

Synopsis of the points made and discussed in

CHAPTER I

Buddhist Theory of Knowledge

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CHAPTER I

SECTION A

Buddhist theory of knowledge

The Buddhist theory of knowledge may be understood in terms of the Buddhist arguments against the Cārvāka position. The Cārvāka position in the theory of knowledge is that of a sceptic. The Buddhists had historically pioneered, meeting the sceptical doubts, while the issue was later to be taken up by the Naiyāyikas.

In order to explain the theory of knowledge of any system, let us first clarify the term which is often rendered into English by 'Knowledge', Jñāna, we shall use the two terms interchangeably. Roughly speaking, Jñāna means any sort of ascertainment of any object by the subject. That is, it is a kind of Subject-Object relation.

The very possibility of an examination of knowledge rests upon the assumption that first there is knowledge and in the very act of denying knowledge, even the sceptic tacitly assumes that knowledge occurs.

According to the Cārvākas, perception or pratyakṣa is the only source of knowledge. Whatever is real is perceivable. The objects which are perceived exist. Imperceptible entities do not exist. They do not believe in the authority of the Vedas as well as in any other scriptures. Therefore, they totally reject Śabda, the Vedic or scriptural testimony as a valid source of knowledge. But the possibility of knowledge in general has not been denied by them. In the manner of the logical positivists, they hold on to the view that reality of thing depends on verification by senses alone. The Cārvāka method of establishing this contention is however different from that of the positivists. The validity of all other sources of knowledge (Pramā) has been challenged by them. And it has been emphasized by the Cārvākas that since all other sources of knowledge are proved to be unacceptable, perception is to be regarded as the only source. 'A thing which is not perceptible is non-existent'. The non perception of an object proves only the absence of it.

There is, in fact, no other sources of knowledge like inference (anumāna), testimony (Śabda), Comparison (Upamāna) etc. If imperceptible objects are supposed to exist, then even imaginary things would exist, and the poor would remove their poverty with imaginary wealth, the servants would become masters by imagining themselves to be rich and all would fulfil their desires with imaginary objects. The distinction between perceptible things and the imaginary things would be annulled. There would, therefore, be total collapse of practical life, which depends upon the distinction between perceptible and imaginary things<sup>1</sup>. Therefore imperceptible things do not exist. The perceptible would, as an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities, exist.

The Cārvākas do not believe in any theory of causation and its universality. There is, they say no necessary connection between cause and effect. There is only accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent. The two events are found together on numerous occasions and therefore produce an expectation in the mind that they will always go together. But there is no certainty about their co-presence. This might remind one of Hume, who says - "For after a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant and to consider

it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. It is this impression then or determination which affords me the idea of necessity". (A Treatise of Human Nature. Book I, pp.206). Thus we have no absolute, self-evident or certain knowledge of matters of fact, our knowledge never reaches absolute certainty. We base our conclusion on experience. We believe the future will be like the past, but we have no absolute assurance that things will not change. This accidental conjunction of an antecedent and a consequent cannot ensure Vyāpti, which is the ground of inference. Inference for the Cārvākas cannot reveal an object as it is and therefore it can only convey the probable knowledge of an object. A person seeing smoke a far infers the possible existence of fire at that place and if he actually finds there the existence of fire, he then wrongly thinks the mere possibility as a source of valid knowledge. And thus, each and every behaviour of people is based on mere possibility.

The worth of inference is accepted by every-body because otherwise the normal life would be impossible. Rational and intelligent people do believe in anumāna, śabda etc. as pramāṇa and they proceed accordingly. If one sees smoke in a mountain, then he can guess that there is fire. And his anumāna then becomes true. If we do not believe in anumāna, then we cannot give proper explanation to these types of actions. Therefore we should admit

inference as a valid pramāna and along with it, śabda or testimony as a source of knowledge. Against these, the Cārvākas point out that these sorts of actions are nothing but the inflation of the world of fancy. Those who accept the validity of inferential knowledge, they accept the sign (hetu) or the middle term as the causes of knowledge, when middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major (Vyāpti and the Paksadharmatā hetu are the sādhakas of anumāna). That is, the knowledge of existence of the probans in the subject and the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between probans and probandum are necessary for attaining inferential knowledge. This Vyāpti must be a relation devoid of any condition (upādhi), accepted (niscita) or disputed (sandigdha). Since vyāpti and paksadharmatā hetu are the sādhakas of anumāna the following valid syllogistic argument can be drawn.

That mountain is fiery, wherever there is  
smoke, there is fire. Therefore it is fiery.

Hence smoke is the hetu, and there is an invariable connection between smoke and fire. If this relation is avyābhicāri, i.e., if there is no deviation of this relation, then it can be called vyāpti relation. Besides this vyāpti relation in an inference, there should also be paksadharmatā hetu. Vyāpti relation is also known as

Vyāpya - Vyāpaka relation, where smoke is known as vyāpya (pervaded) and the fire is vyāpaka (pervader). An object remaining in more places is called Vyāpaka (Adhikadesavr -ttitvam Vyapakatvam) while an object remaining in comparatively less places is called vyāpya (Alpadesavr ittitvam Vyāpyatvam).

This Vyāpti-jñāna or the ascertainment of vyāpti is the instrument of anumāna, which gives certainty only in the present case and doubt only remains about prediction (Desāntaram and Kālāntaram). Therefore this invariable connection does not possess its powers of causing inference by virtue of its existence, as the eye etc. are the causes of perception but by virtue of its being known. What there is the means of this connection being known ?

The Cārvākas have pointed out that this cannot be known either by perception, inference, testimony or Upamāna (comparison). They have put forward several arguments in establishing their theory. They are playing the role of a sceptic. They are of the opinion that one is always certain in respect of the present cases, but what about the cases of future and the other places. So there is always doubt of Vyāpti-graha, which will at least give rise to the probable knowledge but not certain. Let us see whether other sources of valid knowledge can provide us with the ascertainment of vyāpti or not.

Perception or Pratyakṣa cannot be the source of the knowledge of vyāpti. Since anumāna is based on the knowledge of the law of uniformity or universal perception (vyāpti-jñāna) and vyāpti is the unconditional and universal relation between hetu and sādhya this cannot be known through perception<sup>2</sup>. External perception gives us knowledge of some particulars only and not all. Through perception only object existing in present time can be known but not of course existing in past, present and future, as it has <sup>the</sup> capacity to produce knowledge of an object which is in proximity of the external sense organs. Yet a law is no law if it does not obtain or hold universally. And internal perception or introspection cannot give us the knowledge of vyāpti since introspection is not concerned directly with other objects.

Secondly, vyāpti cannot be established through inference<sup>3</sup>. If it is said that we can establish a vyāpti through inference, then it will involve petitio-principii (Anavasthā) and anumāna becomes superfluous.

Thirdly, Vyāpti cannot be known through testimony also<sup>4</sup>. Since, if we, like the vaiśeṣikas say that testimony is only a form of inference then it will not escape the difficulty of infinite regress. But even if testimony is not a variety of inference and is a new means or a source of knowledge, then also previous difficulty would



remain, for after all, knowledge through testimony always involves some inference.

Belief in the Veda or Śruti are all due to testimony. We infer the authenticity of Vedas due to testimony. Again, if testimony, were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and the major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing another thing (as smoke) hence the whole topic of inference for one self (Svār-thānumāna) would have to end in mere idle words, not to speak of inference for others.

Fourthly, the knowledge of the invariable connection (Vyāpti-Jñāna) cannot also be known through upamāna or comparison. Upamāna or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name and to something so named. This upamāna must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition; since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i.e. the universal proposition) because their end is to produce the knowledge of a quite another connection, viz. the relation of name to something

so named. The last, and most important objection against inference is directly concerned with the notion of vyāpti. A vyāpti has been and can be defined only as unconditional relation or "nirupādhika sambandha" between a hetu and a sādhya. The upādhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term or hetu as in the inference "the mountain is smoky, because it is fiery", if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer general. In the case of valid vyāpti, there is of course no upādhi.

The object, which being pervaded by Sādhya becomes the non-pervader of the Hetu is called Upādhi (Sadhanāvyāpakatve Sati Sādhya samavyāpti).

But how do we able to assure ourselves that the relation between a hetu and a sādhya is free from all conditions<sup>5</sup>. Here the conjunction of wet fuel is Upādhi on account of the fact that it becomes the non pervader of Hetu as well as pervader of the Sādhya.

This absence of conditions or upādhi which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection (i.e. a universal proposition) can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception and therefore although the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible. Obviously we cannot know the absence of imperceptible

things through perception.

Moreover, the very definition of an upādhi is infected with petitio-principii (anyonyāśraya). The Naiyayikas define upādhi as "Sādhanavyāpakatve sati sādhyasama vyaptih". It is evident that the upādhi is here defined in terms of vyapti and that means a petitio. For as it is seen here a vyapti is defined in terms of an upādhi and an upādhi is defined in terms of a vyāpti<sup>6</sup>.

Hence from the impossibility of knowledge of a universal proposition, there follows the impossibility of establishing inference in general. Therefore it follows that no certainty can be found in any knowledge. All knowledge is only probable. Cārvākas, it follows, do not accept demonstrative knowledge. From this it automatically follows that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is not possible also. As the Buddhists have pointed out that in Sva-lakṣaṇa only we find a case of truth, which is not of any inferential character. It is particular and not universal. And particular is always known through perception. Here, of course a similarity can be drawn between Cārvāka and the Buddhist view of perception. That inference cannot give us any certain knowledge. But, in the next section we will notice that although the Buddhists have pointed out that inferential knowledge may not always give us any certain knowledge, yet unlike the Cārvākas they accept inference as a source

valid knowledge. The Cārvākas have pointed out that since perception cannot yield the truth of any universal statement, therefore it cannot give us any certainty in knowledge since certainty involves universality and unconditionality. But as against the Cārvākas, it may be pointed out that one can even doubt sense perception also. As has been pointed out by Descartes, that everything can be doubted. The knowledge which we get through sense-perception is only necessary and not sufficient. In Kant also, we find a distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge. Through sense-perception we cannot have genuine knowledge i.e. no certainty can be found. Therefore, according to the Cārvākas, truth is not the essential character of inferences. It is only accidental. In fact, probability is the guide of life.

Buddhists of course admit inference as a valid source of knowledge. They are the first philosophers who have pointed out certain fundamental inconsistencies in Cārvāka's view of inference and have given inference its proper place. Others also have pointed this out, but the Buddhists are the forerunner in this case. Buddhists have pointed out that invariable concomitance or avinābhāva (i.e. vyāpti) is easily cognizable by means of identity (tādātmya) and causality (tadutpatti)<sup>7</sup>. They also at the same time admit that certainty cannot be found in any

inferential knowledge. In any inferential knowledge, as against the Cārvākas, they have pointed out that we can have only sāmānyalakṣaṇa perceptions, which of course, cannot give us any knowledge like that of the particulars or svalakṣaṇas. It only give us the universality of any object. But as against the Cārvākas, they have pointed out that certainty can be found in svalakṣaṇa perception. Here we find a core of truth, since it gives us the real, the essential, though only for a moment. But according to the Cārvākas, certainty cannot be found at all, Every knowledge (except perceptual) is only probable. Buddhists have pointed out that while denying inference as a form of valid knowledge, Cārvākas create certain absurdities. They take the help of inference only while denying it.

## SECTION B

In the last section we have seen the Buddhist critique of the Cārvāka view of inference. In the present section we propose to discuss how the Buddhists have rehabilitated inference, its structure and how does it work.

According to ~~Ma~~ Nagārjuna, there are four pramānas. He, in his "upāyahṛdayam" says - Atha Katividham pramānam ? Caturvidham pramānam - pratyakṣamanumānam upamānamāgamsceti Catusupramāneṣu Pratyakṣam srestham ... But Dinnāga in his pramānasamuccaye says - Pratyakṣamanumāna<sup>ca</sup> pramānam

hi dvilaksanam. After that Sāmtaraksita in his "tattvasamgraha" also have admitted only two pramānas and have refuted all other pramānas as admitted by others.

According to Dinnāga, whatever is outside the purview of pure sensation, belongs to the sphere of inference. The term 'anumāna' has been used in two different senses by the Dinnāga school. In the narrow sense, it means inference of pure logic, as when fire is inferred from smoke. But in a broad sense it means all kinds of discursive thought, all judgements, all generalized forms and all determinate ideas. As Stcherbatsky points out that Dinnāga's inference embraces besides our inference all that we would call judgement, intellection, ideation, thought, reason etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensations<sup>8</sup>. When the term inference is used in that broad sense, the determinate perception of the realist is also covered by the term inference, e.g. if a fire is cognized by the sense of vision, it is a case of sense-perception for the realist. And if the same fire is cognized indirectly only by perceiving smoke, then it is a case of inferential knowledge. For the Buddhists, there is in both cases a part cognized by the senses and a part cognized by the intellect, which is a case of inferential knowledge, a non senseous source of knowledge.

Kumārila has raised some objection against this. In

the case of smoke-fire example, if the fire is known only by cognizing the smoke which is the hetu of this inferential argument. (e.g. wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The mountain is smoky. Therefore it is fiery) and the generalised nature (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of this is also grasped by an inference, then for this, another hetu is also needed, which leads to Infinite regress. But this objection is not valid since the Buddhists do not hold that a universal or a generalised reality is grasped through inference alone, but an inference apprehends only universal or a generalized reality and never a particular. Dharmakīrti says - Every thing other than the extreme - particular (Svalakṣaṇa) is generalisation (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) which is comprehended by inference.

The Buddhists thus hold that in the determinate perception object is comprehended in its generalised form by means of inference. The main point of difference between perception and inference as sources of knowledge is that in perception, the real, the particular, the svalakṣaṇa is known, though it exists only for a moment but the object of inferential knowledge is only a thought - construction and it does not have any external reality. (Yat Sat Tat kṣanikam). The existent object is always momentary and hence whatever is permanent as thought construction has nothing to do with reality.

Perceptual knowledge i.e. indeterminate perception always precedes the determinate knowledge or the inferential one. Dinnāga has made a sharp and cleancut differentiation between the two kinds of comprehensible objects (Prameya) on the one hand and two kinds of means of their knowledge (pramāna) on the other. Each one of the two kinds of pramānas comprehends only one kind of reality (pramāna vyavasthā) never operating in the sphere of the other (pramāna samplava).

According to the Buddhists, by inference we comprehend only the sāmānyalakṣaṇa of an object by imposing Kalpanā on the particular which is only momentary. Kalpanā is of five types (panca-vidha) - i.e.

- i) Individuals - Proper names (nāma)
- ii) Classes - Class names (Jāti)
- iii) Sensible qualities - Their names (Guna)
- iv) Motion - Karma
- v) Substances - dravya.

When a 'cow' is known as a 'cow' the sāmānya lakṣaṇa i.e. 'cowhood' follows immediately after the indeterminate perception of the particular 'cow' (Svalakṣaṇa), the duration of which is only for a Kṣana. When we say 'This is a cow', the word 'this' refers to the transcendental particular, the external real, and the word 'cow' to the



thought image, the sāmānyalakṣaṇa. To have any knowledge, i.e. to form any judgement, these two absolutely different entities, one being an efficient real particular 'this' and the other only an ideal entity 'cow' should be identified by means of the similarity, the sārūpya. This is an original contribution by Dinnāga in Buddhist philosophy. The thought image is projected externally by being falsely 'identified' with the external particular, and thus, in the perceptual judgement of the determinate perception an element of reality is found. According to the Buddhists, the 'this' element in the perceptual judgement indirectly leads to the real object which was reflected in the immediately preceding sensation. A real object is that which has arthakriyākāritva, which gives man the fruitful result, it is efficient.

Thus, inference, according to Dinnāga, is knowledge through a middle term that is known as hetu. It cognizes a subject as belonging to a class, to the class of things having that particular characteristic (the middle term). The subject will belong to other classes also if other characteristics are selected. Whereas inference cognizes only characteristics of classes, perception cognizes only the 'characteristic' of the object itself, of the object in itself, not classified (which presupposes imagining). Classes are imagined by the intellect; they do not exist objectively. Perception relates to objective reality but

it cannot classify or even name its objects, which would necessitate imagining. Real objects remain inclassifiable particulars. Inference is restricted to imagining (words and classification) and deals in classes having no objective reality, it cannot reach real objects.

The main difference between perception and inference is that perception excludes imagining (Kalpanāpodha). It gives simply the direct, vivid peculiarity of an object (Viśaya). It is inexpressible in speech. It relates directly to real objects, to ultimate reality. The supposed errors or illusions of perception are all due to imagining (Kalpanā), are intellectual misinterpretation of the sense-data. Every act of perception is new, it cannot be repeated, the supposition of repetition (identifying a datum with a previous datum) being due to imagining. According to Dinnāga there is some ultimate reality in phenomena which provides a basis for perception.

Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu has stated, perhaps for the first time that anumāna is of two types (i.e. two aspects of anumāna) - Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna<sup>9</sup>. These two are respectively of the nature of cognition (Jñāna) and verbal communication (Abhidhāna). It should be noted that in Indian logic, Svārthānumāna is not a process of deducting one proposition from another proposition or set of propositions. It is a process by which we arrive

at some kind of knowledge (jñāna, bodha or vikalpanā), which exists for oneself and is non-demonstrative. It should not be confused with the knowledge of truth and falsity of a conclusion depending upon truth or falsity of premises.

Parārthānumāna is that which is communicable to others and therefore it takes the linguistic form. This peculiar Buddhist tenet of an essential distinction between Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna - as a process of thought and as a mode of communicating it - was first set forth by Dinnaga himself<sup>10</sup>. According to Dharmakīrti, these Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna are the two aspects of anumāna. As against the Naiyāvīkas, the Buddhists claim that if the distinction of Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna is based on two distinct kinds of cognitions then it will lead to Pramāna - Samplava, which is unacceptable to Buddhists. For appropriate classification of anumāna, according to Dharmakīrti, one has to look to the different kinds of forms of it rather than to different aspects of it. His classification of anumāna into Svabhāvānumāna, Kāryānumāna and Anupalabdhyānumāna seems to be classification of it in the proper sense of the term. Svārthānumāna is produced through a mark (linga), having three characteristics (trirūpa) and pertains to an inferable knowledge (anumeya)<sup>11</sup>. These three characteristics are -

a) anumeya-sattvam or it must ~~be~~ abide in the inferrable object cognized by anumāna e.g. smoke in the hill,

b) sapakṣa Sattvam or it must abide only in homologous instances i.e., fire in the kitchen, and

c) asapakṣe asattvam, or it must not abide in heterologous instances, i.e., fire should not be found in a lake, where lake is a heterologous instance of fire.

In Svārthānumāna the epistemic aspects is predominant while communicative aspect is predominant in Parārthānumāna. Without language we cannot communicate ~~and~~ although without it we can cognise. But what we communicate needs to be cognised first. Svārthānumāna gets priority in order of knowing as compared to Parārthānumāna. In Svārthānumāna a single individual is enough but in parārthānumāna at least two persons are needed. It is interesting to note that Svārthānumāna-Parārthānumāna distinction of anumāna is parallel to the Nirvikalpa-Savikalpa distinction of Pratyakṣa. Svarthānumāna in case of anumāna and Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa in case of Pratyakṣa seen to be epistemologically primary in their respective domains in a similar way. As there can be no savikalpaka pratyakṣa, without there being nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (i.e. the 'what' of an object is

known only when the 'that' of the object is known), similarly unless and until we have svarthānumāna how can there be parāarthānumāna ? Unless and until we know the object by ourselves, how can we communicate it to others ?

But what is the distinction between such a source cognition as Svāarthānumāna and its result (phala) ? It is similar to the case of perception, where the coordination or similarity (Sārūpya) between things that are essentially dissimilar is established through perception<sup>12</sup>. The given object is singular and unique (Svalaksana) while its image is something general, and how could the two be assimilated to each other ? It is assimilated through consciousness. Consciousness can cognize only that object the reflexion of which it bears in its own being. The same cognitions are not repeated perpetually since each element is characterized by incessant change. There is a peculiar connection between consciousness and its object which is technically known as Sārūpya. In an inferential argument, this co-ordination or sārūpya takes the definite shape. E.g. when we have some indefinite sensation and begin to feel that it is coordinated with the object blue, our sensation then takes the shape of a definite idea of the blue. A feeling of sameness between the consciousness and the object arises, which consists in co-ordination

(Sārūpyātmaka Syasamvedanā) between an image and the initial sensation. Selfconsciousness assumes here the function of object-consciousness and this produces the perceptual judgement - This is blue. There is nothing beyond self-consciousness, the result of all cognition, representing both the act of cognition (Pramāna) and the content grasped by it (Prameya). We thus may regard the fact of coordination of our cognition with its object blue as a kind of cognitive activity producing distinctness.

Anumati as a mental process of attaining knowledge involves only two elements; observation of the middle or mark (linga-Darsana) and remembrance of the universal connection between the mark and the property to be proved (Vyāpti smarana). When expressed in words for the information of others, an argument has five members, according to the Nyāya-Vaisesika school - hence its name Pancāvayavayākya. But the Bauddha seems to have regarded the last two of the members as superfluous, because in an inference one is concerned only with the Vyāpti or Abinābhāya relation (insperable relation) and if that is established between hetu and sādhya, in a paksa then there is no ground of repeating the first two statements again because according to them the first two statements of a pancāvayavi-Nyāya have no value for them. It may have psychological value, but there is no logical value

in repeating the same statement again.

In any inferential argument, vyāpti relation is an essential inseparable <sup>relation</sup> between the cause and the effect. But what is this relation? Mere existence of relation will not make any anumāna possible; the relation should also be known. Unless and until we know that 'Rama is a man' and also that 'men are mortal', we cannot infer him to be mortal. The pakṣa 'Rama' and sādhya 'mortality' must participate in the hetu 'men' and their participation must be known. In anumāna one has to know both these relations. Anumāna is thus, a knowledge of this relation based on that of other two relations and this knowledge is not a new thing but is all the same a new knowledge. These relations should be actual relations, there is no place of imaginary and conditional relations, in any anumāna because in anumāna we are concerned with knowledge therefore we must know a relation to be certain (niscaya); i.e. vyāpti-sambandha in any anumāna must be non-deviated (avyabhicāri). It is a logical necessity, different from Hume's real relation. The two terms of a relation must be indispensable for each other and there must not be any factor external to these terms making them related. Therefore the vyāpti sambandha holds only between the hetu and the sādhya which is known as Sāhacarya niyama, avinābhava niyama, or vyāpti. But there is no such sambandha between hetu and pakṣa. E.G. the sambandha

between the smoke and fire is definitely of different type than that between hill and smoke, where the former relation is an invariable or necessary relation which is not so in the case of latter one.

According to the Buddhists, these relations are of two types - tadutpatti (based on cause - effect relation) and tādātmya (based on the relation between a class and its sub class).

#### SECTION C

In the previous section, it has been pointed out that the vyāpti-sambandha is of two types - tādātmya and tadutpatti. In the present section let us discuss in details what these relations are, how do they function in any inferential argument.

In any logical relation neither of the two relations exists without the other. According to Dharmakīrti, the vyāpti sambandha is (i) either based on the cause-effect relation (tadutpatti) or (ii) is based on the relation between a class and its sub-class (tādātmya). Thus, 'there is smoke' implied that 'there is fire'; because 'fire' and 'smoke' are related as cause and effect. Since the effect cannot be produced without the cause,



if there was the effect then it followed that there was the cause also. Similarly, if a natural class includes its sub-class it follows that there is a sub-class would imply that there is a class. If a class of furniture includes a class of tables, then it follows that if X is a table, then it is a piece of furniture, too.

For the Buddhists, hetu or the middle term is of three kinds - Svabhāvahetu, Kāryahetu and anupalabdhi hetu<sup>13</sup>. And corresponding to these three types of hetu, we have three types of cognitions also - tādātmya, tadutpatti and abhāva.

Tādātmya corresponds to the svabhāva hetu in any inference. Svabhāva literally means 'own being'. Candrakīrti in his commentary Mādhyamaka Śāstra says that the word svabhāva has been used in Buddhist philosophy in two ways -

i) The essence or special property of a thing having no exception e.g. heat is the svabhāva or special property of fire. Ih yo dharmo yam padārtham na vyabhicarati, sa tasya svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate, aparapratibaddhattvāt "i.e., in this world an attribute which always accompanies an object, never parts from it, that, not being indissolubly connected with anything else, is known as the svabhāva or special property of that object".

ii) Svabhāva (own-being) is the contrary of parabhāva (other-being). Candrakīrti says - "Sva bhāvah Svabhāva iti yasya padārthasya yadātmiyam rūpam tat tasva svabhāva iti" - "Svabhāva is the own being, the very nature of a thing "Nāgārjuna says - akrtrimah svabhāvo hi nirapokṣah paratraca". That is really svabhāva which is not brought about by anything else, unproduced (akrtrimah), that which is not dependent on, not relative to anything other than itself, non-contingent, unconditioned (nirapekṣah paratraca). This view corresponds to substance in Western Philosophy. The Mādhyamika rejects first meaning of Svabhāva and accepts only the second. Candrakīrti says that which is brought about by, contingent on, relative to something else is not accepted. In the first view, heat depends on so many conditions, e.g. a match, lens, fuel etc. though it is the special property of fire. It is therefore not svabhāva in the highest sense of the word.

Therefore, svabhāva means own existence or essence. Tādātmya is a relation where the very existence of a thing contains the existence of another thing, E.g. This is a tree because it is śimsapā (ayam Vrksah śimsapātvad). Hence śimsapā is said to be the essence of the other, e.g. Vrksah, when it contains the latter in its connotation and is itself contained under the latter's extension, being

Vyāpya to the latter. The tree is related to every form of 'simsapā hence the existence of tree is deduced from it (i.e. from being of the nature of 'simsapā). This may be compared with the relation of entailment of modal logic. The other relation, tadutpatti is caused relation where existence of an effect is invariably due to the existence of a cause, e.g. smoke cannot be without fire<sup>14</sup>.

Dharmakīrti states that tādātmya is found in an inferable property only when the hetu exists as its essence only<sup>15</sup>. According to the Buddhists, 'simsapā is a tree' is a sort of analytical judgement, but it is not a judgement or proposition with two terms, but an anumāna with three terms, since a point - instant of reality, a localization in time-space must be understood, in order to make it a true cognition. It then receives the form, "This is a tree, because it is 'simsapā". Tree is analytically connected or deduced from 'simsapā. This tādātmya conception is the counter part of the Buddhist conception of Viruddha dharma samsarga, according to which, existence is conceived as split into chains of discrete moments (Kṣana). Two consecutive moments in the existence of what appears to us as the same thing constitute two different realities, every moment is another object. All the characteristics which can be given to an object at the same moment are called "ontologically connected" or tādātmya. Thus 'simsapā tree, hard body, thing, substance,

existence etc. will be ontologically connected in this sense, so that we can say that these are analytically connected also. Therefore, tādātmya is a sort of analyticity also. This tādātmya is contrasted with that of tadutpatti which is a relation between two moments following one another. The relation between the seed and the sprout, fire and smoke is a relation of two consecutive moments. Every relation (positive) which is not tadutpatti is a relation of tādātmya. This relation of tādātmya is a peculiar relation. Here the two objects are not absolutely identical since no relationship can be attached to the two absolutely identical objects. Neither the two are absolutely different since two absolutely different things can in no way be related. Therefore, this term tādātmya should be understood in a deeper sense. It represents the essential nature or svabhāva or the ontological identity of an aspect of an object with another aspect of the same object in the same locus (sāmānādhikarānya) where one aspect of the object is dependent on the other aspect of the same object, but not vice versa. When the hetu and the inferable entity are ontologically coexistent then we have an argument based on tādātmya. (E.g., This is a tree, because it is 'simsapā'). And when the inferable entity and the hetu are different in nature, then the argument is based on tadutpatti. (the relationship between smoke and fire).

Therefore a thing can indicate the existence of another thing only when there is a connection through one's intrinsic nature<sup>16</sup>. This is, when two things are found to be connected with each other by their own nature, then an object can be established inferentially. No vyāpti can be ascertained (vyāptigraha) in the case of one that is not connected through one's intrinsic nature<sup>17</sup>.

Tadutpatti is that inferential argument which is based on the Kārya hetu. A cause can be inferred from its effect, but not vice versa. E.g. There is fire here, because there is smoke. (Kāryam yathā agnir atra dhumād iti), but not the reverse. In both these cases, then, (i.e. in tādātmya and tadutpatti) there is always one-sided dependence. This tadutpatti relation can be ascertained by the test of pañcakarānī. This test consists of five steps, viz. (i) non-perception of an effect prior to its production, which means that effect is an event that appears only after a phenomenon known as its cause, (ii) perception of the cause, (iii) the appearance of the effect in immediate succession, (iv) disappearance of the cause, (v) disappearance of the effect in immediate succession<sup>18</sup>. This Buddhists method of determining the casual relation resembles Mill's method of difference in its double application. "If, all other conditions remaining the same, the appearance of one phenomenon is

immediately followed by that of another, and its appearance is immediately followed by the disappearance of the other, then the two are related as cause and effect. When once we know them to be related as cause and effect, we may very well take them as universally related"<sup>19</sup>.

These two relations can never be cognized by the senses (na sambandha indriyena grhyate-Prāmaṇa samuceaya), and therefore its basis can never be found in experience. These are a-priori principles. In this respect, then, the Buddhist logicians are non-empiricists. Every relation for them is to be traced to some a-priori source, and Vyāpti also is no exception to this. Not only are all relations a-priori in origin, the idea of necessity also is never supplied to us empirically. All experiences are contingent and conditional and can never yield the knowledge of necessity. Thus all relation and for that matter all necessary relations have an a-priori basis. (In Hume's language, the idea of necessity is only psychological, and can never be found in an empirical experience).

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, regard Vyāpti as invariable concomitance (Sāhacārya niyama Vyāptih). They do not talk of any necessity but only of nondeviatedness (avyabhicaritatva). It is an invariable and unconditional relation (niyata anaupādhika sambandha) of concomitance

which does not admit of any exception.

Since the Naiyāyikas are thorough empiricists, therefore they do not accept anything a-priori. So the only basis of Vyāpti, can be provided with, is experience. But necessity cannot be obtained through experience. For the Buddhists, the knowledge of Vyāpti is derived from the a-priori like principles of tādātmya and tadupatti and its ascertainment or application is in experience. Contrary to the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas start with experience and reach a-priori reasoning. That is to say, according to them the origin of vyāpti is in experience but its final ascertainment is in a-priori reasoning. Vyāpti is based on repeated uncontradicted observation of agreement in presence and also in absence between two phenomena which is ultimately ratified by tarka.

Tarka is a kind of Indirect Proof invented by the Naiyāyikas. For the sake of argument the Naiyāyikas adopt it in order to establish their own view-point. They at first put forward the opposite standpoint of that what they want to prove. If there is any contradiction or absurdity, that opposite conclusion is to be rejected, which can be compared to Reductio-ad-absurdum in Western Logic. From the contradiction of the opposite conclusion, it follows that their earlier conclusion is true. In this method the Naiyāyikas prove their standpoint or

remove the doubt of deviation of Vyāpti.

Naiyāyikas raise certain objections against the Buddhist's doctrine of tādātmya and tadutpatti. According to the Naiyāyikas, if we accept the tādātmya doctrine as a ground for ascertaining invariable concomitance or Vyāpti, the hetu becomes identical with sādhya, and it is impossible to establish the hetu and if it is not recognized, the sādhya is also not recognized<sup>20</sup>. Secondly tādātmya between two objects involves the simultaneous apprehension of them. But here in the present context, if the smoke and fire are simultaneously grasped, then what is the need of resorting to inference. Moreover, if they are not apprehended simultaneously, how could they be considered as identical<sup>21</sup>.

In reply to this it can be said that for the Buddhist tādātmya relation is not held between two identical things, because no relation can be held between two identical things, Secondly smoke fire example cannot be an instance of tādātmya relation, but an instance of tadutpatti relation. For the Buddhists, in tādātmya relation, the object is the same, but only two aspects of the objects are related. If this is the case, then the objection raised by the Naiyāyikas is not valid.

Thirdly, if the Buddhists hold that inspite of the simultaneous apprehension of effect and cause the



inference finds a justification, since it is necessary for sublatating a contrary character which otherwise may be ascribed to the object to be inferred. Jayanta points out that there is no <sup>such</sup> scope ~~such~~ for an eventuality when an object is rightly determined. E.g. if we see the head, hand etc. of an organic whole, we cannot hold that the object is a post. As far as the example cited by the Buddhists is concerned, there is no possibility of determining Śimsapā as other than a tree, since it is just possible that a tree may not be a Śimsapā but it is not possible that a śimsapā will be a śimsapā without being a tree<sup>22</sup>.

For the followers of Dignāga, these two relations (i.e. tādātmya and tadutpatti) which are essential for an inference are ontologically determined (Svabhāva - pratibandha). These two are the necessary condition for there being an inference at all. This is known as avinābhāva niyama. Here niyama is used in the sense of determination and not in the sense of rule. This determination involves some kind of necessity, whereas rule does not. The Naiyāyikas think that in inference there is no such determination involved whereas the followers of Dinnāga hold this determination be the only condition for inference<sup>23</sup>. For the Naiyāyikas, niyama does not involve necessity but only contingency. It follows only

from their strong empirical outlook. It is sāhacarya niyama.

This "ontologically determined" (svabhāva - prati-bandha) outlook of the Buddhists philosophers is philosophically significant departure from the general trend of Indian logic. Nyāya and Jaina and Early Buddhist logician thought of logic as intimately connected with things and not with concepts or language. But Dinnāga, for the first time was led to think that logic is primarily concerned with the analysis of concepts because here alone some kind of necessity can be obtained. But this shift stand was dictated by his metaphysical viewed and that too, is mainly his famous distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa which has considerably influenced the formulation of their view on inference. Now, this distinction can be understood as similar to the distinction between a thing and an object. A thing is what it is (Svalakṣaṇa), not yet definitely determined, and is real. It can be defined only ostensively. We cannot import reality to it, but can only affirm its reality. An object, on the other hand, can be described linguistically, because it contains more than the mere thing. It is invariably given in knowledge (Jñāna). Here it no longer remains isolated from the rest of the world and selfcontained. It enters into some kind of relation with other things. Since in knowledge, we always

have the knower (the subject), the object (known) and the relation which takes place between the knower and the known (i.e. this relation is the knowledge). Now, relation (Sambandha) always relates at least two things and therefore, this relation has to be different from what it relates and cannot occupy the same position as things. The necessity of relation is felt only when things become objects of knowledge. An object thus must contain more than the things. This extra-element, usually some relation, is a product of the encounter between a thing and a knower.

If inference is possible only because of relation its basis cannot be a thing, as that contains no relation. This is why only sāmānyalakṣaṇa (thing placed under a relation) can be an object of inference. Thus in this system, logic has to be concerned with the analysis of concepts which alone contain relations<sup>24</sup>. Therefore it follows that concepts always have things as their basis, and logic takes into account only such meaningful concepts and not like Vandhyāputra and so on. Both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas take anumāna as not only formally valid, but also materially true. But when the Buddhists talk of material truth, it is with reference to phenomenal reality (Samvrtika satya) and not with reference to the ultimate reality (Svalakṣaṇa).

For the Buddhists then, in tādātmya relation one aspect of an object is ontologically involved in another aspect of the same object. E.g. Śimsapā and Vrkṣa, both are Vrkṣas, but śimsapā is only an aspect of Vrkṣa. A question may arise here - Is it really an Anumāna, if it is analytic ?

The case of tadutpatti is somewhat different. It is a matter of presupposition and conscious being alone can only presuppose, things cannot. Presupposition naturally involves going back in time. Things at present time could not have occurred, had another thing in the past been not there. It is therefore linking of two things (one of them in present and the other one was in the past) under one concept of causality. E.g. in the case of smoke-fire relation, the inference is based on the analysis of one concept (smoke) as having reference to two things (Smoke-Fire).

The distinction between svalakṣana and sāmānyalākṣana impels the Buddhist logicians to believe in inference and therefore inference for them always refers towards a necessary relation in the empirical level. If it is not so, no sāmānyalākṣana conception can be formulated.

The Nyāya system of logic deals with things and not with objects or concepts. No concepts can be formulated through experience, unless and until certain a-priori principles are formulated. And for the Naiyāyikas

inference is based on the knowledge of coexistence as well as absence of the knowledge of deviation (Sahacāradarsanam vyabhicārādarsanam) whereas for the Buddhists, it is based on mainly two a-priori principles, tādātmya and tadutpatti. In order to eliminate effects of real-observation, various steps are taken by the Naiyāyikas, but ultimately for them, inference rests on the faith that since two things are found to exist together in the past they will also be found together in the future. Thus in the Nyāya system, inference referring to a future event is possible, whereas it is not the case in the Buddhists system. For the Buddhists inference refers either to the present or to the past, but inference cannot lead us to predict some thing for the future.

#### SECTION D

Since the Buddhists admit only two sources of knowledge perception and inference, let us see whether these two pramānas work simultaneously or individually in order to have any knowledge. According to the Buddhists, corresponding to these two sources of knowledge, the objects are also of two types. The external objective reality is in the form of isolated, discrete point

instants called moments (Kṣana), which are unique particulars (Svalakṣanas) and these are grasped by perception, called indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) in Nyāya philosophy. Thus through perception we only have a momentary glimpse of svalakṣanas. The world of appearance, the phenomenal world is merely a construction of an intellect and consists of generalized images. (Sāmānyalakṣanas) which are negative in the sense that they are merely mental and objectively unreal. These sāmānyalakṣanas are comprehended by means of inference. Thus it is clear that the function of these two sources of knowledge are totally different, one being a means of knowing the reality as such, whereas the other gives us only the knowledge of the universal which according to the Buddhist, is not real like the svalakṣanas. To some extent, the inference of the Buddhists can be compared with the determinate perception of the Naiyāyiks (Savikalpaka pratyakṣa). This restriction of each of the two pramāṇas to its own sphere is technically called pramāṇa Vyavasthā. This is opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of pramāṇa samplava or pramāṇa saṅkara which means that the same object can be comprehended by perception, inference or any other sources of knowledge. According to the Buddhists, the same object cannot be comprehended by both the pramāṇa. But Udyotakara in his Nyāya-Vārtika-tikā has pointed out that an object is not

comprehended by inference and other pramānas in the same way as it is comprehended in a different way i.e. through sense-contact. By inference it is comprehended without sense contact (through inferential mark). This controversy between the two schools regarding the scope of pramānas is due to their different metaphysical theories.

To the Buddhists, the external reality is of an individual unitary nature. It has not many aspects which may be comprehended by different pramānas. It is unique particular with no parts and exists only for a moment. Svalakṣaṇas when expressed in a judgement, require the help of inference, but otherwise these are known only by means of perception. Thus an inferential judgement though consists of mental image and sāmānyalakṣaṇas, has a case of reality since it is based on svalakṣaṇas.

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