

Synopsis of the chapter-IV

The Advaita Concept of Mind

Mind has got a prominent role in the Advaita theory of perception and in other sources of valid knowledge. Function of Sākṣī in internal perception and its relation to Mind. Reflection - thinking (Manana) which is connected with Mind is highly essential for attaining the Ultimate Reality. Mind, as observed by a section of Advaita Philosophers, is not a sense-organ.

Chapter-IV

The Advaita Concept of Mind

Like the Naiyāyikas the Advaita Vedāntins also have discussed the role of mind (manas) with importance. But the view of the Advaitins regarding the nature and function of mind is different from that of the Naiyāyikas. As the Naiyāyikas are realistic, they have discussed the role of mind mainly from the epistemological standpoint. But as the Advaitins are absolutistic, they must have discussed the same laying emphasis on metaphysical aspect. So let us see how the nature and function of mind (manas) have been considered by the Advaita Vedantins.

According to the Advaitins, there is only one reality which is called Pure consciousness or self or Brahman, and everything else is illusory. "The whole manifested and unmanifested world of things and ideas is

the imagination of the mind of the cosmic self"¹. Śaṅkara says that the false identification of the real self with the body, senses and mind is essential before the knowledge of the self is attained. Self (which is different from manas or buddhi) is the only agent. But Self, being regarded as the agent, has to depend on manas or buddhi and external sense-organ for acquiring knowledge, just as, Śaṅkara says, in the action of cooking a cook, being an agent, requires fuel, water etc. Manas (mind) or buddhi is an instrument which makes self-consciousness possible. But if manas is regarded as agent (Kartā) instead of instrument, another instrument is to be admitted for the above purpose. Because, "manas, being the object of self-consciousness, can no more be the instrument of self consciousness"². If it is accepted that manas (mind) is identical with self, the question

1. Chennakesaven, Sarasvati, The concept of mind in Indian Philosophy, P. 69.

2. Ibid.

of meditation where mind is controlled by the self, would become meaningless. Hence, manas being a limiting adjunct of the self acts as an instrument¹.

Like other objects of this world antahkarana or mind, according to the Advaitins, is a product of māyā. Mind has got no consciousness. Because mind is limited by time and space but consciousness is not so limited. The unconscious character of mind is also proved from our three-fold experiences like the waking, dreaming and sleeping. Self is the only conscious element². According to Śaṅkara, consciousness is not different from Ātman or Self, though the Naiyāyikas have accepted their difference and said that the consciousness and Ātman are related to each other through the relation of samavāya³. Consciousness, according to the Advaitins, has the power to reveal everything whether it is mental or physical. But mind, which is compared with matter, is just an

1. Ibid, P. 39.

2. Ibid, Preface

3. Ibid, P. 35.

appearance of consciousness. The mental or physical experiences seem to be unreal when they are revealed by pure consciousness. The Pure consciousness is known as individual self when it becomes limited by upādhi (adjuncts). This individual self is the knower. The instruments including buddhi or mind which help in generating knowledge and sensation to the knower (i.e., individual self) are limiting adjuncts for the Self¹. Hence, Self is known so long as the qualities of antahkarana or mind like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain etc. become the limiting adjuncts of it². This limiting adjunct can be called in different names due to its different function or Vrtti.

Samkara has accepted the five modes of mind like modes in the form of touch, colour, taste, smell and sound. These modes are possible because the sense-organs like ear etc. and the objects like sound etc. are

1. Ibid, P. 36.

2. Ibid.

regarded as the causes and objects of mind respectively¹. Some Philosophers, however, accept the 'desire' and 'determination' as the modes of mind. Śaṅkara has refuted this view through the mention of 'five number'ⁱⁿ bhāṣya. It may be argued that though 'desire' and 'determination' are not accepted as mental modes yet there are many other types of mode in the case of knowledge of the objects existing in the past and future and these modes are independent of the sense-organ like ear etc.². Hence, the five types of mental mode accepted by the Advaitins will not be possible. In other words, it may be more than five types in number.

In response to the above, Śaṅkara says that

1. "Pañcavṛttirmanovadvapadiśyate"

Brahmasūtra 2, 4, 12.

2. "Srotrādinimitāḥ śabdādiviśayāḥ manasaḥ pañcavṛttayah prasiddhāḥ. Na tu 'Kāmāḥ saṅkalpāḥ' (brh. 1, 5, 3), ityādyāḥ paripathitāḥ parigrhyeran pañcasamkhyātikāt".

Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra 2, 4, 12.

sometimes the conclusions of other system can be forwarded if they are in favour of own conclusion. Following this principle he is quoting the five mental modes like "pramāna (way of knowing), viparyyaya (illusion), Vikalpa (substitutes), nidrā (sleep) and smṛti (memory)" accepted in the Yoga Philosophy. In the latter part of his observation Śaṅkara has accepted the multiplicity of mental mode and that is why, mind is taken as a paradigm of prime vital force. The main intention of the metaphoz is as follows. Just as mind endowed with the multiplicity of mode becomes the means of enjoyment of an individual, the prime vital force which is associated with five mental modes is also same.

Śaṅkara has described mind as a material object which is the effect of taken food (bhaksita anna). In

the bhāṣya he says that there are the effects in the form of flesh (māṃsa) etc. of the causes in the form of rice (anna) etc. taken by an individual. In support of this statement he has quoted Śrutitext which describes that the taken food is transformed into three types of object. The gross portion (sthūlatama dhātu) of food is transformed into faeces (viśthā), the medium portion (madhyama) is turned into flesh (māṃsa) and the minute part (Sūkṣma) of it turns into mind (manas)¹.

The implication of the statement is that the gross element of taken food goes out of the body in the form of faeces, the non-gross but not minute element of taken food increases this flesh of body. But the minutest

-
1. "Bhūmeh triṣṭkṛtāyāḥ puruṣeṇa upabhuḥjyamānāyāḥ māṃsādikāryāṃ yathāśabdaṃ niṣpadyate. Tathāhi Śrutih - 'Annam aśitam tredhā vidhīyate, tasya yaḥ sthaviśthah dhātuh tat puriṣam bhavati, yaḥ madhyamah tat māṃsani, yaḥ anīśthah tat manah' - iti".

Sāṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra 2, 4, 21.

part of it develops the mental faculty¹. The main intention of the Advaitins to develop this argument is to refute the eternity and atomic nature of mind accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. According to Advaitins, mind is produced from material elements, which is supported by the Śruti-text "annamayāṁ hi saumya manah" (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 6, 5, 4).

As mind is produced from material element, it is endowed with parts. Because a produced object will always have parts and hence it is capable of being perceived. The Vaiśeṣikas accept mind as eternal as it, according to them, is a substance having no parts, which can be put in the form of a syllogistic argument :

"Manah nityaṁ niravayavadraṅgyatvāt"

But the Advaitins has pointed out a fallacy called 'sverūpāsiddhi' as the hetu (probans) 'niravayavadraṅgyatva' does not exist in mind which is a pakṣa (minor term). As mind is a

1. "Tasyāśca sthaviṣṭhaṁ rūpaṁ puriṣabhāvena vahih
nirgacchati. Madhymaṁ adhyāmaṁ māṁsaṁ varddhayati
anīṣṭhaṁ tu manah".

Ibid.

sāvayava, according to the Advaitins, the said hetu cannot remain in mind. Hence, there is the said fallacy. As it is perceptible and produced object, it cannot have atomic dimension. With this statement the Advaitins try to refute the all-pervasive character (vibhutva) of mind as accepted by the Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya has given the syllogistic argument :

"Mind is all-pervasive as it is a substance being devoid of colour and touch, as in the case of ātman". ("manah vibhu rūpasparśasūnyadravyatvāt, ātmavat")

This view is easily refuted by the Advaitins because a produced object, according to them, must have colour and touch. As mind is a substance, it is endowed with colour and touch. Hence, as the above hetu does not exist in pakṣa, there is fallacy called Svarūpāsiddhi. In this way, the atomic and all-pervasive character of mind have been refuted by the Advaitins¹.

1. Bhāvadīpikā (a Bengali commentary) on Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra no. 2, 4, 21, Edited by Swāmī Viśvarūpānanda, PP. 811-812.

After refuting the atomic and all-pervasive character of mind, Śaṅkara has accepted mind as a minute in size. According to him, mind has a particular size though the size is very limited. That is to say, it is quite small. If its size were not limited, it would be perceived when it goes out from a physical body at the time of death. It cannot be regarded as an independent reality. It does enter to a physical body when the body comes into being at the time of birth and leaves it when the body is destroyed at the time of death¹. If the minuteness (i.e. limited in size) of mind is denied, the above function of mind i.e. pass in and out of a body would be impossible. The self also becomes limited when it is associated with buddhi or manas the limiting

-
1. "Anutvaṁ ca eṣāṁ sauksmyapericehedau na paramānutulyatvaṁ, kṛtsnadehavyāpikāryyānupapattiprasaṅgāt Sūkṣmāḥ ete prāṇāḥ, sthūlāścetsyuh maraṇakāle śarīrāt nirgacchantāḥ vilāt ahiriva upalabhyeran mriyamāṇasya pārśvasthaiḥ".

Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra 2, 4, 7.

adjunct¹.

Manas or antahkarana being associated with other sense-organs gives us knowledge of the external world. Manas, according to Śaṅkara, is an instrument of knowledge, not an agent.

It has been said by Śaṅkara that antahkarana as the limiting adjunct of self may be described by different terms like mind (manas), intelligence (buddhi), consciousness (viññāna) and citta (thought)². These are

1. "Hṛdayāyatanatvavacanam api buddheḥ eva, tadāyatanatvāt. Tathā utkrāntyādīnāmapī upādhyāyattatāmdarsāyati utkrāntyabhāve hi gatyāgatyoh. Api abhāvah viññāyate. Na hi anapasrptasya dehāt gatyāgatī syātām. Evaṁ upādhiḡuṇaśāratvāt jīvasya anutvādivyapadeśah prājñavat".

Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra 2, 3, 29.

2. Sūtrabhāṣya - 11, 3, 32 & 11, 4, 6.

Also

Bhattacharya Dinesh Chandra : - Prācīn Bharatiya
manovidyā, P. 22.

so named due to the different functions or aspects of antahkarana. Antahkarana is named as mind (manas) when it represents the indecisive state of antahkarana i.e. when we are in doubt in ascertaining an object whether the object is 'this' or 'that'.

When antahkarana performs the function of decision i.e. when we can know an object as 'this' or 'that' particular object with certainty, this particular function of antahkarana is called buddhi¹.

Self-consciousness (vijñāna) is the form of antahkarana which refers to ego. When we say 'I know the object' then antahkarana in the form of 'I' performs its action.

When antahkarana performs the function of remembering a past event then that function of antahkarana is called as citta.

These four functions of antahkarana have also

1. "Samsayādivṛttikam mana ityucyate, niścayādivṛttikam buddhiriti".

been accepted by the author of Vedānta Paribhāṣā. In the Vedānta Paribhāṣā the term 'ahankāra' is used instead of self-consciousness (viññāna)¹. So a simple difference lies in the use of terminology.

The author of Vedāntasāra accepts all the four as mentioned above. But Prakāśātman, the author of Vivarana does not agree with this division. According to him, indetermination (samśaya), remembrance (smarana) are not the attributes of antahkarana. These are the attributes of nescience (avidyā). So, according to Vivaranakāra, antahkarana cannot be divided by its

-
1. "Sāca vṛttiścaturvidhā. Samśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇamiti. Evaṃ sati vṛttibhedenaikamantahkaraṇam mana iti buddhiriti ahankāra iti cittamiticākhyāyate taduktaṃ - manobuddhirahankāraścittam karanamāntaram. Samśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇam viśayā ime".

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Edited by
Sri Srimohana Tarkavedānta Tīrtha, P. 32(Sanskrit
Pustak Bhandara).

division of vṛtti or function¹.

Only two functions of antahkarana e.g. manas and buddhi have been accepted by the author of Pañcadśī. The authors of Vedāntasāra and Vedāntasamgraha are of the view that manas identifies with citta and buddhi with aṅkāra. So they admit two divisions².

It has been said in the Vedānta Paribhāṣā that perceptual knowledge is nothing but pure consciousness. In support of this view Advaita Vedāntins quote the Śruti text "yat sākṣāt aparokṣāt Brahma". According to Advaita Vedāntins, consciousness is beginningless as it is independent reality³.

1. Datta, D. M., The six ways of knowing, University of Calcutta - 1972, P. 48.

2. Ibid.

3. "Pratyakṣapramācātra caitanyameva. Yat sākṣādaparokṣād brahmetisruteḥ. Aparokṣādityasyāparokṣamityarthah".

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Previous edition, P. 11.

But an objection has been raised here that if consciousness be beginningless then how its instruments like the eye etc. be the means of knowledge¹.

In response to the above charge Advaita Vedāntins are of the view that though consciousness is beginningless yet it has beginning when qualified by mental state. Consciousness is revealed through mental state which has got contact of sense-organ. So consciousness qualified by the mental state can be said as having a beginning².

According to the opponents, there can be no modification of mind as it has no part at all. Mental

1. "Nanu caitanyamanādi, tatkathanī cakṣurādestatkarana-
tvena pramānatvamiti".

Ibid.

2. "Caitanyasyānaditve'pi tadabhiyañjakāntakaraṇavṛ-
ttirindriyasannikarsādīnā jāyata iti vṛttiviśiṣṭam
caitanyamādimadityucyate. Jñānāvachchedakatvāccavṛtau
jñānatvopacārah".

Ibid.

state is nothing but the modification of mind. Modification is possible for those substances that have got their own parts. As antahkarana or mind has no parts so it, according to the opponents, cannot be modified¹.

In response to this, Advaita Vedāntins argue that 'the mind has a beginning' is proved by the Śruti text like "Tanmano 'srjata" (It is projected the mind'-)². That is to say, mind is produced by someone. As it is stated in the Vedas that mind is a produced object, so mind must have got its own parts³.

1. "Nanu niravayavasyāntahkaranaṣya parināmātmikā
vṛttih katham?"

Ibid.

2. "Tanmano 'kuruta ātmanvī syāmiti" - .

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.2.1

3. "Ithaṁ - na tāvadantahkaranaṁ niravayavaṁ sādīdṛavya-
tvena sāvayavatvāt. Sādītvañca - 'tanmano 'srjata'
ityādisruteh".

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Previous edition.

Mental state is taken as an attribute of mind. It has been stated in the Sruti "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear - all these are the attributes of mind"¹. Knowledge in the form of mental state has been referred to by the term, 'intelligence' (dhīh). So desire etc. are also attributes of mind not of Ātman or self.

Now the opponents arise the question that if desire etc. are the attributes of the mind then we cannot explain our experiences such as 'I wish', 'I know', 'I fear' which apprehend them as attributes of the self. Because, knowledge, desire etc. are described as identical with the subject i.e. knower and here knower is the self. From such usages apparently it seems that desire etc. belong to self, not mind².

1. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1. V. 3.

2. "Nanu kāmāderantahkaraṇadharmatve ahamicchāmyaham jānāmyahamvibhemītyādyanubhava ātmadharmatvamava-
gāhamānah kathamupapadyate".

Ibid.

In response to the above objection the Advaita Vedāntins say that in the Sruti text ātman or self has been taken as a substance which has no attributes. So desire etc. are the attributes of mind. But due to the false identification of the self with mind we use the expression such as "I am happy", "I am miserable". Where mind is modified in the form of happiness etc. In support of such expression Dharmarāja says that though a lump of iron being the substratum of fire cannot have the property of burning yet we use expression "The iron burns" due to the false identification of fire with iron¹.

Though it is known to us that the self or the attributes of self are completely different from non-self or the attributes of non-self yet in the case of lokavyavahāra or in ordinary usage we mix the self with non-self

1. "Ayaḥpindasya dagdhṛtvābhāvehāpi dagdhṛtvārayavanhitādātmyādhyāsād yathā ayodahatīti vyavahārastathā sukhādyākārapariṇāmyantakaraṇaikyādhyāsādahaṃ sukhiḥ ahaṃ dukkhītyādi vyavahāro jāyate" - Ibid.

or the attributes of self with those of non-self. Śaṅkara has said that the self or non-self are completely opposite to each other just like 'Yusmat' (you) and 'Asmat' (I) or light and darkness. Though this is a fact yet we generally impose the property of self with non-self and the vice-versa. This type of superimposition or illusion is known as adhyāsa in Advaita Philosophy. And this type of superimposition is very much natural and it is allowed in the phenomenal level. In the same way it can be said that the properties of mind like desire etc. are superimposed on self. As it is a kind of superimposition, desire etc. cannot be taken as the attributes of self. Though the burning property exists in fire but not in iron yet the usage 'iron burns' can be done figuratively. In the like manner, desire etc. ascribe the attributes of self figuratively but actually they belong to mind.

The opponents say that, if mind is taken as sense-organ (indriya), it is not capable of being perceived. Because we know from common maxim that a stone cannot hurt another stone (Na śilā tādayet śilāṃ). That is to say, sense-organ is not capable of being perceived. It is a general principle that one's own power is not applicable to oneself. ("Sva-saktih svātmani na pravartate"). According to this principle, sense-organs can reveal all objects

except themselves¹.

The Advaita Vedāntins, like the author of Vedānta paribhāṣā, in this regard, says that there is no proof in favour of treating mind as a sense-organ².

Then the opponents are of the opinion that in the Bhagavad-gītā it has been said "Manah ṣaṣṭhāni indriyāni" (the organ, with the mind as the sixth'- XV. 7) which is a proof regarding the fact that mind is a sense organ.

In reply to this, Advaita Vedāntins say that though mind is not a sense organ yet there is no contradiction to make up the number six by it. Because there is no hard and fast rule behind the view that the number

1. "Nanu antahkaranasyendriyatayātīndriyatvāt katham
pratyakṣa viśayatehi?"

Ibid.

2. "Ucyate - na tāvadantahkaranamindriyamityatra
mānamasti".

Ibid, P. 14.

six must be filled up by the sense organ. According to them, the sixth number may be filled in by an object though it is not the same with the rest five¹. So mind by which the number six has been filled in may not be sense-organ though the rest five are sense-organs, In support of the above explanation Vedāntins quote some Śruti texts like "yajamānapañcamā idām bhakṣayanti" (they with the sacrificer as the fifth-one eat the idā). That is to say, sacrificers are eating substance called idā. Here it is found that the number five relating to the priest is made up by sacrificer who is not a priest². The same case is found again in the statement "Vedānadhya-
payāmāsa Mahābhārata pañcamān", that is to say, he taught

-
1. "Anindriyenāpi manasā ṣaṣṭha saṁkhyāpūranāvirodhāt.
Nahīndriyagata saṁkhyāpūranamindriyenaiveti niyamah".

Ibid.

2. "Yajamānapañcamā idām bhakṣayantītyatra ṛtvig-
gatapañcatvasaṁkhyāya anṛtvijāpi yajamānena
pūranadarsanāt".

Ibid.

the Vedas with the Mahābhārata as the fifth. Here the number five is made up by the Mahābhārata. But the Mahābhārata is not a Veda at all. Because it is known to all that Vedas are four in number¹.

That the mind is not a sense-organ is also proved by the Śruti text "Indriyebhyaḥ parāhyartha arthebhyasca param manah" - where it is said that the elements by which sense-organs are made are subtle than these organs and mind is more subtle than the elements by which it is constituted. So mind cannot be a sense-organ. Again in the Kathopaniṣad mind is considered as different from sense-organ on account of the fact that the functions of the sense-organs are different from those of mind. The whole body is compared with a chariot which is associated with horses in the form of sense-organ. It is the nature of a sense-organ to move out whatever they like and mind is the controller of these sense-organ. That

1. "Vedānadhyaṭṭayāmasama bhāratā pañcamān" ityādaḥ
Vedaḡata-pañcatva-saṅkhyāyā avedenāpi mahābhāratena
pūranadarśanāt".

Ibid.

is why mind is compared with reins. So it is the function of mind to regulate the sense organs¹. Here the function of sense-organ is to move towards their respective objects and the function of mind is to control them. From the different activities or functions it is proved that mind is completely different from the sense-organs.

According to the opponents if mind is not considered as sense-organ then the perception of happiness and sorrow cannot be taken as immediate².

But according to Advaita Vedāntins, the above objection is not tenable. They say that the immediacy of knowledge does not lie in its being due to an organ. The property of being caused by sense-organ cannot entail

1. Ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi śarīraṁ rathameva tu.

Buddhiṁ tu śārathiṁ viddhi manaḥ pragrahameva ca.

Kāthopaniṣad, 1/3/3.

2. "Nacaivaṁ manaso 'niḍriyatve sukhādipratyakṣasya
sākṣātkāratvaṁ".

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Pratyakṣa Paricchedaḥ,

Edited by Śrī Śrīmohan Tarkavedānta Tīrtha (Sanskrit
Pustak Bhandar).

direct apprehension. The statement 'where there is mind, there is immediacy' is not true in the case of God's knowledge and in inference. If mind is considered as the cause of immediacy, the inference which is caused by mind would be immediate and God's knowledge which is not caused by any sense-organ would not be immediate¹. Indirect knowledge thus caused by mind is not directly apprehended. Though the knowledge of God is directly apprehended yet there is the absence of sense-object contact. From the above discussion it can be concluded that mind is not a sense-organ or an instrument to originate knowledge as the opponents suppose it to be. Mind can be regarded as a factor in the modification of the consciousness already existing.

Though the Advaita Vedāntins accept the existence

1. "Na syāndriyājanyatvāditi vācyam naḥindriyajanyatvena jñānasya sāksāttvamanumityāderapi manojanyatayā sāksāttvāpatteh. Īśvarajñānasyāndriyajanyasya sāksāttvānāpatteśca".

Ibid.

of permanent self i.e., knower which is self-conscious yet some of them do not regard manas as an indriya. Regarding the question 'whether mind is a sense-organ or not', Acārya Śaṅkara simply points out different views of Upanisads. He says that the mind is an indriya which finds support in the smṛtis but in the Srutris the mind has not been accepted as an indriya.

Those who do not accept mind as a sense-organ quote the Śruti "The objects are greater than the sense-organs, and the manas is greater than the senses". It is understood from this Śruti text that manas or mind is different from sense-organs, and the manas is greater than the senses". It is understood from this Śruti text that manas or mind is different from sense-organs. Manas is superior to the sense-organs. A particular sense-organ cannot apprehend those objects that are specified for another sense-organ. But manas (mind) can apprehend all objects¹.

1. Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Psychology Cognition, Vol. 1, pp. 17-18.

Sāṅkara quotes Smṛti in support of his view that mind is a sense-organ. He says that eleven sense-organs have been accepted in Manusāṃhitā and of which the eleventh organ is manas. Vācaspati Miśra also says that like other sense-organs mind is a sense-organ.

According to Vivaraṅkāra, manas (mind) cannot be regarded as indriya or sense-organ. If it is accepted that mind is sense-organ (indriya), it must be included in other instruments of perception and then the function of mind must be limited to direct experience of perceptual things. But it is well known fact that mind also acts in other means of valid knowledge like anumāna etc. Vivaraṅkāra is of the opinion that in the case of (inference (anumāna)) mind does not function as a sense-organ. Again, he argues that if mind be treated as a sense-organ, it cannot be an object of knowledge. Because the sense-organs are not self-revealing. They can reveal other objects only. Hence mind (manas) is not a sense-organ¹.

1. Chennakesavan, Sarasvati, Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy, Motilal, pp. 42, 43.

Now, let us discuss the view of some other Advaitins who admit mind as a sense-organ. Vācaspati Misra, the author of Bhāmātī, Svāmī Vidyāranya, the author of Pañcadāsī are worth mentioning. According to them, though mind has been mentioned separately from indriyas i.e., sense-organs in the Srutis yet it is not separate from indriyas. Such type of separate mention of the same object is found in some cases where some extra importance is given to these. As for example, they say that when it is used 'the cattle and the bullock', it is well known to all that the meaning of the two terms i.e., 'cattle' and 'bullock' is the same. In other words, the term 'cattle' is included in 'bullock' but the terms are separately mentioned with a view to giving some special emphasis¹. Applying the same logic it can be said that though sense-organs and the mind are mentioned separately yet they are the same and this has been done to attach

1. Datta, D. M., Six ways of Knowing, University of Calcutta, 1972, P. 55.

a special emphasis on mind.

According to Vācaspati Mīśra mind is a sense-organ. He points out that the vṛtti of the mind (manas) can give us perceptual experience of external things through the external sense-organs like eye, ear etc. But the internal perception of pleasure and pain is impossible if mind is not accepted as sense-organ. Because, he says that the role of sense-organ (indriya) is essential for having any direct knowledge. If mind is not treated as sense-organ (indriya), it must have to admit either the experiences of pleasure and pain are not direct or it is not necessary to accept sense-organs as the cause of direct knowledge. But non of the above two alternatives can be taken as true. So mind (manas) is a sense-organ.

The above view has also been supported by Vidyāranya Muni, the author of Pañcadāśī. He is of the opinion that mind being situated within the lotus-heart rules over the ten sense-organs, (i.e., five intellectual organs and five action organs). Vidyāranya, again, says that as mind has to depend on these organs for its functions in relation to external objects, it is called an internal

organ¹.

The importance of mind is also known from the statement of Śaṅkara that the functions of organs are merged in mind at the time of death. It has been stated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad that when the man departs from this world his speech merges in mind². It says that speech gets merged in mind, mind in Prāna and so on. It may be asked that whether the organ of speech as such gets merged in mind or only its function. The opponent says that as there is no mention about the function of speech getting merged in the text, it is to be understood that

1. "Mano daśendriyādhyakṣaṁ hr̥tpadme golake sthitam.
Taccāntahkaraṇam Vāhyeṣvasvatantryādvinendriyaiḥ"
Pañcedasī 2, 12.

2. "Vānmanasi darsanātsabdācca" Brahma Sūtra - 4/2/1

Also

"Asti prayānaviṣayā śrutih - 'Asya somya puruṣasya
prayato vānmanasi sampadyate manah prāno prānaatejasi
tejah parasyām devatāyām' (Chāndogya 6.8.6) iti".

Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Sūtra 4. 2. 1.

the organ itself gets merged in mind¹.

The Brahmasūtra refers this view and substantiates that only the function of the organ of speech gets merged in mind. As mind is not the material cause of organs, they cannot get merged in it. For the effects get merged only in the material cause. As mind is not the material cause of organs, we have to understand here by speech not organ but its function². Function of the

1. "Kimiha vāca eva vṛttimatyaṁ manasi s̄mpattirucyate, uta vāgvṛtteriti viśayah. Tatra vāgeva tāvanmanasi s̄mpadyate iti prāptam. Tathā hi śrutiranugrhitā bhavati, itarathā lakṣaṇā syāt. Śrutilakṣaṇaviśaye ca śrutirnyāyyā, na lakṣaṇā. Tasmādvāca evāyam manasi pralaya iti. Evaṁ prāpte brūmah - vāgvṛttirmanasi s̄mpadyate iti".

Ibid.

2. "Dr̄syate hi vāgvṛtteḥ pūrvopasāmhāro manovṛttau vidyamanāyām, na tu vāca eva vṛttimatyaṁ manasyupasāmhārah kenacidapi draṣṭuṁ śakyate ... Yasya hi yata utpattistasya tatra pralayo nyāyyo mrdīva śarāvesya.

organ can get merged in mind even though it is not the cause of that function, just as the burning property of fire which has its start in wood becomes extinguished in water. The scripture, therefore, refers to the function of speech as the function and the thing to which it belongs is taken as one¹. It is generally noticed that dying man first loses his function of speech though his mind is still functioning. From this experience it is to be understood that the function of speech but not the organ is merged in mind. For the same reason the

Na ca manaso vāgutpadyata iti kimcana pramāṇamasti.
Vṛttyuddhavābhībhavau tvaprakṛtisamāśrayāvapi drśyete".

Ibid.

2. "Pārthivebhyo hīndhanebhyastaijasasyāgnervṛttiruddhavatyapsu copasāmyati. Kathaṁ tarhyasminpakṣe śabdo vānmanasi sampadyata iti? Ata āha - śabdāceti. Śabdo 'pyasminpakṣe'vakalpate; vṛttivṛttimātorabhedopacārādityarthah".

Ibid.

function of the remaining organs get merged in mind¹.

From the above statement of Brahma-sūtra and Samkarabhāṣya it is known to us that the mind is the substratum in which the function of all the sense-organs is merged. Had there been no mind the phenomenon of merging would have been impossible leading to the absurdity of death. If death is not possible then the concept of Videhamukti at death would not be intelligible.

In the Advaita Vedānta it has been accepted that by the destruction of actions which have not as yet begun to yield result a knower of Brahman attains Jīvanamukti and on exhaustion of the Prārabdha work he attains Videhamukti at death and becomes one with Brahman. The

1. "Ata eva ca sarvānyanu" Brahma sūtra 4, 2, 2.

Also

"Tasmādupaśāntatejāḥ punarbhavamindiyairmanasi sampadyamānaih ' (Prasna up. 3, 9) ityatrāviśeṣeṇa sarveśāmevendiyānām manasi sampattih śrūyate".

Samkarabhāṣya on sūtra 4, 2, 2,

process of death is, as described earlier, the function of organ with mind. The function of mind gets merged in prāna and the function of prāna gets merged in individual soul. So, for the attainment of liberation in the form of Videhamukti, death is highly essential and for, this mind plays a vital role on account of the fact that the functions of all organs get merged into it. Had there been no mind the whole metaphysical scheme of Advaita Vedānta would not have been come into being.

Now, let us discuss the function of mind in perception as stated by the Advaita Vedāntins. According to them, the perception is of two types : perception of an object and perception of the knowledge. There is a difference between the perception of a jar and the perception of the knowledge of the jar¹. In case of

1. "Siddhante pratyakṣatvaprāyojakam kimiti cet, kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya prāyojakam pṛcchasi, kimvā viśayagatasya? Ādye pramāṇacaitanyasya viśayāvacchinnacaitanyābhedaṁ iti būmah".

attaining any perceptual knowledge, as Advaita Vedāntins explain, two types of consciousness must be identical. Consciousness, according to them, is three fold : (i) Consciousness limited by mind is called pramātr caitanya. (ii) Consciousness limited by object is regarded as Viśaya-caitanya and (iii) Consciousness which is limited by mental state is called pramāṇa caitanya¹.

Advaita Vedāntins say that when we attain the perceptual knowledge in respect of knowledge two types of consciousness limited by the mental state and consciousness limited by the object become identical. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra is of the opinion that when

1. "Tathā hi trividhaṁ Caitanyam. Viśaya caitanyam pramāṇacaitanyam pramātrcaitanyam Ceti. Tatra ghatādyavacchinnacaitanyam viśayacaitanyam. Antahkaranavṛttyavacchinnam caitanyam pramāṇacaitanyam. Antahkaranāvacchinnam caitanyam pramātrcaitanyam".

Ibid.

consciousness limited by mental state turns into the consciousness limited by the object through the sense organ etc. then perception in respect of knowledge can be attained. He explains it in the following manner. Just as water of a tank goes out through a drain to a tub and assumes a shape of a tub, similarly in case of perception our mind goes out through indriyas or sense-organs to the object and becomes identical with the object. Antahkarana or mind moves towards the object with the help of sense-organs.

In case of perceptual knowledge of a jar our mind goes through the eye to the space occupied by the jar and becomes identical with the form of it¹. But it is true that the fact of modification of antahkarana by itself is unable to explain the knowledge of the jar.

1. "Tatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrānnirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuskoṇādyākāraṁ bhavati tathā taijasamantahkaraṇamapi cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghaṭādi viśayadeśaṁ gatvā ghaṭādiviśayā-kāreṇa parinamate"

Ibid.

Because antahkarana or mind is unconscious or material. The Advaita Vedāntins say that Ātman illuminates the modification of an antahkarana. Ātman, the Cit, is the observer (sāksin) of all changes. Just as in a red hot iron ball, iron and fire become identical indistinguishably, similarly in the case of perception the modification of antahkarana possesses the light of self that is purely identical with it. So the contact of modification or Vrtti of antahkarana or mind has got an important role in perception. According to Advaita Vedāntins, antahkarana sheds its lusture on the object to reflect them. Through the relation to Ātman, antahkarana acquires the power of reflection. Because Ātman is the ultimate consciousness and everything is proved by it.

Had there been no existence of mind or antahkarana, the perceptual knowledge of an object would not be possible. The Advaita Vedāntins are the pioneers in pointing-out the role of antahkarana in the field of perception in a very novel way. They say that mind has got the capacity of being modified. In other words, the antahkarana has got a flexible character on account of which it along with the help of sense organ can go out of the body and assumes the shapes of the object of perception. This aspect of antahkarana has not been pointed out by other

philosophers. By way of pointing out this aspect of mind the Advaita Vedāntins want to put in record that antahkarana has got vital or prominent role in the field of perceptual cognitions. Even the sense organs have no power to reveal an object if mind does not reach to the object. Hence this function of mind indicates its inevitability in the field of perception.

It is a wellknown fact that the knowledge of all objects do^{es} not always come to our awareness. When our sense-organs like eye etc. are connected with objects, our mind becomes transformed in the form of mental modes of those objects. Under this situation, the knowledge of that object can be attained. This knowledge in the form of mental state is nothing but the transformation of the knower in the form of mind. The mind which becomes transformed into knowledge becomes the substratum or knower of knowledge, but not the seer. For, that which is transformed is capable of being seen. Because, one cannot see one's transformation due to contradiction between agent and object (Karmakatrvirodha). Hence, in the form of knowledge - "I am seeing a jar", there are the seer or revealer of jar, the knowledge of jar and knower of jar. Among these the revealer of truth is Sākṣī.

This Sāksi is one in number. It has been stated by Vārtikakāra that Sāksi remains the same in every body though the knower is different ("matrman prabhede'pi pratideham na bhidyate"). All that is revealed in our knowledge in this world is called Sāksibhāṣya (sarvaṃ jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā saksibhāṣyaṃ). All objects of this world including pramāṇa being endowed with mind are included in the phenomenal world. The revealer of those is Sāksi which is self-luminous and hence eternal and immediate. The immediacy of Sāksi does not depend on other and hence it alone is self-luminous¹.

Sāksi is admitted in the Advaita Vedānta in order to reveal gross and subtle body of an individual being. These two bodies of an individual, being inanimate cannot reveal themselves. In order to reveal them the consciousness in the form of Sāksi which is self-luminous is accepted in the Advaita Vedānta². It may be

1. Introduction, Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Śrī Śrīmohana

Tarkavedāntatīrtha, 1377 (B. S.) P. 5-6.

2. "Sthūlasūksmātmakasya jīvaśarīradvayasya avabhāṣārtham sāksi svīkriyate iti. Etayoh jīvaśarīrayoh

argued that the mental mode which is capable of revealing can reveal the body of an individual. Then what is the utility of accepting Sāksi?¹

In reply, it can be said that as mind is inanimate in character the modification of mind in the form of mental mode is also inanimate. This mental mode being inanimate is not revealed and hence it depends on consciousness for its own manifestation. That consciousness is Sāksi. Just as inanimate mental modes are not capable of revealing an individual's body, it cannot reveal the mental properties like happiness, misery etc.

jadatvena aprakāsarūpatvāt tayoh avabhāsārtham
sāksīrūpaṁ svaprakāśātmakam caitanyam aṅgīkriyate
ityarthah"

Dr. K. P. Sinha, Śāṅkara-Vedānte Tattva-Mīmāṃsā,
P. 82 (Viśvavidyālaya Prakāśana).

1. "Nanu prakāśasvarūpayā antahkaraṇavṛttyā eva jīvadehasya avabhāsaḥ upapadyate iti sāksīsvikāre kim prayojanaṁ iti cet".

Ibid.

For the manifestation of mental properties like happiness sāksi is to be accepted¹.

According to the author of Vedānta Paribhāṣā perception again can be divided into two types from a different point of view which are as follows :

(1) Perception due to the witness in the individual self (jīva-sāksi)

(2) Perception due to the witness in God (Isvarsāksi).

In other words, these two can be said as perception in the individual self (jīva-pratyakṣa)

1. "Antahkaranasya jadatvāt antahkaranavṛttyākhyah antahkaranaparināmo'pi jadah. Jadatvena ca aprakāśātmikā antahkaranavṛttil svaprakāśārthameva caitanyam apeksate, katham tayā jīvadehasya avabhāsa sambhavet. Tasmāt jīvasya sthūlasūksmadehayoh avabhāsartham sāksi svikaranīyah eva. Api ca, yathā jadabhūtā antahkaranavṛttil jīvasarīram na bhāsayati, tathā antahkaranadharmabhūtām sukhadukkhādīkamapi na bhāsayati. Tathā ca sukhadukkhādīnāmavabhāsartham

and perception in God (Īśvarapratyakṣa)¹.

Individual self means consciousness limited by antahkarana (antahkaraṇāvachinna caitanya) and the witness in the individual self (jīvasākṣī) means consciousness that has the antahkarana (mind) as its limiting adjunct (upādhi). So the difference between the individual self (jīva) and the witness in the individual (jīvasākṣī) is this that in the first case the antahkarana or mind is a qualifying attributes (Viśeṣaṇa) and in the latter antahkarana or mind is a limiting adjunct (upādhi)².

avabhāṣā
ca sākṣī svikarāṇīyah"

Ibid.

1. "Tacca pratyakṣam punardvividham jīvasākṣī īśvarasākṣī-ceti."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā, pratyakṣa Paricchedah, Edited by Sri Srimohana Tarkavedāntatīrtha, P. 36.

2. "Tatra jīvo nāma antahkaraṇāvachinnam Caitanyam. Tat sākṣītu antahkaraṇopahitacaitanyam. Antahkaraṇasya viśeṣaṇatvopādhitvābhyāmanayorbhedah" - Ibid.

Now let us discuss how a qualifying attributes (Viśeṣana) differs from limiting adjunct (upādhi). There are criteria which are common to both of them. These common criteria are :

- (1) that which differentiates, (itara-vyāvartaka) i.e., indicates that cognition which is different from others,
- (2) that which is present (i.e., Vartamāna).

There is one more criterion which is not the same and which is the only differentiating character between qualifying attributes (Viśeṣana) and limiting adjunct (upādhi). The first one i.e., the qualifying attributes (Viśeṣana) is that which ^{is} connected with the predicate in respect of something related to it (Kāryānvayī). But the second one i.e., limiting adjunct (upādhi) is that which is not connected with the predicate in respect of something related to it (Kāryānvayī)¹. In other words, it cannot be said that in the first case the relation between subject and predicate is not the relation between

1. "Viśeṣanañca kāryānvayī vyāvarttakam. Upādhiśca kāryānvayī vyāvarttako varttamānaśca".

definition and definatum. But this relation can be applied to the second case i.e., in the case of limiting adjunct. As for example, in the sentence "The coloured jar is non-eternal" (Rūpavān ghataḥ anityah) the 'colour' is a qualifying attribute (Viśeṣana). Because it (i.e. colour) differentiates particular jar that is related to it from other jars. Again, 'colour' is present (Vartamāna) so long as the jar is present and it is connected with noneternity i.e., it being connected with the subject i.e., jar may be connected with the predicate i.e., 'non-eternal' (anityah).

But in the sentence "The space enclosed by the auditory passage is the ear" (Karnaśaskulyavacchinnaṁ nabhaḥ śrotram) the auditory passage is not a qualifying attributes rather it is a limiting adjunct (upādhi). Because the auditory passage is present and differentiates the space enclosed by it from the remaining space. But if the term 'limited by auditory passage' (Karnaśaskulyavacchinnaṁ) alone is taken into account, it will be seen that this part cannot be connected with the predicate term i.e., 'ear' (śrotram). In other words the term 'Karnaśaskulyavacchinnaṁ' is uttered in isolation it can never be connected with ear or śrotra. Hence, the

sentence "Karnaśaskulyavacchinnam śrotram" (i.e., ear is limited by auditory passage) bears no meaning at all until and unless the term "nabhah" (space) is associated with "Karnaśaskulyavacchinnam". If it is said that the 'space is limited by auditory passage is ear', it carries sensible meaning. But in the previous case if somebody says that, the 'coloured' (rūpavān) is noneternal, it makes sense though the term ghaṭa is not uttered at all. Hence, the 'coloured' has become a Viśeṣana by virtue of the fact that it can be related to that which is predicated here. But the term "Karnaśaskulyavacchinnam" is an upādhi (but not Viśeṣana) as the term is not capable of being related with the predicate. According to the logicians, this limiting adjunct may be addressed as an indicator (paricāyaka). The antaḥkarana or mind (i.e. limiting adjunct) is actually a material object and hence, it cannot reveal things independently. But due to association with the consciousness it can move anywhere and can reveal things. So mind can be taken as limiting adjunct of consciousness¹. This witness in the individual self

1. "Yathā rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭo'nitya ityatra rūpaṁ viśeṣanaṁ.
Karnaśaskulyavacchinnam nabhaḥ śrotramityatra

is different in each individual. If the witness were one to each individual then there would have been the possibility of having cognitive knowledge of an object in an individual though it was not known by him earlier. In other words, if this be the case the knowledge acquired by someone would have been recollected by other due to having the same witness¹.

According to the author of Pāñcadaśī, witness in consciousness (sākṣīcaitanya) reveals individual being in the form of ego associated with the appearance of consciousness, object and different mental states and at the time of their absence of it as in the deep

karnaśaṣṭkūlupādhiḥ. Ayamevopādhirnaiyāyikāḥ paricāyaka ityucyate. Prakṛteca antahkaranasya jātayā viśayabhāśakatvāyogena viśayabhāśakacaitanyopādhitvaṁ".

Ibid.

1. "Ayañca jīvesākṣī pratyātmaṁ nānā. Ekatve caitrāvagate maitrasyāpyanusandhāna-prasaṅgaḥ"

Ibid, (P. 38).

sleep it also remains self luminous. With the help of an example the author tries to explain the fact of revelation. He says that just as the lamp in the dancing hall (nṛtyasālā) reveals all the members i.e., the master or prabhu (who arranges the programme of dance), spectators and the artist (dancer) and even at the time of their absence i.e., at the end of the programme the lamp remains self-luminous, the witness in consciousness (saksīcaitanya) similarly reveals all ~~these are~~ mentioned above (i.e., individual being in the form of ego associated with the appearance of consciousness, object and different mental states) and remains self-luminous even at the time of their absence. Anything which is not being perceived by an individual is also revealed by the witness in consciousness.

According to the Advaita Vedāntins, the witness is that consciousness which reveals object but is indifferent in itself. Pure consciousness (suddhacaitanya) is free from the property of being seer (drastrtva) and witness in consciousness (jīvacaitanya), though endowed with the property of being seer, is not indifferent. Hence both the pure consciousness and the witness in

consciousness take the help of the mental states in the form of object to reveal the external objects like jar etc. as well as it depends on the mental states in the form of nescience (avidyā) to reveal those objects which have got apparent reality. Witness in consciousness reveals unknown object through nescience (avidyā). It reveals antahkarana along with its different parts like pleasure, pain etc. It also reveals nescience and the objects produced by nescience directly without depending on other factors.

Mind or antahkarana plays also a prominent role in other sources of valid knowledge like inference testimonial knowledge, presumption etc.

In the case of nirvikalpaka patyaksā, as for example, "This is that Debadatta" ('thou art that' or tattvamasi), there is identity between Debadatta seen earlier in other places and Debadatta existing in present time. If we do not accept antahkarana or mind then this knowledge of identity would not be possible.

In the case of inferential knowledge, e.g., 'The mountain has got fire' the knowledge of Vyāpti in the form 'where there is smoke, there is fire' is highly

essential. Without such knowledge none can come to the conclusion : 'The mountain has got fire' after seeing smoke in the mountain. But such type of the knowledge of Vyāpti is possible due to the existence of antahkaraṇa through which the remembrance of Vyāpti is possible in a particular case.

The knowledge through similarity also depends on mind, because after seeing a particular object another similar object is known. The function of similarity and dissimilarity is possible due to mind or antahkarana.

In the case of testimonial knowledge (śabdajñāna) also mind is essential, because it presupposes one's capability of understanding the meaning of a sentence, either implicative or suggestive. It is possible with the help of mind.

In the case of presumption, from the fact of being stout of Debadatta and fact of not taking food at daytime, it is known that he takes food at night. This understanding is the result of function of mind.

In the case of the knowledge of absence also the role of mind cannot be ignored. Because the knowledge

of non apprehension of an object leads to the attainment of the knowledge of absence which is also the outcome of the function of mind or antahkarana.