

---

---

# *Chapter - III*

---

---

## CHAPTER – III

### **The concept of *Tātparya* in *Navya Nyāya***

A sentence is a collection of words. When a sentence is considered as made up of words, having independent meaning of each of its own, it requires an explanation as to how a connected meaning is understood from the sentence. Different schools of thought in India discussed the matter resulting in the evolution of various theories. *Mīmāṃsā*, the *vākyaśāstra*, are prominent in this field. Various characteristics of this problem have been discussed by Bhartṛhari and different observations were noted. Of course, he clarified his view in this regard that the sentence as a whole is the unit of utterance.

*Vākya* as used by Pāṇini is understood as the general sense of an utterance without defining it. Kātyāyana, who defines it as group of words having a finite verb (*ekam vākyam*). Pāṇini, as it appears, does not contribute to such a view of Kātyāyana. Pāṇini's view about sentence seems more to that of *Mīmāṃsakas* than to that of Logicians. Grammarians later agreed that a simple sentence may have more than one finite verb provided other conditions are fulfilled. To illustrate, *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*, "See, the deer is running" – is an example of its kind.<sup>(1)</sup> Sentence or sentence-meaning does not referred to by the *Nyāyasūtra* whereas the *Nyāya* is mainly concerned with the word meaning. In *Tarkasaṅgraha* it is said that when a group of letters arranged in a fixed order is called a word.<sup>(2)</sup> The essential nature of a word lies in its meaning.<sup>(3)</sup> The meaning of a word consists in its relation to the object which it signifies. Thus we can say that words are significant symbols.

Verbal knowledge is produced by verbal testimony, which is dependent on the use of sentences. Though a sentence is a combination of words yet any combination of words cannot be regarded as sentence, or to be more precise, meaningful sentences. For example, if one says – “The cow is white”, it carries some meaning; but another arrangement of the same set of words conveys nothing, for example, “The cow, white, is”. This is, at best, a pseudo-sentence (*vākyabhāsa*). ‘Cow, horse, man, elephant’ is another example of meaningful words that have failed to combine into a meaningful sentence. There are certain conditions, which are to be fulfilled if one is to understand a sentence. According to the Nyāya school, there are four such conditions: *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, *tātparya* and *ākāṃkṣā*. These four conditions as such do not become operative in producing a meaningful sentence, but cognition of these conditions are necessary for our verbal knowledge. Let us explain it with an example. There is a sentence – “cow exists”. When the speaker utters this sentence, we are sure that he is uttering a meaningful sentence. But it may so happen that the hearer is unaware of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, and *sannidhi* operative in this sentence. He may not know the speaker’s intention, i.e., *tātparya*. In that case, the hearer would not have any verbal cognition. So, for the generation of verbal cognition, the mere presence of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *sannidhi* and *tātparya* is not enough; the hearer must be aware that there are *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *sannidhi*, and *tātparya*. Let us see the nature of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti* and *tātparya*.

There is nothing in the Nyāya concept of a meaningful sentence (*vākya*) to show that all four of them are involved in the very concept of a sentence, though cognition of these conditions are necessary for understanding a meaningful sentence. That is, cognition of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, etc., is essential for the generation of *vākyaṛthabodha*.

## **Ākāṁkṣā**

In the case of the generation of verbal knowledge, we require the cognition of *ākāṁkṣā*, without which we cannot have verbal cognition. Verbal knowledge is generated from meaningful sentences. A sentence is a combination of different words. These words refer to different objects. When a relation is established between these objects and is captured properly by the sentence (which is an ordered sequence of words), it can be said that verbal knowledge has been generated. We require *ākāṁkṣā* for the understanding of this relation among the objects referred to by different words.

*Padasya padāntaravyatirekaprayuktānanubhāvakatvam ākāṁkṣā*

*Tarkasaṁgraha* says – the inability of a word to produce without another word, an apprehension of the relation between what is signified by these two words is *ākāṁkṣā*<sup>(4)</sup>. By *ākāṁkṣā* or expectancy is meant that quality of the words of a sentence by which they expect or imply one another. A word is not solely self-sufficient in conveying a complete meaning but in order to express the complete meaning the word should be brought into relation with other words. When someone said the statement like “bring out a pot” the hearer understand the meaning of that statement. But when the hearer hears only the word ‘bring’ it cannot give a unified sense. Hence, the word ‘bring’ has an expectation for another word to give a complete or unified meaning. Such mutual expectancy of the words of a sentence is regarded as *ākāṁkṣā*. *Ākāṁkṣā* can be considered from two aspects – psychological and syntactic. The Naiyāyikas consider it as a syntactic expectancy. When someone said the statement like “bring out a pot” the hearer understand the meaning of that statement. But when the hearer hears only the word ‘bring’ – it can not give a unified sense.

Such mutual expectancy of the words of a sentence is regarded as *ākāṁkṣā*.

In this context a point may be noted. Though there is one *ākāṁkṣā* in a simple statement ('bring out a pot') but there are many longer statements where we observed more than one *ākāṁkṣā*. *Ākāṁkṣā* is thus a kind of 'syntactical demand'.<sup>(5)</sup> That is to say, the relation between *kriyatva* and *karakatva* is the *akamksa*. If so many words like 'man', 'horse', 'dog', 'tree', 'cow', etc are uttered, they can not convey a complete meaning. Because there is no syntactical demands between those words.<sup>(6)</sup> In spite of all these things we may have some instances. Where, the relation of *kriyatva* and *kāarakatva* is not present between the constituent words of a sentence, e.g., "so' *yam Devadatta*". Moreover the relation of *kriyatva* and *kāarakatva* is not necessary for the relation of identity.

The question arises where does this *ākāṁkṣā* belong to? In a conversational situation there are speaker and a listener. The listener has the verbal cognition, when an individual understands the relation among the referents of the terms that constitute the sentence generating verbal cognition. Apart from the speaker and the relation between the term and the referent, there are three major factors – the listener, the term and the referent. The question is: does *akamksa* belong to the referent (*padārthagata*) or to the listener (*śrotrgata* or *ātmagata*) or to the term (*padagata*) itself?

According to the first view, *ākāṁkṣā* means *avinābhāva* or universal concomitance between the objects. What is the exact significance of *avinābhāva*? Suppose there is a sentence having two words 'a' and 'b'. If there is *ākāṁkṣā*, then it is not the case that the negation of the referent of 'b' can reside along with the referent of 'a'.

This is called *avinābhāva* and it indicates that *ākāṁkṣā* is a characteristic associated with the referent (*padārthagata*). Let us take an example to clarify the point. In the sentence *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* (The jar is blue) the term *Nīlo* indicates 'blue' and *ghaṭa* indicates 'a jar'. If there is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case, then it is not the case that the negation of the jar resides along with something blue. In other words, the negation of the referent of *ghaṭa* does not reside along with the referent of *nīla*. This explanation of '*avinābhāva*', however, is not complete. Referring back to our first example which indicates that the sentence is constituted of two terms 'a' and 'b', we can say that we have to specify the relation in which the referent of 'a' does not reside in some locus along with the negation of the referent of 'b'. If we do not specify the relation, then a difficulty may arise. Let us think that someone employs the following sentence, *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra is cooking). The case-ending *tip* attached with the verb-root *pac* refers to the *karṭṛtva* (agency) and this would have *ākāṁkṣā* with Caitra who is the *kartā* or agent here. According to the criterion set by the propounders of *avinābhāva*, the negation of *karṭṛtva* should not reside along with Caitra. But if we do not specify the relation, then the negation of *karṭṛtva* can reside along with Caitra. The locus of Caitra may be the ground (*bhūtala*) on which he is standing in the relation of conjunction or *saṁyoga*. The ground or the *bhūtala* cannot be an agent or *kartā*. Therefore, the negation of *karṭṛtva* can reside there. Therefore, the negation of *karṭṛtva* resides along with Caitra in *bhūtala*. So the criterion of *avinābhāva* would be violated in this case. So we have to specify the relation. If we say that the absence of *karṭṛtva* does not reside in a locus where Caitra resides in the relation of identity or *tādātmya*, then the difficulty would be solved. Caitra does not reside in the ground or *bhūtala* in the relation of *tādātmya* or identity. Referring back to the example of the sentence constituted of 'a' and 'b', we can say in a general way that if there is

*ākāṁkṣā*, then the negation of the referent of 'b' resides in some locus, where the referent of 'a' does not reside in the relation of identity, i.e., the negation is conceived here as a reciprocal negation or *anyonyabhāva*. Now, if we explain the concept of *ākāṁkṣā* in this fashion, then it becomes a characteristic of the objects referred to by the words without any doubt. The philosophers here raise a question: should we regard these objects as qualified by any property? If we consider the object to be qualified by its generic property, then immense difficulties follow. Let us take a concrete case to show this – *nīlāṁ sarojaṁ* (i.e., The lotus is blue). According to the former stipulation (taken simply) there would be a universal concomitance between the two constituent concepts, viz., between blueness and lotus species. In other words, there should be the reciprocal negation of some object in lotus, which has the negation of blue in it. If we consider lotus to be qualified by lotushood, then we are to think of each and every lotus to be having the reciprocal negation of that object, which has the negation of blue. Now, if we take such an object to be white object, then it is difficult to imagine that every lotus would be having its negation, since we know that there are white lotuses also. To avoid this difficulty it may be suggested that the object should not be qualified by the generic property, but by a particular property. So, lotuses, which are white, or those, which are not blue, are excluded from our domain of discourse. The difficulty may be avoided in the former case. But it cannot be avoided in the following two instances – *vimalāṁ jalāṁ nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣaḥ carati* (i.e., How clear is the water of the river / The buffalo is grazing on the bank). If *ākāṁkṣā* is *avinābhāva*, then these two sentences would be reduced to a single sentence as there is *avinābhāva* between the river and its bank or to be more specific, between the referent of the sixth case-ending attached after *nadī* and the bank; and the intended construction of the

word *kacche* as being a member of a separate sentence would become impossible.

This, however, is not the only difficulty, which is to be found in this definition of *ākāṁkṣā*. This definition is vitiated by certain other fallacies. In the sentence-*prameyam abhidheyam* there may be some problems. If we are to maintain the former criterion, then we are to think, that which is *prameya* has the reciprocal negation of the object having the negation of *abhidheya*. We know that *abhidheyatva* is an exclusively affirmative property (*kevalānvayī dharma*). That which is *abhidheyatva* is omnipresent. Hence its negation cannot be found. Similarly *prameyatva* is an exclusively affirmative property (*kevalānvayī dharma*). That which is *prameyatva* is omnipresent. Its negation cannot be found. So the former definition of *ākāṁkṣā* cannot be applied in this case. So we cannot accept the alternative that *ākāṁkṣā* is *padārthagata*.

Now let us deal with the second alternative that *ākāṁkṣā* belongs to the self (*ātmagata*) what has the verbal cognition. In our everyday vocabulary, we use the term 'desire' as an English equivalent to *akamksa*. So this second alternative tallies with the common view. In this alternative, it has been suggested that the desire to relate the objects denoted by the words constituting a sentence is *ākāṁkṣā*. The sentence-*ghaṭaḥ asti* (The jar exists) is constituted of four words – *ghaṭa*, *su*, *as* and *tip*. The will cognise (the relation among) the four objects referred to by these four terms and grasped via memory is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case. These words, which constitute a sentence, should have a certain order and when we desire to relate different referents of these terms we have to maintain the order. Otherwise improperly ordered terms would claim to constitute a meaningful sentence, if we desire so, e.g., *ghaṭa*, *tip*, *as*, *su*.

Let us consider the sentence – “The jar is blue”. If we want to have verbal cognition from this combination, we have to accept that first of all the referents of these words would be remembered by us and then if we can establish a relation among these objects, we would be able to have verbal cognition. Suppose the objects are presented to us not by the knowledge of *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*, that is, by *vṛttijñāna*, but by some other way. For example by the relation of being present at the same time (*samakālinatva*). Would we say that this is another condition for producing verbal cognition? This is not the intention of the Nyāya philosophers. Because the Naiyāyikas think that in the case of verbal cognition the referents must be present via *vṛttijñāna*. So we must include the factor of *vṛttijñāna* in the definition of *ākāṅkṣā*. The revised definition would be as follows “The will to have the cognition of relating the objects referred to via *vṛttijñāna* by different words constituting a sentence producing verbal cognition is *ākāṅkṣā*”. Even if we accept this definition, we would not be able to avoid difficulties. Let us consider a sentence from the Vedas – The sacrifice called Viśvajit should be performed (*viśvajitā yajeta*). What is *ākāṅkṣā* in this case? *Ākāṅkṣā* is the will to have the cognition of the relation among the objects referred to by different words of the above sentence via *vṛtti*. But only that does not satisfy our will. We would be eager to know as to who would be the performer of the rite. The answer will be – “one who is eager to attain *svarga*”. This is not indicated by any word of the sentence. So this object is not presented by *vṛttijñāna*, though this feature in the verbal cognition under consideration. Therefore, we have to abandon the former formulation of *ākāṅkṣā*. To reformulate the definition, we should say that not the will, but the capability of having the will to have the cognition of the relation among the objects, etc., should be regarded as *ākāṅkṣā*. How does this capability originate? Whenever we have a prior absence of the verbal cognition, we can say that we have the

capability of having the will. This also is not sufficient. We would try to elaborate it more clearly. Whenever the speaker has the prior absence of a piece of verbal cognition produced by the pronunciation of particular words constituting the sentence generating the verbal knowledge, the speaker has the said capability or *yogyatā*. It may be asked why we have inserted the fact of *pronunciation*. It is relevant because otherwise we cannot explain the following case. We may have verbal cognition from a particular set of words. If that particular set is pronounced again, we should have verbal cognition. But according to the definition adopted by us, *ākāṁkṣā* would be absent in that case and verbal cognition would not be generated. *Ākāṁkṣā* would be absent because here there is not the prior absence of that verbal cognition as it has already been generated. So each time we should put emphasis on the *pronunciation* of the particular words. The *pronunciation* of the first time is not the same as the *pronunciation* of the second time. From the standpoint of type it may be the same. So, the second piece of verbal cognition can be generated. But there arises a difficulty. If *pronunciation* is of that importance then what about *maunīśloka*-s i.e. the verses which are read silently without any pronunciation? Should we not take *maunīśloka*-s to be generating verbal cognition? In fact 'pronunciation of the set of words' means knowledge of that particular sentence. It is present in the case of *maunīśloka*-s. So there is *ākāṁkṣā* and there can be verbal cognition from the *maunīśloka*-s.

Now, suppose there is a false cognition about *yogyatā* and we have a piece of verbal cognition from *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam* amounting to the fact that *ghaṭa* is identical with *karmatva*. So this piece of cognition is not illusory. Can we regard the prior absence of this verbal cognition to be the *ākāṁkṣā* in the case of *ghaṭam*? This, however, cannot be

accepted. We should follow the rule that the prior absence of that verbal cognition which is intended, is *ākāṁkṣā*.

Why are we considering the prior absence without taking into consideration the generic absence? If we take generic absence, there will be some problems. Suppose there is a sentence constituted by the words 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd' etc. In order to have verbal cognition from this, first of all the referent of 'a' would be related with the referent of 'b'. Then the referent of 'b' would be related with the referent of 'c' and so on. We would get a complete verbal cognition from the total sentence by summing up the partial cognition. When we have the verbal cognition from the whole sentence, there is not the generic absence of the verbal cognition generated by the whole sentence, because partially the verbal cognition is present before hand. But there is the prior absence of the said verbal cognition.

Again, if we take generic absence seriously, another problem would crop up. There may be the case when the speaker has the intention that let there be the same verbal cognition twice: some difficulty will crop up in the second case. There will not be the generic absence of the verbal cognition though there will be the prior absence of the second verbal cognition. Generation of this piece of verbal cognition is called the absentee (*pratiyogī*) of the prior absence. The prior absence differs depending on the absentee i.e., *pratiyogī*. In the case of generic absence only one absentee (*pratiyogī*) is sufficient to negate this. This is not so in the case of prior absence.

Those, who insist that the prior absence of verbal cognition should be taken into account, can put forward another argument. The generic absence of verbal cognition can reside in self or *ātmā*. Now, cognition does not pervade the self. When the self is attached with a

body, cognition can reside in the self. But if we think this self to be attached with a jar or cloth, then it can be said that the generic negation of the cognition resides in the self. Through this sort of generic absence same verbal cognition can be thought to be generated repeatedly as there always will be the generic negation. This situation cannot be tolerated. So we cannot take any generic absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṅkṣā*.

It is maintained by some that this objection regarding the repeated verbal cognitions is not a genuine one. We all know that *śabda* is a cause of verbal cognition. As this *śabda* is impermanent having duration of two moments (*dvikṣaṇasthāyī*) according to Nyāya philosophers this can act as the cause in the first case of verbal cognition, but will not act as the cause for the second or the third instance of verbal cognition, as it would be destroyed by that time. In reply to this it is suggested that the *śabda* as such does not act as the cause of verbal cognition. But the cognition of the referent signified by the *śabda* is the cause of verbal cognition. This is the cause for the first case of verbal cognition. This acts as the cause for the second case of verbal cognition also. Again the cognition of the referents of the words constituting the sentence generating the second verbal cognition acts as the cause for the third case of verbal cognition and so on. This solution, however, invites a problem. If the former process continues, then there will be unending repeated verbal cognition. Can this be accepted? The reply is that as long as our mind is not diverted to a different subject of whom we are not occupied by sleep, disease, etc., there can be repeated verbal cognition. As soon as any of the former factors appears, it acts as an obstacle for the generation of verbal cognition and verbal cognition is not produced again. If we think that the first case of verbal cognition is produced, then we are to take it for

granted that before the generation of this cognition there was its prior absence. Similarly if the second verbal cognition is originated, we have to think that there must have been its prior absence before its generation. But if we know that the third verbal cognition is not produced at all, then the case is otherwise.

Now, if we take the prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*, then an objection may be raised regarding the following sentence, *vimalam jalam nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣah carati* (How clear is the water of the river / The buffalo is grazing on the bank). When uttering the sentence the speaker intends that *nadī* (river) should be related to *jala* (water). We have to think of the verbal cognition in that form. Again, where the speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *kaccha* (bank), the form of our verbal cognition becomes different. If we consider the prior negation of the verbal cognition to be *ākāṁksā*, then we may imagine a case where we have prior absence of the verbal cognition indicating the fact that *nadī* is related with *kaccha* and consequently verbal cognition of that form would follow although the speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *jala*. This problem may be solved by indicating the fact that everywhere the intention of the speaker should be taken as one of the causes of verbal cognition. Where the speaker does not intend that *nadī* would be related with *kaccha* we couldn't have verbal cognition of that form, even if other causal factors are present. The clause 'prior absence of the verbal cognition' can be analysed in the following way — 'prior absence of the verbal cognition generated by the pronunciation of a certain set of words'. Let us take the following example — *ghaṭah karmatvam ānayanam kṛti*. We all know that if the naming words constituting a sentence have the same case ending, then the relation of identity relates the referents of the words. So if we consider the above

sentence, then we can say that the referent of the word *ghaṭa* is related with the referent of the word *karmatva* by the relation of identity, provided we have false cognition about *yogyatā*. But we can never have the cognition that *ghaṭa* is the object of the verb of bringing from this sentence, as one of its causes, viz. *ākāṁkṣā* is absent here. In this sense the contention of the above words is said to be devoid of *ākāṁkṣā* or it is *nirākāṁkṣā*. It is claimed that if any cognition be generated from the above combination of words, then the set cannot be said to be *nirākāṁkṣā*, as *ākāṁkṣā* is nothing but the prior absence of the verbal cognition. Now if we think that there can be no verbal cognition from the above set of words, then the notion of prior negation of that verbal cognition, viz. *ākāṁkṣā*, and the notion of the absence of the prior absence of that verbal cognition, viz, *nirākāṁkṣā* are devoid of facthood. So we cannot claim that above case to be *nirākāṁkṣā* at all.

Another objection has been raised here by the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. In the sentence-*vimalaṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣa carati*. The speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *jala* and *kaccha* would be construed with *mahiṣa*. If it is a case that there are two listeners, one of them does not hear the whole sentence. Let us suppose that he does not hear the part *vimalaṁ jalaṁ*. The second listener has got auditory perception of the whole sentence. For the first listener, there is the prior absence of the verbal cognition expressing the fact that *nadī* and *kaccha* should be related. The second listener, however, has the verbal cognition depicting the fact that the *nadī* is related with *jala* and *kaccha* is related with *mahiṣa*. But both the first listener and the second one have verbal cognition from the same sentence and as such the prior absence present for the first listener is also there for the second. And an objection may be raised that let us suppose that because of the first prior absence, both the listeners have

verbal cognition expressing the fact that *nadī* is related with *kaccha*. This type of situation may arise in some other circumstances when the listeners has the false cognition about the intention of the speaker, or when the listener is deceived by the context that determines the intention of the speaker. This problem, however, cannot be solved. Therefore, this sort of prior absence cannot be treated as the cause of verbal cognition. But we regard *ākāṁkṣā* to be the cause of verbal cognition. Therefore *ākāṁkṣā* cannot be understand in terms of this sort of prior absence.

Actually the prior absence of verbal cognition has been introduced as a cause of verbal cognition just to avoid the unpleasant consequences resulting from repetitive verbal cognition. The Nyāya philosophers, however, hold that the prior absence of each and every effect is the cause of that particular effect as per the definition –*Kāryaṁ pāgabhāvapratiyogi*. If we regard prior absence of any effect to be cause of that effect, then it is a common precondition for all the effects and cannot be treated as a special (instrumental) cause of verbal cognition only. If *ākāṁkṣā* is nothing but a kind of prior absence, then another difficulty will also crop up. There are certain terms, which cannot be used singly. These terms always refer to some other terms in order to be intelligible. These are called *svasambandhika* or related terms, for example – ‘wife’, ‘slave’. Etc. Whenever we use the term ‘wife’, immediately the question arises – ‘whose wife’? Whenever we use the term ‘salve’, immediately the question arises – whose salve? *Ākāṁkṣā*, present in these cases is called *utthitākāṁkṣā*, i.e., the *ākāṁkṣā* that has already been evoked. Again, there are some other cases where we call this *ākāṁkṣā* to be *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*, i.e., the *ākāṁkṣā* that may be evoked, e.g. let us take the sentence – “there is water in the pond” (*sarovare jalam vidyate*). A question may be raised

– what is there in the water? (*jale kim vidyate*), Answer – ‘lotuses’. Again another question may be raised – what is there in the lotuses (*padme kim vidyate*)? The answer is – ‘bees’. Even if this type of questions are not raised, the original sentence, i.e., “there is water in the pond” does not cease to be intelligible. *Ākāṁkṣā* present in the case of this type of sentences is called *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*. If we regard prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*, we cannot make any distinction between *utthitākāṁkṣā* and *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*. Because in both the cases the nature of prior absence would remain unchanged. Therefore, we should not regard prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*.

Let us now deal with another view regarding the nature of *ākāṁkṣā*. Sondada, (a Nyāya philosopher, who is a predecessor of Gaṅgeśa) is the prepounder of this position. It is questionable whether according to this view *ākāṁkṣā* is purely *ātmagata*. We shall try explain this view with an example. Let us suppose that here is a sentence – “The pot is blue” (*nīlah ghaṭaḥ*). If we utter only ‘blue’, a question will be raised – “what is blue”? In this case we will have a notion of blue from the word ‘blue’. So, the object blue here is the object of cognition. It has become the object of cognition because the cause for it, i.e., the utterance of the word ‘blue’ is present here. This object, ‘blue’ is called *jñāpya* (indicated). In the case under consideration (*nīlah ghaṭaḥ*) there is the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to have cognition about the relationship of what is the object of cognition (i.e. *jñāpya*, here it is blue) and what has not yet become the object of cognition, i.e., which is different from the object of cognition (*jñāpyetara*, here it is pot). Now, according to Sondada, whenever this sort of situation occurs along with the non-occurrence of the verbal cognition intended by the speaker, there is *ākāṁkṣā*. These two conditions are present

when there is the utterance of only 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*). So there is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case. According to the former explanation *nīla* is the object of cognition and *ghaṭa* is the object, which is different from the object of cognition. A difficulty crops up here – can we really regard *ghaṭa* to be different from *nīla* as according to the Nyāya explanation, there is the relation of identity between *nīla* and *ghaṭa*? Some later Naiyāyikas raised this difficulty. It may be suggested that from the explanation of *ākāṁkṣā*, as given by Sonadada, explicit indication of the object of cognition and object different from the object of cognition should be eliminated. Instead, it should be stated that we want to have the notion of the relation between the referents or simply between the objects. Now, do we always want to know or do we always have the desire to know the relation between the objects or does it sometimes come naturally to us even if we do not have the desire? It sometimes really happens so that we do not have the desire. Then what would be the fate of the explanation as given by Sonadada? The answer is that even if there may be no actual desire, there is always the scope or the possibility for having the desire.

It may, however, be suggested that there is no necessity of bringing in the factor of desire or the scope or possibility of desire as a separate condition. Can we not say that whenever the verbal cognition desired by the speaker is not generated, there is *ākāṁkṣā*? This suggestion cannot be accepted. Suppose a speaker in order to communicate *Ghaṭam ānaya* or "bring the pot", by mistake utters the words *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛti*, *ghaṭam* is a combination of *ghaṭa* and *am*. *Am* indicates *karmatva*. *Ānaya* is a combination of a *dhātu* indicating *ānaya* and a *dhātu-vibhakti* indicating *kṛti*. Hence, someone instead of uttering *ghaṭam ānaya*, by mistake can utter *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛti*. If we accept the above suggestion

then we must admit that  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}m\dot{k}\bar{s}\bar{a}$  should be present in the case of this combination of words. To avoid this sort of difficulty, we must say that along with the non-origination of verbal cognition, there should be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relationship between what has become the object of cognition and what has not become the object of cognition. Let us suppose a speaker utters the word  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{m}$ . It comprises of two words  $gha\dot{t}a$  and  $a\dot{m}$ . The term  $gha\dot{t}a$  indicates a sort of locushood residing in  $gha\dot{t}a$  and  $a\dot{m}$  indicates the object of action. So the utterance  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{m}$  indicates the  $gha\dot{t}a$  is the object of action. If there is only the word  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{m}$ , then there would be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relation between the referent of  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{m}$  which is a locus of something and some other referent which has not yet become the object of cognition (here it may be the referent as indicated by  $\bar{a}naya$ ). But when there is the combination  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{h}, karmatva\dot{m}$ , etc.  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{h}$  does not refer to  $gha\dot{t}a$  as a locus of something. Therefore, the former cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire of cognition is not present in the second case and the verbal cognition resulting from  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{m} \bar{a}naya$  and the verbal cognition resulting from  $gha\dot{t}a\dot{h} karmatva\dot{m} \bar{a}naya\dot{m} k\dot{r}ti$  cannot be regarded as the same. At this point another question may be raised. If the phrase 'cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relation between the object of cognition and which is not the object of cognition is so important, why should we not regard this to be  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}m\dot{k}\bar{s}\bar{a}$ ? Why should we add the condition that there should be the non-origination of the verbal cognition as intended by the speaker? We should better drop it. Now, let us consider a sentence:  $anyeti putra\dot{h} r\bar{a}j\bar{n}\bar{a}\dot{h} puru\dot{s}ah apa\dot{s}\bar{a}rya\dot{t}\bar{a}\dot{m}$ , there may be two types of verbal cognition from this.

1) *Rājapuruṣa* is coming. Drive away the *putras*.

2) *Rājaputra* is coming. Drive away the *puruṣa*.

It is well known that a single person cannot have these two cognitions at the same time. But if we consider the 'Cause etc.' to be *ākāṁkṣā* then one would have two cognitions at a time, which is absurd. To avoid this situation, the condition that there should be non-origination of the verbal cognition as intended by the speaker, should be added. Each time, a single verbal cognition would be originated depending on the intention of the speaker.

Now, some thinkers may not agree with the opinion of Sondada. It may be interpreted that, when Sondada deals with the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya*, he says that from the term *ghaṭa* we should have the reference, i.e., *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. It may be said that there is no such stipulation that we should refer to *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. Therefore, we should reject *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. Therefore, we should reject the opinion of Sondada. Moreover, according to Sondada, when *ghaṭam* is pronounced, it can act as a cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognise that object which has not yet become the object of cognition. But how can we be aware that *ghaṭa* and *am* (which we get by analyzing *ghaṭam*) possess *ākāṁkṣā*? If it is suggested that *ghaṭa* would be apprehended as such, then we have to grant that *ghaṭa* can be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the will, which indicates that *ghaṭa* should be related with *katṛtva* (not signified by *am*) and not with *karmatva*. That is, *ākāṁkṣā* in this case may be of the above sort. If that be the case, then why should we not take the combination of words, *ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṁ ānayanam kṛti* to be possessing *ākāṁkṣā* and generating *śābdabodha* as *ghaṭam ānayati*?

It is accepted that this combination does not generate *śābdabodha* as *ghaṭam ānāyati*. But if we agree with Sondada, we would have to admit the reverse. Hence, Sondada's view cannot be accepted.

After rejecting various views about *ākāṁkṣā*, Gaṅgeśa proceeds to give a view about *ākāṁkṣā* in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. According to Gaṅgeśa, *ākāṁkṣā* is nothing but *abhidhānaparyabasanam* i.e., the speaker intends to speak something. Sometimes it happens that this desire is not fulfilled because there is absence of some factor for generating verbal cognition.<sup>(7)</sup> This factor is called *ākāṁkṣā*. Suppose there is a sentence, *ghaṭaḥ asti*. If the speaker pronounces only *ghaṭaḥ* then the listener feels that *something more* is to be pronounced if the speaker intends to utter a whole sentence, which would generate verbal cognition. Now, we can say that this *something more* has *ākāṁkṣā* with formerly pronounced term, i.e., *ghaṭaḥ*. In this sentence *ghaṭaḥ asti* it can be said that the term *asti* has *ākāṁkṣā* with *ghaṭaḥ*. If we want to analyze the case more minutely, then we should say that the term *ghaṭaḥ* is a combination of *ghaṭa* and *su*. And between these two terms there is *ākāṁkṣā*. Similarly the term *asti* is a combination of *as* and *ti*, hence *ti* has *ākāṁkṣā* with *as*. There are certain case endings in Sanskrit grammar and language, which are to be related with name-words, and there are some other case endings, which are to be related with verb-roots. The first type of case endings is called *śābdavibhakti* whereas the second type of case endings is called *dhātuvibhakti*. If the *śābdavibhakti* is not joined with name-words, then it cannot generate any verbal cognition. Similarly, if the *dhātuvibhakti* is not joined with verb-roots, then it cannot produce verbal cognition. In the former example, the name-word *ghaṭa* is immediately followed by *śābdavibhakti* *su*. Therefore *su* is related with *ghaṭa* in the relation of

immediate *precedence* and *ghaṭa* is related with *su* in the relation of *immediate succession* ; this is *ākāṁkṣā*.

## **Yogyatā**

*Yogyatā* is the second condition of verbal knowledge. It is also described as mutual fitness. According to *Tarkasaṁgraha* “*Arthabādhō yogyatā*”. That means – the absence of incompatibility among what is signified by the several words of a statement is *yogyatā*<sup>(8)</sup>. The author of the title *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Viśvanātha has discussed the nature of *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā* etc. In his view, *yogyatā* is a system of words with mutual fitness (*Ekapadārthe aparapadarthasamandha yogyatā*).<sup>(9)</sup> The realization of meaning of a sentence cannot be achieved in absence of the knowledge of *yogyatā*. When a sentence has a *yogyatā* it can be considered that there is no contradiction between the meaning of the constituent words forming that sentence.

To explain the *yogyatā* more clearly we may say that verbal knowledge can never be produced from a sentence unless the objects denoted by the different terms of the sentence have the capability of getting related. For example, if I utter a sentence –“bring water” it can produce verbal knowledge, because the action of bringing (signified the term ‘bring’) and water (signified by the term ‘water’) can be related. But if I utter the sentence, “bring the moon”, it cannot produced verbal knowledge proper, because the action of bringing (signified by the word ‘bring’) can never get related with moon (signified by the word ‘moon’), because it is not possible for a man to accomplish it through his effort (*kṛtisādhyā*). Someone may, however, question whether bringing the moon is logically impossible, though it is factually impossible. For them, let us cite another example, where it is logically impossible to relate the objects denoted by different words – “he is watering with fire”. It cannot

be a source of true knowledge; for 'watering' (of some ground) means 'sprinkling' with a liquid called 'water' and such sprinkling is not possible with 'fire'. *Yogyatā*, or more specifically, the cognition of *yogyatā* is thus a requirement for verbal knowledge.

It may be objected that, the cognition of *yogyatā* cannot be a precondition for verbal knowledge. Because the cognition of the relation between the objects signified by different words of a sentence is quite uncertain before the verbal knowledge is produced. The Nyāya philosophers, however, would not agree with this. According to them, when an individual remembers the objects signified by different words of a sentence, he can have the cognition of the relation between the objects in two ways. Where the objects are not present perceptually, the cognition of the relation between them comes in the form of doubt and where the objects are present perceptually, the cognition of the relation between them has the element of certainty in it, i.e., there is a definite knowledge of the relation.

Though the traditional Nyāya philosophers consider the cognition of *yogyatā* to be a necessary requirement of verbal knowledge, it is very interesting to note that the Neo-Nyāya philosophers oppose this view. They hold that the cognition of *yogyatā* is not to be considered as a necessary precondition of verbal knowledge, because it is redundant. To understand their position, we would have to analyze the very concept of 'cause'. What is a cause? Generally, it is accepted that a cause is an immediate, indispensable, unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect. This antecedent may be understood from two points – the positive and the negative. There are certain conditions, the presence of which is necessary for the production of the effect. This is the positive aspect. And there are certain other conditions, the absence of which is required for the

production of the effect. This is the negative aspect. Let us consider a situation when I see a flower. The production of this effect requires that among other conditions I should have clear eyesight and also that there is not the absence of light when I see the flower. The absence of light acts as an obstacle for the production of the effect. The absence of obstacle is also necessary for the production of the effect. And this is the negative condition. Now let us come back to the Neo-Nyāya philosophers' view regarding *yogyatā*. They think that *yogyatā* is not to be considered as a separate cause for verbal knowledge, because the concept of the absence of the obstacle is enough to explain away the concept of *yogyatā*. The question is – how? Let us take the former instance – “he is watering with fire”. The Neo-Nyāya philosophers would say that we have the knowledge that the fire has the incapability of sprinkling water. This acts as the obstacle. The absence of this obstacle is necessary for the production of the knowledge. If that were so, we require no separate positive precondition like *yogyatā* in the case of verbal knowledge. The grammarians also hold that the factor of *yogyatā* is insignificant in the generation of verbal cognition. *Yogyatā* can very well be dispensed with. Nāgoji Bhatta contends that in such sentences as, “there goes the barren woman’s son with a chaplet of sky-flowers on his head. He has bathed himself in the waters of a mirage and is holding a bow of rabbit’s horn”, we are fully aware of the relation though the knowledge of the absurdity of such relations is immediately present before our mind. “Can we honestly disclaim our cognition of judgmental thoughts despite the physical impossibility of the relations between the concepts denoted by the constituent terms? Certainly not. Their prepositional character must be admitted if we are true to our experience, if for nothing else. According to the Naiyāyikas, the words, “he is sprinkling the flowers with fire” would be nonsensical because of the physical impossibility of the relation between the two

concepts – viz., sprinkling and fire. But such a position is psychologically unjustifiable, argues Nagoji Bhatta. For, whenever we hear someone speaking the words, “Sprinkle with fire” we invariably ridicule the speaker thereof and accost him with the remark: “How is it possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance?” Had the words referred to above been completely nonsensical signifying nothing but themselves, such remarks would have been impossible. Silence would have been more proper than such sarcastic comments, just as a northerner is apt to be silent when he hears the words of a stranger hailing from the land of the Dravidas, even though the latter might express the self-same idea, physically impossible as it is, in his own language. What more, the adoption of the Naiyāyika viewpoint would render all philosophical disquisitions *ipso facto* absurd and impracticable? In all serious disputes two or more disputants take part, each representing the views of the school to which it is affiliated. For instance, in a discussion about the category of ‘sound’ (*śabda*), the Mīmāṃsakas would uphold its ubiquity and eternity while the heterodox Buddhists would maintain its transitoriness consistently with their peculiar doctrine of universal flux. Consequently, the views of one disputant would be absolutely repugnant to the other. But if the validity of the Naiyāyika thesis be acknowledged, the arguments of the Buddhist in favour of the impermanence of sound would be absolutely nonsensical, may unintelligible abracadabra, in view of the syntactical impossibility of the component concepts from the Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint and vice versa. This would lead to an insoluble deadlock”. Now, the Naiyāyikas might contend that though in the absence of ‘syntactical possibility’ there might be non-cognition of the relational thought from a particular group of words, yet there is nothing to prevent the comprehension of the discrete and isolated concepts *per se* in

succession, so that the apprehension of a total collapse of philosophical disputes becomes irrelevant.

Again admitting that such groups of words as, "sprinkle with fire" constitute valid propositions and are capable of generating the final relational cognitions even though deficient in respect of *yogyatā*, why is it that those cognitions are not followed by corresponding pragmatic activities as is usually the case with propositions that satisfy the requirement of *yogyatā*? The grammarians' answer to this contention would be as follows: The opponents' criticism of our position is altogether irrelevant as it is based on a confusion of two totally divergent issues. The Naiyāyika uncritically enough confounds it with the issue of *objective validity* of propositions. These two issues must always be kept apart and studied separately. The Nyāya philosophers can answer that when they discuss the pre-conditions of the generation of verbal knowledge they cannot just ignore the fact of objective validity.

### ***Sannidhi or āsatti***

According to Annambhaṭṭa, *sannidhi* is the utterance without delay of the several terms that constitute a statement. If we take a statement like, " a horse is a quadruped animal", uttered in a normal manner i.e., the several words uttered without any undue time-gap them, then we can say that this combination of words has *sannidhi*. It would obviously be a source of knowledge because it satisfies the condition of *sannidhi*. The same words, however, uttered at long intervals of time, say of one minute (a horse..... is a ..... a quadruped) will not be a source of any verbal cognition because of the absence of the required *sannidhi*. In *Tarkasamgrahadipika* Annambhaṭṭa explains that the word *sannidhi* is

to be understood not really as the utterance of words without delay but rather the presentation without delay to the mind of what is signified by the words of a statement. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* he has spoken of utterance (*uccāraṇa*) only because such utterance without delay of certain words has usually been in the presentation without delay of what is signified by those words. This explanation is quite sufficient to understand the nature of *sannidhi*. But in *Bhāṣāpariccheda* it is maintained that whenever there is closeness or proximity among the terms used in a sentence there is *āsatti* or *sannidhi*. In the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Viśvanātha tries to elucidate the criterion of *āsatti*. We all know that verbal knowledge is produced by meaningful sentences, i.e., if the reference of the terms used in a sentence are related with one another, then and only then, verbal knowledge is possible. This can happen only if the referring expressions, i.e., the terms have no gap between them and the cogniser or the knower has cognition about that. It may be objected that sometimes the terms are so arranged that the consecutive terms produce meaning, though the speaker does not intend that. Particularly, in the case of the Sanskrit language, we find many such instances. "The cloth and the jar are blue and substance (respectively) (*nīlo ghato dravyam patah*). It is not the case that 'the cloth' and 'blue' have no gap between them. But we may have proper verbal knowledge regarding the cloth. So this counter-example proves that there is no necessity for the condition called *sannidhi* as defined in *Bhāṣāpariccheda*. In the *Muktāvalī*, however, it is said that in the case of *nīlo ghato dravyam patah* it may be arranged in such a way that the hearer have some invalid cognition about the gap between the terms. In fact, as we find that the proximity of the terms is not always necessary for the verbal cognition, we can say that the presentation without delay of the reference, which is intended to be related by the speaker, is the necessary precondition for verbal cognition.

It may be argued that the syntactical contiguity need not be considered as an essential precondition for verbal cognition. To those of quick intelligence it is absolutely superfluous. The absence of contiguity can at best delay the comprehension of the required judgment, but it cannot check it altogether, just as we comprehended relational ideas from a verse where the concepts intended to be brought into relation are mostly separated by intervening words that do not directly stand to any such relation? Just as a mob, when it is about to enter a royal city through a narrow gateway, must arrange itself into an ordered line, so too concepts even though expressed by words jumbled up together without any syntactical contiguity, relate themselves with one another. This explanation is not too strong to combat the position of the Nyāya philosophers that the apparent non-proximity is bridged with the help of memory and the impression left by it. Hence there is the necessity of *āsatti*.

### ***Tātparya***

The meaning of a sentence can be considered from two points of view – from the speaker's point of view and from the listener's point of view. The general Western approach has been from the speaker's point of view. But the Indian approach has been mainly from the listener's point of view. According to the Nyāya philosophers, apart from *sannidhi*, *yogyatā* and *ākāṁkṣā*, the factor of the speaker's intention or *tātparya* should be taken into account.

In Indian Philosophy of language *tātparya* is a technical term. The term *tātparya* is a noun and it indicates the intended meaning, which is conveyed by a sentence either in a written form or in a spoken form. A wing of the Naiyāyikas consider *tātparya* or a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker as a criteria that is

compulsory for any kind of verbal comprehension. This is why they have placed *tātparya* in the same group of criteria consisting of *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti* that are essential for all verbal comprehension. But others do not accept speakers intention as a direct factor rather they want to include *tātparya* in *ākāṁkṣā* itself. Moreover, they prefer to take into consideration the role of *tātparya* in understanding *āsatti* completely. It is Gaṅgeśa the father of the Navya-Nyāya and Viśvanātha who have considered *tātparya* as a fourth necessary condition.

The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention (*Tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning (*Lakṣaṇā*). To them non-realisation of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e. implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term, *gaṅgā* as found in the sentence *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ* is 'the bank of the *gaṅgā*'. The primary meaning of the term *ghoṣaḥ* and *gaṅgā* are *ghoṣapalli* and a particular flow of water (*Jalpravāha-viśeṣa*) respectively. The milkman-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is non-realisation of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them. This can be removed, if the bank of the *gaṅgā* is taken as the meaning of the term *gaṅgā* through *lakṣaṇā*.

Now what is to be understood by the term *tātparya*?<sup>(10)</sup> The desire of the speaker (*vakturicchā*) is *tātparya*. In other words, it has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātparya* (*tātpratiticchayā uccaritatvaṁ*).<sup>(11)</sup> When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātparya*. The term *uccaritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons

there is *tātparya* in spite of not having utterance of the same. Hence, it is better to accept the former definition (i.e. intention of the speaker is *tātparya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.<sup>(12)</sup>

The non-realisation of *tātparya* but not of relation (*anvaya*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. This point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence, '*kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām*' (i.e., protect the curd from crow etc.) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. In order to incorporate all types of *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realisation in respect of *tātparya* is *lakṣana* but not otherwise.

Let us see the role of *tātparya* in determining the meaning of an ambiguous sentence having various meanings. If someone utters the sentence *saindhavam ānaya*, it may mean the bringing of a horse of salt. The exact meaning of the term *saindhava* is to be determined according to the intention of the speaker uttered under a particular context.<sup>(13)</sup> That is why, the knowledge of *tātparya* is taken to be the cause of verbal comprehension.

It can be said in reply that : in order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), space (*deśa*) etc. serve as promoters. If in the context of taking meal the term *saindhava* is uttered, it will mean *salt*. But if the context is otherwise (i.e. going to the battle-field), the same term would mean horse.<sup>(14)</sup> After hearing the sentence of the speaker uttered in a particular context, the hearer infers the intention in the following way. The term *saindhava* existing in the above mentioned sentence has got the *tātparya* in salt as it is so uttered in the context of talking meal (*etadvākyaghaṭaka-saindhavapadam lavaṇatātparyayakam bhojanaprakarane prayuktatvāt*). In the same way, the hearer infers the

*tātparya* of the same term as otherwise depending on a different context. In this way, the intention of the other person (i.e., the speaker) can be known through inference.<sup>(15)</sup>

Let us consider the intention of different sentence uttered in a different context. If a teacher asks his student to do something after uttering the word *dvāram* (door) and pointing out to the door, the student may have confusion due to having multiple alternative such as either closing or opening the door. Let us think of a situation when the door remains closed and suddenly there is a power cut. The teacher utters the term 'door' to a particular student, which would likely imply the opening of the door as the context is in favour of this. If the situation is otherwise (i.e., the door is open), and suddenly a dusty storm comes and the teacher utters the some word 'door' which would refer under this circumstance to the closing of the door. Hence, a word can give its accurate meaning only if the proper context is known by the hearer. Hence, the role of intention of the speaker dependent on the context has also to be accepted as a fundamental basis of verbal comprehension.

Dinakara has analysed the concept in the context of non-ambiguous sentence. *Tātparya* is the intention of the speaker of conveying the sentences like 'Bring a jar' (*ghaṭam ānaya*) in which 'jar' has become a *prakāra* or qualifier, *karmatva* or the property of being an object attached to it has become a qualificand and superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) has become a relation. When there is the awareness of the sentence *ghaṭamānaya*, there is the knowledge of a jar, *karmatva* as denoted by the word *ghaṭam* and as this, being a property, remains in the substance *ghaṭa*. Here the jar is the substratum and *karmatva* is the superstratum. This is the nature of awareness (*pratīti*) which is the intention of the speaker.<sup>(16)</sup> When a particular sentence is uttered in

order to convey a particular intention, the knowledge of such intention of the speaker is the cause of verbal comprehension. <sup>(17)</sup>

Rāmarudra further raises a different problem. To him ambiguity is of two types: ambiguity as involved in the sentences like *Saindhavamānya* etc., and as involved in *ghaṭamānaya paṭamānaya* etc; It may be argued that the intention of the speaker is very difficult to understand if two sentences 'Bring a jar', 'Bring a cloth' are uttered simultaneously without the copula 'and'. For there are two intentions, which leads the hearer to the land of confusion about the real intention of the speaker. <sup>(18)</sup> In order to remove this problem it is said that the particular intention of the speaker behind the utterance of a particular sentence must be taken as the cause of verbal comprehension of it. If it is said *śveto dhāvati* (i.e., the white runs), the intention of the speaker may sometimes be known as the object bearing white colour runs or sometimes as 'the dog etc. run'. <sup>(19)</sup> Such an awareness of intention serves as the main factor for apprehending the meaning. If there is the doubt or confusion as to the intention of speaker or if there is the ascertainment of that which is not intended by the speaker, the verbal comprehension from the sentence is not at all possible. Hence, the knowledge of intention has to be taken as the cause of the same. <sup>(20)</sup>

Let us see how the intention of the vedic sentence and *Śukavākya* can be understood. Even the vedic statements contain some intention. God who is accepted as the agent of the Vedas is supposed to have such intention. God's knowledge of intention can be inferred as the cause of the verbal comprehension arising from the Vedic sentences. It may be argued that the knowledge of intention of the teacher should be taken as the causes of the said apprehension. This view is not tenable, because the knowledge of *tātparya* of the teacher cannot be the cause of the same due to the absence of him

before the initial creation. It may, again, be argued that if the dissolution is not accepted, the question of initial creation cannot be thought of. This position is also not sound, because the existence of dissolution is known from the Vedas and hence there is the initial creation.<sup>(21)</sup> In the same way, the Divine knowledge of *tātparya* can be said to be the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence uttered by a parrot without any intention of its own and revealing the true picture of reality (*saṁvādī*).<sup>(22)</sup> The knowledge of the intention of the trainer is the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which does not correspond to the reality (*visamvādatva*). For, the property of being non-correspondent to the reality (*visamvādatva*) lies on the intention of their trainer, but not on that of God, as in the intention of God *visamvaditva* is not possible.<sup>(23)</sup> Hence, the knowledge of *tātparya* existing in God cannot be the causes of verbal understanding of the *visamvādī* statements made by a parrot.<sup>(24)</sup> The term *saṁvādī* in this context has been introduced to convey that God's knowledge of intention becomes the cause of understanding the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which is *pramā*. If the parrot, on the other hand, utters the sentence *vahninā siñcati* (i.e., watering with fire), God's knowledge of intention cannot be the cause of the same, as God does not possess any intention which does not correspond to the reality (*visamvādicchā*). In order to exclude such sentences from the purview of the Divine intention the term *saṁvādī* is introduced.<sup>(25)</sup>

Generally, a speaker of the sentence is supposed to have a volition in favour of what is said in the sentence (*vākyānukūla*). As the Divine volition is working behind each and every effect, it becomes favourable to what is uttered by a parrot incidentally. As a parrot cannot

have intention of its own, there are no other alternatives than to accept Divine intention behind it.<sup>(26)</sup>

It may be argued that if context, etc, are taken as the causes of the potency of word, it (i.e., potency) should be taken as the cause of meaning and hence there is no necessity of accepting another distinct cause i.e. *tātparya*.

This view is not tenable. For, when a word or a sentence having double meaning is uttered, the intention of the speaker cannot be known due to having potency conveying two meanings, which leads to the impossibility of verbal understanding. Hence, the knowledge of the intention of the speaker has to be accepted as a determining factor in verbal understanding, which has been beautifully classified by Nāgeśa.<sup>(27)</sup> Moreover, for understanding a non-ambiguous sentence also the intention of the speaker plays a prominent role. It determines the potency of the word giving rise to sentence.

Let us consider some philosophical problems, which may arise in one's mind in this connection. First, human actions in the forms of inclination (*pravṛtti*) refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and being indifferent (*upekṣā*) are dependent on the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. If someone utters an ambiguous sentence *navakambalaṁ ānaya* (i.e., Bring *nava* blanket or blankets), no *pravṛtti* or inclination of the hearer is possible due to the non-understanding of intention of the speaker. In this case, it is not clearly known to us what the speaker intends to say by this sentence (i.e., whether the speaker intends to have a new blanket or nine blankets denoted by the word '*nava*'), which leads us to the land of inactivity.

It may be argued that the intention or *tātparya* of the speaker may confuse others under certain circumstance. It may happen that the

speaker wants to hide his own intention by way of confusing others deliberately so that he does not face an undesired situation. At this stage, the concealing of his own intention may be treated as his own intention. In such cases the sentence cannot provide us with the proper understanding though the knowledge of the speaker's intention is known.

To reply, it can be said that if a speaker bears an intention to hide his own intention by using an ambiguous sentence, the sentence cannot give us an accurate non-ambiguous meaning. As the speaker's intention in adopting this method of confusing others is known to us, it falls under the category of *chala*. Unless it is known or detected, we cannot be successful in philosophical debate, which leads to highest good (*niḥśreyaas*) of seen (*draṣṭa*) type. To understand the particular intention of the speaker in adopting *chala* has got a positive role in philosophical debate. The philosophical significance of the inclusion of *chala* under sixteen categories lies on the fact that a true debater should not adopt *chala* in his speech unnecessarily, and at the same time it is essential to detect the same in an opponent's speech. This detection of *chala* is also possible through the knowledge of intention of the speaker to confuse others. If the intention of the speaker is *tātparya*, it can be described as such and hence it is very much important in the field of philosophical discourse.

Secondly, the non-realizability of *tātparya* is the seed not only of *lakṣaṇā* but also of suggestive (*vyañjanā*) and metaphorical meaning as accepted by the rhetoricians. Moreover, *tātparya* is closely related or identical to *vivakṣā* (i.e., intention to convey something) of the speaker. In other words, it is the *vivakṣā* of the speaker which is the *tātparya* of the sentence uttered by him. A sentence which is non-sensical in a particular context may seem to be significant in another

context depending on the *vivakṣa* of the speaker. A word or sentence may seem to be significant if the speaker wants to signify something by uttering this. This desire of signifying (*vivakṣā*) is the *tatparya* of the sentence. Even the sentence signifying identity (e.g. 'London is London' or 'Bombay is Bombay') may seem to be non-sensical apparently, but somehow this usage finds justification if the speaker wants to signify the incomparability of the cities like London or Bombay through this. If this *vivakṣā* is taken into account, this sentence will certainly bear *tātparya*.

Though Raghunath does not accept the absence of the absurd entities like *śaśasṛṅgam nāsti*, etc. (which is called *alīkapratiyogikābhāva*) as real absence, it is known from the ordinary experience that such usages provide us with some information. Though the direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) of this is not possible, these usages give some implicative meaning due to the *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning, which leads to exploration of some secondary meaning. Because it signifies something when it is used or uttered by someone secondarily on the strength of *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning. Raghunath's position is substantiated by assigning the following reason in favour of him. For understanding an absence the knowledge of the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is the precondition, which is not at all possible in the case of absurd entities like *śaśasṛṅga*, castle in the air etc. This view of Raghunatha, I believe, is acceptable so far as the direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) of the sentence is concerned. But it cannot be denied that these sentences convey us some sense which is available secondarily. Otherwise, these would not have been uttered by the speaker. The utterance of a particular sentence in a particular context by an individual presupposes some *vivakṣā* which is the intention. Considering the particular aspect Dharmakīrti has accepted

the importance of *vivakṣā* in determining the meaning of a word or a sentence in the following *kārika* :

“*vakṛvyāpāraṣaye so'rtho buddhau prakāśate  
prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanivandhanam.*”<sup>(28)</sup>

That is, in the expression of a speaker the corresponding image appears in our awareness. It is constituted and evidenced by the words, but not by the meaning of the same. When someone says, 'I am building a castle in the air', the intention of the speaker is to convey to us some image about some absurd events through this sentence, and hence it is not at all non-sensical.

Thirdly, let us consider whether the intention of the speaker can be treated as a cause of verbal understanding only in the case of ambiguous sentences as advocated by a section of scholars. This view is not tenable. For though in an ambiguous sentence the intention of a speaker is to be known perfectly, it is also essential for a non-ambiguous sentence also. Otherwise how can a sentence be known as 'non-ambiguous' ? As the intention of the speaker is perfectly reflected in the language used by him, it is taken as a non-ambiguous one. When a sentence is uttered, the particular intention of a speaker is expressed there (through which he intends to convey something). Otherwise the utterance of a sentence would be of no use. Hence, the intention of the speaker cannot be denied in providing the sentence-meaning though it is true that the role of it is much more prominent in the case of an ambiguous sentence. The role of *tātparya* in non-ambiguous sentence like *ghaṭamānaya Paṭamānaya*, etc., has already been pointed out. The *saṁyoga*, distance, co-existence, etc., are taken as the indicators (*jñāpaka*) of a non-ambiguous sentence.

The above mentioned view can be substantiated from the standpoint of Jayanta. *Tātparya* is the knowledge which is endowed with the capability of expressing a particular comprehension (*tatpratījānanayogyatva*). To him the words of a sentence can convey to us their distinct (non-related) meanings like iron-stakes and hence their construction or relation among them is not possible. These isolated meanings cannot be the meaning of a sentence as they are not related to each other. This relation is not possible through *abhidhavṛtti*. Hence, *tātparyavṛtti* has to be accepted as a connecting factor among the word-meanings. The power of *Abhidhā* lies on giving rise to primary meaning of a word (*śuddhapadārtha-visayinī*) while *tātparya* gives rise to connected meaning (*samsargaviṣayinī*).<sup>(29)</sup>

Lastly, it has already been accepted that God's intention is the cause of the *samvadi* sentence uttered by a parrot, as a parrot cannot have an intention of its own. This view again needs thorough review. As God is taken as a *Nimittakāraṇa* of all activities. His intention etc. would have to be taken as common cause to all activities, including our utterance of word or the utterance of sentence by a parrot. If God's intention is common causes to the *Samvādī śukavākya*, it cannot be taken as an uncommon cause of verbal understanding. In fact, the sentences uttered by a parrot though valid bears no intention of its own, but on the other hand, it repeats that it imitates from others or trainer and *samvādakatva* is just a co-incident. If there is any intention at all, it is of others from which it has learnt and through it the intention of that person is reflected.

However, the answers suggested here in response to the problems raised are just forwarded to defend *Nyāya* position in some cases and to deviate from *Nyāya* position. In course of study we may come across various problems, which also need some focus. A

question may be raised : What is the exact distinction between *tātparya* and *vivakṣā* ? The former is defined as '*vaktuḥ icchā*' i.e., intention of the speaker while the latter as '*vaktumicchā*' i.e., 'intention to say'. There is a subtle distinction between these two formations on which the grammarians can highlight. Another problem may be raised : can an individual mean anything by any word if he bears a strong intention ? Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been any law between a word and its denotation. The grammarians have said *vivakṣā* i.e., 'will to speak' as having restricted freedom of a speaker. It is metaphorically said that *vivakṣā* is a *kūlabadhū* (house-wife) having freedom within restriction, but not a *kulatā* (house-wife not adhering to family norms) who has unrestricted freedom which is called *svecchācara*. Would the intention of a speaker be of such type to *Nyāya* ? At last we may see some problems regarding language and its meaning which are due to the different set of presuppositions admitted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians. As the latter believes in the theory of *Śabdabrahma*, there is not a single word which is meaningless. But so far as the *Navya Nyāya* view is concerned, a word would be meaningful if and only if it refers something which really exists in this world. Many problems concerning this would come up and a sincere effort would be made to suggest solutions of the same.

## Reference

1. *Sphotasiddhi, Kārikā* 23.
2. *Tarkasaṅgraha with Tarkadīpikā and Vivṛti*, ed. By Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta, 1897, pp-63-64.
3. Cf. 'Padam ca varnasamuhah' *Tarkabhāṣā* – Keśavamiśra, Original text & Eng. Trans. Oriental Book Supplying Agency, Poona, 1924, p. 14, 'śaktam padam' *Tarkasaṅgraha with Tarkadīpikā and Vivṛti*, ed. By Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta, 1897, p. 64.
4. *Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpikā on Tarkasaṅgraha* Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive, Calcutta, 1994, pp. 302.
5. *Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpika on Tarkasaṅgraha* Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive, Calcutta, 1994 pp. 304
6. Vide *Tarkabhāṣā* – Keśavamiśra, Original text & Eng. Trans. Oriental Book Supplying Agency, Poona, 1924, p. 13.
7. Gaṅgeśa : *Tattvacintāmani*, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1897, pp. 185-196.
8. *Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasaṅgraha* Translated and Elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Progressive, Calcutta, 1994 pp. 302.
9. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse no. 83.
10. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse no. 84.
11. *Tarkasaṅgraha-dīpika*, ed. by Satkari Sharma Bangiya, Chowkhamba, 1976.

12. Nāgeśa : *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, ed. & Tr. By B. Goswami, S. Ganguli, 'Anvikṣā', Research Journal, Dept. of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Vol. XIII, April, 1990.
13. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
14. Nāgeśa : *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, ed. & Tr. By B. Goswami, S. Ganguli, 'Anvikṣā', Research Journal, Dept. of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Vol. XIII, April, 1990.
15. *Adhyāpana* on *Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpika* by N.C. Goswami, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1410 (Bangabda).
16. *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Rāmarudrī* on *ibid.*
19. *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 94.
20. *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
21. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
22. *Rāmarudrī*<sup>or</sup> *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
23. *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
24. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
25. *Rāmarudrī* on *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 84.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Nāgeśa : *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*, ed. & Tr. By B. Goswami, S. Ganguli, 'Anvikṣā', Research Journal, Dept. of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Vol. XIII, April, 1990.
28. *Pramāṇavārtika* 1/4.
29. *Nyāyamañjarī*, Chowkhamba, 1936, pp. 370-72.