

CHAPTER IV

Objections to Moral Realism

Moral realists have been characterized as those who hold that moral claims purport to report facts, that they are evaluable as true or false in light of whether the facts are as the claims purport, and that at least some such claims are actually true. Many, however, have thought that there are good reasons for rejecting moral realism so conceived.

The most telling objection is advanced by J. L. Mackie in his book *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*.¹ His skeptical view is indicated by the subtitle of this work itself. He says that moral realism is committed to the existence of moral entities but there are no such entities. So realism is false, Mackie's chief contributions to the current debate on moral realism are twofold: (i) that people in general thought (or their language suggested) that moral values were objective realities but that they were wrong and (ii) that morality, in the narrow sense, as a system of particular sort of constraints on conduct, is adopted to facilitate co-operative action.² We shall concentrate on the first part of Mackie's thesis on moral facts.

Mackie's opening page of the book starts with the sentence, "There are no objective values"³, and in the third paragraph of the same page, he says, "... values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world."⁴ He goes on to say that no one can deny the objectivity of "the natural, factual differences on the basis of which differing values are assigned".⁵ "They", he adds, "are indeed part of the furniture of the world, ... but not, perhaps, their differences in value."⁶ Mackie, thus, says that values lack objectivity, for like the natural descriptive features on which they supervene, values are not part of the world, that is, do not exist. Mackie argues that there could be

no moral facts of an objective kind, having an existence independent of our judgment of the case. Mackie gives several reasons for his anti-realist claims in ethics.

1. Mackie, in support of his thesis, draws on the argument from relativity. The most common argument against moral facts, which Mackie calls the argument from relativity, starts from the observation that moral disagreement is widespread. For example, Mackie cites "the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another, and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community."⁷

These observations provide the basis for an inductive inference to the best explanation:

...the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values.⁸

Mackie also dismisses the hypothesis that moral disagreement "results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence,"⁹ or from differing applications of "very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society."¹⁰ The observed patterns of moral disagreements reflect ways of life. The best explanation of these phenomena does not require any allegiance to objective moral facts. There are, hence, no moral facts, according to Mackie.

2. "Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness"¹¹, says Mackie. According to him, this argument has two parts, the one metaphysical and the other epistemological. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong¹²

has spotted another dimension of the argument, and puts it under the heading, psychological.

2.a. Mackie begins his argument from queerness on epistemological ground saying that our ordinary ways of knowing cover only “sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inferences or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these.”¹³ Objective moral values could not be known by any of these methods. “Correspondingly, if we were aware of them [objective moral values], it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else”.¹⁴ He also claims that positing moral intuition is implausible. “‘A special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort.”¹⁵

2. b. Sinnott-Armstrong locates a psychological segment too in Mackie’s queerness-argument. Moral facts are also supposed to bear a queer relation to motives and reasons. Realism is committed to the existence of moral entities that, on being beheld, would necessarily compel an agent to allegiance. As Mackie puts it, objective moral values would have a “power, when known, automatically to influence the will.” He refers to Plato, Clark and Hume in his support. In Plato’s version: “The Form of the Good is such that it provides the knower with ... an overriding motive.” He also refers to Clark’s idea of “necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such-and-such an action built into it.” “... if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built in it.”¹⁶ What Mackie is driving at is the relationship between motivational powers and distinct existences.

2.c. Mackie, finally points out the metaphysical queerness. Here, his argument largely consists of questions and he seems to think that the defenders of moral facts will not be in a position to answer his questions. His pattern of argument is as follows:

What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty - say, causing pain just for fun - and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be 'consequential' or 'supervenint', it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what *in the world* is signified by this 'because'? ... How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential?¹⁷

Mackie's position is called the 'error' theory for he thought that our ordinary moral language embodies an error to which we were unthinkingly prone, namely that being right or being wrong were properties of things, acts or persons independently of our judgment or sentiment, that we could recognize (and, of course, failed to recognize) what would still be true, even if we have never noticed, or never had a moral thought at all. We have stated above Mackie's arguments regarding the queerness of moral realism. Now there may not be any moral facts, but not for the reasons Mackie advances. We shall, in what follows, try to answer, as far as possible, Mackie's claims against moral realism.

When Mackie argues that the moral realist is ultimately committed to an implausible intuitionist epistemology, obviously, he has in mind, traditional moral intuitionists, e.g., Price, Reid, Moore, Broad, Ross, etc. Against the charge of the epistemological queerness of an 'implausible faculty of intuition' for knowing moral facts, it may be pointed out that it is also hard to figure out how we can know essences, causes, numbers, propositions, meanings and so on, but most philosophers do not deny facts of these sorts, rather, they go on talking about them. In response, Mackie says, "I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms."¹⁸ He seems to reject other non-empirical terms along with moral facts. However, it remains to be seen whether investigations of these other areas will lead us to expand Mackie's list of ordinary ways of knowing. For the present the main point is that these epistemological considerations do not yield Mackie's ontological conclusion. Even if, we do not have any epistemological access to moral facts, that does not show that they do not exist. May be we cannot believe in facts which we cannot know; but if so, for the same reason, we also should not believe that such facts do *not* exist, if we cannot know that they do not exist. "The only way", Sinnott says, "to get from 'no knowledge' to 'no fact' is *via* a premise that we would be able to know moral facts if there were any. But Mackie gives us no reason to accept such a premise. So it seems reasonable to suspend belief until we find a better ground."¹⁹

Let us now come to the psychological queerness. It is not clear here what Mackie wants to say. Clearly, moral facts themselves cannot motivate the will. Question of motivation arises only when we have access to that which is supposed to motivate us. On Mackie's own admission there are no moral facts to have access to on our part. It seems that our beliefs rather than facts that have the queer relationship to

motivation. Supposing that moral facts are 'utterly different' from other kinds of facts in having the 'queer relationship to motivation, what is not clear is how does this difference in power makes them suspect metaphysically? Magnets have a power of attraction that makes them different from anything else, but that does not lead us to deny the existence of magnets. What we need is some reason to believe in magnets or moral facts. If we have these reasons, the uniqueness of their power hardly disproves their existence. We are also not quite satisfied with his claim that motivation follows 'automatically'. It is questionable whether moral beliefs are as closely related to motivation, even in a realist claim, to be automatic. If I am in a zoo and a tiger escapes from its cage, it will influence my choice to immediately flee, but the relationship is not conceptually necessary. Not everyone perhaps will move from the path of the tiger. A person suffering from morbidity or death wish, or having lost all zest for life might want to be attacked and devoured by the tiger. Analogically, a not-to-be-doneness as per Mackie's analysis is built into the moral belief that we ought not to cheat the tax department. Yet, there are people who seem not to care at all about cheating on their taxes even though they believe that tax fraud is a wrong principle. So it clearly goes against Mackie's claim that everyone who believes that an act is immoral is at least somewhat motivated not to do it. It is not true that always and without fail moral beliefs are tied to motivation.

In his final kind of queerness - metaphysical queerness, Mackie is raising the question of the relationship between a natural fact, like causing a pain and a moral fact that causing pain is wrong. The mystery of relationship cannot be an argument for giving up moral facts. It is indeed a hard question to answer. But there are no dearths of cases where it is hard to state or clarify a certain relationship that does not mean that

there is a reason to doubt the facts about them. E.g., it is hard to say how biological facts are related to non-biological facts, such as facts from physics and psychology. That inability does not lead us to deny biological facts. Our inability to spell out relations amongst facts might be a reason to doubt those facts, but it is hardly a reason to deny that those facts exist.

Besides, it is not very hard to specify the relation between moral facts and non-moral facts. The relation may be characterized as supervenience. The fact that you ought to pay your tailor is supervenient on the fact that he made your dress on the understanding that you would pay him. That someone is a talented painter is supervenient on the non-evaluative fact that his pictures are exhibited by the Lalitkala Academy. On the level of moral language, the supervenient relationship between evaluative words like 'good' and descriptive words was pointed out by R. M. Hare in the fifties of the last century. He says "... one of the most characteristic feature of value-words is a feature sometimes described by saying that 'good' and other such words are the names of 'supervenient' or consequential properties."²⁰ The relation of supervenience which applies to moral language is also applicable to moral facts.

Recent work on supervenience distinguishes several different relations. Defenders of moral facts do not all agree on which relation holds, but whatever be the relations, each has an answer to Mackie's question: "what in the world is signified by this 'because'?" Even if they cannot justify their preference or explain why one relation holds rather than another, that is no reason to deny that moral facts exist and have some relationship to non-moral facts.

In rounding up our evaluation of Mackie's objections to moral realism we observe that Mackie might be right to suppose that no moral facts exist. He is wrong to suppose

that realists are committed to their existence. We may make another comment. Mackie's own position in his *Ethics* is no less queer. He believed that once we had recognized our error in moralizing, we could continue to moralize, knowing that what we were doing was not discovering or reporting upon facts but drawing out the implications of the rules we must devise (or at any rate, have devised) for social harmony in a world of limited resources and parochial affections. One may wonder how one can or try for a harmonized social living on a systematic adherence to false beliefs.

Philosophers who have contributed to the volume published in honour of Mackie have responded differently to Mackie's thesis.²¹ We shall state some of these below.

According to Mackie, it is a (perpetual) error to suppose that there are moral entities, and hence his theory is named the "error theory". We have already noted that we have moral beliefs which we take to be true. But we are suffering from error. Our moral beliefs are not meaningless, but false. Mackie's error theory is a *prima facie* descriptivist antirealist position: it maintains that there are no moral facts. In addition he accepts that moral judgments are meant to describe the world. Is this combination of moral antirealism and descriptivism plausible? Simon Blackburn certainly thinks that it is not. Blackburn, whose own views seem to be indeterminate between descriptivism and non-descriptivism, thinks that Mackie's error theory is inconsistent. This is partly because of the apparent difficulty in attributing a pervasive systematic error to our making moral judgments. As Blackburn puts it, "[T]he puzzle is why, in the light of the error, Mackie did not at least indicate how a shorn vocabulary [that is, a moral vocabulary cleansed and purged of its ontological error] would look, and why he did not himself go on only to shornalize, not moralize."²² According to Blackburn, this is

so seriously puzzling that Mackie's failure to shmoralize "... in itself suggests that no error can be incorporated in mere use of these concepts. And ... this is enough of a puzzle to cast doubt back on to the original diagnosis of error."²³ To try to avoid the pervasive and systematic error should appear reasonable to those who were aware of it. But Mackie seemed "quite happy to go on to express a large number of straightforward moral views about the good life, about whether it is permissible to commit suicide or abortion, and so on [namely], to moralize rather than to shmoralize."²⁴

Let us now turn to Mackie's objections to the existence of moral facts on the strength of moral relativity. There are many ethicists, like Gilbert Harman, and Bernard Williams who have contributed to the debate on moral relativity, if not with the same intention as Mackie's. Defenders of moral realism might question whether moral codes and beliefs really do vary as much as Mackie made it out to be. In considering the argument from relativity, it is useful to distinguish two types of cases.²⁵

(i) Cases concerning which we are inclined to say when in Rome do as the Romans, and

(ii) Cases in which we think that even with respect to their morality, the members of a society ought not to do as they *customarily* do.

In the first category belong social conventions of politeness, deference and etiquette. Although the conventions vary from one society to another, that particularly does not disturb us. These conventions which have become a practice with us are accepted unreflectively. They help smooth relationship with others, making certain activities more predictable and easier to participate in. They make it possible for one to relax in various social situations and reduce tension.

In the second category belong conventions having to do with marriage and family, position of women and slaves (if any), cruelty to animals, etc. Here also we are not very much perturbed by the relativity of social practices because we feel that the local moral practices are based on false beliefs about the difference between man and man, between man and woman and between man and animals. Where moral intuitions are not clear due to false assumptions we are not disturbed for the reason that we feel the conflict will gradually diminish with the greater awareness and education about the matter.

Relativity of moral codes seems to pinch on us when we feel not only that a certain moral practices are objectionable, but also considers it wrong of us to engage in the practices even temporarily. Cannibalism is a case in point

A more promising defense claims that, even though people disagree about many moral issues, they agree about some other moral issues. It is artificial to treat different cultures as absolutely airtight and self-contained systems. A fully individual culture is at best a rare thing. Cultures, subcultures, fragments of cultures, constantly meet with one another and exchange and modify practices and attitudes. Social practices would never come with a certificate saying that they belong to genuinely different cultures, so that they were granted immunity to alien judgments and reactions.

It is true that when a society is exposed to another culture, it is like a 'confrontation.' The new situation requires the society to confront it, to look beyond its existing rules and practices. People can and must react when they are confronted with another culture. Not so to react is something strange. Similarly, if a person is constrained to live in another culture, it comes to her as a shock, and causes lot of

tension. Adjustment is also made by applying their existing notions. This shows that the ethical norms of a given culture can always stretch beyond its own boundary

It is important that this is a point about the content and aspirations of ethical thought, not about its objectivity. Even if there is no way in which divergent ethical beliefs and practices can be brought to converge by independent inquiry and rational argument, this fact will not imply relativism. Each outlook may still be making claims it intends to apply to the whole world, not just to that part of the world which is its 'own' world.

In this connection we may refer to Paul Taylor's paper "Ethnocentric Fallacy."²⁶ He argues that if someone's moral convictions are relative to the moral code of a particular society, then there is the danger of committing the ethnocentric fallacy. Persons, belonging to a particular culture, for example, 'the liberal western society'—the society which has adopted a moral code embodying varying principles of justice, impartiality and brotherhood extending to all human beings, may assume that a moral claim acceptable from the point of view of western liberal morality is true and all moral convictions which do not accord with those of that society are false. The absolute values of Christianity which were foisted upon conquered tribes-people in the wake of free trade systematically suppressed or denigrated local cultures in the name of superior global, white civilization.

But the above liberal code of conduct is only one among many. However, deeply the conscience and moral outlook of a society has been shaped by it; we must recognize that other societies in the history of the world have been able to function on the basis of other codes. There are societies with caste systems, societies which practice slavery, societies in which women are treated as inferior to men and so on. The claim

that a person who is a member of one of those societies and who knows its moral codes, nevertheless does not have *true* moral convictions, it seems to me, is fundamentally correct. But if we assume that the moral code of liberal Western society is the only genuine morality, then it becomes nonsensical to talk of alternative moral codes. Thus the argument from relativity may be given a reading according to one's advantage - namely that one's own moral point of view is true and others' false.

The very notion of disagreement of values which underlies moral relativity is not really possible because it leads to a mutual and total incomprehensibility. Two people can disagree if one can understand what the other is talking about. If there is no possibility of communication, there can be no disagreement. People do, of course, sometimes appear to experience a yawning gap with others. However, that does not literally mean that they have reached the limit of unintelligibility, but only that there are tremendous differences. To say that there are differences presupposes that one understands what is being said by the other. Suppose, I have visited a country, the people of which follow a practice which I find morally revolting e.g., incest marriage. The people of the country may be able to justify it but the justification leaves us totally unconvinced and shocked. All the same, I understand the other's attempt as justification but fail to be impressed. Let us take another example, the cannibal society. When cannibalism is a custom in a society, the members of the society cannot be blamed for eating human flesh. We feel uncomfortable about saying that it is merely wrong of them to eat human flesh. On the other hand, we also believe that this practice is objectionable. If I am a guest to a family in that society, it would be wrong of me to engage in eating flesh; but there is hardly any break-down of communication to create

incomprehensibility. Thus, what relativity of morals shows is that we have a complexity of reactions to what are considered as moral custom, practices, duty or obligation. It does not mean that there are no objective moral values.

We may state another well-known answer to the argument from relativity. It is true that specific moral rules or codes are relative to a particular culture and community. Hence, they are not candidates for objective validity. But these are the instantiations of very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly, to some extent, in all societies. Such general principles when assimilated with different concrete situations, different existing social patterns or different preferences will generate different specific moral codes. To make clear what we mean we may use the analogy from the working of language. There are certain underlying constitutive rules of language which are manifested by means of certain specific conventional devices. These conventions differ from one linguistic community to another and reflect the uniqueness, the idiosyncrasies, and the peculiarities of a particular linguistic community. It is by virtue of these underlying unities of language that translation from one language to another is possible.²⁷ In the same way the specific moral rules may be the expression and manifestation of some very general basic moral principles.

In encountering relativism we may take seriously features of our value experiences. Courage, courtesy, temperance, prudence, generosity, proper pride, loyalty and justice are all sound Aristotelian virtues over all the world (although they may be manifested in widely differing circumstances) because these qualities do have effects whether we notice them or not. Sometimes even the continued existence of vice rests upon the manifest advantage of virtue. From this we may proceed a step further. There is a range of ethical concepts, call them 'thick' ethical concepts *a la* Bernard Williams – a mixed

bag of virtues and vices alike – like murder, adultery, truth-telling, suicide etc. , - which are in the same sense constitutive of a morality. In the first place, it is they which enable us to recognize a justification as a moral justification, and in the second, it is through them that a way of life as a morality has points of contact with other moralities. A similar point is made by Hume in one of his dialogues against Palamades, a character in the dialogue. Hume emphasizes the similarities which are to be recognized by

“...examining the first principle, which each nation establishes, of blame and censure. The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south, but both spring from the same mountain... In how many circumstances would an Athenian and a Frenchman of merit certainly resemble one another? Good sense, knowledge, wit, eloquence, humanity, fidelity, truth, justice, courage, temperance, constancy, dignity of mind, this you have all ‘omitted’.”²⁸

What intended to be shown here is that there are certain ‘thick’ ethical concepts which are not culture-specific. They are shared across cultures. So, relativity is not an absolutely good argument to criticize moral realism.

However, Williams who has introduced the distinction between thick and thin moral concepts is not optimistic about the applicability of thick ethical concepts to overcome moral divergence, for the facts of historical and social variation is undeniable. He is only hopeful that some homogenous structure of thick ethical concepts will emerge across historical and social variation.²⁹

Another objection to moral realism connected to the above has been made by Williams. It is based on the fundamental difference between the scientific and the ethical. It has been observed that in a scientific enquiry there is a convergence on an answer to the question as to how things are in the area of the ethical there are no such convergence. Science gives us, it has been claimed an absolute conception of the world in which all the other perspectival conceptions of it converge. In ethics, this convergence is not to be found. One might hope that convergence in ethical outlook will take place. Even if that happens, it will be wrong to think the convergence has been guided by how things actually are. In William's words:

In a scientific enquiry there should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of that convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how the things are, whereas in the area of the ethical, at least at a high level of generality, there is no such coherent hope.³⁰

The point of the contrast, he says, is:

... even if that convergence in ethical outlook happens, it will not be correct to think that it has come about because convergence has been guided by how things are, whereas convergences in science might be explained in this way if it does happen.³¹

What Williams is trying to say is that in the scientific case, theory is tested against the world. But in ethics we need not make any assumptions about the world to explain moral observations.

There is then Gilbert Harman's well-known argument for the general conclusion that moral realism is untenable. In the opening chapters of the *Nature of Morality* he argues that ethics is problematic because it appears that "there can be no explanatory chain between moral principles and particular observings in the way that there can be such a chain between scientific principles and particular observings."³² For example, Harman points out that if we see some young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it we do not need to conclude that their behavior is wrong just as clearly as we see that it is an instance of cat burning behavior.³³ But he argues, moral facts have no role to play in explaining this sort of observation: they have no role to play in the best causal explanation of this sort of observation. We can grant that we are repulsed by the behavior of the hoodlums because it is wrong, that the urchins were depraved. The point is just that the wrongness of their behavior does not cause our observation that the behavior is wrong, nor does it cause our repulsion at that behavior. All these events have perfectly natural, non-moral causes, and it is those causes, rather than any alleged moral facts, that seem to figure in the best (causal) explanation of their effects.³⁴

The above argument is based on the umbrella conception of science that it is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. Naturalism has different forms. The one resorted to here appears to be methodological naturalism and not naturalism as a substantive thesis. Methodological naturalism treats the methods of science and those methods alone, as basic sources of evidence. There are reasons to doubt its applicability in moral explanation. Moreover, the objective moral properties play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of moral beliefs and judgements and morally significant behavior. We are inclined to believe that moral depravity leads people to do terrible things or that moral decency keeps people from

doing these things. This seems to make sense if moral properties enter into causal explanations. Again, one might “think that certain regularities, for instance, honesty’s engendering trust or justice’s commanding allegiance, or kindness’s encouraging friendship, are real regularities that are unidentifiable and inexplicable except by appeal to moral properties. Her, too, we have a case for moral properties playing a role in causal explanation.”³⁵

Notes and References:

1. J. L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, Penguin Books, 1977. 1983 edn. .
2. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
6. *Ibid.*, pp.16-17.
7. *Ibid.*, 36.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
12. *Moral Skepticism*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 46-50.
13. Mackie, *Ethics: inventing Right and Wrong, op. cit.*, p. 39.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
15. *Ibid.*, p.39. NB.Robert Audi in "Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism" defends the possibility of moral knowledge and offers a reconstruction of intuitionism of Ross's kind. He emphasizes the feature of non-inferentiality rather than infallibility. He tries to show that intuitionism is neither closed off to arguments against moral judgements nor are they irreversible or infallible. Some moral propositions are immediately self-evident, others are not so obvious and need reflection .His example is: If my friend asks my help for loading his car, I ought to immediately load his car. But I shall reflect if the friend is about to abandon his wife and children. Intuitionism is contextual.

Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, eds, Greco and Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, pp. 275 off.

16. *Ibid.* p.40

17. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

19. *Moral Skepticism, op. cit.*, p. 46.

20. R.M.Hare, *The Language of Morals*, Oxford, University Press, 1952, p.80.

21. *Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie*, Ted Honderich, ed., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

22. Simon Blackburn, "Error and the Phenomenology of Value" in Ted Honderich, ed., *Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 2.

23. *Ibid.*, p.1.

24. *Ibid.*, p.2. Parenthesis ours.

25. Gilbert Harman, *The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp.96-98. Emphasis original.

26. Paul Taylor, "The Ethnocentric Fallacy", *The Monist*, Vol. 47, 1963, pp. 563-584.

27. John, R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 33-40.

28. David Hume, "A Dialogue" in *Essay: Moral, Political and Literary*, Longmans, 1869, Chapter 3, p.297. Source, R.W. Beardsmore, *Ethical Reasoning*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

29. Bernard Williams, "Truth in Ethics", *Ratio*, VIII, 3, 1995, pp.241-242.

30. Bernard Williams, "The Scientific and the Ethical", in *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence, Supplement to Philosophy*, 17, 1986, p. 214.
31. *Ibid.*, p.215.
32. Gilbert Harman, *The Nature of Morality*, NY: Oxford University Press, 1977, p.9.
33. *Ibid.*, p.4.
34. *Ibid.*, p.10.
35. Sayre-McCord, "Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence" in *Essays on Moral Realism*, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, p.276.