

Synopsis of the points made and discussed in

CHAPTER III

The Nyāya Rejoinder

Criticism of the Buddhist concepts of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa that are related to the Buddhist theory of perception and inference respectively.

- A) Criticism and refutation of the Buddhists definition of perception.
- B) Refutation of the theory of momentariness leading to the refutation of the concept of svalakṣaṇa.
- C) Establishment of Sāmānya and refutation of the view of the Buddhists.

## SECTION A

It should be in fairness to discuss how the Nyāya thinkers would have responded to the Buddhist critique of the cognitive process and its critical apparatus.

In the preceding chapters, we have discussed in details, how the Buddhists have explained their theory of knowledge, the sources of knowledge, the objects of knowledge etc.

According to the Buddhists, perception is Kalpanā-podham. Kalpanā is the activity of thought by which a name is given to the object. Abhilāpasamsargayogya pratibhāsa pratitih kalpanā.

It is the knowledge which is capable of connection with words. Perception does not apprehend the qualification of the objects, such as generality substantiality quality, action and name (i.e. jāti, dravya, guna, karma, nāma) but simply grasps the specific individuality of the object, its svalakṣaṇa. Sajātiya vijātiyaparāvrttai svalakṣanam (Nyāya Manjarī). The real with which we come into contact is inexpressible, and what we express has for its province concepts. The object of perception is the unique, the particular, and the momentary; the object of inference is the typical, the universal and

the lasting. Metaphysical presuppositions, for both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas are totally different. According to Dinnāga, all real knowledge non-conceptual, for the Naiyāyiks, universals are as real as the particulars in which these subsist by the relation of samavāya.

Buddhists, being thorough going empiricists, have judged everything on the perceptual basis. They do not believe in Śruti (testimony) like the Naiyāyikas. In early Buddhism and even in later Buddhism analysis of experience and an understanding of the concept of man have remained constant. From the earliest time, man has been conceived, as a complex of Kāya and viññāna. Buddhist theory of consciousness has an empirical basis. Perception is regarded as one of the four aspects of empirical consciousness. Hence the importance of perception in Buddhist's analysis of empirical knowledge.

The distinction, which the Naiyāyiks have made within perception, as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka has not been accepted by the Buddhists. They do not include the Savikalpaka or determinate perception within perception as such. According to them, this cannot be termed as perceptions but it comes within the realm of inference. But for the Naiyāyikas Savikalpaka pratyakṣa depends on nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, that these two are only the two

grades of perception. Unless we know the 'that' (nirvikalpaka stage) of an object we won't be able to know the 'what' (Savikalpaka stage) of the same object. Perception does not only mean sense-object contact but that it is something more than that. And this is its special characteristic. For the Buddhists, there are certain ontological presuppositions and the doctrine of momentariness is one of them. Perception, for them, is only momentary; the momentary object is the only reality. Therefore, the object of perception, the particulars, Svalaksana are the only reality. That which is capable of evoking mental image is the object of perception and particulars can only serve that purpose. Universals are incapable of evoking images, since they are themselves thought construction Svalaksanas, the unique particulars, which are the objects of perception are always uncategorized.

As against the definition of pratyakṣa offered by Dharmakīrti, the Naiyāyikas have raised significant objections -

a) What does the word perception denote? If it denotes perceptual cognition, how is it then perception is not spoken of by a name? (This is the first, differentium in in the definition). And if it does not denote 'perceptual cognition' this word (perception) is meaningless. (But

the definition includes the word).

It may be said that the word perception denotes some general (unspecified) thing. But it may be asked, is this generic, something other than 'perceptual cognition' or same as the 'perceptual cognition'. If it (generic thing) is other than the perceptual cognition, the 'perceptual cognitions' remains undefined. And if it is (generic thing) the same as the perceptual cognition, how is it, then, that perceptual cognition is not the same ?

b) If the expression 'free from determination' (in the definition Kalpanāpoḍham) is meant to denote 'perceptual cognition' the definition becomes self contradictory. This is because 'perceptual cognition is defined as that which is not named and yet it is named 'free from determination'. And if 'perceptual cognition' is not denoted by the expression 'free from determination' this expression becomes futile as a definition of perceptions.

c) The definition, e.g., perception is that which is free from determination, may be accepted as a form of sentence. But then, what is it that is denoted by the sentence ? If it is perception, that is denoted by it (sentence) there is again the same self contradiction.

d) The Buddhist may say that the expression 'free from

determination' means that specific individuality of a thing cannot be determined or spoken of. According to them, every object has a distinctive form of its own but the distinctive form is purely negative; e.g. the specific individuality of a cow consists in the negative of the not-cow, which is called 'apoha'. But Vdyotkare has pointed out that this is not practicable because the specific individuality of things is indeterminate something which cannot be definitely grasped and spoken of. The main point is that according to the Naiyāyikas, every object has two forms - general and specific and so every cognition also has these two forms which can be grasped by both the indeterminate and the determinate perception.

Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti accept the genuineness of the object in perception. But they ignore the fact as to how mind interprets the objects given to the sense. Their theory of perception is therefore, indefinite and indeterminate. But perception is really definite, determinate and meaningful.

The definition of perception as given by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti is self-contradictory. This is because on the one hand, they regard perception as indeterminate and indefinite, and on the other hand, they try to determine and define that which is indeterminate and indefinite.

If we analyze the perceptual process, we find that in

perception there must be both objective and subjective factors. The objective factors are the sensation received when the objects are presented to the sense. The subjective factors are the concepts such as name class etc. which are supplied by the mind.

Now, perception means a synthesis of sensations and the concepts, such as name, class etc.

The Buddhists accept the objective factors in perception, but they reject the subjective factors involved in it. Thus, they rule out the possibility of determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa), because this perception depends on the synthesis of both the factors. The Buddhists, however are contented to accept the reality of indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) which is dependent on the objective factors in perception or on the sensation given to us. Perception is not completed without these two grades of perception, and so the Naiyāyikas try to refute the Buddhist theory of perception vehemently. The Naiyāyikas define perception as - indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadesyam avyabhicāri Vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam. Their definition of perception includes both the nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Jayanta, in his Nyāya-Manjari has critically pointed out the inconsistencies which follows if we accept the Buddhist's theory of perception. According to the

Buddhists, a determinate perception always grasps an imaginary object, but Jayanta has pointed out, this, to be totally an erroneous view. An object, if it is expressible in words, cannot be said to be imaginary. Word reveals the very same object which is revealed by an indeterminate perception, thus it cannot be unreal. As an indeterminate perception is brought about by a sense organ, so a subsequent perception (i.e. a determinate perception) is also generated by a sense organ, since in both cases their causal relation is determined by means of the joint method of agreement and difference. Even if Buddhists doctrine of universal flux is admitted, it can be said that the object which is grasped by a determinate perception is the same as is sensed by the preceding indeterminate perception, though these two objects are not numerically identical, yet they are the same in the sense that they belong to one and the same series.

Buddhists might argue that since the determinate perception cognizes the same object which has been cognized by the indeterminate perception, therefore it does not give us anything new, but only repeats the same thing. Therefore, determinate perceptions is totally insignificant. But as against this, Jayanta has pointed out that novelty does not constitute the criterion of true knowledge. Even if a piece of knowledge apprehends a cognized object, then it is not benefited of its property of truth.



He also points out that the falsehood of an awareness consists in mistaking one thing for another. A determinate perception is not a case of mistake because a mistake is detected when it is contradicted. But we find no such judgements as contradicted the five kinds of imaginative judgements (Kalpanā) which has been described by the Buddhists. For the Naiyāyikas, a determinate perception results in a synthetic judgement. Indeterminate perception cannot apprehend an exclusively particular point of reality which is distinct from all sorts of homogeneous and heterogeneous objects, because then its immediate successor, a judgement of imagination cannot have a universal as its content all of a sudden. A determinate perception should always imitate the form of an indeterminate perception. Even the Naiyāyikas say that there is no qualitative difference also between a determinate and an indeterminate perception but only two stages of perception. They also suggest that all cases of indeterminate perception are true but some cases of determinate perception are wrong, not all, as the Buddhists say. A piece of knowledge is not falsified unless and until it is cancelled by another piece of knowledge. But if it is held that everything in this universe has only momentary existence, then a piece of knowledge cannot be annulled by another piece of knowledge.

## SECTION B

As has been pointed out again and again in the previous chapters, that the whole philosophy of Buddhism is based upon some ontological presuppositions - one of them is the doctrine of momentariness or ksanikavāda. If the doctrine of momentariness is granted then all the conclusions which logically follows from it must also be granted. This is the reason why Vācaspati and Udayana try to reject the doctrine as an unproved assumption.

In the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists, the ksana or moment means the minutest part of the time. In perception we have the awareness of the object only. We know only the 'this' of the object. It is indeterminate, nirvikalpaka. As given in Sarvadarsana samgraha and Nyāya bindu<sup>1</sup> - "unqualified perception is stripped of character and unerring qualification is an accretion since it disagrees with appearance of the thing. For the object (in perception) has the thing itself as the means by which it is validly cognized, apprehension in any other way than this (i.e. apprehension not immediately derived from the thing) is not reality and is not proof - neither proof by testimony nor by inference nor by perception".

But Vācaspati Mīśra in his Nyāya vārtikatātparvatikā has said that "There is no thought known to experience which is without correspondence with a word, the whole of

knowledge is as it were pierced and threaded with words<sup>2</sup>". That is, words and thoughts are inseparable. But as Dinnāga points out that there is a moment in perception separable from all use of language<sup>3</sup>. Thus according to the Buddhists, it is found that only nirvikalpaka is valid and not Savikalpaka. That nirvikalpaka is valid in the ultimate sense of savikalpaka is valid only in the empirical sense. Perception is kalpanārahita and that the knowledge of Kalpanā constitutes savikalpaka i.e. all thought determinations are illusory as not immediately given. The word nirvikalpaka has been used by both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas in different senses, because the Buddhas understand by it perception free from all vikalpas while the Naiyāyikas use it, as perception of unrelated vikalpas.

Dharmakīrti, in his Nyaya-bindu says<sup>4</sup> - The object of perception is the Svalaksana. The svalaksana is that through the proximity to and remoteness from which differences in the cognitive appearances arise. It alone is ultimately real since competency for action is the definition of real thing. Other objects are sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Such is the object of inference. Svalaksana thus means - 'own unique character' or being. A reality has a unique being and it has also a common character. The unique character is the cognized object (grāhya) in the case of

perception. Dharmottara says<sup>5</sup> - that the object (visaya) of a pramāna is two fold - either the object of apprehension (grāhya) or the object of acquisition, endeavour or activity (prāpaniya). The object apprehended in perception is the single moment, but this cannot be the object of endeavour or achievement - the prāpaniya of perception is not the single moment but the series of moments (which, of course, is unreal). He added that in inference, on the other hand, the object apprehended (grāhya) is an unreality (anartha); but this unreal is illusorily imposed on real (āropita) and is conceived of as svalaksana; the svalaksana, thus 'supposed', being the object of activity. All the inferred objects depend on the subject - attribute relation imposed by thought and has no reference to the existence or non-existence of external things.

Thus, it is clear from the above exposition that the Real is momentary. The following are the arguments which the Buddhists have given in favour of their doctrine of momentariness.

1) They have identified existence with causal efficiency whatever is existent is momentary. Existence means the capacity of fulfilling some purpose (artha-kriyā-kāritva) i.e. producing some effect. This is because whatever produces some effect is existent; e.g. the seed produces

a sprout; and again whatever does not produce any effect is non-existent, e.g. here's horn.

ii) The momentariness of objects is proved by the instance of the body<sup>6</sup>. The same person has quite different bodies in the different stages of his life. This means that one's body in childhood is replaced by a new one in youth and so on. All this is possible only through a continuous process of creation and destruction in the body, which, in other words, implies that the body goes on changing every moment and the latter ones are different from the previous ones.

The Buddhists argue that a permanent entity is inconsistent with production of effects<sup>7</sup>. The permanent entity cannot exist since its various effects cannot be produced either successively or simultaneously. A real object, the seed for instance, is to produce its effect, viz. a sprout, either in succession or simultaneously, there being no third alternative. If the seed is admitted to be permanent, it cannot be the cause of a sprout because in that case, there being no difference between a seed in the barn and a seed in the field; a sprout may spring even from a seed in the barn.

According to the Naiyāyikas, with the help of different cooperating or auxiliary causes (sahakārin) like earth, water and others, the seed can produce the effect.

But this is not possible because, if a permanent entity has the capacity to produce some effect, it can produce the desired effect anywhere, - the seed can produce the sprout not only in the field but also in the barn. If it is not really capable it can never produce a sprout - just like a piece of atom-even when the cooperating causes are present.

The concept of cooperating causes is without any basis. The seed alone is the cause of the sprout. The seed, in the immediately preceding moment of the production of a sprout is characterized by a specific property (jāti Viśeṣa) in the form of efficiency for an effect (kurvad-rūpatva). The seed which is in the barn is without such a property and hence no sprout is produced there as against the seed which is in the field, and is characterized by such a property.

Thus the seed exists only for a moment in order to produce the sprout. There is no permanent seed, but only a stream of seeds each seed of which lasts for only one moment and is destroyed immediately after its production. In the same way it can be proved that all the existent objects produce their effects in succession only because they are momentary.

This doctrine of momentariness has been refuted by all the Naiyāyikas. Udayana in his Nyāya-kusumānjali has

devoted two verses (verse no. 16 and 17) towards refuting the Buddhists doctrine of momentariness and the concept of perception as savikalpaka is employed by both the wings - Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas, of course with different connotations. Udayana mentions the Buddhists view as Kṣaṇabhangavāda as opposed to the views of the Cārvākas. Haridāsa suggests the kṣaṇabhangavāda to be the sine-quo-non (defining feature) of the Buddhists point of view. The intention of this point of view is to arouse detachment among the followers of Buddha. The question of how the Buddha perceived (so it was generally held) realities beyond ordinary perception remained difficult and controversial. It was generally accepted that people who attained an exceptional degree of detachment and purity through the practice of the way, gained a greater clarity in their perceptions and eventually gained the mental perception of ultimate realities of the real nature of the universe which could not be seen at the every day concealing level. This was a kind of intention of the universe as it really is as opposed to the superficial appearance. The Buddhist logicians regarded it as a special variety of perception as a means of knowledge. The doctrine of momentariness can be said to have arisen from the noble truths of Buddha. It should be noted that Kṣaṇabhangavāda is at once an ontological doctrine and the Buddhists theory of perception is geared in such a way so

as to exemplifying the ontological state of happenings. This point can be appreciated by taking into account the following example - "ghatah kṣanikah sattvāt". The pot is momentary because such is its nature. The statement quoted is an anumāna vākya. It can be derived only if there is available such a Vyāpti as, yat sat tat kṣanikam and instantiation of the Vyāpti may be had in the case of the cloud formation (meghamālā). Hence if the given argument is valid, then the predication of the momentariness of things may be taken as established. It is important to note that the term 'sat' as used by the Buddhists bears a different connotation from that of the Naiyāyikas.

According to the Naiyāyikas, existence has been assimilated with jāti. That is sattvā sāmānya yogitvam sattam. Obviously the Buddhists could not accept this definition of 'sat' as given by the Naiyāyikas. For whom, sāmānya or jāti is a kind of nitya padārtha, which the Buddhists could not believe in. On the contrary, the Buddhists uphold the view that the mark of 'sat' is causal efficiency or arthakriyākāritva. A pot may be said to 'sat' because one can collect water in it, and the collection of water is the arthakriyākāritva which marks the pot as 'sat'. The Naiyāyikas argue that the property of arthakriyākāritva cannot be said to be present in the ghata. The two contrary properties of kartr̥tva and akartr̥tva are simultaneously present in the ghatah. Let



us suppose that the Naiyāyikas might say that a pot has to be casually efficient in ten different situations. Now the causal efficiency of the pot may be manifested all at once or in succession. If the case of successive manifestation of casual efficiency is true, then when at time the pot is casually efficient, then the other nine casual efficiency remain unrealized. Hence the contraries of Kartr̥tva and akartr̥tva together qualify a form, i.e. it both has and has not the capacity to produce its effects, it has the capacity in so far as it is now producing (present) effects, and it has not the capacity in so far as it is not now producing its (past and future) effects. If the pot performs the ten causal efficiencies all at once, then for the rest of its duration as the pot, it remains devoid of arthakriyākāritva and hence it ceases to be a pot at all. The Naiyāyikas might point out the fact that the Buddhist criterion of arthakriyākāritva defeats its own purpose; the Naiyāyikas do not consider the Kartr̥tva and akartr̥tva as contrary properties. They look upon them as a disposition, manifesting at different times according to the need and situation. Now, the point of their argument is that if kartr̥tva and akartr̥tva are contraries, then the criterion of arthakriyākāritva does no work. But if these two properties are looked upon as dispositions, then the momentary nature of the pot need not be supposed. The Naiyāyikas doubt the particle sattva

in the inference ghatah ksanikah sattvāt as a real vyāpti and if it not a real vyāpti, then it is not an inference. And if it is not an inference, then the question of establishing the ksanikavāda does not arise at all. The nature of an object is admitted as it is actually observed to be. The production of new prototypes, one after another in different moments is inferred by the observation of a continuous process of growth and decay only in the case of the objects which are actually observed to have continuous growth and decay, as, e.g., in the body etc. Such production of new prototypes on the other hand, is denied in the case of objects where continuous growth and decay are not observed as, for instance, in the ghatah etc. Therefore, according to Udayanācārya, Vinā tena na tatsiddhāt i.e. the doctrine of momentariness cannot be accepted unless and until it is justified by means of inference.

Can it then be said, that, if kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda cannot be established by arguments or inference, then it could be established by means of perception ? In this context, Udayana devotes the verse no.16 (Nyāyakusumāñjali) to show that in perceptual experience, savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka are so interrelated that one cannot be had without the others. As against the Buddhists (according to whom perception is only nirvikalpaka, savikalpaka cannot be given the status of perception, it comes under inference),

the Naiyāyikas says that perception is of two types - nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka and there cannot be any savikalpaka pratyakṣa without there being and nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa; in other words, both are interrelated. Therefore, if anything is savikalpaka pratyakṣa, it is obvious, that thing has already been known by nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Udayanācārya says that by means of perception we can know only that 'it is ghatah' that 'it is blue', but we cannot know that it is momentary. Kṣanikatva cannot be known by means of perception though it is true that the knowledge of kṣanika can be had by means of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. According to the Buddhists the bare particulars, the point instant is known in nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. And by imposing sāmānyalakṣaṇa to the bare particulars by means of kalpanā (i.e. inference or savikalpaka pratyakṣa) the object is known hence it is unreal. Momentariness cannot even be determined by savikalpaka and the Naiyāyikas point out that since savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka are interrelated, therefore momentariness cannot be the object of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa also. Thus Udayana says - kṣanikatva cannot be known by means of perception.

So far, the Naiyāyikas have established the view that the Buddhists doctrine of momentariness cannot be proved either by means of perception or by inference. Now, they are arguing that in the Buddhist view there can be no

explanation for the fact of recognition (pratyābhiñā). The seed, e.g. perceived once in some place may be perceived on another occasion in some other place and be recognized as 'this is the same seed as was perceived previously'. Such recognition proves that the seed is a permanent object and hence the inference seeking to prove momentariness could be contradicted by perception.

Buddhists answer it by means of a similitude of the flame of the lamp. Just as in the case of the perception of the flame of a lamp which, though different in every moment, is cognized to be one and the same due to its santāna or the continuous process of the flame, similarly the object is known as the same because of the continuity of all the changing moments. Recognition is really knowing again not the same object but only a complete prototype of it. The known of the object is also the stream of consciousness which are continuously produced and destroyed. (It is the logical outcome of the doctrine of momentariness that self or the known can not also be the permanent known or the self).

Naiyāyikas point out first that the Buddhist's argument is not logical because there is no ground to prove a rule that recognition invariably refers to a different but similar objects and never to the same one.

Secondly, they point out that without a permanent

entity recognized to be known, no proper explanation of the Samtāna and samtānin can be given (Nyāya-Sūtra, iii. 2. 17).

Thirdly, it is not possible to explain how the reminiscent impression belonging to one samtānin is transferred to the later samtānins and as such recollection and recognition too remain unexplained.

Further, the seed along with the differeng cooperat-  
ing causes have the capability of producing the effect. Still the effect comes into being only when all the causes have assembled together. Through agreement in presence 'and agreement in absence' (anvaya and Vyatireka) the cooperating factors are determined to be the cause of a sprout.

The Buddhists claim that the seed characterized by a specific property in the form of 'efficiency' (Kurvad rūpatva) is the cause of a sprout. But, then, in the same way, let it be admitted that earth or water alone - as characterized by the so-called efficiency is the cause of a sprout.

Udyotakara says - that the Buddhists cannot even defend the preliminary thesis (pratijñā) of their inference, viz. all objects are momentary (Sarvam Kṣaṇikam). What does kṣaṇika mean here ? It cannot mean 'what is

subject to quick destruction' because there being no permanent object in the Buddhists view, the adjective 'quick' becomes redundant. It cannot also mean 'what is destroyed immediately after production' because the causes of both destruction and production of an object cannot be present in the same moment. Moreover, there is no object which can be indisputably taken as momentary in the Buddhist sense, and be cited as a corroborative instance to substantiate the inference of momentariness.

Lastly, as the Jaina philosophers point out 'producing an effect' does not invariably mean 'being existent'. A rope in the darkness may produce all the effects of coming upon a snake. Still it does not indicate the presence of a real snake.

After analyzing the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and its refutation by the Naiyāyikas, it is found that if the doctrine is not established then the concept of Svalakṣaṇa cannot also be established. The refutation of the theory of momentariness leads to the refutation of the concept of svalakṣaṇa. Svalakṣaṇas are particulars, the point instants, cannot exist for more than a moment. It is the real, free from all determination. Its reality is based on the reality of the momentariness. The doctrine holds an important role in Buddhist philosophy and the Nyāya criticism of the doctrine makes the

doctrine more clear and understandable.

### SECTION C

The problem of sāmānya or universal has been tackled differently by different systems of Indian philosophy. Universal denotes the common feature or quality shared by many individuals belonging to the same class, e.g. to know this particular animal as 'cow' one should know that it has that common quality, viz. 'Cowhood', which is shared by all the animals so-called and henceforth, under the class 'cow'. This status of universal can be stated variously according to the position one holds that of a realist, of a conceptualist and a nominalist. The term 'nominalism' has been defined variously. Following Nelson Goodman's lead, it may be said that the nominalistic world is a world of individuals, and nominalism consists specifically in the refusal to recognize classes, that abstract entities do not exist; that whatever exists must be construed as an individual. A nominalist should refuse to construe anything as a class, and he makes the distinction of entities, without a distinction of content. The nominalist would deny further that the two different entities can be made up of the same entities. Since nominalism describes the world as composed of individuals,

therefore to explain nominalism we should not explain what individuals are but rather what constitutes describing the world as composed of them. So to describe the world is to describe it as made up of entities, no two of which break down into exactly the same entities. Here the case of Buddhist nominalism will be described along Goodman's thought. According to the realist, universals have real existence. As opposed to conceptualism and nominalism, realism means that universals residing in the particulars have their independent reality whereas conceptualism and nominalism hold that universals do not have any independent being. According to the conceptualist, these exist only in the mind, whereas Nominalists hold that these are nothing but names. Everything which exists is particular, universals are simply the fictions invented by a mind which cannot cope with unlimited variety and is content to take similarity for identity.

Buddhists uphold the above version of nominalism. Their nominalism is known as apoha-vāda. 'Apoha' literally means removing negative reasoning, excluding all things not coming under the category in point. That is when we describe something negatively, it is known as apohavāda; e.g., if we have to describe an animal as a 'cow' this job may be done only by reasoning negatively that it is not a non-cow, i.e. it is not a horse, not an ass etc. In course of reasoning negatively we come to the



conclusion that since the entity described is not non-cow, therefore it is a cow. This description of 'cow' is nothing but a name given by an imagination. Since the name is a figment of imagination, it cannot be ultimately real. At the most one can say that it is empirically real. According to Dinnāga only svalakṣaṇas are real. These are known by perception. Svalakṣaṇas are nothing but particular point instants given as perceptual data. A particular thing is a 'this'. But in respect of any particular thing, one can always ask - 'What it is'. The nominalists says that the concrete particularity of a thing (its thisness) is all it really is, and everything about it (its whatness) is only in our imagination.

The apohavāda is based upon the Buddhist's presupposition of universal momentariness. Since every this is momentary, the real, Svalakṣaṇas which we perceive can exist only for one moment. The next moment there would be another svalakṣaṇa. Then how should one explain sāmānyalakṣaṇa as well as the continuity of an existing object ? The Buddhists argue, (as has been explained in the previous sections) that to exist is to exercise arthakriyākāritva i.e. causal efficiency. The svalakṣaṇa alone is there momentarily, it alone can be causally efficient. And about the continuity of an existing object the Buddhists state that the things in the two moments of our cognitions are only similar and that we mistake them to

be the same. In other words, all recognition is erroneous since similarity is mistaken in it for identity. This continuity has been explained also by the simile of a burning lamp. The flame of each moment is dependent on its own condition and different from that of another moment which is dependent on other condition. Yet there is an unbroken succession of the different flames.

Concepts, according to them are unreal, since they do not function causally. According to the Naiyāyikas universals are real, apart from the particulars which they co-exist with. This relationship between the universal and particular is termed as samavāya relation. But the Buddhists point out that if this were the case, then why did we perceive from a long distance a cow, not as a cow but merely as an instance of sattā or the universal of being (i.e. as a barely existing something) and not the substancehood (dravyatva), the cowness (gotva) and other universals also similarly inhering in the selfsame distant objects ?

The main point of polarisation over the issue of the reality of universals between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas lie in their respective theories of perception. Naiyāyikas hold that the universals or sāmānya can be known through perception, by savikalpaka pratyakṣa, whereas Buddhists do not categorize savikalpaka under pratyakṣa.

A sāmānya does not have that much reality which a svalak-  
sana has, yet it cannot be said totally unreal, since it  
depends for its existence on the particulars; it is  
nothing but the conceptualized particular. As has alrea-  
dy been said, it is not real in the ultimate sense, but  
only empirically. It is quite correct to say that the  
terms in which we intellectually characterized what we  
know in sense-intuition are all general; if we say that  
this <sup>is</sup> round, or it is red, we are describing it in terms  
which are potentially applicable to any number of other  
objects of the same class. And the universal character  
of the predicates remain even when the subject of our  
thinking is highly complicated. It should always be  
remembered that nominalism follows from an empirical out-  
look. According to this theory, knowledge is a compound  
of sense and thought and if thought is necessarily  
universal, sense may equally be said to be necessarily  
particular. Dinnāga was first to point out that it is in  
sensation i.e. in perception that we grasp the particu-  
larity (Svalakṣaṇa) of things and this remains true even  
though we cannot find intellectual terms to do justice to  
that particularity. He makes a clear-cut distinction  
between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa and their means of  
cognition. We can then say that each individual exists  
in its unique particularity and what separates then from  
other things and constitutes their uniqueness we cannot  
explain, since every attempt of explanation makes use of

general terms. Now the question arises - how can we explain the category of difference (Viśeṣa)? Or, how can we explain the apprehension of things as being associated with other characters as when it is said 'this is a qualified thing or this is its special character'. Now, it is obvious that a special character of a thing is its difference (Viśeṣa) from others, but it does not establish any qualified character and the difference (viśeṣa) itself again is not separate from entities that are differentiated. It is the negative character or apoha of an object, that the cow is not non-cow. It is not true that in perceiving an object we perceive it also as different (viśeṣa) when a cow is perceived as not non-cow, then its unique nature is only grasped and only in linguistic usage, we can say that it is not non-cow. Therefore the category of difference (viśeṣa) is only a mental mode which has never come to us directly in perception. Therefore according to the Buddhists, all universals or sāmānya are known only in their negative character; no universal can be apprehended by itself. In this view, there are no abstract general concepts, it is only the individuals that stand as universals and only their specific individual character are for the time being wiped out of the mind.

In this way the Buddhists try to establish their theory of sāmānya i.e. nominalism by apohavāda.

They say that since the datum of perception is absolutely characterless, unspeakable and indefinable these, by their power of arthakriyākāritva make possible all the determinable relations. These by their very nature stand as differentiated from other entities of different characters and can assimilate to such other entities having like characters. Buddhists only try to explain that no conscious process of assimilation, discrimination or association of diverse kinds can take place.

Their main point of argument regarding the non-existence of universal is that, how a class concept may remain constantly the same, when all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing (It follows from their presupposition of universal momentariness). If class-concepts are said to inhere owing to specific qualities e.g. brahmanism in a brahmin, it may be objected that a person is still known as a brahmin, even though he acts clearly in a non-brahmanical way. Therefore, for various reasons, it is not possible to admit any class concept.

Naiyāyikas do not agree with the Buddhists. For them, sāmānya or universal is a reality. It has its locus in viśeṣa by virtue of the relation of sāmānya. It is an eternal and timeless entity. It being eternal subsists in many (nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam), The particular is

said to manifest or reveal the universal. All the universals are regarded as distinct realities having spatial manifestations at different places at the same time. But the Buddhists object to this view. Dharmakīrti in his Pramānavārtika points out that if the universals are eternal, then these must exist always. 'Cowness' as an objective universal has to be related to the particular object as soon as a calf is born and has to disappear from the spatial location as soon as an old cow dies. 'Cowhood' cannot travel from the former cow to the latter cow, for then the nature would not be a cow any longer; nor can it remain stationary, for then the latter cow would not even be a cow. But the Naiyāyikas in reply point out that this only shows that universals are not particulars; they are universals. Buddhists also object to the eternality of the universal. During the intermediate period, when a calf is born and a cow dies, where does the universal 'cowhood' exist then? It is not perceived to exist anywhere. In reply the Naiyāyikas point out that non-perception of anything is not the cause of its non-existence. During that intermediate period the 'cowhood' is not perceived because the particular 'cow' which is the source of cognition of the universal is not there and that is the reason of the non-perception of the universal.

According to the Naiyāyikas, it is not the case that unless and until the particular exists, the universals

cannot exist. Universal exists independent of the particular. It is sat by its own nature. When there is the particular, the relation of inference or samavāya becomes apparent between the particular and the universal (yadaiva vastu tadaiva gotvenābhisambandhate - Nyāya Vārtikā). Gotva is eternal, samavāya relation is also eternal, but the particular cow is not eternal. It is one of the relata only. Therefore in the absence of the cow the relation between cowhood and the cow is not visible. Thus it is clear from this that the relation between sattva and asattva can be explained only by means of the individuals i.e. the particular.

The Naiyāyikas make it clear that the real universal cannot be a summation of several essential properties, because a real universal should be unitary, simple and unanalysable (akhaṇḍa), eternal i.e. timeless and indestructible and present in many by a single unitary relation called inherence (samavāya) E.g. they point out that the universal 'cook', 'servant' cannot be real universals because the application of such general terms are based on some upādhis i.e. nominal properties not objective universals. The relation which is essential for a real universal is the samavāya relation. This relation is found in dravya, guṇa and karma i.e. the blue particular is related to the blue thing, the action particular to

the acting i.e. moving object that instantiates it. This relation is described as a-yutasiddha is inseparable. This inseparability is however unidirectional. It is a permanent relation in which one of the relata cannot exist without the presence of the other, though the latter can continue without the former. The blue particular exists in the pot and it may be destroyed while the pot may continue to exist with another colour and so on.

According to Dinnāga, the objects are in fact unique particulars which have infinite properties. These properties are not ontological; they do not exist in the object but superimposed by the mind or conceptually constructed. E.g. a particular comes to be recognized as blue only when it is excluded from non-blue things and their process of exclusion is certainly a contribution of the mind or thought which is called either vikalpa or kalpanā or conceptual construction.

For the Buddhists, each object in the world has corresponding exclusion class and an object is presented before us by means of this mental representatives. The commonness of mental representation (i.e. the universal or sāmānya) is not connected with any real thing in the world which is full of only with particulars but by means of this 'commonness' the world is represented (or captured or conceived) in our language (in our concepts or words).



Buddhists view of Sāmānya has been refuted by Jayanta in his Nyāya Manjari. According to him, universals cannot be constructed by our mind, it cannot be a case of kalpanā. These are directly given to us. Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity but also its disjunctive feature. When we perceive something, its manifoldness is as such manifested to consciousness as is its unitary character. It is cognized as a totality of many parts, qualities and aspects. The Buddhists maintain that the universal is a mere concept, whereas the 'real' is a unique particular. But Jayanta refutes this and states that an object denoted by a word is real since it is the same object which is revealed by an indeterminate perception also.

Naiyāyikas also point out that when we see a cow sometimes we also see cowhood along with it, although we may not at the same time see one as cow and the other as cowness. Both entities appears in our awareness. This has been explained by Gangesa as pure non-constructive, non-judgemental or non-qualitative perception. This is only a precondition for seeing a cow as cow.

This non qualificative awareness is also in a sense inexpressible in language. This seems to be a reflex of the Buddhist thesis of the inexpressibility of the pure object of sense perception. For in the linguistic

expression of the awareness of the cow as a cow, or the sky as the sky, we do not say 'This has cowness' or 'this has skyhood'. For these would be expression of very different cognitive episodes. In Wittgensteinian language, we may say that the awareness 'This is a cow' shows 'cowness' but does not say it. According to the Naiyāyikas, these universals are unsaid or unexpressed in the verbal representation of the awareness because if they are expressed, they also need another 'qualifier' or a mode of presentation.

As against the Naiyāyikas, who uphold the realistic position, Buddhists say that a cow is known from the fact that it is not a non-cow. If the specific individualization of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and so on ad infinitum. No sāmānya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impression of past experience of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to extend objects.

The thinkers of Vedānta fold also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know sāmānya or jāti as a separate substance. So it discards the notion of sāmānya. But the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophers point out that negation of non-cows is a negative perception (abhāvātmake Pratyakṣa) whereas the sameness

perceived as cow is a positive perception (bhāvātmake pratyakṣa) which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negative theory or the apoha theory of the Buddhists. Thus they admit Sāmānya as having separate reality. According to the Buddhists, universals are subjective constructions or logical fictions. These are nothing but the names which we give to certain particular objects as shorthand for the series of particulars. Corresponding to these names, we cannot say that there are actual real objects. Herein lies the importance of their apoha theory. Ratnakīrti in his Apoha-siddhi has stated that words denote neither positive object nor negative ones. The positive meaning is not a consequence of the negation of other objects any more than the negative meaning is the consequence of the positive denotation; they are the simultaneous cognition of the positive and the negative sides. All determinate objects have a positive nature which excludes others.

Buddhists do not accept any relational statement to be real. In a relational statement, the knowledge apprehends the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier; e.g, the statement 'I know the jar', means that, 'I am the knower of the jar'. Here we find a kind of relation between 'I' the qualificand with the 'knower of the jar', the qualifier. This relation is known as the relation of identity and here the statement is a relational

statement which is not accepted by the Buddhists. These are nothing but the ideal construction of our mind. All relation, as Kant would say, are the forms which our mind imposes on the given element to make them into objects of knowledge. In determinate perception, we twist the real out of its shape and so it is said to be invalid. Kant however denies the possibility of indeterminate perception by which the Buddhists mean the barely unrelated, momentary, real particulars; e.g. Kant's famous statement - "perceptions without conceptions are blind and conceptions without perceptions are empty". Dinnāgā denies all knowledge of substances, qualities and actions as false. The outer objects are momentary and so cannot be known.

It follows therefore from the above account that according to the Buddhists, words or names refer to objects which are not real like sva-lakṣaṇas, because these are admixed with imagination. And this is the characteristic of sāmānyalakṣaṇa. If it be asked that words do not signify any real object, what is then its signification? Buddhist's reply is that the connotation of words is but a subjective idea, a mental image, which however is hypostatized as an objective reality existing in its own right independently of the thinking mind. As a subjective notion and a mental image, it is positive, but it has an exclusive reference by implication and as this negative implication gives the verbal import, its distinguishing

character, its real significance is always designated as a fundamental negation. It should always be noted that negation is only a logical presupposition and is not psychologically felt in the first presentation. This was first pointed out by Dinnāga. Words have a synthetic and comprehensive import but as particulars alone are real in Dinnaga's school of thought and as particulars are absolutely distinct and discrete without any connecting link or nexus; the universal of the Realist was equated with a negative concept and not any positive fact. A concept or universal is possessed of a definite content, therefore it is naturally demarcated from other concepts, and this negative aspect is regarded as constitutive of its individuality and significance. It is apoha. The connotation of the word is then subjective in fact and objective in content. Here lies the nominalistic attitude of the Buddhists. The question then naturally arises - If it is subjective then how can it be communicated to others? Buddhists reply is that it is through language that it can be communicable to one another, which however are fictitious representatives of reality.

Thus it can be said that according to both the schools, a class name expresses both aspects of the meaning, positive as well as negative; but the realists lay emphasis on the positive aspect and declares the universals to be positive i.e. an objectively real entity,

while the Buddhists insist on its negative aspect and declares the universals to be negative i.e. merely a mental construction and objectively unreal.

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2. 'na sa 'sti pratyayo loke yah 'sabdānugamād r̥te anuvidham iva jñānam 'sabdena gamyate', NVT, p.83.I.9.
3. asti hy ālocanajñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam bālamūkādivijñānasadr̥sam 'suddhavastuyam. It is illustrated by the experience of infants and dumb persons, e.g. by Kumarila in the Slokavartika (pratyakṣa, 112).

There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real - like the apprehension of the infants and the dumb.

4. Nyāya-bindu, p.103.
5. Pravrttivisaya, p.16, I.6.
6. Nyāya-Sutra, (III.2.10).
7. 'Kramākramavyāvṛttav akṣaṇikāt sattvavyāvṛttih',  
Sarvādarsanasamgraha and also 'sthāyitvavṛttyāsā  
mūṣikabhakṣitābijādāv ankurajananaprārthanām  
anuharet', SDS, also  
Samarthasya ksepāyogāt, SDS.