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# Chapter - II

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### The concept of *Tātparya* in different systems of Indian Philosophy.

There are different schools of thought in India who have accepted *tātparya* (in relation to the meaning of the sentence) as a factor of verbal understanding showing fine discrimination depending on primary viewpoint taken by each. Although the general idea is very clear. The term *tātparya* means intended meaning. That is, the *tātparya* or intention stands for the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence uttered or written by some one. Moreover, it signifies the meaning intended by the speaker or the purport of the utterance. In order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*) plays an important role and different schools of thought existing in India generally support this view. Thus, as far as the exact role of *tātparya* is concerned there is no dissentient of opinion as regards the communicative understanding (verbal comprehension).

The meaning of the sentence can be judged from viewpoint of speaker and from viewpoint of listener. The speaker's point of view in general has been accepted in Western approach while the Indian approach, mainly *Śābdabodha* approach is connected with listener's point of view.

"In a normal speech situation there can be five different aspects of the meaning of an utterance : what is in the mind of the speaker who makes the utterance, what the speaker wants the listener to

understand, what the utterance actually conveys, what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance, and what is in the mind of the listener on hearing the utterance."<sup>(1)</sup>

In proper linguistic communication all five of these meanings are synonymous or identical, but often due to various reasons differences arise which stand in the way of lucid communication. When a person intends to speak lie, he hides his own mind deliberately in his utterance at that time, so that confusion is created in the meaning intended to be conveyed to the listener.

Thus in many situations, what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance is different from that intended to be conveyed by the speaker. This is due to the weakness of the speaker's ability in expressing or the inability of the listener in proper comprehension of the utterance.

The speaker's mind before he expresses and listener's mind after hearing the utterance of speaker are both imperceptible and are not within the domain of scientific objective analysis. The original utterance can be analysed objectively into its components of words, morphemes and phonemes and studied, but it does not signify that the other aspects are unimportant.

Common people understand something through the utterance of a sentence without going to such intellectual analysis. The cultivators, fishermen etc. understand others' intention without any problem, which indicates that verbal understanding is a kind of convention. If the intellectual analysis is given it becomes a philosophical explanation of the verbal expression. This exercise is essential for rationalising the system. We should see why there is misunderstanding, ambiguity etc. and should try to sort out the problems standing in the way of our

understanding. If this can be done successfully we can do justice to the rationalisation of the communicative system.

### **The Grammarians' View**

The grammarians have attached greater importance to the role of speakers intention in interpretation of a sentence. Nāgeśa, a great grammarian, is of the opinion that if there is intention, all words can denote all senses (*sati tātparye sarve sarvārthavācakāh.*<sup>(2)</sup>). If it is admitted, all words can denote all senses, without recourse to *lakṣaṇā*. To them the *tātparya* or intention of the term *gaṅgā* in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is the bank of Ganga, and hence there is no necessity of applying *lakṣaṇā* here. If there is a strong intention of the speaker, denotation of a word can convey all senses.

This type of speaker's intention can be extended to the phenomenon of *vivakṣā* (will to speak). The role of *vivakṣā* in determining the relation between word and meaning is brought out by the grammarians. Bhartr̥hari has depended on *vivakṣā* for his ideas of interpretation. At the initial *śloka* of the *Vākyapadīya* he has claimed that the words are the regulators of the usage of the meanings ("*arthapravṛttitattvānaṁ śabdāḥ eva nibandhanam*")<sup>(3)</sup>. The term '*arthapravṛttitattva*' has been interpreted in various ways to accommodate various theories. The interpretation as found in the *Svapajñātikā* is as follows : *arthasya pravṛttitattvam vivakṣā* i.e. the intention of the speaker is the semantic factor.

The communication of a meaning does not always depend on any real existent which would correspond to it. A word may be used to convey some meaning, although the actual object cannot exist in reality. The following sloka is a classic example of such cases "*Eṣo bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpakṛtasékharah / kūrmakṣīracaye snātah*

*śaśasṅgadhānurdharaḥ* // (i.e. The barren woman's son is going after wearing a crown of sky flowers, he has taken bath in tortoise milk and carries a bow made from a rabbit's horn. The words 'barren woman's son', 'skyflower' 'tortoise-milk' and 'rabbits' 'horn' have no corresponding existing objects. From this it does not follow that these words convey no sense at all.

What is the principle factor of semantics? It is an ideational character of meaning which has no corresponding object in the outside world. Equivalent to the rabbit-horn or sky-flower so dear to the Indian thinkers we come across mythological beasts in the West, e.g. the unicorn. Although these objects do not exist in the real world, they are not really 'nonsense', for they make some sense in some way. Bhartrhari has recognised the idea of *aupacārikī sattā* or a kind of metaphorically imposed existence which is not existent in the literal sense.<sup>(4)</sup> Words like sky-flower etc having no corresponding reality, still make sense. This intellectual meaning (*bauddha artha*) is pure sense, although they may not be a referent or external reality (*vāhya artha*).

In fact, such a concept brings us to the concept of *vikalpa* or ideational meaning recognized by the yoga thinkers. *Vikalpa* is defined as a sense which appears in the intellect from the knowledge of certain word, but which may have no corresponding external reality (*vāhya artha*)<sup>(5)</sup>. The grammarians too admit such ideational meaning. To the grammarians, a *prātipadikārtha* usually takes on the first case-ending<sup>(6)</sup>. A *prātipadikārtha* is the meaning that essentially appears in the intellect as soon as the *prātipadika* is uttered. A *prātipadika* is a word which has specific meaning, but is not a verbal root or a suffix<sup>(7)</sup>. In the sentence *śaśasṅgam nāsti* (there is no rabbit-horn) the word *śaśasṅga* assumes the first case-ending because it is a *prātipadika* and conveys certain sense. If we do not admit the phenomenon of

purely dependent on the speaker's will – and hence there must be some conventional connection between the two. It has been explained with the help of the metaphor of eye which cannot grasp sound. Hence the grammarians belong to the conventional school of thought.

Bhartṛhari also admits that the meaning of a particular word or sentence depends on the sweet will of the speaker. The usage of the cases depends on *buddhi* or intellect, which is nothing but the speaker's intellectual or ideational analysis which is called *vivakṣā*.<sup>(9)</sup> The following instance may be cited for justifying the above case. If it is used – *asinā chinatti*, it is intended by the speaker that the sword is an instrument by the use of instrumental case. If the usage is *asiśchinatti taikṣṇyena* (i.e., the sword cuts with its sharpness), the instrumentality is shifted to the sharpness from sword in order to emphasise the sharpness of the sword. In another usage – “*Taiṣṇyam chinatti svasāmarthyena* (i.e., sharpness cuts by its own power), the sharpness serves both as instrument and as subject to emphasise on sharpness<sup>(10)</sup>

It is found in usage – ‘*valahakād vidyotate*’ (i.e. lightning flashes from the cloud), where the lightning, thought mixed with cloud, is perceived as different from it and coming out of it. If the usage is *valāhake vidyotate* (lightning flashes *in* the cloud), it would mean that lightning, though perceived as non-different from the cloud, is seen being situated in it. It may otherwise be described as *valāhako vidyotate* (i.e. the cloud flashes lightning) the lightning is seen as non-different from the cloud.<sup>(11)</sup> In the like manner, different case endings may be used as per intention of the scholar. In the oblique case (*apādāna kāraka*), the sense of oblique must be intended as found in *vṛkṣāt paṇam patati* (the leaf falls from the tree). If it is not desired, the speaker is authorized to use otherwise as found in *vṛkṣasya paṇam*

*patati* (the leaf of the tree falls). In this case the tree is playing the role of an adjunct of leaf with the use of genitive (*sasthi*), which is not a *kāraka* due to not bearing any relation with the verb. Hence, the role of intention cannot be neglected in framing a sentence and conveying a particular meaning.

### **The Rhetoricians' View**

The rhetoricians also have given much importance on the intention of the speaker, not only in the field of poetics but in other normal spheres also. The entire system is depended on the speaker's will to speak a particular sense. The *Alaṅkāra* school of thought claims that figures of speech (*alaṅkāra*) are essential to poetry, the *Rīti* school is of the view that style is of great importance in poetry, the *Rasa* school believes in bringing out the aesthetic pleasure. The Dhvani theorists combine are these and state that the suggested meaning is the soul of poetry. The suggested meaning may be brought through suggestion by the word, the primary meaning, the figure or anything constituting the body of the poetry. Every word, every sense, etc must be used keeping in view the delineations of aesthetic sentiment of pleasure. For this reason one cannot but depend on the speaker's intention to convey a sense which would enhance *rasa* or aesthetic pleasure. We may elaborate this point in the following manner.

All aspects of poetic activity, from creation to expression, have been studied with perceptive insight and its meticulous detail by the great Hindu thinkers in the field of aesthetics from Bharata onwards. Bharata's is perhaps the most complete theoretical statement in the world heritage on the entire poetic circuit: the latent effective reactivity of man, its activation by the organization of various kinds of stimuli in the dramatic presentation, the reaction to it by the spectator, and its final distillation into a pure aesthetic relish. Bhamaha explored the mysterious mutual interfusing of sound and sense, their transformation

into an indissoluble unity, in poetic language. Ānandavardhana perceived and Abhinavagupta further clarified the quantal leap of power, the power of resonance or *dhvani*, which poetry acquires and which transcends all the logical, grammatical and synatactical resources of prose discourse. Vamana studies the features of the integrated reality that is poetic diction. Other thinkers related poetics to ontology and transcendence.

Before I proceed further in my endeavour of delineating the salient and central features of Hindu aesthetic thinking, I propose to make some clarificatory distinctions. There the Hindu view of art, and it can be studied in a two-fold manner, one historical and the other theoretical. One can pursue the historical development of Hindu art, independent of aesthetics, from the poetry, descriptive nature-poetry enlivened by wonder and imagination, followed by the combination of passion and austerity in the language of the *Upaniṣads* and Pali Buddhism. This was the language at the service of the search of the truth. The late Hindu view treated the practice of art as a form of *yoga* and identified aesthetic emotion with that fact when the self perceives the Self. In later time the 'defense' of any art, such as poetry and drama, was characterized as contributory to the achievement of all or any of the Four Aims of Life (*caturvarga*). The point of moment is the important part played in Hindu thought by the concept art as *yoga*. This is a large issue and we can hardly undertake to deliberate on the issue. But we can certainly cite a few instances to highlight the importance of the concept.

It follows, in the other side of the story, that the quality of beauty in a work of art is really quite independent of its theme. Beauty has never been reached except through the necessity that was felt to deal

with a particular subject. The theory of beauty is a matter for philosophers, not of the artists.

When we turn to the theoretical aspect of the Hindu view of art, we come across the agreement that the one essential element in poetry is *rasa*. With the term, which is equivalent of beauty or aesthetic emotion, must be considered the derivative adjective *rasavanta*, having *rasa*, applied to a work of art, and the derivative substantive, *rasika*, one who enjoys *rasa*, a connoisseur, and finally *rasāsvādāna*, the tasting of *rasa*, i.e., aesthetic contemplation. A whole literature is devoted to the discussion of *rasa* and the conditions of its experience. The theory is worked out in relation to poetry and drama. Aesthetic emotion, *rasa*, is said to result in the spectator, *rasika*, though it is not effectively *caused*, through the operation of determinants (*vibhāva*), consequents (*anubhāva*) mood (*bhāva*) and involuntary emotions (*sattvabhāva*). There is no one single term for the English 'beauty'. The words like *saundarya*, *cārutā*, *ramaṇīya*, *rūpa*, *camatkāra*, *hṛdayālhādajanaka* etc, should be taken as suggesting loveliness or charm. But these are of secondary importance in relation to the master idea of *rasa*.

It is arguable that the Hindu theory of poetry is an improvement upon Croce's definition, 'expression is art'. A mere statement, however, completely expressive, is not art. Poetry is indeed a kind of sentence, but what kind of sentence? A sentence ensouled by *rasa*, is Visvanatha's answer ('*vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam*')<sup>(12)</sup> in which one of the nine *rasa* is implied or suggested, and the savouring of this flavour, *rasasvādāna*, through empathy, by those possessing the requisite sensibility is the condition of beauty.

In discussing the nature of aesthetic experience, it is said to be pure, indivisible, self-manifested, compounded equally of joy and consciousness, free of admixture with any other perception, the very twin brother of mystic experience (*brahmasvādasahodara*), and the very life of it is supersensuous (*lakottara*) wonder. For that very reason it cannot be an object of knowledge, its perception being indivisible from its very existence. Apart from perception it does not exist. It is not on that account to be regarded as eternal in time or as uninterrupted. It is timeless. It is again supersensuous, hyperphysical or *alaukika* and only proof of its reality is to be found in experience. It is possible to remark that the view of the aesthetic experience is monistic, implying that through the world of experience may be seen by those of penetrating vision (artists, lovers and philosophers) glimpses of the real substrate. Beauty, then, is reality as experienced by the artist. It is through the objective work of art that the artist is able to communicate his experience. The artist reveals beauty wherever the mind attaches itself, not directly to the Absolute, but to objects of choice. The true critic (*rasika*) perceives the beauty of which the artist has exhibited the signs. Works of art are reminders. It may be suggested that on the Hindu view the vision of the artist may be rather a discovery than a creation. In aesthetic contemplation we momentarily recover the unity of our being released from individuality.

It is time now that we turned to the Hindu theorists of art and aesthetic experience. More specifically, we propose to consider the centrality of *prātibhajñāna* or intuitive cognition in aesthetic experience.

Most of us are more or less acquainted with the phenomenon of aesthetic experience in our lives. It is the philosophers' task to trace its source and discover the nature of this unique experience, which is rendered possible by *Pratibhā* or creative genius. Of the Hindu

philosophers of art Abhinavagupta has given the most elaborate defense of aesthetic experience arising from the literature. But there are other accounts as well of the phenomenon.

Poetry or *kāvya* is called a perfect combination of a word and its meaning and hence it is said by Rajasekhara as '*śabdārthau te śārīram*'<sup>(13)</sup>. Such a view is first propounded by Bhamaha in his *Kāvyaśāstram* as '*Śabdārthau sahitaū kāvyam*'(1/16) i.e., the assimilation of a word and its meaning is called *cāvya* or *sāhitya*. The appropriate combination between a word and its meaning is called *sāhitya*. Kuntaka in his *Vakroktijīvitā* has expounded the exact significance of such appropriateness. To him *sāhitya* is a supernormal composition of a word and its meaning, which becomes charming and beautiful through their *balanced usage* neither too less nor too much ('*anyuṇānatiriktivamanohariṇyavasthitih*')<sup>(14)</sup> The point implies that a word cannot be less or more beautiful than the beauty of meaning and in the same way meaning cannot be less or more beautiful than the beauty of a word, which can be called balancing beauty. As if the beauty of a word is challenging the beauty of its meaning and the vice-versa, which is called metaphorically '*paraspara-spardhitva-ramaṇīya*' (*Vṛtti on Ibid*) i.e., each other possessing the challenging beauty. The assimilation between word and meaning is metaphorised as *Pārvati-paramēśvara* and *ardhvanarīśvara*. Just as the beauty of Pārvati and Paramēśvara is realized when they stand biunity, where each is both, the beauty of *sāhitya* lies in the proper union between a word and its meaning, which can never be separated. For, the existence of a word is covered with its meaning and the existence of the meaning is full with its word. A word and its meaning cannot be separated just as there does not arise any question of separation between the lines and the paintings painted through them. The ideal union of Pārvati and

Parameśvara is as inseparable as the union between *vak* (word) and *artha* (meaning) – ‘*vāgarthāviva samprktau*’<sup>(15)</sup>, which is the fundamental material in creating the poetic universe full of various colours and aesthetic sentiment. In this way, the union can be compared to the icon of *Ardhvanārīśvara* in which both the halves are taken to be equally superior but not the upper half is relatively superior or inferior to the other. To Rabindranath *sāhitya* is the means to unite not only a word and its meaning, but between one man with another man, between the past and the present, between that what is remote and the near. The inhabitants of a country where there is no *sahitya* at all are alienated due to the lack of live mutual binding. Hence Rabindranath has described *sāhitya* as temporal, cultural and social union. (*Bānglā Jātīya Sāhitya*).

A piece of literature has its body which is in the form of a word and its meaning. It has a self or essence, in the form of aesthetic sentiment. It possesses the virtues like velour etc, styles like the arrangements of the limbs, rhetoric like ear-ring etc and devoid of the faults like deafness etc. (*‘kāvyasya śabdārthau śarīraṃ, rasādiścātmā, guṇaḥ śauryādaya iva, doṣaḥ kāṇatvādivat, rītayaḥ avayavasamsthānaviśeṣavat, alaṃkāraśca kaṭakakunḍalādivat*)<sup>(16)</sup>.

The merit, rhetoric or figure etc cannot be taken as vital factors of a literary art due to their inadequacy in the manner of poetic creation. When the poetic language is completely distinguished from the ordinary language, the beauty of the former can easily be realized. Though the merit, rhetoric etc. are of course found in the language in our day-to-day communications, it is not taken as evidence of literature. All persons are gifted to follow the ordinary language, but hardly the poetic one. In enquiring into its cause Anandavardhana has proposed the theory of *Dhvani* or suggestion, which alone can offer the

reasonable explanation of the creation of the poetic beauty. The nature of *Dhvani* is given in the following way – “*Arthaḥ sahrdayasīāghyaḥ kāvyātmā yo vyavasthitaḥ*”. The aesthetic pleasure arising from literary art cannot be understood by all, but only by the appreciators (*sahrdaya*). In other words, literature is always appreciated by the *sahrdayas* alone. The portion which the appreciators specifically apprehend and which is taken as a vital factor in literature is called *Dhvani*. The aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) arises if there is supremacy of *Dhvani*; otherwise it is *rasavadalamkāra* (i.e. rhetoric mixed with *rasa*).

The aesthetic experience arising out of literary form of art, as Abhinavagupta has observed, is different from the experience arising from other sources (i.e. non-art objects). Those who enjoy a literature (either in the form of poetry or drama) become happy or unhappy after sharing the happiness or misery of the hero or heroine. Behind this happiness or misery of the audience there is no reason by which a logical mind can be satisfied. As for example, Rāma, a character of a drama might be happy or unhappy, but there is no reason of being involved emotionally with the dramatic character sharing their pleasure and misery. It is true of course that one in the audience or an appreciator is found to be emotionally involved. From this particular effect on the audience it is quite rational to look for a cause. As this cause is not found through ordinary sense organs and logical argumentation, it can be taken as something mysterious, non-logical in essence.

That the aesthetic pleasure is mystical can again be known from the fact that the aesthetic emotional mood of grief is found to rise to the experience of joy. How is the joy realized in the depicted painful situations? In the dramatic situation our mind is absorbed in the performances of the actors and this absorption depends on the

equilibrium of mind. When our mind is disturbed, the pain follows. If our mind remains in the state of aesthetic experience, there is something, which forcibly snatches our mind and keeps it in a state of complete rest, which is called *visrānti*. When a human situation is artistically presented usually against the background of the nature, the critic does not get himself transported to the peak of *rasavisrānti* or repose. It is in fact the last stage of his contemplation. Leading up to it are the diverse impressions he is receiving from different angles, almost simultaneously. His imaginative sensibility helps him in reception while his intellect is at work all along sorting them out. When the intellect and imagination slide into the margin, his heart is moved to an intense aesthetic state of repose, which is an end in itself. It is the aesthetic pleasure, which only can do this thing. This joy is endowed with such a type of mystical power by which the audience can enjoy this bliss even out of painful situation, but in our practical life human nature is found averse to experience pain. Hence, *Viśvanātha*, the celebrated rhetorician, has said that poetry is a unique unworldly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of a supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situations.

In case of aesthetic encounters there is some sort of identity between the audience and the object of experience. This notion of identity emerges from having self-involvement (*Ekātmatā*) with it. As for example, when an individual perceives a scene in which Dusyanta enjoys happiness in company of *Śakuntalā*, he is realizing bliss just as Dusyanta. For the time being he is identified himself with the character of the drama. On account of this identification (with the hero) the

spectator loses his individuality and forgets his personal this-worldly matters. This shows the mystical power of the aesthetic pleasure.

The real appreciator of a literature is a *sahṛdaya*. The property of being a *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. The poet creates poetry, the appreciator realizes it and being a *sahṛdaya* he recreates the creative mood in his own self. Just as fire covers the dry wood, the aesthetic pleasure arising in one's heart engulfs experiencer's whole being. This aesthetic pleasure is generated if the work of art is appreciated by the heart (*hṛdayasamvādī*). ("Yo 'rtho hṛdayasamvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhāvaḥ / Śarīraṁ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṁ kaṣṭhamivāgnina").<sup>(17)</sup> Generally artists are not content with a simple and direct representation of nature. They make the *bhāva* or representation more and more complex when they are gifted with imagination. The more refined critic welcomes it too, and the most complex pattern thus imposed on nature and human nature by the imagination of the artist wins the admiration of the most cultivated man of taste. He calls such a completely successful *bhava-complex* itself by the name *rasa* since it means supreme delight.

It may be asked why is this-worldly pleasure not aesthetic. In reply, it can be said that the said pleasure is not aesthetic because aesthetic pleasure should be impersonal, disinterested and universal in character. When an individual feels happy at the happiness of the dramatic character, that pleasure is not exclusively his own (i.e. arising from his personal life) and it is impersonal. As this pleasure is not owing to the fulfillment of his self-interest, it is disinterested. Such a type of feeling does not occur in the case of only one individual. It happens so in the case of all individuals. That is why it is universal. It has been stated earlier that due to complete absorption in the aesthetic pleasure a man forgets his own loves and fears etc. At that time there

prevails a universal love, which is aesthetic pleasure. When a terrible scene is represented, there is an enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure called *Bhayānaka*. In this case too we generally forget that this fear felt by us belongs to the dramatic character and enjoys the universal character of fear, which is free from privative barriers of individualistic elements. The generalization is the process of idealization through which an individual transcends and alights on his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. The poet and the audience have to be endowed with the capacity of idealization. The poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure, which is enjoyed by others, as if it were theirs. As this pleasure transcends the limitations of personal interest and inclinations, it is disinterested universal pleasure. A pleasure which transcends this-worldly interest is surely transcendental and hence, mystical. As this worldly pleasure arising out of this worldly affairs like the birth of a son, attainment of property etc. is hardly impersonal, disinterested and universal, it cannot be described as aesthetic. Aesthetic pleasure is the emotional mood revealed in a blissful state of knowledge free of all barriers. When someone undergoes aesthetic experience, he becomes identified with the characters of the drama, and it is called identification of self (*ekātmā*). Just as the identification there is also distancing from the characters. The pathos experienced as joyous in aesthetic sentiment is due to the impersonalisation of the sorrow. Had this sorrow been my personal feeling, it would make me cripple, but actually we 'enjoys' sorrow under such a special and unique situation. The enjoyment of sorrow is possible through impersonalisation, which is the product of distancing from the characters. It is a kind of identification with as well as distancing from the characters. Hence it is very difficult to say whether the experience belongs to the characters of drama or to myself. As there are both the

situations of distancing and identification, it is very difficult to describe it as belonging to me or belonging to other. This is as Visvanatha's account of the matter.<sup>(18)</sup>

According to Abhinavagupta, an object becomes beautiful when our self gets involved in it. When someone realizes the misery of some character in a piece of literature, he thinks it as though it were his own due to the reflection of his own self there. This view is more firmly rooted in the Upanisadic view. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* says that husband comes to be loved to the wife not because she loves her husband but because she loves her own self etc. ("...*na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*" etc.) One can realize the nature of Rasa with the help of bliss arising from the realization of Brahman as accepted by the Advaitians. When an individual's personal desire is transformed into the impersonal aesthetic sentiment, the realization of aesthetic pleasure, universal in character, comes into being. Hence, Abhinavagupta has accepted the process of 'generalization' (*sādhāraṇīkarana*) as one of the characteristic features of aesthetic pleasure. Though there is reflection of Brahman in an individual's mind, which is free due to the prominence of *sattvaguna*, this pleasure is quantitatively different (but qualitatively same) from the pleasure of Brahman. Hence it is described as a dwarfed image of the taste of Brahman (*Brahmasvādasahodara*).

The aesthetic pleasure leads a man to the world of creativity. After seeing the separation of the one of the curlew-couple *Vālmiki* became greatly moved, and out of his grief he created a *śloka*. He intensely felt of pathos in which he lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality he had a sense of joy out of the grief. This joyous experience of pathos prompted him to composing a *śloka* spontaneously. *Vālmiki*'s grief was not this worldly. Had it been so, he

would have felt sympathy with the bird. This could not have been sufficient for the creation of poetry. This wordly grief makes a man stupefied and dumb. When a poet's vision deepens, he gets inspired from within. Then the crafts of writing of *Kavya* (like characterization, plot etc) follow just as water overflows a jar already filled with water. The poet's genius absorbed in the aesthetic state comes to be endowed with capacity of composing a *Kāvya* in a spontaneous manner. If a poet's heart is filled with emotion, it (emotion) finds a spontaneous outlet in the metrical form. This spontaneity arises when there are no barriers (like personal interest etc.) for the realization of aesthetic pleasure. The spontaneous outlet of poetry from a man who was idle before having aesthetic absorption proves again the mystical character of aesthetic pleasure. This spontaneous poetry is called *śloka* as it arises from the grief due to the separation of the curlew couple ('*krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokah ślokatvamāgataḥ*)<sup>(19)</sup> The theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa*, though invented in connection with the literary form of art, can be extended to other forms of art also. It has been stated by Ānandavardhana that an individual, though conversant in respect of word, meaning and their relation, cannot understand literature until and unless his heart is saturated with aesthetic sentiment. He explains this phenomenon with the help of an example taken from the world of music. He adds that an individual, though expert in the science of music, cannot understand melody and pleasure arising from it until and unless his heart is saturated with *rasa*. The same theory can be applicable to the pictorial form of art also. In the phrase of Abhinavagupta, any type of the creative art presupposes the condition of *rasāveśā* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual. Various experiences of our daily life are represented in the art-objects like literature, painting etc. In order to represent the reality one should need deep concentration, which is supported in the *Gitā* –

'na cāyuktasya bhāvanā'. This abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in artist, dramatic character and spectators (in the case of literary art). In the case of pictorial art also, there must exist the same sentiment among artist, pictorial presentation, and the viewer. Hence, the property of being *sahṛdaya* is not essential in the case of literature only, but is in other forms of art also.

When an individual shares the feelings of the hero or heroine, he becomes sensitive in having heart saturated with aesthetic pleasure generated within him through his self-involvement. The situation of being moved by *rasa* (*rasāveśā*) impels the individual with the power of creativity (*nirmāṇakṣamatva*). Sharing the pathos of others in a drama he gets aesthetic pleasure, which associates him with the power of creativity. If, on the other hand, he has the feeling of pathos from the incident occurred in his own life due to the death of a son etc, it (this pathos) renders him incapacitated instead of conjoining him with the power of creativity, which is called *kārayitṛi pratibhā*. An individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure after sharing his self with the character of the drama as he is also having same feeling subsisting in the dramatist and dramatic characters. This common experience is possible due to having the similar feelings, because they are *sahṛdayas* (literally having common heart). When the hearts of the people are expanded having clear mind due to a culture of fine arts and inculcate the capability of being identified with the characters of the drama as described (*varmaṇīyatanmayībhanayogyatā*), they are called *sahṛdayas* as they all possess the same feeling.

If the above-mentioned view of *sahṛdayatva* were accepted, the aesthetic experience would be regarded as universal. The success of an art-object depends on its engendering universalisation (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), which depends on the experience of *sahṛdayatva*. If

each and every reader or audience has got the same sensitivity or feeling, there is transparency regarding the fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahrdaya-samvāda-sālitā*). This phenomenon is otherwise described as 'one-pointed concentration of all the audiences' (*sarvasāmājikanam ekaghanatā*). Universality (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) is the hallmark of aesthetic experience though it proceeds from the object highly individualized by the artist. The situation presented in art becomes aesthetic only when all the elements therein are grasped by the critic in their universal aspects. Personal considerations fade away. Even impossible things in life do not engender disbelief in art.

The universalisation is possible through the melting of the state of being a knower (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*). It can be explained in the following manner. A knower of *pramata* has got some elasticity through which he can expand himself. This may be called 'subjectification'. As a subject is no more confined within him and is extended to the objects after covering their essential characters, it is called subjectification of the object.<sup>(20)</sup>

It may be adduced in this context, and it has already been stated earlier, that one gets identified with object (*tanmayibhāvanā*). This state may be called 'objectified subject'. Again, when it is said that subject extends himself to the object (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*), it may be called 'subjectified object'. I think there is no fundamental difference between 'subjectified object' and 'objectified subject' because this state allows a two-way traffic. If someone shares the grief of a character of drama, he obviously expands himself to the object. In other words, the same case can also be interpreted, as 'objectified subject' as the subject is really objectified in the sense that subject has no personal feeling at this stage. That is why, it is said that in such an experience a two way-

traffic may be accepted, even though Abhinavagupta has emphasized on the subjectification of aesthetic experience. To Viśvanātha also the subject sees himself in the object being identified with it (“*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānaṁ pratipadyate*”). In fact, self exists everywhere and hence, following the Advaitin’s line Abhinavagupta is of the opinion that the relishment itself is a *rasa* (*rasanīyaḥ rasah*). What is the object of relishment? In reply, it is said that relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama) is called *svasamvidānanda*. As if we have undertaken an activity of savouring (*carvaṇavyāpāra*) of the bliss arising from self-knowledge. It can be asserted that to Abhinavagupta the relishment in the form of chewing activity of the bliss rising from self-knowledge is called *rasa*. As *rasa* is itself a kind of self-relishment, it is not proper to say – ‘relishment of *rasa*’ with genitive case-ending, as we cannot say that he is cooking the boiled rice, (*odanam pacati*). Just as ‘boiled rice’ is itself a cooked object, relishment is itself *rasa*. If *rasa* is subjectified, it is not proper to say – ‘*rasa* of’, which presupposes subject-object dichotomy, which is not accepted in Abhinavagupta’s philosophy.

In fact, one’s mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at the situation of aesthetic relish and hence it is uncontaminated by *Rajaḥ* and *Tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* a person can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not moved or swayed away by knowledge of other objects (*vedyāntarasparśāsūnya*). This bliss is the highest possible *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaparakāśānanda*), and it is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman but not quantitatively. The former is transitory while the latter is ever abiding. That is why; such pleasure is described by Viśvanātha also as *Brahmasvādasahodara* (i.e. the sibling manifest of the taste of Brahman).

Moreover, the concepts of disinterested pleasure (*lokottarānanda*), universalisation (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), subjectification etc. are not to be taken as closed concepts but open ones as they can be applied in a similar fashion to not-literary art objects like music, dance etc. the bliss arising from melody, dance etc, is disinterested, universal and subjectified in the same way as shown in the case of literature. In short, the aesthetic experience is essentially a state of bliss, a state of self-realization. This state of bliss is pervaded by a feeling of spiritual illumination and free from sensual elements. The physical emotions shake off their sordid attributes when they are converted into artistic emotions-they are free from the limitations of time and space and are universalized. As a result they do not become a part of the direct physical experience of the spectator, they raise him above the petty mundane experience of the self, refine his sensibility and sublimate his consciousness. But it is not a state of pure spiritual bliss, because it is neither a permanent state of joy nor is it completely unrelated with the material attainments.

Life is a complex fact and fancy, logic, meaning and mystery and poetry pierces life where it is sensitive and seeks to pluck the heart of the mystery. The poet uses words in a metrical form to convey such mystery or deeper significance of our life. But words are mere appearance, and words have to be charged with significant undertones that a poet may be able to convey the reality that remains beyond him through the help of the appearances. We often refer to the poet's inspiration, which nothing but a primordial divine energy. Such inspiration has to be turned into the currency of language before it becomes poetry. We may describe poetry as mystic incantation allied to prayer. When poetic expression achieves the status of a *mantra*, the effect on the hearer is far more profound than the mere words seem to

mean. It is a kind of leap from the physical boundaries or intellectual cognition to the realm of reader's soul. Words, grammatical formations, rhythmic arrangement, figures of speech, operation of intellect, emotional excitement etc. all have their part to play in determining the composition of a poem. In spite of this without soul-quality there is no poem. Without soul it would turn into a lifeless mass of words, a temple without an installed deity, a statue without life. *Dhvani* in poetry is really this soul-quality. When a poem, without suffocating the reader within the walls of precise meaning, proves to be magic casement opening on the foam of the endless oceans of significance, it is poetry in the true sense of the term. In poetry we seek to pierce the *māyā* or cognizable picture and touch the intangible reality within. To Ānandavardhana the poetry is a means of cultivating the double vision so that we may be able to perceive the vision and invade the invisible. Professor Srinivas Iyerger opines – "We are not the same people after reading the poem that we were before. The words of the poet are verily like a dance of creative life, they are like unto a racing squadron of the spirit, and whereas the five senses open without, the sixth sense that poetry gives us opens within, and the undertones of *Dhvani* carry us almost to the threshold of Reality. The pleasure is not denied, it is only transformed into a discipline in awareness, a deepening of consciousness, a realization of things undreamt of before".

*Dhvani* is an exclusively poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of the elements embellishing the language like *alāmkāra*, *guṇa* etc to delineate aesthetic pleasure. Ānandavardhana admits its independent existence after refuting the views that it can be included in *lakṣaṇā* or *tātparya*. He had given a scientific account of *Dhvani* to explain the phenomenon of *sahṛdayatva*. The suggested meaning or *pratīyamāna artha* cannot be stated in words and can only be felt or

realized by the reader possessing an aesthetic attitude. In poetry the suggested meaning has always been taken as superior to the direct embellishment. Hence the suggested meaning is always of the nature of *Rasa*. When the heart of the reader is affected by that meaning, the reader is impressed by the poetic genius (*pratibhā*). Those who have an attitude of aesthetic relish can feel it. It is not felt by those who have complete mastery over the language and reasoning, because a sentence or word provides us the suggestive meaning suddenly like a flash. *Rasa* is that which initially inspires the poet into creativity and ultimately ensures the aesthetic delight of the critic. In life there is joy and pity in our life, but no aesthetic enjoyment or relishment. The impersonal, disinterested and universal delight is exclusive to poetry. The suggested beauty surpasses the beauty of the expressed (*vācya*). Such poetry is called first-rate poetry (*Dhvani-kāvya*). On the other hand, if the beauty of the expressed (*vācya*) outshines the beauty of the suggested (*vyangya*), it may be described as a second rate poetry. The characteristic features of *Rasa* can be realized more fully in the *Dhvani* theory. There may be various causes of beauty between the expressed and the expresser (*vācya-vācaka*). When these causes fail to attract others due to the supremacy of the suggestiveness, the real *Dhvani* is realized (“*Vācya-vācakacarutvahetūnām vividhātmanām / Rasādiparatā yatra sa dhvanerīṣayo mataḥ*”).<sup>(21)</sup> When *Rasa* is considered superior, it is surely *Dhvani*. If otherwise, it is not *Dhvani* and hence acquires the lower status called *Rasavadalamkāra*. In fact, beauty generated through suggestion is more intrinsic and aesthetic than what is expressed. In other words, *vyangya-cārutva* is always better than *vācya-cārutva*. *Dhvani* is that which is *vyangya* and exclusively important in comparison with other factors in poetry. In a good poetry there are various elements, which help to generate beauty of poetry. Some of the elements are *vācya* and some *vyangya*. The

prominence of the *vācya* over the *vyangya* or the *vice-versa* has to be judged to determine something as *Dhvani* or *alaṅkāra*. If the *vyangya* meaning is prominent over *vacya* then it is *Dhvani*. Otherwise it is *alaṅkāra*. Each and every poem has got a theme of its own which is called *vastu*. It may be communicated to the audience directly (*vācya*), figuratively (*lakṣya*) or suggestively (*vyangya*). In an understanding of poetry a critic should judge what gives him the final resting place (*samvid-viśrānti*). Such freedom and the lack of precision is the essential characteristic of poetry. No logic is applicable here, because the logic of poetry is something different from that of other fields.

*Dhvani* is of three types: *vastudhvani*, *alaṅkāra-dhvani* and *rasa-dhvani*. Of these three the province of *rasa-dhvani* is not only largest but sweetest also. In poetry language is taken as unique medium, because the poet tries to convey his emotion and feelings through it. Just as the apparently dry things like stones and bones are associated with our feelings, poetry that apparently seems to be *rasa*-less passages, a connoisseur will experience some aesthetic pleasure. Even in the case of *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṅkāra-dhvani* the existence of *Rasa* cannot be denied logically. It is admitted that the *dhvani* is the essence of the best poetry through which the *rasa* is delineated. Hence the application of the definition cannot be denied to *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṅkāra-dhvani*. These are more beautiful than their *vācya*-counterpart due to their contribution to partaking the healing touch of *rasa*.

We may cite the following example in favour of *Rasa-dhvani*:  
 “*Evaṁ vāḍini devarṣau pārsve pituradhomukhī / Līlakamalapatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa pārvati*” (That is, while the seer-deity was telling such, Pārvati counted the leaves of the beautiful lotus standing by the side of her father. The expressed meaning of the counting of the petals of the

beautiful lotus has no direct excellence. If we ponder over the whole situation, we will see that Nārada, the seer deity, was having some talk about Parvati's marriage with Shiva. After hearing this Parvati was ashamed of as found often in an unmarried woman and she was trying to hide this feeling after counting the petals of the lotus, which indicates that as if she had not heard any thing from them. This meaning is more beautiful than the expressed meaning. This is a classic example of *rasa-dhvani*.

In the *Meghnādvadha* the lamentation and frustration of Rāma is depicted in a very beautiful way. It has been said by Rāma that there is no need of rescuing Sītā, because innumerable monkey-soldiers are killed in the battle, many great kings are brought to Lanka with their soldiers. But every thing is in vain, because their bloods have dampened the earth just like rainwater. He has lost kingdom, wealth, father, mother and relatives due to his bad luck. There is none in this world for whom he can protect his life and live in this world. Hence it is better to go back to forest. Being enchanted by infatuative hope they have come to the kingdom of Raksakas. The original verse goes as follows:

*"Nahi kaj Sitai uddhari, vrtha, he jaladhi, ami bandhinu tomare, asamkhya raksasagram badhinu samgrame; aninu rajendradale e kanakpure sasainye; sonitasrota, hai akarane, barisar jalasama ardrila mahire! Rajya dhan pita mata svabandhubandhabe-harainu bhagyadose. Keval acchila andhakar ghare dip maithili; tahare (he vidhi, ki dose das dosi tava pade?) nibaila duradrsta! Ke ar acche re amar samsare, bhai, jar much dekhi rakhi e paran ami? Thaki e samsare? Cal phiri, punah mora jai banabase, Laksman, kuksane, bhuli asar chalane, e raksasapure, bhai ainu amara."*<sup>(22)</sup>

The frustration and lamentation as found in the above-mentioned verses are the expressed meaning (*vācyārtha*). After surpassing this expressed meaning another meaning (*vyangyārtha*) is suggested from which it is known that Meghnād is undefeatable due to his immeasurable valour. Lakṣmana, however great hero he may be, will surely be destroyed in the confrontation with Meghnad. This suggested meaning is more prominent and gracious. The matter (*vastu*) expressed here gives rise to another matter (*vastu*) suggestively and hence it is a case of *vastu-dhvani*.

If in poetry the matter (*vastu*) expressed gives rise to another rhetoric (*alamkāra*) suggestively then it is called *alamkāra-dhvani*. As for example the following verse may be taken into account: "Divākar, niśākar, dīp tārāgaṇ/ Divāniśi karitecche tamaḥ nibāraṇ// Tārā nā harite pāre timir āmar/ Ek Sītā bihane sakali andhakar//" (That is, the Sun the Moon, lamp and the stars are dispelling darkness day and night. But they cannot dispel my own darkness. Everything seems to be dark to me if alone Sītā is absent). In this case also the suggested meaning is more graceful and prominent than the expressed one. In this context the superiority of Sita has been suggested than the Sun, Moon etc. The rhetoric called *vyatireka* is found here, which is the suggested meaning coming under *alamkāra-dhvani*.

*Dhvani* may again be divided into two-*avivakṣita-vācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. When the suggested meaning is most desirable but not the expressed one, in such situation there we find *dhvani* called *avivakṣita-vācya*. It may be used in two distinct cases- inclusion of another meaning rejecting the expressed one (*arthāntara-samkrāmita*) and inclusion of the opposite meaning rejecting the expressed one (*atyanta-tiraskṛta*). The second type of *dhvani* i.e., *atyanta-tiraskṛta* is found in the following case where the prohibition

(*niṣedha*) is suggested in disguise of injunction (*vidhi*). The *śloka* runs as follows: “*Bhrama dhārmika! Viśraddhaḥ sa śuṅako'dya māritastena / Godābarīnadikūla-latāghanavasinaḥ dr̥ptasim̐hena*”<sup>(23)</sup> (That is, O virtuous man, you can freely move now. The particular dog, which you are afraid of, is killed by dangerous lion living in the dense creepers situated on the bank of Godavari). This is an excellent example of *Dhvani* of *atyanta-tiraskṛta* type. A virtuous man used to destroy the secrecy and beauty of the bower by way of plucking flowers and leaves where a couple meets very often. But that man was always scared of a dog living there. Towards this man the intelligent ladylove uttered this beautiful *śloka*. The injunction (*vidhi*) to move freely is the expressed meaning (*vācyārtha*), but the suggested meaning is the prohibition, which is completely different from the expressed one. The suggested meaning is that, though there is no dog, a dangerous lion had replaced it. Hence he should be more cautious and leave the place immediately. It comes under the *Dhvani* called *atyanta-tiraskṛta*.

The second type of *Dhvani* is *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. In this case the expressed meaning, though desired, suggests another meaning as more prominent and excellent. It is again of two kinds – *asamlakṣyakrama* (understanding *dhvani*, the stages of which are not capable of being noticed) and *samlakṣyakrama* (understanding *dhvani*, the stages of which are capable of being noticed). In the previous case it seems that both the expressed and suggested meanings are manifested simultaneously. Though there might be some stages for the origination of the suggested meaning, it is very difficult to notice them due to their minute and subtle character as per the principle involved in the pricking hundred petals of a lotus (*satapatrabhedanyāya*). The second type of *dhvani* is found there where the stages for understanding the suggested meaning from the expressed one are

noticed. The case cited as an example of *rasa-dhvani* may be taken as an example of the *samlakṣyakrama dhvani*. The fact of Pārvatī's feeling of uneasiness arising from her marriage-talk is available after analyzing different stages in the expressed meaning.

### **The Vedāntists' view**

The Vedāntists are not ready to appreciate *tātparya* in the sense of speaker's intention as a condition of verbal knowledge. The utterance of a parrot do not bear any intention. But it is not difficult to us to understand such expression. When one mechanically recited or uttered a vedic passage he cannot be said to intend the meaning which the hearers interpret out of it. The Vedāntist therefore advocate earnestly that *tātparya* as a condition of verbal comprehension is not constituted by the meaning which the speaker intends to convey with it, but by the fitness of the meaning which the words of a sentence creates. Thus the sense 'the jar is in the room' is fit to locate the relation of room and jar but not the relation of room and cloth. The Nyāya meaning of *tātparya* which the Vedāntists readily accepts only in the case of *nānārthakaśabda's* where the same statement involves the possibility of different implications.<sup>(24)</sup>

In case of ambiguous words like '*saindhava*' etc. it can be said that *tātparya* appears in their fitness to locate a particular meaning in absence of some other meaning intended to. The word '*saindhava*' is correct to signify 'salt' when there is no scope to involve the meaning of horse at all. However, if both the meanings of salt and horse are to be taken into account, we can say that it is capable of to mean both in absence of any intended meaning other than the two. In accepting *tātparya* as a condition of understanding of words or sentence the

vedāntists reduces it to fitness of words themselves with a particular meaning other than the speaker's intention if any.

### **The Mīmāṃsakas' View**

The Mīmāṃsakas consider a sentence as a combination of its constituent words where every word of that sentence has a definite meaning of its own and the power of *tātparya* helps to understand the construed meaning of the sentence. Of course, it is true that, the constituent words of a sentence have its own separate meaning, but a bunch of ununified separate meaning cannot make a unified meaning. In this context, a point may be noted. Whenever we use words, we have intention to convey a connected meaning or sense. The intention of a speaker behind the use of words in juxtaposition (*samabhivyāhāra*) is to carry a conjugated meaning without which the simultaneous application of different words in a sentence could be of no use. In such situation *tātparya* appears to be a general initiating factor in bringing into the relation of word meaning and the formulation of sentence meaning. *Tātparya*, as the Mīmāṃsakas' envisage, is the purport of the sentence while the Naiyāyikas accept it as intention or desire of the speaker.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not recognize the Nyāya concept of *tātparya* at all. This is why they totally ignore the requirement of the knowledge of the speaker's intention in the matter of *śābdabodha* in a sentence. Moreover, it is assumed that *tātparya* is all comprehensive but not absolute one, as it cannot change the *śakti*, the primary meaning of a word. The Mīmāṃsakas visualize *śakti* or the relation between the word and its meaning as normal, innate or permanent, i.e., they believe *śakti* as *autpattika*.<sup>(25)</sup>

But on the other hand, the Naiyāyikas consider the *śakti* or the relation between word and its meaning as conventional i.e., the *śakti* is *sāmketika* and permanent.

Moreover, to enrich the Mīmāṃsakas' standpoint a modern scholars view is quoted : 'The Mimamsakas' habit of attending too exclusively to the 'revealed' texts of the Vedas probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of Verbal Comprehension without any reference to the speaker at all. Even a sentence, which is unintelligible to the speaker has an inherent capacity to convey its meanings. Thus the phrase, 'the pot in the room' conveys the relation of the pot and the room without the help of the speakers intention".<sup>(26)</sup>

To discuss the Mīmāṃsakas' view about *tātparya* a point may be noted. All Mīmāṃsakas do not envisage the concept of *tātparya* in the same fashion.

The *Prābhākaras*, the advocates of *Anvitābhīdhānavāda* consider that it is *tātparya* that makes the power of *Abhidhā* to convey or carry the total meaning of sentence as well as the (*prāthamyādabhidhātṛtvat tātparyāvagamādapi / padanameva sā śaktirvaramabhyupagamyātām*) individual meaning of the word.<sup>(27)</sup> "According to the *Prābhākaras*, the *tātparya* enables primary meaning itself to give both its word meaning and the syntactic relation. These *anvitābhīdhānavādins* think that the *śakti* of words is understood with reference to a meaning that is related to some *kārya*. All sentence, especially in the Veda, have to be ultimately meaning injunctions or prohibitions. The later theory of Dhānika, who includes *dhvani* under *tātparya*, follows this *anvitābhīdhānavāda*"<sup>(28)</sup>

Bhāṭṭa comes to reject the notion of *Tātparya* prevailing in the circle of *prabhakaras*. *Dr̥ṣṭanugūṇyādapi padarthanimitaka eva*

*vākyārtho na padanimittaḥ dṛṣṭavādhaprasaṅgat..... tātparyañcāvā  
ntaravyaparadvarenapi sādhyatāmaviruddhamityucyate tadatrāpi  
samānam.*<sup>(29)</sup>

On the other hand the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas holds the view that in a sentence, the individual words denotes their isolated meaning while the meaning of the sentence is found through *lakṣaṇā* depending on *tātparyānupapatti*. For the Bhāṭṭa, *tatra vākyenānvayānubhavajanane ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsattijñānaṁ sahakāri.... tātparyaṁ tu tatpratīticchayā vaktrānusamhitatvam ..... kecittu tātparyajñānaṁ lakṣṇikanānārtha sthaliyasabde heturnatu śābdabodhamātre .... pare tu tātparyajñānasya na hetutvam sambhavati.*<sup>(30)</sup>

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