

## CHAPTER - 3

### DIFFERENT FORMS OF

### METAPHOR IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

We have already seen in the previous chapter that *Rūpaka* is dominated by deliberate superimposition. When metaphor is in the sense of *Rūpaka* there are always *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. There are also some cases of metaphor where there is no mention of either *Upamāna* or *Upameya* as in the case of implicative or suggestive meaning. Suggestive meaning or suggested sense is known as *Dhvani*. This *Dhvani* originates from the power of suggestion or *Vyañjanā*. ‘*Dhvani*’ is a dialectical word of rhetoric. *Dhvani* is never expressed directly. It is expressed through suggestion. It reveals a charming sense over and above the literal sense. The term *Dhvani* is used to denote the suggested sense (*Vyangārtha*) or the function of suggestion (*Vyañjanā*). It is like the chime of a bell, whose resonance continues vibrating in the air even after the bell stops. It is like an aura or powerful fragrance, which pervades the

atmosphere entirely with its presence. Ogden says that *Vyañjanā* (the function of suggestion) is evocation in the listener.

**Dhvanivādins** say that the soul of poetry is *Dhvani* (suggested sense). Though the modern western scholars do not analyse minutely like Indians, yet they clearly realise that *Dhvani* is a great asset of Poetry (*Kāvya*). Bradley says – “What does poetry mean? This unique expression, which cannot be replaced by any other, still seems to be trying to express something beyond itself … About the best poetry, and not only the best, there floats an atmosphere of infinite suggestion. The poet speaks to us of one thing, but in this one thing there seems to lurk the secret of all.” He further says – “This all-embracing perfection cannot be expressed in poetic words or words of any kind, nor yet in music or in colour, but the suggestion of it in much poetry, if not all, and poetry has in this suggestion, this ‘meaning’, a great part of its value … It is a spirit. It comes we know not whence. It will not speak at our bidding, nor answer in our language. It is not our servant; it is our master.”<sup>1</sup>

It has been claimed by Ānandavardhana and his followers of the *Dhvani* School of Indian Poetics that this suggestive power (*Vyañjanā*) is quite different from *Sakti* or *Lakṣanā*. A new meaning or attributes associated with the term is expressed through *Vyaṅgartha* (suggestive meaning) beyond *Vācyārtha* and *Lakṣyārtha* (primary and secondary meaning). The meaning, which is obtained through *Vyañjanā* (suggestion), is known as *Vyaṅgartha* or *Dhvani*.

Bradley says at first in his essay that poetry means something beyond itself but what he said afterwards is worth mentioning in this context – “Of course, I should add, it is not merely beyond them or outside of them. If it were, they (the poems) could not ‘suggest’ it. They are partial manifestation of it and point beyond themselves to it, both because they are a manifestation and because this is partial”.<sup>2</sup>

The relation between *Vācyārtha* and *Lakṣyārtha* with *Vyaṅgartha* is explained here. *Vyaṅgartha* (suggested sense) is the main thing or spirit; ‘they’ signify poetry, here *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning). *Vyaṅgartha* is not beyond *Vācyārtha*. As literal meaning is

partial manifestation of suggestive meaning, it can express the whole manifestation. *Vyañjanā* (suggestion) thus transcends the literal meaning by taking its support and expresses the complete *Vyaṅgartha* or suggestive meaning.

The *Ālamkārikas* classify *Vyañjanā* into two types – *Sābdi* (where sound is dominant) and *Ārthī* (where meaning is prominent) – according to the part played by the sound and sense elements in the suggestion of the implicit sense. The *Ālamkārikas* think that both *Sabda* and *Artha* play their respective parts in bringing the suggested content into light; yet in some cases, the sound element plays a prominent role – the sense element being auxiliary to it and in others the case is just the opposite. The *Ālamkārikas* say that those cases of suggestion where *Sabda* plays a greater part are regarded as instances of *Sābdi-vyañjanā* and those where *Artha* plays a greater part are regarded as instances of *Ārthī-vyañjanā*.

*Sābdi-vyañjanā* is again classified into two types according to the function that constitutes its basis. The two types are *Laksanāmūlā* and *Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā*. Of these the first is based

on Indication and the second is based on denotation.<sup>3</sup> Let us consider the sentence – ‘*Gangāyāmī ghosah*’ (The milkman colony is on the Ganges). Here *Lakṣaṇā* conveys only the meaning “*Gangātīre*” (the bank of the Ganges) which is absolutely necessary in order to remove the inconsistency (*Anupapatti*) and does nothing more. But the speaker of the sentence has wanted to convey the attributes of coolness (*Saitya*) and airiness (*Pāvanatva*). These two attributes associated with the term do not come up before the mind either through *Abhidhā* (conventional meaning) or *Lakṣaṇā* (secondary meaning) but through *Lakṣaṇāmūlā Vyañjanā*.

*Abhidhāmūlā Vyañjanā* brings into comprehension that sense, which does not form the primary meaning of a multi-meaning word. We can cite as example – “Said by *Sūlapāni*”. Here *Sūlapāni* is the name of *Sāstrakāra* (author). But it has another meaning, i.e., ‘Lord Śiva’. The term literally means an individual having trident in hand (*Pānau śūlamī yasya*). After the first or literal meaning (*Vācyārtha* is expressed, we get another meaning with the help of multi-meaning embedded in the word – *Sūlapāni* is not only *Sūlapāni*; he is Lord Śiva himself. Both of these *Vyañjanā* are *Sābdī* (related to word) and

mainly originated from *Sabdaśakti* (power of word). Thus, *Dhvani* or suggested meaning obtained through this *Vyañjanā* (suggestion) is called *Sabdasaktyudbhava Dhvani*.

*Ārthī Vyañjanā* implies another meaning. Being aided by the speciality of the speaker, it implies the person spoken to, time, place, context and such other things by taking support of conventional meaning or denotation. For example, the simple expression “The sun has set” (*Gataḥ astamarkah*) signifies only one explicit sense, but it conveys a number of implicit ideas according to the difference in the nature of the speaker and the person addressed. *Dhvani* originated from *Artha* (meaning) is known as *Arthasaktyudbhava Dhvani*.

In the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana establishes his theory that suggestion or *Dhvani* is the soul of Poetry – “*Dhvaniरात्मा काव्यस्या*”.<sup>4</sup> He says that beautiful ideas in poetry are of two kinds, – literal (*Vācyā*) and implied (*Pratiyamāna*). *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning) is the conventional meaning obtained through the power of *Abhidhā* (denotation). *Pratiyamānārtha* (implied meaning) is

*Vyaṅgartha* (suggested meaning) obtained through *Vyañjanā* (suggestion). The latter is something like the feminine charm, which is distinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body. This implied sense is something more than the literal meaning and depends on the whole poem and not merely on its parts.<sup>5</sup> Though the implied sense (*Vyaṅgartha*) is more than the literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*), yet it is expressed through the literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*). So literal meaning cannot be neglected. One should be careful about the lamp if he wants light. Similarly, one who loves *Vyaṅgartha* (suggested meaning) should be careful of *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning).<sup>6</sup>

Rhetoricians take the term *Dhvani* directly from grammar, just as the sounds of utterances (*Dhvani* in the grammarian's sense) reveal the integral linguistic sign (*Sphoṭa*). The concept of *Sphoṭa* is something more than what is generally implied by the term 'linguistic sign'. The relationship between a word and its meaning is an essential factor for the *Sphoṭa* concept as for the sign. There is no *Sphoṭa* without meaning; it is the meaning bearing nature of an expression that makes it a *Sphoṭa* (when considered as a whole

apart from its parts that are irrelevant). In fact the *Sphoṭa* is the *significant* taken as a timeless and indivisible symbol denoting a meaning. The time-order of the *significant* is merely a means for revealing the timeless and partless *Sphoṭa*.

The *Sphoṭa* – the word or the sentence located in the minds (of the speaker and the listener) and taken as an integral symbol – is revealed by the sounds produced in a fixed order. The sounds are only the manifesting agencies and have no function other than that of revealing the symbol. Each sound helps in manifesting this *Sphoṭa*, the first one vaguely, the next one more clearly and so on, until the last one; aided by the impressions of the preceding perceptions, reveals it clearly and distinctly. It is one and the same *Sphoṭa* that is revealed by each one of these letters. Bhartrhari says that with the last sound, the word is grasped in the mind (of the hearer) where the seed has been sown by the sounds and which has been brought to ripeness by the telling over in order (*Āvṛtti*) of the sounds. So according to Ānandavardhana a good poem with its sound, as well as the literal sense, reveals over and above the literal sense, a charming sense that has great aesthetic value. On account of this

similarity of function, the term *Dhvani* is applied to suggestive poetry when the suggested sense predominates over the literal sense. The term *Dhvani* is also used to denote the suggested sense or the function of suggestion.

After describing the nature of *Dhvani* (suggestion), Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana divide it into two broad classes: *Avivakṣitavācyā* (literal meaning unintended) and *Vivakṣitānyaparavācyā* (intended something, which is not expressed by word). The characteristic features of these two types are evident from their very designation. In the first case literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*) is not intended, the implied sense is important. It is obviously based on *Lakṣaṇā*, which the speaker employs consciously with the sole purpose of bringing the implicit into comprehension. It is characterised by the use of expressions in their transferred sense. It is also called *Lakṣaṇāmūlā* (*Dhvani*, the root of which is implication). The motive element in all cases of intentional metaphor comes under this. Corresponding to the two varieties of *Lakṣaṇā* namely *Ajahallakṣaṇā* and *Jahallakṣaṇā*, *Dhvani* of *Avivakṣitavācyā* is subdivided into two: *Arthāntarasamikramitavācyā* and

*Atyantatiraskrtavācyā*, according to the nature of *Lakṣaṇā* that forms its basis.<sup>7</sup> In the first type, the literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*) though not totally incompatible, is transformed into one characterised by new attributes. As an illustration of this variety, Ānandavardhana quotes the *Prākṛta Gāthā* –

*Tālā jāanti gunā jālā te sahiae himi gheppanti /  
Raikiranānugahiāim honti kamalāim kamalāim //*

i.e., ‘Merits become real ones; when they are appreciated by connoisseurs: the lotus becomes a true lotus, when favoured by rays of the sun.’ Here, he points out, the second term ‘lotus’ does not convey simply the concept of a water lily, but that of a lily as endowed with attributes like fragrance and tenderness. Thus the expressed is transformed from a mere thing designated (*Sañjīn*) to some other sense, which includes within its scope the thing designated, as well. He further maintains that, the attributes are comprehended through suggestion and that it is the inexplicable charm of this implicit idea, which bestows on the piece of poetic creation the status of *Dhvani-kāvya*. In the second sub-variety that is *Atyantatiraskrtavācyā*, the expressed being totally incompatible is

abandoned altogether in favour of a new idea. As an example of this variety of *Dhvani* Ānandavardhana cites negative suggested sense from positive statement –

*"Bhrama dhārmika! Visṛavdhah sa śunako'dya māritastena  
Godāvarī-nadīkūla-latāgahana-vāsinā drptasimihena" //<sup>8</sup>*

An unchaste woman, who had given a rendezvous to her lover on the bank of Godāvarī, found a pious man frequenting that place for the purpose of plucking flowers etc. She found that he was susceptible to the fear of a dog of that place. In order to drive him away from that place, she gives him a piece of news that a lion living on the bank of the river killed the dog. Therefore, he can freely move in the neighbourhood. Although the literal meaning of the above stanza is that the pious man may freely move there, the suggestive meaning is completely opposite, – that a ferocious lion is frequenting that place and that it would be better for him to go away from that place. Therefore, the implied sense of 'Bhrama' makes room for 'Mā-bhrama', which is 'suggested sense' according to Ānandavardhana. It is a kind of prohibition in disguise of injunction (*Vidhirūpeṇa pratīṣedhah*).

The second division of *Dhvani* (suggestion), the *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* is sometimes also called *Abhidhāmūlā* as it is based on *Abhidhā* or the primary meaning of the word. In this type the literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*) is in fact intended but subserves under the implied sense. Here the literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*) remains as usual but another suggestive meaning becomes important. It is the real subject matter of *Dhvani-kāvya* (suggestive poetry). The example of this type of *Dhvani* is

“*Śikhariṇī kva nu nama kiyacciram kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapah / Taruni! yena tavādharapātalam daśati bimbaphalam sūkasāvakah //*”<sup>9</sup>

i.e., a man sees a young and pretty lady. He is smitten with love for her. He also sees her parrot tasting the red fruit of the *Bimba* tree. The man expresses his desire by way of appreciating the good fortune of the young parrot. The man remarks that the parrot must have observed austere penance, on unheard of places and for a very long duration because he has become worthy of enjoying the *Bimba* fruit that resembles the lower lip of the lady. Though the apparent meaning of the verse is the extolling of the parrot's good luck

acquired through hardships, the suggestion is the flattery of the lady that her lip can be “gained by excessive merit only”.

This *Vivakṣitānyaparavācyā Dhvani* is also classified into two sub-varieties according to the perceptibility or otherwise of the sequence existing between the comprehension of the *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning) and that of the *Vyaṅgartha* (suggested meaning). In the first of these two sub-varieties, which is named *Asamlakṣyakrama*, the sequence that intervenes between the cognition of *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning) and *Vyaṅgartha* (suggested meaning) is imperceptible. Although there is transition from the literal to suggested, the change is so quick that it is hardly observed and hence negligible. That is to say, the *Vyaṅgartha* is felt almost simultaneously with the comprehension of the *Vācyārtha*. The logical time sequence between the two becomes so thin as to escape notice. This is compared to the quick piercing of a hundred lotus leaves placed one above the other with a needle in the shortest span of one second. In the second sub-variety, which is named *Samlakṣyakrama*, the sequence existing between the cognition of *Vācyārtha* (literal meaning) and *Vyaṅgartha* (suggested meaning) is clearly perceptible

i.e., the process of manifestation of the suggested is perceptible.<sup>10</sup>

Any emotional Poetry aesthetically sound (*Rasātmaka Kāvya*) is generally the example of *Asamlakṣyakrama Dhvani*. *Sthāyībhāva*, *Sañcārībhāva*, *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyavicārībhāva* instil the aesthetic enjoyment (*Rasa*) in the reader as soon as he reads *Kāvya* (Poetry). So the feeling of emotion (*Rasabodha*) cannot be explained by time sequence. Ānandavardhana says –

“*Yatra sākṣācchābdaniveditebhyo vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhyo rasādīnam pratītiḥ sa tasya kevalsyā margah //*”<sup>11</sup>

According to him, arrival of Umā embellished with the spring-flower ornament and in search of Madan’s arrow – these descriptions in the “*Kumārasambhavam*” are examples of *Asamlakṣyakrama Dhvani*. This is clear from the name of *Samlakṣyakrama* that the sequence of transition from literal (*Vācyārtha*) to suggested (*Vyanigṛtha*) can be observed. In this case both literal and suggested meaning cannot be expressed or cannot find expression at a time. Suggested sense (*Vyanigṛtha*) is more charming than the literal sense (*Vācyārtha*). Ānandavardhana quotes the famous stanza of an example of *Samlakṣyakrama Dhvani* –

*"Evam vādini devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhī /  
lilā-kamala-patrāṇī gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī //"*<sup>12</sup>

i.e., when the sage Angīras spoke thus, Pārvatī who was seated beside her father started counting the petals of the sport-lotus. The literal meaning (*Vācyārtha*) of counting the petals of the sport-lotus has no charm. But in the conventional sense, it suggests Pārvatī's coyness. She is invariably reminded of her own efforts to win over Samikara and is hence, overwhelmed with the feeling of shyness, which is natural in the case of an unmarried girl. The stages of transition from the literal (*Vācyārtha*) to the suggested one (*Vyaṅgārtha*) are all clearly discernible.

The *Dhvani* theorists, after categorising the role of suggestion, turn their attention on the nature of what is suggested. This yields another system of categories. The three aspects of the suggested sense may be (i) a matter or an idea (*Vastu Dhvani*), (ii) poetic figure (*Alamikāra Dhvani*) and (iii) mood or feeling (*Rasa Dhvani*). In *Vastu Dhvani* a distinct subject or thought (a matter of fact) is suggested. In *Alamikāra Dhvani* the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative whereas *Rasa Dhvani* suggests a

mood or feeling. This doctrine is not expressly taught in the core of gnomic formulae (*Kārikā*) of the *Dhvanyāloka*, as pointed out by Abhinavagupta, but is sanctioned by Ānandavardhana's treatment in his exposition (*Vṛtti*).<sup>13</sup>

This discovery of the suggestive power of poetry caused the realities in the background to be temporarily forgotten. But remembrance of the already established supremacy of feeling (*Rasa*) in poetry returned only when suggestion and feeling (*Dhvani* and *Rasa*) were linked in the further analytical exploration. It compelled a subtle but radical reshaping of the entire doctrine. In the Indian tradition, feeling (*Rasa*) had the supreme status in poetry. It was regarded as the soul of poetry. Being elated by the discovery of the profoundly integrative significance of diction (*Riti*), Vāmana called it the soul of poetry. But his claim was summarily dismissed by critics like Viśvanātha, who held that nothing could dislodge *Rasa* from its supreme position. In spite of its great poetic value, suggestion also could not capture the status of *Rasa*. With the return of the remembrance of the supremacy of *Rasa* in poetry, Ānandavardhana accepted it without the slightest reservation in spite of his

commitments regarding suggestion. Throughout *Dhvanyāloka*, one can find affirmations about the supremacy of *Rasa* scattered generously. There is no glory in poetic endeavour which does not seek to realise *Rasa*.<sup>14</sup> The genuine poet's primary intention should be the evocation of *Rasa*.<sup>15</sup> Neither poetic figure nor ornament nor the mere narrative, but the suggestion of *Rasa* should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense.<sup>16</sup> *Rasa* is in fact the essence of poetry, as it is of the drama.<sup>17</sup>

Thus begins the subtle reshaping of theory. Ānandavardhana's object is not merely to establish the doctrine of suggestion (*Dhvani*) but also to harmonise it with the theory of the aesthetic emotion (*Rasa*).<sup>18</sup> This synthesis, however, is completed only with Abhinavagupta's contribution. In Ānandavardhana the return of *Rasa* to supreme status, which *Dhvani* had tried to usurp for a while, is reflected in the special stress given to the suggestion of feeling (*Rasa Dhvani*) as against the other two categories – *Vastu Dhvani* and *Alamkāra Dhvani*. Abhinavagupta affirms the supremacy of *Rasa*. This value is the essence of poetry.<sup>19</sup> There can be no poetry without *Rasa*.<sup>20</sup> He holds that other two categories – *Vastu Dhvani*

and *Alamikāra Dhvani* – resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of *Rasa*, which is in fact the essence of poetry.<sup>21</sup>

Now let us see how the suggestion of matter of fact (*Vastu Dhvani*) resolves itself into suggestion of feeling (*Rasa Dhvani*). According to Visvanātha, the suggested matter (*Vyainga Vastu*) cannot by itself constitute the essence of poetry. He analyses the example of material suggestion (*Vastu Dhvani*) given in *Dhvanyāloka*<sup>22</sup> and argues that it is not a neutral evocation or reference; rather it is admissible as poetry because the evocation has a touch of feeling (*Rasa Sparsā*).

In the case of suggestive poetic figure (*Alamikāra Dhvani*) also, the ultimate reality is the feeling. In the language of Kathleen Raine,<sup>23</sup> juxtaposition of images is the basis of the poetic figure – “This elaboration refines the sensible image by association with other sharp and sensible images, to produce a highly sophisticated and delicate way of looking at the visible world”. This, of course, refers to the normal association of images in poetic figures and not especially to the image that is suggested, which is the specific

concern of the *Dhvani* theory. Nevertheless, what she says further is applicable to suggested imagery also. "Perpetual images, however intense or refined, lack a dimension without which we soon begin to feel an intolerable claustrophobia". She demands "a synthesis of the symbolic and the contemporary"; i.e., the image, expressed or suggested, should be an objective correlative of inward feeling. Kuntaka emphasised that in poetry we deal, not with mere embellishment (*Alamkāra*) but poetic embellishment (*Kāvyālamkāra*). Ruyyaka pointed out that if elements of doubt and inference are involved in figures like *Samdeha* and *Anumāna* these should be "poetic" doubts and inferences; that is, they should incarnate poetic beauty, which in Indian tradition is definitely related to feeling. The demand holds good for imaginary and poetic figures, which are not directly expressed but suggested.

With aesthetic feeling restored as the centre of gravity of poetry, the *Dhvani* theory escaped the serious danger of hermeticism and preciousity to which the doctrine would have drifted if the initial position, which made suggestion as such the soul of poetry, had not been modified. But the modified theory, though it

claimed to be the basic principle of evaluation of all poetry, successfully defined only a special type of poetry. For, in the poetry the theory of obliquity and indirect approach are preferred and regarded as the best. The suggested image is more important than the expressed image. Even in the case of factual references and ideas, things should not be what they seemed to be or the things that mattered are other than the things denoted.

It is true that a degree of hermeticism is unavoidable in this type of poetry (*Dhvani-kāvya*). But the *Dhvani* theorists have asserted that the *Dhvani-kāvya* is hermetic only for those who approach it with grammar and lexicon, not for those who approach it with a sensitive heart. According to *Dhvani* theory, suggestion (*Vyañjanā Vṛtti*) is as real a power of words, of language, as denotation. The *Dhvani-kāvya* is built up with the suggestive power (*Vyañjanā Vṛtti*) of words, just as prose discourse and even some types of poetry are built up with the familiar functions of language like denotation. The *Dhvani* theorists demand that the centre of gravity in the literary creation should lie in the plane of the suggested and definitely not in the expressed. According to them,

the meaning of literary creation is characteristically different in kind from logical meaning. While poetry uses the medium of language, which is also the medium used in science, logic and daily discourse, its sense is not derived from the words in the same manner. At a definite moment poetic meaning breaks off markedly from the conventional symbolism of words and reveals a completely new sense. The distinct feature of this view is that the suggestion does not form an extension of language in its ordinary usage, nor it is just another one of its functions, but its presentation is a unique one. All poets resort to metaphor because the direct and straight way of expression cannot adequately objectify their experience. A philosophy of language, which would eliminate whole areas of human discourse as meaningless and unintelligible, has significance for human culture. It is only through the power of language to suggest things, which cannot be expressed directly, that it can convey philosophical truth. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bergson says, "Language is incapable of apprehending and expressing reality. But language may be used in another way, not to represent but to bring the hearer to a point where he himself may transcend language and

pass to incomunicable insight. It is a dialectical ladder which, when we have ascended, may be kicked away." This insight and intuition cannot be expressed directly by words, but they can be communicated through the power of suggestion. Jespersen defines suggestion as impression through suppression. He says, "In all speech activity there are three things to be distinguished, expression, suppression, and impression. Expression is what the speaker gives, suppression is what he does not give, though he might have given it and impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. Suggestion is impression by suppression."<sup>24</sup>

If we take metaphor as 'go beyond the given', suggestion, technically called *Dhvani*, also comes within the sphere of metaphor. In case of suggestive use of language it adopts a new meaning going beyond the literal and conventional meaning.

The Naiyāyikas reject the suggestive power of words. Mahimabhatta in his *Vyaktiviveka*, which he wrote with the specific

purpose to prove that *Dhvani* is included in *Anumāna* or inference,<sup>25</sup> says that the implied sense in literature is always conveyed by the expressed sense through the process of inference itself. There is no necessity to accept a new potency for words. Mahimabhatta is not the discoverer of this anti-*Dhvani* theory, for Ānandavardhana himself anticipates this objection and criticizes it in the third chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka*.<sup>26</sup> Ānandavardhana's main argument against the inference theory of poetic charm is that inference depends on the knowledge of *Vyāpti* or an invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term of a proposition. In literature there is no such invariable relation between the primary sense and the suggested sense. Therefore, the latter cannot be inferred from the former. There cannot be valid inference when there is the fallacy of undistributed middle (*Anaikāntikatva*). Ānandavardhana illustrates his point by means of an analogy. He says that the relation between the expressed and the implied sense is something similar to that between a light and pot; the light reveals the pot, even though there is no invariable relation between the two. Again in inference, the minor term becomes related to the major term through its relation to

the middle term. Thus, a degree of mediacy is an essential feature of inferential process but one feels that in suggestion the necessary characteristic of the degree of mediacy is wanting.

In the *Nyāyamañjari*, Jayantabhaṭṭa refers to the *Dhvani* theory as one adopted by a wiseacre and dismisses it as unworthy of serious consideration by scholars.<sup>27</sup> The later Naiyāyikas hold that the *Vyangārtha* or the suggested sense of a word is really inference from its primary and secondary meanings and is not separate from them.<sup>28</sup> Other Naiyāyikas incorporated *Dhvani* under *Lakṣaṇā*. In *Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā* Annambhaṭṭa explains this position. He does not, however, deny that occasionally certain terms do indeed suggest things of the kind claimed by the advocates of *Vyañjanā*. But he points out that the so-called ‘suggestive power’ (*Dhvani*) of terms is nothing but an extension of *Lakṣaṇā* (indirect sense) of terms. Let us take the term ‘*Gangā*’ in the sentence “*Gangāyām ghosah*”. We have already seen in the second chapter that the statement cannot be taken in a direct sense, as in that case it would not make any sense. It is this ‘logical difficulty’ that justifies the employment of the term in an ‘indirect sense’ to mean the bank of the river *Gangā*.

Now, if to some people the term *Gangā* signifies not merely the river-bank but also the attributes of ‘coolness’ (*Saitya*) and ‘airiness’ (*Pāvanatva*) pertaining to the bank, then it can be said that the term has been used or understood not merely in the simple ‘indirect sense’ of the ‘river-bank’ but in a little more complex ‘indirect sense’ of “a cool and airy river-bank”. If there is no objection to accept this ‘complex indirect sense’ for presentation of the suggested attributes, then suggestive power (*Vyañjanā vṛtti*) of a term seems to be uncalled for. In Annambhatta’s words ‘the suggestive power’, which is included either under ‘direct signifying power’ or under ‘indirect signifying power’ has its basis in the ‘signifying power of a term’. (“*Vyañjanā api śakti-lakṣanāntarbhūtā śabdāśaktimūlā*”).

The view that *Dhvani* is to be included in *Arthāpatti*<sup>29</sup> is similar to the previous one. *Arthāpatti* also is a kind of immediate inference based on the universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle terms. Professor Kuppusvāmī Śāstrī says that all schools of thoughts have to accept suggestion. In the case of ordinary sentences, the individual words give only their

isolated meanings, leaving the *Samsarga* or the mutual relation of the words to be conveyed by suppression or suggestion. The Naiyāyikas call this *Samsargamaryādā*, while the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas consider it as based on *Lakṣanā*. There is apparent contradiction between the juxtaposition of words in a sentence and they are not being related to serve some purpose. Thus the *Samsarga* is cognised through a process of inference of the *Arthāpatti* type. We may note here that even in *Lakṣanā* the transferred sense is obtained through *Arthāpatti* and Mukulabhaṭṭa actually quotes the well-known example of ‘the fat boy who does not eat during the day’ as a variety of *Lakṣanā*.<sup>30</sup>

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept *Srūtarthāpatti* to explain elliptical sentences. This has to be distinguished from *Dhvani*, for here the expressed sense itself is incomplete. *Arthāpatti*, being a means of valid knowledge, implies accuracy and definiteness of the sense cognised through it; but in poetic suggestion the implied sense is rather vague and can be fully understood only by men of literary taste who can appreciate the context of situation.

Some of the Ālamkārikas like Mukulabhaṭṭa try to include *Vyañjanā* or the suggestive power under *Lakṣanā* itself. They accept that it is possible to convey ideas different from literal sense through sentence; but all such instances can be included in *Lakṣanā* itself. According to Mukulabhaṭṭa,<sup>31</sup> one variety of *Lakṣanā* mentioned by the Mīmāṃsaka scholar Bhartr̥mitra is that wherein the expressed literal sense indirectly leads to some other idea (*Abhidheyena sambandha*). Thus even instances of *Arthāpatti* will come under *Lakṣanā*. Mukulabhaṭṭa defines *Lakṣanā*<sup>32</sup> in such a way that all instances where the expressed sense indicates other ideas are included in it. He says that *Dhvani* propounded as a new doctrine by some literary critics, actually falls within the sphere of *Lakṣanā* itself.

Ānandavadhana refers to this anti-*Dhvani* theory and says *Lakṣanā* and *Dhvani* differ from each other with regard to their nature and subject matter. *Lakṣanā* operates when there is some kind of inconsistency in the primary sense; it indicates the secondary or metaphorical sense after concealing its primary sense. But in suggestion the primary sense need not be discarded.<sup>33</sup> This

argument is based on the assumption that *Lakṣaṇā* involves the impossibility of the literal sense and not merely the inconsistency of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker. For we know that in cases of *Ajahatsvārthā* *Lakṣaṇā* the literal sense is not completely rejected.

*Lakṣaṇā* is based on the primary sense of a word and is its extension.<sup>34</sup> *Dhvani*, on the other hand, depends on suggestion and suggestion can occur even in the cases where there is absolutely no expressed sense, as in the case of emotion suggested by the sound of music or the sight of dances or pictures. Many musicians believe that different *Rāgas* (a particular melodic form) are suggested by different combination of notes. In the same way, colours, lines etc. of a picture suggest something embedded in it. The emotive element in language can never be explained in terms of the expressive but in terms of the suggestive or metaphorical sense of words. In *Lakṣaṇā* the implied sense is always indicated indirectly through the primary sense of the word; but in the case of *Dhvani* it is possible for both the meanings to occur almost simultaneously.<sup>35</sup>

The subjects of *Lakṣanā* and *Dhvani* are different. The meaning conveyed by *Lakṣanā* is always an idea whereas the suggested sense can be an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion. Even though *Dhvani* is different from *Lakṣanā*, there is an element of suggestion in all cases of deliberate and intentional metaphors. What might be left unnoticed in ordinary cases is emphasised by *Lakṣanā* because the inconsistency of meaning (or the strangeness of the collocation of words) produces a break in the flow and makes the listeners think about the purpose behind it. Thus, *Lakṣanā* leads the way to the land of suggestion or *Dhvani*.

Language is the principal instrument of communication in human society. Any language is composed of words, which are combined to form sentences. Metaphor has its own features, which are recognisable by the readers. It has now crossed the strict boundary of aesthetic and has become very much important and central to any adequate account of language. It is a fact that we use metaphor in our everyday language and we do understand them as we understand our standard literal one. So, why should we not give metaphor an appropriate place in ordinary language when it is

already stuffed with metaphorical use? Metaphor has a great and important role in poetics, as it is essential to evoke aesthetic pleasure. But our ordinary language is also not free from its use. In our everyday speech we cannot do without it. Richards challenges Aristotle's contention that the gift of metaphor is an eye for resemblance and a gift that some have and some have not, on three counts. First of all, he says, "we all live, and speak, only through our eye for resemblances. Without it we should perish early."<sup>36</sup> Secondly, the claim that the command of metaphor cannot be handed down is also open to doubts. Richards says, "Metaphor is imparted to us from others, with and through the language we learn, language which is utterly unable to aid us except through the command of metaphor which it gives."<sup>37</sup> He also disputes the "third and worst assumption – that metaphor is something special and exceptional in the use of language, a deviation from its normal mode of working, instead of the omni-present principle of all its free action."<sup>38</sup>

The analysis of metaphor is an academic one. But when we use metaphor in everyday life, we do so spontaneously, without thinking about how it operates. The ordinary people, even the

unlettered persons are endowed with the gift of metaphor. Everyday, persons around us use metaphor in some way or other. "Do not talk rubbish!", we admonish. When we have any demand, we meet the "Head" of the Institution. We never think twice when we speak of the "legs" of a chair. In the same way the expressions like "Bottle-neck", "Traffic jam", "Zebra crossing", "Horse power", "The foot of the Himalayas", "Rooting out evil" etc. can be justified through metaphor alone. Leading advertisement agencies use metaphor widely in their sophisticated advertisements. Even the hawkers selling their wares on pavements and on board train peddlers use metaphor.

**Emblems, symbols and signs that are used in our ordinary life are also metaphorical. As for example, we can take the emblem of Life Insurance Corporation of India – 'a lamp in between two hands'. Here 'lamp' signifies 'life', which is protected by 'insurance' symbolised by protective hands. Again, a road sign – 'a picture of a leftward curve' – means that there is a left curve ahead. Sometimes on the roadside we can see the picture of a 'running boy' on the signboard. This picture conveys something beyond its apparent**

meaning. Actually it signifies – ‘school ahead, drive slow’. Again, we can take traffic signals – ‘red light’ signifies ‘stop’ whereas ‘green light’ signifies ‘go’. Thus, in our ordinary life we often use metaphors for communication.

When an instrument is invented for the first time, the engineers generally name it after considering its similarity with the existing object already known by us. Nowadays, most of us are very familiar with ‘computer mouse’. It is so named due to its physical resemblance with a mouse. Again, let us take the example of ‘think pad’ – a computer having physical resemblance with a writing pad; or ‘Tata Sumo’ – a passenger car manufactured by the Indian automobile giant ‘Tata’ and as fat and heavy as the world famous Japanese Sumo wrestlers.

Metaphor plays an important role in selection of proper names. In every society parents try to choose the best names for their newborn babies. In the past children in our society were often named after gods and goddesses and renowned personalities who earned fame and fortune in society by their good deeds or invaluable

contribution to society. One never thinks of naming his/her child after a person who has or had earned notoriety or suffered misfortune. For example, we do not generally prefer the name 'Sītā' for our beloved daughters as 'Sītā' in the *Rāmāyana* had to go through ordeals all along her life and suffered misfortune for reasons beyond her control. Again, some parents may prefer the name 'Sītā' or 'Satī' for their daughters as the characters serve as ideal for virtues like 'self-sacrifice' and 'chastity'. Similarly, while selecting the name of one's house one generally prefers '*Snehanīda*' (abode of affection), '*Chāyānīda*' (abode of soothing shade), and '*Sukhanīda*' (abode of happiness) and the like as opposed to '*Asnehanīda*' (abode of disaffection), '*Raudrānīda*' (abode full of the sun shine and scorching heat) and '*Duhkhanīda*' (abode of sorrow) respectively. We all know that names are non-connotative; yet good deeds or notoriety of a known person flashes upon our mind as soon as we think of the name he is associated with, or we remember the good or bad meanings of a word instantaneously as we think of a particular word. These good or bad aspects or bright or dark history associated with a name flashes upon our mind, serves as a metaphor

(in the sense of ideal), and help us to choose or discard a particular name.

**O**ne should be aware of the fact that metaphor is not at all an isolated problem of passing interest. A good metaphor places things in a new light; so that we can see them in a way we have never seen them before. When one says, "Ram babu is a godly person" or "Raju is a devilish man", we understand that the speaker does not mean what he says literally, but he utters something metaphorically. Here his utterance is metaphorical because his intention is to highlight the similarity with others that he wants to communicate. The choice of metaphor will depend on which aspects of the thing described one wishes to highlight. One uses metaphor in order to express his intention to others in a more striking way.

**B**ut what is the necessity of using metaphor in ordinary life? If Ravi is an idiot then we can say, "Ravi is an idiot"; but instead of saying that sometimes we say, "Ravi has a hole in the head". This expression is more forceful and more striking than the former. To refer to one important area of a city we often say, 'this is the heart

of the city'. Actually metaphorical statements can appeal more than literal to the hearer. We can say, 'this attempt is abortive' instead of saying 'this is not a good attempt'. The first one is more striking or forceful than the second. The beauty, which is veiled or suppressed, is more charming and attractive than that which is already revealed or expressed.

The metaphor is not merely in the words we use – it is deep rooted in the very concept we use. This concept governs our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do everyday is very much a matter of metaphor. When we say, "The problem is thorny" – we talk about the problem in terms of thorns, for we conceive of them as thorns. Sometimes we say, "He is a sly fox". We talk about the person in this way because we observe some of the characteristics of a fox such as craftiness,

cleverness and untrustworthiness in him. It seems then, metaphors are a part of our everyday life, behaviour and consequently of our ordinary language. The poet Dylan Thomas wrote:

“The force that through the green fuse  
drives the flower

Drives my green age”.

Now, if somebody likes to understand each word of the above lines literally, then the questions that can arise are, “how can flowers be driven and how can also the ages be driven?” Again, “how can the fuses do it and how can the ages be green?” If we try to respond in this way, then much poetry will turn out to be meaningless. But we all know that these lines do have meaning and we do understand them and gather a new feature of worldly things. To call a stem a ‘fuse’ is to call attention to the explosive quality of plants growing in the springtime. To call an age green is to point out the relation of greenness to immaturity of youth: green things are still growing, not yet ripe. The fact is that these metaphors forcefully shock us into a kind of awareness, which we will not have if we use the sentence literally. It is to be noted here that the metaphors operate by

similarity. If we could discern no connection between greenness and immaturity, we would not know what to make of the phrase "green age" and would be likely to dismiss it as meaningless. But it is a similarity that may not have occurred to us before. This is the use of metaphor that enables us to discern likeness or similarity in apparently unlike or dissimilar things. Its use heightens our perception of the world around us. A metaphor carries more than what a literal meaning carries. It is a fact that metaphors forcefully give us a jerk and bring a kind of awareness – throw us into a new trajectory, help us to see in a new dimension of reality that we cannot have if we use the sentences literally.

There are many odd or intricate subjects that cannot be said directly due to the complications of thought or due to the nature of the content which cannot be expressed through normal way, i.e., in a non-metaphorical way. We feel psychologically free to express such odd or delicate subjects to the hearer through the help of metaphor. We can also express many abstract things easily with the help of metaphor.

The greatest function of metaphor, however, still remains that of detecting similarities in disparity. Richards says, "It is the supreme agent by which disparate and hitherto connected things are brought together in poetry for the sake of the effects upon attitude and impulse which spring from their collocation and from the combinations which the mind then establishes between them."<sup>39</sup> Palmer says, "Often the hearer is more stimulated by allusiveness of expression which requires a greater effort of imagination or thought of his part. To achieve this, linguistic symbolism turns to its service what is perhaps the most remarkable quality of the human mind – its capacity for analogy that is the ability to perceive similarity of quality or relationship in dissimilar objects or situations."<sup>40</sup>

**But if the objects and situations are very dissimilar, how does the speaker connect two such objects and situations? There must be some basis for bringing together these dissimilar objects and situations and this basis is similarity. The human mind does not stop with similarity but goes beyond it to identity. When we analyse it we may be confronted with a myriad of ideas: that of the primary and the secondary senses, that of polysemy or two meanings of a single**

word, that of similarity giving place to identity and so on. It is true that in analysis the identity in metaphor emerges as based on similarity. We no more think of this analysis when we metaphorise.

There is also the darker side of such metaphors. Metaphor may create misunderstanding among the hearers if they fail to grasp the proper meaning of the metaphor. The plain (non-metaphorical) statement does not involve ambiguity, i.e., there is at least a less chance of being ambiguous. Through metaphor the speaker hides his own intention and cheats the hearer. Metaphor may be used negatively, i.e., it may be used as an instrument to hide our own intention, which is a kind of deliberate hiding of fact called *Chala* by the Naiyāyikas. In fact, *Chala* has been enumerated as one of the categories by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. The use of *Chala* is considered as a defect of debate by the Naiyāyikas because it is instrumental to hide the speaker's intention – a deliberate creation of 'communication gap' or miscommunication if something is at all communicated. For example, one man says, "The boy is *Navakambala*" (possessed of a new blanket), and another unfairly objects,

"he is not *Nava-kambala*" (possessed of nine blankets); here the latter is using '*Chala*'.

It is clear that metaphor deals with the superimposition of identities. There has been the tendency to superimpose ever since language began – whether the superimposition of divinity on natural phenomenon, poetic superimposition of the standard of comparison on the object compared, the more practical scientific superimposition or the superimposition in day-to-day speech. There are two kinds of superimposition – voluntary and involuntary. The involuntary superimposition occurs when one mistakes something for an object quite different or when a speaker unconsciously superimposes i.e., where the superimposition is not deliberate. We usually find involuntary metaphor in ordinary usage. Illiterate or ordinary people use so many metaphors unconsciously or involuntarily in their conversation for communication. But voluntary superimposition occurs when the observer deliberately and consciously identifies an object with another while knowing fully well that they are different and distinct entities. For example, a man presents a rose to his fiancée by saying, 'a rose for a rose'. Though this identification of

the two totally separate objects is a kind of factual impossibility, such identification has to occur in language. This kind of superimposition is the basis for all art and literature. The depersonalisation in art is another name for deliberate superimposition of identity or voluntary metaphor. This voluntary superimposition has a great role to play in relishing aesthetic feeling (*Rasa*). In literary works, wide ranges of figures have this voluntary superimposed identity as their foundation.

In imagination also there is voluntary superimposition of identity. An imaginary cognition associated with *Icchāprayojyatva* (knowledge that is produced out of one's own desire). It has a great value in relieving us for sometime from our daily tensions or this mundane life. Moreover, in *Āhāryajñāna* there is deliberate superimposition. The knowledge that is produced out of one's desire at the time when there is contradictory knowledge (*Virodhijñāna*) is known as imposed knowledge (*Āhāryajñāna*). (*Virodhijñāna-kālīneccchāprayojyajñānatvam āhāryajñānatvam*).<sup>41</sup> The word 'Āhārya' means 'artificial' which is found in the *Bhāttikāvya* where the ladies are described as *Āhāryasobhārahitairamāyaih*<sup>42</sup> (that is free from

artificial beauty). If the knowledge in the form “there is fire in the lake” (*Hrado vahnimān*) is produced out of one’s desire at the time when there is existence of contradictory knowledge in the form “there is the absence of fire in the lake”, the knowledge is called an imposed one, which is deliberate. In *Āhārya* cognition though there is semantic incompatibility yet meaning of such sentences is understood by others. For example, “Had I the wings of a bird, I could fly.” This sentence is a factual impossibility but it has suggestive or metaphorical meaning. In fact, the conception of an aeroplane had its origin in this *Virodhikālīneccchā*. The sight of a flying bird made man think, “I too can fly if I can get the buoyancy of the air by using a pair of wings.” This desire inspired man to conceive the first model of the aeroplane ever made. Though it was not fully successful, yet it provided the basic concept of a modern flying machine.

**M**an began to superimpose identities right from the day he learnt to use speech for communication. But, every man is an individual entity having nothing in common with another’s language. How is it possible then to communicate with another person with the

help of any language where there is nothing in common with each other? To overcome this problem we take recourse to symbols in a language. "Symbolism is the study of the part played in human affairs by the language and symbols of all kinds ... Symbols direct and organise, record and communicate."<sup>43</sup> Symbolisation is another name for a greater degree of identification; in short, for metaphorising. Man cannot live alone. So he tries to identify with others. This is how society grows. The basis of language then is metaphor. When we use metaphor or hear it being used, we do not have to analyse it to understand its meaning. Understanding comes naturally to us. Far from being a special gift, the gift of metaphor is one that is handed down with language itself and every person is capable of creating metaphors. In fact, without metaphors we cannot communicate at all.

Indian rhetoricians have always conceived of figures of speech in relation to the entire context. There can be no figure that can be taken totally out of context. In *Rūpaka* the whole operation of superimposition takes place in totality with the context. Thus, being a part of the whole is the basic idea of metaphor.

Metaphors are a part of language and in language too, this totality of context is everything. A word cannot convey any sense on its own without the totality of a sentence. Similarly, man cannot exist without being a part of the society. When we express our individual feelings in language, we identify our individual thoughts with those of society. This identification leads to depersonalisation of feeling. Without this basic identification, every human being would be isolated and lonely. Once language was created, this human tendency to identify with others or to become part of the whole has led him to metaphorise. This explains why we take recourse to metaphors as naturally as we speak. In fact, metaphor is the part and parcel of our living speech.

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3. “*Abhidhālakṣaṇāmūlā śabdasya vyāñjanā dvidhā//*” – *Sāhityadarpana* II 20.
4. *Kāvyasyātmā dhvanīḥ: Dhvanyāloka* p. 2. Henceforth DL.
5. *Pratiyamānam punar anyadeva vastvasti vāñisu mahākavīnām / Yattatprasiddhāvayavātiriktam vibhāti lāvanyam ivāṅganāsu //*  
*Ibid*, 1/4.

6. *Ālokarthī yathā dīpaśikhāyām yatnavān janah /  
Tadupāyatayā tadvad arthe vācye tadādrtaḥ //*  
*Ibid, 1/9.*
7. *Arthāntare samikramitamatyantam vā tiraskṛtam /  
Avivakṣitavācyasya dhvanervācyam dvidhā matam //*  
*DL, II, I.*
8. *DL 1/4, Vṛtti.*
9. *DL, p. 138.*
10. *Na khalu dharmigrāhakamānasiddham ratyādīdhvaneralakṣyakrama-vyaṅgyatvam.  
Rasagangādhara 1, p.129.*
11. *DL, 2/23 Vṛtti p. 102.*
12. *Kumārasambhavam 6/84.*
13. *Etat tāvat tribhedatvam na kārikākāreṇa kṛtam / vṛttikāreṇa tu darsītam /  
Locana p. 123.*
14. *DL, p. 221.*
15. *Ibid, p. 181.*
16. *Ibid, p. 148.*
17. *Ibid, p. 182.*
18. *Ibid, p. 163.*
19. *Locana, p. 27.*
20. *Ibid, p. 65.*
21. *Ibid, p. 27.*
22. *DL, p. 20.*
23. *DL, II. 4.*

24. Jespersen: *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 309.
25. *Anumāne' ntarbhāvam sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum / Vyaktivivekam kurute pranamya Mahimā parām vācam // Vyaktiviveka*, 1.1
26. *Vyañjakatvam śabdānām gavamkatvam, tacca lingatvam atasca vyāngyapratitir lingipratitir eveti lingalingibhāva eva tesām vyāngya vyāñjakabhāvo nāparah kascit.*  
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27. *Yam anyah pāṇḍitam manyah prapede kāmcana dhvanim ... athavā nedṛsi carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate.*  
*Nyāyamanjari*, p. 45.
28. *Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, pp. 144 – 145.
29. Mentioned by Jayaratha in the *Vimarsinī* commentary on *Alamkārasarvasva*, p. 9.
30. *Abhidhārvttimatr̄kā*, p. 19.
31. *Ibid*, p. 17.
32. *Arthāvaseyasya punar laksyamānatvam ucayte*. *Ibid*, p. 3.
33. *Vyañjakatvamārge tu yadārtho 'rthāntaram dyotayati, tada svarūpam prakāśayann evāśāv anyasya prakāśakah pratiyate pradipavat*. DL, p. 192.
34. *Vācakatvāśrayenaiva gunavrttirvyavasthitā / Ibid*, p. 55
35. In *asamlakṣyakrama-vyāngya*, even though the emotion is based on the primary sense, the sequence is not felt.
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