No. 1 Also,

Tattvakaumudī on the same.

accepted the existence of suffering and the absolute cessation of the same. According to them, the summum bonum of life is absolute freedom from this ("Tadatyan-tavimukto 'pavargah'"). Hence, all most all the systems have tried to make a man free from suffering by way of removing impurity of mind. In other words mind may be purified if one always thinks of the suffering and its consequence in one's life. Hence, this point is so emphatically mentioned by the Advaitins.

Regarding the concept of mind one serious problem may be raised. It has been pointed out earlier that mind is the instrument of all types of knowledge, perceptual as well as non-perceptual. If this be the case then there would arise the fallacy named 'Mutual dependence' (Anyonyāśraya). When someone forwards some arguments in favour of the existence of mind viz., non-production of simultaneous knowledge (yugapajjñānānutpattikatva), he wants to prove mind with the help of this reasoning. The phenomenon of the non-production of simultaneity of knowledge is conceivable if there is the existence of mind. Here the mind is proved in terms of the above hetu and the hetu is again realised if there is the existence of mind. Hence, there is the fallacy mentioned above.

The above mentioned defect can be removed with the help of following argument. The mind is an eternal object as accepted by the Naiyāyikas and hence, it can never be negated. Whenever there is enquiry about mind, its functions etc, all these are the products of mental reflections. When someone has an enquiry about the existence of mind, it is, nodoubt, the function of mind. But the enquirer does not know it systematically and surely. When the argument is forwarded in favour of its existence, it is not a new thing. The mind which was present earlier and which was not in our awareness is known logically and systematically. As in the case of knowledge 'You are the tenth' (Dasamastvamasi) there is the intermingling of perceptual and testimonial knowledge. Because the man who is tenth was really tenth before knowing. But after the pointing out of the fact he knows himself as the same more logically and systematically. In the same manner, mind was existent and it functioned within an individual, but this was not in his awareness. Hence, logic was essential to convince an individual about the existence of mind in a systematic and scientific way. The mind which was working was an unknown fact and the mind which is known with the help of an argument is proved, systematized and the result of systematic thinking. Hence,

there is no mutual dependence. If there is still any defect like 'mutual dependence' it is not vicious but virtuous as it leads us to scientific understanding of a concept. Hence, it should be taken as 'Phalamukha-anyonyāśraya i.e., the mutual dependence leading to the attainment of desired result.

Some modern thinkers like Sri Aurobindo, Vivekananda etc. have correctly realised the role of mind for the sake of spiritual realisation which is very much essential for our social and political development. According to them, the importance of mind is so great that they have invented some procedure for upliftment of human mind.

Sri Aurobindo was a philosopher but not a psychologist in the traditional sense. But his philosophy is completely dependent on the concept of mind. His psychological ideas and concepts are found throughout his writings. Some important concepts like impulses and instincts existing at the physical and vital levels, consciousness including inconscient, sub-conscient, conscient and super-conscient, levels of mind namely, higher mind, illumined mind, overmind and supermind, ego or the Desire Soul, transformation (i.e., a radical

change of consciousness, being and nature through a process of psychicisation, spiritualisation and super-mentalisation) are incorporated in Indian Philosophy. Sri Aurobindo has taken these psychological concepts as important media in his philosophical and political thought¹. He has accepted the psychological stages of development namely, symbolic, typical and spiritual for the complete evolution of man. Various mental stages like infra-rational, rational and suprarational have been accepted for the progress of society and state. Sri Aurobindo's perception of the future man in a divinised society is based on a psychological understanding of inner nature of man².

In the modern society a man is regarded as having body, life and mind which is expressed by Sri Aurobindo as physical, vital and mental selves³.

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1. The Advent, Vol. XLVI No. 3, August 1989 (The article named Sri Aurobindo as a psychologist, by Som P. Ranchan & K. D. Gupta), Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

A psychic being is the reflexion of the divine, Sat-chit-Ānanda in the body-mind complex. The soul covers the physical, vital and mental selves and is centralised itself. Its power of knowledge and will is personified by Caitrapurusa¹. The higher mental stage is the level of the intellect. It is the intellect which is being used by the soul for all types of knowledge. The higher mental stage is the organ of analysis and synthesis and it is the higher mental stage through which Caityapurusa goes into the inconscient, the sub-conscient and clears the concient after pulling them up for having a communication between themselves and the over-conscient and supraconscient².

The higher mind, if cultivated and developed properly, becomes illumined. At this stage soul's light goes directly to the mental leading to the imagistic, symbolic stage of mind.

1. Review of Darshana, Vol. VII, No. 1 July, 1988

(The article entitled Sri Aurobindo's concept of Time and Change by Raghunath Ghosh)

2. Ibid.

Shakespeare in poetry and Einstein in physics are examples of the illumined mental¹. If the illumined mental stage symbolic and imagistic, the intuitive mental faculty becomes full of simplicity and refreshness. At this stage what illumined mind receives is not meant for oneself but for the whole humanity as it is full of the light of the overconscient².

According to Sri Aurobindo poetry per-
excellence always comes from the overmind. One after passing through the illumined mind may reach to the domain of overmind. When one is able to produce a creative literary art which is described by him as Mantra, it is described so because it possesses the power of vision³. The poet or kavi is seer (ṛṣi) and can foresee truths in the womb of the future (Krānta-
darsī). Without some kind of yoga a poet can neither

1. The Advent, Vol. XLVI No. 3, August 1989.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

he would not have described this world as such.

After this stage an individual possesses the supermind through which he can know that Matter, Life and Mind are the nonmanifested forms of Sat, Cit and Supermind of Brahman respectively¹. Through the supermind or enlightened reason an individual will know that like Saccidānanda Brahman the world-phenomenon consisting Matter, Life and Mind is real. Subjectivism prevails in the symbolic stage in infrarational stage, but in subjective age it will remain in suprarational level. An individual will harmonise two hemispheres, one consisting of Matter, Life and Mind accepted by the materialists but denied by the ascetics and another having Sat, Cit and Supermind of Brahman accepted by the ascetics but denied by the materialists. In this age each and every member of society will realise this harmony resulting in the Age of Divine or Spirit which is the ultimate goal of society². In this way,

1. Review of Darshana, Vol. VII No. 1 July 1938.

2. Ibid.

society will turn into a Divine one where each and every member possesses Divine body. It has been stated earlier that a man can make his body Divine after bringing the Caitya purusa in front through some Yogic process¹. How can all the members of the society know this truth? According to Sri Aurobindo, the man who has realised the truth can communicate it to others. As the common people have got ordinary minds influenced by physical and vital selves, they cannot take the image of the Divine though they may have faith in the teachings of the man having supermind. To prepare to make them accept the Divine image the subjectivism of the mental self of a man is highly essential². This subjectivism of the mental self is possible only by awakening and bringing forward the Caityapurusa which can master and enlighten the physical, vital and mental selves. When this becomes possible through some Yogic

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

process, a man can realise the Divine image and the Age of Superman begins¹.

From the foregoing discussion one may aware of the fact that what importance has been laid on the concept of mind of an individual. A man's personality becomes change to the change of mind as shown earlier. One can attain Divine Life through the upgradation of human mind. If mind is kept covered with vital and physical selves, Caityapurusa cannot illumine other selves. Through the awakening of the Caityapurusa mind is illumined at first and hence one becomes the abode of Supermind and Divine body as well. Hence mind occupies a prominent role in whole Sri Aurobindian literature and philosophy.

The role of mind is also discussed with great importance in Swāmi Vivekānanda's philosophy which is called Vyavahārika (practical) Vedanta. Throughout his writings he makes us understand that a man with a concentrated mind can achieve the highest success of both

1. Ibid.

the worlds - physical and metaphysical. Hence, our first and foremost duty is to concentrate our mind to that object or objects which we want to have.

According to Vivekānanda, only a human being can concentrate or control his mind but an animal cannot and from this point of view he distinguishes a human being from an animal. The power of concentration of a human being is much more than an animal. Again, he says, this power of concentration makes a distinction among human beings. An ordinary man (i.e., a man of lower level) differs from a superman (i.e., a man of higher level) as they are not in the same level of concentration¹.

We generally concentrate our mind to a particular object which we like best. Again, the object being concentrated becomes attractive to us. By virtue of its melody a classical song attracts our mind. Somebody may be attracted by an ordinary song also. In these cases the main problem is this that we do not control

1. Vivekānanda Racanāsaṅgraha, Vol. 4, Baipatra, 1377, P. 240.

our mind rather mind controls us, when we hear a sweet melody or when we see a beautiful picture then our mind becomes concentrated to those.

Now, the question is that how can we control our mind? or is there any process by which our mind may be concentrated? Vivekānanda suggests to follow some Yogic actions in order to gather the power of concentration. But mere concentration, as Vivekānanda observes, is not an efficacious if we do not gather the power of detaching our mind from a particular object or objects. Hence, it is necessary to gather both the power of concentration and the power of detachment and this, according to Vivekānanda, is the only way by which one can reach to one's ultimate goal i.e., non-pathological happiness. Without mind's concentration no scientific knowledge can be achieved also. Hence, it, Vivekānanda opines, is very important to concentrate our mind for discovering both scientific and non-scientific truths¹.

A man who has mental equilibrium or who is

1. Ibid, P. 24.

self-restrained is completely free from jealousy, hatred, malice etc. and he is always calm and quiet. No unpleasant situation can irritate him or can disturb his mental peace. A story from Buddha's life has been narrated by Vivekānanda as an example which runs as follows. Once Buddha was coming back from a remote village. On the way when he saw that the sky was overspread with clouds, he took shelter in the outside of a farmer's house. A cowherd saw him in the unpleasant situation and tried to make him irritate. He started to sing a song addressing cloud, 'My cows have returned home safely, paddies have been collected from the field, there is no problem in my house, hence, oh, cloud pour water as much as you can throughout the whole night'. Buddha heard the song and he too prayed to cloud 'My mind is kept within, my sense-organs are controlled, hence, let it rain all over the night.' The cowherd again started his song 'My wife is with me, my child is taking rest at home so, cloud - pour water continuing the whole night'. But still Buddha was tranquil not being irritated with the words likely to be unpleasant. Due to having mental equilibrium it was possible for Buddha to remain calm and quiet in that unpleasant situation also. If a common man, who is not

self-restrained, would remain in the same situation he would have been irritated and failed to control his organs. From this it can easily be understood that it is the mind (concentrated mind) which can give us a life full of tranquility¹.

A society may be free from malice, hatred, jealousy etc. if each and every member of the society can achieve such type of mental equilibrium. Vivekānanda, being a social philosopher has tried to hint us that the turmoil of mind can be the cause of unpleasant situation of the society while the calmness of it (mind) can form a maliceless society. Hence, he has dealt a lot on the concentration or the control of the mind.

1. Vivekānanda Racanāsamgraha, Vol. 3, P. 93,

Baipatra, 1977.