

Synopsis of the chapter-II

Proofs for the existence of Mind

The existence of Mind is proved through inferential arguments forwarded by the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Schools of Philosophy.

Chapter-II

Proofs for the existence of Mind

Though mind is not an object of perception yet the existence of it can be inferred from the verbal usages of common people like 'My mind says that it would happen', 'I have no mental peace' etc. This belief of common people in the existence of mind (which is not based on blind faith) is indicated or pointed out through logical analysis by the Indian thinkers.

Let us discuss first how Gautama, the exponent of Nyāya Philosophy, tries to prove the existence of mind. In the Nyāya Sūtra No. 1.1.16 he says, "Yugapajjñānānutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam". That isto say, the sign by which the existence of mind is proved is the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. Here the term 'liṅga' is used in the sense of indicator (jñāpaka). Generally a dharmī (an object containing some properties) is known through the indicating signs (jñāpaka-dharma). Here

the property of being the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions (Yugapajñānānutpattikatva) is the dharma through which the dharminī i.e., mind is known. This proof may also be treated as an inferential one. In other words, the existence of mind can be proved with the help of following syllogistic argument.

"Manah sattāvat yugapajñānānutpattikatvāt".

That is, the mind is endowed with its existence or the mind is existent, as it is endowed with the property of being the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognition. Here pakṣa (minor term) is 'manas', sattā is the sādhya (major term or probandum) and 'yugapajñānānutpattikatva' is the hetu (probans). With the help of this hetu the existence of mind is inferred.

It is also said that one cannot have perceptual knowledge of two or three objects at a time due to the absence of mind¹. If sense-object-contact alone, without the help of mind, could result in cognition, there would

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have been simultaneous cognition¹. But in fact, it is not possible at all. Hence the existence of an object can be inferred as the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge. This instrumental cause must not have any part. Because, had there been any part of it, simultaneity of conjunction between different parts and sense-organs would have been possible and, as a result, there would have been simultaneity of cognitions. This instrumental cause which is also partless or atomic in character is called mind. This atomic character of mind ^{counteracts} ~~prevents~~ simultaneous cognition. Hence, though different sense-organs come in simultaneous contact with different objects yet the perceptual knowledge is possible only through that sense-organ which is endowed with mind². In some

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1. "Manah samyogānapeksasyahīndriyārtha-sannikarṣasya jñānahetutve yugapadutpadyeranjñānānīti".

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra 1, 1, 16.

2. "Yugapacca khalu ghrāṇādīnāṃ gandhādīnāṃca sannikarṣesu satsu yugapajjñānāni notpadyante. Tenānumīyate, asti tattadīndriyasamyogi sahakāri nimittāntaramavyāpi, yasyā'sannidhernoṭpadyate jñānaṃ, sannidheṣcotpadyata iti".

Ibid.

cases it seems to us that simultaneous cognitions of different objects appear at the same time through different sense-organs. According to Gautama, simultaneity of cognition in respect of different object is, in fact, due to swift fluctuations of the same mind. Hence, what apparently seems to be simultaneous cognitions is nothing but the result of different contacts between the mind and the different objects in several moments¹.

The above view of Gautama has not been accepted by all the systems of Indian Philosophy, Kumarila, the celebrated philosopher of Mimāṃsā school, puts forth a view which is opposite to that of the Naiyāyikas. According to him, mind is all-pervasive (vibhu) in character which, therefore, can come in simultaneous contacts with different sense-organs².

In order to refute the above view, Vātsyāyana, in his bhāṣya, mentions some other grounds to establish

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1. Nyāyadarśana (with Vātsyāyana bhāṣya), Vol. 3, Edited by Phanibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, pp. 404-405 (Pāścim Vaṅga Rājya Pustak Parsad, 1982).
 2. Ibid, Vol. 1, P. 223.

the existence of mind¹. One of these probans is pratibhā or intuition.

Pratibhā or intuition is such a wisdom having capacity to illumine the objects newly again and again, ("Prajñā navanavonmesasālinī prātibhā matā" - Sanskrit English Dictionary, V. S. Apte, P. 358, Motilal, 1973). Such type of knowledge has also been accepted by Dr. Gopināth Kavirāja, an eminent Indian thinker. According to him, the term 'pratibhā' means a flash and light which reveals objects. The light is 'the wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness'².

Dr. Kaviraj is of the opinion that our ordinary sense organs are not capable of knowing many things in the world. But the existence of these things cannot be denied though our sense organs fail to reveal them. Though it is not possible for us to know, for example,

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1. "Smṛtyanumānāgama-saṁśaya-prātibhā svapnajñānohāh
sukhādi-pratyakṣamicchādayasca mānaso liṅgāni".

Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra 1, 1, 15.

2. Gopinath Kaviraj : Aspect of Indian thought, PL.
University of Burdwan, 1984.

self, God, through our sense organs yet most of the systems of Indian philosophy accepted the existence of them and showed special significance in realising them¹. The knowledge of such objects come through supernormal perception which is called pratibhā. Perception through sense organs like eye etc. is called normal perception, while supernormal perception bears altogether a different meaning opposite to it, If supernormal perception is not at all possible then the term is of no use. So its usage proves its existence².

It has been said by the Naiyāyikas that the mind remains motionless at the time of susupti or dreamless sleep and at samādhi. At the time of samādhi mind stands face to face with the realities of all things. Such type of knowledge which is known through mind without the help of sense organs is called pratibhā. Yogins may increase the power of their sense organs through deep concentration or Yoga. Deep concentration is possible when mind stands face to face with self. If it is so the

1. Nyāvādarsana, Vol. 1, P. 224.

2. Ibid, Vol. 3, P. 320 (footnote)

ear can hear any sound produced anywhere and eye can visualise any object existing in any corner of the world. Such type of knowledge is also possible if mind be concentrated to the object of knowledge¹.

The Vaiśeṣikas opine that the merits of the past life or this life and the restraint (yama) and observance of rules are the causes of such knowledge. The restraint (yama) and observance of rules are nothing but putting chain in our mind. The restraint etc. may follow if someone has got control over his mind. From the activities like yama etc. the existence of mind can be inferred. Without admitting the existence of mind these phenomena cannot be explained².

According to the Naiyāyikas, yoga intuition is of two types. When a yogī who being eternally connected becomes aware of all things existing in past, present and future and can describe the state is called yukta. But a yogī who is not eternally connected but connected

1. Nyāya-Sūtra - IV/2/38-50.

2. Navonmesa (Gopinath Kaviraj Commemoration Volume),
Varanasi - 1987, PP. 58-64.

with them for the time being is called yuñjana¹. The first type of yoga ~~intuition~~ is possible for those who have adopted complete mastery over concentration and the second type of intuition is possible for those who have no such mastery rather have momentary concentration². Hence, considering all these Gautama also accepted the prātibhāñāna as an indicator for the existence of mind. Intuition or prātibhā is nothing but a faculty of mind. At this stage mind can attain the said supernormal power. This particular mental platform has been described by Sri Aurobindo as intuitive mind, which will be elaborately discussed afterwards.

The opponents may argue that there is no necessity to admit the existence of mind other than self. Because all grounds indicating the existence of self are

1. " ... Yogajo dvividhaḥ prokto yuktayunjanabhedatah"

Bhāṣā-Pariccheda Sūtra No. 65.

2. "Yuktasya sarvadā bhānaṁ, cintāśahakṛto'paraḥ"

Ibid, Sutra No. 66.

visayamiti"

padakanam hetunam manasi sambhavyateh, mano hi sarva-
parsanabhyamekarthagrahana - dityevamadimamaprat-
3. "Atmapratipattihetunam manasi sambhavat. 'Darsanas-

Nava-Sutra - 3/1/1.

2. "Darsanasparśanabhyamekartha-grahanat" -

Nava-Sutra - 3.1.15.

1. "Natmapratipatti-hetunam manasi sambhavat" -

According to the opponents, such type of acti-
vity which indicates the self can be applied to mind, as
mind itself can perceive all sorts of object³. Again, it
has been stated that the fact of recognition cannot be

the visual as well as tactual sense organs².
have the same knower who knows the same object through
tion is possible. It has also been stated that there must
the admission of a distinct self, the fact of recogni-
self can apprehend all sorts of objects and (2) only on
existence of self, are two : viz., (1) only a distinct
The grounds that are applicable for proving the

also applicable to mind¹.

explained, if the existence of self is not admitted. The fact of recognition can, according to the opponents, be explained with the help of mind which has been accepted by the Naiyāyikas as eternal. Hence, mind would be the cause of recognition of an object perceived earlier and the acceptance of the existence of the self is superfluous and unnecessary. So the opponents come to the conclusion against the Naiyāyikas that the self is not distinct from the mind¹.

But the above charge of the opponents has been rejected by the Naiyāyikas who opine that if the opponents want to use the word 'manas' for Ātman, the dispute would be mere terminological². But it is impossible to equate the internal sense organ with knower or the self. The internal sense organ is capable of cognising various kinds of objects for the agent who internally apprehends all sorts of objects with the help of this. If this be the case, the knower can be referred to as mind (but not as

1. Nyāyadarsana - Vol. 3, P. 63.

2. "Jñāturjñānasādhānopapattēh saṁjñābheda-mātram".

Nyāya Sūtra - 3/1/16.

self) and mind can be referred to as an instrument of the internal perception (but not as simply mind). Therefore, therein lies the terminological difference, But so far as the content is concerned, there is no dispute¹. Because, it is not possible to say that internal sense-organ is self. Just as the external sense-organs serve as the instruments in the case of knowledge in the form - "one sees with the visual sense" or "one smells with the olfactory sense", so also is necessary to assume the instrumentality of distinct internal sense-organs by which the perception of pleasure, pain etc. are possible. Thus, in short, mind is the only instrument for the knower in the perception of pleasure, pain etc. and hence it cannot

1. "Jñātuḥ khalu jñānasādhānānyupapadyante, cakṣuṣā paśyati, ghrāṇena jighrati, sparśanena sprśati, evaṃ mantūḥ sarvaviśayasya matīsādhānamantahkarāṇa- bhūtaṃ sarvaviśayaṃ vidyate yeṅyāṃ manyata iti ... tadidaṃ saṃjñābheda-mātram nārthe vivāda iti ...".

Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra - 3/1/16.

be identical with the knower, i.e., the self¹.

It may be argued by the opponents that it is superfluous to assume manas as an instrument for the perception of pleasure, pain etc. The manas itself is the agent that apprehends pleasure, pain etc. Hence, it is not a case of mere substitution of the term manas for ātman.

In response to this, Gautama answers that just as there are instruments for the perception of external objects like colour etc. so there must be an instrument for the internal perception of pleasure, pain etc. It is unproved that there is no need to assume an instrument for internal perception like pleasure etc.². For, the existence of different instrument for the apprehension of pleasure etc. should be admitted as they are different

1. ... "Rūpādibhyaśca viśayāntaram sukḥādayastadupalābdhau karanāntarasadbhāvah ... yacca sukḥādyupalābdhau karanam, tacca jñānāyauḡapadyaliṅgam ... tatra yadukta 'ātmapratipattihetunām manasi sambhava' diti tadayuktam".

Ibid.

2. "Niyamaśca niranumānah" - Nyāya Sūtra - 3/1/17.

from objects like colour etc. Thus, a separate instrument in the form of the olfactory sense organ is admitted, because smell cannot be apprehended by the visual sense organ. Similarly, a separate instrument in the form of the gustatory sense-organ is admitted, because taste cannot be apprehended either by visual or olfactory sense-organ¹. By applying the same logic, it can be said that there must have a distinct instrument for internal perception like pleasure etc. because pleasure etc. are not apprehended by the visual and other external sense-organs. Hence, the existence of mind can be inferred² and the form

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1. "Rupādibhyasca viṣayāntaram̐ sukhādayastadupalabdḥau karaṇāntarasadbhāvah. Yathā, Cakṣuṣā gandho na grhyante iti, karaṇāntaram̐ ghrānam̐, evaṁ cakṣurghrānābhyām̐ raso na grhyata iti karaṇāntaram̐ rasanam̐ evaṁ śeṣeṣvapi".

Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on Sūtra - 3/1/17.

2. "Tathā cakṣurādibhiḥ sukhādayo na grhyanta iti karaṇāntareṇa bhavitavyam̐, tacca jñānāyugaḥpadyalingam̐, Yacca sukhādyupalabdḥau karaṇam̐, tacca jñānāyugaḥpadyalingam̐, tasyendriyamindriyam̐ prati sannidherasannidheśca na yugaḥpajjñānānyutpadyanta iti, tatra yadukta 'mātmapratipattihetūnām̐ manasi sambhava'diti tadayuktam̐".

Ibid.

of the syllogistic argument would be as follows :

"Sukhādi-pratyakṣam indriyajanyam
Kṛtakatvāt rūpadipratyaksavat".

That is, the perception of pleasure, pain etc. must be due to an instrument, because these are caused, just as the perception of colour etc. So self cannot be identical with mind, the instrument of internal perception. Only the self (but not the mind) can reveal past, present and future object simultaneously¹.

Again, if the mind is identical with self, knowledge will have to be considered as the quality of mind. But the quality of something having atomic magnitude can never be perceived. If knowledge is assumed as the quality of mind then the knowledge in the form of recognition cannot be explained. Because mind being atomic in character cannot be the locus of such impressions (samskāra)².

In the light of the above argument mind is inferred as distinct from self.

1. Nyāyadarśana, Vol. 3, Edited by Phanibhūṣaṇa
Tarkavagīśa, P. 68.

2. Ibid.

Now, the arguments given by the Vaiśeṣikas in favour of proving the existence of mind are being reviewed. According to them, manas is a kind of universal which exists in all the individual manifestations of mind and this is the thing which can be inferred as existing in other places. In individual manifestations (of an object) which have got the same activity and the same quality there is the existence of a kind of Sāmānya. E.g., the ghatātva exists in all types of ghata. Because the causal efficacy or quality of all types of ghata are of same type. All individual manifestations of mind are having the activities of same ^{type} ~~qualities~~. Therefore, there is one type of sāmānya which is called superior type of universal.

If mind does not exist, the question of the determination of the nature of mind will not arise. Hence, it is proposed to prove the existence of mind in the following way¹.

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1. Manastvaṁ nāma sāmānyam manovyaktīnām bhede sthite satyanumeyam. Yā hi samānagunakāryyā vyaktayastāsu param sāmānyam dr̥ṣṭam yathā ghaṭādiṣu, samānagunakāryyāśca manovyaktayastasmāttāsu parasāmānyayogaḥ. Asiddhe manasi tasya dharmanirūpanamanyāyāyāmiti matvā tasya sadbhāve pramānamāha-satyapyātmendriyārthasānnidhe iti" - Prasastapādabhāṣyam with Nyāyakandali - (Vārānasi - 1963).

The self is such an entity which is connected with all types of indriyas simultaneously. The sense-organs are in contact with the objects which are in proximity with these. In spite of this one object is known but another is unknown. In other words, the contact of the self with the sense organs and sense organs with the objects sometimes produce knowledge and sometimes do not. The knowledge of other object as well as the knowledge of happiness etc. are not known at the same moment. After the cessation of one type of knowledge, another type of knowledge arises. From this experience it can be said that only the contact of the self with sense-organs and sense-organs with the objects cannot be the causes of knowledge. If it would be the cause of knowledge then knowledge must be occurred by such contact in every case. For this reason, it may be inferred that there must be some sense-organ other than the external ones like eye etc. through the contact of which the knowledge is possible¹.

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1. "Ātmanastāvatsarvendriyairyugapatsambandho 'styeva, indriyāṇāmapī sannihitairartheḥ sannikarṣo bhavati, tathāpyekasmin viśaye pratīyamāṇe viśayāntare jñānasukhādayo na bhavanti, taduparamācca

Here, Śrīdhara in his commentary known as Nyāya-kandali on Prasastapādabhāṣya has adopted the method of agreement and difference (Anyaya-Vyatireka) for proving the existence of mind. If something follows from the presence of something (tatsattve tatsattā) and something does not follow from the absence of something (tadasattve tadasattā) then there is the method of agreement and difference which is very much essential for determining the causal relation between two objects.

There is a special type of cause due to which the knowledge or the knowledge of happiness etc. arises and due to the absence of which the knowledge or the knowledge of happiness etc. does not arise. Therefore, the contact of the sense-organs with object and the contact of the sense-organ with self is always dependent with another special

bhavanti dr̥śyate, taddarśanādāt̄mēndriyār̄thasannikarṣebhyaḥ karaṇāntaramanumīyate yasya sannidhānā-jnānasukhādīnām utpattih, asannidhānāccānutpattih, Ātmēndriyār̄thasannikarṣāḥ kāryyotpattau karaṇāntarasāpekṣāḥ, satyapi sadbhāve kāryyānutpādakatvāt tantvādivat, yacca tadapekṣānīyaṁ tanmanah".

Ibid.

cause which plays a vital role in producing an action.

As self is all-pervasive in character so it can come in contact with all sense-organs at a time and sense-organs can come in contact with those objects that are not far from them. Though the contact of the sense organ with object and the contact of the sense-organ with self exist, there does not arise any effect just as from the thread alone cloth is not produced. The object on which the production of some object depends is called 'mind'. Here object means the knowledge or the knowledge of happiness etc.

In continuation with the above argument one problem may be raised. When an object is cognized, then what may be the proof behind the existence of the contact of sense organs with other objects that are not at all cognized¹?

In reply, it may be said that the locus of the sense-organ is the proof for this. When our eye is appre-

1. "Ekārthopalabdhi-kāle 'nupalabhyamānasyāpyarthānta-rasyendriyasannikarṣe 'stīti kim pramāṇam"?

Ibid.

hending colour then there is the relation of smell of that object with nose at the same time. Because the smell exists in proximity with the nose¹.

Now, Vaiśeṣikas are going to put forward another argument in this connection. According to them, memory is due to some sense-organ just like the knowledge of smell. The cause of memory etc. is not the auditory sense-organ etc. Because in the case of deaf person the knowledge in the form of memory arises though there is no function of auditory sense-organ. It is proved from this that auditory sense-organ is not the cause of it. In this way, the visual sense-organ cannot be the cause of memory etc. Therefore, there must be some cause in the form of sense-organ which is called mind².

1. "Indriyādhiṣṭhānasannidhireva. Rūpopalabdhi-kāle gandhādayo 'pi ghrāṇādibhiḥ sannikṛsyante, tadadhi-
sthānasannihitatvādupalabhyamānagandhādivat". - Ibid.

2. "Pramāṇāntaramapyāha-śrotrādyavyāpāre smṛtyutpattida-
rśanāditi. Smṛtistāvadindriyajā jñānatvād gandhā-
dijñānavat, na cāsyāḥ śrotrādīni karaṇāni, ...". - Ibid.

The foregoing grounds are not enough for inferring the existence of mind. So another type of inference has been mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas. With the help of visual sense-organ i.e., with the external sense organ the knowledge of happiness etc. cannot be known. Because external sense organ can reveal only the objects like colour etc. As the happiness etc. cannot come under the purview of the external sense organ, it may be caused by another sense organ which is other than the external one. It is called mind¹.

As the eye etc. have nothing to do with the feeling of happiness etc. so different type of sense-organ i.e., mind is to be admitted.

But objection has been raised by the opponents who are of the opinion that the happiness etc. or the knowledge of happiness etc. are in the form of knowledge.

1. "Na kevalam pūrvasmātkārenāt karanāntarānumānam
vāhyendriyaiscakṣurādibhirgrhītānām sukhādīnām
rūpādyapeksayā grāhyāntarānām bhavācca tadanumā-
namityāha - vāhyendriyairiti Sukhādipratītirindriyajā,
aparokṣapratītitvād rūpādipratītitvat, yacca tadindriyam
tanmanah, cakṣurādīnām tatra vyaparābhavāt" - Ibid.

As other knowledge are attained with the help of external sense organ, the knowledge of happiness may also be attained by the same. There is no necessity for looking into another type of cause other than external sense organ¹.

But the above standpoint is not tenable. Because if it is accepted that the happiness is nothing but the nature of knowledge or knowledge of happiness is nothing more than knowledge itself then there will be no distinction between happiness and misery. But it is known from our practical experience that happiness and misery are not of same type. If they are distinguished then both cannot be described as knowledge.

Though happiness and misery are of the nature of knowledge yet they are completely different. Because both happiness and misery can give us a different kind of feeling.

It cannot be said that the knowledge of

1. "Abhinnakāraṇatvājjñānātmakāḥ sukhādayaḥ sukhasamvedanāni (ca) na kāraṇāntareṇa gṛhyante iti". - Ibid.

happiness and the knowledge of misery always depend on the Viñāna. Because when Viñāna is associated with object then it can give rise to the knowledge of happiness and misery. When this Viñāna is associated with desire or Vāsanā then the knowledge of happiness and misery arises. Otherwise there would have been no room for upeksābuddhi¹. Upeksābuddhi is a kind of action which does not give one happiness or misery. It is a balanced type of action which neither gives pleasure nor misery. And when this Viñāna is associated with Vāsanā or desire then the question of happiness or misery arises, otherwise all type of knowledge would remain as indifferent.

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1. "Jñānasvabhāvatve sukhaduḥkḥayorviśeṣaprasaṅgāt. Parāsparabhede ca na tayorjñānātmakatā, bodhākārasyobhayasādhāranatve'pi sukhaduḥkḥākārayoḥ parāsparavyavṛttatvāt. Na cānayoṛviñānābhinnahetujatvān, jñānasyārthākārādutpattēh, tasmācca vāsanāsahāyāt sukhaduḥkḥayorutpādāt, anyathopeksājñānābhāvaprasaṅgāt". - Ibid.

The word 'antahkarana' is used for 'manas' or mind in the Advaita Philosophy. According to Advaitins, mind or antahkarana is not a fundamental substance as it is not an independent reality like Ātman or self. Though there is diversity of opinion among the Advaita Vedāntins regarding the nature and function of antahkarana or mind yet it is true that the existence of it has been admitted by all. Let us discuss how the Advaita Vedāntins try to prove the existence of mind or antahkarana.

Śaṅkarācārya, commentator of Brahma sūtra and founder of Advaita school, gives some arguments in favour of the existence of mind or antahkarana. He says that if the self, the sense-organs and the objects - these three factors always lead to knowledge then knowledge is possible for all time or not. Because these three factors always present to co-operate together. But inspite of having the above three factors sometimes we get knowledge and sometimes we do not. So, according to Śaṅkara, it is necessary to admit one more factor other than previous three and this factor is called antahkarana or mind¹. One can get knowledge of an object only when

1. "Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhi prasāngo'nyataraniyamo vā'nyathā."

such type of antahkarana i.e., mind accompanies with the other three factors and cannot get when there is the absence of such relation. So it is proved that apart from the self (ātman) and external organs there is the existence of antahkarana or mind.

It is found that the argument by which Sāṅkara proves the existence of mind is similar to the 'method of agreement and difference' i.e., Anvaya-vyatirekī. The definition of it is as follows :-

'Tatsattve tatsattā and tadasattve tadasattvā'.

The existence of mind is also proved through testimony in the form of Śruti. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad we find some arguments in favour of the existence of mind. There it has been said "I was absentminded, I did not see it", "I was absentminded, I did not hear it"¹. So it is obvious that through the mind one sees and hears etc. Upaniṣad again says that desire, deliberation, doubt,

1. "Anyatramanā Abhūvaṁ nādarsamanyatramanā abhūvaṁ nāśrausaṁ manasā hyeṣa paśyati manasā śṛnoti".

Bṛha. Upaniṣad - 1/5/3.

faith, want of faith, patience, impatience, shame, intelligence and fear - all these are the different modes of the mind¹. Even one's eyes are closed, and is touched by a person from behind, one can realise the person doing so with the help of one's mind. Such is the power of mind.

Śaṅkara, in supporting the above text, says that perception cannot take place inspite of the connection between the external organ, the object and the self. It is seen from our practical experience that sometimes we do not see an object which is proximate to our sense-organ ~~and which has got visibility~~. From this fact it is clear that apart from the relation between external sense-organ, the object and the self there is something involved in conveying the knowledge of an object. This is nothing but internal sense-organ called antahkarana or mind which is the illuminer of the object. If mind is not in operation then the sense-organs having no power to illumine will be of no use. But the sense-organ being associated

1. "Kāmah saṅkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā'śraddhā dhṛtirdhṛ-
tirhīrdhīrbhīrityetaṭ sarvaṃ mana eva tsmādapī
prsthata upasprsto manasā vijānāti"

with mind can reveal the object.

It has been described in Kausītakī Upaniṣad that sense-organ can reveal objects only with the help of prajñā, a superior form of mind. For the absence of prajñā in the form of mind, we cannot know other's name, our nose cannot grasp smell, our eye cannot receive colour, our ear cannot hear sound, our tongue cannot taste food. Not only the sense-organs our head being devoid of mind cannot do actions, our body is not able to express happiness etc.¹

Again, it has been said in the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad that "Mind is Brahman, one cannot attain liberation who has no mind²".

1. "Na hi prajñāpetā vānāma kiñcana prajñāpayet. Anyatra me mano 'bhūḍityāha. Nāhametannāma prajñāsisamiti. Na hi prajñāpetah prāno gandham kiñcana prajñāpayet. Anyatra me mano 'bhūḍityāha. Nāhametaṁ gandham prajñāsisam itī ... Na hi prajñāpetā dhīh kācana sidhet. Prajñātavyaṁ prajñāpetā".

Kausītakī Upaniṣad - 3/7.

2. "Mano vai Brahmeti amanaso hi kim syāt".

Bṛha. Upaniṣad - 4, 1, 6.

According to Vidyāranya, the author of Pañcadaśī, mind which is situated within the lotus - heart is the ruler of the ten organs (i.e., five sense-organs and five organs for actions). But if the existence of mind is not admitted, the relation between external objects and ten organs can never be established. Hence, mind, being an internal organ (antahkarana), establishes such relation. That is, mind is the medium which, remaining in between them, connects them together. Otherwise the external sense-organs would have no capacity to reveal the objects¹.

In the Pañcadaśī it has also been said that antahkarana or mind is such an agent which points out the merit and demerit of an object and then sense-organs give us such knowledge. That is, when the respective object is in contact with the sense-organ, we can find out that what is right or wrong or good or bad. Such type of moral values can be considered only by mind. The self

1. "Mano dasendriyādhyakṣaṃ hrtpadme golake sthitam
Taccāntahkaranaṃ Vāhyesvasvātantryādvinendriyaiḥ".

(ātman) is the knower. So the self is not able to find out merit and demerit of an object. Sense-organs like eye etc. are also incapable of doing, so. Because they can give us only the knowledge of colour, sound etc. So the question immediately arises what the cause of knowing merit and demerit of an object is, as such type of knowledge is not caused by the self and sense-organs. The author of Pañcadaśī, in this regard, opines that mind is the cause of knowing the moral and social values of objects e.g., good or bad, right or wrong etc. That is our mind tells us the rightness and wrongness of an object. That which is connected with our well-being or non-well-being is known through it. In other words, the faculty by which the act of discrimination is possible is called mind¹. In this way, the existence of mind has been proved.

Vidyāranya again says that renunciation, forgiveness, broadness, desire, anger, lazyness, illusion

1. "Akṣeṣvarthārpitesvetadgunadoṣa vicāraḥ
Sattvaṃ rajastamaścāsyā gunāvitrīyate hitaiḥ".

etc. belong to different state of mind. Though it is said that renunciation etc. are the qualities of nature but these qualities always belong to mind, not to body. When we say that a man possesses the qualities like renunciation, broadness, forgiveness etc, we mean to say that his mental state belongs to such qualities. These qualities are nothing but the production of sattva gunas. Desire, anger, greed - these qualities are nothing but the production of raja gunas. When a man possesses these raja qualities, his mental state actually belongs to these qualities¹.

Lazyness, illusion, drowsiness etc. are originated from the Tama quality of mind. When mind is guided by sattva qualities, merit is acquired but demerit is produced when our mind is guided by raja qualities².

1. "Vairāgyam ksāntiraudāryamityādyāssattvasambhavāḥ
Kāmakrodhau lobhayatnāvityādyā rajasotthitah".

Ibid, Kārikā No. 14.

2. "Ālasyam bhrāntitandrādyā Vikāṣtamāsoththitāḥ
Sāttvikaih punyanispattiḥ pāpotpattiḥcarājasaiḥ".

Ibid, Kārikā No. 15.

In this way the Naiyāyikas as well as Advaitins have proved the existence of mind. If their arguments are analysed, it will reveal that all the arguments are of inferential nature, though sometimes the Sruti texts like Upanisad etc. are quoted in favour of its existence. After explaining some activities it has been tried to show that without the existence of mind there activities are not possible. All these syllogistic arguments may be described as Śesavat inference. When the cause is inferred after observing some effects, it is an inference of Śesavat-type. In this case also, the cause i.e., mind is inferred after seeing many effects like non-simultaneity of knowledge, fear, doubt etc.