

CHAPTER V

**KANT :
AN INTERFACE WITH EMPIRICAL
MORALITY**

The utilitarian theory of morality is often criticised for not accommodating justice, J. S. Mill was aware of that and writes "In all ages of speculation, one of the strongest obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is the criterion of right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of Justice."¹ Let us see how Bentham and Mill understand the principle of pleasure. The greatest happiness of the greatest number introduces a distributive principle: each person is to count for one, and nobody for more than one. Right and wrong, good and evil turn on the distribution of pleasure produced by an action. A less amount for others might be preferable to a greater amount for me. A less amount equally distributed, might be preferable to a greater amount unequally distributed. Justice means equal distribution of available good among men making an equal contribution to the goodness of their lives. Equality cannot be taken to mean identically, that pleasure should be distributed in 'equal measured amounts to each person.' It must be in proportion to the needs, capabilities and special status (e.g., the handicapped or belonging to a backward class). This principle of equality, the critic of utilitarianism points out, is not in any way based upon 'maximizing pleasure or minimizing pain,' but upon the principle of justice which takes precedence over the pleasure-principle. This problem, as we have already noted, was not unknown to Mill. He elucidates the idea of justice as follows:

The powerful sentiment and apparently clear perception resembling an instinct, have seemed to the majority of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things; to show that the Just

must have an existence in Nature as something absolute, generically distinct from every variety of the Expedient, and, an idea, opposed to it, though (as is commonly acknowledged) never, in the long run, disjoined from it in fact.”²

Mill then attempted to show that the principle of utility does not violate the principle of justice (chapter V, *Utilitarianism*). His arguments are presumed to be based on Hume’s *Enquiry*. Hume looks upon justice as an artificial virtue, the consequence of human social and political contrivances which have the utility to promote the good of society and its members in the long run. Justice is one of the greatest of all utilities. Mill’s views on justice follows the same line of thinking. There are situations in which we think it right to do an action which though not in conformity with the maxim of utility, arise out of the existence of institutions that serve human happiness, e.g., right to property, keeping a promise, paying a debt etc. The loyalty to such institutions, though, is not based on utility. Utilitarianism has attracted critical attention from its very inception. In what follows we shall take up two attacks on Utilitarianism from two different positions. One is from Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the other is from M. K. Gandhi (1869-1948). We shall first deal with the views of I. Kant.

“In emphasising the rights of the individual, Kant sets himself against every form of Utilitarianism. He believes that neither morality nor law can be founded on social utility, the general happiness, or the common good; they are founded, rather, on the rights of individual man.”³ Thus not only the ‘happiness theory’ but any sort of utilitarian theory would have been discarded by Kant as “... he categorically

repudiates the principle that the end justifies the means, however good and worthwhile the end may be.”⁴ Kant’s own idea of justice has been discussed by him in his book *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (*The Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*). This book forms Part I of his *The Metaphysics of Morals* (*Metaphysik der Sitten*). In whole of Kant’s major philosophical works, these metaphysical element plays the most important role. The meaning of ‘metaphysics’ as used by Kant must be made clear in order to understand his philosophy, whether it be pure reason or of practical reason.

Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Kant : Epistemologically, Kant rejects the possibility of Metaphysics as a science. To Kant, knowledge means scientific knowledge, e.g., mathematics, physics. “The analysis of mathematics and theoretical knowledge results in the thesis that all theoretical knowledge consists in categorising perceptual material located in space and time. Knowledge is thus the joint product of perceiving and thinking.”⁵ Thus, *a priori* categories and sense perceptions are both necessary for knowledge to be there. But we can have no sense perception of the metaphysical entities like God, soul etc. “Thus cognitive function of the categories lies in their application to objects as given in sense intuition, that is, to phenomena. Things-in-themselves are not, and cannot be, phenomena. And we possess no faculty of intellectual intuition which could supply objects for a meta-phenomenal application of the categories.”⁶ Hence metaphysics of the classical type, when considered as a possible source of objective knowledge is discarded by Kant. Any speculation about metaphysical entities will give rise to mere transcendental illusions or antinomies. For

example, the thesis (according to quality), "Nothing exists but the simple" and the antithesis "There exists nowhere in the world anything simple" can both be shown by reason to be equally valid and also opposed and inconsistent with each other. But if metaphysics can yield no knowledge, what does the word 'metaphysics' signify in the titles of the books *The Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*? Do these books maintain that speculations on morals or justice will end up in smoke? Or he is creating a new metaphysics in his preoccupation with practical reason? Copleston writes, "It seems to me, ..., to be arguable that what Kant is doing is to substitute a new type of metaphysics [in morality and religion] for the metaphysics which he rejected in the *Critique of Pure Reason*."⁷ A Kantian would seek for different interpretations in different contexts and justify the different uses of the term. An opponent would demand for a consistency in use. Hegel also has criticised Kant by saying that if noumenon is unknowable in Kant's sense, then how can Kant apply the category of 'causation', 'reality' and even 'existence' to it? Kant accepts noumenon at least as a cause of the phenomenon. But here, some words can be said in support of Kant. Hegel did not seem to take seriously Kant's distinction between knowing and thinking. The unknowable can be thought, but without being given in sensibility cannot be known. It can be thought because mind with its *a priori* categories are there. Thus, "... in so far as the unschematized categories can be used by the mind to think things-in-themselves and to form ideas which contain no logical contradiction, metaphysics of the traditional type is a psychological possibility. It is psychologically possible, for example, to think of things-in-themselves as substances."⁸ Secondly, the word 'metaphysics' in the titles "The Metaphysics of Morals" or "The Metaphysical Elements of Justice"

stands for "... the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason"⁹ thus "metaphysical elements of justice" points to the *apriori* elements of justice contributed by the mind) the metaphysics of morals embraces only the pure *apriori* part of morals, in abstraction from its empirical components, whereas, the word metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* certainly does not mean the *apriori* contributions but the entities to which *apriori* categories cannot be applied to yield knowledge.

Our concern is to judge whether utilitarianism as a moral theory violates justice. (On my part, I feel uncomfortable) to value a moral theory at the point of justice. This is because, it would presuppose that 'moral' and 'justice' are two different standards and justice has the higher authority over the moral. But the word 'justice' has a very wide range of senses in the history and thus the relation of it to morality is made obscure. To a modern student of humanities, moral philosophy, political science and jurisprudence are three different branches of learning. *The Republic* of Plato has come down to us with a double title—"The State' or 'Concerning Justice'.¹⁰ First, in spite of these two titles, it must not be assumed that it is a treatise either on political science or on jurisprudence, but it is both or more than both. Second, the question which Plato sets himself to answer in this book is: what is a good man and how does a man become good? Such questions might seem to belong to moral philosophy. But, to the Greek it was obvious that a good man must be a member of a state and could become good only through membership of a state. Upon the first question, therefore, a second naturally follows: what is a good state, and how is the good state

come into being? Moral philosophy thus comes closer to political science and in fact, it can be said that for Plato, there is no other word for morality than justice. In *The Republic*, the word morality is absent but the subject is present in the guise of justice (one thing we must however keep in our mind that the Greek word for justice—‘*dikaiosyne*’ has a broader sweep than its English counterpart). In Aristotle, the word ‘justice’ begins to gather its own distinctive features from morality. For him, though moral philosophy is a Ground of Politics, justice is a moral virtue, ... the virtue of justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all other virtues is a virtue which acts in social relations.¹¹ Justice is again, in *The Politics*, general and particular. General justice is ‘righteousness’, being the exercise of goodness as a whole and particular justice as a component of the former, consists in behaving ‘fairly’ or ‘equally’. Kant certainly makes a distinction between morality and justice if morality is concerned with virtue only. Kant writes “All duties are either duties of justice, that is, those for which external legislation is possible or duties of virtue, for which such legislation is not possible.”¹² Thus, Kant too holds like Aristotle that justice is a matter of exercise. Again, the above division made by Kant is under the head of “Division of the metaphysics of morals in general.”¹³ That may mean that the study of justice is a part of the study of morals. That may also mean that the *a priori* contribution of the mind to justice and to morals (i.e., to virtue) are essentially the same. The only difference between the two is that duties of virtues are internal acts of mind (and that is why no external legislation is possible for them) and duties of justice are external actions (for which external legislation is possible). Mill, on the other hand, gives justice an upper hand over morality when he entitles himself to show that his moral standard of utility does not violate justice.

We have addressed ourselves to the task of judging the utilitarian moral standard in the light of Kant's concept of justice. Contrary to the fact that the Greek ethics cannot be properly understood without their politics, Kant's theory of justice can be understood without the theory of morals, Kant certainly links justice with an activity. Duties of justice are those for which external legislation is possible, but for duties of virtue (morals) no such legislation is possible. This legislation then constitutes the watersheds between justice and morality. A just action is defined by Kant as follows : "Every action is just [right] that in itself or in its maxim is such that the freedom of the will of each can co-exist together with freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law."¹⁴ Kant's moral dictum of virtue also says like "Act only on that maxim ..." etc., but the real significance of this dictum does not consist in 'acting' so much but in 'willing' that maxim to be a universal law. Thus virtue really is consisted in willing. But both justice and virtue, as they come under the same head of "morals", have the same *apriori* or metaphysical elements. Being a deontologist, Kant hold that our willing must be categorical, i.e., We cannot ask for a 'why' behind moral will; but can't we ask for a "why" even that for which external legislation is possible? But, our moral will and the metaphysical elements of justice (and morals), both belong to that part of our soul which is called the noumenal self.

Throughout his philosophy, Kant relies on a distinction between two sorts of objects of thought : the objects with which empirical science is concerned and the objects with which ethics, theology and politics with which ethics, theology and politics are concerned. Phenomena are the objects of empirical knowledge. They

exist in space and time. In addition to phenomena, there are another kinds of objects which we can think only but cannot know applying our categories of understanding. Such non-phenomenal objects are called "noumena". It can be said that "... the objects of ethical, legal and political thought, insofar as they are not matters of empirical knowledge, are noumena."¹⁵ As a phenomenal being, man must be considered as subject to causal laws and as determined. But "... insofar as men are moral, they cease to be phenomenal."¹⁶ Thus, for Kant, the moral self of man is beyond any determination. One point we must note here that Kant would maintain that to be free is not to be under any causal law.

But, Mill being an empiricist would not agree with Kant; self for him would be purely phenomenal. Kant could not have disproved Mill if he faced the latter and probably he would not need to do such. First, noumena is a matter of faith or belief and if Mill does not believe in, it would not carry any meaning to say that Mill is wrong. Second, Kant admits that men are phenomenally determined. But the difference is that the moral self of Kant is noumenal and that of Mill is phenomenal. Kant says that Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber, but Russell doubts. The latter writes "... he soon invented a soporific", Russell may mean is Kant's search for the *apriori*. In order to provide a necessary ground for science (and even morality), Kant contends himself with the mirage of the absolute. It is another question that recent studies agree rather with Hume than Kant; that all science is relative in its truth. It is another question that "perhaps, after all, 'necessary' knowledge is not necessary?"¹⁷ But for our purpose at the moment, it would be sufficient to remember that J. S. Mill has no faith in *apriori*.

Kant defines justice as "... the aggregate of those conditions under the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law freedom"¹⁸ or a just action is "... that is itself or in its maxim is such that the freedom of the will of each can co exist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law."¹⁹ Freedom of will, the most important postulate in Kant's moral philosophy will be discussed later. But what is that 'universal law'? Kant refers to a universal law whenever he speaks of justice. In addition to his above statements about justice, Kant further writes, "... the universal law of justice is: act externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law."²⁰ This universal law is the categorical imperative. In this regard Kant's theory of justice differs from his theory of right. The theory of right concerns what we can be compelled to do. No body can be compelled to act out of a sense of duty, but they can be compelled to keep promises, pay debts, or in general to perform right actions.²¹ Justice has to do with ends that cannot be externally compelled. By 'being properly compelled' in the context of right Kant means 'being properly compelled by law'. However Kant had a liberal conception of the proper sphere of law in that he regards the state as essentially functioning to prevent people interfering with the freedom of others.

Actions to be moral must be unconditional. What is a command or imperative? In Kant's words, "The conception of an objective principle so far as it constrains a will, is a command (of reason), and a formula of this command is called an imperative."²² Imperatives are expressed by an ought : Moreover, "All imperatives

command either hypothetically or categorically.”²³ An imperative is hypothetical if it states that some action is right or advisable as means to some specific good. Such an imperative has an “if-clause”. For example, “If you want to get help, help others.” Kant does not count these sort of imperatives as moral. A moral imperative is categorical, i.e., unconditional. Such imperatives are not connected with any “if-clause” and do not refer to any goal but are desired from the mere concept of “ought” or the “idea of obligation” itself. Thus, the categorical imperative “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”²⁴ is the criterion for deciding whether a maxim is moral. This is the one and only categorical imperative. A maxim is the subjective principle of an action. Moral laws are not given as universal laws like the other laws of nature. Moral laws are to be made universal. Until and unless I will my subjective principle be a universal law, it remains a mere maxim. One makes a maxim universal by consistently willing that maxim to be a maxim for all rational beings. One’s will is consistent if he could also count himself under the jurisdiction of that maxim. For example, if I could withstand or will myself being a slave owned by another person, then the ‘slave owning’ would be a moral act. Kant points to the logical impossibility of such cases. Once the categorical imperative is obeyed, it becomes “universal law according to which, justice demands we should act externally. This categorical imperative must be *apriori*, having its seat in reason. Thus, the idea of justice necessarily follows from the idea of morality. Now, I wish to make certain points.

- I) Why should an imperative, to be a moral one, be categorical and not hypothetical? Kant writes that “... all moral concepts have their seat

and origin entirely *apriori* in reason". But why is it needed to assume this? In his theory of knowledge, Kant sets his goal to show how synthetic *apriori* judgements in physics and mathematics are possible. It was not his problem that whether *apriori* elements in judgements are present or not. Our critical philosopher somewhat dogmatically maintains that there are *apriori* elements in knowledge. Hegel points out that Kant's assumption of twelve categories is a dogmatic attempt. Why twelve and not more or less? Hegel however gives some more of them. But recent developments in science clearly shows that "necessary knowledge is not necessary." Not a single category or concept is needed to be present *apriori* in mind. (This dogmatism is not unique in Kant. Many examples are there in the history of philosophy. Plato, for example, says that knowledge must be necessary and universal, perception cannot give that, therefore knowledge is through concepts etc. etc. But why at all knowledge should be necessary? It is for the sake of modern science Kant sought for *apriori* concepts. But the modern science rejects his thesis and holds that concepts are rather an achievement, not a gift. Similarly, Kant's demand for an *apriori* categorical imperative can be criticised as a dogmatic one. I would like to quote a passage here from Will Durant's *The Story of Philosophy* :

"The nineteenth century dealt rather hardly with Kant's ethics, his theory of an innate, *apriori*, absolute moral sense. The philosophy of evolution suggested irresistibly that the sense of duty is a social deposit in the individual, the content of conscience is

acquired, though the vague disposition to social behaviour is innate. The moral self, the social man, is no special creation” coming mysteriously from the hand of God, but the late product of a leisurely evolution. Morals are not absolute; they are a code of conduct more or less haphazardly developed for group survival ... No action is good in itself, as Kant supposed.”²⁵

(II) Are the so-called categorical imperatives really categorical? Let us examine. Categorical means two things : (i) non-teleological, and (ii) *apriori*. Does a law to be a universal one really need to be non-teleological? The law of survival is universal in a sense and yet it is teleological. Being a teleologist, Mill criticizes “*apriori* moralists”. Of these *apriori* moralists, Mill says, Kant was the “most illustrious.” Mill has the highest regards for “this remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculations, ...”.²⁶ But Mill is critical of Kant’s concept of categorical imperative. Mill writes :

... when he begins to deduce from this precept (The categorical imperative) any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say any physical) impossibility, in the adoption of, by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.²⁷

The allegation of Kant's being a utilitarian in those arguments is not accepted by some philosophers and scholars of Kant. He is not arguing, they say, that one must keep one's promises because the results of every one's breaking them when convenient or advantageous to themselves would be so bad as to be intolerable, "Kant, however, is contending that one cannot even will such a maxim to be universally acted on, because in so doing, one would be involved in a contradiction of will; one would be willing both that it be possible to make promises and have them credited and that everyone be free to break promises to suit his own purpose."²⁸ This argument too cannot eliminate the element of consequentialism from Kant's morality. If it is purely formal, it too has some consequences, because, no argument is without consequence. A contradiction is also an outcome of a deduction. Second, a will cannot be separated from the possibility of the act of which it is a will. Will after all is not a will that wills nothing: Third, even the author of the above view, Frankena, admits that Kant's arguments are not always as convincing as the one against deceitful promising, as for example—slave owning.

(III) Modern philosophers do not always identify utilitarianism with the happiness principle. Kant, in criticising utilitarianism is focussing on the "happiness as an end" theory. "If moral philosophy were nothing but eudaemonism [the happiness theory], it would be absurd to look to *apriori* principles for help."²⁹ Kant, in fact would criticise every form of teleology in morality. But has Kant succeeded in eliminating the element of happiness or teleology from his theory? He writes "Morality is not properly the doctrine of how we make ourselves happy, but how we make ourselves worthy

of happiness.”³⁰ I really cannot find much difference between “making ourselves happy” and “making ourselves worthy of happiness.” The difference between the two either is a matter of words or it consists in that the process of ‘being worthy of happiness’ is a more lengthy process than the process of ‘making ourselves happy’.

Kant maintains that ‘moral laws with their principles’ are essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical; and ‘all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part’ that is, its *apriori*, non-empirical part. Even when we ‘apply’ moral principles to man, we do not need—do not, in Kant’s phrase, ‘borrow the least thing from’—empirical knowledge about humans. In ‘the metaphysic of morals’, as distinct from the human sciences, we do not only require, but must even carefully and on principle rule out and disregard, empirical information about people.³¹ Now, the above contentions are absolutely consistent with the deontologism of Kant. Moral values and laws of justice are absolutely determined by ‘a priori intuition of pure reason.’ But if *apriori* intuitions were wholly different from all that are found in experience it would be impossible to establish any relation between these and the experience. Kant says that so far as our actions are chosen or determined by that unique and universal sense of value they are to be called moral. But, S. N. Dasgupta, in his essay ‘International Morality’ writes that “... it is difficult for us to agree with Kant, that such a notion of value should always remain transcendent yet practical. To be practical requires the notion of value to be immanent. The notion of value, therefore, must be immanent in our experience. The chief fault of Kant both in his *Critique*

of Pure Reason and *Critique of Practical Reason* has been the assumption of the transcendental factors which have been permitted to remain transcendent and yet are allowed to take part in experience in which their immanence is denied.³²

Let us look at the matter afresh. There have been several value theories of non-deontological readings of Kant in the last few years. The most influential have been the interpretations of Allen Wood, Onora O’Neil, Barbara Herman and others. These interpretations suggest that Kant hardly ignored the issue of moral life as a whole, or the substantive value that underlies it, or the anthropological and historical facts without which the theory remains formal and empty. Real human life is emotionally responsive and historically, socially situated. Kant did not ignore the role that moral commitments and difficult judgments must play in a real human life. This modern interpretation seeks to replace the traditional emphasis on deontology in Kant studies with a substantive value theory and therewith the theories of practical rationality and teleology such an approach requires. Allen Wood who relies heavily on an analysis of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, the *Metaphysics of Morals* and various of Kant’s lectures in practical philosophy, proposes a re-focussing of our attention not on the first two formulations of the categorical imperative, the Formula of the Universal Law, and the Formula of the Law of Nature, but on the Formula of Humanity, the Formula of Autonomy and the Realm of Ends.³³ Wood holds that for Kant, moral action is not concerned with bringing about states of affairs, and in that sense is certainly not ‘consequentialist’. But Kant does regard life as expressing a reverence for a substantive value, such as ‘humanity’ or ‘our rational capacity to set ends’ or the priority of

Humanity as an end in itself—all these are central to Kant if his full position is understood (Kant's Ethical Theory, page 127). Rational human nature exists as an objective end-in-itself. A certain being or state of mind is better and so provides us with strong reasons to pursue it. Such pursuing furthers or promotes what we must be presumed we are seeking to realize or fulfil. Such an understanding frames a more substantively and somewhat teleologically oriented construal of Kant's project. Wood also has given us an account of the ways in which Kant understood the various empirical claims about human nature. He gathers facts from Kant's lectures on anthropology and ethics as well as passages from the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Wood is not proposing that according to Kant morality is based on facts of human nature. He deals with a much deeper role of the latter. Empirical knowledge of human nature is required to determine which ends will honour the rational nature of human beings and which ends are contrary to the respect we owe to human dignity. Further the uniting of the ends of rational beings in a kingdom of ends cannot ignore what ends such beings are empirically disposed to accept. The above interpretations have made us to think twice about the formalistic-rigoristic interpretation as *the* interpretation of Kant. In a way, the modern interpretations have 'taken away the winds from the formalistic-rigoristic sails of Kant studies', being inclined towards a teleological interpretation.

From what has been discussed so far in this chapter, we can make the following observations. Kant's theory of justice is a subordinate part of his theory of morals. And Kant's theory of the *apriori* cannot give a verdict against Mill's empirical moral theory for not accommodating justice. We have discussed the modern teleological

interpretation as against the adequacy of a strict deontologism and thus, so far we have found no reason to discard 'utilitarianism' as a teleological theory.

Notes and References

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- ² Ibid.
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- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, London : Unwin Hymann Ltd., 1989, page 161.
- ⁶ F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Vol. IV), London : Search Press, 1976, page 277.
- ⁷ Ibid, page 341
- ⁸ Ibid, page 277.
- ⁹ Introduction to *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, page xii.
- ¹⁰ Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, New Delhi: B.J. Publications, 1980, page 168.
- ¹¹ Aristotle, *The Politics* (ed. E. Barker), London : Oxford University Press, 1952, page 132.
- ¹² Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, page 45.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, page 35.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, page xxv.

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- ¹⁶ Y. Masih, *A Critical History of Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Baranasidass, 1994, page 398.
- ¹⁷ *History of Western Philosophy*, London : Routledge, 1994, page 678.
- ¹⁸ *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, page 35.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Theory of Right* , Introduction, Sec. II.
- ²² Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals* (tr. By L. W. Beck), New York : The Bobbs Merrill Co., 1959, page 30.
- ²³ *Ibid*, page 31.
- ²⁴ *Ibid*, page 39.
- ²⁵ Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, page 288.
- ²⁶ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, page 4.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ W. K. Frankena, *Ethics*, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1982, page 31.
- ²⁹ *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, page 15.
- ³⁰ I. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, page 31.
- ³¹ R. S. Peters (ed.), *Nature and Conduct*, London : The Macmillan Press, 1975, page 37.
- ³² S. N. Dasgupta, *Philosophical Essays*, Delhi: Motilal Baranasidass, 1990, page 33.
- ³³ *Kant's Ethical Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Specially Chapters IV and V.