

CHAPTER - 5
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

In this dissertation, it has already been pointed out that 'metaphor' is taken in a very larger sense. It means 'to go beyond the given'. This type of 'going beyond' may be possible through the use of *Upamā* (simile), *Utprekṣā* (poetical fancy), *Atiśayokti* (hyperbole), *Vyatireka* (disparity), *Lakṣaṇā* (implication) or *Dhvani* (suggestion). Sometimes this transcendence provides us aesthetic experience. In fact, for such experience, the use of metaphor in the above mentioned sense is a precondition. Metaphor in the sense of *Dhvani* can be realised by the audience because it is something that is uttered. As soon as it is uttered, it suggests something which is 'beyond the given'. That is why it is suggestive meaning. Whenever it acquires suggestive meaning, it is not conjoined with the audible quality, but it acquires the power of illumination. When a word is uttered, it is no doubt *Dhvani* or resonance. But such resonance gives rise to a higher order of understanding which is compared to *light* in as much as the light alone has got the power of illumination.

For this reason, *Dhvani* does not possess resonance alone, but through it *Dhvani* can throw some light. In order to show the enormous power of such metaphorical meaning in the sense of suggestion, Ānandavardhana, the propounder of *Dhvani* school, has given his book the title "*Dhvanyāloka*", which literally means 'the light of suggestion'. This metaphor of light has got a tremendous significance in highlighting the importance or inevitability of metaphorical use in language. Language, though heard, can provide 'light' to someone who can go far away from the given knowing no bound of it. In order to support this standpoint Abhinavagupta, a great commentator of *Dhvanyāloka*, has given his commentary the title '*Locana*', which means *eye*. It is the function of eye to see the light. If a human being is deaf, he can be illuminated by the light of *Dhvani* through his eyes. Even if he possesses the power of hearing, he is not always capable of grasping the same at the secondary level. The object that was heard at the initial stage has been functioning as an illuminating factor i.e., light to him. It may be contended that hearing has a prominent role in providing vision to a connoisseur (*Sahrdaya*). If someone cannot hear, he is not able to

receive light particularly in the case of drama. Nevertheless, in the other forms of literary art such hearing is not always essential. In these cases vision comes through the seeing of the sentences or letters used in a piece of literature. But it should be kept in mind that the reverse is not true, because one who hears the poetry cannot always appreciate it due to the lack of *Sahrdyatva*. Hence, to receive light eye is the suitable sense organ. Light of *Dhvani* is already there, but it has to be received or apprehended. Otherwise, the existence of light will be of no use. That is why, eye only can receive the light. So, the *Locana* or eye is the receiver of the same light. Abhinavagupta's *Locana* is also a kind of metaphorical expression. Again, eye may be taken as an instrument of normal vision (*Sthūladṛṣṭi*) or subtle vision (*Sukṣmadṛṣṭi*). In other words, eye can reveal those that are very much proximate to it and at the same time, it can reveal those that are beyond the limit of time and space. In fact, this second type of 'vision' is found in the case of aesthetic experience. A beautiful piece of art object can provide us aesthetic delight, which is not confined to a particular time and space. Such statement is true in the case of literary art also. In this

connection, we may recall Rabindranāth who also subscribes this view. In his poem "*Nilmañilatā*" he aptly says – '*Yena itihāsajāle bāndhā naha deśe kāle*' (as if a beautiful object is not bound with space, time or any net of history). Such is the grace of the subtle vision, which is provided by this *eye* also. In fact, our normal eye is associated with an inner eye, which is described in the *Upaniṣad* as '*Cakṣuṣaḥ cakṣu*' (eye of the eye). It cannot be ignored by considering it as a mere tautology. It has got a deeper significance, which has been explained by the seers, yogins etc. This subtle vision has been described in various ways by different thinkers – '*Prajñā*' according to the Buddhists, 'surplus power' according to Rabindranāth, 'super power' according to Sri Aurobindo and '*Kulakuṇḍalinī śakti*' by Patañjali. Abhinavagupta also has accepted such power as intuitive power or vision. Such vision is achieved through *Yoga* or contemplation. The use of *Dhvani* is instrumental to such realisation. That is why such usage is highly significant in an art object to have aesthetic delight, the influence of which in our life cannot be ignored.

The Naiyāyikas have not admitted suggestion (*Dhvani*) as a different form of meaning. On the other hand, they have accepted it as an extension of implication (*Lakṣaṇā*). If *Dhvani* or suggestion is so important, why do the Naiyāyikas admit it as an extension of *Lakṣaṇā* or implication? In reply, one justification may be adduced in favour of their conclusion. In fact, as realists, they cannot admit such suggestion, which is far-fetched in the phenomenon of linguistic meaning. When it is said – ‘*Gaṅgāyāmi ghoṣoḥ*’ (i.e., the milkman colony is on the Ganges), the term ‘*Gaṅgā*’ means ‘the bank of the Ganges’ through implication. But the suggestive meaning though connected with the primary and secondary meaning, is far-fetched in the sense that it has been abstracted. In the second order when ‘the bank of the Ganges’ is taken into account, it is due to the incompatibility of the intention of the speaker with the primary meaning (*Tātparyānupapatti*). As a village cannot remain in the flow of water of the Ganges, the meaning of the term ‘*Gaṅgā*’ is taken as ‘the bank of it’ due to the inconsistency with its primary meaning also (*Mukhyārtha bādha*). A sensible speaker cannot say that such non-sensible sentence like – ‘The village is on the Ganges’ and

hence the speaker's intention is inferred and assumed the secondary meaning. Though this is also a kind of abstraction, it is not a far-fetched one. If there is further query as to why the village is 'on the bank of the Ganges', and not other places, it may lead to another type of abstraction. As on the bank of *Gaṅgā* there is coolness (*Sāitya*) and airiness (*Pāvanatva*), it has been selected for the colony. The second order secondary implication, which may be taken as suggestive meaning, is unnecessary for them. They do not think that such second order abstraction is at all possible, because it depends on the speaker's intention. But there is no necessity to give it a different place like *Dhvani*. Even this type of far-fetched abstraction is nothing but a form of implication. If such meaning is available through implication, what is the use of admitting the suggestive meaning?

In response to the above, the propagators of the *Dhvanivādi* school are of the opinion that this cannot be described as merely an extension of implication because it has already been described as a far-fetched one. If it is really a far-fetched one, it is not of first order abstraction. If the first order abstraction is described as

Lakṣaṇā, the second order abstraction should be given some other name in order to differentiate it from the *Lakṣaṇā*. When the term *Gaṅgā* is secondarily explained as *Gaṅgātīra* (bank of the Ganges), there is no doubt an incompatibility of the speaker's intention and therefore a way out has been chosen after admitting secondary implication or *Lakṣaṇā* of it; but when it means coolness (*Śaitya*) and airiness (*Pāvanatva*), this meaning does not follow from the said incompatibility of the speaker's intention. In fact, there was incompatibility of relation also (*Anvayānupapatti*) in the earlier case, because village cannot be related to flow of water and hence implication was resorted to. However, in the later case there is no such incompatibility of relation so far as the semantic factor is concerned. This meaning comes out of the queries of the speaker, which may lead to different nature of meaning, which is described as *Dhvani* by the rhetoricians. As a matter of fact, on the culminating point of primary and secondary meaning there arises a different type of potency called suggestion, which is novel and unique in character. When other meanings lose their power of denotation, a new potency called *Vyañjanā* emerges out of them. This suggestive meaning

cannot be included on them because it is suggestive meaning having no relation with the primary and secondary one.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Grammarians did not admit *Vyañjanā* or *Dhvani* as a separate entity, because they admit a separate power called *Tātparyasakti* (the power in the form of intention of the speaker) apart from primary and secondary meaning. This power of *Tātparya* (*Tātparyasakti*) has enormous power to reveal what is called suggestive meaning. Thus, suggestion, if any, is the result of the power of the intention of the speaker, leading to the non-acceptance of *Dhvani* as a separate entity. Nevertheless, the *Dhvani* school out and out rejects the thesis after considering its independent status in the phenomenon of linguistic analysis. Ānandavardhana and others do not admit any power in the intention of the speaker, though Abhinavagupta has admitted second category of power in *Tātparya*. To them, the intention of the speaker helps in relating a word to another, but cannot reveal their meaning. At the initial stage, meaning available from the primary potency becomes exhausted. Afterwards, *Lakṣaṇā* can extend the meaning to certain extent and get an extended meaning. With this, the power of

Lakṣaṇā is also exhausted leading to the completion of the power of the speaker's intention (*Tātparyasākti*). Apart from these, there is a specific novel power in a word, which can transcend the limitation of the relation between a word and its meaning and express a wider meaning of the same. This power is suggestion or *Vyañjanā*, which has a prominent role in literary form of art. Through the instrumentality of such suggestive meaning, an individual will be in a position to find out a way of aesthetic delight that is free from pathological sorrows or miseries. Such is the mystic power of suggestive language, which has to be admitted as a special entity in the phenomenon of language as such. To the aestheticians, the disinterested, otherworldly pleasure cannot be generated in one's mind by words having direct meaning (*Abhidhā*). Such pleasure can be generated through metaphorical use of words, because such experience is always *Vyaṅgya* or suggested and not directly posited. Herein lies the beauty and significance of metaphorical language.

A question may again be raised as to how the use of *Dhvani* can help in delineating *Rasa* in a piece of literature. In reply it can be said that the direct expression of any sentiment particularly of love,

does not create poetic beauty. If the same sentiment is expressed indirectly in a crooked way, it is easy to generate aesthetic sentiment in an individual. That is why, *Rasa* is always *Vyañgya* or suggested. Just as cooked vegetables (called *Vyañjana*) can help an individual to enjoy the eatables, the suggestion or *Dhvani* (called *Vyañjanā*) helps an individual to enjoy aesthetic delight. In this connection, the phonetic similarity between the terms *Vyañjana* and *Vyañjanā* is remarkable. This phenomenon of *Dhvani* being associated with various emotions (*Bhāvas*) generates such aesthetic delight in a connoisseur. In fact, *Dhvani* is the revealer of aesthetic pleasure. The word, meaning, style, rhetoric etc. are the promoters to realise aesthetic pleasure. They are essential for the manifestation of *Rasa*, but they are not instrumental to generation of the same. It is *Dhvani* that generates the aesthetic pleasure (*Rasa*) and for this reason it is called soul of poetry. A literary piece of art, like a woman, must need beautiful limbs like nose, eyes, hands etc. and beautiful ornaments; but they are not *all*. Over and above these, she should need a basic thing pervading the whole body (*Prasiddhāvayavātirikta*) called glamour (*Lāvanya*). If a poem is

compared with a woman, its body comprises of word, meaning, rhetoric etc. and *Dhvani* is its soul.

The metaphor of *Lāvanya* is very much significant in this context. This can easily be understood if we consider the etymological meaning of the term '*Lāvanya*'. The term '*Lāvanya*' means '*Lavanasya bhāvah*' i.e., a state of being salty. A salty thing is called as having *Lāvanya*, which is again significant in bringing palatability in the vegetables. If there is a situation when someone cooks vegetables or some eatables with the help of everything essential for cooking like oil, spices etc. but without salt, the vegetable cooked would be non-palatable or non-presentable even non-eatable. All efforts become in vain due to the lack of salt. Such is the case of *Dhvani*, which makes a literary art palatable to others through generation of aesthetic pleasure in it. Hence, it is correctly metaphorised as glamour of the women (*Lāvanyamiva anganāsu*).

One can raise a problem in connection with the use of metaphor in the sense of *Dhvani*, so far as it is taken as an inevitable factor in a literary form of art. It may happen that the poet uses a

beautiful metaphor having an equally beautiful meaning, but the reader or audience cannot follow the same. If there is a problem of communication between a poet and the reader or audience, the *Dhvani* remains unintelligible. Again, it sometimes happens that we see an art film full of suggestions, but we cannot understand the same leading to the lack of aesthetic enjoyment on our part.

The problem raised above is a genuine one. Following the line of Indian rhetoricians it can be said that *Dhvani* should be treated as a real one if it is communicated to the audience, because, the charm of suggestive meaning lies in its understanding. If it is not at all communicable to others, it is not a good metaphor. For this reason the topic entitled 'Communication in Art' occupies a prominent place in the Philosophy of Art. It is not true only in the case of *Dhvani*, but also in the cases of *Alamkāra*, *Guṇa* etc. If a poet uses a particular simile (*Upamā*), which is not understood by the readers, it would be taken as a bad simile or obscure mode of presentation, which has in fact no literary value. Before using metaphors, the poet should keep their intelligibility in mind. Otherwise, such use of metaphor would be a futile exercise. Any type of literary form of art is meant for the

connoisseur. If an individual sitting in the hall among the audience cannot understand what is communicated through the presentation of the drama, it fails to generate aesthetic sentiment in him. If metaphor used in the literature is obscure in nature, it should be treated as a defect. The ancient rhetoricians have discussed at length on the defects of literature. If a poet uses some words, which are not found in a civilized society, it is described as having defect of *Grāmyatā*, which is to be avoided in literature. In the same way, it can be said that obscurity is a defect of language. Dandin always prefers to have language endowed with lucidity (*Prasāda*) and forcefulness (*Ojasvī*). If language (poetic) bears only forcefulness, it may be obscure to others. Therefore, it is necessary that forcefulness must be associated with lucidity so that it becomes communicable to others. If the language used by the poet fails to communicate with others, it is the defect of the language. Moreover, the question of sharing of emotion with the dramatic characters arises only when there is a successful linguistic communication. Otherwise, the phenomenon of *Sahridayatva* would be an impossible or utopian entity. If it were not possible, literature would not turn

into an art-object, because the truth of literature is to generate aesthetic delight among the audience.

It may be argued that linguistic crookedness (*Vakratā*) is treated as an unwanted or undesired phenomenon in our day-to-day communication. When someone indirectly attacks others with the help of some crooked language, it is advised to take a straight path in communication without adopting such *vicious* means. Everybody wants to have a free dialogue without taking recourse to linguistic tricks or hide and seek in language. If so, how is such language taken as *virtuous* in literature?

In justifying the use of metaphorical language, it has already been pointed out that the crooked language has virtuous effect in the field of art. That which is vicious in ordinary domain of life becomes virtuous in the region of art. The crooked language or crooked way of expression is normally taken as vicious, yet it may sometimes be inevitable for the generation of aesthetic sentiment. For this reason, the vicious crookedness (linguistic) is favourable and result-oriented (*Phalamukha vakratā*). The logical cumbrousness (*Gaurava*), which is

regarded as a defect, may sometimes become an inevitable method due to the lack of other alternatives. Under such situation, *Gaurava* (logical cumbrousness) is taken as favourable (*Phalamukhagaurava*). Therefore, it is treated as virtuous and not vicious. In the like manner, the linguistic crookedness as available in suggestion should be regarded as virtuous as it is the only means to generate aesthetic delight.

It may be argued that the suggestive meaning helps an individual to enjoy the aesthetic pleasure after identifying himself with the dramatic character. The function of suggestion is to establish an identity between them (*Ekātmata*). For this reason, an individual can 'feel' the happiness or misery of the dramatic character. In this connection, it should also be kept in mind that like identification or association, there must also be the sense of dissociation. Through association, a connoisseur shares the feeling of them and through dissociation, the feeling becomes impersonal and disinterested.

Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* has beautifully handled the above-mentioned problem. There, it appears, is a built in paradox in the experience. Experiences are intentional in having objects and they are owned by their subject. There is the Vedantic distinction between *Dr̥k* and *Dr̥śya*, the owner of the experience and the object of experience. When I am moved to fears by the pathos of the dramatised character, whom does the sorrow belong to – the dramatic person or me? That is the problem and calls for a metaphysical resolution. Viśvanātha has suggested one line approach and it is worthwhile to look into the thesis. What is the locus of the feeling experienced in course of our aesthetic encounters with the *dramatis personae*?

This is a fact that the nature of aesthetic experience is indeterminate in the sense that it is not easy to locate the substratum of the experience. It is not determinable whether it belongs to me or to the other i.e., objects. Viśvanātha captures the uniqueness of the experience by saying – *'Parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca / Tadāsvādervibhāvāvadeḥ paricchedo na vidyate //'*¹ At the time of the enjoyment of the *Vibhāva* etc., there

is no determinant in the sense that they do belong neither to others nor to me. At the same time, the feeling belongs to me as well as does not belong to me. In fact, there is no determinant through which the nature of experience or substratum of the awareness could be mapped.

In the *Kusumapratimā*, commentary on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, the point is explicated in the following manner. Before the aesthetic experience occurs, the joys and sorrows depicted in the drama belong solely to the dramatic characters, as no communication had been yet established with the audience. The activities like crossing the sea etc. (*Samudralanghanādivyāpāra*) which are enacted on the stage, belonged to the heroes like Rāma etc. (*Rāmāderāsīt*) in the past, but at present the act of *observation* (*Darśanādivyāpāra*) of such activities belongs to me due to empathic involvement with the characters of the drama, but it is not any longer related to the heroes like Rāma etc. In the same way, the phenomenon of *viewing* etc. (*Darśanādivyāpāra*) of activities belongs to me, whereas the real activities like crossing the sea etc. (*Samudralanghanādivyāpāra*) do not belong to me. The difference of the dramatic activities with our

soul does not remain at all due to the difference of time and action. The term '*iti*' used twice signifies both others and me just as the principle involved in the analogy of the eyeball of a crow (*Kākākṣigolakanyāya*). In order to show that there is basic difference between the audience (connoisseur) on the one hand and the heroes like Rāma etc. on the other and also between the two types of activities, the usage of '*iti*' has been taken appropriately employed.²

It has also been stated that the activities staged by the actors for the dramatic persons certainly belong to others as well as not to others. It belongs to me and does not belong to me as well. The activities belong to the dramatic characters (*Parasya*), but the present awareness of such activities (*Darśanādivyāpāra*) does not belong to them (*Na parasyeti*). On the other hand, the present awareness of the activities performed by the dramatic characters belongs to me (*Mameti*), but the real activities do not belong to me (*Na mameti ca*), as they are performed by the characters in drama. In fact, in such cases, there is a self-identity no doubt, but there is self-distancing no less. When it is felt that they belong to me (*Mameti*), not to others (*Parasyeti na*), it is a result of self-identity

(Ekātmata) as evidenced from the Viśvanātha's statement – "*Pramāṭā tadabhedena svātmānam pratipadyate*" i.e., the subject sees himself in the object being identified with it.³

When the same phenomenon is interpreted as belonging to others (*Parasya*), and not belonging to me (*Mama*), there is a psychological distance, which makes our feelings impersonal. Had there been self-identity alone, it would have been taken as a case of personal or pathological feeling, but not a non-pathological one.

The Western thinkers have accepted the concept of psychological distance involved in aesthetic experience. Looking back to Kant perhaps Bullough's theory of 'psychical distance' maintains that an individual actively distances himself from any object or even in such a way that he can dissociate himself from the practical mode of awareness and its consequences. The phenomenon of aesthetic delight is possible through such psychological distance. One can have aesthetic delight after seeing fog in the sea, as for example. The passengers aboard in the ship may be in agony regarding the consequences of the future accident due to the fog, as they fail to

distance themselves from these practical modes. Had they been able to distance themselves appropriately, they would have tasted the aesthetic delight. Bullough's usage of the term 'distance' in the context of aesthetic experience is quite different from its use in ordinary language. In ordinary usage, the term 'distance' means the measurement of space between two points or places, which means spatial distance. Bullough uses it in a special sense and calls it 'psychical'. The delight arising from the aesthetic experience is not related to our personal loss or gain. In aesthetic experience, an individual does not allow personal factors to affect his perception. An event, if viewed by maintaining the proper psychical distance, provides us aesthetic delight. When personal considerations become factors in a feeling, an individual is affected by the series of personal emotions. Aesthetic experience is not based on such personal feelings or desires and hence it is of disinterested nature. In the aesthetic experience, we are directly aware of the object. In exercising the distance, a relation between self and the object is not totally denied. Bullough thinks, 'Distance does not imply an impersonal, purely intellectually interested relation of such a kind.

On the contrary, it describes a personal relation, often highly emotionally coloured, that of a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in that personal character of the relation, which has been, so to speak, filtered'.⁴ From the above statement it is obvious that Bullough also has maintained a relation between self and the art-object as well as distancing between them, which is so similar to the view expressed by Viśvanātha in the dictum – '*Parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca ...*'

The indeterminate character of the aesthetic experience can also be substantiated through the following observations: that the aesthetic pleasure is somewhat paradoxical in character can further be known from the fact that the emotional mood involved in grief also gives rise to the realisation of joy. In normal life, one feels happy and miserable from the joyful and painful situations respectively. How is joy realised from the painful situations depicted in a piece of literature? In this situation, our mind is absorbed in the performances and this absorption depends on the equilibrium of mind. When our mind is disturbed, the pain follows. If our mind remains in the state of aesthetic experience, there is something,

which forcibly snatches our mind away from the everyday world and keeps it in a state of complete rest, which is called *Viśrānti*. Professor K.Krishnamoorthy observes – “When a human situation is artistically presented usually against the background of the nature, the critic does not get himself transported to the peak of *rasaviśrānti* or repose. It is in fact the last stage of his contemplation. Leading up to it are the diverse impressions he is receiving from different angles, almost simultaneously. His imaginative sensibility helps him in reception while his intellect is at work all along sorting them out. When the intellect and imagination slide into the margin, his heart is moved to an intense aesthetic state of repose which is an end in itself”.⁵ It is the aesthetic pleasure, which only can do the miracle. The joy is endowed with a mystic power by which audience can enjoy bliss even out of the depiction of painful situation, but in our practical life, human nature is found averse to experiencing pain. For this reason, Viśvanātha remarks that poetry is a peculiarly unworldly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of supernatural, supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life, sorrow originates from sorrow, fear

follows fear; but in the world of poetry, we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and even terrible situations. Such *Virodhābhāsa* is just like the experience – ‘it belongs to others and does not belong to others’ (*Parasya na parasyeti*).

The active process of concentration (*Yoga*) is generally characterised in respect of the perceiver as one of complete detachment from practical action; complete disinterestedness from any practical ends of life and perhaps also a certain kind of psychical distancing. To what extent such detachment, disinterestedness and distancing are possible, is a question that has not been satisfactorily answered. Thus, detached, disinterested and distanced perceiver experiences a sort of intense joy and delight arising out of tasting Brahman.

The pleasure derived from art is a kind of spiritual joy, transcendental and super sensuous. This is a concept difficult to be proved or disproved by reason because the existence and conception of soul are matters of never-ending controversy. If I do not have necessary scientific data to prove the existence of soul, I

do not, at the same time, have any unimpeachable evidences to disprove it. Viśvanātha has eulogized the transcendental nature of aesthetic experience after considering its true manifestation. To him such a nature of aesthetic pleasure is not a defect, rather it is an ornament (*Alaukikatvameteṣāṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ na tu dūṣaṇaṃ*).⁶ The factors generating aesthetic pleasure are also taken to be ornamental (*Bhūṣaṇaṃ*). In other words, they are efficacious for the manifestation of *Rasa* just like ornaments (*Bhūṣaṇavadupakāraṇaṃ rasābhīrābhāvānukūlamityarthaḥ*)⁷ are.

In holding out the thesis '*Parasya na paraesyeti...*', Viśvanātha has outlined the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. The two poles of the experience, the *Dr̥k* and the *Dr̥śya*, have distinguishable properties, and yet, the *Dr̥k*, the subject experiences the states of mind and feelings that do not, properly speaking, belong to it, and yet they are somehow *owned temporarily* by the subject or the person who experiences. This is the mystical about aesthetic experience. Viśvanātha has succinctly laid bare the philosophical foundation for the viability of the aesthetic experience. He occupies

the foremost place among those of matured thought who had expounded the *Dhvani* school.

A question may again be raised as to whether metaphor can be taken as intuitive cognition (*Pratibhājñāna*). According to Gopīnātha Kavirāja, *Pratibhā* literally means a flash of light, which reveals the objects. The light is 'the wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness'.⁸ In fact *Pratibhā* is such a wisdom as having capacity to illuminate the objects newly again and again.⁹ *Pratibhā* is described as 'suprarational apperception'.¹⁰ It bears some similarity with Aurobindo's philosophy. He says, "It comes out from something deep within which calls down the world-vision, the light and power from a level above the normal mind (i.e., over mind)".¹¹ In Western Philosophy such type of vision is also accepted where it is described as intuition. Croce says that this intuition is a distinct species differing from intuition-in-general by something more.¹² In this world there are many mystic things that cannot be perceived or known by our ordinary sense organs. Nevertheless, there is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that unknown or mystic world. This faculty is known as *Pratibhā*.¹³

Metaphor is generally used in literary form of art to arouse aesthetic pleasure, which is the product of *Pratibhājñāna* or intuitive cognition. As this pleasure transcends the limitation of personal interest, it is disinterested universal pleasure.¹⁴ As such pleasure is mystic in nature, it must be caused by *Pratibhā* or intuition, which is described by Abhinavagupta as a dwarf image of Brahman.¹⁵

This can be argued that a connoisseur relishing literature transcends his own personal interest and enjoys the pathos or feelings of others without being indifferent to them. The pleasure thus arising through the empathy with the characters of the drama is designated disinterested or non-pathological. This point can be rendered viable by the following argument. An individual's attitude towards an object may be of three modes: inclination (*Pravṛtti*), refraining from it (*Nivṛtti*) and indifference to it (*Upekṣā*). Human inclination presupposes the knowledge of the conduciveness of what is desired (*Iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) and refraining from some activity implies an awareness or knowledge of the conduciveness of what is not desired (*Aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna*). If there be any object or activity, which is related, neither to the conduciveness of what is

desired nor undesired, there arises the attitude of indifference. As the pleasure or grief of a dramatic character is not related to our direct interest, we should have shown an indifferent attitude to them. Nevertheless, it is found that we are inclined in a free manner perhaps to share their joys and sorrows and enjoy disinterested pleasure, which can be characterized as non-pathological. From this it follows that the domain of aesthetic experience is qualitatively different from the experiences of mundane world. In the mundane world we generally derive pathological (*Laukika*) pleasure on being told 'your son is born' (*Putraste jātaḥ*) or sorrowfulness when told 'your unwed daughter has conceived' (*Kanyā te garbhinī*) etc., but the non-pathological aesthetic pleasures are non-mundane (*Lokottara*). From this it may be inferred that such aesthetic experience is transcendental or mystic in nature.

The transcendental or *Pratibhā* character of such cognition may also be brought home with the help of the following considerations. If it is argued that the scenes, background music etc. (in the case of the dramatic performance) are the causes of the realisation of aesthetic experience, the question arises whether

these causes are producers (*Kārahetu*) or revealers (*Jñāpakahetu*). The *Kārahetu* ceases to exist with the advent of the effect. As for example, a table made by a carpenter may last even after the death of its maker. So far as aesthetic experience is concerned, it ceases if the scene, background music etc. are withdrawn and hence they are not to be taken as producers. On the other hand, they cannot be put under *Jñāpakahetu* because aesthetic pleasure did not pre-exist before scenes, background music etc. were set. When a cause reveals an object, it must be there. As for example, an open door reveals the objects inside the room and so it is called revealer. It cannot be said that the aesthetic experience exists before the causes mentioned above are set. Nothing, properly speaking, is revealed by aesthetic experience but only suggestion of pleasure enjoyed by us. The object created by imagination is neither caused (*Kārya*) nor revealed (*Jñāpya*). It is neither found in the empirical world. The aesthetic enjoyment is mystic and transcendental.¹⁶ From another stand point, aesthetic experience may be considered as mystic. Each and every type of experience must be either determinate (*Savikalpaka*) or indeterminate

(Nirvikalpaka). Such type of experience is not indeterminate because it gives rise to bliss (*Ānanda*). In the indeterminate stage, one has the feeling of indifference; but in the case of aesthetic experience, there is a feeling of bliss and hence it is not indeterminate. It cannot be described as determinate either (which is definite and related to name, quality etc.), because the experience, though blissful is beyond the reach of direct expression. After having enjoyed reading a novel, one may have blissful experience that cannot be explained with the help of description (like name, quality etc.) like any ordinary pleasure. So it is not determinate. As the experience does not come under the purview of both the types of knowledge, it is considered as mystic.¹⁷ Further, each and every type of experience is either wholly true or false. Such type of experience (i.e., aesthetic experience) is not wholly true because it is contradicted by our knowledge of the world just after the aesthetic absorption breaks up. When we return to this practical world from the world of aesthetic experience, we do realise that the characters and the incidents that occurred (in the drama) were not real at all, but imaginary creations. Again, aesthetic experience cannot be designated as wholly false, as

it gives rise to a particular kind of pleasure towards which we are drawn again and again and hence we cannot ignore it by saying that it was unreal. Because of this, the experience can be ignored neither as partially true nor as partially false. This is not possible at all, because such type of object is not found in this world. Hence, it can be concluded that it is mystic in character,¹⁸ which can be known through intuitive cognition (*Pratibhāñāna*).

The theory of metaphor or *Dhvani* is mainly found in the literary form of art. In ancient India, other forms of art like music, dance, painting etc. were equally appreciated. Is it possible to apply such metaphor in other forms of art?

It is the contention of the *Ālanikārikas* that the theory of metaphor or *Dhvani*, though invented in connection with the literary form of art, can be extended to other forms of art also. It has been rightly pointed out by Ānandavardhana that an individual, though conversant in respect of word, meaning and their relation, cannot understand literature until and unless his heart is saturated with aesthetic sentiment. He explains this phenomenon with the help of

an example taken from the world of music. He adds that an individual, though expert in the science of music, cannot understand melody and pleasure arising from it if his heart is not saturated with *Rasa*.¹⁹

The same theory can be applicable to the pictorial form of art also. In the phrase of Abhinavagupta, any type of creative art presupposes *Rasāvesā* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual for its generation. Various experiences in our life are represented in the art objects like literature, picture etc. In order to represent reality one should need a deep concentration which is echoed in the *Bhagavadgītā* - 'Na cāyuktasya bhāvanā'.²⁰ This abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in an artist, dramatic characters and spectators in the case of literary art. In the case of pictorial form of art also there must exist such sentiment among artists, pictorial presentation and the critic. Hence, the property of being a connoisseur (*Sahridayatva*) is not essential for the literature alone but other forms of art also. For being a *Sahridaya*, there must be the use of metaphor to which aesthetic delight comes in. In dance, different postures represent different thoughts through the

path of metaphors or suggestion. Different *Mudrās* of a dance, different patches of colour or lines of picture have specific suggestive or metaphorical meaning. Even a particular note creates a particular suggestion in music too. The same taste of infatuating impersonal disinterested feeling can be traced in dance and music also. A man is found to forget his grief in his personal life at the time of the enjoyment of the performance of music or dance. That the spontaneity is one of the vital characteristics of aesthetic experience from literature can be applied to music and dance also. How far the performance of dance and music is artistic can be inferred from the spontaneity of them along with other factors. If the performance of dance or music is not spontaneous, they may seem to be artificial. As spontaneity comes from within, it belongs to an artist whose heart is absorbed in aesthetic pleasure. If a musician or a dancer is absorbed in such enjoyment within himself, which is usually called *mood* in ordinary language, he cannot help dancing or singing. At this stage only spontaneity comes. Music and dance forms begin and end in aesthetic pleasure. Dance like other arts also has spiritual significance independent of its charms as claimed by

Ānanda Coomār Swāmī. As music and dance clearly express the aesthetic pleasure and enable a man to taste it, they, like literature, give us the wisdom of Brahman.²¹

References:

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2. ‘Tasya rasasya āsvāde bhāvini sati rasāsvādāt pūrvamityarthah. Iti ayam abhinīyamāna ucyamāno vā samudralanghanādivyāpārah, parasya rāmādināyakāderāsīt, iti ayam punarvartamāno darsānādivyāpārah, napaṛasya naiva rāmādināyakādeḥ, tathā iti ayam darsānādivyāpāro mamaiva iti, ayam samudralanghanādivyāpārah punaḥ naiva mama; ittham kriyākālabhedena vibhāvādeḥ paricchedaḥ ātmana saha bhedaññānam na vidyate sabhyasya na vartate. Atra itisābdadvayasyaiva kākākṣigolakajñānena ubhayatraivānvayah. Rāmādināyakādibhiḥ saha sāmājikasya atantabhedasūcanārtham dvividhayā api kriyāyā vyatyayo’pibhedam darsāyitum dvividhoktiritidik’ – *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Haridās Siddhāntavāgīśa (Ed), 1875 (B.S).
3. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* – 3/9.
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5. K.Krishnamoorthy: Traditional Indian Aesthetics in theory and practice: A restatement with special reference to Natyaśāstra and the graphic art (in) *Indian Aesthetics and Art Activity*, IAS, Simla 1968, p.53.
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7. *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Haridās Siddhāntavāgīśa (Ed), 1875 (B.S). p.76

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9. "Prajñā navanavonmesasālinī pratibhā matā" – *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, - V.S.Apte, p. 358, Motilal, 1973.
10. *Indian Thought*, p. 1.
11. Sri Aurobindo : *Future Poetry*, p. 342, Sri Aurobindo Āshrama, Pondicherry.
12. Benedetto Croce : *Aesthetic*, p. 12, Vision Press, London, 1962.
13. *Indian Thought*, p. 1.
14. Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy : *Dhvanyāloka*, Motilal, 1982, p. XXXI.
15. "Parabrahmasvādasavidhah" – *Locana, on Dhvanyāloka*, p. 193, Chowkhamba.
16. A.Sankaran: *The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*, University of Madras, 1973, pp.125-126.
17. *Ibid*.
18. Raghunath Ghosh: *Is Aesthetic Experience Mystic? Review of Darshana*, Vol. IV, Nos. 3-4. University of Allahabad, pp.13-22, 1986.
19. "Atha ca vācya-vācaka-lakṣaṇamātrakṛtaśramāṇām
kāvyatattvārthabhāvanāvimukhānām svaraśrutyādilakṣaṇamivāpragītānām
gāndharvalakṣaṇavidāmagocara evāsāvarthah"
prose portion of Kārikā No. 1/7 of *Dhvanyāloka*.
20. *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* – 2/66.
21. Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy : *Studies in Indian Aesthetic and Criticism*, Mysore, 1979, p.257