

**PROBLEMS RELATED WITH THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI IN
KANT'S THREE CRITIQUES**

Susil Sinha
LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY
COOCH BEHAR COLLEGE

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INTRODUCTION

The greatness of Kant is beyond doubt and his greatness as a philosopher is expressed when it is said that no modern philosopher, no matter whether he is a Kantian or anti-Kantian, must use 'not only the method, but also the problems which Kant has bequeathed to philosophy'. The problems are, of course, very difficult and it is the genuine difficulty of the problems, with which Kant grappled, that largely explains why we fail to understand him with that ease with which we understand his predecessors, like Descartes, Hume and Leibniz.

The problem of 'synthetic a priori judgements' is a Kantian problem in the sense that it is Kant who for the first time has used the expression 'synthetic a priori' with reference to judgments and drawn our attention to the significance of such judgments. This problem may be described, without exaggeration, as the central problem of

Kant's philosophy and naturally a good number of books and articles are already available on it. But all these, so far my knowledge goes, are treatments of Kant's central problem in a rather piece-meal fashion. While dealing with this problem, they have confined their discussion within a particular 'critique' of Kant, and so we lack a treatment of it in a greater perspective of all the three 'critiques' taken together. It is this lacuna in the former treatments that has inspired me to undertake my present work. My treatment of the problem, I believe, has a double advantage of exploring the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori judgments' in this or that particular 'critique' of Kant and of discovering whether a single identical meaning can be associated with this expression in the whole gamut of Kantian philosophy.

Kant demands that we have synthetic a priori judgments not only in the realm of theoretical knowledge but also in the realms of moral and aesthetic experiences. He further demands that we have such judgments in all the above domains of experience, i.e., in all his three 'critiques' in exactly the same sense. These two claims, though not unrelated, are different. Our assent to the first claim does not imply our acceptance of the second one. The present thesis is, in fact, mainly concerned with the critical

evaluation of Kant's second claim that we have synthetic a priori judgments in all his three 'critiques' in exactly the same sense, though the question of the implication or of the possibility, of a synthetic a priori judgement has not been left untouched.

We do not have 'synthetic a priori judgments' in all the three 'critiques' of Kant in exactly the same sense, and this is not unnatural since the conditions of judgement in the three 'critiques' can not be called identical. For theoretical judgements, i.e., experience of objects in space and time, dealt with in the Critique of Pure Reason, we require an a priori law or principle supplied by the mind or understanding and also an intuition of something given to the mind. Our mind can not produce this intuition by itself. Thus in the first 'critique' our mind or intellect has only a 'logical use'.

In case of moral judgments, dealt with in the Critique of Practical Reason, on the other hand, we are in need only of the a priori moral law or principle supplied by the mind or reason. Unlike the principles or laws of the understanding, the universal moral law of our reason completely determines the instances coming under it. The supreme principle of morality is not just a test for judging an action to be moral but it produces the intuition of such an

action by itself. Thus our mind or intellect has a 'real use' with reference to moral judgments.

An aesthetic judgment, dealt with in the Critique of Judgment, is fundamentally different from the theoretical and moral judgments of the first two 'Critiques', since its predicate, 'beautiful' is not at all a predicate in the true sense of the term. An aesthetic judgment does not assert anything about an object but simply expresses our feeling towards an object when we represent it to ourselves. An aesthetic judgment is not based on any objective a priori principle with reference to which others may be compelled to accept the judgment.

The present thesis has been divided into six chapters. In the first chapter, an explanation of how Kant performs the difficult job of combining the notion of necessity or a priority with that of syntheticity has been given and thereby the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori', as it is used in the first 'critique', is explained. For this purpose two relevant distinctions, viz., a priori - empirical distinction and analytic - synthetic distinction have been taken up for discussion.

In the second chapter, attempts have been made to discover the real implication or significance of Kant's

thesis that 'some judgments are synthetic a priori' and thereby the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori' has been further explained. This chapter identifies some assumptions required for sustaining the thesis of synthetic a priori judgments.

The third chapter explains the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori' as it is used in the second 'critique' and here it is shown that in the second 'critique' this expression does not and can not mean what it means in the first 'critique'.

The fourth chapter is concerned with the third 'critique', the Critique of Judgment. In order to find out the sense in which a judgment of taste is synthetic a priori an analysis of such a judgment has been undertaken from different standpoints. It has been argued here that the logical status of synthetic a priori judgments in the domain of aesthetic taste must be different from the status of those synthetic a priori judgments which we find either in the first or in the second 'critique'.

The fifth chapter deals with the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments from the standpoint of Quine and logical positivism. The theses of Quine and of the logical positivists are critically discussed and it is argued that the possibility of the synthetic a

priori judgments can not be rejected simply on the basis of the arguments advanced by these philosophers.

In the sixth and concluding chapter it is argued that Kant's 'second claim', the claim that we have synthetic a priori judgments in all his three 'critiques' in exactly the same sense can not be sustained. It is held that the concept of 'synthetic a priori' is a dynamic concept in Kant's philosophy, that it begins to change its connotation as we pass from the first to the second 'critique' and this change continues even in the third 'critique'.

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Susil Sinha

(SUSIL SINHA)

CHAPTER I

Kant's Theory of Synthetic a Priori

Kant's critical philosophy may be called essentially 'an enquiry into the nature and function of synthetic a priori judgements'¹. The expression 'synthetic a priori' is typically Kantian in the sense that no philosopher before Kant clearly thought of combining the terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori' together to form that expression. It is not the case that the idea of combining those two terms somehow escaped the attention of the pre-Kantian philosophers. The fact rather is that they were not ready to combine. And it would not be misleading to say that it is under this background that the expression 'synthetic a priori' draws so much attention from all quarters. It may be said that though some of the predecessors of Kant, like Hume and Leibniz, hold that all a priori judgments are analytic, all

are not of the same opinion. Locke has recognised the existence of synthetic a priori judgments. Hence Kant can not claim originality in the act of combining the terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori' together. But this is a gross mistake, since Kant does not mean by synthetic a priori judgments exactly what his predecessors mean when they affirm or deny synthetic a priori judgements. Kant's predecessors use the term 'a priori', as it is applied to judgment, in the traditional sense, which is different from Kant's sense of the term. C.D. Broad observes '... Locke held that there are in fact plenty of judgments which are both a priori in the traditional sense and synthetic. Others, e.g., Leibniz held that this is a mistake, and that all judgments which are a priori in the traditional sense must be analytic'².

But the use of the expression 'synthetic a priori' is not clear enough in Kant's philosophy. In the first 'critique' i.e., Critique of Pure Reason Kant has used the expression with reference to judgment or cognition. This does not mean that the expression can not be intelligibly used beyond that context even if we use the terms, 'synthetic' and 'a priori' in Kant's sense of the terms. But what is more important is that it would not be wrong to hold that Kant's use of the expression 'synthetic a priori' in his other two

'critiques' is not exactly similar to that of the first 'critique'. I call this 'more important' since Kant's own claim in this respect is something radically different. In what follows we shall, of course, confine our discussion of the 'synthetic a priori' within the first 'critique'.

[II]

With reference to judgment no philosopher before Kant used the expression 'synthetic a priori'. Judgments are either analytic a priori or synthetic a posteriori. 'Hitherto, both by the sensationalists and by the rationalists, all synthetic judgments have been regarded as empirical, and all a priori judgments as analytic'³. Kant makes an addition to this list of judgment by recognising a new type of judgment which is synthetic and a priori at the same time. It is, of course, interesting to note that credit to a great extent for this discovery of Kant should go to a person who would himself oppose the characterisation of judgment as 'synthetic a priori'. The brilliant and consistent approach of Hume to the problem of universal causation was a great help to Kant in hitting upon the idea of synthetic a priori judgment. This is clear from Kant's own confession that it was Hume's attack on the law of causation which 'aroused him from his dogmatic slumbers'⁴. Let us dwell upon this point at some length.

[III]

Hume makes an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of propositions viz., necessary and contingent. "All the objects of human reason or enquiry", Hume holds, "may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relation of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably certain ... propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe ... Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality"⁵.

An essential feature of Hume's analysis of the causal principle, 'every event has a cause' is that he denies this principle to be identical in status with the mathematical propositions. Mathematical propositions are necessary. They can not be denied without self-contradiction. But

this is not the case with the causal principle. We have no right to infer the effect from the existence of an antecedent event. No logical principle justifies our journey from the cause to the effect. No event in itself, Hume asserts, implies the existence of any other. The causal principle can be known only a posteriori.

This view of Hume has been anticipated by Spinoza. He is of the opinion that 'there is no kind of reciprocal influence between the physical and the mental and no reason why bodies should think or mind should have bodies'⁶. Leyden rightly holds that if 'this view is generalised one might argue that there is no more than a concomitance between certain physical event and a corresponding mental one, but never a necessary or any other kind of connection'⁷.

Hume's analysis of the causal principle really poses a challenge to the validity of science itself. To accept this challenge is to show that we can have synthetic a priori judgments, in the sense in which Hume has denied it. To see how Kant performs the difficult task of combining necessity or a priority and syntheticity together let us follow the convenient procedure of discussing certain important distinctions and relevant relations. Kant has made two divisions, one is between a priori and empirical or a posteriori and the other is between synthetic and analytic. Both these divisions are exclusive and exhaustive. Let us

start with the first one.

[IV]

A priori and a posteriori : Kant is not the first man to make the distinction between a priori and a posteriori or empirical. Albert Saxony has made it in the fourteenth century. But Kant's way of making the distinction is quite different. Of the two forms of knowledge, a priori and empirical, the former deserves special attention since it crosses the limit of what is directly known by sense-perception. Clue to Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori is given in just two sentences ; 'In respect of time all knowledge begins with experience. But it does not therefore follow that it all arises from experience'. It indicates that there is knowledge which begins with experience and also arises out of experience, and again knowledge which begins with but does not arise out of, experience. Knowledge of the first kind is empirical and of the second kind a priori.

This distinction like the one between analytic and synthetic is very much important for Kant's thesis that some judgments are synthetic a priori. For making this

distinction clear Kant has given definition and also criterion of a priori knowledge or truth. But inspite of this there is reason to doubt whether Kant has been successful in making the concept of 'a priori' clear just with the help of this definition and criterion. The failure may be due to the fact that "under the concept of 'a priori' Kant has included so many characteristics which do not seem necessarily to^{go} together". As we proceed further, it will be evident that in fact, in most of the cases, Kant goes beyond his definition and criterion to decide whether a given truth is a priori or not.

Kant defines a priori knowledge as that which is independent of experience and even of all sense-impressions. Here the term 'independent' should not be interpreted in the psychological sense. Kant has clearly said that temporally no knowledge can precede experience. What Kant wants to mean is that an a priori judgment is not accepted on the evidence of experience. On the contrary, we may say that an empirical judgment is that which is accepted only on the evidence of experience.

The definition of 'a priori' judgment given by Kant is not as much clear as is required to distinguish infalliably a priori from empirical judgments. Perhaps, Kant was aware of that. He felt the necessity of stating

some criteria. "In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter in the universe remains unchanged"⁹ is an example of a priori judgment given by Kant. But unless we assume that the concept of 'permanency' is deducible from the concept of 'matter' we cannot necessarily say that the proposition can be known to be true without empirical evidence.

It is suggested that a priori judgments are 'logically' independent of experience. But the use of the word 'logically' does not seem to improve the situation. We may say that there is a relation of logical independence between two propositions if the truth or falsity of the one is not affected by that of the other. Now to show the relation of logical independence between a priori judgments and experience we should say that a judgment is a priori if it is logically independent of all judgments which describe experience, i.e., all empirical judgments. Thus in order to ascertain that there is a relation of logical independence between a given judgment and experience we have to know beforehand which judgments are a priori and which are empirical by some other way. Thus to try to distinguish an a priori judgment from an empirical one by using the relation of logical independence is to beg the question.

"Kant believes that necessity and strict universality, although not used in his definitions of a priori judgments, are jointly and separately, adequate tests of their a priori character"¹⁰. He has used necessity and strict universality as two separate infalliable marks of a priori judgments with the hope that by applying these criteria we would be in a position to distinguish between a priori and empirical judgments. Without examination Kant assumes that necessity and strict universality can not be derived from experience. This exactly what Hume also believes. After making that assumption Kant goes on to hold that if any judgment has the characteristic of being necessary and universal, it is not derived from experience. In otherwords, it is a priori.

But what do we achieve here ? We fail to show that necessity or universality is a criterion for distinguishing between a priori and empirical judgments. First Kant assumes that necessity or universality is not derived from experience, which amounts to saying that empirical judgments are not necessary or universal. Then he holds that necessary or universal judgments are not empirical, i.e., they are a priori. From this we can not say that a judgment is a priori because it is necessary or universal.

Let us now come to the meaning of necessity and universality. A judgment is necessary, Kant holds, if the

opposite of it is inconceivable. And a judgment is strictly universal if an exception to it is impossible. Now let us apply these criteria upon the following judgments :

- (a) all metals expand when heated; and
- (b) all animals take food.

It can not be denied that these judgments have not yet been found to be false. We have not met any contrary instance. But Kant will not recognise them to be necessary or universal. It is true that Hume also will not take them to be necessary. But how are we to decide that their opposite is conceivable or that they do admit of an exception ? We can not appeal to experience, for experience, according to Kant, can not teach us necessity. Secondly, in experience we have not yet found any exception and so just depending upon experience we can not say that an exception is possible.

Neither can we appeal to the law of contradiction or any other law of logic, for the simple reason that according to Kant, all a priori judgments are not justified by the law of contradiction (or we may say by logical laws).

We thus lead to the position that before we come to know any judgment to be necessary or universal we know it to be a priori on the basis of some ground other than necessity or strict universality. The universal causal principle, for example, is a priori not because it is

necessary, in the sense explained, but rather because it is an assumption of the possibility of experience itself. This is the stand which Kant adopts in the case of a priori concepts also. Space and time, for example, are a priori and not empirical because they make experience possible. It may be noted here that Warnock¹¹ has recognised the universal causal principle to be 'a priori' but he does not call it necessary. He has accepted this principle to be a priori on a different ground. The causal principle is a priori since it can not be refuted by experience. But experience can not refute it, Warnock holds, not because it is necessary but because it is uninformative or vacuous.

[v]

Analytic and synthetic :

All judgments, holds Kant, are either analytic or synthetic, there is no third alternative. In this respect Kant agrees with Leibniz and Hume. Though Leibniz and Hume do not actually use these terms, the foreshadow of Kant's distinction is found in the distinction between 'Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact' and also in the distinction between 'Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact'. It is interesting to note that though Kant, Leibniz and Hume do

not differ on the essential nature of analytical judgment and though the pair of terms in the three distinctions are used as contradictory terms, Kant's distinction is different from that of the others. But let us confine ourselves to Kant's distinction.

Kant holds that in all judgments where the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought, this relation is possible in two different ways. "Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytical, in the second, synthetic. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetic judgments"¹².

There are philosophers like Quine¹³ who do not admit of the synthetic-analytic distinction of judgments and all who recognise such a distinction of judgments do not agree with the Kantian way of making this distinction. The main objections against the Kantian distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments are, according to Korner, two,

"first that Kant considers only subject-predicate judgments and secondly that his definition of an analytic judgment as one whose subject contains its predicate is metaphorical and therefore too vague"¹⁴.

Thus Kant's definition of analytical judgment is both too vague and too narrow. These objections are not baseless but they are not very serious; we may get rid of them. The definition is vague, since a term of a judgment can not be contained in another term in the sense in which a physical object can be in another physical object. We may say, however, that the predicate is contained in the subject in the sense that the predicate does not go beyond the subject. To get the predicate we need not depend upon experience; we get it simply through an analysis of the subject. This means that an analytical judgment is uninformative or vacuous.

The objection of too narrowness can also be removed. Apart from a definition, Kant has given a criterion of analytical judgment. An analytical judgment, Kant holds, is such that it can not be denied without self-contradiction. Analytical judgments are logically necessary for they are justified by the 'law of contradiction'. Thus we may reconstruct the definition of analytical judgment as: A judgment is analytical if its denial involves self-contradiction. This definition applies even to those

judgments which are not in the subject-predicate form.

Kant, perhaps, thinks that once we have the 'criterion' we can without difficulty ascertain whether the predicate of a given judgment is contained in the subject of that judgment, i.e., whether the judgment is analytic or not. But is it really so? The judgment ' $7 + 5 = 12$ ' is analytical according to Hume. Hume thinks that the denial of it involves self contradiction. But strangely enough, Kant does not think this denial to be self-contradictory. It seems that whether the denial of a judgment involves self-contradiction is to be determined by whether the predicate of that judgment goes beyond the subject of it. The case being so, the criterion fails to perform the function it is supposed to do.

In the case of synthetical judgments the predicate goes beyond the subject. We can not get the predicate just through an analysis of the subject. Such judgments extend our knowledge. They can not be justified by the law of contradiction (or, let us say, by logical laws).

Kant has not explicitly stated any criterion of synthetical judgments. But as Kant thinks such judgments to be contradictory of the analytical ones, we may use a negative criterion. One might say, a judgment is synthetical

if its denial is not a contradiction in terms. But as it is not clear when the denial of a judgment involves self-contradiction, we are again brought to the difficulty that we have faced in case of analytical judgments.

[VI]

Let us now see what Kant means by synthetic a priori judgments and how they are possible. But before we do that we may note one interesting point that though Kant and Hume agree on so many points, one of them admits and the other denies the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The points of similarities and differences between them will be of great help in answering the question : How does Kant perform the difficult job of combining the terms 'a priori' and 'synthetic' together or, what does he mean by synthetic a priori judgments ? Both of them believe that experience can not teach us necessity. They believe a priori judgments to be necessary. Again, they hold that all analytical judgments are necessary on the ground that their denial involves self-contradiction. They have taken 'analytical' to be the contradictory of 'synthetical' and 'a priori' of 'empirical'.

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In spite of these points of agreement Hume does not think synthetic a priori judgments to be possible. First, to him all a priori judgments are analytical and so they are justified by the law of contradiction (or, we should better say, by laws of logic). The synthetical judgments, according to both Hume and Kant, are not so justified. Second, according to Hume, all synthetical judgments are about matters of fact and so they are empirical. What is empirical can not be a priori. Third, Hume thinks that there is only one kind of necessity, in the true sense of the term. This necessity is intrinsic necessity found in analytical propositions. The necessity of the analytical judgments follows from the meaning of the terms occurring in them.

If we agree with Hume's beliefs and assumptions, we have reason to accept his conclusion that there is no synthetic a priori judgment.

Let us see how Kant differs from Hume. (1) For Kant all analytical judgments are a priori but all a priori judgments are not analytical. He uses the concept of 'a priori' in such a wide sense that it does not necessarily exclude synthetical judgments. (2) Kant does not use the words 'synthetical' and 'empirical' as identical. The judgments which state the general conditions or principles of the possibility of experience are synthetical, but they

are not empirical. So synthetic judgments can be a priori. (3) Kant recognises a new kind of necessity which is different from the necessity found in the analytical judgments. This is what is called 'transcendental necessity'. The general principle of causation is synthetic but it is necessary too, in the sense that it is one of the organising principles of experience, and, for that matter, of the physical sciences. We can not have the physical sciences without this principle. This necessity, it might be said, is imposed upon something from without.

[VII]

Kant's synthetic a priori judgments can not be logically necessary for the simple reason that they are not analytic. They must be necessary or a priori in a different sense, a new sense. This new sense can be made clear if we follow his treatment of the principle of universal causation, 'every event has a cause', which is recognised by him as a synthetic a priori judgment. It is clear that Kant's synthetic a priori judgments, in the Critique of Pure Reason, are not self-evident truths. If they were so, Kant would not have to take so much pain to prove them. Proof, of course, does not mean here what it generally means.

Kant's proof of synthetic a priori judgments does not start from some self-evident premises, but from some contingent, though very general, facts about the way in which human mind works. Thus Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are 'transcendentally a priori' and not 'absolutely a priori'. This, of course, does not mean that Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are transcendentally a priori in his other 'critiques' also.

Though we have synthetic a priori judgments, the range of such judgments, Kant admits in the Critique of Pure Reason, is very limited. We have synthetic a priori judgments so far we are concerned about objects of possible sense-perception. 'The moment you try to apply these a priori propositions to objects like God and the soul, which could not possibly be perceived by the senses, they lose all intelligible meaning'. This is because Kant's synthetic a priori propositions are 'principles of organisation or connexion which convert a chaotic mass of sensations into the perception of ostensibly a world of permanent extended law-abiding objects'¹⁵.

The judgment 'every event has a cause' is synthetic for in the conception of an event we do not, Kant asserts, cogitate the conception of a cause. But this judgment is not necessary in the sense that its denial is a contradiction

in terms. This universal law of causation is necessary or a priori in the sense that it states a condition or assumption of the possibility of the objects of perception, of theoretical knowledge. The way we are constituted, we must assume the causal principle to be true if we are to explain the possibility of human experience. Thus the causal principle has no intrinsic necessity of its own; it is necessary or a priori only in the transcendental sense. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are statements of the conditions of the possibility of objects themselves.

[VIII]

Now if we are to reach any conclusion from the above considerations of Hume and Kant, the reasonable conclusion seems to be that two different but not opposed theses have been upheld by Kant and Hume on different sets of premises; so none can be proved false on the strength of the other. Kant has not done, as it is sometimes thought, what Hume has failed to do, remaining within the same framework in which Hume worked. Kant has been successful and Hume has failed, to combine the terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori' together on different grounds. But we may mention one point which will, perhaps, add an extra weight to Kant's

thesis, 'some judgments are synthetic a priori'. This point is that knowledge is something more than unconnected brute facts of experience. It is something to be organised. This stand has also been taken by the Gestalt psychologists who interpret perception to be a case of organisation. This organisation requires a principle which is not itself one of the items to be organised. It is to be supplied by the organiser himself. Every organisation points to a beyond. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are principles of organisation, constitutive principles of human experience. This fact of organisation may be counted as a point for preferring Kant's thesis that there are synthetic a priori judgments.

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CHAPTER II

Implication of Synthetic a Priori Judgment

[I]

It has been suggested in the previous chapter that Hume's brilliant empirical analysis of universal causal relation worked as a great stimulus to Kant's discovery of 'synthetic a priori judgments'. At some stage of his philosophical development Kant was influenced by extreme rationalism or, what may be called, "pure or ideal rationalism"¹. This form of rationalism has recognised an unlimited power of reason or thought. Thought by itself is in a position to produce necessary or certain knowledge which is true about this world. But it is Hume's analysis of the causal judgments which succeeds in changing Kant's

faith in the power of reason. Hume's analysis of causal judgments, says N.K. Smith, "awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber, and so ultimately led to the raising of the logical problem in its widest form :- how synthetic a priori judgments, whether mathematical, physical, or metaphysical, are possible"².

The suggestion, of course, is not wrong, but it might be misleading. It might be thought that Hume's analysis of the causal principle logically leads to Kant's thesis that there are synthetic a priori judgments, or that this analysis and Kant's thesis can not be accommodated together. This ambiguity may constitute a good logic for investigating the real implication of Hume's analysis of the universal law of causation in our attempt to realise the significance of Kant's thesis that some judgments are synthetic a priori.

Hume's analysis of causal relation implies not that there is no such relation, not that we have, in fact, no science; but that the causal relation can not mean more than mere concomitance or regularity, that we can not claim for science any superior status than what is enjoyed by the contingent empirical judgments, "that the principle of causality has no possible rational basis"³. In the words of Prof. Smith, Hume's position on causal relation may be stated as :

"The principle that every event must have a cause, is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. So far from there existing a necessary connection between the idea of an event as something happening in time and the idea of a cause, no connection of any kind is discoverable by us"⁴.

Hume is conscious that the universal causal principle, 'every event must have a cause' claims to be necessary and every necessary judgment is a priori. Again, he is also conscious that this causal principle is not analytic but synthetic since it can not be justified simply by logical laws. Thus it may be inferred that though Hume himself did not recognise the existence of synthetic a priori judgments, he could realise what such judgments would have been like, if possible. From this it is not quite unnatural to get at the suggestion that the implication of the admission of synthetic a priori propositions lies in the consequence of the denial of those propositions. And it can not be denied that Hume is obviously right in thinking that the denial of synthetic a priori judgments destroys the basis of science which claims certainty, makes certain knowledge impossible. But Hume was, perhaps, wrong in taking this to be the whole story. The real implication of this denial may be much more devastating than Hume thought it to be. It might be said that the negation of the existence of synthetic a priori judgments destroys not only necessary knowledge or

science but also the possibility of empirical knowledge, which does not claim to be necessary. This is also clear from Prof. Smith's statement when to express Kant's continued belief in the Idealist view of thought he writes : "Though pure thought never by itself amounts to knowledge -- therein Kant departs from the extreme rationalist position -- only through it is any knowledge, empirical or a priori, possible at all"⁵.

[II]

The great merit of Kant's thesis 'some judgments are synthetic a priori', it is thought, is that it saves us from accepting some unpalatable consequences, e.g., there is no science, experience is impossible, and so on. From this we might be tempted to assert that Kant's thesis secures everything that we miss by Hume's denial of synthetic a priori judgment, that this thesis implies that Hume was mistaken in his denial of synthetic a priori judgments. We could assert this without hesitation if Hume and Kant had denied and affirmed, respectively, the same thing. But this does not seem to be obvious. Kant himself, of course, believes that Hume has denied exactly what he has affirmed in the statement, 'there are synthetic a priori judgments'. In

other words, if we commit ourselves to Kant's thesis, we are to admit physical science; and if we refuse to admit it, we thereby miss even empirical knowledge, which Hume himself was not ready to deny. This may be taken to be the real implication of Kant's thesis, 'some judgments are synthetic a priori'. Let us see, in what follows, how far it is true that Kant's thesis has this implication, and whether it has this implication without any further assumption; whether the affirmation of Kant's thesis implies the falsity of Hume's denial of synthetic a priori judgments.

[III]

Hume subscribes to the doctrine that all true propositions are either analytic a priori or synthetic a posteriori. Hume's conclusion that there is no synthetic a priori proposition rests upon this dichotomy of judgments. If for the sake of argument we admit this dichotomy, we can not deny Hume's conclusion without contradiction. Again, assuming that Kant is not logically wrong in affirming the existence of synthetic a priori judgments, we can easily draw the conclusion that Hume and Kant have not referred to the same thing when they denied or affirmed 'synthetic a priori judgments'.

The same conclusion will follow even if we proceed in a different way. Both Hume and Kant have admitted that we can deny any synthetic judgment without self-contradiction. They have also admitted that we can not so deny any analytic proposition. As because Hume has denied but Kant has affirmed synthetic a priori judgments, inspite of their fundamental agreement on the meaning of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments, they can not mean the same thing when they deny or affirm 'synthetic a priori judgments'.

If we admit this conclusion, we can not but hesitate to concede to the claim that the affirmation of Kant's synthetic a priori judgments implies that Hume was mistaken in denying synthetic a priori judgments.

[IV]

Can we hope to find any possible way of showing that Hume will deny what Kant has affirmed by the statement, 'some judgments are synthetic a priori' ? Our answer to this can be affirmative. From what has been already said it is clear that Hume will not admit of any such propositions which state something about the world and yet claim to be necessary in the sense that they are justified simply by logical laws. This is quite justified, but not a bold step at all. We can not expect that the synthetic judgments will

be justified by the law of contradiction if we already define synthetic judgments as those judgments which can be denied without self-contradiction. "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality"⁶.

Hume will also deny another kind of judgment. He has identified synthetic judgments with the empirical ones and such judgments, according to Hume, are contingent. Now, if any synthetic judgment claims to be more than contingent, it will be impossible for the simple reason that the only justification that Hume could discover for any synthetic judgment, i.e., judgments concerning matters of fact, was experience. Let us state it in Hume's own words :

"When it is asked, what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact ? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, what is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation ? it may be replied in one word, Experience"⁷.

Sense-experience can not justify any discrimination between any ordinary empirical statement, like 'grass is green' and any principle of physical science, like, 'every event must have a cause'. In other words, to Hume all

synthetic judgments are of the same status. He will deny all synthetic judgments which pretend to be more than contingent, i.e., not contingent in the ordinary sense of the term — judgments which can not be justified by sense-experience.

Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are of this kind. He holds that there are propositions which state 'the conditions of the possibility of experience', or the fundamental defining characteristics of experience. Such propositions are not analytic for if we deny that there is human experience, no contradiction arises. But again, they are not like ordinary contingent propositions. If the truth of a proposition is the condition of the possibility of experience itself, there is no point in seeking the verdict of experience to know whether it is true or not. Thus if we assume that there is human experience, we can assert those propositions a priori. It is this kind of propositions which Kant calls synthetic a priori, and Hume will definitely deny them. Thus it is not quite unjustified to hold that the affirmation of Kant's synthetic a priori judgments implies that Hume is mistaken in denying synthetic a priori judgments.

[v]

Hume has identified synthetic judgments with empirical judgments, and such judgments are, he says, contingent. Thus if any judgment claims to be more than contingent and yet to be synthetic, it is not possible. The judgments of science are of this type and so science is, Hume will say, impossible. The whole gamut of knowledge or judgment is, according to Hume, exhausted by analytic and empirical judgments.

Kant is convinced that there are synthetic a priori judgments in mathematics and logic; and so, he argues, science is possible. This means that the existence of synthetic a priori judgments makes science possible. But we should rather say that if the judgements of sciences are such that they claim more than to be contingent in the ordinary sense but less than to be logically necessary, then the recognition of synthetic a priori judgments implies the existence of science. This is, no doubt, an important fact about the synthetic a priori judgments. But what is more fundamental about them is something different. It is this that if we exclude synthetic a priori judgments from the class of judgments, the class of judgments will thereby be rendered empty. It is not simply false that all synthetic

judgments are empirical, but that it is absurd. It is not possible to have empirical judgments without recognising a different type of synthetic judgments, which are not as contingent as the empirical ones. They are, what may be called, Kant's synthetic a priori judgments.

But how is it that empirical judgments require some other judgments which are not themselves empirical? This is not unnatural. There must be, according to Kant, an element of compulsion, some kind of necessity, a universal element, which distinguishes a judgment from a fiction or mere opinion, from a psychological association of ideas. Judgment is not a matter of caprice. In B.143, Kant has made a clear distinction between a psychological association of ideas, and objective unity of given representations or judgment. In a psychological association the relation between the ideas is casual and contingent; but in judgment this relation is no longer arbitrary. It is governed by a law that is linked with the unity of the self. This relation is necessary even when the judgment is not concerned to assert the relation as necessary. In other words, it holds good even if the judgment is empirical. The empirical judgment, "all bodies are heavy" does not assert that if we support a body, we feel an impression of weight, it does not assert that this impression may be different for different persons at different times. It asserts that the

impressions of 'body' and 'weight' are combined in the object itself. I combine them not simply because I am pleased to do that, but because I feel some sort of compulsion. This implies that there are some principles or laws behind the organisation of the sense-impressions into a unity. This is, perhaps, true even in the case of the so-called emotive judgments, which may not be called judgments if judged by the more or less well accepted criterion of 'truth-claim'. This principle of organisation can not be supplied by the brute facts of experience; it is to be imported from outside of experience. This should be obvious from the fact that a principle of organisation can not itself be one of the items to be organised; from the fact that in a logical argument no principle of that argument can be a conclusion of that argument. Moreover, if the principles are to be received from the impressions themselves, any organisation will be as better as the other. There will be no intelligible way of distinguishing between a mere psychological association of ideas and a judgment; a mere opinion and knowledge. The principles are to be a priori. Again, the principles are not analytical. They have no intrinsic necessity. They would have possessed intrinsic necessity if it were impossible for human experience not to occur. But this is not the case. They can not, of course, be denied if there is human experience

or knowledge; but the denial of human experience does not involve any self-contradiction. Thus with reference to human experience these principles are both a priori and synthetic. These principles are the conditions of the possibility of experience and we have already seen that Kant's synthetic a priori judgments express such conditions. Thus the synthetic a priori judgments are to be recognised not only for the sake of a special type of experience called science, which claims to be necessary or, at least, more than contingent; but also for empirical knowledge, which does not so claim. This is thought to be the full implication of synthetic a priori judgments, and, perhaps, Hume would not have denied them if he could realise this full implication.

[VI]

In connection with what has been stated as the full implication of synthetic a priori judgments two issues might be suggested. It is true that for the validity of the statement, "no forms of knowledge, even empirical one, is possible without synthetic a priori judgments" we need not know whether anybody happens to admit it or not.

Hence, we can avoid the discussion of the question as to whether Hume would not have denied synthetic a priori judgments if he could realise its full implication. But the validity of that statement requires a certain conception of knowledge and this conception of knowledge does not enjoy universal consent. It requires that knowledge is always judgmental. Judgment is systematisation; it involves organisation or interpretation which requires synthetic a priori principles. One such principle recognised by Kant is, "every event must have a cause". But it might be said that we can have knowledge which is not discursive. It might be claimed that we have knowledge even when our awareness is simply an awareness of an existence, and not of an existence of a certain sort. The indeterminate or "Nirvikalpaka" perception recognised by the Nyāya philosophers may be used to substantiate this claim. It is, of course, not necessary, for our purpose, to establish or destablise this claim. But what is important is that the view, "even empirical knowledge is not possible without synthetic a priori judgments" can not be accepted without reservation; for its validity will be affected by the existence of indeterminate perception, if there is any. Thus we should rather say that no forms of knowledge, even empirical, is possible without the recognition of synthetic a priori judgments, provided

judgment is the unit of knowledge.

Another issue, which is not unrelated with the investigation of the implication of synthetic a priori judgments deserves attention. We have seen that judgments require some principles of organisation, and we have also seen that these principles are to be synthetic and a priori. These principles are Kant's synthetic a priori judgments. Kant's efforts are directed to establish that there are such principles, but he has not established that these principles are judgment. Moreover, there are definite objections against describing them as judgments. The most reasonable objection, perhaps, is that a principle which makes judgment possible can not itself be a judgment, for in that case we shall have to admit that for judgment to be possible there is no need of any such principle. Walsh writes "synthetic a priori judgments fall in a class of their own, and it may even be suggested that they are not judgments at all"⁸.

The relation of this issue with the investigation, here undertaken, is that if these principles are not judgment, the investigation loses its meaning and Kant's very problem of "synthetic a priori judgment" is reduced to a pseudo-problem.

[VII]

No form of knowledge is possible, we have seen above, without the recognition of synthetic a priori judgments. Synthetic a priori knowledge, in its turn, requires a new conception of mind. According to Kant, we can not have synthetic a priori knowledge if we conceive human mind after the fashion of the empiricists or the rationalists. According to them, knowledge is mere analysis - either analysis of universal a priori laws or analysis of the manifold of experience revealed in sense. For both of them, mind is passive in knowledge. But for Kant, mind is not simply a "clean slate" upon which experience writes the whimsical wills. Our mind supplies the required principles for organising the discrete sense-manifolds into experience. Thus the existence of synthetic a priori judgments implies a conception of mind, different from those of the rationalists and the empiricists. "If we assume that the human mind is purely passive in knowledge, we can not explain the a priori knowledge which we undoubtedly possess"⁹.

The existence of synthetic a priori judgments implies a second change also - a revolutionary change in our outlook - a change which is not unrelated with the change in the conception of mind. We can not have synthetic a

a priori judgments, i.e., judgments expressing conditions of experience if such conditions are to depend upon the world we experience rather than upon our own faculties that we employ in experiencing the world; for in that case the synthetic a priori judgments, according to Kant, will be reduced to contingent empirical judgments. Hence, the existence of synthetic a priori judgments implies a fundamental change in philosophical method. We should no more stick to the long cherished idea, "our knowledge must conform to objects" but subscribe to a new one, "objects must conform to our knowledge" instead. This revolutionary change has been described as 'Copernican revolution' by Kant himself. By this revolution Kant does not suggest that mind can create things, as far as their existence is concerned, by thinking them. "What he is suggesting is that we can not know things, that they can not be objects of knowledge for us, except in so far as they are subjected to certain a priori conditions of knowledge on the part of the subject"¹⁰.

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1. F.Copleston : A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
Vol.VI, p.398
2. N.K.Smith : A COMMENTARY TO KANT'S
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 2nd
edn., p.592.
3. " : Ibid, p.594
4. " : Ibid, p.593
5. " : Ibid, p.606
6. David Hume : AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING, Sec.IV, Part I

something which ought to be the case. Judgments of the first type are theoretical, of the second practical'⁴. The hypothetical and categorical imperatives, Kant tells us, are instances of analytical and synthetic a priori judgments, respectively.

But as we pass to the second 'critique' from the first one, one thing that strikes us is that Kant continues to stick to his firm conviction that all judgments without exception do not fit into the scheme either of 'Analytic a priori' or of 'synthetic a posteriori'. This time, of course, he attempts to vindicate his belief in a different direction. Here he is concerned not with how synthetic a priori theoretical judgments are possible, but with the synthetic a priori character of moral judgments. It may be observed here that when Kant claims 'synthetic a priori' character for moral judgments he does not claim this for every individual moral judgment but for the principles in accordance with which such judgments can be truly made. Kant believes that we do have or make synthetic a priori moral judgments. Thus in connection with the above conviction of Kant in the two 'critiques' the difference appears to lie not with the qualification 'synthetic a priori' but simply with the thing so qualified, i.e., 'judgment'. But it remains to be seen whether the qualification does not silently change its meaning with the change of context. Do we have synthetic a

priori judgments in the context of moral experience in exactly the same sense in which we have them in connection with theoretical experience ?

If we do not like to drag the debate any further, we may adopt at the very outset the positivistic assumption that 'only judgments which can be verified by sense are true' and say that moral judgments not being so verifiable and hence not being true are not judgments at all. Thus there is no point in discussing in what sense such judgments are synthetic a priori. But this line of approach should be avoided on some vital grounds. First, it is obvious that there is no reason to accept this positivistic assumption to be true if sensuous-experience is the only criterion of accepting anything to be true. It itself cannot be so verified. Second, in asserting the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments Kant is posing a challenge to the authenticity of the assumption that being sensibly verifiable and being true are identical. This very assumption which Kant himself challenges can not be reasonably used as a premise to challenge Kant's position. Moreover, if this criterion is adopted, the synthetic a priori judgments of the first critique will not fair any better.

[II]

There is a sense in which we may assert that in using the expression 'synthetic a priori' with reference to the moral law Kant is not making a new stipulation. And Kant himself believes that in claiming synthetic a priori judgments in the fields of mathematics, physics and moral thought he is not using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in different senses. The expression 'synthetic a priori' is a combination of two distinct terms, 'synthetic' and 'a priori'. The meaning of these terms have been separately clarified by Kant in the first 'critique'. If we stick to this original sense, i.e., the sense in which they have been used in the first 'critique', each term is applicable to the 'categorical imperative', which is, according to Kant, a synthetic a priori judgment in the second 'critique'. A proposition is synthetic, holds Kant in the first 'critique', "if its negation is not a contradiction in terms. It is a priori if it is logically independent of any proposition which describes sense-impressions"⁵. The proposition that a rational will is subject to the categorical imperative can be denied without self-contradiction. Again, this proposition, even the empiricists would admit, can not be shown to be logically dependent on any proposition describing sense-impressions. The proposition is both synthetic and a priori.

Thus we may be tempted to conclude that the expression 'synthetic a priori' is applicable to moral judgments as well as to theoretical ones, meaning thereby that we have synthetic a priori judgments in the second 'critique' in the sense in which we have them in the first 'critique'.

The meaning of a given combination of words is not always a logical product of the meanings of the individual words entering into that combination. The combination 'synthetic a priori' as used by Kant in the first 'critique' is a good example of this. In the first 'critique' when Kant calls any judgment synthetic a priori, he uses the expression 'synthetic a priori' in a technical sense. By synthetic a priori judgments Kant here means principles which state the conditions of the possibility of theoretical knowledge. The principle of causation, 'every event has a cause' is, according to Kant, a synthetic a priori judgment because we can not have any form of theoretical knowledge, empirical or a priori without assuming it to be true. Thus to say that a moral judgment is synthetic and is also a priori is not to say that we have 'synthetic a priori' judgments in the second 'critique' in the sense in which we have such judgments in the first one.

[III]

The synthetic a priori judgments, according to Kant, express conditions or assumptions required for the possibility of theoretical knowledge and Kant claims to have given a complete list of such judgments in the first 'critique'. "Just as Kant believes he has discovered all the categories and their schemata, so he believes he has discovered the synthetic a priori principles of all possible objective experience"⁶. If this claim is right then from the mere fact that the synthetic a priori moral judgments have not occurred in the first 'critique' it follows that they are of a different type from those occurring there.

But this does not mean that if Kant's claim were false, if that list of synthetic a priori judgments he thought complete were not really so, we could include the synthetic a priori moral judgments in the first 'critique'. In other words, what we intend to mean is that we can not have synthetic a priori judgments in the second 'critique' in exactly the same sense in which we have such judgments in the first 'critique'. It may, however, be stated here that Kant's claim, as a matter of fact, is not right. Korner holds that "Kant was mistaken in regarding Newton's physics as containing all the possible types of objective empirical

judgment and consequently in regarding his own list of a priori principles as complete"⁷.

Let us consider, in this connection, an important feature of all synthetic a priori judgments. All synthetic a priori judgments, no matter whether they belong to the first or to the second 'critique', holds Kant, are necessary. Necessity is a mark of a priority. But what does 'necessity' mean? It admits of different interpretations. A proposition is necessary if we can not deny it without self-contradiction. This is the sense in which the analytical propositions are necessary. This necessity is known as logical necessity. But no synthetic a priori propositions can be necessary in this sense simply because they are supposed to be synthetic. The necessity of the synthetic a priori theoretical judgments consists in their being conditions or assumptions of our having any experience of objects in space and time. This necessity has been termed 'transcendental necessity'. It is conditional and so it resembles Kant's 'hypothetical imperatives', which are of the form 'Do this if you want this'. 'Every event has a cause', for example, which is a synthetic a priori proposition of the first 'critique', is necessary only if there is human experience and if human reason has only a 'logical use'. If human reason or intellect had a 'real use', we could do

without the synthetic a priori principles of theoretical knowledge. In other words, in that case the synthetic a priori judgments of the first 'critique' would cease to be necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. Kant has recognised a distinction between a 'logical use' and a 'real use' of reason or intellect. "In its 'logical' use the function of the intellect is to intellectualize the data of sense or, in language Kant was to make familiar later, 'bring them to concepts' ... It is not, that is to say, a source of knowledge on its own account ... By contrast the 'real' use of the intellect is one in which that faculty acts independently of any other. The function of the intellect in this aspect is not the mere conceptualization of the given, but the production of knowledge on its own account"⁸.

But the moral principle, the categorical imperative is not necessary in this sense. We are not required to assume any moral principle to think about matters of fact. Our experience of the world of objects is not affected by what moral principle we happen to subscribe to. This, of course, does not mean that the categorical imperative is not objective. It is true that the term 'objectivity' "is used in complete different senses and often with no clear meaning at all"⁹. But yet it is without doubt that the objectivity of the categorical imperative is something different from

that of the synthetic a priori judgments of the first 'critique'. "It is clear that the objectivity or, if we like, the absolute validity of the categorical imperative must be different from the objectivity of the synthetic a priori principles which are the conditions of the experience of physical objects and science. The categorical imperative does not, whatever else its function may be, confer objectivity on perceptual judgments. The apprehension of it and the 'feeling' of respect for the law which accompanies it may conflict with desires which can be described by perceptual judgments. But it modifies neither these desires nor their description"¹⁰.

[IV]

It may, thus, be suggested that though we can not have synthetic a priori judgments in the second 'critique' in exactly the same sense in which we have such judgments in the first 'critique', we can speak of synthetic a priori judgments in the second 'critique', though in a slightly different sense — in the sense of being conditions of what we ought to do. In what follows let us see whether the categorical imperative, which is a synthetic a priori judgment, according to Kant, supplies a necessary requirement for the determination of obligation or duty, the

ultimate test of moral judgment.

That we have moral consciousness, holds Kant, is an undebatable fact of experience. We make moral judgments like, 'we ought to speak the truth'. The moral judgments are different from theoretical judgments, like, 'rain is more frequent in the summer than in any other season'. The theoretical judgments express what is the case. The moral judgments, on the other hand, are concerned with what we ought to do, and not with how men actually do behave. But moral judgments and theoretical judgments are alike in the important respect that none of them is a matter of caprice. Whether we judge something to be the case or judge an action to be moral we judge according to definite objective laws or principles. As Kant differs from the empiricists in holding that the theoretical judgments are not subjective association of ideas so also he differs from them in holding that a moral judgment is not an expression of our subjective feeling of approval or disapproval. An action is a moral action or a duty because of the principle or law by which it is determined. According to Kant, the moral value of the action lies "in the maxim according to which it has been decided upon"¹¹. There is an element of compulsion in morality. The linguistic expression of this compulsion or command is called by Kant an 'imperative'; and as

distinguished from the hypothetical imperatives, which are based on the contingent facts of individual desires and interests, the supreme principle of morality is called by Kant the 'categorical imperative'. "Hypothetical imperatives are the expressions of commands which are conditional on inclinations or purposes. They have the form 'Do this in order to achieve that'"¹². In such imperatives the actions commanded, says Copleston, "are conceived as being good with a view to attaining a certain end"¹³. The actions are not such which ought to be done for their own sake. Hypothetical imperatives are either 'imperatives of skill' or 'imperatives of prudence'. This distinction depends on the purpose on which the commands are conditional. In one case the purpose is contingent and in the other necessary for all human beings. But this does not make any difference to their essential nature, they have the same form. "Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, express commands which are not conditional on any purpose at all. They are not of the form 'Do this in order to achieve that', but simply 'Do this'."¹⁴ 'It commands, that is to say, that the maxims which serve as our principles of volition should conform to universal law'¹⁵.

The categorical imperative is, according to Kant, a synthetic a priori judgment. But as distinguished from a

synthetic a priori theoretical judgment of the first 'critique' it is ^apractical synthetic a priori, judgment.

"That is to say, it does not extend our theoretical knowledge of objects, as is done by the synthetic a priori propositions ... It is directed towards action, towards the performance of actions good in themselves, not towards our knowledge of empirical reality"¹⁶.

It is to be noted here that any individual moral judgment is not called by Kant a synthetic a priori moral judgment. The categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori judgment in being a test or condition for the determination of a moral principle or maxim and, indirectly, of moral action. An action, Kant holds, possesses moral worth only when it is chosen, and to choose an action is not just to behave but to adopt a principle or maxim in doing the action. Only rational beings can follow principles and so, according to Kant, morality is strictly an affair of rational beings; it is not restricted to human beings only. One of the fundamental ways in which Kant's ethical theory differs from that of Hume is that whereas morality, according to Hume, is simply a human affair, the fundamental principles of morality, holds Kant, are the same for every rational being, since the ultimate criterion of morality, according to Kant, is deducible from the concept of a rational being as such. Just as Hegel holds that to be real is to be rational, so Kant holds that to be moral is to be rational. The categorical

imperative says that a rational agent ought to do such and such. This categorical imperative has been formulated in different ways, and let us consider two such formulations to see what this imperative really determines.

1. 'Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'.
2. 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature'¹⁷.

It is a bit difficult to see how these two formulations are formulations of exactly the same thing. Unlike the first formulation the second one requires us to know, Richard Norman holds, that our maxims of actions, when universalised, "could be consistent with the empirical facts of the natural world in which we have to act"¹⁸. If consistency with the facts of the world we live in is thus emphasised, the ultimate criterion of morality will no more be confined within the principle of 'universalisability' and that will be something not wanted by Kant, since in that case we will have only an empirical test of morality.

[v]

An important feature, of course, is common to both the above two formulations. They express a relation between the

concepts of 'rationality' and 'universality'. They require that, as rational beings, we should be able to universalise the maxims of our actions. It is not, perhaps, unjustified to assert a close relation between rationality and universality. We can not show something to be reasonable without going beyond the mere particularity of that thing. Moreover, universalisability may be interpreted to mean consistency, and consistency is a condition of being rationally justified. We are not rationally justified in adopting an action unless we can universalise it. In any valid argument we are required to use a term in one definite sense in all its occurrences. Consistency is a condition of intelligibility.

Again, Kant asserts another relation, a relation of identity between rational behaviour and moral behaviour. It is because of this that Kant thinks that moral distinctions could not be made to depend on any contingent fact about human beings, it is to be made on the sole consideration of man as such. "It is reason in man, Kant holds, that makes him a moral being ... He held it to be evident that the demands of morality are peculiarly and characteristically unconditional, absolute, or "categorical"; that the principles of morality are invariant; and that morality imposes its demands on free and responsible beings alone. If so, he argued -- in direct opposition to Hume -- that

moral distinction must be "derived from reason" and not from a "moral sense" or any other feeling, sentiment, desire, or any passion whatever"¹⁹.

The identification of rational and moral behaviours can be accepted if being consistent ^{i.e., universal} and being obligatory are not different; and Kant, of course, does not explicitly say this to be the case. His categorical imperative is a negative test. Actions whose maxims can not be universalised, i.e., whose maxims do not accord with the categorical imperative are such which we ought not to perform, are such which are impermissible. This is also clear from the application of the categorical imperative to maxims. Kant has given four examples of this application. Let us consider Kant's second example which is 'intended as an example of a logical contradiction being involved in turning one's maxim into a universal law'²⁰. A man needs money and he can have it only by promising to pay it back, though he knows that he would not be able to repay it. Then his maxim is ; when I am in need of money, I will borrow it and promise to repay it, though I know that I shall not be able to do so. If this maxim is elevated into a universal law, such promises and the purpose which they serve would become impossible. So the maxim is not moral.

Kant appears to have thought that the proposition which results from the universalisation of the maxim is itself

self-contradictory. But Copleston wriely observes that it is difficult to see how the proposition that 'anyone who is in need and can obtain relief only by making a promise which he can not fulfil may make such a promise' is self-contradictory in purely logical sense. But the important thing which is evident from this and the other three examples of Kant is that in every case what the test shows is that this or that maxim or action is not moral, but it never identifies any maxim or action to be moral.

Kant does not want to say that "all actions which do accord with the categorical imperative are ones which we ought to perform"²¹. But Kant wants to say that "there are positive as well as negative duties"²². But how can we identify a positive duty with the help of the categorical imperative, which is a negative test? This can be done on the assumption that a positive duty of the form 'you ought to do X' can be restated, Richard Norman holds, as 'Failure to do X is impermissible'²³.

But why should we allow this assumption? If 'impermissible' and 'obligatory' are contradictory terms, we can affirm one by eliminating the other. To think them contradictory is to make a bold and unwarranted step, and Kant makes such a step. Kant claims, Warnock holds: 'that his test of universal acceptability without conflict

suffices to rule out certain principles as unacceptable, but also that it definitely identifies certain principles — the principle of morality — as demanding acceptance.²⁴ To claim this is to make the obviously false claim that a proposition is true simply because there would be no contradiction or inconsistency in asserting it. This suggests that Kant's categorical imperative is not a synthetic a priori judgment in the sense of stating a condition of what is obligatory or moral. In this sense, it does not make moral judgments possible. It expresses simply a condition or test of what is impermissible and does not determine what should be done. Korner²⁵ holds that Kant's principle of morality is highly relevant to the way in which the morality of actions is judged; but to say this is not to say that his principle is a necessary and sufficient test of morality of action.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept Kant's supreme principle of morality, i.e., the categorical imperative to be a condition of moral judgments, it must be different from a synthetic a priori theoretical judgment, which has a necessary reference to space and time, discussed by Kant in the first 'critique'.

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CHAPTER IV

Synthetic a Priori and the Third 'Critique'

[I]

Kant's third 'Critique', the Critique of Judgment is not a mere appendage. It performs, so Kant believes, the important function of linking the other two 'Critiques' and it constitutes a part of the critical philosophy undertaken in the first and the second 'critiques'. "Further, if the power or faculty of judgment is related", writes F. Copleston, "in regard to its a priori principles, to feeling in a manner analogous to the ways in which understanding is related to cognition and reason (in its practical employment) to desire, we can see that the Critique of Judgment forms a

necessary part of the critical philosophy, and not simply an appendage which might or might not be there"¹. Kant admits of three particular cognitive faculties, viz, understanding, judgment and reason; and he believes that each of them is connected with a different mental power or faculty. The first 'critique' shows that there are a priori principles of the understanding, which makes knowledge of objects possible. In the second 'critique' Kant holds that reason, too, has an a priori principle which legislates for desire. In the same way, in the third 'critique' Kant asserts that the faculty of judgment gives a priori rules to feeling. As a part of the critical philosophy the third 'critique' is concerned with the general critical question : How synthetic a priori judgments are possible ? But this time the question is raised not with reference to the world of freedom but with reference to the domain of reflective judgment, i.e., the purposive and the beautiful products of nature and art. "The objects of the teleological and the aesthetic judgment, the purposive and the beautiful products of nature and art, constitute the desired immediate field between nature and freedom : and here again the critical question comes up, how, in relation to these, synthetic judgments a priori possible ?"²

Though the same critical question is raised in the third 'critique' also, the meaning of the expression,

'synthetic a priori' changes with the change of domain. In the Critique of Pure Reason the synthetic a priori judgments are such that they make knowledge of objects possible. They state conditions of the possibility of experience itself. These judgments are constitutive. In the second 'critique' the synthetic a priori judgments do not stand for conditions of the possibility of experience nor do they mean conditions of the determination of what should be done. They come to stand for those judgments which state the conditions of the determination of what we should not do. These synthetic a priori judgments are regulative. In the third critique the expression 'synthetic a priori' assumes a third sense, i.e., a sense which is not exactly similar to the sense either of the first 'critique' or of the second 'critique'.

Though the synthetic a priori judgments of the first two 'critiques' have each a different connotation, in one important sense they belong to the same category. These judgments are, according to Kant's division of the term 'judgment', determinant. 'The faculty of judgment, in general'³, Kant holds 'is the power of thinking the particular as being contained in the universal'. The subsumption of the particular under the universal may assume two forms, and accordingly we have two kinds of judgment, viz, determinant and reflective judgments. In judgment of the first kind we subsume the particular under

a determinate concept or rule supplied by the understanding or the pure reason. But the reflective judgment is independent of any determinate concept or law. Here the law or concept is not given, it is to be discovered. 'If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the faculty of judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant, this being true also when the faculty as a transcendental faculty of judgment gives a priori the conditions under which alone the particular can be subsumed under the universal. But if only the particular is given, for which the faculty of judgment is to find the universal, then judgment is merely reflective'⁴. Thus the reflective judgment is not simply a case of subsumption. It has to find the universal, as Kant puts it, under which the particulars can be subsumed. Thus though the universal law of causation is given a priori by the understanding, the special empirical laws under which the particulars are to be subsumed are not so given, for they are not deducible from the universal law of causation; nor are they given a posteriori, as objects of experience. They are to be discovered. As the factor of being dependent or being independent of any determinate concept or law plays a role in the characterisation of the logical status of a judgment and as the third 'critique' is concerned with the reflective judgments, it is not unlikely that the logical character of the synthetic a priori judgments of the third 'critique' will be different from that of the first or the second 'critique'.

[II]

Reflective judgment which ascends from the particular in nature to the universal needs a principle of its own. This principle is not supplied by the understanding. Understanding supplies the most general a priori principles to which any object of experience must conform. From these principles we can not deduce the special empirical laws of nature. For the discovery of these special empirical laws, or for the subsumption of one empirical law under a more general one, i. e., for constructing a system of inter related laws reflective judgment depends, Kant holds, on the principle that 'nature itself is systematic'; that an unlimited diversity of empirical laws does not belong to nature, that, instead 'nature is fitted for experience as an empirical system'.

It is a principle which is implicit in all scientific enquiries. But since it is not a principle of the understanding, its validity is essentially different from the categories and the principles of the understanding.

"... the faculty of judgment demands this systematic unity of nature on merely subjective grounds. It expects that nature will meet its demands. The faculty of judgment presupposes that it will succeed in connecting the particular laws of nature with each other so as to be able to arrange

them in a system. It follows that the faculty of judgment is not entitled to assume the objective existence of such laws or of such a system. It can do no more than apply its principle as a principle of enquiry into nature. Since there are no laws given to judgment, all that judgment can do is to look for such laws in experience. When it finds them there, it must seem as if nature had adapted itself to the faculty of judgment and its subjective principles. Thus the principle of judgment is of an entirely different kind from the objective principles of the understanding which are necessary conditions of experience as such. It is a subjectively necessary principle, a necessary maxim of scientific enquiry"⁵.

This principle of reflection is different from the principle that 'every event must have a cause'. It is not a synthetic a priori judgment in the sense in which the principle of universal causation is. Let us see how far we can characterise it as 'synthetic a priori'.

The judgment that 'nature itself is systematic' is a synthetic judgment. It is synthetic in the sense that the negation of it does not involve us in any self-contradiction. It claims also to be a priori. It may claim to be a priori in the sense of not being empirical. Though it is in a real sense empirically verified, it is not in itself the result of observation. This principle is, rather, the

presupposition of all empirical investigation of objects of nature. But it is not a priori in exactly the sense in which the judgment 'every event must have a cause' is. This 'universal law of causation is objectively valid; it is a constitutive principle, it is a priori in the sense that it is the very condition for there being any object at all.

The principle of reflective judgment, 'nature itself is systematic' is, on the other hand, subjective. To make this point clear Kant calls it a "technic of nature". It does not furnish "knowledge of objects and their nature". It does not attribute anything at all to the object, but only concerns our mode of reflection on it. Kant holds that this principle "only represents the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon the objects of nature ... and so is a subjective principle, i.e., a 'maxim of judgment". This principle is not a constitutive principle, without which any experience would be impossible, but a regulative principle, which motivates the search for a system among the concepts of experience. The supreme principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative, which has been recognised by Kant as a synthetic a priori judgment in the second 'critique', is also regulative. But there is an important distinction between these two regulative principles. The categorical imperative has, Kant asserts, objective validity. It does not express subjective feeling of approval

or disapproval. Its validity can be demonstrated. But the principle of reflective judgment, 'Nature itself is systematic', being independent of all concepts can not be demonstrated to be valid. It is subjectively valid, it concerns only our mode of reflection.

But though this principle is not constitutive in the sense of being a condition of the possibility of experience, it is the condition of the possibility of a system of such experiences. The possibility of undertaking an investigation for bringing the distinct experiences or the individual empirical laws into a unified whole or system presupposes that nature itself is systematic. In this sense it is a priori. According to Kant, H.W. Cassirer writes, "Experience depends upon two a priori presuppositions : (a) that nature is determined by universal laws and (b) that the empirical laws of nature are intelligible to the human mind"⁶.

We have objective grounds to accept the first presupposition and this is shown by Kant when he establishes the objective validity of transcendental laws in the Critique of Pure Reason. The second presupposition is a "subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition" because it is accepted not on the basis of objective reasons but simply on the ground that experience would be impossible without it. "Thus it is a subjectively necessary transcendental

presupposition that this unlimited diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms, of which otherwise we might be afraid, actually does not occur in nature. We must presuppose, on the contrary, that nature, through the affinity of particular laws, provides itself with the qualities necessary for it to become experience as an empirical system"⁷.

Thus the principle of reflective judgment is synthetic a priori in the sense of being a condition not of the constitution of objects themselves, but of the systematic study of these objects, already constituted by the principles of the understanding. This sense of 'synthetic a priori' is definitely not exactly similar to the sense in which this expression has been used in the first or in the second 'critique'. The synthetic a priori judgment that 'nature itself is systematic' states neither a condition of the possibility of experience nor does it state a condition of the determination of what should be avoided. It attributes a new sense to the expression 'synthetic a priori', but this sense is not completely new. The synthetic a priori judgments of all the three 'critiques' are alike in respect of being or stating a 'condition' of something, but they differ in being conditions of 'different things'. In the first 'critique' it states a condition of 'the possibility of experience', in the second 'critique' of 'the determination of what should not be done', and in the third 'critique' of

'the establishment of the relations among the experiences'.

[III]

H.W.Cassirer holds that in the Critique of Judgment 'Kant goes on to distinguish two kinds of reflective judgment, viz, aesthetic judgments of reflection and teleological judgments of reflection'. These two kinds of reflective judgments, Cassirer asserts, 'are only subjectively valid in so far as they can not determine their objects as such but only in relation to the human mind'⁸.

Like the occurrence of the pair of terms 'synthetic analytic' or 'a priori-aposteriori' the occurrence of another pair of terms 'subjective-objective' is very much frequent in Kant's philosophy. It is possible to give more than one interpretations to any term of these pairs. The terms 'subjective' and 'objective', for example, admit of at least, three different interpretations; and what is subjective in one interpretation may be called 'objective' judged by a different interpretation. 'A judgment is subjective if no universality or necessity can be attributed to it, if for its validity it depends entirely on the state of mind of an individual subject. A judgment is objective if some such universality or validity can be attached to it'⁹. Judged by this criterion a reflective judgment "This picture is

beautiful" is objective or it has objective validity. But it is subjective in the sense that it refers to the knowing subject and not to natural objects; or in the sense that it is independent of all determinate concepts. Kant calls an aesthetic judgment subjective in both these two senses.

In what follows we shall take up a particular form of reflective judgment and see whether we can sustain the conclusion that in the third 'critique' a judgment is 'synthetic a priori' in yet a different sense. We shall confine our discussion to aesthetic judgments only. This is because of two reasons. First, here we have a limited purpose of showing that in the third 'critique' a different sense, which is not present either in the first or in the second 'critique', is attached to the expression 'synthetic a priori', and for this limited purpose inclusion of the second form of reflective judgment within the purview of our discussion is not indispensable. Second, of the two forms of reflective judgment, aesthetic judgments "are more closely connected with the faculty of judgement than teleological judgments"¹⁰ in so far as they do not make use of any concepts and thus obviously can not derive their principles from any other faculty of the mind than judgment.

[IV]

There is a clear distinction between two modes of speaking and we use both these forms. We say, on the one hand, that 'this stone seems to me to be heavy' or that 'I believe this stone to be heavy' and, on the other, that 'this stone is heavy'; we say that 'impartiality is desirable' and that 'being impartial is a duty'. It is the claim of 'universality' or a 'reference to others' on which the above distinctions are dependent.

Same is the case with judgments of aesthetic taste. Some merely state private likes and dislikes, and others in addition to this, a claim to universal validity. Some times we say 'I like this statue' i.e., the statue seems to be beautiful to me. Again, we say that 'the statue is beautiful'. The latter claims that any body who judges the statue differently is, in some sense, wrong. It is this latter form of aesthetic judgments, called by Kant judgments of taste, which will be discussed below with the aim of finding out the sense in which a judgment of taste is synthetic a priori.

Kant analyses an aesthetic judgment or a judgment of taste from four different standpoints, or, as he calls them, 'moments', which he claims to correspond to four different logical forms of judgment - quality, quantity, relation and modality. Each moment constitutes a partial definition of 'beautiful'.

In the opinion of F.Copleston, however, these four moments have been 'rather oddly perhaps' correlated with the four logical forms of judgment. "I say 'rather oddly perhaps', because the judgment of taste is not itself a logical judgment, even though, according to Kant, it involves a reference or relation to the understanding"¹¹.

(1) From the standpoint of quality beautiful is that which is the object of an 'entirely disinterested'¹² satisfaction or dissatisfaction. An aesthetic judgment or a judgment of taste implies that the object which is called beautiful causes satisfaction without depending on any desire or appetite of the subject who judges. In this respect a judgment of taste is different from a judgment about the pleasant or the good. Both in case of the pleasant and the good we have feelings of pleasure. But we call something to be pleasant, for example, because we are interested in its existence, because we like to have it.

It is to be noted here that by using the expression 'entirely disinterested' Kant does not want to mean that an aesthetic judgment can not or that it ought not to be accompanied by any interest. What he really wants to mean is that an interest is never the determining ground of a judgment of taste. "In society men certainly have an interest in communicating the pleasure which they feel in aesthetic

experience. And Kant calls this an empirical interest in the beautiful. But interest, though it may accompany or be combined with the judgment of taste, is not its determining ground. Considered in itself, the judgment is disinterested"¹³.

(2) From the standpoint of relation beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, without any representation of a purpose. In a pure judgment of taste, says Kant, there is an awareness of finality, without the concept of an end which is achieved in the object, called beautiful. In making the aesthetic judgment 'the flower is beautiful', we do not conceive of any purpose which is achieved in the flower. On the other hand, if in judging a particular building as beautiful, we represent to ourselves a purpose which is achieved and perfectly embodied in the building, we miss a pure judgment of taste. "There can, of course, be a concept of purpose, which accompanies the experience of beauty. But Kant will not allow that a judgment of taste is 'Pure' if it presupposes a concept of a purpose. He distinguishes between what he calls 'free' and 'adherent' beauty. If we judge that a flower is beautiful, we have, most probably, no concept of a purpose which is achieved in the flower. The beauty of the latter is then said to be free; and our judgment of taste is said to be pure".¹⁴

(3) According to quantity, beautiful is 'that which pleases universally, without a concept'¹⁵.

The fact that the beautiful pleases universally is implicit in the fact, already stated, that the beautiful pleases without any reference to interests or private inclinations. If my judgment that 'the statue is beautiful' is entirely disinterested, i.e., independent of my private inclinations and idiosyncrasies, then I will have reason to believe that the beautiful object will produce a similar feeling of pleasure in all others who face it, and hence others will judge it to be beautiful, too. A judgment of taste is universal. In respect to this feature of universality a judgment of taste is different from a judgment concerning the pleasant. When I say that 'hot-bath is pleasant', I recognise the possibility that others may find it unpleasant. I take the latter judgment that 'hot-bath is unpleasant' to be quite consistent with my judgment that 'hot-bath is pleasant'. This is because I am conscious that my judgment concerning the pleasant is dependent on my peculiar inclinations, and inclinations may vary. Thus a judgment about the pleasant does not demand universal agreement.

But the case is quite different with the beautiful. An aesthetic judgment involves a claim to universal validity. It is true that a judgment about the beautiful involves a subjective element like the judgment about the pleasant. I do not judge a statue, for example, to be beautiful unless I myself enjoy a feeling of satisfaction at the representation

of the object. This may be idiomatically expressed as 'tasting the taste with one's own tongue'. But this is not all. An aesthetic judgment of taste is based on my own feeling of pleasure, this feeling is not caused by anything peculiar to me, but by something common to all, i.e., the harmonious relation between the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. It is because of this that when I assert that 'the statue is beautiful', I do not take it to be valid simply for myself but for all others. An aesthetic judgment claims universal acceptance, and this feature distinguishes it from an ordinary judgment of taste which does not involve any such a claim.

This claim of universal validity is, to some extent, peculiar, since the validity of it can not be demonstrated to others. Logical proof or demonstration requires the use of determinate concepts, but an aesthetic judgment being a variety of reflective judgment is independent of all concepts. In making an aesthetic judgment we refer "only to the feelings in every subject. We can not, therefore, make good our claim to the universal validity of the judgment by any process of logical argument. We can only persuade others to look again, and to look with more attention, at the object, confident that in the end their feelings will speak for themselves and that they will concur with our judgment. When we make the judgment, we believe that we speak, as it were, with a

universal voice, and we claim the assent of others; but they will give this assent only on the basis of their own feelings, not in virtue of any concepts which we adduce"¹⁶.

(4) From the standpoint of modality 'beautiful is that which without any concept is recognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction'¹⁷.

In judging something to be beautiful we 'assume agreement' on the part of everybody who perceives it. This necessity which an aesthetic judgment involves is different both from the theoretical objective necessity and from the practical necessity. When I say that 'the statue is beautiful', I do not claim to know a priori that everybody will agree with me. My knowledge that others in fact agree with me depends on empirical investigation. If my aesthetic judgment were theoretically necessary, I should have that knowledge of agreement without waiting for any further information. Again, this necessity is different from practical necessity. Practical necessity originates from the concept of an objective law which determines how we ought to act. To distinguish aesthetic necessity from the other two forms of it, mentioned above, Kant calls it 'exemplary'; 'that is, necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is regarded as an example of a universal rule which one can not state'¹⁸. An aesthetic judgment, say, 'the statue is beautiful' claims

that everybody ought to describe it as beautiful. The necessary connection between the representation of the statue and the feeling of pleasure presupposes a universal principle. This can not be a logical principle, for an aesthetic judgment is a form of reflective judgment which is independent of any determinate concept.

Here two points may be noted. First, the four moments of aesthetic judgment or the four partial definitions of beauty do not have the same function in the making of aesthetic judgments. The moments of universality and necessity state the goal at which the particular aesthetic responses, i.e., the feelings of pleasure, aim at - the goal of inter-subjective validity or agreement. This inter-subjective validity is different from objective validity. Kant, of course, has not made any distinction between inter-subjective and objective validity in the first and the second 'critiques'.

The other two moments, i.e., the moments of disinterestedness and finality of form, on the other hand, state the conditions to be fulfilled by an aesthetic response for becoming intersubjectively valid.

The second point is that though Kant is clear enough in explaining that a particular aesthetic judgment has both an empirical and a priori elements, he does not state whether the

four partial definitions of beauty are synthetic or analytic.

[v]

According to Paul Guyer, Kant argues that 'aesthetic judgment is a variety of synthetic a priori judgment, so that the problem of a deduction of aesthetic judgment may, therefore, be considered "part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy : How synthetic a priori judgments possible ?"¹⁹. From the expression 'a variety of' it may be guessed that Kant did not use the expression 'synthetic a priori' with reference to aesthetic judgments in exactly the same sense in which he used it in the other 'critiques'.

The second point that may be guessed is that an aesthetic judgment makes an a priori claim, for what requires a deduction in a synthetic judgment is just whatever a priori claim it contains. A judgment that contains an a priori claim is an a priori judgment. An a priori claim is made by an aesthetic judgment in the sense that it attributes universal and necessary validity to particular feelings of pleasure.

It is, however, clear that an aesthetic judgment can not be synthetic a priori in the sense in which we have such

judgments in the first or in the second 'critique'. In the first 'critique' the judgment 'every event must have a cause' is an example of synthetic a priori judgment. This judgment states the condition of the possibility of objects of experience. In the second critique the Categorical Imperative, which is recognised by Kant as synthetic a priori, states the condition of the determination of what should not be done. In both the cases, a synthetic a priori judgment states an objective condition or criterion of something. An aesthetic judgment, according to Kant, is neither a theoretical cognitive judgment nor a practical cognitive judgment, but a reflective one. Like a judgment concerning the pleasant, it is a subjective judgment concerning the pleasant, it is a subjective judgment in the sense that it does not state anything in the object but our private feelings that we take in the object. Hence, an aesthetic judgment is unable to state any objective condition or criterion of anything. If it is synthetic a priori, it must be so in a different sense.

[VI]

In our attempt to find out the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori' with reference to aesthetic judgments let us proceed in a different way. Instead of asking the

meaning of the single expression 'synthetic a priori' let us ask whether an aesthetic judgment is 'synthetic' and whether it is 'a priori'. That an aesthetic judgment is synthetic is not difficult to understand. A synthetic judgment, as it is explained by Kant in the first 'critique', is that in which the predicate goes beyond the subject, or, we may say, in which the predicate can be denied of the subject without any contradiction. An aesthetic judgment is synthetic, for it is self-evident that its predicate, i.e., the pleasure connected with the representation of the object, is not implicit in the concept of the object. When we assert that we take pleasure in the object, we do so 'irrespective of any concept'. The predicate also goes beyond the intuition of the object judged. Intuition enables us to know sensible qualities of object. But a judgment of taste joins as predicate to our intuition of the object something that has nothing whatever to do with the object. "It is easy to see, that judgments of taste are synthetic judgments, for they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object in order to add as predicate to that intuition something that has no reference to knowledge, namely, the feeling of pleasure or pain"²⁰.

The expression 'a priori' means prior to experience. In the first critique Kant holds that a judgment is a priori if it is logically independent of sense-experience. To

assert an a priori judgment we are not required to wait for further experience. But this is all about the manner in which an a priori judgment is made. An a priori judgment has also an a priori content as its part. In the first critique, apart from giving a definition of 'a priori' Kant mentions universality and necessity as marks of a priority.

An aesthetic judgment may be said a priori because of the manner in which it is made. It is never made on the basis of any induction from other persons' expression of approval. It must be "pronounced a priori"²¹. A judgment to qualify as a judgment of taste must be made on the basis of one's own feeling of pleasure. Thus the manner in which it is made is in some sense a priori. Kant holds that taste makes a claim to "autonomy"²² and if the judgments of others are made the determining ground of one's own judgment of tastes, taste will cease to make that claim.

Does a judgment of taste have an a priori content, too? In his analysis of the 'beautiful' from four different standpoints or 'moments' Kant has held that a judgment of taste is universal and necessary. It is with reference to this feature of universality and necessity that Kant makes an important distinction between a judgment about the pleasant and an aesthetic judgment. But though according to Kant, a logical judgment and an aesthetic judgment are

different from a judgment concerning the pleasant, an aesthetic judgment can not be universal and necessary in the sense in which a logical judgment or a synthetic a priori judgment of the first or the second 'critique' can be.

In the first critique Kant identifies universality or necessity with objective validity. But in the third critique Kant shifts away from this identity. An aesthetic judgment has got only subjective validity. So the sense of its universality and necessity must be different. Objective necessity is the necessity that any determinate concept be predicated of a particular object. An aesthetic judgment refers to the subject and his feelings. When we say that 'the table is beautiful', we are not concerned with an object 'table' and we do not ascribe a property to that object. We are, rather, concerned with the pleasure or pain which we feel when we represent the object to ourselves. But in the logical judgment, 'the table is round' we ascribe a property to an object, 'table'. An aesthetic judgment, not being at all concerned with an object, can not claim objective validity. Its universality and necessity must be different from that of a logical judgment, for "it does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of an object taken in its entire logical sphere". 'Its universality and necessity rather consists in the fact that it extends this predicate over the whole sphere of judging subjects'²³. This universality is

subjective. An aesthetic judgment is not universal in the sense that it claims that others actually feel the same pleasure which I myself feel. If it claimed that it would have been an empirical proposition, since what others actually feel can be determined only through an empirical investigation. It rather claims that others ought to feel the same pleasure or ought to agree with me. 'Ought' remains unaffected even if no body actually agrees with me, and this ought can be determined only with reference to an a priori principle. Thus an aesthetic judgment is synthetic in the sense of going beyond the concept of an object, and it is a priori in the sense that it claims universal validity of pleasure, that it demands the agreement of all. This is, definitely a new sense of 'synthetic a priori'.

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CHAPTER V

Quine, Logical Positivists and Kant's Thesis

[I]

The question 'Does synthetic a priori propositions exist ?' may be restated as ; Are all a priori propositions analytic ? Both Kant and the logical positivists recognise a relation between the concept of 'analyticity' and that of 'a priority'. Again, they admit another relation, a relation between necessity and analyticity. In spite of their recognition of these relations, we find Kant asserting a thesis which is opposed by the positivists. We may naturally ask about the relations between :

- (i) necessity and analyticity; and
- (ii) a priority and analyticity,

Three possible answers are :

- (a) The first and the second conjuncts in each case, i.e., (i) and (ii) are co-extensive.
- (b) The second conjunct implies the first in each case.
- (c) The first conjunct implies the second in each case.

Among these possible answers Kant accepts only (b), a logical positivist all the three and Quine none, for Quine does not think that there are analytic propositions. As Kant accepts (b), he is entitled to admit synthetic a priori propositions and he, in fact, asserts that there are such propositions. By accepting (a) and (c) a positivist loses his right to recognise synthetic a priori propositions and in fact he denies that there are such propositions. For Quine the question whether some synthetic propositions are a priori does not arise, since for him there is no absolute analytic or synthetic proposition at all. Here lies an important difference between a positivist and Quine. The positivists have an absolute conception of analytic or synthetic propositions. Judging by that conception they identify or reject some judgments to be synthetic. They reject, e.g., the proposition ' $7 + 5 = 12$ ' to be synthetic, but by applying their own standard they characterise it as analytic.

A.J.Ayer writes, "a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience. Thus, the proposition, 'There are ants which have established a system of slavery' is a synthetic proposition. For we can not tell whether it is true or false merely by considering the definitions of the symbols which constitute it. We have to resort to actual observation of the behaviour of ants. On the other hand, the proposition 'Either some ants are parasitic or none are' is an analytic proposition. For one need not resort to observation to discover that there either are or are not ants which are parasitic"¹.

Quine, on the other hand, refuses to call the judgment '7 + 5 = 12' synthetic or analytic, for he does not recognise any 'analytic-synthetic' distinction among propositions. This theory of Quine, of course, may be interpreted as an opposition to Kant's thesis that some propositions are synthetic a priori.

[II]

Let us take up logical positivism first. Logical positivism is a brand of the Philosophy of Analysis. It

owes its origin to, what is more popularly known as, the the Vienna Circle which consists of some students and teachers of the University of Vienna². The philosophy of the Vienna Circle, logical positivism, is also characterised as logical empiricism; and the fact that it is a combination of 'the empiricism of the nineteenth century and the logical' methods that were developed, since that time' is quite clear from this characterisation. The function of philosophy, logical positivism holds, is the logical analysis and clarification of meaning. It may be noted that the positivists' dissatisfaction with Kant's distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions lies on their analysis of the notion of 'necessity'. The major motive behind their philosophy of analysis is the elimination of metaphysics, the checking of the unlimited victory of speculative philosophy. The principle that helped them in this elimination is called 'the principle of verification' which means that a sentence to be meaningful must be empirically verifiable.

The principle of verification has sometimes been used in the 'strong' sense and at some other times in the 'weak' sense. 'A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term', says A.J. Ayer, 'if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable'.

This principle of verification is believed to owe its origin to L. Wittgenstein who holds that 'to understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true'³. Meaning is treated to be something not different from truth-value, and the logical positivists refer only to extensional logic in their arguments. The principle of verification, the positivists believe, compel them to admit only two kinds of propositions, viz, analytic and empirical. In other words, they had to reject Kant's thesis of synthetic a priori propositions.

With reference to Kant's thesis 'some judgments are synthetic a priori' the discussion of positivism is very much relevant, though it is, perhaps, true that there is no form of empiricism which does not go against Kant's thesis of 'synthetic a priori'. Positivism does not present just an alternative thesis to that of Kant, it rather goes to the extreme position that synthetic a priori propositions are logically impossible. M. Schlick, a leading member of this brand of empiricism holds "... as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility"⁴. Thus if logical empiricism is true, Kant's thesis loses all possibility of survival.

[III]

For the sake of convenience we may split up the thesis of logical positivism into four sub-thesis, as done by B. Blanshard, viz, (i) all necessary statements are reports of linguistic usage; (ii) they represent conventions; (iii) they are analytic and (iv) they do not say anything about fact.

These sub-theses are inter connected and they are, I think, so much inter connected that anyone of them may be derived from the rest.

(i) To see that a necessary proposition is a report of linguistic usage let us consider the proposition 'all bachelors are unmarried' which will be recognised by all as necessary, though not as analytic. Quine, for example, is not ready to characterise this proposition as analytic. Unlike the rationalists, the positivists hold that necessary propositions do not reveal relations between things, but between our own ideas or meanings. In the proposition 'all bachelors are unmarried' we do not claim, the positivists hold, to have any insight of a relation between two attributes, referred by the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried'. What the proposition really declares is that we are using these two expressions with the same reference. This will be

clear if we universally quantify this proposition as '(X) (Bx, ux)', which means that if there is anything 'X' to which we apply 'B' then we should not deny the application of 'u' with reference to that 'X'.

In the same way, the positivists hold, the proposition 'A material thing can not be in two places at once' expresses the conditions under which we should be prepared to use the words 'material thing' and not 'a profound and universal insight' into what being a material thing entails. 'The question, "what is the nature of a material thing?" says Professor Ayer, 'is, like any other question of that form, a linguistic question. And the propositions which are set forth in answer to it are linguistic propositions, even though they may be expressed in such a way that they may seem to be factual. They are propositions about the relationship of symbols, and not about the properties of things which the symbols denote'⁵. Thus a necessary proposition states about the usage of linguistic expressions.

(ii) The necessary propositions are linguistic conventions. A necessary proposition, as stated above, does not express a relation between things, but a relation between symbols or linguistic expressions. As symbols have no meaning of their own, the relations between the symbols can not be something unalterable or fixed. The relation between,

say, 'bachelor', and 'unmarried' will hold good so long we stick to our determination to use these symbols in the fashion we now actually do. Thus if we try to deny the proposition 'all bachelors are unmarried' without altering our determination or convention regarding the use of these expressions, we will be contradicting ourselves. And it is to this fact, the positivists hold, that the necessary propositions owe their necessity. Conventions have no intrinsic necessity of their own, they are man-made. The necessary propositions are conventions and this is true, so the positivists believe, even about the principles, of logic and mathematics'. 'The principles of logic and mathematics', Ayer holds, 'are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else'⁶.

The theory that necessary propositions are linguistic conventions admits of two versions, an extreme and a moderate. According to the extreme version, a necessary proposition states just the rules for the transformation of one set of symbols into another. The necessary propositions, are verbal propositions and this surely amounts to saying that the necessary propositions are empirical statements about how words are actually used. This is definitely a major defect of this version of the linguistic thesis. It abolishes the distinction between the necessary and the empirical propositions, a distinction that is asserted by the positivists themselves. Ayer, when he first expressed his linguistic

theory of necessary propositions, was a supporter of this extreme version. But later on he modifies his earlier version and adopts a moderate one instead. He now holds that necessary propositions are not themselves linguistic rules but are rather consequences of linguistic rules, i.e., conventions. 'Just as it is a mistake to identify a priori propositions with empirical propositions about language', Ayer holds, 'so I now think that it is a mistake to say that they are themselves linguistic rules'⁷.

This linguistic thesis of the positivists is an attack on Kant's thesis that some a priori propositions are synthetic. But any philosopher who attacks Kant's thesis does not necessarily entertain this linguistic thesis of necessary propositions. Lewis, for example, denies the existence of synthetic a priori propositions but he holds that the necessity of an analytic proposition is not grounded in linguistic conventions, for if the truth-value of a statement is affected by the change of linguistic rules, the statement is not necessary but empirical.

(iii) The necessary propositions, the positivists hold, are analytic. By characterising necessary propositions as analytic they want to mean that such propositions do not state anything new but simply explicate what we already mean. Here the expression 'nothing new' refers to logical novelty and so psychological novelty is beside the point⁸. The

conclusion of a deductive inference is Psychologically new to the person who makes the inference, for otherwise he would not need infer at all. But this does not mean that the conclusion is not contained in the premises. But what is the test of this lack of logical novelty, i.e., of analyticity? As the positivists are conscious of the fact that all propositions are not of the subject-predicate form, they generally prefer to say that a proposition is analytic if its truth follows simply from the meaning of the terms. But a more formal test of analyticity, used by them, is that a proposition is analytic if the denial of it results in a self-contradiction. This test, it may be noted, has been used by Kant also. We can not deny an analytic proposition, says Kant, without self-contradiction.

Being influenced by Wittgenstein, the positivists identify analytical propositions with tautologies. As distinguished from a 'synthetic sentence', which communicate a state of affairs 'an analytic sentence, or to put it more clearly, a tautology', writes Schlick, 'has a quite different function; it represents only a purely formal transformation of equivalent expressions, and serves, therefore, only as a technical device within a proof, a deduction, a calculus'⁹.

A tautology has been taken by the positivists to mean a statement which is composed of some simpler statements in such a way that its truth-value is not affected by the

truth-values of those simpler ones. The proposition 'either it is raining or it is not raining' is a tautology in this sense, and this is an analytical proposition also. But this definition of tautology does not adequately apply to all analytical propositions recognised by them, e.g., to the proposition 'all bodies are extended'. But the positivists never say that some analytical propositions are not tautologies. They rather use the term 'tautology' in another sense also to make the expressions 'analytic' and 'tautologous' co-extensive. In this second sense, a proposition is a tautology if it is true under every possible circumstance. In other words, the truth-value of a tautology is not affected by any possible change in the circumstances.

The positivists hold that if any proposition is really a priori, it must be analytic or tautologous. A proposition is a priori if its truth-value can be determined without any appeal to experience. And we are not required to appeal to experience in determining the validity of that proposition which does not state any fact of experience. The propositions that do not state any fact of experience, i.e., which are true under all circumstances are tautologies. Thus the positivists maintain that all a priori propositions without exception are tautologies or analytic.

The positivists argue that "while it is true that we have a priori knowledge of necessary propositions, it is

not true, as Kant supposed, that any of these necessary propositions are synthetic. They are without exception analytic propositions, or, in other words, tautologies"¹⁰.

(iv) Necessary propositions, the positivists assert, are non-factual, they state nothing about the realm of existent things and events. No necessary proposition, Ayer holds, 'provide any information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. And it is for this reason that no experience can confute them'¹¹. From the last statement of Ayer it is clear that he can not think of any explanation of the fact that 'the necessary propositions are not confuted by experience' other than the hypothesis that such propositions are factually vacuous. But what can or can not be that can not be settled by what the positivists can or can not think. We may, for example, say that a given necessary proposition is not confuted by experience for the simple reason that it is one of the conditions that make experience possible. This, of course, does not mean that the thesis that the necessary propositions are non-factual can not be justified by other means.

[IV]

Both Wittgenstein and the positivists are of the opinion that no a priori propositions are synthetic, i.e.,

all a priori propositions are analytic. Let us present their argument in a series of four statements, all of which are shared by them.

- (1) All a priori propositions are necessary.
- (2) All necessary propositions are factually vacuous, i.e., lack in factual content.
- (3) No propositions which lack in factual content are synthetic.
- (4) No a priori propositions are synthetic, which may be restated as 'all a priori propositions are analytic', provided we accept the expressions 'analytic' and 'synthetic' to be contradictory terms.

The premises of this argument and the way in which they are arranged are such that anybody who accepts the premises is driven thereby to accept the conclusion also. The second point to be noted about this argument is that Kant accepts all the premises save (2), and ultimately he affirms a statement which is not simply different from (4), i.e., the conclusion but contradictory to it.

Thus the second premise of the above argument, 'all necessary propositions are factually vacuous' creates a major difference between Kant and the positivists. In connection with this proposition we may ask two relevant questions :

- (a) The first question is about the status of the proposition. Is this proposition (i) analytic a priori, (ii) synthetic a priori, (iii) synthetic a posteriori or (iv) simply an arbitrary convention ?
- (b) The second question concerns the justification or basis of it. Why should we accept it to be true ? If we can not justify it, it can not be used to justify the conclusion also. But why do we accept it to be true ?

Let us take the second question first. The logic of the positivists is this. If a proposition states any situation or state of affairs, a change in the state of affairs or facts will make a change in the truth-value of the proposition also. But the truth-value of a necessary proposition, say, 'it is either raining or not raining' remains unaffected in all circumstances. Hence, it states nothing at all about the circumstances.

Let us take this argument for granted. Here the positivists are affirming two propositions to be always true. One is that 'a necessary proposition does not change' and the other one is that 'circumstances may change'. The second proposition is expected to cover all possible circumstances, and thus it is always true, no matter what circumstance it is we are referring to. In other words,

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this is a necessary proposition, but about circumstances. But this is self-defeating, for the second premise, i.e., (2) asserts that all necessary propositions are factually vacuous. Thus the argument does not establish what it intends to establish.

It is, of course, to be noted here that in case of causal relations it seems reasonable to hold that if a proposition states any situation or state of affairs, a change in the state of affairs or facts will make a change in the truth-value of the proposition also. A supposed cause of a given event is rejected in favour of another on the plea that the absence or presence of that event does not make any corresponding change in that supposed cause.

But what is true in connection with causal relations may not hold good with reference to necessary propositions. And the empiricists, in fact, do not identify causal relations with the necessity of necessary propositions, which are, as stated by the positivists, identical with analytical propositions.

Let us take up the first question now, the question regarding the status of the proposition 'All necessary propositions are factually vacuous'. This proposition should not be an arbitrary convention, for an arbitrary convention, lacking in truth-value, can not be put in support of any truth. Thus if the second premise is an

arbitrary convention, the conclusion of the argument will be rendered unwarranted.

The proposition can not be synthetic a posteriori also, for in that case it is admitted that it may not be always true, and with such a premise, if we can at all arrive at any truth, it can not be more than a contingent proposition. But the conclusion of the above argument is intended to be always true.

It can not be analytic a priori, too. Because in that case it is useless in establishing the desired conclusion. An analytic a priori proposition, according to the positivists, is uninformative, but the conclusion of this argument has been intended to convey information. A proposition which itself does not convey information can not make any proposition, sustained by it, any more informative.

We are thus, left with the last alternative that the proposition in question is synthetic a priori. If I am not mistaken in including all the possible alternatives, we are to accept this last alternative, whether we like it or not. But it will be suicidal for the positivists to accept it, for this is what they try their best to avoid. They can not expect to establish the conclusion 'no a priori proposition is synthetic' by already recognising the existence of, at least, one such proposition.

[V]

The difference of opinion between Kant and the logical positivists regarding the existence of synthetic a priori propositions seems, to some extent, due to an ambiguity in the meaning of the expression 'to know'. Unlike the synthetic-analytic distinction, the a priori-a posteriori distinction is an epistemological one. To know a proposition a priori is to know it to be true independently of experience. But what do we mean by 'to know'? To know and to imply are not exactly the same. If any proposition 'P' implies another proposition 'q', the implication certainly holds good whether we know it to be the case. Can we not claim to know something without knowing all the implications of it? Do we know the meaning of ' $7 + 5$ ' without knowing that it implies ' 12 '? If we do not then the positivists seem to be justified in asserting that the proposition ' $7 + 5 = 12$ ' is not synthetic a priori. But if we answer the question affirmatively, Kant's thesis will be more plausible, and there are philosophers, like Ewing, who accepts Kant's thesis that some propositions are synthetic a priori. Ewing¹² does not accept it to be true that all a priori propositions are based on linguistic conventions and so are analytic in character. He criticises the positivists by holding that the very assertion that 'there are no synthetic a priori propositions' can convey any information

only if it is not a mere consequence of certain linguistic conventions, only if it is synthetic a priori.

Again, there are philosophers, like Quinton, who will argue against Kant, Quinton¹³ holds, that synthetic propositions can not be a priori. He explicitly states that if a proposition is true, it must be true either by virtue of definition or by virtue of experience. Synthetic propositions are, he holds, non-analytic propositions, and as an analytic proposition is true by virtue of its meaning or definition, a synthetic proposition is true only by virtue of experience. Again, an a priori proposition is non-empirical and as non-empirical propositions are true independently of experience, no a priori proposition can be true by virtue of experience. Thus an a priori proposition, so Quinton believes, can never be synthetic.

We may not agree with Quinton on the point that any proposition is true either by virtue of its meaning or by virtue of experience, for this point has not been established by him. But one thing is clear enough. Once we give our consent to it, Kant's thesis can not but be rejected, since his synthetic a priori propositions are neither true by definitions nor by experience. Kant's thesis may, however, survive if he no more claims that his synthetic a priori propositions are really propositions. Walsh, for example,

holds that synthetic a priori judgments are not judgments at all, for they are prescriptive in nature and so they are neither true nor false.

We may at this point, however, note Blanshard's objection against positivism¹⁴. He argues that if all logical laws are linguistic conventions and so arbitrary, we shall fail to explain why we do follow one kind of logic rather than another. Modern logic, I think, is not an alternative to the Traditional one, though it is more general than the latter in application. There can be different alternative linguistic rules but not different alternative logic. The law of contradiction, for example, is a condition of the possibility of intelligibility itself. We can have an alternative to it only at the cost of intelligibility.

[VI]

Kant makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions in such a way that a priori ceases to be the monopoly of analytic propositions. The positivists find fault with this way of making the distinction and consequently they discard Kant's thesis that there are synthetic a priori propositions.

W. Quine goes a step further. He finds fault not only with the Kantian way of making the distinction but with any

possible effort in this direction. If, as Quine holds, no satisfactory distinction can be made between analytic and synthetic propositions, the question of subscribing to the thesis of 'synthetic a priori propositions' does not arise at all. Let us see how Quine proceeds.

Quine attacks the notion of analyticity. To make his point clear he makes a distinction between two types of analytic statements. Some analytic propositions are such that they are true and remain true under all reinterpretations of their components, other than logical particles. In other words, the truth-value of these propositions remain unaffected in all possible interpretations of the constituents. These analytic propositions are logically true. The proposition 'No unmarried man is married' or the proposition 'All birds are birds' is an example of this type.

Analytic statements, Quine writes, 'fall into two classes. Those of the first class, which may be called logically true, are typified by :

(1) No unmarried man is married.

The relevant features of this example is that it is not merely is true as it stands, but remains true under any and all reinterpretations of "man" and "unmarried". ...

But there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified by :

(2) No bachelor is married.

The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting "unmarried man" for its synonym "bachelor".¹⁵

The first type of analytic propositions is not a problem to Quine because it is explained by him with reference to logical truths, and he derives the notion of logical truth simply from a list of logical particles and the notion of truth itself. But the analytic propositions of the second type, Quine holds, are not by themselves logical truths, though it is possible to turn them into logical truths by simply substituting synonyms for synonyms. The proposition 'No bachelor is married' is an example of this type. The problem concerning the notion of 'analyticity' crops up at this point. How is this concept of 'synonymy', i.e., cognitive synonymy, which depends on words having the same meaning for thought rather than on words having simply the same denotation, to be explained? In order to clarify the notion of analytic proposition we must explain the notion of 'synonymy'. But how are we to determine that the expressions, e.g., 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' are synonymous? It is, of course, true that these two expressions are used as interchangeable expressions. But

synonymity, Quine holds, can not be explained as interchangeability. Interchangeability is a wider expression than synonymy. The expressions 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys' are interchangeable but they are interchangeable not because of any sameness of meaning but because of an accidental factor that they happen always to apply to the same thing. But the notion of synonymy or, more precisely, cognitive synonymy does not depend on accidental factors. If the synonymy of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' were dependent on accidental factors, the analytic proposition 'No bachelor is married' could not have been turned into a logical truth.

It might be suggested that the two expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' are synonymous if the proposition 'No bachelor is married' is an analytic proposition. Synonymity may be explained, Quine holds, with reference to analyticity, but in that case our explanation will be something like circular, for we have taken the notion of synonymy to explain that of analyticity. Thus Quine is of the opinion that no satisfactory distinction can ever be made between analytic and synthetic propositions.

Quine's second thesis in connection with analyticity is that even if a distinction is made between analytic and synthetic propositions, the distinction could not be made

absolute. A proposition is analytic or synthetic only with reference to a particular system, certain contexts. Thus a proposition, as such, is neither analytic nor synthetic. This thesis is based on Quine's repudiation of the dogma of reductionism, which makes a sharp distinction between statements. There are no statements, it is said, 'that depend for their truth on a direct confrontation with experience'. Any distinction between different kinds of statements can, at best, be relative.

[VII]

A similar view is also held by Waismann. The proposition 'I see with my eyes', he maintains, may be interpreted as an analytic proposition and it may also be interpreted, with equal plausibility, as a synthetic one. If whatever I see with are called 'eyes', the proposition becomes an analytic one. Again, as it is a matter of fact that we see with our eyes and not with any other organs, the proposition should be taken to be synthetic. Thus waismann denies any sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.

If Quine is right, we can no more extent support to the thesis that there are synthetic a priori propositions. If no proposition is absolutely synthetic or if the analytic

-synthetic distinction is not at all tenable, Kant's thesis that some judgments are both synthetic and a priori can not be sustained.

It is, of course, not the case that Quine's theses have received general acceptance. Against both the theses of Quine objections may be raised. His first thesis is based on the failure to define the notion of synonymy. This failure, Grice and Strawson hold, is due to Quine's refusal to understand. The notions of analyticity, necessity and cognitive synonymy, they maintain, belong to the same family of terms. As we can not adequately explain any of these terms with reference to another term belonging to a separate family, we must take recourse to another term of the same family. But Quine will not accept 'as explanations of any one of them, accounts which involve reference to other members of the family'¹⁶.

As regards Quine's second thesis it may be said that the rejection of the dogma of reductionism, by itself, does not make a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions impossible. Even if we accept the view that there is no statement which depends for its truth on a direct confrontation with experience, statement in which the factual component is everything, it does not follow that there is no statement in which the linguistic component is everything.

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CHAPTER VI

Review of Kant's 'Second Demand'

[1]

The question 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible ?' has occurred several times in Kant's Philosophy and unlike many other philosophical questions it has some peculiarities. It is an important question in philosophy and it is so important that it may be called revolutionary. But it has, as a matter fact, been raised for the first time at a much latter stage of philosophical development. Second, when the question was raised, it was criticised by many as a 'Pseudo question'. Many prominent figures from the rival camps, Empiricism and Rationalism, vehemently opposed the existence of 'synthetic a priori judgments', which are being referred to in this question. Third, though

the question is raised by Kant several times in different contexts, doubt remains as to whether he is asking the same question everywhere. It may be suggested that Kant is asking the same question, though not in the same contexts, and attempts may be made to make this suggestion plausible by producing Kant's own demand that he is using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in exactly the same sense in all his three 'critiques'. But Kant's own practice does not seem to justify this demand. In the first 'critique', Critique of Pure Reason, Kant speaks of a new variety of judgment¹ which is clearly distinct from both analytic a priori judgments and synthetic a posteriori ones. Judgments of this variety are termed by Kant 'synthetic a priori'². Kant demands that this variety of judgments is not a mere possibility but we actually have such judgments³. He demands that some judgments are both synthetic and a priori. In the first 'critique Kant shows how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in the field of theoretical experience. But synthetic a priori judgments are not, Kant holds, confined to this region of experience. He uses the expression 'experience' to include moral and aesthetic experience, too. These two other aspects of experience are dealt with by Kant in his second and third 'critiques'. Kant holds that we have synthetic a priori judgments not only in the context of

theoretical experience but also in the fields of moral and aesthetic experience. From this it is clear that Kant is demanding not only that we have synthetic a priori judgments but also that we have such judgments in different regions of experience in the same sense, otherwise it would have been meaningless to claim that synthetic a priori judgments are not restricted to theoretical experience only.

We thus face two demands : (1) there are synthetic a priori judgments; and (2) in all his 'critiques' Kant is using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in the same sense; in other words, we have synthetic a priori judgments in all domains of experience in the same sense. The demand (2) will be referred to as Kant's second demand or claim. These two demands are not identical, though not unconnected. Moreover, the second demand has, at least, an extra significance in determining what Kant has really explored. It is usually held that Kant has explored a new variety of judgment, called synthetic a priori, but a denial of the second claim may encourage us to change this view for the sake of becoming more precise. We may hold that Kant has really explored a lot of varieties in a new variety of judgment, for the simple reason that his new variety of judgment, called synthetic a priori, fails to maintain an unchanging identity all throughout his 'critiques'.

The claims, however, are not unconnected. The question whether we have synthetic a priori judgments in all the three 'Critiques' of Kant in exactly the same sense can intelligibly be asked only if Kant first recognises such judgments in his 'Critiques'. This question would have been not only irrelevant but also meaningless if Kant had shared a view similar to that of Walsh⁴, Quine or the positivists about synthetic a priori judgments. Again, any affirmative or negative answer that we may please to give to this question will require us to recognise Kant's first claim that there are synthetic a priori judgments.

But these two claims can not be identified. Philosophers like Quine and the Positivists have opposed Kant's thesis that there are synthetic a priori judgments. Their arguments, of course, do not conclusively prove that Kant is wrong in demanding that some judgments are synthetic a priori. An attempt at the denial of the thesis of 'synthetic a priori propositions', however, will be considered successful if we first agree to interpret the term 'necessity' as logical necessity. But why should we prefer a particular interpretation of this term among a lot of interpretations? Moreover, Kant is frank enough to admit that his synthetic a priori propositions are not logically necessary in the sense that their denial will involve self-contradiction. But even if we agree with Kant

on his demand that there are synthetic a priori judgments, we are not thereby compelled to accept his second demand that we have such judgments, in exactly the same sense, in all the three different regions of experience — theoretical, moral and aesthetic — dealt with in his three 'Critiques', 'Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment, respectively. Though these claims are different, Kant is not, probably, well aware that his second claim does not get established by the arguments that we may put in favour of his first claim, 'there are synthetic a priori judgments'. This seems to be the reason why we find Kant try his best to establish his first claim only. He was, perhaps, convinced that the expression 'synthetic a priori' was not accumulating even minute changes as it was rolling down from one 'Critique' to another. Kant, is, however, wrong in connection with this conviction.

[II]

There is, of course, a sense in which it may be suggested that in using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in his three 'Critiques' Kant is not making a new stipulation everytime. In the first 'Critique' the judgment 'every event must have a cause' has been recognised by Kant as 'synthetic a priori'. The expression, 'synthetic a priori' is a

combination of two distinct terms, 'synthetic' and 'a priori'. The meanings of these terms have been clarified by Kant in the first 'Critique'. "A proposition is synthetic if its negation is not a contradiction in terms. It is a priori if it is not logically dependent on any proposition which describes sense-impressions"⁵ i.e., if its truth is not affected by any experience that we may have. Here we thus have two negative descriptions of synthetic a priori propositions. These descriptions equally apply to the synthetic a priori judgments of the second and the third 'Critiques' as well as to those of the first 'Critique'. Thus it may be said that Kant is not using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in his subsequent 'Critiques' in a sense which is different from the sense of the first 'Critique'. But this defence of Kant's position is not adequate for various reasons. From the fact that the synthetic a priori propositions are not like this or that we can not exactly grasp what are they like. Under such a situation it is not possible to say that all synthetic a priori propositions mean the same thing.

Again, it may be true that in Kant's Philosophy there is not even a single instance of synthetic a priori propositions to which the above negative descriptions do not apply, but from this we are not warranted to say that by a synthetic a priori proposition Kant simply means that

proposition whose negation is not a contradiction in terms and which is not logically dependent on any proposition that describes sense-impressions. The meaning of a given expression is not necessarily a logical product of the meanings of the constituent terms of that expression. The expression 'synthetic a priori', as used by Kant in the first 'Critique' is a good example of this. The expression 'dog-sleep' is another good example from everyday language. From the fact that somebody fails to understand the expression 'dog-sleep' we can not say that he does not know the use of the terms 'dog' and 'sleep'. In such cases the sense of a given expression can not be inferred just from the meanings of the terms entering into that expression. Such a sense of an expression may be called its technical sense, as distinguished from its literal sense. In the first 'Critique' when Kant calls any judgment synthetic a priori, he uses the expression 'synthetic a priori' in a technical sense. By synthetic a priori judgments Kant here means principles which state the conditions of the possibility of theoretical knowledge. According to Kant, G.J. Warnock holds, there is "a third class of propositions, whose existence none of his predecessors had explicitly recognized - certain propositions that must be true if human experience is to occur at all, propositions that state, in Kant's phrase, "the

conditions of the possibility of experience", or, as we might say, its fundamental defining characteristics ... But if propositions of this class are not analytic and are not contingent, then they are precisely what Hume and the rest had rejected or ignored - namely, synthetic a priori propositions⁶. The principle of causation, 'every event must have a cause' is, Kant holds, a synthetic a priori judgment; for we can not have any form of theoretical knowledge, empirical or a priori, without assuming it to be true. Thus in the Critique of Pure Reason by synthetic a priori propositions Kant means those propositions which state conditions of the possibility of any experience in space and time⁷. The case being so, Kant's second claim that he is using the expression 'synthetic a priori' in exactly the same sense in all his 'critiques' will be entertained only if we can show that the synthetic a priori judgments of the second and third 'Critiques' state conditions of the possibility of experience in space and time, i.e., of theoretical experience. If we, however, aim simply at the refutation and not at the establishment of Kant's second claim, it will be enough to show that the synthetic a priori judgments either of the second or of the third 'critique' do not state conditions of the possibility of theoretical experience.

[III]

In the field of moral experience, Kant asserts, we have synthetic a priori propositions. He, of course, does not recognise every individual judgment, which can be called moral, to be synthetic a priori. The supreme principle of morality or the Categorical Imperative⁸ with reference to which a principle or maxim of action is judged to be moral is a synthetic a priori judgment of the second 'Critique'. The proposition "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"⁹, is one of the formulations of the Categorical Imperative and it is, Kant holds, synthetic a priori. But why? Does it state any assumption without which we can not have any experience of objects in space and time? Certainly not. Kant is clear enough in asserting that in the second 'Critique' we are not at all concerned with spatial and temporal experience. So the Categorical imperative is not supposed to be a synthetic a priori judgment in the sense of expressing conditions required for the possibility of theoretical knowledge; and Kant himself claims to have given a complete list of such judgments in the first 'critique'. Our experience of the world of objects is not affected by what moral principle we happen to subscribe to.

It may be suggested that in the second 'Critique' the expression 'synthetic a priori' means what it means in the first 'Critique' for here also Kant has used this expression in a technical sense. The categorical imperative is synthetic a priori in the sense that it states conditions for the determination of what we ought to do, in the sense that it supplies a necessary requirement for the determination of obligation or duty.

But this suggestion is not tenable for two reasons. First, it is not the case that the categorical imperative really expresses conditions or assumptions for the determination of what we ought to do. Kant's categorical imperative resembles Mill's so-called 'Inductive Methods',¹⁰ which instead of identifying the cause of a phenomenon under investigation eliminates the claim of something to be the cause of that phenomenon. According to the categorical imperative, actions whose maxims can not be universalised, i.e., whose maxims do not accord with the categorical imperative are such which we ought not to perform. "Basing his argument upon the sole consideration of man as a rational being, Kant is perhaps in a position to lay down what men should not do — namely, they should not adopt principles of judgment or conduct which lead to or involve inconsistency. However, it is by no means clear that this suffices to determine in any positive way what

they should do"¹¹. It may be noted that Kant does not want to say that "all actions which do accord with the Categorical Imperative are ones which we ought to perform"¹². So, why should we say that the categorical imperative states conditions for determining what we ought to do ?

A possible answer to the above question is this. Kant has definitely wanted to say that "there are positive as well as negative duties"¹³. No such distinction between positive and negative duties can be satisfactorily made unless the categorical imperative is of some help to us in identifying a positive duty. So the categorical imperative, it is believed, has the required efficacy in determining what we should do. This belief will be entertained if we assume that a positive duty of the form 'you ought to do X' can be restated as 'Failure to do X is impermissible'¹⁴. But this is an undue assumption, for 'impermissible' and 'obligatory' are not contradictory terms; we can not affirm one on the strength of eliminating the other. Thus Kant's categorical imperative is not a synthetic a priori judgment in the sense of stating an assumption for determining what is obligatory or moral. It may be called a synthetic a priori judgment, in the sense of expressing a test of what is 'impermissible'.

Second, even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that the categorical imperative states a condition for

determining what we should do, it does not follow that it is 'synthetic a priori' in the sense in which the causal principle 'every event must have a cause' is. The causal principle states conditions of the possibility of objects in space and time, whereas the categorical imperative expresses a condition or assumption for the determination of a moral principle and, indirectly, of a moral action or duty. Moral principles are not objects in space and time. Thus the synthetic a priori judgments of the first and the second 'critiques' are not 'synthetic a priori' in exactly the same sense.

[IV]

In the third 'critique' the Critique of Judgment, too, Kant raises the general critical question : How are synthetic a priori judgments possible ? This time, of course, the question is raised with reference to the domain of reflective judgment, i.e., the purposive and the beautiful products of nature and art, and not with reference to theoretical knowledge of objects or with reference to the world of freedom, as done in the first or the second 'critique'. Now, has not the meaning of the expression 'synthetic a priori' changed in this 'critique' with the change of domain ? Can we have

synthetic a priori judgments in the third 'critique' in the sense in which we have such judgments in the first or in the second critique' ?

Aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste is one of the two forms of reflective judgments discussed by Kant in the third 'critique'. According to Paul Guyer, Kant argues that 'aesthetic judgment is a variety of synthetic a priori judgment, so that the problem of a deduction of aesthetic judgment may therefore be considered "part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy ; How synthetic a priori judgments possible ?"¹⁵. From the expression 'a variety of' it may be guessed that Kant did not use the expression 'synthetic a priori' with reference to aesthetic judgments in exactly the same sense in which he used it in the other two critiques. And in fact this is the case. No aesthetic judgment can be synthetic a priori in the sense in which we have such judgments in the first or in the second 'critique'. The judgment 'every event must have a cause' is a synthetic a priori judgment of the first 'critique'. It states conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. In the second 'critique' the categorical Imperative, which is recognised by Kant as synthetic a priori, states the condition of the determination of what should not be done. In both the cases a synthetic a priori judgment states an objective condition

or criterion of something, though not of the same thing. An aesthetic judgment, say, 'the rose is beautiful' is neither a theoretical cognitive judgment nor a practical cognitive judgment, but a reflective one. A reflective judgment is peculiar in the sense that it does not use any determinate concept. An aesthetic judgment resembles a judgment concerning the pleasant in being subjective, since it does not state anything in the object but our private feelings that we take in the object. Hence, an aesthetic judgment is unable to state any objective condition or criterion of anything whatever. This means that if an aesthetic judgment is at all synthetic a priori, it must be so in a different sense.

Kant has given four definitions of beauty. Regarding the logical status of these definitions Kant is completely silent. He does not state whether the definitions are analytic, or synthetic a priori or a posteriori. But he clearly holds that a particular aesthetic judgment has both an empirical and an a priori elements. He recognises the particular aesthetic judgments like, 'the rose is beautiful' or 'the statue is beautiful' to be synthetic a priori. It is clear that unlike the synthetic a priori propositions of the first and the second 'critiques' a particular aesthetic judgment, say, 'the rose is beautiful' is a singular judgment considered from the logical point

of view, since an aesthetic judgment does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of an object taken in its entire logical sphere. It is also obvious that the judgment 'the rose is beautiful' does not state an assumption for the constitution of objects of experience, or a condition for the determination of what should or should not be done. It is not at all concerned with spatial and temporal objects or moral actions. It is rather concerned with our private feeling that we have in representing an object to ourselves, the feeling of pleasure. But inspite of this we may characterise an aesthetic judgment as 'synthetic a priori'. A synthetic judgment is that in which the predicate goes beyond the subject or in which the predicate can be denied of the subject without any contradiction. An aesthetic judgment is synthetic for its predicate, i.e., the pleasure connected with the representation of the object, is not implicit in the concept of the object. When we assert that we take pleasure in the object, we do so 'irrespective of any concept'. "It is easy to see, that judgments of taste are synthetic judgments, for they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object in order to add as predicate to that intuition something that has no reference to knowledge, namely, the feeling of pleasure or pain"¹⁶.

An aesthetic judgment may be called a priori, too. In the first 'critique' Kant has mentioned universality and necessity as marks of a priority. In the third 'critique', in his analysis of the 'beautiful' from four different standpoints or 'moments' Kant asserts that a judgment of taste is universal and necessary. Kant makes an important distinction between an aesthetic judgment, 'the rose is beautiful' and a judgment about the pleasant, 'hot-bath is pleasant' with reference to this feature of universality and necessity.

Here it may thus appear that there is a sense in which Kant may be said to use the expression 'synthetic a priori' in the same sense in all his 'critiques'. Like the aesthetic judgments of the third 'critique' the synthetic a priori judgments of the first two 'critiques' are universal and necessary. Moreover, these two forms of synthetic a priori judgments also may be called synthetic in the sense in which the aesthetic judgments are synthetic. The synthetic a priori judgments of all the three 'critiques' are universal, necessary and synthetic. Thus if by a synthetic a priori judgment we mean a judgment which, though universal and necessary, can be denied without contradiction, the expression 'synthetic a priori' may be said to mean the something in all the 'critiques' of Kant.

But there is a difficulty. An aesthetic judgment can

not be universal and necessary in the sense in which a logical judgment, or a synthetic a priori judgment of the first or the second 'critique' can be. In the first 'critique' Kant identifies universality or necessity with objective validity. The synthetic a priori judgments of the second 'critique', too, have been recognised by Kant as objectively valid, though, to be precise, this objective validity is not identical with the former. Objective necessity is the necessity that any determinate concept be predicted of a particular object. An aesthetic judgment refers to the subject and his feelings. When we say that 'the rose is beautiful', we are not concerned with an object 'rose', i.e., the concept of rose and we do not ascribe a property to that object. We are concerned with the pleasure or pain which we feel in representing the object to ourselves. Thus an aesthetic judgment does not and can not claim objective validity. It is universal and necessary in a quite different sense. An aesthetic judgment does not affirm the predicate of beauty of an object taken in its entire logical sphere. It is universal and necessary in the sense that it extends this predicate over the whole sphere of judging subjects¹⁷. This universality is subjective. .

Even if it is taken for granted that the aesthetic judgments are objectively valid, it can not be said that

an aesthetic judgment is synthetic a priori in the sense in which the synthetic a priori judgments of the first or the second 'critique' are; for an aesthetic judgment states neither the condition of the possibility of objects in space and time nor the condition of the determination of what should not be done. An aesthetic judgment does not at all state a condition or an assumption of anything, for it is independent of all determinate concepts whatever.

[v]

It may be said that though a particular form of reflective judgment, aesthetic or teleological, does not express an assumption or a requirement of something and so can not be a priori in the sense in which a synthetic a priori judgment of the first or the second 'critique' can be, the general principle of reflective judgment does express an assumption. The judgment 'nature itself is systematic' is, Kant holds, the general principle of reflection. This judgment is synthetic in the sense that the negation of it does not involve us in any self-contradiction. It is a priori in the sense of stating an assumption for constructing a system of interrelated laws, i.e., a system of experience. So there is no fundamental difference between the universal principle of causation

'every event must have a cause' and the general principle of reflection 'nature itself is systematic'.

The last statement is not tenable. The universal principle of causation is objectively valid, it is a constitutive principle. It is a priori in the sense that it is the very condition for there being any object at all. The principle of reflective judgment, on the other hand, is subjective¹⁸. It is not a constitutive but a regulative principle. It does not attribute at all to the object, it only concerns our mode of reflection of it. It is not a presupposition of the possibility of experience itself, but of the possibility of a system of such experiences. Thus though the universal law of causation, the categorical Imperative and the general principle of reflective judgment are alike in stating a condition of something, they do not state a condition or an assumption of the same thing. The first states the condition of experience itself, the second of the determination of what is impermissible and the third of the systematic investigation of experiences, already obtained by the first. Thus it can not be said that we have synthetic a priori judgments in all the three 'critiques' in exactly the same sense.

[VI]

The same conclusion, reached in section [V], is also suggested from other considerations. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are different from the ordinary synthetic judgments, called a posteriori, in being 'independent' of experience. Independence of experience is the defining characteristic of a priori in Kant's philosophy. This characteristic does not mean the same thing in the contexts of, say, the universal principle of causation and the supreme principle of morality, i.e., the synthetic a priori judgments of the first and the second 'critiques'. The judgment 'every event must have a cause' is not independent of experience in the sense that experience is irrelevant to its truth. The judgment will be rejected if a single instance of events, which has no cause, is recognised. But this is not the case with the principles of morality. A judgment which states what we ought or ought not to do remains unaffected by experience in the sense that experience is quite irrelevant to its validity. The principle that 'we ought to speak the truth', for example, may be valid even if nobody in fact speaks the truth.

However, this notion of independence is difficult to understand. We can not determine this 'independence' of a synthetic a priori judgment by a law of logic or by experience. It is only an analytic proposition, holds Kant, which can be logically independent of experience. Again, the question of determining this independence by

experience does not arise for the simple reason that in that case the judgment will cease to be independent of experience.

Perhaps, Kant was aware that he might be misunderstood and so he gave us two marks of 'a priori', over and above a definition of it. These are necessity and universality. As Kant considers each one of them to be a sufficient and necessary mark of a priority, let us consider necessity only.

Are the universal law of causation, 'every event must have a cause' and the categorical Imperative necessary, i.e., 'a priori' in the same sense? This question arises because Kant himself has recognised, at least, three different kinds of necessity - logical, transcendental and unconditional, logical necessity is the necessity which can be explained with reference to the logical laws. It is only the analytic propositions which have this kind of necessity. The synthetic a priori judgments of the first 'critique' have only transcendental necessity. Their necessity consists in the fact that we must recognise them if we want to have experience that we actually have. This necessity is conditional, since its recognition depends upon the condition that human beings desire for experience. It is hypothetical in nature. This necessity is not intrinsic

but extrinsic¹⁹. It does not come up from the necessities of thought, for it is not necessary that a human being must desire for experience.

But the categorical Imperative is necessary in a different sense. To distinguish this necessity from the transcendental one Kant makes a clear distinction between hypothetical imperatives, on the one hand, and the categorical Imperative, on the other. The necessity of the Categorical Imperative does not refer to our private desires and inclinations or any ends to be achieved, for in that case it will be hypothetical in character. It is not dependent on any external factor but upon the concept of man as such. Just from the rationality of a man it can be shown, Kant holds, that he will obey the categorical imperative. Rational and moral behaviours are identical. So this necessity is intrinsic and unconditional. It is this characteristic of 'unconditionality' which makes the categorical imperative a priori or independent of experience. As the universal law of causation and the categorical imperative are not a priori or independent of experience in the same sense, the expression 'synthetic a priori' does not mean exactly the same thing in all its occurrences in Kant's philosophy.

[VII]

Each of Kant's three 'critiques' is concerned with a different cognitive faculty, and each cognitive faculty has some a priori principles of its own. The first 'critique' deals with understanding, the second with Reason and the third with Judgment. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments are a priori principles of these cognitive faculties. The synthetic a priori judgments of all the three 'critiques' of Kant can not be said to mean exactly the same thing, for there is a considerable difference in the status and implications of these a priori principles. Let us consider, for example, the a priori principles of the understanding and reason. Kant holds that human understanding has to become operative if experience, i.e., perceptual knowledge, is to be possible. Knowledge is not just a passive manifestation of the given. The objects of knowledge are not given, they are yet to be made possible by the understanding. Understanding, Kant asserts, makes nature. In this respect Kant anticipates the stand of the Gestalt Psychologists who hold that the objects of perception are actively organised by the mind in accordance with some organising principles. The objective validity of these principles of the understanding is guaranteed by the fact that we can not have any object of knowledge without them. Each principle states a condition of the possibility

[VII]

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just a rule or principle which organises the particular but is such that it 'actually produces the particulars which are judged to be instances of the universal rule'. A particular moral action, so Kant believes, is fully determined by the universal moral concepts. The status of the synthetic a priori moral judgments, thus, gets differentiated from the status of those of the first or the third 'critique'. If we are allowed to say as Kant has really said, that a synthetic a priori moral judgment expresses a condition or test of a moral principle and indirectly of a moral action, we should say that it expresses not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition thereof. Thus the synthetic a priori moral judgment implies that our intellect has a 'real use' which is opposed by Kant in the first 'critique'.

There is another difference in implication. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments of the first 'critique' do not require us to cross the limit of the phenomenal world, they rather imply that we are confined within the world of appearance. They state conditions not of objects as they are, but of objects in space and time. Though Kant recognises the synthetic a priori judgments, like, 'every event must have a cause' to be objective, they are objective only in the epistemological sense and not in the ontological sense of the term. They are objectively valid since we

must take them for granted if we are to know physical objects.

The synthetic a priori judgment of the second 'critique', the categorical imperative, on the other hand, requires us to go beyond this world of appearance. The first formulation of the categorical imperative states ; 'Act on that maxim whereby you can will it to be a universal law'. It is quite clear that we can apply such a test only if we presuppose that a man is morally free. It is also clear that a self which is to be regarded as free to choose between alternative courses of action must be distinguished from a self which, like other phenomenal events, is conceived to be governed by causal laws. This free self, the autonomous self of Kant's moral theory, falls in the noumenal realm, and it can not be an object of theoretical knowledge. Thus it is unpalusible that the synthetic a priori judgments of Kant's three 'critiques' having considerable differences in status and implications among themselves, are 'synthetic a priori' in exactly the same sense.

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