

CHAPTER IV

CERTAIN TYPES OF PERCEPTION

4.1. Nyāya View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

According to the Nyāya, in one way perception is of two kinds viz. (a) ordinary perception or Laukika Pratyakṣa and (b) extra-ordinary perception or alaukika Pratyakṣa. Ordinary perception, again, is of two types, viz. (i) determinate perception and (ii) indeterminate perception. Here, we will discuss these divisions.

Determinate perception is just opposite to indeterminate perception i.e., it possesses determinate character and it is relational¹. Perception generally is the perception of definite object (Viśiṣṭadravya Pratyakṣa). Substantives, attributes and substantives as characterised by attributes these three make qualified cognition. The perception which is of the nature of Viśiṣṭajñāna

(relational perceptual cognition) is called determinate perception.

Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is such perception in which the object does not possess any determinate character or Prakāra². In it though there is substantives and attributes, yet we cannot understand or know, this is substantive or this is attribute. Here, we have no relational cognition.

From above discussion we find the difference between determinate perception and indeterminate perception. The Naiyāyikas have pointed out that without the admission of indeterminate perception, determinate perception i.e. definite perception, cannot be possible because the cause of relational cognition of the qualified (Viśiṣṭajñāna) is the cognition of qualifying attributes (Viśeṣjñāna).

According to the Naiyāyikas, indeterminate cognition is not perceived retrospectively. It is inferential. The manifestation of objects of cognition in Vyavasāya-jñāna or determinate cognition are the same as those in the case of non-relational perception. According to Nyāya view, indeterminate perception cannot be known by mental perception or by anuvyavasāya. It can only be known by inference. First, there is indeterminate perception and then determinate perception. Consider, for example, a case of perceptual cognition — 'This is pot'. When I said, 'I am seeing a

pot' — which is characterised by potness, I may be questioned, what are you perceiving ? - For answering this question, I am to take the help of mental perception or anuvyavasāya (in the sense of retrospection).

The perception of Pot possessing Potness (Ghatatva viśiṣṭa ghata) is called determinate perception. But that perception in which objects denoted normally by nouns and adjectives have been manifested but the manifestation of the relation between the objects is absent, is called indeterminate perception. Determinate perception presupposes indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception comes first, it precedes. Determinate perception comes later, it follows. The awareness of Viśiṣṭa or being qualified by a quality presupposes the awareness separately of that which is qualified (object denoted by noun) and that which qualifies (object denoted by adjective). Without the perception of the object denoted by the adjective there cannot be Viśiṣṭa cognition or determinate cognition. The awareness of substantives and adjectives separately which is non-relational is called indeterminate perception. We can put the contention of the Naiyāyikas regarding this issue by saying that indeterminate perception is the first stage of cognition which can never be known directly (i.e. by perception). Yet it is admitted by them because of the fact that without it the very existence of the determinate perception is not possible.

Only of determinate cognition anuvyavasāya is possible but in respect of indeterminate cognition anuvyavasaya is not possible. In indeterminate cognition there is no substance — attribute relation. For this reason perception of indeterminate cognition, is not possible. As indeterminate perception does not involve any judgement, therefore, it is taken to be a case of pre-judgemental cognition. But determinate perception is judgemental cognition.

4.2. Advaita View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Like the Nyāya thinkers the Advaitins (non-dualists) also admit two kinds of perception, namely, determinate and indeterminate perception. According to them,

'vaiśistyavagāhijñāna (mediated by relational knowledge) is determinate perception. Samsargānavagāhi Jñāna (not mediated by relation) is called indeterminate perception.

Determinate perception is an immediate cognition that apprehends relation between terms (Samsarga-avagāhi jñānaṃ). Contrariwise, indeterminate perception is one which is not relational or discursive. It apprehends identity. There is similarity between the views of Nyāya and Advaita as to the definition or lakṣaṇa of determinate perception and indeterminate perception. But there is also difference between the two views regarding the instances of indeterminate perception.

Dharmarāja, the author of Vedānta-Paribhāṣā has explained indeterminate perception with the help of two instances, one of which is taken from ordinary life (Laukika) and the other from scripture (Śāstriya). 'This is that Devadatta' (So'yam Devadatta) is the example of indeterminate perception ^{(Laukika);} 'Thou art that' (Tattvamasi) is an instance of scriptural (Śāstriya) indeterminate perception. In 'this is that Devadatta' — 'that' indicates Devadatta whom I met previously and 'This' indicates the person Devadatta whom I am seeing here and now before me, same Devadatta continuing in existence from the past to the present. In 'Tattvamasi' we find a relation of non-difference (abheda Samvaddha) between 'Tat' and 'Tvam'. Hence, it may be asked how can it be an indeterminate perception? In reply to this, the Advaitins point out that 'abheda' (non-difference) is not really a 'Samvaddha' or relation requiring two relata. It is identity. Since identity or non-difference is no relation, perception of identity is indeterminate perception.

The Naiyāyikas have raised an objection against the examples of indeterminate perception as given above by pointing out that these are not examples of perceptual cognition but of verbal comprehension. The reason is that such cognition of identity does not arise from sense-object contact or operation of senses. Dharmarāja's answer to this objection is that there is no necessity that perceptual

cognition will always be due to sense-object contact. What is necessary in perception is that there should be identity between the subject of cognition, the object of cognition and the cognition . Some times senses function in bringing about this identity, sometimes not.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of perceptual cognition is due to anuvyavasāya or retrospection. To them, knowledge is not self-revealing but manifested by anuvyavasāya i.e. another piece of knowledge to which it becomes an object. The function of consciousness is to reveal its subject. It is Viṣaya-Prakāśa-svabhāva. It does not manifest itself but only its object. It cannot be an object to itself i.e. self-manifesting. It can only be the object of another cognition and be the object of that. That which is non-relational cannot be an object of anuvyavasāya because to be an object of anuvyavasāya is to be related; and as indeterminate perception is nonrelational, it cannot be known perceptually. Its knowledge is inferential. But the Advaitins hold that the knowledge of indeterminate perception is perceptual for knowledge is self-revealing. For the knowledge of it there is no need to postulate another cognition. The Nyāya thinkers hold that indeterminate knowledge is neither valid nor invalid. But the Advaitins do not subscribe to this view and point out its inconsistency.

There can be another objection against the Advaita theory and their examples of indeterminate perception. It may be said that the instances given ('This is that Devadatta'), (You are Brahman) are instances of apprehension of the relation between the meanings of words, and therefore, the cognition is cognition of relation and not of identity. The Advaita reply to this objection is that this is not so. It is not that the relation of the meaning of words always determine the sense of a sentence; because were it so, unintended relation would also be apprehended. What is conveyed by a sentence is its intention (Tātparya). The sentences in the examples are meant to convey identity or non-difference between Brahman and self or between Devadatta of the past and of the present. In these cases relation is not to be understood, for relation is not meant or intended. Thus, though there is relation between words, there is no relation in the sense intended. Therefore, these sentences exemplify non-relational nirvikalpaka cognition or indeterminate cognition.

Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is prearticulate cognition. But indeterminate perception, according to Advaita, is the cognition in which the distinction between the subject and object is lost as well as the distinction between sukha or pleasure and anubhava or knowledge is lost. Hence, from the Advaita point of view indeterminate perception is superior.

4.3. Viśiṣṭādvaita View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Rāmānujists and the Mādhva thinkers subscribe to similar views regarding determinate and indeterminate perception. Śribhāṣyakāra in his commentary holds the view that determinate perception apprehends the relation of dravya (substance) with guṇa (quality), Karma (action) etc. Indeterminate perception is also cognition of relation of particular attributes. It does not mean absence in knowledge of all attributes (sarvadharmarahita). No purely non-relational perception is possible. It is so because in every knowledge there is an assertion of a relation between the subject and predicate. For example, "this is red". Here, 'this' is subject, 'red' is the predicate which is asserted to be related to the subject. This predicate stands for an attribute which qualifies the object denoted by 'this'. Knowledge without predicate (Vidheyabhāva-sūnya) is an absurdity. But it is to be remembered that in indeterminate perception all attributes are not known, but there may be manifestation of particular attributes³. The first perception of an object is indeterminate perception and its perception at subsequent times when we perceive it is called determinate perception. "What is called nirvikalpaka is the cognition of the first individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. The savikalpaka is the cognition of the second (third and so on) individual qualified by its attributes, configuration,

etc. grasped with retrospection"⁴. "What was indefinite and devoid of specific judgement in the nirvikalpaka perception becomes definite and determinate in the Savikalpaka perception"⁵.

According to the Rāmānujists, all knowledge is rational and is expressed in the form of "This is that". They refute the indeterminate perception of the Advaita-Vedāntins and Naiyāyikas. Śāṅkara, the Advaitin, has admitted that determinate perception has empirical validity. This has been rejected by the Rāmānujists and they hold that determinate perception has metaphysical validity. Thus we find that Rāmānujists' view differs from Nyāya and Advaita views.

4.4. Sāṅkhya View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Vācaspati Mīśra divides perception into two classes viz. (i) indeterminate perception and (ii) determinate perception. This division shows that Vācaspati Mīśra follows the Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas. According to him, ālocanā-jñāna or the primitive cognition from sense-object-contact is indeterminate perception. On the other hand, determinate perception is due to the perception of manas or mind. "According to Vācaspati, buddhi comes into touch with external objects through the senses. At first moment of the contact there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particular features of the object are not noticed,

and we have only indeterminate perception. At the second moment, through the exercise of mental analysis (Vikalpa) and synthesis (saṅkalpa), the object is perceived as possessing, a definite nature and we have determinate perception"⁶. In this connection, it be noted that Vācaspati holds that an object is determined by manas. Like the Tārkikas and Mimānsakas, Sāṅkhya also admits the determinate and indeterminate as an appropriate division of perceptual cognition. The Sāṅkhya like Nyāya thinks that indeterminate perception is the root of determinate perception.

In Sāṅkhyatattvā-Kaumadi it has been said that external Jñānendriyas (organs of knowledge) give us at first indeterminate perception; but determinate perception is a product of manas or mind. But Sāṅkhya is silent on the point whether indeterminate perception is pramā or apramā or cognition other than pramā or apramā. The example which sāṅkhya gives carries the suggestion that sāṅkhya is in this respect subscribing to the contention of the Mimānsakas as opposed to the contention of the Naiyāyikas. That is, they with the Mimānsakas accept indeterminate perception as the psychological antecedent to determinate perception. For example, at the first moment the visual apprehension of the tree appears as greenish object or form and in the next moment it appears as a banian tree with trunk, branches and providing shade beneath from the sun.

4.5. Mimānsakas View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

According to the Buddhists, there can be no determinate perception ; all valid perception are indeterminate perception. Though the Advaitins admit both determinate and indeterminate perception, yet they opine that by indeterminate perception alone we can have the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. We can never get the knowledge of it by means of determinate perception because Reality is one (non-dual). The grammarian e.g., Bhaṭṭhari, recognizes only determinate perception. According to him, not only is perception determinate but all forms of knowledge are determinate also as all of them involve verbalization. "There is no cognition in the world, which is not accompanied by words; all cognitions are, as it were, interpenetrated by words"⁷. No knowledge can be attained without apprehension of the relation between word and its meaning. Hence, all perceptions being necessarily verbalized are determinate. Indeterminate cognition which is non-relational is a mere figment of the imagination.

Like the Naiyāyikas, the Mimānsakas admit two stages of perception, namely, (a) determinate perception and (b) indeterminate perception⁸. We have found that the grammarians do not admit indeterminate perception but Kumāṛila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school, and Prabhākara

point out that to deny indeterminate perception is to deny a well established fact. The experience that we get at the first moment is non-relational, it is bare sensation. But it is not valueless because predicative consciousness can only be possible by means of indeterminate perception. Determinate perception, according to them, is a relational and articulated form of perception. This means that in determinate perception the different parts of the object are revealed as related giving us the object as one object. Indeterminate perception is prior stage to determinate perception.

The Mimāṃsakas hold that the indeterminate perception is the perception of infants, dumb persons and animals and is produced by the object⁹. On the ground of direct apprehension indeterminate perception is considered by the Mimāṃsakas as Pramā or veridical perception although it is incommunicable being unverbalisable. Here we find a similarity with the view of William James who characterised the perception of an infant as a "blooming, buzzing confusion", i.e., the perception of the infants are not determined by the representative elements. According to Kumāṛila, in indeterminate perception neither particularity nor Universality is present to consciousness. The Mimāṃsakas like Sāṅkhya philosophers regard indeterminate perception as "ālocana jñāna" or pure presentative cognition untainted by representative element. It is inarticulate

cognition. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara are of opinion that determinate perception is valid because its main cause, mukhyakāraṇa, is the subject-object intercourse which is aided by recollection and this recollection is its auxiliary causes (Sahakārikāraṇam).

According to Kumārila, both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are valid. Indeterminate perception is direct apprehension. It is valid because it is direct and immediate. Prabhākara also holds that indeterminate perception is valid because it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection. Moreover, the validity of indeterminate perception is proved by self-awareness.

As regards indeterminate perception of the Bhāṭṭas, says A.B.Keith, "Kumarila happily expresses the primitive form of perceptions as bare observation (Ālocanā) pertaining to the object pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that a new born child has of its environment. (The savikalpaka pratyaksa adding afterwards, or rather breaking up the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa into substance, class, quality, motion as distinct from the thing moving, name etc.)"¹⁰.

4.6. Jaina View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

The Jainas have admitted only determinate perception and rejected indeterminate perception and they hold the view that perception is clear or spasta. "The Jaina thinks that all knowledge including perceptual knowledge is of a determinate nature which is opposed to doubt. The Buddhists hypothesis of indeterminate cognition is not supported by experience. Only doubt can be indeterminate"¹¹.

The Jainas reject indeterminate perception on the following grounds :

First, indeterminate perception cannot be vaisistha-avaḡāhi i.e. cannot determine the nature of its object as endowed with its specific qualities. Hence, indeterminate perception is not clear perception and as such they have demurred to admit indeterminate perception as pratyakṣa or perception. Secondly, it cannot unlike a valid determinate cognition apprehend itself (Sva-agrāhaka). Thirdly, it cannot apprehend its objects definitely, i.e. it is not a distinct cognition.

As by 'perception' the Jainas understand definite, clear and distinct perception and as indeterminate perception does not have such characteristics, therefore, they are not ready to accept indeterminate perception as one of the stages of perception. It may not be out of place here

to mention that the view of the Jainas regarding the non-acceptance of indeterminate perception reminds us by way of contrast the Buddhists' view to the effect that only the indeterminate perception is valid and determinate perception is false i.e. the Jainas views regarding indeterminate perception is just reverse of the Buddha view. The Jainas are of opinion that indeterminate perception which is devoid of all relations of things and qualities is a psychological myth.

Anyway the question is : can we deny indeterminate perception fully ? Our answer will be in the negative. If it be so, the position of the Jainas will not be acceptable. In this connection, I am quoting following lines after Nyāya : "If indeterminate perception (Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa) is denied, and only determinate perception (Savikalpaka) is accepted, such an assumption would involve an ad infinitum regress; for we know that determinate perception is analysed into the knowledge of the thing itself and the knowledge of its attributes; the knowledge of the thing itself and its attributes is therefore a necessary preliminary to determinate perception. First we know the Visēya as unconnected with its Visēsanas then the Visēsanas themselves, and then only by synthesizing these impressions we have determinate perception"¹².

4.7. The Bauddha View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

The Bauddha view as to determinate perception and indeterminate perception is just opposite to Mādhva and Rāmānuja where we find the acceptance of determinate perception. The Buddhists admit only indeterminate perception and demur to assert the existence of determinate perception. "Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of sense, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant of reality and is absolutely devoid of the constructions of the understanding"¹³. The Buddhists are of opinion that there is no determinate perception. They point out that the determinate perception is neither valid nor perceptual because determinate perception is presentative-representative process involving determinations and, therefore, falsification. According to the Buddhists, true perception must be without interpretation. Whenever there is any intervention of thought, there cannot be perception. Indeterminate perception, according to the Buddhists, is only form of valid cognition. The Buddhists, e.g., Dharmakirti, Dinnāga, Vasubandhu and others do not accept determinate perception. On the contrary, they point out that name (Naming) Universal (Jāti), quality (guṇa), action (Kriyā), etc. are imaginal and they are of the nature of intellectual game. Indeterminate perception is free from imagination and as such it is alone real. The

Buddhists advocated the theory of momentariness (Kṣaṇa-bhangurvāda) according to which everything of this universe is transitory and does not exist for more moments than one. Non-imaginational cognition becomes possible in the case of momentary object grasped by the sense-organ. The acceptance of indeterminate perception of the Buddhists follows from their theory of momentariness.

To them, without indeterminate perception it is not possible to know the momentary svalakṣaṇa. It (momentary Svalakṣaṇa) can be known by means of indeterminate perception alone. Hence, they admit indeterminate perception alone as valid cognition and they deny determinate perception on the ground that determinate perception involves fictitious images. "Thus for the Buddhists the Nirvikalpa^o Pratyakṣa without any admixture of the operation of thought upon it, was valid, as it alone gave an intuitive insight into the original flux, while the Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa giving us precepts of static or solid things was regarded as invalid"¹⁴.

4.8. Mādhva View of Determinate Perception and Indeterminate Perception

That indeterminate perception is non-relational and determinate perception is relational has not been accepted as true by Rāmānuja and Mādhva thinkers. According to them,

every perception is relational. Indeterminate perception which is called non-relational, is chimerical according to these philosophers. Vikalpa or conceptual construct, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is of eight kinds, namely, dravya (substance) Guṇa, (quality), Karma (action), Jāti (Universality), Nāma (identification by naming), Viśeṣa (Particularity), Samavāya (inherence) and abhāva (non-existence). These eight kinds of Vikalpa or conceptual construct having object counterparts show that there are eight kinds of determinate perception. The Mādhva thinkers do not admit Viśeṣa (Particularity) and Sāmavāya (inherence) as separate categories due to absence of cogent reasons. Hence, Viśeṣa and Samavāya as Vikalpa cannot be taken for granted as true. The nāma-Vikalpa and abhāva-Vikalpa cannot be possible through a sudden contact of eyes with the object of knowledge. Dravya Vikalpa, Guṇa-Vikalpa, jāti-Vikalpa and karma-Vikalpa are possible after the direct contact with the object. So, no perception can be regarded as the indeterminate perception. All perceptions are relational in nature¹⁵. In this way the Mādhva thinkers have shown that every perception is determinate cognition (viśeṣabodha) and indeterminate perception is a myth. According to the Mādhvas, determinate perception is valid as and when it apprehends its object as it really is in the spatio-temporal order.

4.9. A Critical Note on Indeterminate Perception

From the views of different thinkers considered so far it is clear that philosophers are at variance as to the nature or types of perception. There are some who admit only indeterminate perception, there are others who admit determinate perception only. Again, there are some who admit both determinate and indeterminate perception. We shall not at this stage discuss who is right. The discussion will be confined to the attempt to have a clear and distinct idea of indeterminate perception.

Presuming two stages of perception we can raise some questions. First, whether indeterminate perception is valid or invalid. As to the question, no unanimous conclusion is reached. The Nyāya philosophy holds the view that indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid¹⁶. Indeterminate perception having neither the Guṇa or uncommon cause of valid specific cognition nor the doṣa or uncommon cause of invalid specific cognition is other than both valid and invalid cognition. On the other hand, the Buddhists reject the determinate perception and regard indeterminate perception as the valid form of perception. They advocate the theory of momentariness which is connected with their theory of indeterminate perception. Thus, we find that there is a difference of opinion as to the validity of indeterminate perception. The Advaitins maintain that the

Brahman can be known by indeterminate perception. This indeterminate perception is direct and immediate and is valid. Hence, the views of the Naiyāyikas are also different from the Advaitins. Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is not pramā because it is non-relational. Moreover, it is not apramā because valid perceptual cognition presupposes indeterminate perception. Hence, it is neither valid nor invalid. Here, we find that Nyāya logic regarding this issue does not subscribe to truth-falsity dichotomy.

Indeterminate perception, according to Mimāṃsakas, is direct and immediate and transforms itself into determinate perception. So indeterminate perception is valid. Therefore, both indeterminate and determinate perception are valid. This goes against the view of Nyāya thinkers, according to whom, indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid. But it is to be remembered that Nyāya position is well argued. At the level of bare sensation the question of validity and invalidity does not arise.

Secondly, another interesting question is : Is indeterminate perception a psychological antecedent or a logical one of determinate perception ? It seems that according to the Nyāya, indeterminate perception is the logical antecedent of determinate perception - it is not psychological antecedent. This problem arises for those who admit the

existence of both the indeterminate perception and determinate perception. This question does not arise where only one form of perception is admitted. Now (a) what is psychological antecedent ? and (b) what is logical antecedent ? Indeterminate perception can never be the object of retrospection. That is, it can never be an object of another cognition and therefore is incapable of being taken as psychological antecedent. That of which there is no retrospection cannot be a psychological antecedent. Indeterminate perception is a logical antecedent because whenever there is determinate perception there must be indeterminate perception preceding it. Let us mention the views of later Nyāya thinkers who follow Gaṅgeśa. "With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of more predication without ^{any} association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage"^{16a}.

Thirdly, how is indeterminate perception known ? In order to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding this question we should cite the views of the Bauddha, Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita philosophers.

The Buddhists try to prove the existence of indeterminate perception with the help of kṣaṇabhanguravāda or

momentariness and they deny the validity of determinate perception. They maintain that indeterminate perception is atindriya or supra-sensible. The Nyāya thinkers admit indeterminate perception; but they hold the view that this type of perception can never be known directly like determinate perception. Then, how can we know it? In reply to this question Naiyāyikas maintain that the existence of this perception can be known inferentially. Without indeterminate perception there can be no determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is prior to a determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is bare sensation, it is vague and an undifferentiated form of perception. It is beyond the range of retrospection. According to Nyāya and the Bauddha logicians, knowledge of knowledge is due to retrospection. Knowledge is not self-revealed but is revealed by retrospection. Indeterminate perception is neither retrospective cognition nor an object of it. Hence, indeterminate perception is not perceived. In this sense it is supra-sensible. The Advaitins hold the view that indeterminate cognition can never be perceived as an object. According to the Advaitins, Brahman as consciousness, existence, bliss can only be known by indeterminate perception. If indeterminate cognition is not direct apprehension, Brahman can never be perceived. Hence, indeterminate cognition is perception. In this connection, the Advaitin uses the simile of light. Light reveals the object as well

as itself being self-luminous. Similarly Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness reveals the object of knowledge and itself. Even when there is no object, light reveals itself as self-luminous.

Fourthly, whether indeterminate perception differs in quality or in quantity from determinate perception. This Question brings us to the Nyāya and Mimāṃsā. The Nyāya holds the view that indeterminate perception differs from determinate perception in quality but not in quantity. Determinate perception is relational whereas indeterminate perception is not so. This can easily show that the difference between the two is the difference of quality. Indeterminate perception, according to Mimāṃsakas, is inarticulate perception. It is bare sensation and is less clear while determinate perception is vivid perception. This shows that one is less clear and another is more clear, "... , according to the Mimāṃsakas, the difference between savikalpa and Nirvikalpa is a difference of degree rather than of kind, the nirvikalpa being less differentiated, less articulate than our sabikalpa experience"¹⁷. From this we can say that indeterminate perception and determinate perception differ in quantity. In this context, a few relevant lines from Hume's Enquiry are quoted :

"... we may divide all the perceptions of the mind

into two classes of species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others, I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call them impressions, employing that word in a sense different somewhat from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel or love or hate or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of these sensations or movements above mentioned¹⁸.

The distinction between impression and idea in short can be said to be the distinction between less vivacity and more vivacity. Similarly, the distinction between determinate perception and indeterminate perception of the Mimānsakas is the distinction between more vivacity and less vivacity. From the above discussion, we find that there is a point of difference between Naiyāyikas and the Mimānsakas regarding indeterminate perception.

Fifthly, whether indeterminate perception reveals the reality or not. This question leads us to think whether

reality is relational or not. If the reality is non-relational then indeterminate perception reveals the reality, otherwise not. The Advaitins subscribe to the view that the indeterminate perception reveals the reality, Brahman is the highest reality and Brahman is indeterminate and non-relational. From this we can find that to them, reality is non-relational. We have found that reality which is non-relational can be known by indeterminate perception, i.e. indeterminate perception reveals the reality. On the other hand, the Buddhists hold the view that there is no determinate perception, and indeterminate perception alone is real. To them, reality which is changable can only be known by indeterminate perception. So we can find that both the Advaitins and Buddhists are of the opinion that indeterminate perception reveals the reality. But there is a point of difference between Advaita and Bauddha. Now, as opponents' view we can cite the views of thinkers of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Both the schools admit both the stages of perception i.e. indeterminate and determinate perception. They have pointed out as is shown in the previous discussion that determinate perception is dependent on indeterminate perception and without indeterminate perception there cannot be determinate perception. From this it can be said that indeterminate perception helps us to know the reality but it cannot alone reveal reality. In conclusion, we can say that indeterminate perception helps us to reveal reality but it cannot reveal it by its own activity alone as it is

bare sensation.

Sixthly, it seems that the distinction between indeterminate & determinate perception mentioned by the Indian philosophers is parallel to Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance which is known directly or immediately and knowledge by description which is indirect. Now the question is : can it be so ? In knowledge by acquaintance the object is directly apprehended and can only be pointed out ostensively but cannot be verbally articulated. In knowledge by description the object of knowledge is apprehended in terms of a description although the description involved may be incomplete description and also the object is capable of being uniquely described, e.g "the first Lady Prime Minister of India". However, the parallel is only a rough parallel and one to one correspondence between indeterminate perception and knowledge by acquaintance on the one hand and determinate perception and knowledge by description on the other hand should not be sought. The main reason for this absence of one to one correspondence between members of each of the above pairs is that Russellian Philosophy accepts while Indian Philosophy does not, the distinction between immediate knowledge and discursive knowledge and also the distinction between knowledge based on deduction and knowledge based on Induction. For Russellian philosophy the above distinctions are essential and cannot be dispensed with while Indian

philosophy simply ignores this distinction. So the parallel should not be pressed further.

Seventhly, can we say that the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception roughly parallels the distinction between non-propositional and propositional knowledge? In a sense we answer the question in affirmative. For both indeterminate perception and non-propositional knowledge do not involve linguistic articulation. But determinate perception and propositional knowledge from the nature of the case must necessarily involve verbal articulation. Otherwise they are nothing. This justifies our proposal to consider these two distinctions as parallel.

Finally, the question is; does the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception coincide with the Western 'sensing' and 'perceiving'? We believe that is to be answered in the negative. For sensing and perceiving are contingently related, there is no mustness between sensing and perceiving so that sensing must develop into perceiving. Sensing that something is, does not necessarily develop into perceiving what that something is. Contraiwise, indeterminate perception of that it is must develop necessarily into the determinate perception of what it is. Hence, our denial. For example, if I perceive in an indeterminate way something before me without being capable of knowing clearly and distinctly what it is that is before

me, then my indeterminate perception of bare indistinct existence of something must develop into the determinate perception of something clear and distinct having qualities and states, for example, a something having all the characteristics of the bovine species.

4.10. Meaning of Extra-Ordinary Perception and Its Division

Non-eternal or anitya perception is of two kinds, namely, ordinary and extra-ordinary. Ordinary perception is of two kinds. viz. Sabikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa. Extra-ordinary perception, according to Nyāya, is of three kinds, namely, (a) Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or perception of classes. (b) Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or complication and (c) Yogaja pratyakṣa or intuitive perception. Here, we shall take up the discussion on extra-ordinary perception and its division. This extra-ordinary perception has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas. The Cārvākas and Mimāṃsakas have rejected this type of perception admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Moreover, the Advaitins do not accept the view of Nyāya.

Perception, according to Nyāya, is due to sense-object contact. This contact is of six kinds, namely (i) conjunction (Samyoga) (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (Samyukta Samavāya) (iii) inherence in what inheres in a

thing which is conjoined (Samyukta samaveta samavāya) (iv) inherence (samavāya) (v) inherence in what inheres (Samaveta samavāya) and (vi) the relation of character and characterised (Viśeṣaṇa-Viśeṣyābhāva). These six types of contacts are laukika sannikarṣa or ordinary contact. The perception which is due to alaukika Sannikarṣa or extra-ordinary contact is called alaukika pratyakṣa or extra-ordinary perception. Extra-Ordinary perception is of three kinds which we have already mentioned above. Now, we shall deal with the different kinds of such extra-ordinary perception separately.

Though some Indian thinkers admit extra-ordinary perception, e.g. Naiyāyikas. Nevertheless, there are some thinkers who do not admit such type of perception. However, I like to quote the following : "According to some a non-sensuous perception is one which involves no sense-organ. According to others it is one which involves a sense-organ and yet is non-sensuous as the contact between the object and the sense-organ is extra-ordinary or subjective. Now, as against the first view the Bhattas hold that an experience that does not involve use of a sense-organ is no perception at all. And as against the second view they hold that the contact spoken of is unintelligible. The contact that obtains between a sense-organ and its object is always ordinary and never extra-ordinary. The alleged cases involving extra-ordinary contact are cases either of inference or of Phantasy"¹⁹.

4.11. Jñāna-Laksana Pratyakṣa (Complication)

When a sense-feature which is normally picked up by one sense, is captured by another sense resulting in a perception of that captured sense-feature, it is called Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa or complication. The contact which is due to traces of previous knowledge is called Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. We hope to make the nature of this type of cognition clear by means of an example. When we see a piece of sandalwood, we at once perceive the fragrance of the sandalwood virtually from a distance. This knowledge is not inferential knowledge. This is a kind of perception which is known as jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. Here, the present contact is due to previous knowledge. In the past we saw and smelt the sandalwood and got fragrance from it. Now, if only knowledge (Jñānatva) is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa then the alaukika pratyakṣa would be possible through any contact with any individual object. But this is not the fact. Here, automatic subjective recollection of past experience is required for the contact. Hence, we cannot say that every knowledge is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. The contact is not normal or laukika.

Through a proper explanation of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa, we find that this alaukika pratyakṣa is due to saṃskāra or disposition and sense-organ or indriya-janya. Knowledge due to sense-organ is called pratyakṣa and knowledge due to

samskara or disposition is called smṛiti or memory. In jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa we find it is a combination of the two. Hence, the question comes to our mind : Is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa memory (smṛiti) or is it perception (pratyakṣa) ? If this knowledge is primarily due to sense-contact then it will be regarded as pratyakṣa. Memory knowledge is due to activity of disposition and its object is the past object. In memory knowledge where the object does not indicate the past object but indicate the object of the present then it will be called pratyakṣa. Though jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is due to disposition yet it is found that it does not refer to its object as past but the object of the present. It is found that in the jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa disposition acts as one of the generative conditions.

In the Western philosophy we find that Stout, Ward and Alexander admit complication as a factor in perception. We find a similarity between the views of Naiyāyikas and that of Alexander etc. as to the explanation of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or complication. Alexander says that complication is mere a relation of togetherness between the apprehended and apprehending.

It is to be remembered that by means of such perception we can perhaps explain the fact of illusion e.g. snake-rope illusion. There is rope but not the snake. Here the perceiver due to darkness could not recognize the rope but due to similarity between rope and snake the perceiver

perceives snake in place of rope by means of recollection. It disappears after a while. Hence, we say that only by this alaukika pratyakṣa illusory perception becomes possible.

The opponent may raise a question against jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa pointing out that both cognitions establish a relation. Hence, it is an unnecessary multiplication of admitting two kinds of extra-ordinary perception than is necessary. Apparently it seems that there is no difference between the two. We contend, however, that there is difference between the two. The main difference between the two in our opinion is this that in sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa we get the knowledge of all the members of a class in a generic aspect while in jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the agent acquires the knowledge of an object in its specificity by means of a sense-organ which is not ordinarily a fit sense-organ for making that sensuous apprehension possible.

The Advaitins hold the view that jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is not at all a perception but a kind of inference. Such type of perception dismisses the distinction between perception and inference. Besides, can this type of extra-ordinary perception explain illusory object satisfactorily? Ordinary perception involving sensation required the contact of the object with only one of the different types of sense-organs which is fit to come in contact with it.

For example, visual perception which involves object which is visual sensation, requires 'eye' as the sense-organ which alone is fit to come in contact with object of visual perception. Object which is different from the particular type which is fit for this sense-organ is not grasped by the particular sense and no sensuous knowledge of that type is generated. For example, 'ear' cannot see 'colour' nor 'eye' can hear 'sound'. But if we admit that at least in some cases one type of sense-organ can perceive object which is fit for another type of sense-organ, we are incapable of supplying good reasons for the view that ordinarily a particular type of sense-organ will apprehend only that object which is fit for that particular type of sense-organ.

4.12. Sāmānya-Lakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa (Perception of Classes)

Whenever we perceive an individual of a species by sense-organ, at once we also perceive the generic character (Jāti) of that individual by that sense-organ. As we perceive the class-character (Jāti) we can get perceptual cognition of other individuals generically belonging or coming under that class-character (Jāti). Sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception is called the perception of the universal or jāti. The knowledge of universality brings the perceptient in contact with the individuals belonging to that universality. We cannot perceive all the individuals

through the sense-organs; but they are perceived indirectly through the knowledge of generic character. For example, we can cite this : whenever we perceive a cow, we perceive all the cows generically as coming under cowness and being determined by it. The perception of universal cow is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or perception of class.

Now, we face a question, i.e. why do we admit such a type of perception ? The Naiyāyikas have put forward various arguments in favour of this type of perception. First, without admitting this kind of perception we can never pass to the general conclusion. It is admitted for enabling us to explain the perceiving of all the spatial and temporal perception of all smokes through the perception of smoke of a particular place. Let me make the point clear with the following inference.

All men are rational

$$\begin{array}{c} X \text{ is a man} \\ \hline \therefore X \text{ is rational} \end{array}$$

Here, in the major premise we can find a relation between 'men and 'rational'. How can we establish a general relation between referents of this two terms of the major premise ? In our experience we can have the perception of particular man and his rationality. Hence, in order to establish the relation between the referents of the two

terms of universal proposition, we have to admit sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. Secondly, we accept this type of extra-ordinary perception because by this perception we can differentiate one thing from another thing as belonging to different classes. There is difference between 'man' and 'cow', i.e. 'man is not cow'. How can we differentiate between the two ? we differentiate between the two by means of class-character, namely, 'manhood' and 'cowhood'. 'Manhood' and 'cowhood' can be perceived by this sāmānyalakṣaṇa^{na} pratyakṣa. So we are to admit such type of extra-ordinary perception.

The advaitins have raised objections against sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. They hold the view that inference is possible even without the knowledge of all individuals of a class and as such there is no need of sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa to perceive all the individuals. Moreover, absence of class-character in an object or a thing does not necessarily presuppose the immediate knowledge of all things or objects. It is sufficient if we know the specific class-character of the thing or object and this can be known by means of perception of particular thing or object in its general aspect and as such Nyāya view is not acceptable to the Advaitins.

In ordinary perception the perceiver and the perceived object are situated at a particular space and

time. But in sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the object of perception being a sāmānya, it is situated in all the areas of space and all moments of time where and when its instances are situated whereas the perceiver is situated only at a particular area of space and time. Naturally the question arises : how the perceiver without leaving the particular area of space and time which he occupies, can come in contact with all the objects—past, present, and future ? To say that it is extra-ordinary or alaukika is to explain it away and not to explain it.

4.13. Yogaja Pratyakṣa (Intuitive Perception)

Every system of Indian Philosophy except Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsaka admits yogaja pratyakṣa. Let us first take the meaning of yogaja pratyakṣa. The Yogins or mystic by means of Yogābhyāsa acquire the extra-ordinary power by means of which they can perceive the distant objects in space and time which we can never perceive ordinarily. The perception of the Yogins by means of meditation is called Yogaja pratyakṣa. The Yogins by means of their intuitive powers can perceive the objects of past, present and future and also the objects of distant land and of different size. The mind of the Yogins are free from all veils and impurities and limitations of sense. Their mind is purified and as such perceive the objects which are subtle, hidden etc.

The perception of the Yogins is like the divine perception. But there is significant difference between perception of the Yogins and divine perception. Divine perception is eternal but the perception of the Yogins are non-eternal.

Yogaja Pratyakṣa is of two kinds, namely, (a) Yukta and (b) Yunjān. In the case of Yukta Yogins extra-ordinary perception is always possible but in the case of Yunjān Yogins extra-ordinary perception is not always possible, they can perceive in the extra-ordinary way by means of meditation.

In short it can be said that yogic perception is the perception directly through the mind without any mediation of external sense-organs which are limited by space and time in their capacity to come in contact with the object. Like sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa and jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the existence of Yogaja pratyakṣa has been gainsaid by the Mimānsakas. The Mimānsakas pointed out that the Yogic perception is nothing but the concentration of mind towards object. This mystic perception, according to them, is nothing but memory. But memory is not vivid like perception. Hence, they have drawn the conclusion that Yogic perception is non-existent like Sky-Lotus.

We may, however, say that Yogic perception is a function of concentration of mind and this concentration leads the Yogins to perceive such things which are not

present before their sense-organs. In the Bauddha Philosophy we find the admission of the existence of Yogic perception. The Buddhists hold the view that Yogic perception is most distinct. It is bereft of mental constructs or kalpanā. Though the Buddhists do not admit the existence of God and permanent self and permanent world yet they believe in yogic perception and to them this perception is valid. In jaina Philosophy there is admission of such type of perception because they believe in the possibility of self's perception independently of sense-organs.

According to the Mimānsakas, the yogis have not perception of supra-sensible objects because the yogis are like us.

The sense-organs of the yogis cannot operate on supra-sensible objects as they are like our sense-organ. Moreover, according to Mimānsakas, in perception the object of the perception must always be existent, i.e. present to the sense-organ without which perception cannot be possible at all. Perception to the Mimānsakas, is due to contact or Sannikarṣa that obtains between present object and sense. Although the yogis possess extra-ordinary power, yet yogic perception is not possible because in it the object is not present before the sense-organ and, therefore, is not in contact with it, and, therefore, the basic condition of

perception, namely, sense-object contact is lacking in the case of yogaja pratyakṣa. We may not accept the view of the Mimāṃsakas regarding this issue. But one thing is clear, i.e. there is possibility in Yogaja pratyakṣa to be false and this can never be denied. It is undeniable that yogaja pratyakṣa is fallible, for adherents of different systems of Indian Philosophy point out that they have true knowledge of reality which is known by means of intuitive capacity. There is diverse opinions amongst the philosophers as to the knowledge of reality. Every intuitive knowledge is not valid and cannot give us the knowledge of reality and this points out that Yogaja pratyakṣa may be false.

1.14. A Note on Complication and Perception of Classes

Prof. N.V.Banerjee is of the opinion that both sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa & jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa being related to determinate perception are also related to indriya and object in the ordinary way, and, so, they cannot be regarded as instance of alaukika pratyakṣa or extra-ordinary perception. To quote him :

" jñanalaksana pratyakṣa, like samanyalakṣana pratyakṣa, is organically related to some savikalpaka pratyakṣa or other and as such is laukika (normal) instead of being alaukika (supranormal)"²⁰.

Now the question arises : Is Dr. Banerjee's contention tenable ? We like to answer in the negative.

Firstly, nowhere in any one of the Nyāya texts it is stated that instances of alaukika pratyakṣa are bereft of the stages of Savikalpaka & Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. What the Nyaya stated is simply that the contact that obtains between object and the indriya is alaukika or extra-ordinary and not laukika or ordinary. Hence Dr. Banerjee's contention does not bear logical scrutiny.

Secondly, from the fact that a type of Pratyakṣa is related to determinate perception, it does not follow that it must be laukika (ordinary) and not alaukika or extra-ordinary. Being alaukika does not preclude, in the case of perception, to have determinate perception as one of its stages. As a matter of fact Dr. Banerjee seems to have the contention that if a mode of perception is related to or happens to have determinate perception as one of its stages it cannot be an alaukika pratyakṣa, as the unargued pre-supposition of his argument.

4.15. External and Internal Perception

Laukika Pratyakṣa or ordinary perception is again divided into two kinds, namely, Vāhya Pratyakṣa or external perception and mānas pratyakṣa or internal perception.

External perception is due to five external sense-organs of knowledge, namely, eye, ear, tongue, skin and nose. So we get five types external sense knowledge which can be named as (i) Visual perception (cākṣusa pratyakṣa) (ii) auditory perception (śrāvana pratyakṣa), (iii) tactual perception (sparsa pratyakṣa, (iv) gustatory perception (rāsana pratyakṣa) and (v) olfactory perception (ghrāṇaja pratyakṣa). Internal perception is due to soul-mind (ātma-manasanyoga) contact. Mind as an object of knowledge is atindriya or supra-sensible. It can never be perceived. Combining the two kinds of perception, i.e. external and internal perception we get six kinds of perception as there are six sense-organs. It is to be noted that in every kind of external perception we do require the help of mind because in perception the contact of sense-organ with mind is required. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mimāṃsaka philosophy admit of two kinds of perception and six sense-organs. But the Cārvākas admit only external perception. They do not admit internal perception because mind can never be perceived. Regarding these perceptions as mentioned above the difference between the Nyāya and Mimāṃsaka thinkers are related to the auditory perception. "Kanada, the author of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, states that the proof of the existence of manas can be obtained from the fact that in cases of absent-mindedness we do not get knowledge, although an object, an external sense and the self are all present to

co-operate with one another. This shows that the activity of some other factor is necessary for the production of knowledge. This factor is mind"²¹.

The Vedānta paribhāsākāra rejects the sense-organ character of mind. According to the Advaitins, there is no internal organ. They hold the view that mind is not a sense-organ and as such there is no internal sense-organ. Vācaspati holds the view that the perception of Brahman is due to mind, hence, mind can be admitted as Karaṇa, instrument of Brahamasākṣātkāra. But in accordance with the view of Vivaraṇa, mind is not a sense-organ and it is said that Vedavākya is the Karaṇa of Brahamasākṣātkāra. In this way it is shown that mind is not a sense-organ.

The external and internal perception remind us the Lockean philosophy when we find that Locke admitted experience as only the source of knowledge. By experience he meant sensation and reflection. Sensation is external perception whereas reflection is internal perception. From this we can find that there is similarity between Locke's view and the views of Indian thinkers who also admit two kinds of perception, namely, external and internal perception. Humean philosophy is like the Cārvāka philosophy as both of them refrain from admitting internal perception of a non-momentary spiritual substance having mental states and possessing knowledge as its finite and evanescent attribute.

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