

Synopsis of the chapter-III

The Concept of Mind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Mind which is atomic in magnitude, one in number has got a prominent role in Nyāya epistemology. Mind which is unconscious is regarded as a sense-organ. The role of mind cannot be ignored in the case of invalid cognitions like dream etc.

### Chapter-III

#### The Concept of Mind in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

It has been discussed in the previous chapter that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas accepted mind as an internal sense-organ. It is, according to them, an instrument of knowing pleasure, pain etc. directly. So they conceived mind as an unconscious substance like other sense-organs.

But a question may be raised here. If mind is accepted as a sense-organ then why it has not been included into others i.e., eye, ear etc.<sup>1</sup>.

---

1. "Nanu manas indriyatvāttadvarga eva pathanam yuktaṁ kimartha 'yaṁ prthaṁ nirdeśaḥ"

Nyāyamañjarī - Ed. with notes by pt. Sūrya  
Nārāyaṇa Śukla (part II), P. 67 (Chowkhamba  
Sanskrit series - 1971).

The Naiyāyikas, in this regard, opine that though mind is a sense-organ yet there are some differential elements in mind than other sense-organs. The dharma or the quality of mind is not the same with other sense-organs. All the external sense-organs are constituted by any of the physical elements of earth, water etc. So they are called physical or bhautika. But mind is not constituted by any such physical element. As mind, according to them, is not a produced object so the question of constitution does not arise here. Hence, mind is a non-physical (abhautika). Again an external sense-organ is constituted with any specific attribute of the physical elements. As for example, eye is constituted with a particular physical element like teja and it possesses a particular class of object called rūpa. Eye is not able to receive any sound other than rūpa. Again, ear is related to sound only but not to rūpa. But there is no any such particular object to which mind is related. Mind may be related to any external sense-organ whether it is visual or auditory or any other than these two. Sense-organs like eye etc. can

produce knowledge of their particular objects only when mind is endowed with them<sup>1</sup>. In other words, if mind is related to external organ then only the organ can perceive object. For this reason, it seems that a sense-organ cannot perceive object in a state when mind is absent. Again, mind can give us knowledge of mental states like pleasure, pain etc. without taking help of external sense-organs<sup>2</sup>.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, mind is not all-pervasive. Because due to the absence of mind sometimes we do not see an object which is under the purview of our vision. If mind be all-pervasive then there is no possibility of such experience.

---

1. "Bhautikāṅdriyāṇi niyataviṣayāni, Saḡuṅānām caisāmindriyabhāvaḥ manestu na bhautikam na niyata-  
viṣayam na cāśya saḡunasyendriyabhāva iti, tacca na  
bhautikamakāryatvādata eva na tadḡunayogi na ca niyata-  
viṣayam ...". Ibid.

2. "Sarvaviṣayatvam tasya sakalavāhyendriyāṅmadhi-  
sthānatvāttadadhigamyasukhādiviṣayagrāhitvācca ..."

According to Jayanta Bhatta, if the external sense-organs are associated with mind, they can grasp the objects. In other words, the sense organs like eye can grasp the object like colour etc. if they are endowed with mind. There is no other measure for the connection of the sense-organs with the object. Why is it possible? This connection of sense-organ with object through mind is known with the help of the fact of the nonsimultaneous cognition. As ~~simultaneity~~ simultaneity of knowledge of two objects is not possible, the operation of mind is to be admitted. Moreover, when some object is recollected afterwards, it is possible without the functioning of external sense-organ due to having existence of mind. Hence, the function of mind is highly essential for the grasp of something<sup>1</sup>.

- 
1. "... vāhyendriyāni hi mano'dhīsthitāni svavīśayā  
 pravartitūnā utsahante cakṣurādīni nānyathā,  
 kasmādevamiti cedyugapajñānānupapattē, uttarakālam  
 ca vāhyendriyavyāpāravirāhe'pi tadarthāvamarsāt".

Ibid.

Mind has got a particular form though it has no part. Because formless entity is not capable of performing any action. Mind is permanent though it has a form, since there is no rule that a permanent thing must be formless. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa opines that due to its swiftness it can also grasp things of remote place within a moment.

According to the Naiyāyikas, mind is atomic in magnitude<sup>1</sup>. It is one in each body<sup>2</sup>. In order to support this view Vātsyāyana says that if mind were not atomic, there would have been simultaneity in it. Because all sense-organs may come in contact with their objects at the same moment, but, in fact, it is not possible for one to get more than one cognition

---

1. Jñānāyauḡapadyādekam manah

Nyāya Sūtra - 3/2/56.

2. "Yathoktahetutvāccānu"

Nyāya Sūtra - 3/2/59.

at a time<sup>1</sup>.

But the opponents may argue that at the same moment different objects of cognition can come in contact with the mind through sense-organs. Hence simultaneous cognition is possible and so mind cannot be regarded as atomic<sup>2</sup>. As for example, it is possible for the same preceptor to read, to walk, to hold a water pot, to look at the path, to hear sounds of animals and to try to determinate the mark of the animals and to recollect his destination at a same moment. It is not observed that these actions occur one after another. So it can be said that the same preceptor has come in contact with different cognitions at the same time by different

---

1. "Yattu khalvidamindriyāntarānām viśayāntaresu jñānāyugapadyamititalliṅgam. Kasmāt? Sambhavati khalu vai vahuṣu manahsvindriyamanahsamyogayaugapadyamiti jñānayaugapadyam syāt, natu bhavati, tasmādvīśaye pratyayaparyyāyādekam manah"

Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra 3/2/56

2. "Na yugapadanekakriyopaladdheh"

Nyāya Sūtra - No. 3/2/57.

minds. As simultaneous cognition in respect of different actions is possible by different mind, so mind is not atomic<sup>1</sup>. Again, when we take food like cake etc. it seems to us that we get the knowledge of its colour, smell, taste etc simultaneously. Hence, the nature of mind is not atomic<sup>2</sup>.

In response to the above objection Naiyāyikas argue that just as in the case of fire-circle (alāta-cakra) what we perceive, we perceive due to the rapid succession of the fire-circle. Similarly in the case of simultaneous

1. "Ayaṁ khalvadhyaṅpako 'dhite, brajati kamaṅḍalūṁ dhārayati, panthānaṁ paśyati, śrṇotyāraṇyajān śabdān, vibhyaḍ vyālalīṅgāni vubhutsate, smarati ca gantavyaṁ sthānīyamiti kramasyāgrahaṇādyugapadetāḥ kriyā iti prāptaṁ manaso bahutvamiti"

Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra No. 3/2/57

2. "Sugandhiṁ śītalāṁ dīrghāṁśantahpūpaśaskulīm.  
Kapilabrahmaṇāssanti yugapatpañca buddhayaḥ"

Nyāyamāñjarī (Part II), Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla edition, P. 68 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit series - 1971)



perception (in respect of different actions) it is due to rapid movement of the same mind<sup>1</sup>. In this regard Vātsyāyana tries to give an explanation. He says that we wrongly ascertain the fire brand to be round as a wheel. Though the succession of movement is present yet it is not apprehended, because of its rapid movement. It comes to us as a whole due to the non-apprehension of its succession. Similarly, in the case of previous example (i.e., the simultaneous cognition in respect of different actions) it is non-apprehension of succession by which we wrongly ascertain that the actions have been done at the same time. From this it can be said that the rapidity of succession is the cause of such illusory experience of simultaneity. Hence, the view of admitting more than one mind in a human body is not justified<sup>2</sup>.

1. "Alātacakradarsānavattadupalabdhirāsūsāñcārāt"

Nyāya Sūtra No. 3/2/58

2. "Āsūsāñcārādālātasya bhramato vidyamānaḥ kramo na gr̥hyate, kramasyāgrahanādavicchedabuddhya cakra-  
dbuddhirbhavati, tathā buddhīnām kriyānāñcāsuvṛttitvā-  
dvidyamānaḥ kramo na gr̥hyate, kramasyāgrahanādyugapat  
kriyā bhavanti tyabhimāno bhavati".

Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra - 3/2/58.

Only the self is all-pervading. But mind is atomic and it can move anywhere rapidly like air. This characteristic feature of mind finds support in the Bhagavadgītā where it is said - "cañcalam hi manah kṛṣṇa pramāthi valavaddrdham" (Bhagavadgītā - 6/34). But if mind is taken as all-pervading, the question of its rapid movement does not arise.

Though there may exist the contact of our external sense-organs with their corresponding objects, no perception will be produced until mind comes in contact with them. If mind is endowed with its infinite extension or with proportionate extension, it could have come into union with all the five external sense-organs at once giving rise to five types of perception simultaneously<sup>1</sup>.

---

1. "Jñātakaraṇājanyaḥ sukhādyanubhavaḥ indriyajanyaḥ janya-pratyaksatvāt rūpapratyaksavat, janyasākṣātkārasyaendriyajanyatvāditi tatrāpi tallakṣaṇasattvāt. Sparsādyaṅvisayatvena tvagādinaḥ nārthāntaram, gandharasa-rūpasparśesvekaikamāmatrasākṣātkārājanakatvena pṛthivyādivedasiddhau nihsparsa lāgavānniravayavañca manah"

It is a wellknown fact that it is not possible for a man to have more than one kind of perception at a time. From this, it follows that mind can come into the contact with only one sense-organ at a time and hence, it is atomic in extension.

Some scholars deny the atomic dimension of mind on the ground that sometimes as in the case of eating bread soaked in milk and sugar the mind is found united with several objects like milk, sugar and bread simultaneously<sup>1</sup>. This view is not correct, because the operation of mind, though apparently seems to be simultaneous, takes place in succession just as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pricked one after another with the help of a needle.

- 
1. "Evam manahsaṅkoca-vikāsayorbubhutsādikaṃ heturiti cet, tarhi pañcabubhutsāyāṃ praṇidhāne ca sarvādā sarvveśāṃ pañca jñānāni jāyeraṃ pañcāvadhānājñāne krama eva ... anuvyavasāyāḥ pañcaiva samayasauksmyātteśāṃ krama na grhyate".

Ibid - PP. 780-781.

Gaṅgeśa has explained it in another way. At the time of such perception we have the recollection of the knowledge of five objects due to having impression existing in successive apperception and hence this knowledge seems to be simultaneous. In other words, an individual has got a knowledge which is apparently simultaneous due to imposition of the awareness in the form of anubhava on the memory of the five objects of knowledge arising out of impressions inhering in the successive anuvyavasāya. From this it follows that the simultaneous cognition of this is not correct but apparent. If it (mind) is considered as all pervasive then we would not have the awareness of pleasure etc. due to not having the cause i.e., the connection between mind and self<sup>1</sup>.

---

1. "Vyāsaṅgadaśāyāmindriyānām svasveviśayasambandhe'pyekasmāt jñānam nānysmādityanubhavasiddhamato yasambandhānna yugapajjñānāni tadindriyasahakārikramena tadadhīṣṭāyakam manastadeva sukhādigrāhaka-miti tasya dharmnigrāhaka mānabādhitam vibhutvam".

It may be argued by the opponents that, if there is impossibility of simultaneous cognitions, the art-object in the form of dance which consists of various simultaneous actions arising out of different parts of the body like eye-brow, eyes, hands, legs etc. would not be perceived<sup>1</sup>. If there is impossibility of the simultaneity of actions, another problem would crop up. If it is so, there would not be the awareness of the particular happiness which is different from the happiness arising from other actions. In other words, there would be the impossibility of the awareness of a particular type of happiness which is originated through the happiness of each and every action as in the case of dance<sup>2</sup>.

The view, according to Gaṅgeśa, is not true. Just as someone wants to have sandal-wood due to having

---

1. "Kramotpāde ca bhrū-nayana-karacaranādīsakalasarīrāvayavanām yugapadvicitranānakarmasamūharūpaṃ nrtyaṃ na pratyakṣaṃ syāt."

Ibid - P. 782

2. "Tathāca pratyekakarmajanyasukhādīlakṣaṇasukhaviśeṣo nānubhūyetaṭi".

Ibid - P. 782

the desire of having it, cikīrsā (desire for doing) becomes the main factor in some action which can give us happiness. This action always comes from the effort originated through that particular desire (cikīrsā). Here the physical activity also comes from the effort existing in a place of atomic dimension originated from that particular desire. Effort is originated through the limitation of the desire of action. The physical movement is again originated through the effort limiting the particular body. In this way, twenty types of action may be originated simultaneously from the effort existing in an object of atomic dimension, the locus of the cikīrsā. In the same way, twenty types of action of fingers as in the case of dance arise out of the effort of twenty types due to having the same type of cikīrsā. The effort and action is to be understood according to particular desire<sup>1</sup>.

- 
1. "Sukhe candanādivat cikīrsaiva niyamikā yatkriyāyām cikīrsa sā kriyā taccikīrsājanyāt prayatnādbhavati. Tatra śarīrakriyāpi taccikīrsājanyādanumātradesādapi prayatnādbhavati. Athavā yasya kriyāyām cikīrsā tadavacchedena prayatna utpadyate tena śarīrāvacche-

The spirit of such argument is as follows. Each and every bodily activity is arising from a particular effort which is connected with a particular cikīrsā or desire. This desire or cikīrsā always comes from a place having atomic dimension and that which gives rise to a particular effort which again, in return, gives rise to a particular physical activity is called mind. Though twenty types of action are originated simultaneously from a place having atomic dimension i.e., mind where there is desire of twenty types. One mind having atomic magnitude cannot contain twenty types of desire simultaneously and hence, it contains successively the said quantity of desire giving rise to the said quantity of action. Hence, from the various types of activity as in the case of dance, the simultaneity of knowledge in mind cannot be proved and hence it is

---

denotṣannaprayatnādeva śarīrakriyā. Ayam vimśatikriyā cikīrsājanyādanumātradesādapi prayatnādvimśatikriyā yugapadutpadyante.”

of atomic nature<sup>1</sup>.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, mind which is one of the nine substances, possesses the qualities like number (saṅkhyā), dimension (parimāna) separateness (pr̥thaktva), conjunction (saṃyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), priority (paratva), posteriority (aparatva) and trace or impression (saṃskara)<sup>2</sup>.

Regarding the question whether mind is one or many to each body, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that due to the non-simultaneity of effort and knowledge mind

1. "Athavā aṅgulīvimśatikriyāyāṃ cikīrṣeti vimśatyavacchedena vimśati prayatnādvimśatikriyāhetava utpadyante, evaṃ nr̥tyādāvapi. Etaccikīrṣānuvidhānāt kriyāprayatnayoradhyavasāyam. Tadevamaṇu-~~nanah~~ siddhau...".

Ibid - pp. 782-783.

2. "Tasya guṇāḥ saṅkhyāparimānapr̥thaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatva-saṃskārah"

Prasastapādabhāṣyam - (Vārānasi-1963), P. 221.



is one in one body<sup>1</sup>. From this fact the quality like separateness is followed. If there were many minds, there would be a multiplicity of contact between self and mind and then the same person would have many cognitions and would achieve many actions at the same time<sup>2</sup>.

But it is a wellknown fact that the different cognitions and actions appear one after another but not simultaneously. That is to say, when a person is engaged in one cognition of one thing, he is desisted from other thing and when he is desisted from the former only then

- 
1. "Pratīsarīramēkam mana āhosvidanekamiti saṁśaye sati sūtrakṛtkaṁ - 'prayatnāyugapadyājñānāyugapadyācca pratīsarīramēkaṁ manah'iti. Tena pratīsarīrameka-  
tvam siddhyamiti".

Prasastapādabhāṣyam with Nyāyakandali.

PP. 221-222 (Vārānasi - 1963).

2. "Manobahutve hyātmamanahsamyogānāṁ bahutvādyugapajñānāni prayatnāśca bhaveyuh".

Ibid.

he gets cognition of the latter. In the same way, when a person achieves an effort in one direction, he is not able to act with another effort. He can do another action only when the former is over. From this single cognition and a single effort at a time the oneness of mind is proved<sup>1</sup>.

In some cases simultaneous cognition seems to be possible. Just as in the case of revolving of a fire-brand, the circle of fire is appeared to us, but it is actually a single flaming point which is rapidly revolving and through it such notion of simultaneous cognition is generated. In such cases, as a matter of fact, we

- 
1. "Drśyate ca kramo jñānānāmekopalambhavyāsaktena viśayāntarānupalambhād nivṛttavyāsaṅgena copalambhādityuktam. Evaṁ prayatnānāmapī kramotpāda eva, ekatra prayatamānasyānyatra vyāpārābhāvāt, samāptakriyasya ca bhāvāt, tasmādekam manah. Tasyaikatve khaṅgalveka evaikadā saṁyoga ityekameva jñānamekaḥ prayatna ityupapadyate".

Ibid.

perceive a gradual succession of efforts<sup>1</sup>.

The opponents may argue, in this regard, that how the cognitions like 'the trees are in flower' would be explained. Because in this case simultaneous cognition of two objects appear to us. Again how would the simultaneous actions of acceptance and transmission of one's body be explained<sup>2</sup>.

In response to the above, the Vaiśeṣikas opine that in the above case we have a single cognition comprising of a number of objects, which is technically

1. "Yastu kvacidyugapadabhimānastadalātacakravadaśubhāvāt, na tu tāttvikam yaugapadyamekatra dr̥ṣṭena kāryykramenānyatrāpi karanasya tasyaiva sāmārhānumānāt".

Ibid.

2. "Nanvevam tarhi dvāvimāvarthau puspitāstarava ityānekārthapratibhāsaḥ kutah ? Kutaśca svasarīrasya saha preranaadhāraṇe".

Ibid.

called samūhā-lamvanajñāna i.e., cognition in which the totality of some individual objects is revealed at a time. But when the cognition made distinct viz, the cognition of the flower and the tree, we do not have the cognition in the above form. Due to the separation of object cognition is also separated. In other words, when we look into the cognition of a particular individual object from the totality, the cognition of it becomes distinct from that of other objects. By applying the same logic the simultaneous efforts (i.e., the acceptance and transmission of an individual body) can be explained<sup>1</sup>.

---

1. "Arthasamūhālamvanasyaikajñānasyāpratiśedhād buddhibhede eva na tu tathā pratibhāsah, sarvasāmekaikārthanīyatatvāt. Evaṃ śarīrasya preranadhāraṇe ca prayatnaviśeṣādekasmādeva bhavatah".

Ibid.

It has already been discussed that the knowledge generally arises in self when it is associated with mind which is, again, associated with sense-organ and sense-organ is, again, associated with an object. (1) But there are some other cognitions <sup>which</sup> with are produced by mind without being associated with sense-organs. Dream-cognition is one of such cognitions. In other words, no external sense-organ can be an instrument of the knowledge of mental phenomenon like dream (svapna). Mind alone acts as an instrument to produce such cognition. Let us discuss how does dream occur and what role does the mind play in its occurrence.

According to Vaiśeṣikas, when our mind becomes free from the association of soul and enters into a special state of heart which is known as purītat, we become asleep (Susupti)<sup>2</sup>. But sometimes our sleep

---

1. "Ātmā manasā saṃyujyate, mana indriyena, indriyamārthena".

Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā, P. 231, Satkāriśarmā Edition.

2. "Yadā Manah purītat praviśati tadā susuptih".

Ibid, P. 201.

being disturbed by some bodily factors mind remains associated with that special state of heart as well as self. At this stage though the mind is completely free from the association of the external sense-organs, yet a kind of cognition, though invalid, arises from the mind which is described as dream<sup>1</sup>. Dream is occured due to the special type of contact between self and mind and latent impression (samkara) through the help of mind, the internal sense-organ. Knowledge of colour etc. cannot come under the purview of dream as at this stage mind is not associated with sense-organs like eye etc.<sup>2</sup>. Hence, the knowledge in the form of dream is produced in a non-existent object. The Vaiśeṣikas make a distinction between illusion and dream though both of them are invalid cognitions. They opine that in the case of illusion (viparyaya) the external sense-organs serve as a promoter (proyojaka).

---

1. Prasastapadabhāṣya, PP. 437-38, Edited by Gaṅganath Jhā.

2. "Jñānam svapna ityukte rūpādijñāne'tivyaṅgī, tannirāsārtham nidreṭi".

Jinabardhani Commentary on Sūtra no. 252 of Saptapadārthī, P. 76, Edited by Dr. J. S. Jetly.

But in the case of dream these external sense-organs have no function at all.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, there are three factors which cause the dream. The factors are : i) latent impression (saṃskāra), ii) defect of a humour of affection of the body (dhātudoṣa), and iii) unseen factor (adrsta) i.e., merit and demerit<sup>1</sup>. When sleep is disturbed by above three factors, cognition in the form of dream is produced. As for example, due to the latent impression an angry person sees that he is killing his enemy or a lustful person sees in a dream that he is embracing his lady-love<sup>2</sup>. The Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that dream is a determinable mental phenomenon with physiological

1. "Tattu tribidham - saṃskārapātavāt, dhātudoṣādadrstācca".

Prasastapādabhāṣya, P. 439, Edited by Gaṅganātha Jhā.

2. "Saṃskārapātavāt tāvat kāmī kruddho vā yadā yamartham priyatamām Śatruṃ vādrto-numanyamānaścintayan svapiti, tadā saiva cintāsantatiḥ smrtisantatiḥ saṃskārātīśayāt pratyakṣākāra sāksādarthavibhāsini sañjāyate".

Nyāyakandali on Prasastapādabhāṣya, P. 439,

Edited by Gaṅganātha Jhā.

determinants. That is to say, a particular dream is produced from a particular type of cause. Dream is also caused by the defect of a humour or affection of the body. The term 'humour' or 'affection' means wind (Vāta), bile (pitta) and phlegm (ślesmā)<sup>1</sup>. By the term 'dhātu' seven objects viz., brain, blood, flesh, fat, marrow of bones, bones and semen are to be understood. These objects preserve our body. The existence of wind, bile and phlegm in a limited dimension is also essential for our body. But these (wind, bile and phlegm) existing in our body become vitiated due to the vitiation of the seven objects (i.e., dhātu) like brain, blood etc. When the existence of wind becomes excessive in one's body, one sees that he is flying on the sky or he is afraid of tiger etc.<sup>2</sup>.

- 
1. "Sarīradhāranād dhātavo vasāṇnamāmsamedomajjāsthīśukrātmanah tesāṃ doṣād vātādiduṣitatvād viparyayo bhavatītyā na".

Nyāyakandālī on Prasastapādabhāṣya, P. 439,

Same Edition.

2. "Kiñcid dhātūnām vātapittaslesmānām doṣāt. Tatra vātadoṣādākāśagamanavasun - dharāparyatanavyāghrād haya-palayanadīni paśyati".

Upaskāra commentary on Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 9/2/7,

P. 414, Chowkhamba Edition.



Again, someone perceives the flash of lightening or a golden mountain etc., when the existence of bile becomes excessive in his body<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, when the existence of phlegm becomes excessive in someone's body, he perceives the mountain like the Himalayas, heavy rain, crossing the river or mountain covered by silver etc.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Vaisesikas, every produced object must have some cause. As Dream is a produced phenomenon, the causal explanation of dream has been given by the Vaisesikas. They opine that the unseen factor (adrsta) is the cause of dream. By unseen factor or 'adrsta' they mean to say the merit (dharmā) or demerit (adharma). Due to the impression caused by merit (dharmā) one sees the auspicious incidents like obtaining royal umbrella, ascending on elephant's back etc. Again, due to the impression caused by demerit (adharma) one sees the inauspicious incidents like ascending on the back of a ass,

---

1. "Pittopacayadosamahimnā vahnipraveśa-jvālālingana-kanakaparvate - vidyullatāvisphurana - digdāhādikam paśayati" - Upaskāra commentary on same sūtra.  
(Also Praśastapādabhāṣya, P. 440).

2. "Śleṣmādosaprayalyāttu samudra-santarāna-nadimajjena-dhārāsāravarsana-rajataparvatādi paśayati". Ibid.

falling in a dark well etc.<sup>1</sup> The unseen factors (i.e. merit and demerit) have got an important role in building one's character and personality. Hence, by explaining the particulars of dream (which is caused by unseen factors) of an individual, the character and the personality of the individual can be known. These unseen factors are preserved in mind. After analysing the dream which is caused through mind along with other factors like Adrsta, physiological disorder etc. one can know the physical and psychological conditions of an individual. If someone wants to know the historical background of an individual like what sort of person he is etc., it can be known from the analysis of dream an individual experiences. What type of Samkāra he possesses is known from what type of dream he sees. Moreover, the physiological disorder like excess of bile etc. is known or rather inferred from the analysis of dream. Hence, the

- 
1. "Yat svayamanubhūtesvananubhūtesu vā prasiddhārthesvaprāsiddhārthesu vā yacchubhāvedakam gajārohanachatralābhādi tatsarvamsamskāradharmābhyām bhavati".

Prasastapādabhāṣya, P. 440 (Same Edition).

therapeutic value of dream cannot be ignored. Hence, the dream - experience which is centred with mind.

Like dream all other forms of invalid cognition are also generated through the operation of mind. The Saṁsāra which is in the form: 'It is a man or trunk of a tree' may be produced through the help of many causes of which the mind is one. In the same way, illusory knowledge is also produced through mind. From this it appears that whatever cognition is attained it is due to the existence of mind. Hence, there is hardly any time when our mind is not operated.