

# **THE CONCEPT OF *TĀTPARYA* IN *NAVYA NYĀYA* : *Some Philosophical Problems***

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***Submitted by :***

***Nayana Bhattacharjya***

Junior Research Fellow,  
Indian Council of Philosophical Research, at  
University of North Bengal



**Guided By :**

***Prof. Raghunath Ghosh***

Dean, Faculty of Arts, Commerce & Law  
University of North Bengal

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY  
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL**

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**Prof. Raghunath Ghosh**

*Dean*

Faculty Council for Post-Graduate  
Studies in Arts, Commerce & Law  
University of North Bengal  
P.O. North Bengal University  
Dist. Darjeeling, West Bengal  
INDIA, PIN – 734 013



Tel. Ph. : (0353) 2699116

Fax : (0353) 2581546

Ref. No. ....

Dated .....

### **TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

This is to certify that the thesis entitled : **'The Concept of *Tātparya* in *Navya Nyāya* : Some Philosophical Problems'** prepared by Nayana Bhattacharya is the result of her critical and analytic thinking on the subject. The thesis is not submitted here or elsewhere for the Ph.D. or any other degree and hence it is recommended for submission for the Ph.D. degree to the University of North Bengal.

**Raghunath Ghosh**

Professor of Philosophy and Dean  
Faculty of Arts, Commerce & Law  
University of North Bengal

## PREFACE

Language is the vehicle of our communication, which is the foundation of our social relation. A communication becomes successful if an understandable language is used. Language cannot always give us a non-ambiguous unequivocal meaning because there is something behind the use of a particular language. Normally a particular desire of the speaker is encoded in language, when it is communicated to a particular person, that desire of the speaker is understood through the decoding of the language. Language itself can provide meaning, which may not always be non-ambiguous. The same language can be using the sense of appreciation, non-appreciation, teasing and suggestion. An individual should know whether it is used in the sense of appreciation, non-appreciation or something else. For this reason, the desire of the speaker or the intention of the speaker should be properly understood. It is due to this reason; the concept of *tātparya* is fundamental and basic for verbal understanding. Considering this I have chosen the topic on intention and I feel the communication through language becomes easy and understandable if the intention is properly grasped. The success of a language in communicating some ideas depends on the apprehension of the intention of the speaker. If the problems arising out of the intention of the speaker are raised and carefully sorted out, communication becomes more easier, leading to the communication gap, misunderstanding and other difficulties.

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*Nayana Bhattacharjya*

**Nayana Bhattacharjya**

# CHAPTERISATION

## CHAPTER – I : Introduction

A brief history of Indian Philosophy of Language in Different Schools. The specialities in the *Navya Nyāya* view. How do the *Navya Naiyāyikas* account for the phenomenon of *Śābdabodha* (verbal understanding).

## CHAPTER – II : The concept of *Tātparya* in different systems of Indian Philosophy.

The concept of *Tātparya* in different systems of Indian Philosophy. The role of *Tātparya* in ordinary sentences and Vedic sentences as accepted by the Vedāntas etc.

## CHAPTER – III : The Concept of *Tātparya* in *Navya Nyāya*

The criteria or factors that are essential for apprehending meaning of a sentence. The concepts of *ākāṅkṣā*, *Yogyatā*, *Āsatti* and *tātparya*. The meanings of *tātparya* : whether non-realisation of intention (*anvayānupapatti*) or non-realisation of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*). How is intention grasped ? How is it known in ambiguous, non-ambiguous, Vedic sentences and a sentence uttered by a parrot etc. ? Philosophical implications of *tātparya*.

## CHAPTER – IV : A critical evaluation of the concept of *tatparya* in other systems and defence of *Navya Nyāya* view.

## CHAPTER – V : Some philosophical problems and their probable solutions.

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# Chapter - I

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# CHAPTER - I

## Introduction

Language is an important tool in communicating thoughts, because of the fact that thinking is almost impossible without thought. But, in the west, philosophy was thought to be concerned with the established truths of a very general kind with metaphysics and ethics, with other truths to be arrived at through the power of reasoning. In this scheme, philosophy of language occupied no important place. Later in the post Fregean period, some analytical philosophers believed that 'philosophy of language' in a specific sense should constitute the starting point of philosophical studies.<sup>(1)</sup>

For Dummett, (1980, 442) philosophy of language is "the base of the entire structure"— we call philosophy. However, how language functions was not the chief concern of most classical Indian Philosophers except Bhartṛhari. In this way, language gained a metaphysical importance, which influenced all post-Bhartṛhari grammarians. Philosophy of language as a separate discipline is a contemporary phenomenon in British and American Philosophy. Except for its concern with language the boundary of this branch of knowledge is anything but clear or definite. Sometimes descriptive metaphysics and study of language have been identified.<sup>(2)</sup> But even when the two have not been identified it is believed that philosophy of language is that study of language which is relevant in some special and important way for philosophy. The other disciplines like grammar and linguistics, particularly when taken in a narrower sense, do not, however, conduct

equally useful study of language – useful, that is, for the philosophers and philosophy. But when it is understood broadly so as to include descriptive linguistics, psycho-linguistics or socio-linguistics, one finds the study of language conducted by the linguists to be philosophically most relevant. It is often thought that with the development of these specialized branches of linguistics, philosophy of language is facing the problem of losing much of its subject matter.<sup>(3)</sup> A philosopher who does philosophy of language for the relevance and uses the latter for philosophising tends to view language more as a medium of thought and concentrates more on the theory of reference. But one who is first a philosopher of language seems to take language a vehicle of communication and concentrates mainly on the theory of meaning.<sup>(4)</sup> A philosopher or an ontologist can emphasize how the language can be anchored in relation to experience. This anchorage, of course is to be supposed by reference.

It has been accepted in the theory of reference that the expression considered as referring expressions, are chosen in relation to its prior commitment to certain ontology or elegance and exactness of the logic on the language to be used. In actual linguistic act in the matter of communication it is necessary that there should be a speaker and a hearer. In communicating something, it is not necessary that the communicative sentence is a true one. But language is fastened to reality or world through the corresponding referring expression involved in the true sentence. As a result, a large number of thinkers, focused their attention to the problem or theory of truth, who were earlier studying language for its relevance for ontology. It is not deniable that the false sentence can also carry information. Yet, in case of communication assertion of true sentence plays an important role. That means, the assertion of true sentence is the way of conveying correct

information to the competent speaker. Thus the theory of truth get a special attention from the contemporary ontologists and philosophers of language.

The language has got various roles in various Indian Philosophical systems. To the Buddhists, language cannot received the true picture of reality while Bhartrhari believes that no reality escapes the net of language. In this way we will see how language plays an important role in the development of a particular system.

In order to discuss the Buddhists thought about the role of languages, it is necessary to point out the Buddhists conception of perception. In this connection a question may arise what is the nature of perceptual awareness? Is our perceptual awareness non-judgemental and hence non-linguistic in nature? These questions make a great debate among the different school of Indian Philosophy. Answering the question the Buddhists say that, perceptual awareness are not-linguistic in nature. Defining the perception Bauddha logician Dignāga says perception is free from conceptual construction or *Kalpanā*. According to the definition, the Buddhists also support that any use of language involves conceptualism, which makes a connection with name (*nāma*), genus (*jāti*), categories, etc.

A man may perceive a thing, which is blue. But it is not necessary for him to conceive that 'This is blue'. This argument was taken by Dignāga from Abhidharma treatise to support his position that perception is free from *Kalpanā*. That means in perception, when we perceive an object, we are aware of the object itself. But when we attach a name to it and express our perceptual awareness that takes a judgemental form. The object of perception is a unique momentary particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and for this reason, memory of this *svalakṣaṇa*

is impossible. But if Buddhists view is true, that means if all things are momentary then how can perception take place at all?

To supporting this point Dharmakīrti said that when we perceive an external object, we actually perceive the copy of that object in the mind and this copy is supposed to represent the object faithfully. That means, in case of perception of an external object, we first perceive the copy in our mind and then infer the existence of that external object. But how we are sure that whether a copy represents the object faithfully or not? We cannot determine the validity of our perception without a perceptual judgemental awareness of the object concerned. That is to say, pre-judgemental awareness of an object is useless and as good as non-existent. So, the validity of pre-judgemental awareness is dependent upon the corresponding judgemental awareness.

But Dharmakīrti holds that judgemental awareness is not perceptual in character, since it involves memory, which is not a valid knowledge. Moreover, judgemental awareness is not a valid knowledge since it grasps an object that is already known in a pre-judgemental state. It cannot serve our purpose also.

Words can denote objects but cannot be identical with that material one. On the other hand judgemental awareness helps in comprehending the object as referred to a verbal expression and thus cannot be perceptual in nature. As words are related to the universal so also the judgemental awareness are related to the universal. Judgemental awareness is not related to the unique object and so is not perceptual in nature.

To the Buddhists language cannot determine the true picture of reality and something, which is signified by a word, is not real.

Language is mental friction, which has nothing corresponding to it in reality.

After discussing the Buddhists view an effort is being made to give a brief account about the role of language according to Naiyāyikas. To the Bhartṛhari, every knowledge is interrelated with language. On the other hand Grammarians hold that, if an object is not denoted by a name then we cannot know the object exactly or we have not the knowledge of the name of that object. From the above discussion it is clear that our knowledge of an object is identical with our knowledge of the corresponding word. Arguing against the Grammarians, Vācaspati says that the word does not mean the *spṛṣṭa* or any audible sound. Because, children and dumb persons can perceive object without the awareness of any words or expressing any names. For their understanding speech latency (*Śabda-bhāvana*) play an important role. It follows that, since children and dumb persons are not able to realize the relation between word and object, they have non-judgemental perceptual knowledge. Normal and literate persons also have such kind of knowledge. Having the awareness of relation between word and object when the normal and literate person perceives an object he try to memorise the name of that object. So, it is clear that, perception of the object precedes the phenomenon of naming or using word. That means phenomenon of naming or using word comes out from perception of the object. This type of perceptual knowledge, which is produced just after perceiving the object is called '*avypadeśya*'. The Naiyāyikas accept both memory and sense object contact in case of perceptual judgemental knowledge. But, whatever comes within the range of the knowledge produced by the senses is perceptible.

It is said that there is a causal relation between sense object contact and the subsequent judgemental awareness. The denial of that causal relation creates impossibility in making the difference between non-perceptual judgemental awareness and perceptual judgemental awareness. Under these circumstances a point may be noted. Whenever we try to reflect on our pre-judgemental awareness it would involve construction of judgements and so we fail to perceive any difference between pre-judgemental awareness and the subsequent judgemental one.

Explaining the role of language in Indian philosophical system now I am trying to discuss the Bhartṛhari's standpoint.

The Sanskrit Grammarian school of Indian Philosophy holds that only word is the ultimate reality. In the works of Pāṇini we can find out the origin of the Sanskrit Grammarian school. But Bhartṛhari made a great and historic task by developing a separate school of philosophy. Linguistic monism (*Śabdādvaitavāda* or *Śabdabrahmavāda*), Bhartṛhari's separate school of Indian philosophy gave him the honour of first man in developing such kind of separate school of philosophy.

In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari discusses his thesis, (i) *Brahmakānda*, (ii) *Vākyakānda* and (iii) *Padakānda* are three chapters of his thesis. *Brahmakānda* gave us an outline of the metaphysics of linguistic monism.

According to Bhartṛhari, language or knowledge of language is the only source from which our all actions and thoughts are developed. Without the knowledge of language no one can perform any action for not having action performing guidance. That is to say, language is the only way, which gives us the awareness of 'what I should do' and 'what I should not do'. If I have no knowledge of language, I cannot

think, "this is what I should do" and as well as I cannot think, "this is what I should do" and as well as I cannot perform any action. So all our actions are the result of knowledge of language. Without any knowledge of any language a person have nothing to think and as well as have nothing to do. In this circumstances a question may arise. Babies do not possess any knowledge of language, yet they know what they ought to do when they are playing. If without having any knowledge of any language creates thoughtless, actionless situation, then how is the action of babies possible?

Bhartṛhari puts his argument against this objection and points out the 'innate-ism'. Every human being possesses a previous birth. And as far as traditional Indian belief, soul is immortal and it has no destruction, but it shifts from one body to another. Thus a new birth is due to the shifting of soul. And with this shifting the soul brings impression of knowledge of language (*Śabdabhāvana*), which is due to the use of language in previous birth. Hence, a baby who does not possess any knowledge of language is able to know of what ought to do.

In case of an absurd entities language plays an important role. On the basis of linguistic expression the absurd entity like 'hare's horn' appears to be an existing one in the real world. Although we know that there is no such thing like 'hare's horn' in the real world. But with the use of the linguistic expression 'hare's horn' we come to know what the expression 'hare's horn' actually means. On the other hand a thing, which exists in the real world may turn to be a non-existent absurd entity for not having such linguistic expression.

In mythological incident we also see the role of language. Such mythological characters only appear to us as real through language. Even though they have no historical proof.

The ascribed existence (*Aupacārikī sattā*) of a thing appears to as primary existence of a thing due to having the corresponding linguistic expression.

For Bhartṛhari, *Śabdabhāvanā* which is main thing for babies action is implicit in every human being. And as because of this (*Śabdabhāvanā*) knowledge of language of every individual is possible.

The relation of speaker and hearer can be explained through *Śabdabhāvanā*. It is said the *Śabdabhāvanā* of the speaker is the cause (not in sense of production, but in the sense of awakening) of the *Śabdabhāvanā* of the hearer. So Bhartṛhari claims that no knowledge is possible which is not followed by words.

Imaginative knowledge and knowledge of past and future thing is possible only because of corresponding linguistic expression. To Bhartṛhari pre-linguistic awareness is a sensation. But when the human being verbalises it or able to give a linguistic expression of that sensation, it is considered as knowledge.

After having a sound sleep I can say I have enjoyed a sound sleep. This explanation of mind is the effect of *Śabdabhāvanā*. In such case *Śabdabhāvanā* takes a subtle form. But, in our walking experience we possess *Śabdabhāvanā* in an active form.

So, from the Bhartṛhari's thesis it is clear that every knowledge is object oriented. Even though the *nirvikalpaka* knowledge possess linguistic expression implicitly which will take overt form in *Savikalpaka* stage. The object-oriented knowledge must have a relation with words.



That means with the help of linguistic expression the object reveal to our consciousness and the awareness is considered as a true knowledge. Although every individual possesses *Śabdabhāvanā* but in description of past experience, the exact remembering also has an important part. If I forget some necessary elementary words, I cannot express that past experience in *overt speech*.

Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sphoṭa* is the result of the distinction between overt speech activity and *Śabdabhāvanā*.

According to the Grammarian school, word is an eternal, indivisible, single entity. This is *Śabdabrahman* the Ultimate Reality. To them all objects worthy of being known (*jñeya*) are pervaded by consciousness while consciousness is pervaded by word, since there is no consciousness beyond it – “*na asti pratyayo loke yah sabdanugamadrte / anubiddhamiva jnanam sarvaṁ sabdena bhasate*”<sup>(5)</sup> All eternal objects, even this material universe, emanates from *Sabdabrahman* which though simple, eternal and indivisible, appears to be numerous:” : “*anadividhanam brahma sabdatattvam yadaksaram / vivartate'rthabhavana prakriya jagato yatah /*”<sup>(6)</sup>.

The Grammarians are of the opinion that the conceptual word-entity is named *sphoṭa* from which meanings become apparent. This *Sphoṭa* is to be suggested (*abhivyakta*) by the articulated speech, which is referred to as *nade* or *dhvani*. The grammarians state that the pronounced sounds cannot be *Śabda*, since they are destroyed as soon as they are pronounced. Hence they cannot make sense. If each syllable is destroyed as soon as it is produced, how can a number of syllables exist together, forming a word, which conveys a sense? If wordness belongs to the pronounced syllables, how can we claim that an entire word is a word? For instance, in the word-*gauh*, if 'g' is the

word, 'au' and 'h' are not the word. If 'au' is the word, neither 'g' or 'h' is the word and so on. Each syllable is destroyed as soon as it is pronounced. For this reason it is feasible to conceive of *sphoṭa* reason which is none other than *Śabdabrahman*. This is the word referred to when the grammarians say : *siddhe sabdārthasambandhe*. In this connection Patañjali says that the connotation of *sphoṭa* may be either universal or individual. In other case the connotation too is eternal and the relationship between word and meaning is also eternal.

Language, according to Bhartṛhari, is the bearer of all ideas. As told earlier even the absurd entities can be expressed in language. The Naiyāyikas have expressed their reservation as to this. The Naiyāyikas do not believe in an entity, which does not fall under the seven categories. To Bhartṛhari the entities like 'hare's horn' etc. do not have the accurate meaning or its senselessness if they were not uttered through words. That they belong to *null class* is known through their utterance in words. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas think that these are not meaningless, because they do not belong to any particular category and hence they are *apadarthas*.

The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention (*Tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning (*Lakṣaṇā*). To them the non-realizability of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e., implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term, *gaṅgā* as found in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is 'the bank of the *gaṅgā*'. The primary meaning of the term *ghoṣaḥ* and *gaṅgā* are *ghoṣapallī* and a particular flow of water (*Jalpravāha-viśeṣa*) respectively. The milk-man-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is the non-realizability of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them.

This can be removed, if the bank of the *gaṅgā* is taken as the meaning of the term *gaṅgā* through *lakṣaṇā*.

Now what is to be understood by the term *tātparya*? The desire of the speaker (*vakturicchā*) is *tātparya*. In other words, it has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātparya* (*tātpratīticchaya uccaritatvaṁ*). When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātparya*. The term *uccaritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons there is *tātparya* in spite of not having utterance of the same. Hence, it is better to accept the former definition (i.e. intention of the speaker is *tātparya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.

The non-realizability of *tātparya* but not of relation (*anvaya*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. This point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence, '*kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatam*' (i.e., protect the curd from crow etc.) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. In order to incorporate all types *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realizability in respect of *tātparya* is *lakṣaṇā* but not otherwise.

Let us see the role of *tātparya* in determining the meaning of an ambiguous sentence having various meanings. If such one utters the sentence *saindhavaṁ ānaya*, it may mean the bringing of a horse of salt. The exact meaning of the term *saindhava* is to be determined according to the intention of the speaker uttered under a particular context. That is why, the knowledge of *tātparya* is taken to be the cause of verbal comprehension.

It can be said in reply that in order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), space (*deśa*) etc. serve as promoters. If in the context of taking meal the term *saindhava* is uttered, it will mean salt. But if the context is otherwise (i.e. going to the battle-field), the same term would mean *horse*. After hearing the sentence of the speaker uttered in a particular context, the hearer infers the intention in the following way. The term *saindhava* existing in the above mentioned sentence has got the *tātparya* in salt as it is so uttered in the context of talking meal (*etadvākyaghaṭaka-saindhavapadam̐ lavaṇatātparyāyakam bhojanaprakaraṇe prayuktatvāt*). In the same way, the hearer infers the *tātparya* of the same term as otherwise depending on a different context. In this way, the intention of the other person (i.e., the speaker) can be known through inference.

Though the non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) is taken as the seed of the implicative meaning, there may be the case of the non-realisation of semantic competency (*yogyātānupapatti*). This phenomenon of the non-realisation of semantic competency may lead to the implicative meaning. If some one says – 'I am building castle on the air', it has surely the lack of semantic competency, (*yogyatābhāva*) which leads us to take recourse to the implicative meaning. As the meaning (primary) fails in the above-mentioned case due to the lack of *yogyatā*, it may give rise to the implicative meaning i.e., to think absurd in the present case. Hence, the non-realisation of the intention generated through the lack of *yogyatā* may also be taken the seed of *lakṣaṇā*.

*Śabda*, in the philosophical discourse in India, is valid verbal testimony, and in order to be valid it has to be derived from a trustworthy person. Hence it is said – '*āpatavākyam̐ śabdaḥ*' and

'*āptastu yathārthavaktā*'. *Śabda* is literally a word, for which of course the word *pada* is employed. A *vākya* or sentence is a group of words, *vākyaṃ padasamūhaḥ*, e.g., 'Bring a cow'. Now the question is: how are the sentence comprising words be understood? A linguistic particle or word is understood by virtue of its possessing a property or *śakti*, *śaktaṃ padaṃ*. How does a word come to possess the property or potency? The Nyāya answers this issue in the following way. *Śakti* or significative potency of words is the desire of God (and also of an individual being) that a certain concept be understood from a certain word.<sup>(7)</sup>

*Śakti* is the characteristic of word. It is the relation of a word and the object meant by that word which is always favourable in reviving the memory of that object. The *Bhāṣāpariccheda* accounts for verbal comprehension in terms of a set of metaphors, and says that the knowledge of words is the instrument (*karana*) of verbal comprehension, the knowledge i.e., recollection of the meaning of words is the operation (*dvāra*), verbal comprehension is the result (*phalaṃ*), and the knowledge of denotative function (*śakti*) is an aid (*sahakārinī*).<sup>(8)</sup> It is not that words actually being verbal comprehension even in the absence of word uttered, as in the case of a man under the vow of silence (*mauna*) who recites verse mentally. Hence the recollection of the meaning of words produced by the words is the operation. It may be said that a man with knowledge of words would have verbal comprehension if he had knowledge of the thing denoted by the words through perception. Even in that case recollection should be taken as being produced or generated by words through their significatory function or *vṛtti*. Significatory function is the relation (between words and the things denoted by them) consisting in either denotative function (*śakti*) or implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Knowledge of things

is denoted by words, and it is generated by words in virtue of their denotative function. The denotative function of words has a priority over recollection. Recollection could not have been there unless the association of words with their objects had been earlier established. Knowledge of words reminds us of their meaning by virtue of being the knowledge of either of two related things. When one of the relata is known, the other also is recalled through association.<sup>(9)</sup>

By denotative function of words, it is implied that there exists a relation between a word and its meaning. The relation is pre-existent in a divine will (*iśvarecchā*) that such and such a word should denote such and such a thing. The notion of divine will need not be taken narrowly. In point of fact any will has got to be there so as to make denotation of words possible. At this point the old school adheres to the Vedic dictum that a child should be named on the eleventh day of its birth. The new school of Nyāya thinkers prefer to enlarge the concept of will, including that of *jīvas* as well. Otherwise recent names would become meaningless.<sup>(10)</sup>

How is denotative function be apprehended? Already some reference has been made in this regard to a will, divine or human. Grammar is another source of it. Another may be the lexicon and statement of the *āpta* or trustworthy persons. In point of fact there are various other sources of our knowledge of denotative function of words, such as comparison, usage, supplementary statement, paraphrase and the contiguity of a well-known word. As distinguished from the Mīmāṃsaka view, the Nyāya thinkers emphasize the ordinary language approach to meaning of words. The Nyāya thinker shuns whatever is cumbersome. This is evident from the Nyāya rejoinders to the Mīmāṃsaka.<sup>(11)</sup>

The Mīmāṃsakas hold that denotative function or significative potency of words is apprehended only in the generic attribute. They hold that the immediate apprehension of the notion of generic attribute is the attribute of the qualified object, say a cow. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the individual, as qualified by the *jāti*; is apprehended by necessary implication or by means of *arthāpatti pramāṇa*.

The Nyāya point of view rejects the argument. To ask some one to get a cow, the denotative function applies to the individual cow (*vyakti*). It is not possible to fetch only the generic attribute for exclusion of the individual. Nor does any hearer ever go to fetch the generic attribute of the *vyakti* when he is called upon to bring a cow. The usage of the elders, *vrddhavyavahāra* endorses the point. Hence the significative potency of a word connotes an object as determined by its generic attribute (and *not* merely the generic attribute). Even in the case of the producibility of knowledge by a proposition, *ñānasya vākyajanyatvam*, there occurs no exception. The point is that significative potency or denotative function of a word, say *cow*, is apprehended in the object *cow*, as determined by the adjunct *cowness*.<sup>(12)</sup>

The Mīmāṃsakas further aver that the intention in using a sentence is to motivate the hearer into action. The Nyāya thinker would point out that there are statements not intended at all to motivate the hearer into action. There may be statement, without a copula. Popular usage in such cases guarantees the comprehension of the significative potency of the word used. Again, a word like *madhukara* may be unknown to one, but when the word is used in well-known contiguity of word like 'a lotus in bloom', one comes to comprehend that the word *madhukara* means a bee.

Varieties of words possessing denotative function: A word may come to have denotative function in different ways. They are enumerated as follows: (a) derivative (*yaugika*), (b) conventional (*rūḍha*), and (c) both derivative and conventional (*yaugika-rūḍha*). At times one may understand only the root and the prefix or suffix and their meaning. In such a case the denotative function is derivative. The example given for this case is *pācaka*, i.e., cook. The word *pacaka* is derived from the root *pac*, which means to cook with a particular suffix signifying a doer. A word of which the meaning is wholly determined by usage, or in the language of Nyāya, by the power abiding in the word as a whole (*samudāyaśakti*), without any reference to its derivation is called *rūḍha*. For example, *go* (cow) or *ghaṭa paṭa*, etc. The word *go* (cow) is derived from the root *gam*; it signifies the power of going. However, anything that goes is not cow. So irrespective of the words derivation, the words *go* indicates a cow. In the same manner the derivational meaning of the term *ghaṭa* is 'that which has happened', but usage-wise the word means a jar or pot.<sup>(13)</sup>

Now the example of *yogarūḍha* word is *pankaja* (lotus). The word conveys, by the denotative function of its component parts, the idea of something that grows in mud. But by its collective denotative function it conveys the idea of a lotus as a lotus. A water lily also grows in mud, but the word *pankaja* does not denote that, since the conventional meaning obstructs the purely derivative meaning, though *pankaja* may denote water lily by implication. The word *pankaja* is therefore is usage-governed to denote lotus. Consider the case of flower known as *Hibiscus Mutabilis* popularly called land-lotus *sthalapadma* or *bhumipadma* the meaning of the component parts is contradicted, though the meaning is conveyed by collective denotative function, namely that the flower is a lotus. If it be intended to suggest



that *bhumipankaja* is a flower belonging to a different species altogether, in such a case the meaning is obtained by implication.

But where the derivative and the conventional meanings are conveyed independently of each other, there the word is both derivative and conventional. For example, let us take the case of the word *udbhida*. Etymologically, the word suggests the idea of something that goes up. Customary (*rudha*) significance of the word is a kind of sacrifice. The word *udbhida* has a technical and a derivative meaning attached to it. From derivation the word means a 'plant', anything that sprouts up by breaking open the ground, while from usage the word means a particular form of sacrifice.

It may be recalled that in the *yogarudha* mode of using a word, as with *pankaja*, both the etymological and customary significances are partly retained. *Yoga* or etymological significance is the power of several roots or component parts of a word. *Rudhi* or customary significance is the power or force of the composite whole. In order to get at the customary meaning of *pankaja* as lotus the power of composite whole is used, otherwise, the word *pankaja* may also mean water-lily etc.<sup>(14)</sup>

Implication: its varieties: Implication that is *lakṣaṇā*, is defined as: '*lakṣaṇā śākyasambandhaḥ tātāparyānupapattitah*'.<sup>(15)</sup> That is, implication is the relation with what is denoted by denotative function, where the intention of the speaker is not directly compatible. *Tātāparya* is the intention of the speaker. The relation of a word with its meaning is called *vṛtti*. Now the *vṛtti* in the form of word-meaning relation, is two-fold: *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*. Viśvanātha remarks that *śākyasambandhā lakṣaṇā*. The potency of a word to present or express its meaning or

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object is called *śakyārtha* while the object that is presented is the *lakṣyārtha*.

*Lakṣaṇā* is classified in a three-fold way-*jahallakṣaṇā*, *ajahallakṣaṇā* and *jahadahallakṣaṇā*. Each has got its own examples, which we shall consider later.

*Lakṣaṇā* consists in the relation between *śakyārtha* and *lakṣyārtha*. Implication is the relation between a word and its meaning. By the term *vṛtti*, both *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* are meant. Hence we may speak of *lakṣaṇāvṛtti*. *Lakṣaṇā*, like *Śabda*, is a *vṛtti* in *śabda*. Implication is thus the relation with the direct meaning of a word. The celebrated example of *lakṣaṇā* is the sentence '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', that is, a cowherd's hamlet on the *Gaṅgā*. Here we get the implied meaning of *on the bank* of the *Gaṅgā* on account of the relation of the bank with the stream, signified by the term *Gaṅgā*. Therefore, in the example, the significative potency cannot be said to indicate the bank also. To take another example, i.e., the word *saindhava*, which may mean a horse and salt according to the context and intention of the speaker. In the case of the cowherd's hamlet on the *Gaṅgā*, the relation of the primary meaning, viz, a stream is apprehended with the bank, the latter is recalled, and this leads to verbal comprehension. But if the incompatibility of relation be the essence of implication, then there would be no implication. In a sentence like 'Protect the curd from the crows', the word 'crow' implies any creature that would spoil the curd. The intention of the speaker is about protecting the curd from all creatures.<sup>(16)</sup>

We may turn to considering the three-fold nature of *lakṣaṇā* or implication. *Jahallakṣaṇā* is that where the primary meaning is wholly abandoned and a new one is substituted, e.g., the statement, *mañcāḥ*

*krośantīti*, or 'The cots cry out'. *Ajahallakṣaṇā* is that where a word conveys something more, while retaining the sense of the primary meaning, as is found in the statement *Chatrīṇo gacchanti*, 'The umbrella-holders are going'. *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā* is that where only a part of the statement is abandoned, as is found in the Vedic dictum *tat tvam asi*, i.e., Thou art That.

The statement *mañcāḥ krośanti*, when taken in its primary meaning means *Cots are crying*, which is absurd. This absurdity can be avoided only through the implied meaning, which the statement yields through its association with the primary meaning. By implication the statement means –'The children on the cot are crying'. Here the word *manca* implies the meaning of the children by virtue of its relation with the cot. The relation between the cot and the children is *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*, i.e., the relation between the supported and the support. Thus in order to get a sensible meaning, the primary meaning has to be abandoned entirely and substituted by a totally different meaning. This method of discarding the primary meaning and substituting it by implied meaning is called *jahallakṣaṇā*.

In the example, *Chatrīṇo gacchanti*, 'Men holding umbrellas are going', the primary meaning is in the doership consisting in the activity of going, in those who are holding umbrellas. Since the sentence is employed with the intention of including also those who accompany them without umbrellas (*ekasārthavāhitve*), the primary meaning implies also men without umbrellas. When a sentence conveys something more than what its bare primary meaning conveys, it is called *ajahallakṣaṇā*.<sup>(17)</sup>

Now the third variety, i.e. *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. The Vedic dictum *Tattvamasi* is cited as its example. The word *tat* signifies

consciousness conditioned by omniscience, partial omnipotence etc. Here the attributes ascribed to consciousness signified by *Tat* and *Tvaṁ* are mutually contradictory and arise consequent upon the conditioning adjuncts of *Māyā* in the case of *Tat* and *avidyā* or *antaḥkaraṇa* in the case of *Tvaṁ*. The real sense of the dictum *Tattvamasi* is that *Tat* is the same as *Tvam* but this sense of oneness cannot be had as long as the above terms are qualified by contradictory attributes arising on account of the respective limiting adjuncts. When these limiting adjuncts are removed, the dictum conveys its real sense, viz, oneness of consciousness signified by *Tat* and *Tvam* in *Tattvamasi*. This method of abandoning a certain part while retaining another part is known as *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* or *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā*.

There may be cases of words where the primary meaning is implied by an indirect relation. It is called double implication or *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā*. As for example, in words like *dvirepha* (bee). The relation of the two R's is apprehended with the word *bhramara*, and of the latter with a bee through an indirect relation called *parampara*; hence it is a case of double implication. Compared to this the word *Gaṅgā*, which bears the implied meaning, does not lead to verbal comprehension in a direct manner. It is some other term, i.e., 'a cowherd colony' that leads to the verbal comprehension of the implied meaning. The words a 'cowherd colony' have been ascertained to have the power of generating verbal comprehension of their primary meaning as connected with the meaning of the word 'Gaṅgā', by the relation of either denotative function or implication. This has been the view of old Nyāya School. But the new schoolmen hold that the word that bears the implied meaning also is certainly a cause of verbal comprehension (*tadapyanubhāvakaṁ*), and the apprehension of the meaning of

the word is the (*padārthopasthitistu dāṇvāram*). For the old schoolmen the word *Gaṅgā* itself means the bank of the *Gaṅgā*.<sup>(18)</sup>

Language is a set of sentences described by the rules of 'competence grammar' and that knowing language is essentially knowing such rules. And sentences or linguistic utterances further can be held, in modern linguistics, especially in Chomskyan linguistics, to express a set of 'propositions'. Thus, Chomsky and his followers have held (Neil Smith, 1980) that meaning of a sentence is a set of proposition which are objects designed to represent semantic structure, while ignoring syntactic and phonological form. For instance, consider the following two sentences:

- i) 'The football game is over' and
- ii) 'The football game has finished'.

Here both the sentences, though there are differences in the syntactic and phonological forms, they convey the identical proposition, namely, the end of the football game. Thus, according to modern linguists, sentence-meaning is a set of propositions expressed by sentence.

However, in so far as linguistics and philosophy are concerned with the descriptive function of the language, lexical meaning and sentence meaning are clearly complementary to the language function of communicating prepositional or factual information. Therefore, modern linguists have drawn a clear distinction between the meaning of words or lexemes and the meaning of sentences, i.e., between lexical meaning and sentence-meaning. While the word or lexical meaning is the meaning of words or lexemes used in a sentence, and hence constitutes a component part of sentence meaning, sentence

meaning is a product of word-meanings and hence depends upon the meanings of its constituent lexemes. Also, further, grammatical formation of sentences is also essential to the ascertainment of the meaning of some words; and therefore, grammatical meaning is a further component of sentence-meaning. Thus, John Lyons states (198.56) that meaning of a sentence is both related to its lexical and grammatical aspects meaning, i.e., of the meaning of the constituent lexemes and the grammatical constructions that relate one lexeme syntactically to other.

Sentence meaning is analysed by Indian epistemologists as verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) or comprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between the word-meanings (*anvayabodha*). Thus is taken also as a out-come of linguistic utterance i.e., *śabda*. The linguistic utterance becomes instrumental (*karaṇa*) in respect of verbal cognition. As a matter of fact, the above discussion makes it clear that, there is a distinction between meaning of lexemes and meaning of sentences. Moreover, it also accepts that, meaning of words or lexemes as a factor on which sentence meaning or comprehension of syntactico-symantic relation between word meanings depends. Thus, as verbal cognition is considered to be an effect generated from the recollection of word meanings, epistomatogists, in India, have taken into consideration many auxiliary causal factors conducive to verbal cognition. The verbal cognition, as discussed above is held to be the comprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between the individual word-meanings. The epistomologist, in respect of the status of such relation its nucleus, have expressed different views. A brief account of these interesting aspects of sentence meaning will be given in the following discussion.

Verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) can be explained from the view point of epistemology as the cognition produced (derived) from words that are being heard (*śabdācchrutāt jāyamāno*). This explanation is based on the theory that verbal cognition is produced from recollection of word-meaning which are in turn produced from the words through their indicative power called *śakti*.<sup>(19)</sup> It may be pointed out that the verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) as emphasized above, holds good only in the theory of the older selection of logicians or the *Pracyas*. Verbal cognition as recognized by older selection of logicians is directly produced from words; as a result, linguistic utterances of words are the actual means of verbal cognition. But the *Navyas* or the newer section of logicians says that — even in the case of dumb person or silent speaker, knowledge of the words is taken as a factor on which verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) depends. So in respect of verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) actual use of words is not necessary. That is to say, verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) depends only on the knowledge of the correct words (as opposed to the words). Verbal cognition is different/distinct from the analogical understanding (*upamiti*), inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) and perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). Because verbal cognition is derived from the words where the analogical understanding (*upamiti*), inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) and perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) are derived from analogy, inferential cause and sense organs respectively.

There are three distinct causes in respect of a produced effect (*phala*) : (i) a unique cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) or instrument (*kāraṇa*) (ii) an intermediate cause (*dvāra*) such as operation (*vyāpāra*) and (iii) an associate or auxiliary cause (*sahakāriṇī*). As for example — a clay pot is an effect, since it is produced. And the stick, through which the pot is produced, is the instrument, and simultaneously it is also the

unique cause (extraordinary) or instrument. Moreover, in producing the pot the movement of the potters wheel is taken as the operation and simultaneously it is also the intermediate cause or operation. And the associate cause is the clay etc. which is helpful in producing the pot.

In this circumstances, it is said that, though verbal cognition is produced, it must have all three causal factors. In this case, that is in respect of verbal cognition the unique cause (instrument) is the knowledge of (the utterance of) words (*padājñāna*), the intermediate cause or operation is the recollection of the word-meanings produced from words (*padārthadhi*) and the associate or auxiliary cause is the knowledge of the functional relations such as expressive power between words and meanings (*śāktidhi*).<sup>(20)</sup>

The process of obtaining the verbal cognition, as an effect produced from the (recollection of the word-meanings produced in turn from) words, can be outlined as follows :

(i) With an intention to convey the (valid knowledge of) word meanings, the speaker, utters the grammatically correct words; (ii) The linguistically competent, hearer with adequate qualification to understand hears the utterance and recognize the words, due to his observation of elders' usage, as possessing the functional relations of words such as expressive power with word meanings; (iii) and then, with the help of several auxiliary factors the hearer understands the meaning of the words and thus acquires the knowledge of the syntactico-semantic relations between the various individual word-meanings.

In the production of sentence-meaning (verbal cognition), several auxiliary factors besides the utterance of words come to play fundamental roles. One of the most fundamental auxiliary factors is the



knowledge of word-relations or word-functions (*vr̥tti*). The hearer must have the correct understanding of what word has what functional relation (*vr̥tti-jñāna*) with what word-meaning. For instance the hearer must have the understanding that the word 'cow' (*go*) in 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*) has the functional relation such as the expressive power with the sense of the cow, and also that the word 'Ganges' (*gaṅgā*) in 'Village is situated on the bank of the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*) has the functional relation such as the indication with the sense of the bank of the Ganges, to understand the meanings of the sentences 'Bring the cow' and 'Village is situated on the bank of the 'Ganges' respectively. Thus, the knowledge of the word-relations or word-functions is an auxiliary factor of the verbal cognition.

Sentence-meaning or verbal cognition is held to be indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) and divisible (*sakhaṇḍa*) by Indian epistemologists (Matilal, 1990). Bhartṛhari proposes sentence-meaning to be indivisible, while the Mīmāṃsakas propose the same sentence-meaning to be divisible.

According to Bhartṛhari sentence is an unanalysable meaningful whole, without any real constituent parts, and sentence-meaning is a whole block of reality and also the same sentence-meaning is analysed into unreal abstractions such as *kāraḥ*, actions etc. due to our wrong assumptions.<sup>(21)</sup>

However, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas oppose Bhartṛhari's theory.<sup>(22)</sup> According to them, sentence is a composite constitute analysed into constituent parts such as words, particles, verbs, etc. These constituent parts are meaningful units of expressions. Sentence-meaning is also composite constitute entity consisting of many constituent parts such as subject, object, action etc. To comprehend sentence-meaning, one must comprehend the relations (connections)

between various constituent parts and hence the knowledge of the sentence-meaning necessarily implies the comprehension of the relations between various constituent parts of the sentence-meanings.

However, now the question arises : how does one recognize sentence-meaning ? Does one cognize the word-meanings (constituent parts of speech) first and then recognize them as connected syntactico-semantically together with each other to acquire the knowledge of the sentence-meaning of the form of (comprehension of) connected word-meanings or does one cognize sentence-meaning of the form of (comprehension of) connected word-meanings at once merely from the utterance of words together ?

Precisely to answer such a question, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas have proposed their theory of the cognition of the relation between the meanings expressed by words (parts of speech) (*abhihitānvayavāda*); and established the position that hearer first cognizes the individual expressed word-meanings separately and then recognizes the sentence-meaning of the form of connected word-meanings by connecting individual word-meanings together;<sup>(23)</sup> whereas the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas have proposed their theory of the cognition of the expressed word-meanings that are already connected (*anvitābhīdhānavāda*) and established that hearer cognizes sentence-meaning of the form of connected word-meanings at once from words without earlier cognizing the unrelated individual word-meanings separately from the utterance of words.

It must be noted here, however, that epistemologists in general have followed the Bhāṭṭas' theory that one first cognizes the unrelated individual word-meanings (various parts of speech) separately from words and then recognizes them as sentence-meaning of the form of

connected word-meanings by connecting individual word-meanings together. Thus verbal cognition or sentence-meaning in parts (*sakhaṇḍaśābdabodha*) precedes verbal cognition or sentence-meaning in unity (*akhaṇḍaśābdabodha*). And verbal cognition in parts means verbal cognition of word-meanings in their isolated individual capacity as word-meanings without the cognition of the syntactico-semantic relations between them. Thus, verbal cognition in parts, wherein the word-meanings such as the cow, the objecthood of the cow and the action of bringing are cognized in their isolated individual capacity as word-meanings without the cognition of syntactico-semantic relations between them, may precede the actual verbal cognition in unity from 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*) etc.

Now, verbal cognition in unity (*akhaṇḍaśābdabodha*) may be described as the cognition of the syntactico-semantic relations between various individual word-meanings found in a sentence (*vākyārthānvayabodha*). For instance, consider the verbal cognition in unity form the sentence 'You bring the cow' (*Tvam gām ānaya*). Here, in this sentence, there are six meaningful units (epistemologists of India consider both the base or stem and the inflectional endings as meaningful units) : namely, i) the nominative stem '*tva*' referring to the second person, the agent, ii) the nominative case ending '*su*' referring to the oneness in the second person, the agent, iii) the accusative stem '*go*' referring to the object of cow, iv) the accusative case ending '*am*' referring to the objecthood of cow, v) the verbal stem *ani* referring to the action of bringing and vi) the conjugational ending '*a*' referring to the effort conducive to the bringing.

Now, after cognizing separately the six individual word-meanings, namely, i) the second person, the agent, ii) the oneness in these second person (the agent), iii) the cow, the object, iv) the

objecthood of the cow, v) the action of bringing, and vi) the effort conducive to the bringing, the hearer recognizes the syntactico-semantic relations between these various word-meanings to relate or connect them together. And the syntactico-semantic relations that are recognized (comprehended) between the various pairs of word-meanings are as follows : i) the occurrence or the superstratumness between the cow and the objecthood of the cow, ii) the describing between the objecthood and the action of bringing, iii) the conduciveness between the action and the conscious effort, and iv) the substratumness between the effort and the second person, the agent. Thus, the verbal cognition in unity produced from such a sentence is that "You (the agent) having the oneness are the substratum of the conscious effort conducive to the action of bringing that describes the objecthood occurrent in the cow" (*goniṣṭhakarmatānirūpakānāyanānukūlakṛtyāśrayahtvam*).

Since the verbal cognition is held to be the comprehension of syntactico-semantic relations between word-meanings (*anvayabodha*), the question that arises now is that what is the epistemological or semantic status of such relations. Are they too, like word-meanings, the meanings referred to by words (*prakara*) or are they merely relations (*saṁsarga*).

Now, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas hold that the relations such as the superstratumness between the word-meanings (such as the cow and the objecthood) too are the meanings expressed by the same words that express the word-meanings.<sup>(24)</sup> According to them, no item, unless expressed by words through word-functions or relations, can be comprehended in verbal cognition; and therefore, even the syntactico-semantic relations must be admitted to be the meanings expressed by words only.

However, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, hold that the relations such as the superstratumness etc., between the word-meanings such as the cow and the objecthood etc. could be mere relations understood by semantic conventions.<sup>(25)</sup> According to them, only the word-meanings need to be expressed by words and the syntactico-semantic relations, not being word-meanings, can be understood by semantic conventions; and hence need not be the meanings expressed by words.

Being influenced by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the logicians too hold that the syntactico-semantic relations are merely relations (*saṃsarga*); however, they hold that the same relations are obtained through power as existing in relations (*saṃsargamaryādā*)<sup>(26)</sup>. According to them, words refer to only those items with which functional relations of words (*vṛtti*) are found. Since the functional relations of words such as expressive power etc. are not perceived with the sense of the syntactico-semantic relations such as the describing etc. (they are found with only the word-meanings such as the cow, the objecthood of the cow etc.), the words do not refer to such relations; and therefore, the same relations could be obtained from the relational seem or power of relations.

Sentence-meaning or verbal cognition has been analysed as the cognition of the syntactico-semantic relations between the word-meanings; however, the epistemologists Indian, namely the grammarians, the ritualists and the logicians have focused three divergent theories regarding the chief-qualificand or the nucleus of syntactico-syntactic relations.

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# Chapter – II

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## CHAPTER – II

### The concept of *Tātparya* in different systems of Indian Philosophy.

There are different schools of thought in India who have accepted *tātparya* (in relation to the meaning of the sentence) as a factor of verbal understanding showing fine discrimination depending on primary viewpoint taken by each. Although the general idea is very clear. The term *tātparya* means intended meaning. That is, the *tātparya* or intention stands for the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence uttered or written by some one. Moreover, it signifies the meaning intended by the speaker or the purport of the utterance. In order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*) plays an important role and different schools of thought existing in India generally support this view. Thus, as far as the exact role of *tātparya* is concerned there is no dissentient of opinion as regards the communicative understanding (verbal comprehension).

The meaning of the sentence can be judged from viewpoint of speaker and from viewpoint of listener. The speaker's point of view in general has been accepted in Western approach while the Indian approach, mainly *Śābdabodha* approach is connected with listener's point of view.

"In a normal speech situation there can be five different aspects of the meaning of an utterance : what is in the mind of the speaker who makes the utterance, what the speaker wants the listener to

understand, what the utterance actually conveys, what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance, and what is in the mind of the listener on hearing the utterance.”<sup>(1)</sup>

In proper linguistic communication all five of these meanings are synonymous or identical, but often due to various reasons differences arise which stand in the way of lucid communication. When a person intends to speak lie, he hides his own mind deliberately in his utterance at that time, so that confusion is created in the meaning intended to be conveyed to the listener.

Thus in many situations, what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance is different from that intended to be conveyed by the speaker. This is due to the weakness of the speaker's ability in expressing or the inability of the listener in proper comprehension of the utterance.

The speaker's mind before he expresses and listener's mind after hearing the utterance of speaker are both imperceptible and are not within the domain of scientific objective analysis. The original utterance can be analysed objectively into its components of words, morphemes and phonemes and studied, but it does not signify that the other aspects are unimportant.

Common people understand something through the utterance of a sentence without going to such intellectual analysis. The cultivators, fishermen etc. understand others' intention without any problem, which indicates that verbal understanding is a kind of convention. If the intellectual analysis is given it becomes philosophical explanation of the verbal expression. This exercise is essential for rationalising the system. We should see why there is misunderstanding, ambiguity etc. and should try to sort out the problems standing in the way of our

understanding. If this can be done successfully we can do justice to the rationalisation of the communicative system.

### **The Grammarians' View**

The grammarians have attached greater importance to the role of speakers intention in interpretation of a sentence. Nāgeśa, a great grammarian, is of the opinion that if there is intention, all words can denote all senses (*sati tātparye sarve sarvārthavācakāh.*<sup>(2)</sup>). If it is admitted, all words can denote all senses, without recourse to *lakṣaṇā*. To them the *tātparya* or intention of the term *gaṅgā* in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is the bank of Ganga, and hence there is no necessity of applying *lakṣaṇā* here. If there is a strong intention of the speaker, denotation of a word can convey all senses.

This type of speaker's intention can be extended to the phenomenon of *vivakṣā* (will to speak). The role of *vivakṣā* in determining the relation between word and meaning is brought out by the grammarians. Bhartṛhari has depended on *vivakṣā* for his ideas of interpretation. At the initial *śloka* of the *Vākyapadīya* he has claimed that the words are the regulators of the usage of the meanings (*"arthapravṛttitattvānaṁ śabdāḥ eva nibandhanaṁ"*)<sup>(3)</sup>. The term *'arthapravṛttitattva* has been interpreted in various ways to accommodate various theories. The interpretation as found in the *Svopajñātikā* is as follows : *arthasya pravṛttitattvam vivakṣā* i.e. the intention of the speaker is the semantic factor.

The communication of a meaning does not always depend on any real existent which would correspond to it. A word may be used to convey some meaning, although the actual object cannot exist in reality. The following *sloka* is a classic example of such cases *"Eṣo bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpakṛtasekharah / kūmakṣīracaye snātah*

*śaśasṛṅgadhanurdharaḥ* // (i.e. The barren woman's son is going after wearing a crown of sky flowers, he has taken bath in tortoise milk and carries a bow made from a rabbit's horn. The words 'barren woman's son', 'skyflower' 'tortoise-milk' and 'rabbits' 'horn' have no corresponding existing objects. From this it does not follow that these words convey no sense at all.

What is the principle factor of semantics? It is an ideational character of meaning which has no corresponding object in the outside world. Equivalent to the rabbit-horn or sky-flower so dear to the Indian thinkers we come across mythological beasts in the West, e.g. the unicorn. Although these objects do not exist in the real world, they are not really 'nonsense', for they make some sense in some way. Bhartrhari has recognised the idea of *aupacārikī sattā* or a kind of metaphorically imposed existence which is not existent in the literal sense.<sup>(4)</sup> Words like sky-flower etc having no corresponding reality, still make sense. This intellectual meaning (*bauddha artha*) is pure sense, although they may not be a referent or external reality (*vāhya artha*).

In fact, such a concept brings us to the concept of *vikalpa* or ideational meaning recognized by the yoga thinkers. *Vikalpa* is defined as a sense which appears in the intellect from the knowledge of certain word, but which may have no corresponding external reality (*vāhya artha*)<sup>(5)</sup>. The grammarians too admit such ideational meaning. To the grammarians, a *prātipadikārtha* usually takes on the first case-ending<sup>(6)</sup>. A *prātipadikārtha* is the meaning that essentially appears in the intellect as soon as the *prātipadika* is uttered. A *prātipadika* is a word which has specific meaning, but is not a verbal root or a suffix<sup>(7)</sup>. In the sentence *śaśasṛṅgam nāsti* (there is no rabbit-horn) the word *śaśasṛṅga* assumes the first case-ending because it is a *prātipadika* and conveys certain sense. If we do not admit the phenomenon of

purely dependent on the speaker's will – and hence there must be some conventional connection between the two. It has been explained with the help of the metaphor of eye which cannot grasp sound. Hence the grammarians belong to the conventional school of thought.

Bhartṛhari also admits that the meaning of a particular word or sentence depends on the sweet will of the speaker. The usage of the cases depends on *buddhi* or intellect, which is nothing but the speaker's intellectual or ideational analysis which is called *vivakṣā*.<sup>(9)</sup> The following instance may be cited for justifying the above case. If it is used – *asinā chinatti*, it is intended by the speaker that the sword is an instrument by the use of instrumental case. If the usage is *asiśchinatti taikṣṇyena* (i.e., the sword cuts with its sharpness), the instrumentality is shifted to the sharpness from sword in order to emphasise the sharpness of the sword. In another usage – “*Taiṣṇyam chinatti svasāmarthyena* (i.e., sharpness cuts by its own power), the sharpness serves both as instrument and as subject to emphasise on sharpness<sup>(10)</sup>

It is found in usage – ‘*valahakād vidyotate*’ (i.e. lightning flashes from the cloud), where the lightning, thought mixed with cloud, is perceived as different from it and coming out of it. If the usage is *valāhake vidyotate* (lightning flashes *in* the cloud), it would mean that lightning, though perceived as non-different from the cloud, is seen being situated in it. It may otherwise be described as *valāhako vidyotate* (i.e. the cloud flashes lightning) the lightning is seen as non-different from the cloud.<sup>(11)</sup> In the like manner, different case endings may be used as per intention of the scholar. In the oblique case (*apādāna kāraka*), the sense of oblique must be intended as found in *vrkṣāt paṇam patati* (the leaf falls from the tree). If it is not desired, the speaker is authorized to use otherwise as found in *vrkṣasya paṇam*

*patati* (the leaf of the tree falls). In this case the tree is playing the role of an adjunct of leaf with the use of genitive (*sasthi*), which is not a *kāraka* due to not bearing any relation with the verb. Hence, the role of intention cannot be neglected in framing a sentence and conveying a particular meaning.

### **The Rhetoricians' View**

The rhetoricians also have given much importance on the intention of the speaker, not only in the field of poetics but in other normal spheres also. The entire system is depended on the speaker's will to speak a particular sense. The *Alaṅkāra* school of thought claims that figures of speech (*alaṅkāra*) are essential to poetry, the *Rīti* school is of the view that style is of great importance in poetry, the *Rasa* school believes in bringing out the aesthetic pleasure. The Dhvani theorists combine are these and state that the suggested meaning is the soul of poetry. The suggested meaning may be brought through suggestion by the word, the primary meaning, the figure or anything constituting the body of the poetry. Every word, every sense, etc must be used keeping in view the delineations of aesthetic sentiment of pleasure. For this reason one cannot but depend on the speaker's intention to convey a sense which would enhance *rasa* or aesthetic pleasure. We may elaborate this point in the following manner.

All aspects of poetic activity, from creation to expression, have been studied with perceptive insight and its meticulous detail by the great Hindu thinkers in the field of aesthetics from Bharata onwards. Bharata's is perhaps the most complete theoretical statement in the world heritage on the entire poetic circuit: the latent effective reactivity of man, its activation by the organization of various kinds of stimuli in the dramatic presentation, the reaction to it by the spectator, and its final distillation into a pure aesthetic relish. Bhamaha explored the mysterious mutual interfusing of sound and sense, their transformation

into an indissoluble unity, in poetic language. Ānandavardhana perceived and Abhinavagupta further clarified the quantal leap of power, the power of resonance or *dhvani*, which poetry acquires and which transcends all the logical, grammatical and syntactical resources of prose discourse. Vamana studies the features of the integrated reality that is poetic diction. Other thinkers related poetics to ontology and transcendence.

Before I proceed further in my endeavour of delineating the salient and central features of Hindu aesthetic thinking, I propose to make some clarificatory distinctions. There the Hindu view of art, and it can be studied in a two-fold manner, one historical and the other theoretical. One can pursue the historical development of Hindu art, independent of aesthetics, from the poetry, descriptive nature-poetry enlivened by wonder and imagination, followed by the combination of passion and austerity in the language of the *Upaniṣads* and Pali Buddhism. This was the language at the service of the search of the truth. The late Hindu view treated the practice of art as a form of *yoga* and identified aesthetic emotion with that fact when the self perceives the Self. In later time the 'defense' of any art, such as poetry and drama, was characterized as contributory to the achievement of all or any of the Four Aims of Life (*caturvarga*). The point of moment is the important part played in Hindu thought by the concept art as *yoga*. This is a large issue and we can hardly undertake to deliberate on the issue. But we can certainly cite a few instances to highlight the importance of the concept.

It follows, in the other side of the story, that the quality of beauty in a work of art is really quite independent of its theme. Beauty has never been reached except through the necessity that was felt to deal

with a particular subject. The theory of beauty is a matter for philosophers, not of the artists.

When we turn to the theoretical aspect of the Hindu view of art, we come across the agreement that the one essential element in poetry is *rasa*. With the term, which is equivalent of beauty or aesthetic emotion, must be considered the derivative adjective *rasavanta*, having *rasa*, applied to a work of art, and the derivative substantive, *rasika*, one who enjoys *rasa*, a connoisseur, and finally *rasāsvādāna*, the tasting of *rasa*, i.e., aesthetic contemplation. A whole literature is devoted to the discussion of *rasa* and the conditions of its experience. The theory is worked out in relation to poetry and drama. Aesthetic emotion, *rasa*, is said to result in the spectator, *rasika*, though it is not effectively *caused*, through the operation of determinants (*vibhāva*), consequents (*anubhāva*) mood (*bhāva*) and involuntary emotions (*sattvabhāva*). There is no one single term for the English 'beauty'. The words like *saundarya*, *cārutā*, *ramaṇīya*, *rūpa*, *camatkāra*, *hṛdayālhādajanaka* etc, should be taken as suggesting loveliness or charm. But these are of secondary importance in relation to the master idea of *rasa*.

It is arguable that the Hindu theory of poetry is an improvement upon Croce's definition, 'expression is art'. A mere statement, however, completely expressive, is not art. Poetry is indeed a kind of sentence, but what kind of sentence? A sentence ensouled by *rasa*, is Visvanatha's answer ('*vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam*')<sup>(12)</sup> in which one of the nine *rasa* is implied or suggested, and the savouring of this flavour, *rasasvādāna*, through empathy, by those possessing the requisite sensibility is the condition of beauty.



In discussing the nature of aesthetic experience, it said to be pure, indivisible, self-manifested, compounded equally of joy and consciousness, free of admixture with any other perception, the very twin brother of mystic experience (*brahmasvādasahodara*), and the very life of it is supersensuous (*lakottara*) wonder. For that very reason it cannot be an object of knowledge, its perception being indivisible from its very existence. Apart from perception it does not exist. It is not on that account to be regarded as eternal in time or as uninterrupted. It is timeless. It is again supersensuous, hyperphysical or *alaukika* and only proof of its reality is to be found in experience. It is possible to remark that the view of the aesthetic experience is monistic, implying that through the world of experience may be seen by those of penetrating vision (artists, lovers and philosophers) glimpses of the real substrate. Beauty, then, is reality as experienced by the artist. It is through the objective work of art that the artist is able to communicate his experience. The artist reveals beauty wherever the mind attaches itself, not directly to the Absolute, but to objects of choice. The true critic (*rasika*) perceives the beauty of which the artist has exhibited the signs. Works of art are reminders. It may be suggested that on the Hindu view the vision of the artist may be rather a discovery than a creation. In aesthetic contemplation we momentarily recover the unity of our being released from individuality.

It is time now that we turned to the Hindu theorists of art and aesthetic experience. More specifically, we propose to consider the centrality of *prātibhajñāna* or intuitive cognition in aesthetic experience.

Most of us are more or less acquainted with the phenomenon of aesthetic experience in our lives. It is the philosophers' task to trace its source and discover the nature of this unique experience, which is rendered possible by *Pratibhā* or creative genius. Of the Hindu

philosophers of art Abhinavagupta has given the most elaborate defense of aesthetic experience arising from the literature. But there are other accounts as well of the phenomenon.

Poetry or *kāvya* is called a perfect combination of a word and its meaning and hence it is said by Rajasekhara as '*śabdārthau te śaṁraram*'<sup>(13)</sup>. Such a view is first propounded by Bhamaha in his *Kāvyaṁlamkārasūtra* as '*Śabdārthau sahitaṁ kāvyam*'(1/16) i.e., the assimilation of a word and its meaning is called *cāvya* or *sāhitya*. The appropriate combination between a word and its meaning is called *sāhitya*. Kuntaka in his *Vakroktijīvitā* has expounded the exact significance of such appropriateness. To him *sāhitya* is a supernormal composition of a word and its meaning, which becomes charming and beautiful through their *balanced usage* neither too less nor too much ('*anyuṇānatiriktivamanohariṇyavasthitiḥ*')<sup>(14)</sup> The point implies that a word cannot be less or more beautiful than the beauty of meaning and in the same way meaning cannot be less or more beautiful than the beauty of a word, which can be called balancing beauty. As if the beauty of a word is challenging the beauty of its meaning and the vice-versa, which is called metaphorically '*paraspara-spardhitva-ramaṇīya*' (*Vṛtti on Ibid*) i.e., each other possessing the challenging beauty. The assimilation between word and meaning is metaphorised as *Pārvati-paramēśvara* and *ardhvanarīśvara*. Just as the beauty of Pārvati and Paramēśvara is realized when they stand in unity, where each is both, the beauty of *sāhitya* lies in the proper union between a word and its meaning, which can never be separated. For, the existence of a word is covered with its meaning and the existence of the meaning is full with its word. A word and its meaning cannot be separated just as there does not arise any question of separation between the lines and the paintings painted through them. The ideal union of Pārvati and

Paramesvara is as inseparable as the union between *vak* (word) and *artha* (meaning) – ‘*vāgarthāviva samprktau*<sup>(15)</sup>, which is the fundamental material in creating the poetic universe full of various colours and aesthetic sentiment. In this way, the union can be compared to the icon of *Ardhvanārīśvara* in which both the halves are taken to be equally superior but not the upper half is relatively superior or inferior to the other. To Rabindranath *sāhitya* is the means to unite not only a word and its meaning, but between one man with another man, between the past and the present, between that what is remote and the near. The inhabitants of a country where there is no *sahitya* at all are alienated due to the lack of live mutual binding. Hence Rabindranath has described *sāhitya* as temporal, cultural and social union. (*Bāṅglā Jātīya Sāhitya*).

A piece of literature has its body which is in the form of a word and its meaning. It has a self or essence, in the form of aesthetic sentiment. It possesses the virtues like velour etc, styles like the arrangements of the limbs, rhetoric like ear-ring etc and devoid of the faults like deafness etc. (*‘kāvyasya śabdārthau śarīraṁ, rasādiścātmā, guṇaḥ śauryādaya iva, doṣaḥ kāṇatvādivat, rīṭayaḥ avayavasamsthānaviśeṣavat, alaṁkāraśca kaṭakakunḍalādivat*)<sup>(16)</sup>.

The merit, rhetoric or figure etc cannot be taken as vital factors of a literary art due to their inadequacy in the manner of poetic creation. When the poetic language is completely distinguished from the ordinary language, the beauty of the former can easily be realized. Though the merit, rhetoric etc. are of course found in the language in our day-to-day communications, it is not taken as evidence of literature. All persons are gifted to follow the ordinary language, but hardly the poetic one. In enquiring into its cause Anandavardhana has proposed the theory of *Dhvani* or suggestion, which alone can offer the

reasonable explanation of the creation of the poetic beauty. The nature of *Dhvani* is given in the following way – “*Arthaḥ sahr̥dayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmā yo vyavasthitaḥ*”. The aesthetic pleasure arising from literary art cannot be understood by all, but only by the appreciators (*sahr̥daya*). In other words, literature is always appreciated by the *sahr̥dayas* alone. The portion which the appreciators specifically apprehend and which is taken as a vital factor in literature is called *Dhvani*. The aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) arises if there is supremacy of *Dhvani*; otherwise it is *rasavadalamkāra* (i.e. rhetoric mixed with *rasa*).

The aesthetic experience arising out of literary form of art, as Abhinavagupta has observed, is different from the experience arising from other sources (i.e. non-art objects). Those who enjoy a literature (either in the form of poetry or drama) become happy or unhappy after sharing the happiness or misery of the hero or heroine. Behind this happiness or misery of the audience there is no reason by which a logical mind can be satisfied. As for example, Rāma, a character of a drama might be happy or unhappy, but there is no reason of being involved emotionally with the dramatic character sharing their pleasure and misery. It is true of course that one in the audience or an appreciator is found to be emotionally involved. From this particular effect on the audience it is quite rational to look for a cause. As this cause is not found through ordinary sense organs and logical argumentation, it can be taken as something mysterious, non-logical in essence.

That the aesthetic pleasure is mystical can again be known from the fact that the aesthetic emotional mood of grief is found to rise to the experience of joy. How is the joy realized in the depicted painful situations? In the dramatic situation our mind is absorbed in the performances of the actors and this absorption depends on the

equilibrium of mind. When our mind is disturbed, the pain follows. If our mind remains in the state of aesthetic experience, there is something, which forcibly snatches our mind and keeps it in a state of complete rest, which is called *visrānti*. When a human situation is artistically presented usually against the background of the nature, the critic does not get himself transported to the peak of *rasavisrānti* or repose. It is in fact the last stage of his contemplation. Leading up to it are the diverse impressions he is receiving from different angles, almost simultaneously. His imaginative sensibility helps him in reception while his intellect is at work all along sorting them out. When the intellect and imagination slide into the margin, his heart is moved to an intense aesthetic state of repose, which is an end in itself. It is the aesthetic pleasure, which only can do this thing. This joy is endowed with such a type of mystical power by which the audience can enjoy this bliss even out of painful situation, but in our practical life human nature is found averse to experience pain. Hence, *Viśvanātha*, the celebrated rhetorician, has said that poetry is a unique unworldly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of a supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situations.

In case of aesthetic encounters there is some sort of identity between the audience and the object of experience. This notion of identity emerges from having self-involvement (*Ekātmatā*) with it. As for example, when an individual perceives a scene in which Dusyanta enjoys happiness in company of *Śakuntalā*, he is realizing bliss just as Dusyanta. For the time being he is identified himself with the character of the drama. On account of this identification (with the hero) the

spectator loses his individuality and forgets his personal this-worldly matters. This shows the mystical power of the aesthetic pleasure.

The real appreciator of a literature is a *sahṛdaya*. The property of being a *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. The poet creates poetry, the appreciator realizes it and being a *sahṛdaya* he recreates the creative mood in his own self. Just as fire covers the dry wood, the aesthetic pleasure arising in one's heart engulfs experiencer's whole being. This aesthetic pleasure is generated if the work of art is appreciated by the heart (*hṛdayasamvādi*). ("Yo 'rtho hṛdayasamvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ / Śarīraṁ vyāpyate tena śūṣkaṁ kaṣṭhamivāgnina").<sup>(17)</sup> Generally artists are not content with a sample and direct representation of nature. They make the *bhāva* or representation more and more complex when they are gifted with imagination. The more refined critic welcomes it too, and the most complex pattern thus imposed on nature and human nature by the imagination of the artist wins the admiration of the most cultivated man of taste. He calls such a completely successful *bhava-complex* itself by the name *rasa* since it means supreme delight.

It may be asked why is this-worldly pleasure not aesthetic. In reply, it can be said that the said pleasure is not aesthetic because aesthetic pleasure should be impersonal, disinterested and universal in character. When an individual feels happy at the happiness of the dramatic character, that pleasure is not exclusively his own (i.e. arising from his personal life) and it is impersonal. As this pleasure is not owing to the fulfillment of his self-interest, it is disinterested. Such a type of feeling does not occur in the case of only one individual. It happens so in the case of all individuals. That is why it is universal. It has been stated earlier that due to complete absorption in the aesthetic pleasure a man forgets his own loves and fears etc. At that time there

prevails a universal love, which is aesthetic pleasure. When a terrible scene is represented, there is an enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure called *Bhayānaka*. In this case too we generally forget that this fear felt by us belongs to the dramatic character and enjoys the universal character of fear, which is free from privative barriers of individualistic elements. The generalization is the process of idealization through which an individual transcends and alights on his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. The poet and the audience have to be endowed with the capacity of idealization. The poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure, which is enjoyed by others, as if it were theirs. As this pleasure transcends the limitations of personal interest and inclinations, it is disinterested universal pleasure. A pleasure which transcends this-worldly interest is surely transcendental and hence, mystical. As this worldly pleasure arising out of this worldly affairs like the birth of a son, attainment of property etc. is hardly impersonal, disinterested and universal, it cannot be described as aesthetic. Aesthetic pleasure is the emotional mood revealed in a blissful state of knowledge free of all barriers. When someone undergoes aesthetic experience, he becomes identified with the characters of the drama, and it is called identification of self (*ekātmata*). Just as the identification there is also distancing from the characters. The pathos experienced as joyous in aesthetic sentiment is due to the impersonalisation of the sorrow. Had this sorrow been my personal feeling, it would make me cripple, but actually we 'enjoys' sorrow under such a special and unique situation. The enjoyment of sorrow is possible through impersonalisation, which is the product of distancing from the characters. It is a kind of identification with as well as distancing from the characters. Hence it is very difficult to say whether the experience belongs to the characters of drama or to myself. As there are both the

situations of distancing and identification, it is very difficult to describe it as belonging to me or belonging to other. This is as Visvanatha's account of the matter.<sup>(18)</sup>

According to Abhinavagupta, an object becomes beautiful when our self gets involved in it. When someone realizes the misery of some character in a piece of literature, he thinks it as though it were his own due to the reflection of his own self there. This view is more firmly rooted in the Upanisadic view. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* says that husband comes to be loved to the wife not because she loves her husband but because she loves her own self etc. ("...*na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*" etc.) One can realize the nature of Rasa with the help of bliss arising from the realization of Brahman as accepted by the Advaitians. When an individual's personal desire is transformed into the impersonal aesthetic sentiment, the realization of aesthetic pleasure, universal in character, comes into being. Hence, Abhinavagupta has accepted the process of 'generalization' (*sādhārāṇīkarana*) as one of the characteristic features of aesthetic pleasure. Though there is reflection of Brahman in an individual's mind, which is free due to the prominence of *sattvaguna*, this pleasure is quantitatively different (but qualitatively same) from the pleasure of Brahman. Hence it is described as a dwarfed image of the taste of Brahman (*Brahmasvādasahodara*).

The aesthetic pleasure leads a man to the world of creativity. After seeing the separation of the one of the curlew-couple *Vālmiki* became greatly moved, and out of his grief he created a *śloka*. He intensely felt of pathos in which he lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality he had a sense of joy out of the grief. This joyous experience of pathos prompted him to composing a *śloka* spontaneously. *Vālmiki*'s grief was not this worldly. Had it been so, he



would have felt sympathy with the bird. This could not have been sufficient for the creation of poetry. This- wordly grief makes a man stupefied and dumb. When a poet's vision deepens, he gets inspired from within. Then the crafts of writing of *Kavya* (like characterization, plot etc) follow just as water overflows a jar already filled with water. The poet's genius absorbed in the aesthetic state comes to be endowed with capacity of composing a *Kāvya* in a spontaneous manner. If a poet's heart is filled with emotion, it (emotion) finds a spontaneous outlet in the metrical form. This spontaneity arises when there are no barriers (like personal interest etc.) for the realization of aesthetic pleasure. The spontaneous outlet of poetry from a man who was idle before having aesthetic absorption proves again the mystical character of aesthetic pleasure. This spontaneous poetry is called *śloka* as it arises from the grief due to the separation of the curlew couple ('*krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokah ślokatvamāgataḥ*)<sup>(19)</sup> The theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa*, though invented in connection with the literary form of art, can be extended to other forms of art also. It has been stated by Ānandavardhana that an individual, though conversant in respect of word, meaning and their relation, cannot understand literature until and unless his heart is saturated with aesthetic sentiment. He explains this phenomenon with the help of an example taken from the world of music. He adds that an individual, though expert in the science of music, cannot understand melody and pleasure arising from it until and unless his heart is saturated with *rasa*. The same theory can be applicable to the pictorial form of art also. In the phrase of Abhinavagupta, any type of the creative art presupposes the condition of *rasāveśā* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual. Various experiences of our daily life are represented in the art-objects like literature, painting etc. In order to represent the reality one should need deep concentration, which is supported in the *Gitā* –

'na cāyuktasya bhāvanā'. This abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in artist, dramatic character and spectators (in the case of literary art). In the case of pictorial art also, there must exist the same sentiment among artist, pictorial presentation, and the viewer. Hence, the property of being *sahṛdaya* is not essential in the case of literature only, but is in other forms of art also.

When an individual shares the feelings of the hero or heroine, he becomes sensitive in having heart saturated with aesthetic pleasure generated within him through his self-involvement. The situation of being moved by *rasa* (*rasāveśā*) impels the individual with the power of creativity (*nirmāṇakṣamatva*). Sharing the pathos of others in a drama he gets aesthetic pleasure, which associates him with the power of creativity. If, on the other hand, he has the feeling of pathos from the incident occurred in his own life due to the death of a son etc, it (this pathos) renders him incapacitated instead of conjoining him with the power of creativity, which is called *kārayitṛī pratibhā*.. An individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure after sharing his self with the character of the drama as he is also having same feeling subsisting in the dramatist and dramatic characters. This common experience is possible due to having the similar feelings, because they are *sahṛdayas* (literally having common heart). When the hearts of the people are expanded having clear mind due to a culture of fine arts and inculcate the capability of being identified with the characters of the drama as described (*varṇāñīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā*), they are called *sahṛdayas* as they all possess the same feeling.

If the above-mentioned view of *sahṛdayatva* were accepted, the aesthetic experience would be regarded as universal. The success of an art-object depends on its engendering universalisation (*sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*), which depends on the experience of *sahṛdayatva*. If

each and every reader or audience has got the same sensitivity or feeling, there is transparency regarding the fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahṛdaya-samvāda-śālītā*). This phenomenon is otherwise described as 'one-pointed concentration of all the audiences' (*sarvasāmājikanām ekaghanatā*). Universality (*sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*) is the hallmark of aesthetic experience though it proceeds from the object highly individualized by the artist. The situation presented in art becomes aesthetic only when all the elements therein are grasped by the critic in their universal aspects. Personal considerations fade away. Even impossible things in life do not engender disbelief in art.

The universalisation is possible through the melting of the state of being a knower (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*). It can be explained in the following manner. A knower of *pramata* has got some elasticity through which he can expand himself. This may be called 'subjectification'. As a subject is no more confined within him and is extended to the objects after covering their essential characters, it is called subjectification of the object.<sup>(20)</sup>

It may be adduced in this context, and it has already been stated earlier, that one gets identified with object (*tanmayibhāvanā*). This state may be called 'objectified subject'. Again, when it is said that subject extends himself to the object (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*), it may be called 'subjectified object'. I think there is no fundamental difference between 'subjectified object' and 'objectified subject' because this state allows a two-way traffic. If someone shares the grief of a character of drama, he obviously expands himself to the object. In other words, the same case can also be interpreted, as 'objectified subject' as the subject is really objectified in the sense that subject has no personal feeling at this stage. That is why, it is said that in such an experience a two way-

traffic may be accepted, even though Abhinavagupta has emphasized on the subjectification of aesthetic experience. To Viśvanātha also the subject sees himself in the object being identified with it (“*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānaṁ pratipadyate*”). In fact, self exists everywhere and hence, following the Advaitin’s line Abhinavagupta is of the opinion that the relishment itself is a *rasa* (*rasanīyaḥ rasah*). What is the object of relishment? In reply, it is said that relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama) is called *svasamvidānanda*. As if we have undertaken an activity of savouring (*carvaṇavyāpāra*) of the bliss arising from self-knowledge. It can be asserted that to Abhinavagupta the relishment in the form of chewing activity of the bliss rising from self-knowledge is called *rasa*. As *rasa* is itself a kind of self-relishment, it is not proper to say – ‘relishment of *rasa*’ with genitive case-ending, as we cannot say that he is cooking the boiled rice, (*odanam pacati*). Just as ‘boiled rice’ is itself a cooked object, relishment is itself *rasa*. If *rasa* is subjectified, it is not proper to say – ‘*rasa* of’, which presupposes subject-object dichotomy, which is not accepted in Abhinavagupta’s philosophy.

In fact, one’s mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at the situation of aesthetic relish and hence it is uncontaminated by *Rajaḥ* and *Tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* a person can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not moved or swayed away by knowledge of other objects (*vedyāntarasparśāsūnya*). This bliss is the highest possible *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaprakāśānanda*), and it is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman but not quantitatively. The former is transitory while the latter is ever abiding. That is why; such pleasure is described by Viśvanātha also as *Brahmasvādasahodara* (i.e. the sibling manifest of the taste of Brahman).

Moreover, the concepts of disinterested pleasure (*lokottarānanda*), universalisation (*sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*), subjectification etc. are not to be taken as closed concepts but open ones as they can be applied in a similar fashion to not-literary art objects like music, dance etc. the bliss arising from melody, dance etc, is disinterested, universal and subjectified in the same way as shown in the case of literature. In short, the aesthetic experience is essentially a state of bliss, a state of self-realization. This state of bliss is pervaded by a feeling of spiritual illumination and free from sensual elements. The physical emotions shake off their sordid attributes when they are converted into artistic emotions-they are free from the limitations of time and space and are universalized. As a result they do not become a part of the direct physical experience of the spectator, they raise him above the petty mundane experience of the self, refine his sensibility and sublimate his consciousness. But it is not a state of pure spiritual bliss, because it is neither a permanent state of joy nor is it completely unrelated with the material attainments.

Life is a complex fact and fancy, logic, meaning and mystery and poetry pierces life where it is sensitive and seeks to pluck the heart of the mystery. The poet uses words in a metrical form to convey such mystery or deeper significance of our life. But words are mere appearance, and words have to be charged with significant undertones that a poet may be able to convey the reality that remains beyond him through the help of the appearances. We often refer to the poet's inspiration, which nothing but a primordial divine energy. Such inspiration has to be turned into the currency of language before it becomes poetry. We may describe poetry as mystic incantation allied to prayer. When poetic expression achieves the status of a *mantra*, the effect on the hearer is far more profound than the mere words seem to

mean. It is a kind of leap from the physical boundaries or intellectual cognition to the realm of reader's soul. Words, grammatical formations, rhythmic arrangement, figures of speech, operation of intellect, emotional excitement etc. all have their part to play in determining the composition of a poem. In spite of this without soul-quality there is no poem. Without soul it would turn into a lifeless mass of words, a temple without an installed deity, a statue without life. *Dhvani* in poetry is really this soul-quality. When a poem, without suffocating the reader within the walls of precise meaning, proves to be magic casement opening on the foam of the endless oceans of significance, it is poetry in the true sense of the term. In poetry we seek to pierce the *māyā* or cognizable picture and touch the intangible reality within. To Ānandavardhana the poetry is a means of cultivating the double vision so that we may be able to perceive the vision and invade the invisible. Professor Srinivas Iyerger opines – "We are not the same people after reading the poem that we were before. The words of the poet are verily like a dance of creative life, they are like unto a racing squadron of the spirit, and whereas the five senses open without, the sixth sense that poetry gives us opens within, and the undertones of *Dhvani* carry us almost to the threshold of Reality. The pleasure is not denied, it is only transformed into a discipline in awareness, a deepening of consciousness, a realization of things undreamt of before".

*Dhvani* is an exclusively poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of the elements embellishing the language like *alaṅkāra*, *guṇa* etc to delineate aesthetic pleasure. Ānandavardhana admits its independent existence after refuting the views that it can be included in *lakṣaṇā* or *tātparya*. He had given a scientific account of *Dhvani* to explain the phenomenon of *sahṛdayatva*. The suggested meaning or *pratīyamāna artha* cannot be stated in words and can only be felt or

realized by the reader possessing an aesthetic attitude. In poetry the suggested meaning has always been taken as superior to the direct embellishment. Hence the suggested meaning is always of the nature of *Rasa*. When the heart of the reader is affected by that meaning, the reader is impressed by the poetic genius (*pratibhā*). Those who have an attitude of aesthetic relish can feel it. It is not felt by those who have complete mastery over the language and reasoning, because a sentence or word provides us the suggestive meaning suddenly like a flash. *Rasa* is that which initially inspires the poet into creativity and ultimately ensures the aesthetic delight of the critic. In life there is joy and pity in our life, but no aesthetic enjoyment or relishment. The impersonal, disinterested and universal delight is exclusive to poetry. The suggested beauty surpasses the beauty of the expressed (*vācya*). Such poetry is called first-rate poetry (*Dhvani-kāvya*). On the other hand, if the beauty of the expressed (*vācya*) outshines the beauty of the suggested (*vyangya*), it may be described as a second rate poetry. The characteristic features of *Rasa* can be realized more fully in the *Dhvani* theory. There may be various causes of beauty between the expressed and the expresser (*vācya-vācaka*). When these causes fail to attract others due to the supremacy of the suggestiveness, the real *Dhvani* is realized ("*Vācya-vācakacarutvahetūnām vividhātmānam / Rasādiparatā yatra sa dhvanerviṣayo mataḥ*").<sup>(21)</sup> When *Rasa* is considered superior, it is surely *Dhvani*. If otherwise, it is not *Dhvani* and hence acquires the lower status called *Rasavadalamkāra*. In fact, beauty generated through suggestion is more intrinsic and aesthetic than what is expressed. In other words, *vyangya-cārutva* is always better than *vācya-cārutva*. *Dhvani* is that which is *vyangya* and exclusively important in comparison with other factors in poetry. In a good poetry there are various elements, which help to generate beauty of poetry. Some of the elements are *vācya* and some *vyangya*. The

prominence of the *vācya* over the *vyangya* or the *vice-versa* has to be judged to determine something as *Dhvani* or *alaṃkāra*. If the *vyangya* meaning is prominent over *vacya* then it is *Dhvani*. Otherwise it is *alaṃkāra*. Each and every poem has got a theme of its own which is called *vastu*. It may be communicated to the audience directly (*vācya*), figuratively (*lakṣya*) or suggestively (*vyangya*). In an understanding of poetry a critic should judge what gives him the final resting place (*samvid-viśrānti*). Such freedom and the lack of precision is the essential characteristic of poetry. No logic is applicable here, because the logic of poetry is something different from that of other fields.

*Dhvani* is of three types: *vastudhvani*, *alaṃkāra-dhvani* and *rasa-dhvani*. Of these three the province of *rasa-dhvani* is not only largest but sweetest also. In poetry language is taken as unique medium, because the poet tries to convey his emotion and feelings through it. Just as the apparently dry things like stones and bones are associated with our feelings, poetry that apparently seems to be *rasa*-less passages, a connoisseur will experience some aesthetic pleasure. Even in the case of *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani* the existence of *Rasa* cannot be denied logically. It is admitted that the *dhvani* is the essence of the best poetry through which the *rasa* is delineated. Hence the application of the definition cannot be denied to *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. These are more beautiful than their *vācya*-counterpart due to their contribution to partaking the healing touch of *rasa*.

We may cite the following example in favour of *Rasa-dhvani*:  
"Evam vādini devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhī / Līlākamalapatrāṇi  
gaṇayāmāsa pārvatī/" (That is, while the seer-deity was telling such, Pārvatī counted the leaves of the beautiful lotus standing by the side of her father. The expressed meaning of the counting of the petals of the



beautiful lotus has no direct excellence. If we ponder over the whole situation, we will see that Nārada, the seer deity, was having some talk about Parvati's marriage with Shiva. After hearing this Parvati was ashamed of as found often in an unmarried woman and she was trying to hide this feeling after counting the petals of the lotus, which indicates that as if she had not heard any thing from them. This meaning is more beautiful than the expressed meaning. This is a classic example of *rasa-dhvani*.

In the *Meghnādvadha* the lamentation and frustration of Rāma is depicted in a very beautiful way. It has been said by Rāma that there is no need of rescuing Sītā, because innumerable monkey-soldiers are killed in the battle, many great kings are brought to Lanka with their soldiers. But every thing is in vain, because their bloods have dampened the earth just like rainwater. He has lost kingdom, wealth, father, mother and relatives due to his bad luck. There is none in this world for whom he can protect his life and live in this world. Hence it is better to go back to forest. Being enchanted by infatuative hope they have come to the kingdom of Raksakas. The original verse goes as follows:

*"Nahi kaj Sitai uddhari, vrtha, he jaladhi, ami bandhinu tomare, asamkhya raksasagram badhinu samgrame; aninu rajendradale e kanakpure sasainye; sonitasrota, hai akarane, barisar jalasama ardrila mahire! Rajya dhan pita mata svabandhubandhabe-harainu bhagyadose. Keval acchila andhakar ghare dip maithili; tahare (he vidhi, ki dose das dosi tava pade?) nibaila duradrsta! Ke ar acche re amar samsare, bhai, jar much dekhi rakhi e paran ami? Thaki e samsare? Cal phiri, punah mora jai banabase, Laksman, kuksane, bhuli asar chalane, e raksasapure, bhai ainu amara."*<sup>(22)</sup>

The frustration and lamentation as found in the above-mentioned verses are the expressed meaning (*vācyaārtha*). After surpassing this expressed meaning another meaning (*vyangyārtha*) is suggested from which it is known that Meghnād is undefeatable due to his immeasurable valour. Lakṣmana, however great hero he may be, will surely be destroyed in the confrontation with Meghnad. This suggested meaning is more prominent and gracious. The matter (*vastu*) expressed here gives rise to another matter (*vastu*) suggestively and hence it is a case of *vastu-dhvani*.

If in poetry the matter (*vastu*) expressed gives rise to another rhetoric (*alaṃkāra*) suggestively then it is called *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. As for example the following verse may be taken into account: "Divākar, niśākar, dīp tārāgaṇ/ Divāniśī karitecche tamaḥ nibāraṇ// Tārā nā harite pāre timir āmar/ Ek Sītā bihane sakali andhakar// (That is, the Sun the Moon, lamp and the stars are dispelling darkness day and night. But they cannot dispel my own darkness. Everything seems to be dark to me if alone Sītā is absent). In this case also the suggested meaning is more graceful and prominent than the expressed one. In this context the superiority of Sita has been suggested than the Sun, Moon etc. The rhetoric called *vyatireka* is found here, which is the suggested meaning coming under *alaṃkāra-dhvani*.

*Dhvani* may again be divided into two-*avivakṣita-vācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. When the suggested meaning is most desirable but not the expressed one, in such situation there we find *dhvani* called *avivakṣita-vācya*. It may be used in two distinct cases- inclusion of another meaning rejecting the expressed one (*arthāntara-samkrāṃita*) and inclusion of the opposite meaning rejecting the expressed one (*atyanta-tiraskṛta*). The second type of *dhvani* i.e., *atyanta-tiraskṛta* is found in the following case where the prohibition

(*niṣedha*) is suggested in disguise of injunction (*vidhi*). The *śloka* runs as follows: “*Bhrama dhārmika! Viśraddhaḥ sa śuṇako'dya māritastena / Godābarīnadikūla-latāghanavasinaḥ dr̥ptasimhena*”<sup>(23)</sup> (That is, O virtuous man, you can freely move now. The particular dog, which you are afraid of, is killed by dangerous lion living in the dense creepers situated on the bank of Godavari). This is an excellent example of *Dhvani* of *atyanta-tiraskṛta* type. A virtuous man used to destroy the secrecy and beauty of the bower by way of plucking flowers and leaves where a couple meets very often. But that man was always scared of a dog living there. Towards this man the intelligent ladylove uttered this beautiful *śloka*. The injunction (*vidhi*) to move freely is the expressed meaning (*vāc्यārtha*), but the suggested meaning is the prohibition, which is completely different from the expressed one. The suggested meaning is that, though there is no dog, a dangerous lion had replaced it. Hence he should be more cautious and leave the place immediately. It comes under the *Dhvani* called *atyanta-tiraskṛta*.

The second type of *Dhvani* is *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. In this case the expressed meaning, though desired, suggests another meaning as more prominent and excellent. It is again of two kinds – *asamlakṣyakrama* (understanding *dhvani*, the stages of which are not capable of being noticed) and *samlakṣyakrama* (understanding *dhvani*, the stages of which are capable of being noticed). In the previous case it seems that both the expressed and suggested meanings are manifested simultaneously. Though there might be some stages for the origination of the suggested meaning, it is very difficult to notice them due to their minute and subtle character as per the principle involved in the pricking hundred petals of a lotus (*satapatrabhedanyāya*). The second type of *dhvani* is found there where the stages for understanding the suggested meaning from the expressed one are

noticed. The case cited as an example of *rasa-dhvani* may be taken as an example of the *samlakṣyakrama dhvani*. The fact of Pārvatī's feeling of uneasiness arising from her marriage-talk is available after analyzing different stages in the expressed meaning.

### **The Vedāntists' view**

The Vedāntists are not ready to appreciate *tātparya* in the sense of speaker's intention as a condition of verbal knowledge. The utterance of a parrot do not bear any intention. But it is not difficult to us to understand such expression. When one mechanically recited or uttered a vedic passage he cannot be said to intend the meaning which the hearers interpret out of it. The Vedāntist therefore advocate earnestly that *tātparya* as a condition of verbal comprehension is not constituted by the meaning which the speaker intends to convey with it, but by the fitness of the meaning which the words of a sentence creates. Thus the sense 'the jar is in the room' is fit to locate the relation of room and jar but not the relation of room and cloth. The Nyāya meaning of *tātparya* which the Vedāntists readily accepts only in the case of *nānārthakaśabda's* where the same statement involves the possibility of different implications.<sup>(24)</sup>

In case of ambiguous words like '*saindhava*' etc. it can be said that *tātparya* appears in their fitness to locate a particular meaning in absence of some other meaning intended to. The word '*saindhava*' is correct to signify 'salt' when there is no scope to involve the meaning of horse at all. However, if both the meanings of salt and horse are to be taken into account, we can say that it is capable of to mean both in absence of any intended meaning other than the two. In accepting *tātparya* as a condition of understanding of words or sentence the

vedāntists reduces it to fitness of words themselves with a particular meaning other than the speaker's intention if any.

### **The Mīmāṃsakas' View**

The Mīmāṃsakas consider a sentence as a combination of its constituent words where every word of that sentence has a definite meaning of its own and the power of *tātparya* helps to understand the construed meaning of the sentence. Of course, it is true that, the constituent words of a sentence have its own separate meaning, but a bunch of ununified separate meaning cannot make a unified meaning. In this context, a point may be noted. Whenever we use words, we have intention to convey a connected meaning or sense. The intention of a speaker behind the use of words in juxtaposition (*samabhivyāhāra*) is to carry a conjugated meaning without which the simultaneous application of different words in a sentence could be of no use. In such situation *tātparya* appears to be a general initiating factor in bringing into the relation of word meaning and the formulation of sentence meaning. *Tātparya*, as the Mīmāṃsakas' envisage, is the purport of the sentence while the Naiyāyikas accept it as intention or desire of the speaker.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not recognize the Nyāya concept of *tātparya* at all. This is why they totally ignore the requirement of the knowledge of the speaker's intention in the matter of *śābdabodha* in a sentence. Moreover, it is assumed that *tātparya* is all comprehensive but not absolute one, as it cannot change the *śakti*, the primary meaning of a word. The Mīmāṃsakas visualize *śakti* or the relation between the word and its meaning as normal, innate or permanent, i.e., they believe *śakti* as *autpattika*.<sup>(25)</sup>

But on the other hand, the Naiyāyikas consider the *śakti* or the relation between word and its meaning as conventional i.e., the *śakti* is *sāṃketika* and permanent.

Moreover, to enrich the Mīmāṃsakas' standpoint a modern scholars view is quoted : 'The Mimamsakas' habit of attending too exclusively to the 'revealed' texts of the Vedas probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of Verbal Comprehension without any reference to the speaker at all. Even a sentence, which is unintelligible to the speaker has an inherent capacity to convey its meanings. Thus the phrase, 'the pot in the room' conveys the relation of the pot and the room without the help of the speakers intention".<sup>(26)</sup>

To discuss the Mīmāṃsakas' view about *tātparya* a point may be noted. All Mīmāṃsakas do not envisage the concept of *tātparya* in the same fashion.

The *Prābhākaras*, the advocates of *Anvitābhīdhānavāda* consider that it is *tātparya* that makes the power of *Abhidhā* to convey or carry the total meaning of sentence as well as the (*prāthamyādhīdhātṛtvat tātparyāvagamādapi / padanameva sā śaktirvaramabhyupagamyātām*) individual meaning of the word.<sup>(27)</sup> "According to the *Prābhākaras*, the *tātparya* enables primary meaning itself to give both its word meaning and the syntactic relation. These *anvitābhīdhānavādin*s think that the *śakti* of words is understood with reference to a meaning that is related to some *kārya*. All sentence, especially in the Veda, have to be ultimately meaning injunctions or prohibitions. The later theory of *Dhānika*, who includes *dhvani* under *tātparya*, follows this *anvitābhīdhānavāda*"<sup>(28)</sup>

Bhāṭṭa comes to reject the notion of *Tātparya* prevailing in the circle of *prabhakaras*. *Drṣṭanugūṇyādapi padarthanimittaka eva*

*vākyārtho na padanimittaḥ dṛṣṭavādhaprasaṅgaḥ..... tātparyāñcāvā  
ntaravyaparadvarenapi sādhayatāmaviruddhamityucyate tadatrāpi  
samānam.*<sup>(29)</sup>

On the other hand the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas holds the view that in a sentence, the individual words denotes their isolated meaning while the meaning of the sentence is found through *lakṣaṇā* depending on *tātparyānupapatti*. For the Bhāṭṭa, *tatra vākyenānvayānubhavajanane ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsattijñānaṁ sahakāri.... tātparyaṁ tu tatpratīticchayā vaktrānusamhitatvam ..... kecittu tātparyajñānaṁ lakṣṇikanānārtha sthaliyasabde heturnatu śābdabodhamātre .... pare tu tātparyajñānasya na hetutvam sambhavati.*<sup>(30)</sup>

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# *Chapter – III*

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## CHAPTER – III

### **The concept of *Tātparya* in *Navya Nyāya***

A sentence is a collection of words. When a sentence is considered as made up of words, having independent meaning of each of its own, it requires an explanation as to how a connected meaning is understood from the sentence. Different schools of thought in India discussed the matter resulting in the evolution of various theories. *Mīmāṃsā*, the *vākyaśāstra*, are prominent in this field. Various characteristics of this problem have been discussed by Bhartṛhari and different observations were noted. Of course, he clarified his view in this regard that the sentence as a whole is the unit of utterance.

*Vākya* as used by Pāṇini is understood as the general sense of an utterance without defining it. Kātyāyana, who defines it as group of words having a finite verb (*ekaṁ vākyam*). Pāṇini, as it appears, does not contribute to such a view of Kātyāyana. Pāṇini's view about sentence seems more to that of *Mīmāṃsakas* than to that of Logicians. Grammarians later agreed that a simple sentence may have more than one finite verb provided other conditions are fulfilled. To illustrate, *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*, "See, the deer is running" – is an example of its kind.<sup>(1)</sup> Sentence or sentence-meaning does not referred to by the *Nyāyasūtra* whereas the *Nyāya* is mainly concerned with the word meaning. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* it is said that when a group of letters arranged in a fixed order is called a word.<sup>(2)</sup> The essential nature of a word lies in its meaning.<sup>(3)</sup> The meaning of a word consists in its relation to the object which it signifies. Thus we can say that words are significant symbols.

Verbal knowledge is produced by verbal testimony, which is dependent on the use of sentences. Though a sentence is a combination of words yet any combination of words cannot be regarded as sentence, or to be more precise, meaningful sentences. For example, if one says – “The cow is white”, it carries some meaning; but another arrangement of the same set of words conveys nothing, for example, “The cow, white, is”. This is, at best, a pseudo-sentence (*vākyabhāsa*). ‘Cow, horse, man, elephant’ is another example of meaningful words that have failed to combine into a meaningful sentence. There are certain conditions, which are to be fulfilled if one is to understand a sentence. According to the Nyāya school, there are four such conditions: *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, *tātparya* and *ākāṃkṣā*. These four conditions as such do not become operative in producing a meaningful sentence, but cognition of these conditions are necessary for our verbal knowledge. Let us explain it with an example. There is a sentence – “cow exists”. When the speaker utters this sentence, we are sure that he is uttering a meaningful sentence. But it may so happen that the hearer is unaware of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, and *sannidhi* operative in this sentence. He may not know the speaker’s intention, i.e., *tātparya*. In that case, the hearer would not have any verbal cognition. So, for the generation of verbal cognition, the mere presence of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *sannidhi* and *tātparya* is not enough; the hearer must be aware that there are *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *sannidhi*, and *tātparya*. Let us see the nature of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti* and *tātparya*.

There is nothing in the Nyāya concept of a meaningful sentence (*vākya*) to show that all four of them are involved in the very concept of a sentence, though cognition of these conditions are necessary for understanding a meaningful sentence. That is, cognition of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā*, etc., is essential for the generation of *vākyārthabodha*.

## **Ākāṁkṣā**

In the case of the generation of verbal knowledge, we require the cognition of *ākāṁkṣā*, without which we cannot have verbal cognition. Verbal knowledge is generated from meaningful sentences. A sentence is a combination of different words. These words refer to different objects. When a relation is established between these objects and is captured properly by the sentence (which is an ordered sequence of words), it can be said that verbal knowledge has been generated. We require *ākāṁkṣā* for the understanding of this relation among the objects referred to by different words.

*Padasya padāntaravyatirekaprayuktānanubhāvakatvam ākāṁkṣā*

*Tarkasamgraha* says – the inability of a word to produce without another word, an apprehension of the relation between what is signified by these two words is *ākāṁkṣā*<sup>(4)</sup>. By *ākāṁkṣā* or expectancy is meant that quality of the words of a sentence by which they expect or imply one another. A word is not solely self-sufficient in conveying a complete meaning but in order to express the complete meaning the word should be brought into relation with other words. When someone said the statement like “bring out a pot” the hearer understand the meaning of that statement. But when the hearer hears only the word ‘bring’ it cannot give a unified sense. Hence, the word ‘bring’ has an expectation for another word to give a complete or unified meaning. Such mutual expectancy of the words of a sentence is regarded as *ākāṁkṣā*. *Ākāṁkṣā* can be considered from two aspects – psychological and syntactic. The Naiyāyikas consider it as a syntactic expectancy. When someone said the statement like “bring out a pot” the hearer understand the meaning of that statement. But when the hearer hears only the word ‘bring’ – it can not give a unified sense.

Such mutual expectancy of the words of a sentence is regarded as *ākāṁkṣā*.

In this context a point may be noted. Though there is one *ākāṁkṣā* in a simple statement ('bring out a pot') but there are many longer statements where we observed more than one *ākāṁkṣā*. *Ākāṁkṣā* is thus a kind of 'syntactical demand'.<sup>(5)</sup> That is to say, the relation between *kriyatva* and *karakatva* is the *akamksa*. If so many words like 'man', 'horse', 'dog', 'tree', 'cow', etc are uttered, they can not convey a complete meaning. Because there is no syntactical demands between those words.<sup>(6)</sup> In spite of all these things we may have some instances. Where, the relation of *kriyatva* and *kāarakatva* is not present between the constituent words of a sentence, e.g., "so' yam Devadatta". Moreover the relation of *kriyatva* and *kāarakatva* is not necessary for the relation of identity.

The question arises where does this *ākāṁkṣā* belong to? In a conversational situation there are speaker and a listener. The listener has the verbal cognition, when an individual understands the relation among the referents of the terms that constitute the sentence generating verbal cognition. Apart from the speaker and the relation between the term and the referent, there are three major factors – the listener, the term and the referent. The question is: does *akamksa* belong to the referent (*padārthagata*) or to the listener (*śrotrigata* or *ātmagata*) or to the term (*padagata*) itself?

According to the first view, *ākāṁkṣā* means *avinābhāva* or universal concomitance between the objects. What is the exact significance of *avinābhāva*? Suppose there is a sentence having two words 'a' and 'b'. If there is *ākāṁkṣā*, then it is not the case that the negation of the referent of 'b' can reside along with the referent of 'a'.

This is called *avinābhāva* and it indicates that *ākāṁkṣā* is a characteristic associated with the referent (*padārthagata*). Let us take an example to clarify the point. In the sentence *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* (The jar is blue) the term *Nīlo* indicates 'blue' and *ghaṭa* indicates 'a jar'. If there is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case, then it is not the case that the negation of the jar resides along with something blue. In other words, the negation of the referent of *ghaṭa* does not reside along with the referent of *nīla*. This explanation of '*avinābhāva*', however, is not complete. Referring back to our first example which indicates that the sentence is constituted of two terms 'a' and 'b', we can say that we have to specify the relation in which the referent of 'a' does not reside in some locus along with the negation of the referent of 'b'. If we do not specify the relation, then a difficulty may arise. Let us think that someone employs the following sentence, *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra is cooking). The case-ending *tip* attached with the verb-root *pac* refers to the *kartṛtva* (agency) and this would have *ākāṁkṣā* with Caitra who is the *kartā* or agent here. According to the criterion set by the propounders of *avinābhāva*, the negation of *kartṛtva* should not reside along with Caitra. But if we do not specify the relation, then the negation of *kartṛtva* can reside along with Caitra. The locus of Caitra may be the ground (*bhūtala*) on which he is standing in the relation of conjunction or *saṁyoga*. The ground or the *bhūtala* cannot be an agent or *kartā*. Therefore, the negation of *kartṛtva* can reside there. Therefore, the negation of *kartṛtva* resides along with Caitra in *bhūtala*. So the criterion of *avinābhāva* would be violated in this case. So we have to specify the relation. If we say that the absence of *kartṛtva* does not reside in a locus where Caitra resides in the relation of identity or *tādātmya*, then the difficulty would be solved. Caitra does not reside in the ground or *bhūtala* in the relation of *tādātmya* or identity. Referring back to the example of the sentence constituted of 'a' and 'b', we can say in a general way that if there is

*ākāṁkṣā*, then the negation of the referent of 'b' resides in some locus, where the referent of 'a' does not reside in the relation of identity, i.e., the negation is conceived here as a reciprocal negation or *anyonyabhāva*. Now, if we explain the concept of *ākāṁkṣā* in this fashion, then it becomes a characteristic of the objects referred to by the words without any doubt. The philosophers here raise a question: should we regard these objects as qualified by any property? If we consider the object to be qualified by its generic property, then immense difficulties follow. Let us take a concrete case to show this – *nīlāṁ sarojaṁ* (i.e., The lotus is blue). According to the former stipulation (taken simply) there would be a universal concomitance between the two constituent concepts, viz., between blueness and lotus species. In other words, there should be the reciprocal negation of some object in lotus, which has the negation of blue in it. If we consider lotus to be qualified by lotushood, then we are to think of each and every lotus to be having the reciprocal negation of that object, which has the negation of blue. Now, if we take such an object to be white object, then it is difficult to imagine that every lotus would be having its negation, since we know that there are white lotuses also. To avoid this difficulty it may be suggested that the object should not be qualified by the generic property, but by a particular property. So, lotuses, which are white, or those, which are not blue, are excluded from our domain of discourse. The difficulty may be avoided in the former case. But it cannot be avoided in the following two instances – *vimalāṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣaḥ carati* (i.e., How clear is the water of the river / The buffalo is grazing on the bank). If *ākāṁkṣā* is *avinābhāva*, then these two sentences would be reduced to a single sentence as there is *avinābhāva* between the river and its bank or to be more specific, between the referent of the sixth case-ending attached after *nadī* and the bank; and the intended construction of the



word *kacche* as being a member of a separate sentence would become impossible.

This, however, is not the only difficulty, which is to be found in this definition of *ākāṁkṣā*. This definition is vitiated by certain other fallacies. In the sentence-*prameyam abhidheyam* there may be some problems. If we are to maintain the former criterion, then we are to think, that which is *prameya* has the reciprocal negation of the object having the negation of *abhidheya*. We know that *abhidheyatva* is an exclusively affirmative property (*kevalānvayī dharma*). That which is *abhidheyatva* is omnipresent. Hence its negation cannot be found. Similarly *prameyatva* is an exclusively affirmative property (*kevalānvayī dharma*). That which is *prameyatva* is omnipresent. Its negation cannot be found. So the former definition of *ākāṁkṣā* cannot be applied in this case. So we cannot accept the alternative that *ākāṁkṣā* is *padārthagata*.

Now let us deal with the second alternative that *ākāṁkṣā* belongs to the self (*ātmagata*) what has the verbal cognition. In our everyday vocabulary, we use the term 'desire' as an English equivalent to *akamksa*. So this second alternative tallies with the common view. In this alternative, it has been suggested that the desire to relate the objects denoted by the words constituting a sentence is *ākāṁkṣā*. The sentence-*ghaṭaḥ asti* (The jar exists) is constituted of four words – *ghaṭa*, *su*, *as* and *tip*. The will cognise (the relation among) the four objects referred to by these four terms and grasped via memory is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case. These words, which constitute a sentence, should have a certain order and when we desire to relate different referents of these terms we have to maintain the order. Otherwise improperly ordered terms would claim to constitute a meaningful sentence, if we desire so, e.g., *ghaṭa*, *tip*, *as*, *su*.

Let us consider the sentence – “The jar is blue”. If we want to have verbal cognition from this combination, we have to accept that first of all the referents of these words would be remembered by us and then if we can establish a relation among these objects, we would be able to have verbal cognition. Suppose the objects are presented to us not by the knowledge of *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*, that is, by *ṛttijñāna*, but by some other way. For example by the relation of being present at the same time (*samakālīnatva*). Would we say that this is another condition for producing verbal cognition? This is not the intention of the Nyāya philosophers. Because the Naiyāyikas think that in the case of verbal cognition the referents must be present via *ṛttijñāna*. So we must include the factor of *ṛttijñāna* in the definition of *ākāṁkṣā*. The revised definition would be as follows “The will to have the cognition of relating the objects referred to via *ṛttijñāna* by different words constituting a sentence producing verbal cognition is *ākāṁkṣā*”. Even if we accept this definition, we would not be able to avoid difficulties. Let us consider a sentence from the Vedas – The sacrifice called Viśvajit should be performed (*viśvajitā yajeta*). What is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case? *Ākāṁkṣā* is the will to have the cognition of the relation among the objects referred to by different words of the above sentence via *ṛtti*. But only that does not satisfy our will. We would be eager to know as to who would be the performer of the rite. The answer will be – “one who is eager to attain *svarga*”. This is not indicated by any word of the sentence. So this object is not presented by *ṛttijñāna*, though this feature in the verbal cognition under consideration. Therefore, we have to abandon the former formulation of *ākāṁkṣā*. To reformulate the definition, we should say that not the will, but the capability of having the will to have the cognition of the relation among the objects, etc., should be regarded as *ākāṁkṣā*. How does this capability originate? Whenever we have a prior absence of the verbal cognition, we can say that we have the

capability of having the will. This also is not sufficient. We would try to elaborate it more clearly. Whenever the speaker has the prior absence of a piece of verbal cognition produced by the pronunciation of particular words constituting the sentence generating the verbal knowledge, the speaker has the said capability or *yogyatā*. It may be asked why we have inserted the fact of *pronunciation*. It is relevant because otherwise we cannot explain the following case. We may have verbal cognition from a particular set of words. If that particular set is pronounced again, we should have verbal cognition. But according to the definition adopted by us, *ākāṁkṣā* would be absent in that case and verbal cognition would not be generated. *Ākāṁkṣā* would be absent because here there is not the prior absence of that verbal cognition as it has already been generated. So each time we should put emphasis on the *pronunciation* of the particular words. The *pronunciation* of the first time is not the same as the *pronunciation* of the second time. From the standpoint of type it may be the same. So, the second piece of verbal cognition can be generated. But there arises a difficulty. If *pronunciation* is of that importance then what about *maunīśloka*-s i.e. the verses which are read silently without any pronunciation? Should we not take *maunīśloka*-s to be generating verbal cognition? In fact 'pronunciation of the set of words' means knowledge of that particular sentence. It is present in the case of *maunīśloka*-s. So there is *ākāṁkṣā* and there can be verbal cognition from the *maunīśloka*-s.

Now, suppose there is a false cognition about *yogyatā* and we have a piece of verbal cognition from *ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṁ* amounting to the fact that *ghaṭa* is identical with *karmatva*. So this piece of cognition is not illusory. Can we regard the prior absence of this verbal cognition to be the *ākāṁkṣā* in the case of *ghaṭam*? This, however, cannot be

accepted. We should follow the rule that the prior absence of that verbal cognition which is intended, is *ākāṃkṣā*.

Why are we considering the prior absence without taking into consideration the generic absence? If we take generic absence, there will be some problems. Suppose there is a sentence constituted by the words 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd' etc. In order to have verbal cognition from this, first of all the referent of 'a' would be related with the referent of 'b'. Then the referent of 'b' would be related with the referent of 'c' and so on. We would get a complete verbal cognition from the total sentence by summing up the partial cognition. When we have the verbal cognition from the whole sentence, there is not the generic absence of the verbal cognition generated by the whole sentence, because partially the verbal cognition is present before hand. But there is the prior absence of the said verbal cognition.

Again, if we take generic absence seriously, another problem would crop up. There may be the case when the speaker has the intention that let there be the same verbal cognition twice: some difficulty will crop up in the second case. There will not be the generic absence of the verbal cognition though there will be the prior absence of the second verbal cognition. Generation of this piece of verbal cognition is called the absentee (*pratiyogī*) of the prior absence. The prior absence differs depending on the absentee i.e., *pratiyogī*. In the case of generic absence only one absentee (*pratiyogī*) is sufficient to negate this. This is not so in the case of prior absence.

Those, who insist that the prior absence of verbal cognition should be taken into account, can put forward another argument. The generic absence of verbal cognition can reside in self or *ātmā*. Now, cognition does not pervade the self. When the self is attached with a

body, cognition can reside in the self. But if we think this self to be attached with a jar or cloth, then it can be said that the generic negation of the cognition resides in the self. Through this sort of generic absence same verbal cognition can be thought to be generated repeatedly as there always will be the generic negation. This situation cannot be tolerated. So we cannot take any generic absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*.

It is maintained by some that this objection regarding the repeated verbal cognitions is not a genuine one. We all know that *śabda* is a cause of verbal cognition. As this *śabda* is impermanent having duration of two moments (*dvikṣaṇasthāyī*) according to Nyāya philosophers this can act as the cause in the first case of verbal cognition, but will not act as the cause for the second or the third instance of verbal cognition, as it would be destroyed by that time. In reply to this it is suggested that the *śabda* as such does not act as the cause of verbal cognition. But the cognition of the referent signified by the *śabda* is the cause of verbal cognition. This is the cause for the first case of verbal cognition. This acts as the cause for the second case of verbal cognition also. Again the cognition of the referents of the words constituting the sentence generating the second verbal cognition acts as the cause for the third case of verbal cognition and so on. This solution, however, invites a problem. If the former process continues, then there will be unending repeated verbal cognition. Can this be accepted? The reply is that as long as our mind is not diverted to a different subject of whom we are not occupied by sleep, disease, etc., there can be repeated verbal cognition. As soon as any of the former factors appears, it acts as an obstacle for the generation of verbal cognition and verbal cognition is not produced again. If we think that the first case of verbal cognition is produced, then we are to take it for

granted that before the generation of this cognition there was its prior absence. Similarly if the second verbal cognition is originated, we have to think that there must have been its prior absence before its generation. But if we know that the third verbal cognition is not produced at all, then the case is otherwise.

Now, if we take the prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*, then an objection may be raised regarding the following sentence, *vimalaṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣah carati* (How clear is the water of the river / The buffalo is grazing on the bank). When uttering the sentence the speaker intends that *nadī* (river) should be related to *jala* (water). We have to think of the verbal cognition in that form. Again, where the speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *kaccha* (bank), the form of our verbal cognition becomes different. If we consider the prior negation of the verbal cognition to be *ākāṁksā*, then we may imagine a case where we have prior absence of the verbal cognition indicating the fact that *nadī* is related with *kaccha* and consequently verbal cognition of that form would follow although the speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *jala*. This problem may be solved by indicating the fact that everywhere the intention of the speaker should be taken as one of the causes of verbal cognition. Where the speaker does not intend that *nadī* would be related with *kaccha* we couldn't have verbal cognition of that form, even if other causal factors are present. The clause 'prior absence of the verbal cognition' can be analysed in the following way — 'prior absence of the verbal cognition generated by the pronunciation of a certain set of words'. Let us take the following example — *ghaṭah karmatvaṁ ānayaṇaṁ kṛti*. We all know that if the naming words constituting a sentence have the same case ending, then the relation of identity relates the referents of the words. So if we consider the above

sentence, then we can say that the referent of the word *ghaṭa* is related with the referent of the word *karmatva* by the relation of identity, provided we have false cognition about *yogyatā*. But we can never have the cognition that *ghaṭa* is the object of the verb of bringing from this sentence, as one of its causes, viz. *ākāṁkṣā* is absent here. In this sense the contention of the above words is said to be devoid of *ākāṁkṣā* or it is *nirākāṁkṣā*. It is claimed that if any cognition be generated from the above combination of words, then the set cannot be said to be *nirākāṁkṣā*, as *ākāṁkṣā* is nothing but the prior absence of the verbal cognition. Now if we think that there can be no verbal cognition from the above set of words, then the notion of prior negation of that verbal cognition, viz. *ākāṁkṣā*, and the notion of the absence of the prior absence of that verbal cognition, viz. *nirākāṁkṣā* are devoid of facthood. So we cannot claim that above case to be *nirākāṁkṣā* at all.

Another objection has been raised here by the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. In the sentence-*vimalaṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ, kacche mahiṣa carati*. The speaker intends that *nadī* should be related with *jala* and *kaccha* would be construed with *mahiṣa*. If it is a case that there are two listeners, one of them does not hear the whole sentence. Let us suppose that he does not hear the part *vimalaṁ jalaṁ*. The second listener has got auditory perception of the whole sentence. For the first listener, there is the prior absence of the verbal cognition expressing the fact that *nadī* and *kaccha* should be related. The second listener, however, has the verbal cognition depicting the fact that the *nadī* is related with *jala* and *kaccha* is related with *mahiṣa*. But both the first listener and the second one have verbal cognition from the same sentence and as such the prior absence present for the first listener is also there for the second. And an objection may be raised that let us suppose that because of the first prior absence, both the listeners have

verbal cognition expressing the fact that *nadī* is related with *kaccha*. This type of situation may arise in some other circumstances when the listeners has the false cognition about the intention of the speaker, or when the listener is deceived by the context that determines the intention of the speaker. This problem, however, cannot be solved. Therefore, this sort of prior absence cannot be treated as the cause of verbal cognition. But we regard *ākāṁkṣā* to be the cause of verbal cognition. Therefore *ākāṁkṣā* cannot be understand in terms of this sort of prior absence.

Actually the prior absence of verbal cognition has been introduced as a cause of verbal cognition just to avoid the unpleasant consequences resulting from repetitive verbal cognition. The Nyāya philosophers, however, hold that the prior absence of each and every effect is the cause of that particular effect as per the definition – *Kāryaṁ pāgabhāvapratiyogi*. If we regard prior absence of any effect to be cause of that effect, then it is a common precondition for all the effects and cannot be treated as a special (instrumental) cause of verbal cognition only. If *ākāṁkṣā* is nothing but a kind of prior absence, then another difficulty will also crop up. There are certain terms, which cannot be used singly. These terms always refer to some other terms in order to be intelligible. These are called *svasambandhika* or related terms, for example – ‘wife’, ‘slave’. Etc. Whenever we use the term ‘wife’, immediately the question arises – ‘whose wife’? Whenever we use the term ‘salve’, immediately the question arises – whose salve? *Ākāṁkṣā*, present in these cases is called *utthitākāṁkṣā*, i.e., the *ākāṁkṣā* that has already been evoked. Again, there are some other cases where we call this *ākāṁkṣā* to be *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*, i.e., the *ākāṁkṣā* that may be evoked, e.g. let us take the sentence – “there is water in the pond” (*sarovare jalam vidyate*). A question may be raised



– what is there in the water? (*jale kim vidyate*), Answer – ‘lotuses’. Again another question may be raised – what is there in the lotuses (*padme kim vidyate*)? The answer is – ‘bees’. Even if this type of questions are not raised, the original sentence, i.e., “there is water in the pond” does not cease to be intelligible. *Ākāṁkṣā* present in the case of this type of sentences is called *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*. If we regard prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*, we cannot make any distinction between *utthitākāṁkṣā* and *utthāpyākāṁkṣā*. Because in both the cases the nature of prior absence would remain unchanged. Therefore, we should not regard prior absence of verbal cognition to be *ākāṁkṣā*.

Let us now deal with another view regarding the nature of *ākāṁkṣā*. Sondada, (a Nyāya philosopher, who is a predecessor of Gaṅgeśa) is the propounder of this position. It is questionable whether according to this view *ākāṁkṣā* is purely *ātmagata*. We shall try explain this view with an example. Let us suppose that here is a sentence – “The pot is blue” (*nīlah ghaṭaḥ*). If we utter only ‘blue’, a question will be raised – “what is blue”? In this case we will have a notion of blue from the word ‘blue’. So, the object blue here is the object of cognition. It has become the object of cognition because the cause for it, i.e., the utterance of the word ‘blue’ is present here. This object, ‘blue’ is called *jñāpya* (indicated). In the case under consideration (*nīlah ghaṭaḥ*) there is the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to have cognition about the relationship of what is the object of cognition (i.e. *jñāpya*, here it is blue) and what has not yet become the object of cognition, i.e., which is different from the object of cognition (*jñāpyetara*, here it is pot). Now, according to Sonadada, whenever this sort of situation occurs along with the non-occurrence of the verbal cognition intended by the speaker, there is *ākāṁkṣā*. These two conditions are present

when there is the utterance of only 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*). So there is *ākāṁkṣā* in this case. According to the former explanation *nīla* is the object of cognition and *ghaṭa* is the object, which is different from the object of cognition. A difficulty crops up here – can we really regard *ghaṭa* to be different from *nīla* as according to the Nyāya explanation, there is the relation of identity between *nīla* and *ghaṭa*? Some later Naiyāyikas raised this difficulty. It may be suggested that from the explanation of *ākāṁkṣā*, as given by Sonadada, explicit indication of the object of cognition and object different from the object of cognition should be eliminated. Instead, it should be stated that we want to have the notion of the relation between the referents or simply between the objects. Now, do we always want to know or do we always have the desire to know the relation between the objects or does it sometimes come naturally to us even if we do not have the desire? It sometimes really happens so that we do not have the desire. Then what would be the fate of the explanation as given by Sonadada? The answer is that even if there may be no actual desire, there is always the scope or the possibility for having the desire.

It may, however, be suggested that there is no necessity of bringing in the factor of desire or the scope or possibility of desire as a separate condition. Can we not say that whenever the verbal cognition desired by the speaker is not generated, there is *ākāṁkṣā*? This suggestion cannot be accepted. Suppose a speaker in order to communicate *Ghaṭam ānaya* or "bring the pot", by mistake utters the words *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛti*, *ghaṭam* is a combination of *ghaṭa* and *am*. *Am* indicates *karmatva*. *Ānaya* is a combination of a *dhātu* indicating *ānaya* and a *dhātu-vibhakti* indicating *kṛti*. Hence, someone instead of uttering *ghaṭam ānaya*, by mistake can utter *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛti*. If we accept the above suggestion

then we must admit that  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}m\check{s}\bar{a}$  should be present in the case of this combination of words. To avoid this sort of difficulty, we must say that along with the non-origination of verbal cognition, there should be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relationship between what has become the object of cognition and what has not become the object of cognition. Let us suppose a speaker utters the word  $gha\check{t}a\check{m}$ . It comprises of two words  $gha\check{t}a$  and  $a\check{m}$ . The term  $gha\check{t}a$  indicates a sort of locus-hood residing in  $gha\check{t}a$  and  $a\check{m}$  indicates the object of action. So the utterance  $gha\check{t}a\check{m}$  indicates the  $gha\check{t}a$  is the object of action. If there is only the word  $gha\check{t}a\check{m}$ , then there would be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relation between the referent of  $gha\check{t}a\check{m}$  which is a locus of something and some other referent which has not yet become the object of cognition (here it may be the referent as indicated by  $\bar{a}naya$ ). But when there is the combination  $gha\check{t}a\check{h}, karmatva\check{m}$ , etc.  $gha\check{t}a\check{h}$  does not refer to  $gha\check{t}a$  as a locus of something. Therefore, the former cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire of cognition is not present in the second case and the verbal cognition resulting from  $gha\check{t}a\check{m} \bar{a}naya$  and the verbal cognition resulting from  $gha\check{t}a\check{h} karmatva\check{m} \bar{a}naya\check{m} k\check{r}ti$  cannot be regarded as the same. At this point another question may be raised. If the phrase 'cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognize the relation between the object of cognition and which is not the object of cognition is so important, why should we not regard this to be  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}m\check{s}\bar{a}$ ? Why should we add the condition that there should be the non-origination of the verbal cognition as intended by the speaker? We should better drop it. Now, let us consider a sentence:  $any\check{m}eti\ pu\check{t}ra\check{h} \bar{r}\bar{a}j\check{n}\bar{a}\check{h} pu\check{r}\check{u}\check{s}a\check{h} apa\check{s}\bar{a}rya\check{t}\bar{a}\check{m}$ , there may be two types of verbal cognition from this.

1) *Rājapuruṣa* is coming. Drive away the *putras*.

2) *Rājaputra* is coming. Drive away the *puruṣa*.

It is well known that a single person cannot have these two cognitions at the same time. But if we consider the 'Cause etc.' to be *ākāṁkṣā* then one would have two cognitions at a time, which is absurd. To avoid this situation, the condition that there should be non-origination of the verbal cognition as intended by the speaker, should be added. Each time, a single verbal cognition would be originated depending on the intention of the speaker.

Now, some thinkers may not agree with the opinion of Sondada. It may be interpreted that, when Sondada deals with the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya*, he says that from the term *ghaṭa* we should have the reference, i.e., *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. It may be said that there is no such stipulation that we should refer to *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. Therefore, we should reject *ghaṭa* as a locus of something. Therefore, we should reject the opinion of Sondada. Moreover, according to Sondada, when *ghaṭam* is pronounced, it can act as a cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the desire to cognise that object which has not yet become the object of cognition. But how can we be aware that *ghaṭa* and *am* (which we get by analyzing *ghaṭam*) possess *ākāṁkṣā*? If it is suggested that *ghaṭa* would be apprehended as such, then we have to grant that *ghaṭa* can be the cause of the memory of the referent favourable to the will, which indicates that *ghaṭa* should be related with *katṛtva* (not signified by *am*) and not with *karmatva*. That is, *ākāṁkṣā* in this case may be of the above sort. If that be the case, then why should we not take the combination of words, *ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṁ ānayanam kṛti* to be possessing *ākāṁkṣā* and generating *śābdabodha* as *ghaṭam ānayati*?

It is accepted that this combination does not generate *śābdabodha* as *ghaṭaṃ ānayaṭi*. But if we agree with Sondada, we would have to admit the reverse. Hence, Sondada's view cannot be accepted.

After rejecting various views about *ākāṃkṣā*, Gaṅgeśa proceeds to give a view about *ākāṃkṣā* in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. According to Gaṅgeśa, *ākāṃkṣā* is nothing but *abhidhānaparyabasanam* i.e., the speaker intends to speak something. Sometimes it happens that this desire is not fulfilled because there is absence of some factor for generating verbal cognition.<sup>(7)</sup> This factor is called *ākāṃkṣā*. Suppose there is a sentence, *ghaṭaḥ asti*. If the speaker pronounces only *ghaṭaḥ* then the listener feels that *something more* is to be pronounced if the speaker intends to utter a whole sentence, which would generate verbal cognition. Now, we can say that this *something more* has *ākāṃkṣā* with formerly pronounced term, i.e., *ghaṭaḥ*. In this sentence *ghaṭaḥ asti* it can be said that the term *asti* has *ākāṃkṣā* with *ghaṭaḥ*. If we want to analyze the case more minutely, then we should say that the term *ghaṭaḥ* is a combination of *ghaṭa* and *su*. And between these two terms there is *ākāṃkṣā*. Similarly the term *asti* is a combination of *as* and *ti*, hence *ti* has *ākāṃkṣā* with *as*. There are certain case endings in Sanskrit grammar and language, which are to be related with name-words, and there are some other case endings, which are to be related with verb-roots. The first type of case endings is called *śābdavibhakti* whereas the second type of case endings is called *dhātuvibhakti*. If the *śābdavibhakti* is not joined with name-words, then it cannot generate any verbal cognition. Similarly, if the *dhātuvibhakti* is not joined with verb-roots, then it cannot produce verbal cognition. In the former example, the name-word *ghaṭa* is immediately followed by *śābdavibhakti* *su*. Therefore *su* is related with *ghaṭa* in the relation of

immediate precedence and *ghaṭa* is related with *su* in the relation of immediate succession ; this is *ākāṁkṣā*.

## **Yogyatā**

*Yogyatā* is the second condition of verbal knowledge. It is also described as mutual fitness. According to *Tarkasamgraha* "*Arthabādhoyogyatā*". That means – the absence of incompatibility among what is signified by the several words of a statement is *yogyatā*<sup>(8)</sup>. The author of the title *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Viśvanātha has discussed the nature of *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā* etc. In his view, *yogyatā* is a system of words with mutual fitness (*Ekapadārthe aparapadarthasamandha yogyatā*).<sup>(9)</sup> The realization of meaning of a sentence cannot be achieved in absence of the knowledge of *yogyatā*. When a sentence has a *yogyatā* it can be considered that there is no contradiction between the meaning of the constituent words forming that sentence.

To explain the *yogyatā* more clearly we may say that verbal knowledge can never be produced from a sentence unless the objects denoted by the different terms of the sentence have the capability of getting related. For example, if I utter a sentence – "bring water" it can produce verbal knowledge, because the action of bringing (signified the term 'bring') and water (signified by the term 'water') can be related. But if I utter the sentence, "bring the moon", it cannot produced verbal knowledge proper, because the action of bringing (signified by the word 'bring') can never get related with moon (signified by the word 'moon'), because it is not possible for a man to accomplish it through his effort (*kṛtisādhya*). Someone may, however, question whether bringing the moon is logically impossible, though it is factually impossible. For them, let us cite another example, where it is logically impossible to relate the objects denoted by different words – "he is watering with fire". It cannot

be a source of true knowledge; for 'watering' (of some ground) means 'sprinkling' with a liquid called 'water' and such sprinkling is not possible with 'fire'. *Yogyatā*, or more specifically, the cognition of *yogyatā* is thus a requirement for verbal knowledge.

It may be objected that, the cognition of *yogyatā* cannot be a precondition for verbal knowledge. Because the cognition of the relation between the objects signified by different words of a sentence is quite uncertain before the verbal knowledge is produced. The Nyāya philosophers, however, would not agree with this. According to them, when an individual remembers the objects signified by different words of a sentence, he can have the cognition of the relation between the objects in two ways. Where the objects are not present perceptually, the cognition of the relation between them comes in the form of doubt and where the objects are present perceptually, the cognition of the relation between them has the element of certainty in it, i.e., there is a definite knowledge of the relation.

Though the traditional Nyāya philosophers consider the cognition of *yogyatā* to be a necessary requirement of verbal knowledge, it is very interesting to note that the Neo-Nyāya philosophers oppose this view. They hold that the cognition of *yogyatā* is not to be considered as a necessary precondition of verbal knowledge, because it is redundant. To understand their position, we would have to analyze the very concept of 'cause'. What is a cause? Generally, it is accepted that a cause is an immediate, indispensable, unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect. This antecedent may be understood from two points – the positive and the negative. There are certain conditions, the presence of which is necessary for the production of the effect. This is the positive aspect. And there are certain other conditions, the absence of which is required for the

production of the effect. This is the negative aspect. Let us consider a situation when I see a flower. The production of this effect requires that among other conditions I should have clear eyesight and also that there is not the absence of light when I see the flower. The absence of light acts as an obstacle for the production of the effect. The absence of obstacle is also necessary for the production of the effect. And this is the negative condition. Now let us come back to the Neo-Nyāya philosophers' view regarding *yogyatā*. They think that *yogyatā* is not to be considered as a separate cause for verbal knowledge, because the concept of the absence of the obstacle is enough to explain away the concept of *yogyatā*. The question is – how? Let us take the former instance – “he is watering with fire”. The Neo-Nyāya philosophers would say that we have the knowledge that the fire has the incapability of sprinkling water. This acts as the obstacle. The absence of this obstacle is necessary for the production of the knowledge. If that were so, we require no separate positive precondition like *yogyatā* in the case of verbal knowledge. The grammarians also hold that the factor of *yogyatā* is insignificant in the generation of verbal cognition. *Yogyatā* can very well be dispensed with. Nāgoji Bhatta contends that in such sentences as, “there goes the barren woman’s son with a chaplet of sky-flowers on his head. He has bathed himself in the waters of a mirage and is holding a bow of rabbit’s horn”, we are fully aware of the relation though the knowledge of the absurdity of such relations is immediately present before our mind. “Can we honestly disclaim our cognition of judgmental thoughts despite the physical impossibility of the relations between the concepts denoted by the constituent terms? Certainly not. Their prepositional character must be admitted if we are true to our experience, if for nothing else. According to the Naiyāyikas, the words, “he is sprinkling the flowers with fire” would be nonsensical because of the physical impossibility of the relation between the two



concepts – viz., sprinkling and fire. But such a position is psychologically unjustifiable, argues Nagoji Bhatta. For, whenever we hear someone speaking the words, “Sprinkle with fire” we invariably ridicule the speaker thereof and accost him with the remark: “How is it possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance?” Had the words referred to above been completely nonsensical signifying nothing but themselves, such remarks would have been impossible. Silence would have been more proper than such sarcastic comments, just as a northerner is apt to be silent when he hears the words of a stranger hailing from the land of the Dravidas, even though the latter might express the self-same idea, physically impossible as it is, in his own language. What more, the adoption of the Naiyāyika viewpoint would render all philosophical disquisitions *ipso facto* absurd and impracticable? In all serious disputes two or more disputants take part, each representing the views of the school to which it is affiliated. For instance, in a discussion about the category of ‘sound’ (*śabda*), the Mīmāṃsakas would uphold its ubiquity and eternity while the heterodox Buddhists would maintain its transitoriness consistently with their peculiar doctrine of universal flux. Consequently, the views of one disputant would be absolutely repugnant to the other. But if the validity of the Naiyāyika thesis be acknowledged, the arguments of the Buddhist in favour of the impermanence of sound would be absolutely nonsensical, may unintelligible abracadabra, in view of the syntactical impossibility of the component concepts from the Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint and vice versa. This would lead to an insoluble deadlock”. Now, the Naiyāyikas might contend that though in the absence of ‘syntactical possibility’ there might be non-cognition of the relational thought from a particular group of words, yet there is nothing to prevent the comprehension of the discrete and isolated concepts *per se* in

succession, so that the apprehension of a total collapse of philosophical disputes becomes irrelevant.

Again admitting that such groups of words as, “sprinkle with fire” constitute valid propositions and are capable of generating the final relational cognitions even though deficient in respect of *yogyatā*, why is it that those cognitions are not followed by corresponding pragmatic activities as is usually the case with propositions that satisfy the requirement of *yogyatā*? The grammarians’ answer to this contention would be as follows: The opponents’ criticism of our position is altogether irrelevant as it is based on a confusion of two totally divergent issues. The Naiyāyika uncritically enough confounds it with the issue of *objective validity* of propositions. These two issues must always be kept apart and studied separately. The Nyāya philosophers can answer that when they discuss the pre-conditions of the generation of verbal knowledge they cannot just ignore the fact of objective validity.

### ***Sannidhi or āsatti***

According to Annambhaṭṭa, *sannidhi* is the utterance without delay of the several terms that constitute a statement. If we take a statement like, “ a horse is a quadruped animal”, uttered in a normal manner i.e., the several words uttered without any undue time-gap them, then we can say that this combination of words has *sannidhi*. It would obviously be a source of knowledge because it satisfies the condition of *sannidhi*. The same words, however, uttered at long intervals of time, say of one minute (a horse..... is a ..... a quadruped) will not be a source of any verbal cognition because of the absence of the required *sannidhi*. In *Tarkasamgrahadipika* Annambhaṭṭa explains that the word *sannidhi* is

to be understood not really as the utterance of words without delay but rather the presentation without delay to the mind of what is signified by the words of a statement. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* he has spoken of utterance (*uccāraṇa*) only because such utterance without delay of certain words has usually been in the presentation without delay of what is signified by those words. This explanation is quite sufficient to understand the nature of *sannidhi*. But in *Bhāṣāpariccheda* it is maintained that whenever there is closeness or proximity among the terms used in a sentence there is *āsatti* or *sannidhi*. In the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Viśvanātha tries to elucidate the criterion of *āsatti*. We all know that verbal knowledge is produced by meaningful sentences, i.e., if the reference of the terms used in a sentence are related with one another, then and only then, verbal knowledge is possible. This can happen only if the referring expressions, i.e., the terms have no gap between them and the cogniser or the knower has cognition about that. It may be objected that sometimes the terms are so arranged that the consecutive terms produce meaning, though the speaker does not intend that. Particularly, in the case of the Sanskrit language, we find many such instances. "The cloth and the jar are blue and substance (respectively) (*nīlo ghato dravyam patah*). It is not the case that 'the cloth' and 'blue' have no gap between them. But we may have proper verbal knowledge regarding the cloth. So this counter-example proves that there is no necessity for the condition called *sannidhi* as defined in *Bhāṣāpariccheda*. In the *Muktāvalī*, however, it is said that in the case of *nīlo ghato dravyam patah* it may be arranged in such a way that the hearer have some invalid cognition about the gap between the terms. In fact, as we find that the proximity of the terms is not always necessary for the verbal cognition, we can say that the presentation without delay of the reference, which is intended to be related by the speaker, is the necessary precondition for verbal cognition.

It may be argued that the syntactical contiguity need not be considered as an essential precondition for verbal cognition. To those of quick intelligence it is absolutely superfluous. The absence of contiguity can at best delay the comprehension of the required judgment, but it cannot check it altogether, just as we comprehended relational ideas from a verse where the concepts intended to be brought into relation are mostly separated by intervening words that do not directly stand to any such relation? Just as a mob, when it is about to enter a royal city through a narrow gateway, must arrange itself into an ordered line, so too concepts even though expressed by words jumbled up together without any syntactical contiguity, relate themselves with one another. This explanation is not too strong to combat the position of the Nyāya philosophers that the apparent non-proximity is bridged with the help of memory and the impression left by it. Hence there is the necessity of *āsatti*.

### ***Tātparya***

The meaning of a sentence can be considered from two points of view – from the speaker's point of view and from the listener's point of view. The general Western approach has been from the speaker's point of view. But the Indian approach has been mainly from the listener's point of view. According to the Nyāya philosophers, apart from *sannidhi*, *yogyatā* and *ākāṁkṣā*, the factor of the speaker's intention or *tātparya* should be taken into account.

In Indian Philosophy of language *tātparya* is a technical term. The term *tātparya* is a noun and it indicates the intended meaning, which is conveyed by a sentence either in a written form or in a spoken form. A wing of the Naiyāyikas consider *tātparya* or a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker as a criteria that is

compulsory for any kind of verbal comprehension. This is why they have placed *tātparya* in the same group of criteria consisting of *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti* that are essential for all verbal comprehension. But others do not accept speakers intention as a direct factor rather they want to include *tātparya* in *ākāṃkṣā* itself. Moreover, they prefer to take into consideration the role of *tātparya* in understanding *āsatti* completely. It is Gaṅgeśa the father of the Navya-Nyāya and Viśvanātha who have considered *tātparya* as a fourth necessary condition.

The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention (*Tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning (*Lakṣaṇā*). To them non-realisation of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e. implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term, *gaṅgā* as found in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is 'the bank of the *gaṅgā*'. The primary meaning of the term *ghoṣaḥ* and *gaṅgā* are *ghoṣapalli* and a particular flow of water (*Jalpravāha-viśeṣa*) respectively. The milkman-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is non-realisation of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them. This can be removed, if the bank of the *gaṅgā* is taken as the meaning of the term *gaṅgā* through *lakṣaṇā*.

Now what is to be understood by the term *tātparya*?<sup>(10)</sup> The desire of the speaker (*vakturicchā*) is *tātparya*. In other words, it has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātparya* (*tātpratiticchayā uccaritatvaṃ*).<sup>(11)</sup> When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātparya*. The term *uccaritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons

there is *tātparya* in spite of not having utterance of the same. Hence, it is better to accept the former definition (i.e. intention of the speaker is *tātparya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.<sup>(12)</sup>

The non-realisation of *tātparya* but not of relation (*anvaya*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. This point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence, '*kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*' (i.e., protect the curd from crow etc.) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. In order to incorporate all types of *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realisation in respect of *tātparya* is *lakṣaṇa* but not otherwise.

Let us see the role of *tātparya* in determining the meaning of an ambiguous sentence having various meanings. If someone utters the sentence *saindhavaṁ ānaya*, it may mean the bringing of a horse of salt. The exact meaning of the term *saindhava* is to be determined according to the intention of the speaker uttered under a particular context.<sup>(13)</sup> That is why, the knowledge of *tātparya* is taken to be the cause of verbal comprehension.

It can be said in reply that : in order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), space (*deśa*) etc. serve as promoters. If in the context of taking meal the term *saindhava* is uttered, it will mean salt. But if the context is otherwise (i.e. going to the battle-field), the same term would mean horse.<sup>(14)</sup> After hearing the sentence of the speaker uttered in a particular context, the hearer infers the intention in the following way. The term *saindhava* existing in the above mentioned sentence has got the *tātparya* in salt as it is so uttered in the context of talking meal (*etadvākyaghaṭaka-saindhavapadaṁ lavaṇatātparyayakam bhojanaprakaraṇe prayuktatvāt*). In the same way, the hearer infers the

*tātparya* of the same term as otherwise depending on a different context. In this way, the intention of the other person (i.e., the speaker) can be known through inference.<sup>(15)</sup>

Let us consider the intention of different sentence uttered in a different context. If a teacher asks his student to do something after uttering the word *dvāraṁ* (door) and pointing out to the door, the student may have confusion due to having multiple alternative such as either closing or opening the door. Let us think of a situation when the door remains closed and suddenly there is a power cut. The teacher utters the term 'door' to a particular student, which would likely imply the opening of the door as the context is in favour of this. If the situation is otherwise (i.e., the door is open), and suddenly a dusty storm comes and the teacher utters the some word 'door' which would refer under this circumstance to the closing of the door. Hence, a word can give its accurate meaning only if the proper context is known by the hearer. Hence, the role of intention of the speaker dependent on the context has also to be accepted as a fundamental basis of verbal comprehension.

Dinakara has analysed the concept in the context of non-ambiguous sentence. *Tātparya* is the intention of the speaker of conveying the sentences like 'Bring a jar' (*ghaṭam ānaya*) in which 'jar' has become a *prakāra* or qualifier, *karmatva* or the property of being an object attached to it has become a qualificand and superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) has become a relation. When there is the awareness of the sentence *ghaṭamānaya*, there is the knowledge of a jar, *karmatva* as denoted by the word *ghaṭam* and as this, being a property, remains in the substance *ghaṭa*. Here the jar is the substratum and *karmatva* is the superstratum. This is the nature of awareness (*pratīti*) which is the intention of the speaker.<sup>(16)</sup> When a particular sentence is uttered in

order to convey a particular intention, the knowledge of such intention of the speaker is the cause of verbal comprehension.<sup>(17)</sup>

Rāmarudra further raises a different problem. To him ambiguity is of two types: ambiguity involved in the sentences like *Saindhavamānya* etc., and as involved in *ghaṭamānaya paṭamānaya* etc; It may be argued that the intention of the speaker is very difficult to understand if two sentences 'Bring a jar', 'Bring a cloth' are uttered simultaneously without the copula 'and'. For there are two intentions, which leads the hearer to the land of confusion about the real intention of the speaker.<sup>(18)</sup> In order to remove this problem it is said that the particular intention of the speaker behind the utterance of a particular sentence must be taken as the cause of verbal comprehension of it. If it is said *śveto dhāvati* (i.e., the white runs), the intention of the speaker may sometimes be known as the object bearing white colour runs or sometimes as 'the dog etc. run'.<sup>(19)</sup> Such an awareness of intention serves as the main factor for apprehending the meaning. If there is the doubt or confusion as to the intention of speaker or if there is the ascertainment of that which is not intended by the speaker, the verbal comprehension from the sentence is not at all possible. Hence, the knowledge of intention has to be taken as the cause of the same.<sup>(20)</sup>

Let us see how the intention of the vedic sentence and *Śukavākya* can be understood. Even the vedic statements contain some intention. God who is accepted as the agent of the Vedas is supposed to have such intention. God's knowledge of intention can be inferred as the cause of the verbal comprehension arising from the Vedic sentences. It may be argued that the knowledge of intention of the teacher should be taken as the causes of the said apprehension. This view is not tenable, because the knowledge of *tātparya* of the teacher cannot be the cause of the same due to the absence of him



before the initial creation. It may, again, be argued that if the dissolution is not accepted, the question of initial creation cannot be thought of. This position is also not sound, because the existence of dissolution is known from the Vedas and hence there is the initial creation.<sup>(21)</sup> In the same way, the Divine knowledge of *tātparya* can be said to be the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence uttered by a parrot without any intention of its own and revealing the true picture of reality (*saṁvādī*).<sup>(22)</sup> The knowledge of the intention of the trainer is the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which does not correspond to the reality (*visaṁvādatva*). For, the property of being non-correspondent to the reality (*visaṁvādatva*) lies on the intention of their trainer, but not on that of God, as in the intention of God *visamvaditva* is not possible.<sup>(23)</sup> Hence, the knowledge of *tātparya* existing in God cannot be the causes of verbal understanding of the *visaṁvādī* statements made by a parrot.<sup>(24)</sup> The term *saṁvādī* in this context has been introduced to convey that God's knowledge of intention becomes the cause of understanding the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which is *pramā*. If the parrot, on the other hand, utters the sentence *vahninā siñcati* (i.e., watering with fire), God's knowledge of intention cannot be the cause of the same, as God does not possess any intention which does not correspond to the reality (*visamvādicchā*). In order to exclude such sentences from the purview of the Divine intention the term *saṁvādī* is introduced.<sup>(25)</sup>

Generally, a speaker of the sentence is supposed to have a volition in favour of what is said in the sentence (*vākyānukūla*). As the Divine volition is working behind each and every effect, it becomes favourable to what is uttered by a parrot incidentally. As a parrot cannot

have intention of its own, there are no other alternatives than to accept Divine intention behind it.<sup>(26)</sup>

It may be argued that if context, etc, are taken as the causes of the potency of word, it (i.e., potency) should be taken as the cause of meaning and hence there is no necessity of accepting another distinct cause i.e. *tātparya*.

This view is not tenable. For, when a word or a sentence having double meaning is uttered, the intention of the speaker cannot be known due to having potency conveying two meanings, which leads to the impossibility of verbal understanding. Hence, the knowledge of the intention of the speaker has to be accepted as a determining factor in verbal understanding, which has been beautifully classified by Nāgeśa.<sup>(27)</sup> Moreover, for understanding a non-ambiguous sentence also the intention of the speaker plays a prominent role. It determines the potency of the word giving rise to sentence.

Let us consider some philosophical problems, which may arise in one's mind in this connection. First, human actions in the forms of inclination (*pravṛtti*) refraining from (*nivṛtti*) and being indifferent (*upekṣā*) are dependent on the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. If someone utters an ambiguous sentence *navakambalaṁ ānaya* (i.e., Bring *nava* blanket or blankets), no *pravṛtti* or inclination of the hearer is possible due to the non-understanding of intention of the speaker. In this case, it is not clearly known to us what the speaker intends to say by this sentence (i.e., wheather the speaker intends to have a new blanket or nine blankets denoted by the word '*nava*'), which leads us to the land of inactivity.

It may be argued that the intention or *tātparya* of the speaker may confuse others under certain circumstance. It may happen that the

speaker wants to hide his own intention by way of confusing others deliberately so that he does not face an undesired situation. At this stage, the concealing of his own intention may be treated as his own intention. In such cases the sentence cannot provide us with the proper understanding though the knowledge of the speaker's intention is known.

To reply, it can be said that if a speaker bears an intention to hide his own intention by using an ambiguous sentence, the sentence cannot give us an accurate non-ambiguous meaning. As the speaker's intention in adopting this method of confusing others is known to us, it falls under the category of *chala*. Unless it is known or detected, we cannot be successful in philosophical debate, which leads to highest good (*niḥśreyaas*) of seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) type. To understand the particular intention of the speaker in adopting *chala* has got a positive role in philosophical debate. The philosophical significance of the inclusion of *chala* under sixteen categories lies on the fact that a true debater should not adopt *chala* in his speech unnecessarily, and at the same time it is essential to detect the same in an opponent's speech. This detection of *chala* is also possible through the knowledge of intention of the speaker to confuse others. If the intention of the speaker is *tātparya*, it can be described as such and hence it is very much important in the field of philosophical discourse.

Secondly, the non-realisation of *tātparya* is the seed not only of *lakṣaṇā* but also of suggestive (*vyañjanā*) and metaphorical meaning as accepted by the rhetoricians. Moreover, *tātparya* is closely related or identical to *vivakṣā* (i.e., intention to convey something) of the speaker. In other words, it is the *vivakṣā* of the speaker which is the *tātparya* of the sentence uttered by him. A sentence which is non-sensical in a particular context may seem to be significant in another

context depending on the *vivaksa* of the speaker. A word or sentence may seem to be significant if the speaker wants to signify something by uttering this. This desire of signifying (*vivakṣā*) is the *tātparya* of the sentence. Even the sentence signifying identity (e.g. 'London is London' or 'Bombay is Bombay') may seem to be non-sensical apparently, but somehow this usage finds justification if the speaker wants to signify the incomparability of the cities like London or Bombay through this. If this *vivakṣā* is taken into account, this sentence will certainly bear *tātparya*.

Though Raghunath does not accept the absence of the absurd entities like *śaśasṛṅgaṁ nāsti*, etc. (which is called *alīkapratiyogikābhāva*) as real absence, it is known from the ordinary experience that such usages provide us with some information. Though the direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) of this is not possible, these usages give some implicative meaning due to the *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning, which leads to exploration of some secondary meaning. Because it signifies something when it is used or uttered by someone secondarily on the strength of *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning. Raghunath's position is substantiated by assigning the following reason in favour of him. For understanding an absence the knowledge of the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is the precondition, which is not at all possible in the case of absurd entities like *śaśasṛṅga*, castle in the air etc. This view of Raghunatha, I believe, is acceptable so far as the direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) of the sentence is concerned. But it cannot be denied that these sentences convey us some sense which is available secondarily. Otherwise, these would not have been uttered by the speaker. The utterance of a particular sentence in a particular context by an individual presupposes some *vivakṣā* which is the intention. Considering the particular aspect Dharmakīrti has accepted

the importance of *vivakṣā* in determining the meaning of a word or a sentence in the following *kārika* :

*"vaktṛvyāpāraṇiṣaye so'rtho buddhau prakāśate  
prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanivandhanam."*<sup>(28)</sup>

That is, in the expression of a speaker the corresponding image appears in our awareness. It is constituted and evidenced by the words, but not by the meaning of the same. When someone says, 'I am building a castle in the air', the intention of the speaker is to convey to us some image about some absurd events through this sentence, and hence it is not at all non-sensical.

Thirdly, let us consider whether the intention of the speaker can be treated as a cause of verbal understanding only in the case of ambiguous sentences as advocated by a section of scholars. This view is not tenable. For though in an ambiguous sentence the intention of a speaker is to be known perfectly, it is also essential for a non-ambiguous sentence also. Otherwise how can a sentence be known as 'non-ambiguous' ? As the intention of the speaker is perfectly reflected in the language used by him, it is taken as a non-ambiguous one. When a sentence is uttered, the particular intention of a speaker is expressed there (through which he intends to convey something). Otherwise the utterance of a sentence would be of no use. Hence, the intention of the speaker cannot be denied in providing the sentence-meaning though it is true that the role of it is much more prominent in the case of an ambiguous sentence. The role of *tātparya* in non-ambiguous sentence like *ghaṭamānaya Paṭamānaya*, etc., has already been pointed out. The *saṁyoga*, distance, co-existence, etc., are taken as the indicators (*jñāpaka*) of a non-ambiguous sentence.

The above mentioned view can be substantiated from the standpoint of Jayanta. *Tātparya* is the knowledge which is endowed with the capability of expressing a particular comprehension (*tatpratīṭijānanayogyatva*). To him the words of a sentence can convey to us their distinct (non-related) meanings like iron-stakes and hence their construction or relation among them is not possible. These isolated meanings cannot be the meaning of a sentence as they are not related to each other. This relation is not possible through *abhidhāvṛtti*. Hence, *tātparyāvṛtti* has to be accepted as a connecting factor among the word-meanings. The power of *Abhidhā* lies on giving rise to primary meaning of a word (*śuddhapadārtha-visayinī*) while *tātparya* gives rise to connected meaning (*samsargaviṣayinī*).<sup>(29)</sup>

Lastly, it has already been accepted that God's intention is the cause of the *saṁvadi* sentence uttered by a parrot, as a parrot cannot have an intention of its own. This view again needs thorough review. As God is taken as a *Nimittakāraṇa* of all activities. His intention etc. would have to be taken as common cause to all activities, including our utterance of word or the utterance of sentence by a parrot. If God's intention is common causes to the *Samvādī śūkavākya*, it cannot be taken as an uncommon cause of verbal understanding. In fact, the sentences uttered by a parrot though valid bears no intention of its own, but on the other hand, it repeats that it imitates from others or trainer and *saṁvāḍakatva* is just a co-incident. If there is any intention at all, it is of others from which it has learnt and through it the intention of that person is reflected.

However, the answers suggested here in response to the problems raised are just forwarded to defend *Nyāya* position in some cases and to deviate from *Nyāya* position. In course of study we may come across various problems, which also need some focus. A

question may be raised : What is the exact distinction between *tātparya* and *vivakṣā* ? The former is defined as '*vaktuḥ icchā*' i.e., intention of the speaker while the latter as '*vaktumicchā*' i.e., 'intention to say'. There is a subtle distinction between these two formations on which the grammarians can highlight. Another problem may be raised : can an individual mean anything by any word if he bears a strong intention ? Certainly not. Otherwise there would not have been any law between a word and its denotation. The grammarians have said *vivakṣā* i.e., 'will to speak' as having restricted freedom of a speaker. It is metaphorically said that *vivakṣā* is a *kūlabadhū* (house-wife) having freedom within restriction, but not a *kulatā* (house-wife not adhering to family norms) who has unrestricted freedom which is called *svecchācara*. Would the intention of a speaker be of such type to *Nyāya* ? At last we may see some problems regarding language and its meaning which are due to the different set of presuppositions admitted by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians. As the latter believes in the theory of *Śabdabrahma*, there is not a single word which is meaningless. But so far as the *Navya Nyāya* view is concerned, a word would be meaningful if and only if it refers something which really exists in this world. Many problems concerning this would come up and a sincere effort would be made to suggest solutions of the same.

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# *Chapter – IV*

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## CHAPTER – IV

### **A critical evaluation of the concept of *tātparya* in other systems and defence of Navya Nyāya view.**

The view mentioned in earlier chapter of the grammarians that all words may refer to all objects or any word may refer to any word if there is the intention of the speaker is not acceptable due to the following reasons: First, if any word can refer to any object then there would have been deviation with regard to the relation between a particular word and a particular meaning. If the relation is vitiated, no one would rely on the usage of the word leading to the total non-reliability of the word meaning relationship. Under such circumstances the acceptance of language as *Pramāṇa* would have been at stake. Secondly, it is a common practice that a word stands for a particular object as evidenced from our daily behaviour or convention. The connection (*vrddha-vyavahāra*) has a prominent role in determining word-meaning relationship. If the above-mentioned view of the grammarians is taken for granted, it would go against the traditional linguistic behavioural pattern leading to the communication gap. Thirdly, the intention of the speaker (*tātparya*) must have some limit of its own. The intention may be not arbitrarily, but in accordance to some logic. If there is reason for using a particular word for referring a particular meaning, it must have some grounds or rational grounds. Moreover, the intention of the speaker must be communicable to the hearer. If it is not communicated to the hearer or wrongly

communicated, the hearer cannot get proper meaning. Hence it is very difficult to admit that any word can refer to any meaning.

Bhartṛhari has interpreted the term *arthapravṛttitattva* in another way too – *arthapravṛttitattvaṁ kiṁ tattvamartharūpakaraḥ pratyayātamā bāhyeṣu vastuṣu pratyastaḥ sa ca śābdanibandhanaḥ*<sup>(1)</sup> What is the principle factor of semantics? It is an ideational character of meaning which has no corresponding object in the outside world. Equivalent to the rabbit-horn or sky-flower so dear to the Indian thinkers, we come across mythical beasts in the West, e.g., the phoenix or the unicorn. Although these objects do not exist in the real world, they are not really 'nonsense', for they make some sense in some way. Bhartṛhari has recognized the idea of *aupacārikī sattā*,<sup>(2)</sup> or a kind of metaphorically imposed existence, which is not existent in the literal sense. Words like 'sky-flower' or 'rabbit-horn' etc. which have no corresponding reality still make sense. This intellectual meaning (*bauddha artha*) is pure sense, although there may not be a referent or external reality (*bāhya artha*).

This brings us to the concept of *vikalpa* or ideational meaning recognized by the Yoga philosophers. *Vikalpa* is defined as a sense which appears in the intellect from the knowledge of a certain word, but which may have no corresponding external reality.<sup>(3)</sup> The Grammarians too accept the ideational meaning. According to the rules of grammar, a *prātipadikārtha* normally takes on the first case-ending.<sup>(4)</sup> A *prātipadikārtha* is the sense that essentially appears in the intellect as soon as a *prātipadika* is uttered, and a *prātipadika* is a word which has a meaning, but is not a verbal root or a suffix.<sup>(5)</sup> So in a sentence as *śaśasṛṅgam nāsti* – "there is no rabbit-horn" – the word *śaśasṛṅga* takes on the first case-ending because it is a *prātipadika* and conveys a particular sense. But if we do not accept the idea of the ideational

meaning, then the word *śaśaśṛṅga* ceases to be a *prātipadika*, and hence cannot be used in a sentence. No word can be used in Sanskrit unless it is either declined or conjugated, i.e., has a normal suffix attached to it. Nāgeśa says that words like *bandhyāsuta* etc. have an intellectual meaning although they do not have a corresponding reality, hence they are *prātipadikas*.<sup>(6)</sup>

But in that case, what becomes of the word-meaning relationship? Sanskrit grammar claims that as word and meaning are eternal, so is their relationship constant.<sup>(7)</sup> If the meaning of a word varies according to the speaker's will, how can words make sense to anybody, in fact, how can language operate, if each one interprets each word in his or her own way? In Lewis Carroll's "Through the looking-glass", Humpty Dumpty tells Alice that he uses words to mean anything *he* wants. "The question is", said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things."

"The question is", said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master –that's all."<sup>(8)</sup>

We would be put to the same situation if the meaning of no word was fixed, and any speaker used any word to mean anything he or she liked. Bhartṛhari himself has clearly stated that the word-meaning relationship is as constant as the relationship of the sense-organ to the object of that sense. That is to say, the eye has a constant relationship with the object of sight. One cannot grasp a smell with the eye, or a sound with the nose. This constant relationship, beyond human effort, is provided between word and meaning.<sup>(9)</sup>

Does this mean that Bhartṛhari is contradicting himself? That is not so. The concept of *vivakṣā* is controlled by perennial social convention. Unless this were so, no word would convey the same

meaning to both the speaker and the hearer. So although the word-meaning relationship is 'constant', i.e., determined by social convention, the speaker's will has a great deal to do with its determination.<sup>(10)</sup> It is impossible for a word to convey a sense solely by the speaker's will, unless there is a conventional connection between the two –as impossible as it is for the eye to grasp a sound, or the ear a smell. Thus the grammarian belongs to the conventionalist school of thought.

There is no denying, however, that conveying one particular sense by a particular word is the prerogative of the speaker. This is made very clear by Bhartr̥hari in his discussion on the cases (*Sādhanaśamuddeśa*). He clearly states that the usages of cases depends on *buddhi* or intellect, which is nothing but the speaker's intellectual or ideational analysis,<sup>(11)</sup> or in other words, his intent – *vivakṣā* in fact. Following this tenet, we get instances like *asinā chinatti* –cuts with the sword –where the sword is intended by the speaker to be the instrumental case; *asiśchinatti taikṣṇyena* –the sword cuts with sharpness –where the sharpness of the sword is seen as the instrumental while the sword is seen to be the subject, in order to emphasise the sharpness of the sword; also *taikṣṇyaṁ chainatti svasāmarthyena* –sharpness cuts by its own power –where sharpness is perceived as both the instrument as well as the subject, in order to further emphasise the sharpness.<sup>(12)</sup>

Thus we may say *valāhākād vidyotate* –lightning flashes *from* the cloud, - where the lightning which is part of the cloud is perceived as different from it, and as coming out of it. We may say *valāhake vidyotate* –lightning flashes *in the* cloud –where the lightning, still perceived as different from the cloud, is seen as being located in it. We

may also say *valahako vidyotate* –the cloud flashes lighting –where the lightning is seen as non-different from the cloud.<sup>(13)</sup>

Whether an object will be intended as *Kāra* or not depends on one's intention. An object may not be intended as a *kāra* at all. A *kāra* of course, is related directly to the verb.<sup>(14)</sup> in the ablative case (*apādāna kāra*), the sense of ablative must be intended, as in *vrkṣāt paṇam patati* –the leaf falls from the tree. But if the ablative is not intended, we may also have *vrkṣasya paṇam patati* –the leaf of the tree falls. "Tree" has no direct relation to the verb here, and merely serves as an adjective qualifying 'leaf'. Hence it is not a *kāra*, and takes on the sixth case-ending in the sense of possession.<sup>(15)</sup> From this it follows that before Bhartrhari the importance of *vivakṣa* or speaker's intention had been admitted by Kātyāyana etc.

The above-mentioned view of the grammarians particularly of Bhartrhari cannot be taken into account in so far as Nyāya is concerned. The intention of the speaker for Nyāya cannot be such that the used word may refer to a fictitious entity in the external world. For this reason the entities like *bandhyāputra* (barren woman's son), *ākāsa kusuma* (sky-flower), *śaśa-śṛṅga* (hare's horn) etc. do not have any meaning, because they do not have any referents. To the Naiyāyikas there is no distinction between sense and reference. The grammarians will admit the meaning of the fictitious entities, because they mean something in the intellect of human being, though referents corresponding to them are not exist in the external world. In this connection we may recall Frege's theory of sense and reference and compare it with Indian Systems. So far as grammarians are concerned the above-mentioned words have got senses, though not referents, which are the meanings. The Nyāya, on the other hand, will admit that

they do not have any meaning because they do not have any referents. In fact, they do not believe in distinction of sense and reference.

Now I discuss the Fregean concepts of sense and reference and compares the same with the Nyāya concept of meaning (*artha*). An effort has been made to show that in Nyāya the distinction between sense and reference has not been maintained explicitly, which is followed by some critical and evaluative remarks.

To Frege the statement  $a=a$  is *apriori* and analytic which is called identity having uninformative nature. On the other hand, the statement  $a=b$  contains, if true, very valuable extension of our knowledge and hence it is not *apriori*, but informative in nature. Frege observes that, if a sign 'a' is distinguished from the sign 'b' only as an object but not as a sign, the cognitive value of  $a=a$  is equal to that of  $a=b$  if later is true. A difference can be found if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing designated. The expression  $a=b$  does not refer to the subject matter, but to its mode of designation.

What a sign designates is called meaning of the sign. The mode of presentation is the sense of the sign. The meaning of 'Morning Star' would be the same as that of 'Evening Star', but not the sense. Sign has a definite sense and a definite thing meant. Every grammatically well-formed expression known as a proper name always has a sense, but this does not mean that the sense has a corresponding thing meant. The words- 'The celestial body most distant from the Earth' have senses, but it is doubtful whether there is an object meant by them. In the awareness of a sense an individual is not confirmed about its meaning. The meaning and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If a sign means an object perceptible through



senses, my idea of it is nothing but an internal image generated through my previously experienced impressions.

The meaning of a proper name is the object itself, which is designated through it. The idea received through it is subjective. Sense is neither subjective like idea nor objective like an object. The distinction between sense and reference is just like that of the Moon seen through a telescope and the Moon seen through visual organ. The former is the sense and the latter is the meaning or referent of the term 'Moon'. The proper name expresses its sense and designates its meaning or referent.<sup>(16)</sup>

If one word of the sentence is replaced by another one having the same meaning, but a different sense, it will have no effect on the meaning of a sentence, e.g., 'The morning star is a body illuminated by the sun', 'The evening star is a body illuminated by the sun'. An individual who does not know that the morning star and evening star is same might have a feeling that one thought is true and the other is false. This thought is not the meaning of the sentence, but only its sense. The above-mentioned sentences are possible because these are parts of sentence having sense but no meaning.<sup>(17)</sup>

The Nyāya account of the theory of meaning reveals that it does not strictly distinguished between sense and reference. The term '*artha*' stands for referent only. If a word has no referent, it will be taken as non-sensical. To them there is a relation called *vṛtti* between an expression and what is referred to by it. The referent is meaning or *artha*, which is of two types- primary and secondary. The directly pointed meaning or referent is called primary one. As for example, the referent of the term 'Gaṅgā' is a particular flow of water enclosed by canal brought by Bhagīratha (*Bhagīrathakhātāva-*

*cchinnajalapravāhaviśeṣā*). When this direct referent is conceivable, an indirect referent is to be assigned to a particular expression, which is called secondary referent or implicative referent. As for example, the expression-'*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*' (The milk-man-colony is on the Ganges) gives rise to secondary meaning or referent of the term '*Gaṅgā*' as '*Gangātīra*' (the bank of the Ganges) due to having some incompatibility in taking the primary meaning, i.e., the flow of water. A milkman's colony cannot remain on it and hence there is a shift in the referent.

The relation, which is called *vṛtti*, exists between an expression and its referent. This *vṛtti* is of two types: *śakti* (primary power) and *Lakṣaṇā* (secondary power).<sup>(18)</sup> Each and every word possesses some power directly to refer something and this power is called *samketa* given by the devine will (*īśvarecchā*) or by the will of an independent being (*svatantrapuruṣaprayojyaḥ*).

In fact, the Naiyāyikas believe in the conventional usage of language and its referent. One can aware of a referent referred to by a particular word depending on the convention or verbal usage of the old (*vṛddhavyavahāra*). A child learns linguistic usage from the convention in the following way. A child comes to know the primary relation (*samketa*) of a term with its meaning at first from the verbal usage of the old (*vṛddhasyaśabdādhīnavyavahāra*). When a person who is aware of the meaning of a term (*vyutpanna*) asks another person who also knows the meaning of the same term to bring a cow, for example, the person who is asked to bring a cow by the senior person (*uttamavṛddha*) brings it as per order of the senior. On observing the performance of the man who has been asked to bring a cow, a child draws the inference in the form: 'This bringing of a cow is the result of the inclination, as it has got effortness in it, as in the case of my

inclination to suck mother's breast' (*idaṁ gavānayanāmsva-gocarapravṛttijanyaṁ, ceṣṭātvāt, madiyastanapānādivat*).<sup>(19)</sup>

Accordingly, the child comes to know that the knowledge of the verbal usage of the old (*vrddhavyavahāra*) is the uncommon cause of the learning usage of language. In fact, a child infers the meaning of a word uttered by a senior person to the comparatively less senior person. After hearing the command of the senior a junior person performs some activity. Seeing such activities a child infers the meaning of a word through the methods of agreement and difference.<sup>(20)</sup>

If convention were taken as the sole cause of learning language and its referent, it would have been very difficult to explain the determination of the referent of a word at the time of initial usage just after the dissolution (*pralaya*). Hence the Divine will has been accepted as the potency in the form: 'This particular meaning has to be accepted from this particular word' (*asmāt śabdādayamartho boddhavya iti īśvarecchā samketah*).<sup>(21)</sup> If it is accepted, another problem is raised in the *Dinakari* may crop up. If God's desire is accepted as a *samketa*, it can give rise to the primary meaning as well as secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) of term, i.e., *Gaṅgā* due to having Divine will in this form, which will lead to the non-acceptance of *lakṣaṇā*.<sup>(22)</sup> The position can be defended in the following manner. When the primary meaning of the term '*Gaṅgā*' is understood, the *samketa* in the form of God's desire exists in the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*), but not in the implicative meaning. When the 'bank' is understood by the term '*Gaṅgā*', the *samketa* is of that type. Hence there does not arise any question of *atiprasanga*. However, the later Naiyāyikas do not subscribe this view. To them there is no necessity of bringing God in determining the meaning of a word or a sentence. The initial verbal usage of an object (e.g. ascription of 'jar' to an object jar) may be introduced by a

particular person, which may be followed by the later generations. In fact, it is found in our everyday life that the name of a new object is initially ascribed by a scientist, or by a researcher, which is followed by others. Hence the phenomenon of verbal understanding is possible even without accepting the Divine desire. For this reason the Navya Naiyāyikas have accepted the desire of an individual instead of Divine will for understanding a particular meaning from a particular word.<sup>(23)</sup> This power comes from the knowledge of grammar, comparison, dictionary, reliable texts, or statement of a trustworthy person, paraphrase, usages and contiguity of well-known words.<sup>(24)</sup>

To Nyāya the language is the bearer of reality, which is of seven types-substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*) etc. Language is invented to express such reality or *padārthas*. It cannot be used to express something having no reality at all (i.e., an absurd entity). Each and every word must have a referent, which is metaphorically described as *ekaikaśarānuviddha*. Just as an arrow is thrown aiming at a particular object existing in the external world; each and every word is used to express a particular real entity. A language cannot express something absurd or unreal. In fact the expression of unreality is contradictory in terms, as expressibility (*vācyaṭva*) presupposes its knowability (*jñeyatva*). On account of this the Naiyāyikas have not accepted even the absence of an absurd entity. To them the expressions like '*Ākāśakusumaṁ nāsti*' (sky-flower does not exist), '*bandhyāputro nāsti*' (barren's son does not exist) etc. are not considered as absence in the true sense of the term, because the absentee (*pratiyogī*) whose absence is asserted here does not exist in the real world. The knowledge of absence pre-supposes its absentee (*pratiyogijñānasāpekṣaṁ abhāvajñānaṁ*) and hence the absence of an entity could be talked about if and only if its absentee belongs to the

world of reality hence the absence of an entity could be talked about if and only if its absentee belongs to the world of reality (*prasaktasyaiva pratiṣedhaḥ*).

It is said following the line of Frege that the terms 'sky-flower', 'bandhyāputra' etc. have got sense but not reference; it will not be acceptable to Nyāya. Because, if they are taken as having sense, they would have been taken as *vacya* or expressible entities, which amounts to say that they will have knowability (*jñeyatva*). As knowability of such expressions is not there, they do not have any sense. If it is argued that the entities belonging to the world of reality have got senses, it may be well taken by the Naiyāyikas (*iṣṭāpatti*). The fact that an entity belonging to the real world has got sense proves that it has got referent also.

A problem may be raised in this connection. Can the verbal usage of something, which stands for some unknowable entity be justified as meaningful through implication or *lakṣaṇā*? In other words, it is true that the expressions like *ākāśakusuma* etc. cannot give rise to primary meaning. Can they provide any meaning through implication? In reply, it can be said that the seed of *lakṣaṇā* (implicative meaning) lies on the non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*)<sup>(25)</sup>. The expression-"The milk-man-colony is on the ganges' (*gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*) bears implicative meaning, as the speaker's intention is not realisable to us. A sensible speaker cannot say that a colony remains on the flow of water. In order to understand the real intention of the speaker, which is not known from the primary meaning the implicative meaning of the expression as "The milk-man-colony on the bank of the Ganges' (*Gangāṭire ghoṣaḥ*) is to be resorted to. It is to be borne in mind that implication is always connected with the primary meaning (*śakyasambandhā lakṣaṇā*). If there is

incompatibility in the primary meaning due to non-realisation of the speaker's intention, an individual is allowed to search for its implicative meaning. To have this secondary meaning the understanding of the primary meaning is a precondition. Otherwise how is the non-realisation of the speaker's intention known? In the case of the statements about an absurd entity like 'ākāśakusumaṁ surabhi' (sky-flower is fragrant) etc. fail to provide the primary meaning due to the absurd character of the subject, leading to the impossibility of the secondary meaning. Moreover, the contradiction in the primary meaning (*mukhyārthabādhā*) is the precondition of assuming the secondary meaning. In the above-mentioned case there is no realization of any contradiction in the semantic level, because the absurd entities fail to provide the direct meaning. But in the case of *Gangāyam ghosaḥ* etc. there is no problem of understanding primary meaning and also the non-realisation of the speaker's intention. In order to get rid of this situation the only way out is to admit implicative meaning of the same. From the above discussion it is followed that in Nyāya philosophical framework there is no room for sense without reference.

To Freeze an identity statement in the form: 'The morning star is the morning star' which is *apriori* and analytic is uninformative in character. The Naiyāyikas have accepted identity statements of similar nature like '*ghaṭo'ghaṭaḥ*' (i.e., a jar is a jar) etc. To the most of the Neo-thinkers such identity statements are meaningful due to the following reasons.

The term *tādātmya* may be understood at the very beginning as the absence of *bheda* (difference), which is accepted as *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence). If the term *tādātmya* were replaced by the term '*abheda*', it would mean an absolute absence of *bheda* i.e., mutual

contradictory by virtue of the fact that *bheda* which is taken as an absentee limited by the property *bhedatva* is not at all possible. If it is said that there is the absolute negation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory, because the *bheda* limited by the limiter of *bheda* (*bhedatva*) is always available and hence the search for its absolute negation leads to absurdity (*abhedo yadi bhedatvāvacchinnā-bhāvastadāprasiddhiḥ*).<sup>(27)</sup> An individual manifestation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* would never be available, because everywhere there is a *bheda*. Even if it is accepted that an individual manifestation of *bheda* is there but not in general (*bhedatvāvacchinna*) then in this case also there is a contradiction to the absolute negation of the mutual absence or *bheda*. Because we do not find a place in the world where there is no individual manifestation of *bheda*. So absolute negation of the mutual absence is not possible.<sup>(28)</sup>

From the above discussion it can be said that identity (*tādātmya*) is nothing but the non-distinction, which implies an uncommon property (*asādhāraṇodharmaḥ*) existing in a particular object (*sva*). This uncommon property exists in one and only one object (*Abhedastādātmyam Taccasvavṛttyasādhāraṇo dharmah. Asādhāraṇyañca ekamātravṛttitvam*). If it is said that –‘Devadatta is Devadatta’ or a jar is a jar (*ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ*), they convey the sense of absolute sameness (*bhedābhāva*) between two objects. It has been accepted that a jar exists in itself through the relation of identity (*tādātmyasambandhena ghaṭaḥ svasminneva varttate*). The importance of *tādātmya* may easily be understood if the definition of *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) is carefully reviewed. We generally explain *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) with the example- ‘a pot is not a cloth’ (*ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*) where the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is a cloth (*paṭa*). The relation of identity for knowing an object as non-different from other is

to be admitted. If it is asked why a jar is different from a cloth, because the absentee or *pratiyogī*, which is a cloth (*paṭa*) does not exist in itself (*paṭa*) through the relation of *tādātmya* (*tādātmyasambandhāva-cchinnapratyogitākabhāva*). That something is different from something is known by the absence of *tādātmya* between them. When it is said –‘Calcutta is Calcutta’ ‘Rabindranath is Rabindranath’, it cannot be ignored as having no meaning, because they convey some meaning to the hearer. When we want to express some incomparability of a city or an individual, we express the same with the help of such identity statement. The city Calcutta has got certain characteristics of its own which cannot be compared with other cities, but with itself.

Some Indian thinkers have been found interested in making an artificial difference between after using the term ‘*iva*’. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* said that two objects, though identical, are demonstrated in such a way that one will think of their difference. But this difference is an artificial one in order to show the absolute sameness of the object. When a different object is not available as standard of comparison, it itself is used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability as found in the following example –‘*Rāmarāvaṇayoryuddham rāmarāvaṇayoriva*’ (i.e., the Rāma-Rāvaṇa-fight is just like Rāma-Rāvaṇa-fight) is also a case of identity.<sup>(29)</sup> Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, has accepted the meaningfulness of such identity statements, as he has accepted such statements as rhetoric called *ananvaya*. When an object is imagined as having both the property of *upamāna* (the object with which something is compared) and the property of *upameya* (the object compared) simultaneously is called *ananvaya* (*upamānopameyatvamekasyaiva tvananvayaḥ*). In short, if an object is taken as both *upameya* and *upamāna* simultaneously, it is called *ananvaya*. The following example may be cited- ‘*Rājīvamiva*



*rājīvaṁ jalam̐ jalamivājanicandraścandra ivātandraḥ śāratsamudayodyame'* i.e., when autumn arrives in full swing, the lotus becomes like a lotus (untouched by mud of the rainy season), water becomes like water, the moon becomes like moon (uncovered by thick cloud).<sup>(30)</sup>

Following the Navya Nyāya tradition some of the Anglo-Sanskrit contemporary thinkers, Professor Kalidas Bhattacharya and Professor Jayashankar Shaw think that the distinction between sense and reference as found in Frege's philosophy is available in the Navya Nyāya texts also in the forms of *śākya* and *śakyatāvacchedaka* or *pravṛttinimitta*. Their points of view may be highlighted in the following manner. The Navya Naiyāyikas have admitted that when the word 'cow' is uttered, it refers to many individual cows which are limited by a property called 'cowness' (*gotva*). The property called cowness is called *śakyatāvacchedaka* or *pravṛttinimitta* of the term 'cow' while the individual cows are *śākya*. Professor Bhattacharya has described the former as connotation and the later as denotation.<sup>(31)</sup> So far as the *śākya* (referred entity) i.e., an individual cow is concerned, it is called referent in Fregean terminology. The property existing in a cow or cowness or characteristics of a cow like having tail, dewlap etc, which is called *śakyatāvacchedaka* or connotation, is the sense of the term.<sup>(32)</sup>

In the sense portion any type of description or mode of presentation can be accommodated as found in the expression-'The morning star is the evening star' or 'Rabindranath is the author of 'Gītāñjali''. It may come under the purview of the *pravṛttinimitta* or *śakyatāvacchedaka* of the term. From this it can be said that though referent in such cases is the same, the sense is different. This view is subscribed by Vardhamāna Upadhyaya who has defined *pravṛttinimitta* in the following manner: '*vācyatve sati vācyavṛttitvesati*

*vācyopasthitiprakāratvam*'<sup>(33)</sup> That is, something is to be taken as *pravṛttinimitta* of a word if it constitutes a part of the meaning complex, if it remains in the referent and becomes qualifier in the context of its emergence as a referent. It resembles Frege's theory, because it belongs to the object and it is a mode of presentation of the object.

The above-mentioned interpretation deserves thorough critical analysis. In Nyāya the primary meaning is a composite whole called *śakyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaḥ śakyaḥ* i.e., the primary meaning is something limited by the limiter of being a primary meaning. This limiter which is described as connotation is a part and parcel of the denotation. This view is subscribed by Gadādhara also. To him the *pravṛttinimitta* of a term is a part of the meaning as a whole or it belongs to the referent of a term, which is another member of the meaning complex (*vācyatve sativacyavṛttitva*).<sup>(34)</sup> Hence in Nyāya it is very difficult to distinguish between denotation and connotation or sense and reference.

Raghunātha wants to drop the term '*vācyatve satī*' and says that the *pravṛttinimitta* of a term belongs to the referent but not the part of the composite meaning. The *pravṛttinimitta* has got some indicative value (*upalakṣaṇatva*), as it functions as an indicator of a particular referent from others.<sup>(35)</sup> It is otherwise fixes a particular referent from others. Whatever may be the case, the meaning of a term in Nyāya primarily is available through the potency (*śakti*) of a term, which exists in an individual (*vyakti*), universal (*jāti*) and also configuration (*ākṛti*) as a composite whole. To Nyāya the meaning of a term is its referent associated with universal and configuration.<sup>(36)</sup> There is togetherness (*samūhatva*) or inseparability among the *pravṛttisāmarthyā* or *ākṛti*, universal and individual referent. Hence it is very difficult to distinguish strictly between sense and referent in the Nyāya.

In the same way, it can be said that the eternity of the relation between a word and its meaning as admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas may be taken as a flowing eternity (*pravāhinityatā*) but not permanent eternity (*kūfasthanityata*). If this eternity is of flowing type, the meaning arising after words can be accommodated there. That is, it is having a beginning but no end, which is easily acceptable to us.

## References

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2. *Vākyapadīya* III, *Sambandhasamuddeśa*.
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4. *Prātipadikāṛthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre* *prathamā* – *Pāṇini*-II/3/46.
5. *arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ prātipadikam* – *Pāṇini*-I/2/45.
6. *bandhyāsutādīnām* *bāhyārthaśūnyatve'pi* *buddhiparikalpita* *bandhyā-śabdavācyaṛtham* *adayaṛthavattvāt* *prātipadikatvam* – *Paramalaghumañjūṣā* by *Nāgeśa*, Ed. & Tr. By B. Goswami, S. Ganguli, 'Anvīkṣā', Research Journal, Dept. of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Vol. XIII, April 1990, p. 59.
7. *Siddhe śabdārthasambandhe* – *Mahābhāṣya*. I/1/1.
8. Through the looking-glass – p. 196.
9. *Indriyāṇām śvaviṣayeṣvanādiryogyatā yathā/ anadirathaiḥ śabdābām sambandho yogyatā tathā//*
10. *Vivakṣā hi yogyaśabdanibandhanā / yogyaṁ hi śabdaṁ prayoktā* *vivakṣāprāpitāsannidhāneṣvabhidheyeṣu* *pratyarthamupādatte* – *Svopajñāṭika* on *Ibid* I/13.
11. *Sādhānavyavahāraśca* *buddhyavasthanibandhanaḥ* – *Vākyapadīya* III, *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, 3.
12. *Asyādīnām* *tu* *kartṛtve* *taikṣṇyādi* *karaṇam* *viduḥ/taikṣṇyādīnām svātānratve dvaidhātmā vyavatiṣṭhate//* - *Ibid* 96.

13. *Bhedābhedaḥ prthagbhāvaḥ sthitiśceti virodhinaḥ/ yugapanna vivakṣyante sarve dharmā valahāke*// - Ibid 144.
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vṛttijñānasahakṛtapadajñānanyapadārthopasthitirvyāpāraḥ  
... vṛttirnāma śaktilakṣaṇānyatararūpā' *Nyāyabodhini* on  
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19. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (nāmaprakāśikā), prose portion on verse no. 20.
20. Butpitsurbālo gāmānaya  
ityuttamavṛddhavākyaśravaṇānantaram  
madhyamavṛddhasya pravṛttimupalabhya gavānayanam ca  
dṛṣtvā  
madhyamavṛddhapravṛttijñānasyānvayavyatirekābhyām  
gopadasya vākyaḥ janyatvaṁ niścitya...'  
*Tarkasaṁgrahadīpikā*, pp. 319-20 (Ed. By Satkari Sharma Bangiya), Chowkhamba, 1976.
21. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under verse no. 81.

22. 'Evam̐ gangāpadajanyabodhaviṣayatvaprakāra<sup>ke</sup>cchāyāstīre' pi sattvācchaktaiva tīrabodhopapatteḥ lakṣaṇocchedapapattiḥ.' *Dinakari* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse 81.
23. 'Ghatādivyavahārahsvatantrapuruṣaprayojyaḥ vyavahāratvāt ādhunikalipyādivyavahāravat' *Dinakari* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under verse-1.  
 'Navyāstu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kintu icchaiva' *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under verse-81.
24. 'Saktigrahastu vyakanaditah 'etc. Ibid.  
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26. *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 63, Chowkhamba Edition.
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28. 'Yasya kasyacidbhedasya sattvāt abhāvasya pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnena saha virodhāt bhedatvāvacchinnpratiyogitākābhāvaprasiddhirityarthah' Commentary on *Vyutpattivāda* by Jaydev Mishra (Chowkhamba)  
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30. 'Ekasyaiva tu padārthasya upamānopameyatvaṁ yugapadeva upamānatvamupameyatvañca kalpitaścet tadā ananvayo nāmālamkāraḥ syāt' *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa* on X/37.
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# *Chapter – U*

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## CHAPTER – V

### Some philosophical problems and their probable solutions

It has already been shown that the non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānopapatti*) is the seed of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). That is why, the intention of the speaker (*tātparya*) has occupied a prominent role in our daily verbal understanding. One could raise a question in this connection. If the non-realisation of intention of the speaker becomes the seed of implicative meaning, why the non-realisation of expectancy (*ākāṁkṣānopapatti*) and non-realisation of semantic incompetency (*yogyatānopapatti*) cannot be the seed of the same? The question can properly be discussed in the following manner.

An effort will be made to evaluate critically the theories that the non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānopapatti*) is the root of *Lakṣaṇā*, the supremacy of *tātparya* in the phenomenon of verbal comprehension, whether *yogyatānopapatti* can be taken as a the seed of *Lakṣaṇā* or not etc.

Implication or *Lakṣaṇā* is a relation to that which is conveyed by the potency (*śakti*) of a word due to the non-comprehensibility of the intention of the speaker (*Lakṣaṇā śakyasambandha-stātparyānopapattitah*). The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention (*tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). To them the non-

realisability of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e. implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term *gaṅgā* as found in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is 'the bank of the *gaṅgā*'. The primary meaning of the terms *ghoṣaḥ* and *gaṅgā* are *ghoṣapalli* and a particular flow of water (*Jalpravāha-viśeṣa*) respectively. The milk-man-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is non-realisability of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them. This can be removed, if the 'bank of the *gaṅgā*' is taken as the meaning of the term *gaṅgā* through *lakṣaṇā*. In the same way, the implicative meaning of the term *ghoṣaḥ* is also possible. In the former case *lakṣaṇā* in the term *gaṅgā* is accepted, but not in the term *ghoṣaḥ*. In another the reverse case is accepted. If *lakṣaṇā* is accepted in either of the terms, there will not be the non-realisability in respect of relation (*anvayānupapatti*). Hence, it is admitted that the non-realisability of intention, but not of relation is the root of *lakṣaṇā*. The importance of the application of *lakṣaṇā* lies in the fact of removing the non-realisability of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*) of the speaker,<sup>(1)</sup> which is also supported by Nāgeśa.<sup>(2)</sup>

Now what is to be understood by the term *tātparya*? The desire of the speaker (*vyakturicchā*) is *tātparya*.<sup>(3)</sup> In other words, it has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātparya* (*tātpratīticchaya uccaritatvaṁ*).<sup>(4)</sup> When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātparya*. The term *uccaritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons there is *tātparya* in spite of not having utterance of the same.<sup>(5)</sup> Moreover, there would arise the possibility of the non-attainment of the meaning of the Vedic texts uttered by an individual having no awareness of its meaning.

(*arthajñānaśūnyenapurūṣenoccaritavādvēdārtapratyayabhāva*prasaṅgaḥ).<sup>(6)</sup> Hence it is better to accept the former definition (i.e., the intention of the speaker is *tātparya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.

If a speaker bears a particular intention to express that the fish resides in the water and utters the same sentence –*gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the implicative meaning is to be accepted on the term *ghoṣaḥ* denoting fish secondarily in order to bring the realisability in *tātparya*. If a speaker, on the other hand, possesses an intention to make others aware that the milkman-colony exists on the bank of the *gangā* and utters the same sentence, the implicative meaning has to be accepted in the term *gangā* as per the intention of a speaker as well as for the realisability of *tātparya*. As per the intention of the speaker the implicative meaning of the terms *gangā* and *ghoṣaḥ* are to be taken as ‘the bank of the *gangā*’ and ‘fish’ respectively. Hence, the realisability of *tātparya* but not relation is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. Moreover, this point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence-*kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* (i.e., protect the curd from crow etc) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. The statements like ‘We donot smoke here’, ‘Thanks for not smoking’ etc have no incompatibility in the relation (*anvayānupapatti*), but there is the incomprehensibility of the intention of the speaker which leads to the implicative meaning like ‘Please donot smoke’. In order to incorporate all types of *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realisability in respect of *tātparya* as *lakṣaṇā* but not otherwise. Had the incomprehensibility of relation or connection (*anvayānupapatti*) been the cause of implication, there would not have any implicative meaning in the sentence – ‘Admit the stick’ (*yaṣṭhiḥ praveśāya*). Because the phenomenon of admission is not

inconceivable with the stick and hence no *anvayānupapatti*. If the non-realisation of intention is taken as the seed of *lakṣaṇā* then the implicative meaning is applicable to such case. As the entrance of a stick in the dining hall for a feast is non-realisation, 'the stick-holders are to be taken by the term 'stick' through implication.'<sup>(7)</sup>

Let us see whether the non-realisation of *tātparya* which is accepted as the seed of *lakṣaṇā* belongs to word alone or a group of words. Implication does not belong to a word alone, but a group of words. As in the case of the example – 'There is a milkman-colony on the deep river', the group of two words 'deep' and 'river' refers to the 'bank' through implication.'<sup>(8)</sup>

It may be argued that as a group of words does not have any potency or import (*śakti*), how can it have implication, which is nothing but a form of relation to that which is conveyed by potency? In reply, it can be said that implication is the relation to that what is conveyed by potency related to a word. Just as the meaning of a word is conveyed by potency, the meaning of a sentence is also through it. Hence there is no inconsistency.'<sup>(9)</sup>

Let us examine whether the non-realisation of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*) may be taken as the root of implication or *lakṣaṇā*. The semantic competency (*yogyatā*) is the relation of the meaning of a word with the meaning of another (*padārthe tatra tadvatā yogyatā parikirtitā*).<sup>(10)</sup> Such awareness is the precondition of the verbal comprehension. The sentence – 'sprinkling with water' (*jalena siñcatī*) gives a verbal comprehension due to having semantic competency. It is known to us that the instrumentality of water is connected with the other meaning of the word – 'sprinkling'.

In absence of such *yogyatā* verbal comprehension is not at all possible. In the sentence – ‘sprinkling with fire’ (*vahninā siñcati*) there is no verbal comprehension, because fire cannot be an instrumental to the action of sprinkling.<sup>(11)</sup>

If there is the non-realisation of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*), it may give rise to implicative meaning. Though the sentence – ‘sprinkling with fire’ (*vahninā siñcati*) does not provide any verbal comprehension due to the lack of *yogyatā*, it can give metaphorical or implicative meaning due to having the non-realisation of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*). We may quote a line from the *Meghnādvadha* by Madhusudana Datta which has no semantic competency and for this there is a scope for implicative meaning. The sentence goes like this – ‘*fuldal diyā katilā ki vidhātā śālmolī tarubare?*’ i.e., does God cut the silk-cotton tree called Śālmālī with the petal of flower? In fact, the petal of flower cannot cut the hard tree like Śālmālī and hence it lacks the semantic competency. But it has got a power of referring to an implicative meaning. The sentence implies that the cutting of the said tree through flower-petal is an impossible phenomenon, which is attained through the non-realisation of *yogyatā*. In the same way, the statement – ‘I am building castle in the air’ refers to an absurd phenomenon through implication arising from *yogyatānupapatti*.

In this connection it should be kept in mind that *yogyatānupapatti* may lead us to attain the implicative meaning in some cases but not in all. Hence the non-realisation of intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) has been taken as a root of all including the place where there is the non-realisation of the semantic competency.

If the intention of the speaker is realized (*tātparyānupapatti*) the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*) is known immediately there. The necessity of exploring any implicative meaning becomes inevitable if there is the non-realisation of the intention (*tātparyānupapatti*) alone which may, of course, be caused by the non-realisation either of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*) or expectancy (*ākāṃkṣānupapatti*).

Now we may see how the non-realisation of expectancy leads us to the attainment of implicative meaning. A word must have an expectation with another word if the former is not found related without the association of another, (*yat padena vinā yasyānubhāvakatā bhavet sākāṃkṣā*).<sup>(12)</sup> The *kāraṅkas* cannot generate relation without the help of the verb and hence there is an expectancy of *kāraṅkas* with the verb (*kriyāpadaṁ vinā kāraṅkapadaṁ nānvayabodhaṁ janayatīti tena tasyākāṃkṣā*).<sup>(13)</sup> If it is said – ‘The door please’ (*dvāraṁ*), it will provide no meaning due to the lack of expectancy with a verb. This non-realisation of expectancy gives rise to the non-realisation of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*). For this reason the verb ‘close’ or ‘open’ is brought here through implication considering the context (*prakaraṇa*) under which it is spoken.<sup>(14)</sup>

So far as *Āstīyanupapatti* (non-realisation of contiguity) is concerned, it cannot be taken as a pointer to the non-realisation of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*) separately. If there is any such *anupapatti* here, it is not different from the non-realisation of expectancy (*ākāṃkṣānupapatti*). I think what is accepted as *asatti* or contiguity is not essentially different from the expectancy (*ākāṃkṣā*). *Āsatti* is defined as the contiguity of the words (*sannidhānaṁ tu padasyāsatirucyate*).<sup>(15)</sup> In other words, the contiguity of the terms in forms of subjunct and adjunct forming a relation is called *asatti*

(*anvaya-pratīyogī-anuyogī-padayoranvyavadhanamāśatti*).<sup>(16)</sup> If a word is uttered in the morning and another word uttered in the noon, they cannot provide any meaning because they cannot be related to at all for having a long temporal gap. It is very difficult to apprehend the relation of both due to the non-identification of the subjunctness and adjunctness (*pratīyogitva* and *anuyogitva*) of the terms in a particular relation. When the first word is uttered in the morning, there remains an expectation of the second term which, though uttered in the noon, cannot be related to the first one as there no criterion or scope to relate this. How do we know that the second word is in relation to the first one? The speaker might have uttered many sentences by this time about which we are least interested. Hence, If there is any lack of *āśatti*, it is nothing but the lack of *ākāṁkṣā*.

Though the Naiyāyikas have accepted four means of verbal comprehension- expectancy (*ākāṁkṣā*), semantic competency (*yogyatā*), contiguity (*āśatti*) and intention of the speaker (*tātparyā*), I think the fourth factor i.e., the intention of the speaker (*tātparyā*) has to be taken as the sole factor for the same. It is shown earlier that if there is the realisability of the intention (*tātparyā-upapatti*), there is the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*). If there is the non-realisation of the intention (*tātparyā-anupapatti*), the implicative meaning is to be resorted to. Hence the *tātparyā* has got the prime role in understanding the meaning of a sentence, but not the other three. The sentence- 'There is a jar in the house (*gehe ghaṭa*) is capable of generating a cognition of the relation of a jar (but not that of a cloth) in the house. Hence a sentence is said to mean the relation of a jar (but not that of cloth) in the house. It is the intention of the speaker. If a sentence does not have expectancy or semantic competency, it is understandable if the *tātparyā* or intention of the speaker is realized or unrealized. In the

case of unrealisability the implicative meaning is to be explored as said earlier. In fact the non-realisability of the intention in the given sentence is the seed of the implicative meaning through which the intention of the speaker is realized. In other words, the inconceivability of the intention in the primary meaning gives rise to explore the implicative meaning which reveals the true intention *tātparya* (*upapatti*) of the speaker.<sup>(17)</sup>

Another problem may be raised in this connection. The non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of implicative meaning. Can this cognition of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyajñāna*) lead us to other theories like *Pramāṇasamplava*, *Pakṣata*, *Āhāryajñāna* etc ? The answer is in the positive. Let us see how an individual's intention plays a role in different spheres as mentioned above.

A problem may be raised how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanyajñāna*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *aharyajnana*. The knowledge which is produced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contradictory knowledge is called *aharyajnana*. (*Virodhijñānakālīnecchāprayojyajñānatvaṁ āhāryajñānatvaṁ* or '*Vādhakālīnecchājanyam jñānam*').<sup>(18)</sup> The word '*āhārya*' means 'artificial', which is found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* where the ladies are described as *āhāryasóbhārahitairamāyaih*.<sup>(19)</sup> (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word *anāhārya* means 'natural' which is expressed by the term '*amāyaih*'. When we talk of *āhārya*-knowledge, it has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is deliberately thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects. In these cases one's desire of thinking an



object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* (that is, will to say). Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanyajñāna*). One is allowed to say *sthālī pacati* (he cooks with clay-pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression '*sthālyā pacati*, with the instrumental case-ending with the word *sthali* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *pakṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi*. (*siṣādhayiṣāsattve' numitirbhavatyeva*).<sup>(20)</sup> It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* (that is, capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain an object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be inferred if someone so desires. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer : 'It (that is, a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya* – inferences or knowledges – are not *aharya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhāryajñāna*. From the above-mentioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

Another problem may be raised how the concept of *aharyajnana* can be accommodated in *Nyāya* as the sentence conveying such cognition has no *yogyata*. It may seem strange to us as to why such artificial nature of knowledge is at all essential in the context of *Nyāya*. Though there is no direct result of the deliberation of such artificial knowledge due to not having semantic competency (*yogyatā*), it plays a great role in pointing out the exact nature of an object indirectly.

The importance of accepting *āhāryajñāna* can be realized easily if we ponder over the importance of *tarka* as a philosophical method. *Tarka* is nothing but an *āhāryajñāna*, which is evidenced from the definition given in the *Nīlakanṭhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* '*Āhāryavyāpya-vattābhramajanya āhāryavyāpakavattābhramastarkaḥ*'.<sup>(21)</sup> That is, *tarka* is an imposed (*āhārya*) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*) which is produced by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a *vyāpya*. If the knowledge in the form- 'There is fire in the lake' (*hrado vahnimān*) is produced out of one's desire at the time where there is the awareness of the contradictory knowledge in the form- 'there is the absence of fire in the lake' (*hradovahnnyabhāvavān*), it is called *āhārya*. In this case erroneous cognition is deliberate which is not found in ordinary illusion.

The main purpose of accepting *āhāryajñāna* is to ascertain the true nature of an object (*viśayapariśodhaka*) and to remove the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkānivartaka*). The *aharyajnana* existing in the former type- 'If it has no fire, it has no smoke' (*Yadyaṁ vahnimāna syāt tadā dhūmavān na syāt*) ascertains the existence of fire in a particular locus. In the same way, the Navya Naiyāyikas have accepted another form of *tarka* which is also *āhārya* in order to eliminate one's doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkā*). If someone bears a doubt whether smoke and fire have an invariable relation or not, this doubt of

deviation (*vyabhicāraśamkā*) can be dispelled by demonstrating the *āhārya*-knowledge in the form : 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire'. (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārt syāt tarhi vahnijanyo na syāt*). From this it is indirectly proved that as smoke is caused by fire, it will not be deviated from fire.<sup>(22)</sup>

By virtue of being *āhārya* both the parts — the ground (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary or hypothetical. If the first part is true, the second part would become automatically true. But it is a well-known fact that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. So, the doubt as to the deviation of fire with smoke can be removed by applying the *tarka* in the form of *āhārya*. It, Being a kind of mental construction is useful for removing doubt and hence it becomes promoter to *pramāṇas*. This *āhārya* cognition is otherwise called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*, that is, introduction of the undersired through which the desired one is established. This imposition of the undersired is of two types : the rejection of the established fact and the acceptance of the non-established object (*Syādaniṣṭam dvividham smṛtam prāmāṇikaparityāgastathe-taraparigrahaḥ*). If there is an *āhāryajñāna* in the form-'water cannot quench thirst', there would arise an objection-'If it is so, no thirsty people should drink water'. It is known from our experience that water is capable pf quenching thirst, which is denied here and hence it comes under the first type of *anista*.

If it is said that water causes burning, there would arise objection in the form-'If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation. The burning sensation from water is not an established fact, which is admitted here and hence it belongs to the second type of *anista*. We often take recourse to *āhāryajñāna* even in our day-to-day debate. If an opponent says to a Naiyāyika that self is

non-eternal (anitya), he may first agree with what the opponent says in the following manner-‘O.K., initially I agree with you that self is non-eternal’. This agreement for the time being is *āhārya* and the next step in the form-‘If self were non-eternal in nature, there would not have been the enjoyment of *karma*, rebirth or liberation due to the destruction of the self, is also *āhārya* which indirectly points to the eternality of self. In the same way, various expressions like ‘If I were a bird, I would have flown from one place to another’, ‘If you were a firmament, I would have stretched my wings like a crane’ (which reminds me of a Bengali song- *Tumi ākās yadi hate āmi balākār mato pākhā meltām*) can be included under *aharyajnana*.

The accommodation of *āhāryajñāna* in Navya Nyāya is primarily to promote an indirect method through which truth is ascertained. In the indirect proof in symbolic logic the negation of the conclusion is deliberately taken which is also an *āhārya* and from this it is shown that, if this is taken as conclusion, it will lead to some contradiction or absurdity. If the negation of P which is originally a conclusion is taken as a conclusion of *āhārya*-type and proved it as contradictory or absurd, it will automatically follow that the original conclusion, that is, P (*anāhārya*) is true. The method is also called the method of proof by *reductio ad absurdum*.<sup>(23)</sup>

In metaphorical expressions such *āhāryajñāna* bears a completely different import. *Rūpaka* remains in the representation of the subject of description which is not concealed, as identified with another well known standard (*rūpakam rūpitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave*).<sup>(24)</sup> In the famous case of *rūpaka-mukhacandra* the *upameya* is ‘face’ which is identified with ‘moon’. In this case, the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity. Though the difference between them is not concealed yet

there is the ascription of the identification between two objects (*atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah*). In spite of knowing the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya*, there is the hypothetical ascription of identity deliberately which is also an *āhārya*.<sup>(25)</sup>

From the above discussions, it is known to us that the accommodation of the *āhhāryajñāna* presupposes some intention of an individual. In the case of metaphor, *āhāryatva* is taken recourse to in order to show the extreme similarities between two objects. In the same way, *āhāryajñāna* is accepted by the logicians to ascertain the real nature of an object indirectly. Hence *āhāryajñāna* can be utilized as an accessory to a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānugrahakarūpeṇa*). Though semantic competency (*yogyatā*), the criterion of the meaningfulness of a sentence, is not found in the sentences conveying *āhāryajñāna*, meaning of such sentences is easily understood by others. Had these been not understood at all, the absence of *yogyatā* cannot also be known. Moreover, as there is semantic incompetency, a search for other indirect or secondary meaning is permissible. As there is the absence of *yogyatā* in the expressions like *mukhacandra* and 'If I were a bird, I would have flown', etc., a thorough search for indirect meaning like extreme similarity (*atisāmya*) between face and moon, the absurdity of describing a man as bird, etc. have to be ascertained. It is to be kept in mind that the semantic competency is essential only in the case of direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) but not in implicative or suggestive meaning (*lakṣyārtha* or *vyaṅgyārtha*). In fact, an implicative or suggestive meaning is looked for if there is the incompetency among the words (*mukhyārthavādhe*). Hence the semantic incompetency paves way to the indirect meaning as found in the expressions like 'I am building castles in the air', etc. Following the same line it can be

said that *āhāryajñāna* can communicate something to us indirectly in spite of not having the said competency.

Can we speak of *āhāryajñāna* existing in the pure music or *rāgas*, pure dance or abstract paintings that are new worlds created through imagination? In response to this, the following suggestion can be made. Though *āhāryajñāna* is a product of imagination, all imagination cannot be taken as *āhāryajñāna*. The imaginary ideas as found in the fanciful stories or fairy tales, etc., are not *āhārya*. Some imagination is created out of one's own will (*icchāprayojya*) at the time when one is conscious of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñānakālīna*). In spite of being conscious of the fact that fire cannot stay in the lake, we imagine that the lake has fire out of our strong will. It is a case of *āhārya* as already mentioned. In the case of pure music, dance and abstract paintings, we are not aware of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñāna*) through which the imaginary states are sublated (*vādhita*). Though these are the cases of imagination having the characteristic of *icchāprayojyatva*, or *icchājanyatva*, they are not *āhāryajñāna* due to the lack of the other characteristic, that is, *virodhijñānakālīnatva* or *vādhakālīnatva*. In the case of *āhāryajñāna* both the characteristics should be taken as adjuncts of imaginations. An imaginary cognition associated with *icchāprayojyatva* or *icchājanyatva* and *virodhijñānakālīnatva* is called *āhārya*. Due to the absence of the second characteristic the charge of *avyāpti* of the definition of *āhāryajñāna* to the pure music, etc., does not stand on logic.

To my understanding the whole philosophy of language is centred around the concept of intention. It is intention of the speaker while determines the meaning-primary and secondary. It has already been said that one can go in search of secondary meaning in the form of

*Lakṣaṇā* or *vyāñjanā* if there is some sort of incompatibilities in the primary one which is in terms of intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) considering the importance of the intention of speaker the Grammarians have admitted *tātparya* as the main criterion of meaning. Depending on the intention of the speaker one can determine the meaning and hence there is no necessity of admitting *Lakṣaṇā* or *vyāñjanā* as a separate category. If intention of the is given prominence, other meaning follows automatically. If the purpose is served with the help of intention of the speaker, what is the utility of admitting *Lakṣaṇā*, *Vyāñjanā*, *vakrokti* etc. Moreover, the incompatibility of *yogyatā* or *ākāṅkṣā* is nothing other than the inconceivability of *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*). On account of this, intention of the speaker (*tātparya*) is the pillar on which the whole philosophy of language stands.

Apart from the above it is essential to search for an intention of the speaker while a meaning is assigned to a particular technical term. For example '*guṇa*' is a technical term. It denotes constituents like *sattva*, *raja* and *tama* so far as the *Samkhya* philosophy is concerned. In the same way the *Vaiśeṣikas* have used the same in the sense of qualities colour (*rupa*) etc. In grammar also the term is used in a completely different sense. For this reason the meaning is not fixed to a particular term. We have to assume the meaning of the same depending on the intention of the speaker. That is why, the terms like *vivakṣā*, *tātparya* etc. receive much attention of the scholars in the field of Indian philosophy.

## References

1. "Tātparyanupapattirlakṣaṇāvijam" *Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā*. Henceforth, TSD.
2. "Vastutastu tātparyānupapattipratisandhānameva tadvijam". *Paramalaghumañjuṣā*. Henceforth, PLM
3. "Vakturicchā tu tātparyam parikirtitam". *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse no. 84
4. "Tatpratiticchaya uccharitvarūpatātparyajñānam ca vākyaarthajñānahetuḥ" *Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā*.
5. *Ibid*.
6. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Āgamapāriccheda. Henceforth-V.P.
7. "Parantu yadyanvayānupapattirlakṣaṇāvijam syāt tadā yaṣṭhiḥ pravaśayetyādau lakṣaṇā na syāt. Yaṣṭhiḥ praveśānvayasyānupapatterabhāvat. Tena yaṣṭhipraveśe bhojanatātparyānupapattiyā yaṣṭhidhareṣu lakṣaṇā. Evaṁ kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatāmityādau kākapadasya dadhyupaghātake lakṣaṇā, sarvato dadhirakṣayastātparyaviśayatvāt". *Siddhāntamūktavali* on verse no. 82
8. "Lakṣaṇā ca na padamātravrttiḥ, kintu vākyaavrttirapi. Yathā gambhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣaḥ ityatra gambhīrāyām nadyām iti padadvayasamudāyasya tire lakṣaṇā". *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.
9. "Nanu vākyaśyasaktatayā katham śakyasambandharūpā lakṣaṇā? Ucyate-śaktya yat padasambandhena jñāpyate tatsambandho lakṣaṇā. Śaktijñāpyaśca yatha padārthastathā vākyaartho' piti na kacidanupapattih". *Ibid*.
10. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* verse no. 83, henceforth-B.P.



11. "Ekapadārthe' parapadārthasambandho yogyatetyarthaḥ. Tajjñānābhāvācca vahninā siñcatityādaḥ na śābdabodhah vahninā siñcatityādaḥ seke vahnikaraṇakatvābhāvarūpayogyatāniścayena prativandhāna śābdabodhah." *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse-83. Henceforth S.M.
12. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* on verse-84.
13. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse-84.
14. "Dvaramityatrādhyāhāraṁ vinā pratiyogyalābhāt na svārthānvayanubhāvakatvaṁ." *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Śābdakhānda) "dvaramitytreti adhyāhāraṁ vineti anayaṭityādīpadādhyāhāraṁ vinā na svartheti na dvārakarmākanayanaukulakṛtimān ityānvayavodhakajanakatvamityarthah-atra hetumaha-pratiyogyalabhaditi-kāranibhūtānvayapratiyogyupasthitercbhāvādityarthah." *Māthuri* on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Śābdakhānda)
15. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* verse no. 82.
16. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* verse no. 82.
17. "Gehe ghatah iti gehe ghaṭasamsārgapratīṭijananayogyam. Na tu paṭasamsargapratīṭijananayogyamiti tadvākyam ghaṭasamsargaparam, na tu paṭasamsargaparamityucyate." *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Āgamapāriccheda)
18. *Nyāyakoṣa*, Mahāmāhopadhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalkikar (ed.), Bhandarker Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1928, p. 136.
19. *Bhāṭṭikāvya* 2/14
20. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 70.

21. *Nilakanthaprakasika* on *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 376, edited by Satkari Sharma Bangiya, with seven commentaries, Chowkhamba, 1976.
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