

## Chapter IV

### A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE OPPONENTS VIEWS AND A DEFENSE OF NYĀYA POSITION

Before considering the Nyāya position regarding the theory of causation, let us first evaluate the different theories namely, *Satkāraṇavāda*, *Asatkāraṇavāda*, *Satkāryavāda*, *Asatkāryavāda* from the Nyāya standpoint.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the Vedantin's theory *Satkāraṇavāda*. For the *Naiyāyikas*, it cannot be said that this world has only *vyāvahārika sattā*. Actually the Nyāya cannot divide *sattā* into phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*) aspects. It is meaningless to do so. Whether a particular experience (*anubhava*) is valid or not is determined by our behaviour. According to the Advaitins, something is called transcendently real if it remains (*avādhita*) unvalidated in past, present and future, *Trikālāvādhitatva*. But for the *Naiyāyikas*, in order to be something existent, it is not essential for that thing to remain uncontradicted in past, present and future. For them, something can be said to be *sat* (existent) if it appears as *sat*. A piece of cloth is *sat* as well as a pot. Hare's horn, sky-lotus – these are called absolutely false or absurd (*ālīka*) though hare is not false as well as horn. Hence nothing can be said to be absolutely false. In case of rope - snake illusion, our knowledge of snake is false but that does not mean that the

object 'snake' is false. We cannot say that our knowledge of true object is true and knowledge of false object is false. Rope appears as snake is not false. This snake is beyond time and space. Our knowledge of snake instead of rope implies our knowledge of snakehood in rope in *samavāya* (inherence) relation. But in fact, there is no such snakehood in rope in *samavāya* relation. This is why our knowledge of snake instead of rope is false. So it is not necessary to say that our knowledge of snake is false as it is due to our ignorance. The Naiyāyikas say that something which appears as false does not signify its falsity. We cannot have false knowledge of that thing which is actually false. Rope - snake illusion presupposes our valid knowledge of snake otherwise such type of illusion will not arise. That means we have to say that false knowledge of a particular thing requires true knowledge of that thing which actually exists in the world. Hence it is clear that in order to say that this phenomenal world is false or the object of false knowledge, then we have to admit that this world is true. Therefore, we cannot accept that theory which says that a physical effect is produced out of a cause which is not physical, but transcendental.

*Asatkāraṇavāda* is also rejected by the Naiyāyikas. For them, *abhāva* (absence) is a separate category. Just like a positive entity becomes an object of knowledge, similarly

*abhāva* or a negative fact becomes an object of knowledge. *Abhāva* also becomes a cause because it is always present before the production of any effect. Ether is activityless, still it is regarded as a cause of sound. Similarly, *abhāva* is regarded as cause though it is free from activities. For the Naiyāyikas, it is also a *padārtha* (category) . It can only be a *nimitta kāraṇa* (auxilliary cause) though it cannot be *samavāyī* (inherent) or *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause). This is why *Asatkāraṇavāda* is not acceptable. According to the Buddhistic Philosophers, destruction of seed is *samavāyī kāraṇa* of seedling. But for the Naiyāyikas, destruction of seed is *nimitta* or *sahakāri kāraṇa* of the effect seedling. The Naiyāyikas admit that seedling is produced after the destruction of seed. But they do not admit that the destruction of seed (which is called *abhāva*) is the material cause of seedling. They also say that when the previous constituent parts of seed is destroyed, a new order among the constituent parts is made and seedling is produced out of that new order. So we cannot say that seedling is produced out of the destruction of seed. Not only this, we cannot also say that the destruction of seed is the cause of the production of seedling. If we say that the destruction of seed is the cause of the production of seedling, then we have to say that the dust of seed is also the cause of seedling. But actually we do not find

so. We find that seedling is produced out of the perished seed in presence of *sahakāri kārana* (associate causes) such as, earth, water, air etc. What is the cause of this difference? The difference between the two lies in the fact that we must note that seedling is produced not from the destruction of seed, but from the new order of the constituent parts of destroyed seed. This new order is not produced from the dust of seed; because the grinded condition of seed cannot create any favourable condition out of which this new order can be produced. This new order is produced when seed becomes, destroyed with the help of its *sahakāri kārana* (associate causes) such as, air, earth, fire etc. So it becomes clear that seedling is produced out of the new order of the constituent parts of the destroyed seed. *Vijābhāva* (the absence of seed) is not the material cause of seedling. In fact, a positive substance is regarded as a material cause or *samavāyi kārana*. *Vijābhāva* cannot be said to be *samavāyī* or *asamavāyī kārana* of an effect. *Vijābhāva* is the efficient cause of seedling. A positive effect cannot be produced out of a negative cause. Therefore *Asatkāraṇavāda* cannot be accepted at all.

Let us consider whether *Ṣatkāryavāda* can be accepted or not.

If we analyse causation, we find two elements cause and effect. For the Naiyāyikas, a cause like an effect may be of

both positive and negative character (*bhāva padārtha* and *abhāva padārtha*). As Udayana writes : “*Bhāvo Yathā tathā bhāvaḥ kāraṇam kāryavān mato*”<sup>1</sup>. The production of a jar, for example, is a positive effect while its ceasing to be or destruction is a negative one. According to the Naiyāyikas, a negative effect is always caused by an efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) alone. But for a positive one, we require the conjunction of three causes — *samavāyī*, *asamavāyī* and *nimitta* besides some negative causes. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that *prāgabhāva* (prior absence) and *pratibandhakābhāva* (absence of an impediment) are to be regarded as essential and indispensable for the production of an effect. To illustrate, burning is usually caused by fire. But the mere presence of fire will not produce burning when fire is accompanied by *Āndrakāntamaṇi* (or moon stone). So *Āndrakāntamaṇi* (moon stone) is regarded as a *pratibandhaka* or obstruction. Hence the absence of *Āndrakāntamaṇi* is also to be regarded as a cause. It may be mentioned here that if another *maṇi*, known as *Śūryakāntamaṇi*, (sun stone) gets associated with *Āndrakāntamaṇi*, (moon stone) fire is seen to produce burning. It follows, therefore, that *Āndrakāntamaṇi* is not the real *pratibandhaka*, for even in the presence of *Āndrakāntamaṇi*, fire may produce burning. So the real *pratibandhaka* should be *Āndrakāntamaṇi* as characterised

by the absence of *śūryakāntamaṇi* (*uttejakābhāva-viśiṣṭa - pratibandhākābhāva*). Hence the positive cause of an effect is the threefold causes while its negative cause is *prāgabhāva* and *pratibandhakābhāva*. For the Naiyāyikas both cause and effect are real and existent.

Regarding causation, there are two principal theories : *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda*. The Sāṃkhya admits the doctrine of *Satkārya* as distinguished from the Nyāya doctrine of *Asatkārya*.

The *Satkāryavādins* say that if the effect is non-existent in its material cause prior to its operation, none can bring it into existence out of the cause, blue cannot be turned into yellow even by a thousand artist. Now the *Asatkāryavādins* say that it is true pure non-existence cannot be said to be produced. It is also equally true that which is existent in its cause prior to its production cannot also be said to be produced. For how can that be produced which is already existent ? Production according to the Naiyāyikas, simply means the origin of that which was not before.

To this, the *Satkāryavādins* may say that the term 'production' means not origin, but manifestation. Prior to such production an effect remains latent in the material cause in a very subtle form. The material cause of a particular effect is constituted by the particular substance in which that particular

effect remains latent. Thus a piece of cloth appears out of the threads only and not a lump of clay or anything else, since it remains latent in a very subtle form in the threads, which are its material cause.

Now if a pot exists in its material cause prior to its production, then we have to say that it exists as *asattāviśiṣṭa* (qualified by its nonexistence) and after its production, it is called *sattāviśiṣṭa* (qualified by its existence) and to say this is to impose two contradictory qualities on the same pot.

To this, the *Satkāryavādins* reply that to say that an effect is *asattāviśiṣṭa* prior to its production and *sattāviśiṣṭa* after its production is meaningless because if there is no pot, (*dharmin*), then how can we say that its *dharma*, namely, *asattā* exists in it? To say that pot exists as *sattāviśiṣṭa* and *asattāviśiṣṭa* at two different times, that is, prior to and after its production, is to accept pot as existent. 'Dharma' means that which inheres in a substratum *vṛttimattvaṁ dharmattvaṁ*; *asattā* inheres in a pot. We cannot have knowledge of a pot if two properties *asattā* and *sattā*—are not related with each other. So it is better to call an effect *prāgasat* (non-existent in prior stage) rather than pure non-existent.

Now one may say that if the effect pre-exists in its material cause prior to its production, then what is the necessity of efficient cause? If the pot already exists in the clay, why should

the potter exert himself and use his implements to produce it? To this possible objection, the *Satkāryavādins* reply that an effect pre-exists in its material cause in a latent or unmanifested condition. The activity of efficient cause like the potter and his tool is necessary to manifest the effect, pot, which exists implicitly in the clay.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the theory of Satkārya. For them it is true that prior to its production, an effect is called *prāgasat*. It is also true that an effect is characterised successively by both the properties of non-existence (*asattā*) and existence (*sattā*) — so long as it is not produced, it is characterised by the former and from the moment it is produced to the moment it is destroyed, it is characterised by the latter. Therefore, prior to its production, it is possible for an effect to become *dharmi* (bearer of the property) *asattā dharmā* (property of non-existence). “But that does not mean that *dharmī* means that which carries *dharmā* on its back just like a horse carries a passenger on its back. *Dharmī* means the relata of *dharmā*”<sup>2</sup>. A pot may be *sattā* and *asattāviśiṣṭa* at two different times. We know that pothood resides in pot. The *Satkāryavādins* cannot say that a pot, limited by pothood is present in its material cause, namely, clay, then we could not have knowledge of the absence of pot. Same is true to other effects. Hence, it is proved that an effect can be said to possess two qualities, *sattā* and *asattā* at two different times.

According to the Satkāryavādins, if we accept the Naiyāyikas theory viz., *Asatkāryavāda*, then we cannot say whether the cause related to the effect produces effect or it produces effect when there is no relation between cause and effect.

In answer to this, the Naiyāyikas argue that since the effect is not an absolute non-entity, there can be a relation of the cause with the effect inspite of its absence prior to production. From the moment a positive effect is produced, there subsists, between the effect and its material cause, the 'relation of inherence' (*samavāya-saṃbandha*). Such a relation which determines the material cause and the effect respectively as the substratum (*ādhāra*) and the superstratum (*ādheya*) is not possible in the absence of the superstratum or the effect. But this does not imply a total absence of relation between the cause and its non-existent effect, for on the basis of inference, it is established that a particular kind of object only and thus, the general relation of being an effect to a cause is well proved between two entities even before the one is actually produced by the other. In other words, the effect is said to be related to the cause, since it is the locus of an "effect - hood conditioned by the cause-ness resident in (a particular) cause".<sup>3</sup> (*kāraṇa - gata-kāraṇatva nirūpita-kāryatva*) and such an effect - hood would act as the relation for the effect. Similarly,

the cause is said to be related to the effect, since it is the locus of a “cause-ness as conditioned by the (said) effect hood”<sup>4</sup> (*Kāryatva-nirūpita-kāraṇatva*) and such causeness would act as the relation for the causes. Such relations unlike the relations of conjunction and inherence — do not characterise the relata as substratum-superstratum and hence, they can relate even what would be produced in a later moment. Besides, it cannot be argued that an object to be produced in the future can have no relation with any other existing object. Every piece of knowledge is admitted to have a relation with the object it reveals, for, otherwise, each and every piece of knowledge would have revealed each and every object. Again when the *Satkāryavādins* say that an efficient cause, for example, a potter is necessary to produce a pot which is present in its material cause, namely, clay in the unmanifested condition, the Naiyāyikas reply that the *Satkāryavādins* then would have to accept the view that the changed or unmanifested form of the effect was absent in its material cause. In short, the *Satkāryavādins* would have to admit that there is something in the effect which is absent in the cause. Hence, *Satkāryavāda* cannot be accepted at all.

Again the *Satkāryavādins* say that there is an invariable relation between a material cause and its effect. Only that which has an invariable relation with a particular effect is capable of producing that effect, for example, a jar is produced

from a lump of clay. Therefore it is true that a particular effect can be said to be produced out of a particular material cause. If the effect is not related to its material cause in any way, it cannot be said to be produced. Such relation is not possible if the effect is pure non-existent. Here the 'relation' involves the relation of identity.

To this the Naiyāyikas argue that there is also a causal relation between our future inevitable death and our knowledge of that death. If there is no relation between knowledge and object of knowledge, then we cannot say 'I have knowledge of this object' or 'I do not have any knowledge of that object'. So there is a relation between the particular object and knowledge of that object. Similarly, we must accept the relation between our future death and our present knowledge of death. Such a relation, again, presupposes the pre-existence of future death, which, however, can hardly be accepted, for it leads to an absurd position, that a living person is dead already. This proves that *Satkāryavāda* cannot be accepted as a plausible theory.

Besides this, the Naiyāyikas do not accept causal energy or *śakti* as something different from cause. *Śakti* (potency) is not different from its substratum. It is true that burning cannot be produced in the presence of fire-extinguishing jewel, namely, *Candrakāntamaṇi*. *Candrakāntamaṇi* then appears

to be an obstacle to the production of the effect. But it is not a true obstacle inasmuch as if another jewel known as *Sūryakāntamaṇi* be present even when *Candrakāntamaṇi* accompanies fire, there is the usual effect of burning. Hence a real obstacle is not *Candrakāntamaṇi* by itself, but *Candrakāntamaṇi* being characterised by the absence of *Sūryakāntamaṇi*. Fire, then, in the absence of fire extinguishing jewel and other obstacles is the cause of burning. It is not true that fire as a substratum of the *śakti* for burning is the cause of burning. Fire as such is the cause of burning. We know that no cause can produce an effect in the presence of obstacles. So how can fire produce burning in the presence of fire-extinguishing jewel? Hence, there is no need to accept *śakti* as something different from cause.

To this, the *Satkāryavādins* may argue that how can we say that the absence of fire extinguishing jewel is the cause of burning? We find that only the existent objects are the cause of the effects : for example, clay, potter etc., are the existent causes of pot. That which is nonexistent cannot be said to be the cause of something because it has no power to produce an effect. Hence, absence of fire-extinguishing jewel cannot be said to be the cause of fire.

To this objection, the *Asatkāryavādins* reply that that which is nonexistent can be regarded as an effect; for example,

a pot may be destroyed after its production. When it is destroyed, and its specific nature lost, it has posterior non-existence; that is, *dhvamsābhāva*. The production of *dhvamsābhāva* is also called effect. So if non-existence can be regarded as an effect, why not can it be a cause? In this world, we find different events which are called *kādācitka*. From the one point of view, they are called cause and from another, they are effects. Hence, *Satkāryavāda* can not be accepted at all.

Still the *Satkāryavādins* may argue that if the effect be really non-existent in the cause, then we have to say that when it is produced, the non-existence comes into existence, that is, something comes out of nothing which is absurd. The *Satkāryavādins* do not accept *abhāva* as a separate category. For them, in experience, we do not find any *abhāva padārtha* as a cause of something. It is not possible for an *abhāva padārtha* to produce something which is called *bhāva padārtha*. Only *bhāva padārtha* can produce something; so it can be called a cause of something.

In reply to this, the *Naiyāyikas* say that a cause is an antecedent event in relation to its effect which is always a consequent event. Although antecedent to the effect, the cause is not merely so. It must be invariable also. By invariable antecedent is meant that if the cause is present, the effect is

present (*kāraṇa-sattvekāryasattā*) and if the cause be absent, the effect is likewise absent (*kāraṇāśattve kāryāsattā*). For example, fire is said to be the invariable antecedent of smoke. For whenever smoke occurs, we find that fire invariably precedes it; and whenever there is absence of fire, we experience that there is absence of smoke as well. That means smoke is never found to be perceived without fire and the absence of fire is never found to be perceived without fire and the absence of fire is never found to give rise to smoke. This is confirmed by our experience.

Therefore, in order to establish causal relation, the Naiyāyikas insist on the formula : *sahacāra darśane sati vyabhicārādarśanam*, (that is , observation of instances of agreement in presence) and *vyatireka sahaçāra* (that is, observation of instances of agreement in absence). *Anvaya* is usually stated as : *sā sattā niyatasattakatva*. This simply means that the existence of an effect must invariably be preceded by the existence of the cause. On observing , for example, a regular and uniform agreement in presence between smoke and fire, we conclude that whenever the cause (fire) invariably precedes, the effect (smoke) follows. *Vyatireka* is often stated by the Naiyāyikas as : *sa vyatirekaḥ prāyukta vyatireka.pratīyagotva*. This simply means that the absence of a cause will lead to the absence of the effect as well. On observation, for example, a regular and uniform

agreement in absence between non-fire and non-smoke, we conclude that whenever the cause (fire) does not invariably precede, the effect (smoke) does not follow. By *vyabhicāradarśana*, the Naiyāyikas mean the non-observation of any contrary instance. If, for example, we find an instance where smoke is present while fire is not, that will constitute an exception (*vyabhicāra*); and the causal relation will at once be vitiated by the presence of such contrary instances. Hence, to establish the cause as an invariable antecedent to the effect, we must be assured of the fact that no contrary instance is involved in the case under consideration.

The *Ṣatkāryavādin*s say that the effect is identical with the cause in essence. But the Naiyāyikas do not accept their view. For them, cause and effect are not identical because the essence of these two is not the same. *Avayavi* is something more than the *avayava*. Just like quality and that in which quality inheres; action and that in which action inheres are different from each other; so also *avayava* and *avayavi*. The relation between *avayava* and *avayavi* is inherence. An effect, for example, a piece of cloth is produced out of the conjunction of the threads. In short, any effect must have certain constituent parts which constitute a composite body. The relation between the composite whole and its constituent parts is inherence. The composite body is something more than its parts. Hence

it is proved that material cause and its effect are not identical.

Still the *Satkāryavādins* argue that the material cause and its effect are essentially identical. Their argument can be stated in Kantian fashion. According to Kant, space and time are empirically real, but transcendently ideal. Apart from our faculty of knowing, they have no being as things in themselves. They are merely ideal, that is, belong to our faculty of knowledge and not to things in themselves. But there can be no object of outer experience which is not in space and time. This means that they are empirically real. Similarly, the causal relation, according to the *Satkāryavādins*, holds good between events which are essentially identical, but apparently different. "A jar and a piece of cloth, for instance, is proved, ultimately to be nothing different from a lump of clay and a cluster of threads which are their material causes. Thus, — since the material cause exists even before the production of the effect, the effect too — being essentially identical with the material cause — cannot be totally absent prior to its production"<sup>5</sup>

Such a contention, however, is refuted by the *Naiyāyikas* on the ground that the material cause and the effect are established to be different on the strength of perception. It is, in fact, proved by observation that a jar with its peculiar configuration is something quite distinct from a lump of clay

out of which it is shaped; they are understood to be identical only because an effect always inheres in— that is, is inseparably connected with its material cause. Nor does the fact that both a lump of clay and a jar made of it share the same universal of earthness (*prthivīva*) disprove the individual distinction between the two, for, in that case, one would be faced with the absurdity that all objects are identical, since all of them equally share the universal of probability (*prameyetva*). Besides, a jar and a lump of clay are proved to be different on the ground that they serve quite different purposes, the former helps one in collecting water but the later does not.

Now to this, *Vācaspati Miśra* says that “a cluster of threads and a piece of cloth are not proved to be different in spite of their serving different purposes because even the same object can serve different ends under different circumstances. A palanquin - bearer cannot carry the palanquin individually though he can act as guide for the road. The same bearer, however, can carry the palanquin when other bearers join him. In the same way, the threads taken singly cannot cover anything; yet when they jointly form a piece of cloth, they can serve that purpose.”<sup>6</sup>

But it is to be noted, however, that the instance does not disprove the Nyāya standpoint. The bearers can carry the

palanquin jointly, though they are not inseparably linked with one another. A cluster of threads, however, can cover an object only when they are conjoined with one another in some specific way— and not arbitrarily — as constituting a compact and distinct entity in the form of a piece of cloth. That is why the threads when clustered together in the shape of a ball, for instance, cannot serve as a covering for anything. Thus, the distinction between the threads and their effect, a piece of cloth, can hardly be denied.

As a further argument against the theory of *Satkārya*, the Naiyāyikas point out that it is self - contradictory to say that ‘production’ and ‘destruction’ — these two activities exist in the same cause at the same time. Same material cause cannot be a substratum of the two self - contradictory activities like ‘production’ and ‘destruction’. According to the principle of production, an effect, for example, a piece of cloth is produced out of threads. If cause and effect, that is threads and cloth -- these two are identical — then how can we say that cloth is produced out of threads because one thing cannot be said to be produced out of itself? The same is true to destruction. If a piece of cloth and threads are identical, then the former cannot be said to be destroyed in the latter. Again, when we say that a piece of cloth is contained in the threads, we mean the former is *ādheya* (superstratum) and the latter is *ādhāra* (substratum).

And the relation between them is *ādhāra* — *ādheya* — relation. But if cause and effect are identical, then the relation between *ādhāra* and *ādheya* will not hold good on them. But at the same time we cannot deny this relation.

Now the *Satkāryavādins* say that the above argument suggested by the Naiyāyikas cannot prove that cause and effect are not identical. Two different or self - contradictory activities like production and destruction can exist in the same cause at the same time because of the persistence of a material identity between cause and effect. A tortoise, for example, can expand and withdraw its limbs according to its own will. But neither it creates its limbs nor destroys them. When its limbs appear as manifested from its body, then it is called *āvirbhāva* and when they disappear in it, it is called *tirobhāva*. Its limbs are not different from its body. A gold ring is not different from its material cause. So the Naiyāyikas' argument does not hold good.

But this argument, according to the Naiyāyikas does not prove that material cause and effect are essentially identical. We cannot say that effect is the extended form of the cause and sometimes it is contracted in it like the limbs of a tortoise. In our experience, we do not find any effect like a pot limited by pothood resides in its material cause, namely, clay. Hence it is true that the material cause, and the effect is identical.

Now against the view of the prior non-existence, of the effect, Vācaspati Miśra raises some objections. First, if every effect be really non-existent before production, the production (*utpatti*) itself of the effect too must be non-existent and one would have to admit a further production of that production itself. Again, on the same ground, further and further productions would have to be admitted for each successive production and there would be no escape from the fallacy of *infinite regress*. To avoid this fallacy one may try to maintain that the production of the jar is something identical with the jar itself and hence, the question of a further production of the production does not arise. But such an admission involves another difficulty. In this view, statements like 'the jar is produced' etc. involve tautology and become meaningless because, the jar and its production being identical, the use of only either of the terms 'jar' and 'produced' would suffice. Even if we admit the distinction between the effect and its production, the Naiyāyikas have to define production only as the inherence of the universal of existence (*sattā*) in the effect. And since inherence is admitted as eternal, so the production of the effect too becomes eternal. If this be so, what then, would be the necessity of a causal operation according to Naiyāyikas themselves?

To the above question, the answers given by the Naiyāyikas are as follows.

First, even if the production of the jar etc. be admitted as a form of inherence which is eternal, the causal operation would be necessary for bringing the jar etc. themselves into existence, which are non-eternal and absent prior to their production.

Secondly, production may also be defined as a temporal 'relation' with the first moment of existence (*ādyakṣaṇa-sambandha*) and such a relation is really identical with the effect. Thus the success of the causal operation would lie in making such a relation a possibility. The charge that, on the identity of the effect and its production statements like 'the jar is produced' etc. involve tautology is not justified, because the terms 'jar' and 'produced' though referring to the same object (*dharmin*), characterise it quite differently — the former as a locus of the property of producedness (*utpannatva*). So the objections are plausible. Therefore, the theory of *Satkārya* as proposed by the *Sāṃkhya* philosophers can not be accepted in all its aspects.

An effect is a new creation. It is non-existent in its material cause but it is produced anew out of its material cause owing to the rearrangement of its atoms. Curd is non-existent in milk, but it is produced from milk owing to the disintegration of its parts and a fresh collocation of its atoms. The particles of milk endowed with a particular colour and a particular taste

produce curd with a particular taste due to the peculiarity produced by heating. Likewise a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangement of its atoms due to heat. The atoms are qualified by a peculiarity due to heat and produce a new effect. They produce a first peculiarity in the shape of the first swollen condition, then an intermediate swelling, and then the last peculiarity in the shape of germination. A peculiarity is an aid produced in the material cause by the auxiliary causes for the production of an effect, which is therefore not momentary. It is an intermediate aid favourable to the production of an effect.

Regarding causation the Naiyāyikas also do not accept accidentalism proposed by the Cārvākas. For the Naiyāyikas, an object which exists at a certain time and does not exist at another time is called *kādācitka*. This *kādācitka* (effect) object proves that nothing happens accidentally in this world. It is self contradictory to accept *kādācitka padārtha* on the onehand and not to accept causality on the other. So the accidentalists cannot deny the fact that this world is full of *kādācitka padārtha* which has an occasional occurrence as an event. They cannot also deny the fact that these *kādācitka padārtha* is not free from antecedent events. A pot, for example, is a *kādācitka padārtha*. The production of a pot necessitates the different parts of the pot, (*kapāla*), their

conjunction (*kapāla samyoga*) and the potter together with his tools (*kumbhakāra, ḍaṇḍa, cakra* etc) which are also *kādācitka*. It is clear therefore that there are many antecedent events before the production of effect and these antecedent events as well as the series of events become our object of knowledge.

Let us consider whether these *kādācitka padārtha* have any antecedent which we call *niyata pūrvavṛtti* or *niyata pūrvabhāvī*. We know that an invariable relation is agreement in being co-present or co-absent. There is an invariable relation between smoke and fire. Whenever, we see smoke; we find fire. Wherever there is no fire, no smoke. Again, when we see that production of a pot, we find certain antecedent events of pot like *kapāla*, potter etc. always present. These antecedent events are called *niyata pūrvabhāvī* according to Nyāya philosophy and there is a relation between the effect and its antecedent events out of which the effect is produced.

Here the accidentalists may raise a question: how can we be sure about the invariability of the effect such & antecedent events which we call *niyata pūrvabhāvī* in all cases of past, present and future?

To circumvent this difficulty, the Naiyāyikas say that it is not necessary to perceive all instances in order to assert

something about all of them. We can conclusively say that fire is the invariable antecedent of smoke on perceiving smoke issuing forth from fire in the kitchen in one case. Repeated perception of smoke and fire cannot help us to draw the conclusion because repeated perception amounts to many singular perceptions, each being piled upon another. Repeated observation is, in fact, unique observation made many times. Therefore, perception of one case should be considered as enough. What we learn not from one object, we can never learn from a hundred, which are all of the same kind, and are perfectly resembling in every circumstance. Now one may ask that if perception of one instance is enough then what is the necessity of repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*)? To this, the Naiyāyikas say that in order to remove doubt, whether, fire is the invariable antecedent of smoke, repeated observation is needed.

Still a question arises: namely, what is its use of perception of one case of fire and smoke is considered enough? In answer to this the Naiyāyikas say that it is true that we take the help of repeated observation in order to settle any doubt with regard to the invariable antecedent of the cause over the effect. But that does not mean that doubting should be endless. There must be a limit to doubting and it must have a sound basis. Endless doubting without any appreciable ground is

meaningless. Hence, so long as no sufficient ground is being shown to the contrary, we must maintain that fire is an invariable antecedent of smoke. And this can be done on the basis of perception of one single instance. Still, the accidentalists raise another question. They say that it is due to our habit or custom that we associate fire with smoke. Hence, there is no point in asking whether we do this. The question lies deeper : whether we are justified in substituting an objective relation for subjective expectation. In other words, how do we know that fire and smoke are related objectively?

To this, the Naiyāyikas argue that it is not possible for us even to think of the objects as subjectively associated if they are not objectively related. We know that knowledge itself is formless; it takes the form of that which becomes its object. Hence, there can be no objectless knowledge. Knowledge becomes different because of its different objects. Knowledge of a pot is different from the knowledge of a piece of cloth and the difference lies not in knowledge, but in objects. Grasping knowledge without the object of knowledge is simply impossible. The nature of knowledge is such that it cannot create any new relation which appears in knowledge. It can just change the order of objects and their relation, but cannot form any new relation. Now one may say that sometimes knowledge creates new relation which does not have any

actual existence ; for example, hare's horn, sky-lotus etc. To this, the Naiyāyikas say that here the hare, the horn, the sky, the lotus have objective existence but the relation between them is unreal. And the question is: how do we know that the relation between them is unreal ? The answer is that this is because in our experience we do not find such relation. We can relate horns even to hare because in our experience we find that certain animals such as, cows, buffaloes etc. possess horn. It follows therefore that sometimes knowledge introduces a relation which is not found among objects. But that does not mean that it creates altogether new relations. Knowledge only reveals the relation which only binds the objects as found in nature. Knowledge reveals, for example, a pot as characterised by pothood. And the relation between pot and pothood is *samavāya*. That is, if knowledge reveals pot and pothood, it also reveals the relation between the two. Hence it can be said that, if there is no defect in knowledge, then it binds the objects in such relation as is found in nature. There is no sound basis for doubting whether such objective relation between objects exist — a relation which is really discovered, and not invented by knowlege.

Now one may raise a relevant objection here. He may argue that there is really no invariable antecedent of an effect which is non-eternal. In our experience, we find that a

particular effect may be produced out of different causes. "Death, for example, may be due to diseases, accidents and other causes. Likewise, fire may be produced by straw (*trṇa*) in one case, by tender-sticks (*arāṇi*) in another and by jewel (*maṇi*) in a third circumstance"<sup>7</sup>. But none of the antecedents is really invariable. We do not have any agreement in presence (*anvaya*) and agreement in absence (*vyatireka*) in such cases. Of course, there is agreement between fire and straw; that is, fire is produced in the presence of straw. But there is no agreement in absence between fire and straw, because fire may be produced out of tinder-sticks in the absence of straw. Same thing happens in other cases as well. According to the Naiyāyikas, this difficulty can be removed if we treat the effect not as same in all cases but only similar. Let us illustrate it with examples. Fire produced by tinder-sticks is different from fire produced by straw. There is agreement both in presence and in absence between straw and fire produced by straw ; between jewel and fire produced by jewel, between tinder-sticks and fire produced by tinder - sticks. We can testify that one fire is different from another through our experience. Suppose, I want to light my room, here I must seek fire produced out of flame and not fire present in red-hot-iron-ball. Now if we recognise the differences in fire (*vahnivaijātya*), then no difficulty will arise regarding the

invariable antecedence of fire. Some Western logicians also maintain the view that we can specialise the effect in order to overcome the difficulty arising out of the plurality of causes. This is called specialising the effect. The Naiyāyikas remove the difficulty in another way. Like the Western logicians, they hold that, if we generalise the effect, we must generalise the cause as well. This is called generalising the cause. To fire in general (*vahni-sāmānya*), the Naiyāyikas maintain that '*vijātīyauṣṇāsparsāvat teja*' is the cause of fire in general. The feeling of heat is there in fire; but fire as hot is not the cause of fire because one is not of different nature (*vijātīya*) from the other. In other words, the significance of adding the component '*vijātīya*' (heterogeneous) is to exclude the possibility of fire which feels hot, that is, (*uṣṇa sparsāvān: teja*) is homogeneous (*svajātīya*) with fire (*vahni*) in general. Hence, by '*vijātīyauṣṇāsparsā*' we mean the feeling of heat as present in *ṭṛṇa*, *araṇi* and *maṇi* (straw, tinder-sticks and jewel). In short, the fire which is present in straw, tinder sticks and jewel is not homogeneous but heterogeneous relation to the effect, fire, and so is regarded as the cause of the latter.

It is clear, therefore, that *kārya* is that which is *kādācitka* and *kāraṇa* is that which is invariable antecedent to the effect. Every effect exists for sometime. This is why,

we must have to accept that nothing happens, accidentally in this world. Hence accidentalism cannot be accepted at all.

The Naiyāyikas theory of causation is called *Astkāryavāda*. For them, an effect is a new creation. It is non-existent in its material cause, but it is produced anew out of its material cause, owing to the rearrangement of its atoms. Curd is non-existent in milk, but it is produced from milk owing to the disintegration of its parts and a fresh collocation of its atoms.

The particles of milk endowed with a particular colour and a particular taste produce curd with a particular taste due to the peculiarity produced by heating. Likewise a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangement of its atoms due to heat. They are qualified by a peculiarity due to heat, and produce a new effect. This new effect is distinct from its cause and can never be identical with it. It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought into existence by the operation of the cause.

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