

CHAPTER - 4
METAPHOR IN SIMILARITY,
IDENTITY AND UPAMĀNAPRAMĀNA

This is avowedly granted that *Rūpaka* or metaphor is based on an element of identity. Yet one cannot deny the basic element of similarity underlying this identity. If two things are said to be similar to each other, they are believed to possess some common as well as some uncommon factors and it is on the basis of these common factors that their similarity is traced. On the other hand, if they are said to be identical, then the existence of uncommon factors is denied and they are no longer two distinct objects.

Metaphor is used after keeping the characters of the object called *Upameya* in view. The identification between *Upameya* and *Upamāna* is possible if there are extreme similarities (*Atisāmyāt*) between them. If they lack extreme similarities, the metaphors are not to be taken as healthy. If an argument is able to substantiate the thesis and reject the antithesis, it is called good argument (*Sutarka*). Otherwise, it is called bad argument (*Kutarka*). In the same way, if

Upamāna can adequately explain the extreme similarities with the *Upameya*, it is good metaphor. On the other hand, where *Upamāna* cannot explain the extreme similarities with the *Upameya*, it is bad metaphor, which gives rise to a defect technically called *Dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntika-virodha* (i.e., contradiction in respect of *Upamāna* and *Upameya*). We can mention here the Advaita Vedāntin's critique of Sāṃkhya. In *Tarkapāda* chapter Saṃkara has criticised the Sāṃkhya view that the world is originated through mutual cooperation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* metaphorised as *Andhapaṅgunyāya*. It is the contention of the Advaita that the Sāṃkhya Philosophers have committed a mistake by using a metaphor mentioned above which cannot substantiate their position due to having the defect called *Dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntika-virodha* i.e., contradiction found between a metaphor and the object metaphorised. To them both blind and lame men are conscious, but both *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are not conscious and hence cooperation is not possible. Here we find a fallacious metaphor which is vicious (not virtuous) which is otherwise called a bad metaphor.¹ The Metaphor in the form of cooperation between lame and blind men is not the same with that existing between

Puruṣa and *Prakṛti*. In the former both are conscious but not in the latter. Hence, there is not extreme similarity (*Atisāmya*) between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. Therefore, it is a case of bad metaphor. It is to be taken for granted that between *Upamāna* and *Upameya* there is the similarity, but not absolute identity.

In all metaphors, there is a sense of similarity. In case of inference (*Anumāna*) there is a hidden similarity. In inference we make an assertion about something unknown and unseen on the basis of something known or seen. In case of inferential cognition (*Anumiti*) the perceptual knowledge of probans (*Hetu*) and the invariable relation (*Vyāpti*) of probans (*Hetu*) and probandum (*Sādhya*) are essential. If a person finds smoke in a hill and if he knows wherever there is smoke there is fire, he comes to the definite conclusion that there is fire in that hill. Now in this inferential cognition (*Anumiti*) similarity plays a role. If the constituents (*Avayavas*) of inference for others (*Parārthānumāna*) are discussed properly and if on the role of example (*Udāharaṇa*) is pondered over, we will find that it has got some elements of similarity. So some metaphorical elements are there in inference

(*Anumāna*). It is said that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. In order to substantiate such *Vyāpti*, the Naiyāyikas have given a concrete case – ‘*Yathā mahānasah*’ as it is found in the case of kitchen. Citing a concrete case always serves the purpose of knowing the relation in a better manner. As an invariable relation between smoke and fire is found in kitchen, such invariability remains in other cases also. Hence, *Udāharana*, a constituent of inferential procedure, is very much important in acquiring inferential cognition. It is defined in terms of *Prasiddha Sādharmya* i.e., having common features with the seen cases. In a field where smoke exists, invariably there is fire because the field possesses some features belonging to kitchen also. Here kitchen serves the purpose of metaphor depending on which we infer fire in other relatively non-familiar cases.

In our everyday life we take the help of inference and we remain unaware of the fact. In most of the cases, inference is drawn spontaneously. Illiterate persons are often guided by inference not to speak of the literate. Cultivators are seen to infer some objects after observing some signs or marks (*Linga*). The Naiyāyikas are of

the opinion that even a child also infers.² A child attains inferential knowledge spontaneously without being aware of the inferential procedure.

The valid inferential knowledge guides us in different walks of our life beginning with the dealings with our fellow people in our everyday life. Our life becomes thoroughly impracticable³ unless our fellow beings are properly and satisfactorily dealt with. This can never be done unless we definitely and rightly understand the mind of people around us. This understanding of others' minds depends on inference in most of the cases.⁴ Moreover, from the yellow colour of mangoes it is inferred that they are ripe. In the like manner, the past rain is inferred from the muddy current of the river. On several occasions, we have experienced that yellow mangoes are generally ripe and muddy water signifies previous rain. A sense of similarity works behind our inference that the yellow coloured mango is ripe or muddy river water works as evidence of previous rain. In the same way, the mental states like pleasure, pain etc. existing in a man can be inferred from their different types of expressions and gestures. Sometimes, the exact place or country where a man

resides can be inferred after observing his dress or his particular language carefully. Thus, innumerable instances of knowledge based on inference in our everyday life can be shown. In all these cases of inference, there is a sense of similarity. Any type of inferential or scientific discovery presupposes such similarity as found in the seen cases. Prediction about the unseen depends on the observations of the seen cases. If, in future, a case having such characteristics is found, it would have the same consequences. Any type of medical treatment of a patient having some symptoms that were experienced by the researchers earlier are seen while the present is unseen, the treatment of the unseen is possible due to having some similar ideas from the seen cases. Between these seen and unseen, there are some similar properties. The seen cases may be taken as a basis through which others are taken care of. The jump from the seen to the unseen is justified by the 'instances' or *Udāharana*. Herein lies the importance of metaphor.

The element of similarity is very much present as the basis of metaphor. Yet we must observe that when metaphor is used, the intention of the speaker is not similarity but identity over and above

the similarity. However, the very idea of similarity stands in the way of recognising this identity. We use the expression *Mukhacandra* (moon-face) due to their similarity in *Lāvanya* (loveliness); or when we use the expression *Puruṣasimha* (man-lion) we have in our mind the similarity of valour. In all metaphorical expressions, there is a sense of similarity.

In fact, we come across two types of identity (*Tādātmya*) in Indian Philosophical literature – absolute identity and identity in difference. When it is said, '*Ghaṭo ghaṭah*' (a jar is a jar) there is absolute sameness between two objects. Though such an expression has no informative character due to the absolute sameness of two objects, which is usually called tautology, yet it has to be accepted from the standpoint of logic. It is admitted that something is different from something (e.g., a jar is different from a pot) as found in the case of mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*), it is equally essential to admit a stage where something is non-different from something. In other words, if difference becomes an object of prediction, non-difference would be the same. That is why, mutual absence (*Anyonyābhāva*) is described as characterised by absence of the

relation of identity. Hence, it cannot be said that the absolute sameness or identity bears no meaning.

The second type of identity, which is taken by the Buddhists and Advaita Vedāntins, could be found in two objects that are neither absolutely different nor non-different (*Na atyantabheda na iva atyantābheda*). The Buddhists have used the term *Tādātmya* (identity) in a specific sense, i.e., in the sense of similarity, but not in the sense of absolute sameness as understood by the Naiyāyikas. 'Similarity' remains between two or more than two objects having common properties (*Anugatadharma*). There is no identity between flower and stone as they belong to two completely different domains. In the same way, there is also no identity between a jar and a jar, as they are absolutely identical. To them real identity remains between a set-subset and genus-species (*Vyakti-Jāti*) relationship. As for example between tree and mango tree, between man and Bengali there is the said relation because between these there is similarity, which is expressed in different ways by different philosophers, e.g., the Advaitins describe such situation as identity in difference (*Bheda-sahiṣṇu abheda* or *Bhedarahita abheda*).

Between set and sub-set there is identity (*Tādātmya*) relation and inference of set from a subset depends on this relation. As for example, 'Ayaṁ vṛkṣaḥ Śimśapātvāt' (this is a tree as it has the property existing in a Śimśapā). Here Śimśapā is an object in which there is the invariable concomitance of treeness. This Śimśapā being a *Hetu* or probans, a set called tree is inferred. The Buddhists accept identity between Śimśapātva and Vṛkṣatva (treeness). That is why it can safely be said that wherever there is Śimśapātva, there is Vṛkṣatva but not the vice-versa. As the property Vṛkṣatva (treeness) has got more extensive pervasion than Śimśapātva, so from the Śimśapātva one can easily infer Vṛkṣatva (treeness) due to having the relation in the sense of similarity (*Tādātmya*) there. But, on the other hand, from the property of a tree (treeness) one cannot infer Śimśapātva because treeness (Vṛkṣatva) has got more extensive pervasion. We cannot say wherever there is treeness (Vṛkṣatva) there is Śimśapātva because there are more trees in the world other than Śimśapā. There are so many examples of this class and sub-class relation. We can easily infer the class from the sub-class depending on similarity (*Tādātmya*). As for example, 'Asian'

can be inferred from 'Indian', but all Asians are not Indians; 'flower' can be inferred from 'rose', but all flowers are not roses; 'bird' can be inferred from 'parrot', but all birds are not parrots. That is why, the Buddhists' concept of *Tādātmya* (identity) is taken as neither completely identical nor completely non-identical, but in the sense of similarity. An object covering narrower places remains in another object existing in wider places as shown above.⁵ The identity in the sense of similarity is found in the case of metaphor. Unless there is identity between metaphor and an object metaphorised such expressions are meaningless. The metaphorical elements are also found in the identity in the sense of absolute sameness. When it is said "Rabindranāth is Rabindranāth" or "Calcutta is Calcutta" it means that there is no other poet or city that can be compared to Rabindranāth or Calcutta. So, it is compared to himself or itself. The poet Rabindranāth himself or the city Calcutta itself have become their metaphors.

Some thinkers make an artificial difference between two identical objects after using the term 'iva'. In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartrhari has said that two objects, though identical, are

demonstrated in such a way that one will imagine their difference. But this difference is artificial in the sense that it shows the absolute sameness of the object. Where a different object is not available as standard of comparison, the object of comparison itself is used as the standard of comparison in order to bring out its incomparability, e.g., *Rāmarāvaṇayor yuddham rāmarāvaṇayoriva* i.e., 'Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight is like Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight'. This type of demonstration is a *Jñāpaka* (pointer) to the 'incomparability', which is, a *Jñāpya* (indicated) in this case.⁶ Bhartṛhari also admits that word is also expressive (*Vācaka*) as well as indicative (*Dyotaka*).⁷

This type of liberty of speaking (*Vivakṣā*) has been given to an individual in Navya Nyāya along with other schools like grammarians etc. If someone wants to say that he is cooking with clay-pot (*Sthālyā pacati*) which is a correct usage as third case ending is used with the term *Sthāli*, (i.e., pot), he is allowed to say apparently the wrong usage with the first case ending with *Sthāli* i.e. *Sthāli pacati* if there remains a strong desire of the speaker (*Vivakṣā*).

The Buddhist logicians do not give this liberty. In their opinion, what is known through perception cannot be known through inference. For due to the acceptance of momentariness the perceived object remains for a moment and hence singular (*Svalakṣaṇa*) in character capable of not being known through inference. To them inference can give rise to knowledge of an object which is covered through the net of *Kalpanās* (mental ascriptions) like name, definition, universal, language etc. Hence, the domain of two *Pramāṇas* is completely different, which leads them to admit *Pramāṇavyavasthā* (a particular source of knowing) to be accepted for knowing a particular object.⁸ Moreover, the Buddhists, particularly Dharmakīrti does not make any difference between the instrument of valid cognition (*Pramāṇa*) and valid cognition (*Pramā*).⁹ The entity called singular (*Svalakṣaṇa*) is self-revealed (*Svaprakāśa*) which does not necessitate the Buddhists to accept some linguistic help like relation etc. Such is a case with inference, which is called mental ascription (*Kalpanā*).¹⁰ The entity known through the ascription is not the real in the true sense of the term, but it can provide some second order or distorted reality. That is why, the

difference between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas becomes very much prominent in the epistemic level.

Dharmakīrti has explained the above-mentioned identity as “a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction, i.e., when the predicate is part of the subject. It is therefore, not absolute identity but it is a partial identity”.¹¹

It is evident that the derivative meaning of the term *Tādātmya* has originated from the word ‘*Tadātmā*’. Here *Ātmā* signifies essence or property. “*Tadātmā*” means an entity having some essence or properties possessed by other species like *Śimśapā*, *Aśvatha*, *Devdaru*, *Āmra* etc. The whole phenomenon is called *Tādātmya*. In case of metaphor, such *Tādātmya* (identity) is efficacious.

The identity that operates in metaphor is a step ahead of similarity. When we say “*Puruṣasimha*” (man-lion) instead of calling the man as valiant as a lion (*Puruṣa simha iva sūrah*), there is a total identity where the *Upameya* and *Upamāna* are co-locatives and not

a mere similarity with co-existence of some common and uncommon factors side by side. Early Indian rhetoricians generally defined *Rūpaka* (metaphor) as an identification of two objects as a result of the superimposition (*Āropa*) of the standard of comparison (*Upamāna*) on the object compared (*Upameya*) e.g., “*Mukhameva candrah*” (the face is the moon), where the face, the *Upameya* has the character of the moon, *Upamāna* superimposed upon it, because of an element of similarity that exists between the two. Most Indian rhetoricians agree on the point that *Rūpaka* is based on a sense of similarity between *Upameya* and *Upamāna*. With this similarity working at the base, we identify two distinctly different objects as a single one. According to early rhetoricians, in *Rūpaka* we make the *Upameya* and the *Upamāna* identical or non-different from each other¹² or we merely remove the difference that exists in *Upamā*.¹³ But semantic problems are arising out of this. First, if two objects are similar to each other they are not the same at all, but two separate entities. How then can we say that they are the same? On the other hand, if we try to solve this problem in the way Aristotle and Daṇḍin did, i.e., with the statement that “these two objects are

the same". It is only a manner of speaking, what one really means is that they are similar. We are by no means close to solving it. On the contrary, this statement raises further questions: first, if two objects are similar, why do we not say that they are similar and finish with it, and second, if mere removal of a detail constitutes the basis for accepting two separate figures, then there would be millions of others where a slight alteration in detail might occur. The primary problem, i.e., the clash between similarity and identity has been sought to be solved by some thinkers by denying the role of similarity in metaphor. Richards is of the opinion that metaphor comprises two things put together and the tension between them is the result of a new idea. There two things may be put together on the basis of similarity as well as disparity. Max Black has conceded the comparison aspect of metaphor, but then he clearly states that there may be no proper ground for the metaphorical shift.

Although most Indian rhetoricians are in favour of similarity as the basis of the identity in metaphor, Jagannātha excludes identity between cause and effect e.g., *Sukham manoramā ramā* (happiness is the beautiful woman) from the purview of *Rūpaka*.¹⁴ Others including

Sobhākara opposed this view. He defined *Rūpaka* merely as superimposition – *Āropo rūpakam*.¹⁵ He is of the view that one word or object cannot be imposed on another word or object, as they are known to be distinct. This kind of superimposition may occur only in the case of (a) figures such as *Bhrāntimān* (error) where one object is mistaken for another and (b) genuine illusory knowledge (e.g., a piece of string mistaken for a snake). Superimposition in *Rūpaka* occurs between two objects, which are co-locatives. Sobhākara is of the opinion that these two co-locatives, one of which is taken as the substantive and the other as the adjective, are brought together by a force of will. That is to say, in *Mukhami candrah*, *Candra* is not imposed on *Mukha* but the determinants of both, i.e., *Candratva* and *Mukhatva* are brought into the same substratum, i.e., *Mukha*.

This is very akin to the grammarians' theory that the substantive and the adjective can have only one relation, that of identity. Jagannātha also recognises this aspect. According to him, *Rūpaka* is the identity of the *Upameya* with the *Upamāna* which is cognised with certitude from the metaphorical expression itself and which emerges in cognition along with the connotative limiting factor

of the *Upameya* (*Upameyatāvacchedaka*) figuring as a determinant adjective of the said cognition.¹⁶ In an expression such as “your face is the moon itself” (*Tava mukhami candra eva*) the face is cognised as being identical with the moon. This identity is a certain one, not a possibility and while the *Upameya* ‘face’ is cognised as being identical with the *Upamāna* ‘moon’, the limiting factor or determinant of *Upameya* (*Upameyatāvacchedaka*) that distinguishes the *Upameya*, is also cognised. That is to say, in this particular case, the determinant of *Mukha*, i.e., *Mukhatva* is also cognised. Two objects are placed in juxtaposition so that the character of one is ‘superimposed’ (*Āropita*) on the other. Resultantly, they emerge as identical. Clearly there is interaction between two words but they are not isolated words. However, this analysis of *Rūpaka* (metaphor) is an imperfect one. In all forms of *Rūpaka* or metaphor, similarity operates at the base of identity and even if two objects are brought together by force of will, there has to be some grounds for this bringing together of these two particular objects. Ricouer says, “It is wrong to suppose that the notions of tension, interaction and logical contradiction make the role of resemblance superficial. On the

contrary, tension, contradiction and controversion are the opposite side of reconciliation in which metaphor makes sense. This reconciliation arises from a sense of resemblance".¹⁷

Knowledge of similarity may be acquired in different ways. One of them is perception. When a certain object 'A' is directly presented to sense and resembles another object 'B', which we perceived in the past, we judge that 'A' is like 'B'. The judgement of similarity (A is like B) may be said to be derived from perception. We can very well say here "A looks like B". But if subsequently we pass from this judgement to the judgement that "B is like A", we can not possibly say that the second judgement is also a judgement of perception, because the subject of this latter judgement, namely "B" is not presently perceived and we can not possibly say "B looks like A". The question therefore arises 'how is such a judgement derived?' This question represents in short the problem of *Upamāna* as conceived by the Vedāntins and the Mīmāṃsakas. To understand more clearly the problem and the solution offered to it, we must consider the concrete instances through the investigation of which the Vedāntins try to establish their view.

A certain person who has his own cow at home goes to a forest and sees there a *Gavaya* – a wild cow having no dewlap, and forms the judgement – “This *Gavaya* is like my cow”. He passes thence to another judgement “My cow is like this *Gavaya*”. Of these two judgements, the first represents knowledge gained through perception and the second contains knowledge that is derived through the instrumentality of the perceptual knowledge contained in the first.¹⁸ The psychological account of the process is that at first there is a perception of some points of similarity in the *Gavaya*; secondly, there is revival through similarity of the memory of the cow seen at home and lastly, there is a consequent judgement that the cow seen in the past is like the *Gavaya* presented to sense. The question arises as to what the name and logical status of this psychological process yielding the aforesaid judgements are. It is evident that this judgement – “My cow is like this *Gavaya*” – being derived through the mediation of the knowledge – “This *Gavaya* is like my cow”. So this cannot be classed under immediate knowledge; it must be admitted to be a kind of mediate knowledge. But it is also found that this knowledge cannot be classed under inference

(*Anumāna*) because we do not find any trace of syllogistic reasoning in the process. Therefore, the Vedāntins conclude that this kind of knowledge derived through the perception of similarity must be given a place distinct from that of perception or inference. The Vedāntins and the Mīmāṃsakas give it an independent name – *Upamāna*, which etymologically means comparison or knowledge of similarity.

The Naiyāyikas admit *Upamāna*, which is the third of the four *Pramāṇas* accepted by them. In this present reference, however, the term has been used in a technical sense to stand for the ‘cognition of similarity’ (*Sādrśya-jñāna*), which serves as the ‘special means’ (*Karaṇa*) for the emergence of a kind of veridical cognition called *Upamiti* in the Nyāya school. Annambhaṭṭa says in his *Tarkasamgraha* “*Upamitikaraṇam upamānam. Samjñāsamjñi-sambandhajñānam upamitiḥ. Tatkarāṇam sādrśyajñānam.*”

If the similarity (*Sādrśya*) of some known object (*Jñāta padārtha*) is perceived in an unknown object (*Ajñāta padārtha*) and the relation between known (*Jñāta*) and unknown (*Ajñāta*) is

certainly cognised through this perception of similarity (*Sādrśya*) then that cognition is called *Upamiti*. If we observe the process of culmination of *Upamiti* then it will be easily understood. There is an animal named *Gavaya* and it lives in forest (*Aranya*). *Gavaya* is not cow but it is like a cow. The cow has dewlap but *Gavaya* has not, though in other respects it resembles a cow. As *Gavaya* is a wild animal, the villager had not seen it before and although he had heard the name he did not know the meaning of the term '*Gavaya*'. Once he heard from a forester (*Āranyaka-puruṣa*) that *Gavaya* is a wild animal like cow "*Gosadrśyah gavayah*". He went to the forest and happened to encounter an animal like a cow. He recalled the meaning of the forester's statement and had the cognition that the animal before him is what is meant by the term '*Gavaya*'. Here the word '*Gavaya*' is *Samjñā* (term) and the animal encountered by the villager is *Samjñī* (what it stands for). In this final cognition, what is cognised is just the *Samjñāsamjñī-sambandhajñāna* (*Vācya vācaka sambandha*) obtaining from the thing perceived and the term '*Gavaya*'. This final cognition is *Upamiti*.

It is to be noted that even if a person had not heard from a forester a statement of that kind mentioned before but had simply learned from a book that “A *Gavaya* is like a cow” and if he had happened to encounter an animal resembling a cow and had recalled what he had learned from the book – then also the same cognition would have ensued that the animal encountered was what was meant by the term ‘*Gavaya*’.

Upamāna is the *Karaṇa* of *Upamiti*. Knowledge of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*) of known animal (cow) with this encountered animal (*Gavaya*) is *Upamāna* and the knowledge of memory represents the *Vyāpāra* (intermediary). So *Upamāna* is the knowledge of similarity (*Sādrśyajñāna*). On the basis of this *Upamāna* we go beyond the given. The term ‘*Gosadrśah*’ is given. The word ‘*Go*’ (cow) is familiar to us and we know the meaning of this word. On the basis of similarity (*Sādrśya*) with the cow (*Go*), we are able to know what does the term ‘*Gavaya*’ mean. Herein lies the importance of metaphor in *Upamānapramāna*.

Sometimes metaphor serves to understand metaphysical concept or to express the inexpressible (*Anirvacanīya*). When the author finds it difficult to prove the existence of an entity that is beyond the range of our human intellect or sense organ, he normally takes recourse of metaphors. As for example, we may cite the cases of the metaphorical usages in the *Upaniṣads*. As self or *Ātman* is beyond any linguistic expression or beyond speech and mind (*Avānmanasagocara*). It is explained with the metaphors – “*Aṅoranīyān mahato mahīyān*” i.e., smaller than atom and greater than the space. In fact, nothing is available in this world that is smaller than atom or greater than space. By such expression the seer wants to show that everything, small or great, originates from *Ātman* and the inconceivability of self through ordinary means. Nevertheless, the uses of metaphors help us to form some idea of *Ātman*, as the words atom and space are familiar to us. There are various metaphorical descriptions – “*Tadejati tannaijati taddūre tadvantike/ Tadantarasya sarvasya tadu sarvasyāsyā vāhyatah//*” i.e., self is movable yet stationary; he is far away and also nearer at the same time. He is involved in everything of this world and yet not

involved in anything. These metaphors are normally an attempt to understand the inconceivable. Self or *Ātman* is such that one can realise him in the nearest or farthest point because we move in a place where self is already there due to its all-pervasive character (*Vibhu*). In order to show the all-pervading character of the self, such expressions have been used. When the way of self-realisation (*Ātmajñāna*) is metaphorised as “*Kṣurasya dhārā nisītā duratyayā*” i.e., as impassable as razor’s edge. Though proper realisation is not possible, yet it leads us to conceptualise the idea. There is another beautiful metaphor in the *Upaniṣad* for understanding the relation among *Jīvātmā* (self), *Manah* (mind), *Buddhi* (intellect) and *Deha* (body) – “*Ātmānam rathinam viddhi śarīram rathameva tu / Buddhim tu sārathim viddhi manah pragrahameva ca //*” Here self is metaphorised as the owner of the chariot, body as chariot, mind as charioteer and intellect as bridle. *Ātman* or self does not perceptibly do anything, but his existence keeps body, mind and intellect active.

In order to show the three constituents (*Guṇas*) of *Prakṛti*, Sāṃkhya has taken recourse to a few metaphors. They are of the opinion that just as our body is constituted by three constituents like

Vāyu (air), *Pitta* (bile) and *Kapha* (cough), *Prakṛti* is constituted with three *Guṇas*. The above-mentioned metaphor is taken from the *Carakasamhitā*. In the like manner, the Sāṃkhya has beautifully explained three characteristics like pleasure, misery and indifference of the three *Guṇas* with the help of the metaphor of a beautiful woman. Just as a beautiful woman generates three types of attitude to a man, three *Guṇas* generate three types of behaviour. A woman becomes pleasant to a man who loves her, the same woman creates misery to someone whom she loved earlier, but not now. She creates indifference to other persons. In the same way, the Sāṃkhya wants to convey that *Sattva* creates pleasure, *Rajah* generates misery and *Tamah* indifference. Through the use of metaphors such theory becomes easier to understand.

References :

1. *Samikarabhāṣya* on *sūtra* 2/2/7.
2. "Avalāvalagopālahālikapramukhā api buddhyante niyatādarthādarthāntaramasamśayanī" – *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 110, Chowkhamba.
3. "Anumānāpalāpe tu pratyakṣādapi durlabhā lokayātreṭi lokāḥ syurlikhitā iva niścalāḥ" – *Ibid.*

4. "Pramāṇāntarasāmānyastheteḥ anyadhiyogateḥ, pramāṇāntarasadbhāvah" – Sāyanamādhava: *Sarvadarsānasamgrahah* (Bauddhadarsāna).
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Vākyapadiya* III/14/563 – 566.
7. *Ibid* III/14/253 – 254.
8. Jayantabhaṭṭa: *Nyāyamañjarī*, 1st Chapter (*āhnika*); Definition of *Pramāṇa*.
9. Dharmakīrti: *Nyāyabindu* 1 and 2; Vinitadeva: *Nyāyabindutika*.
10. *Ibid.*
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