

PERCEPTUAL COGNITION (A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY)

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INTRODUCTION

The work is an attempt at a reconstruction of the basic epistemic concept of perception or pratyaksa in Indian Philosophy in the light of critical methodology of contemporary philosophy. It is an independent work rather than a traditional non-secular exposition of Indian thought. This is a conceptual study and as such is an explication of the Advaita concept of perception in the main.

The basic methodological assumptions which provided the guidelines for the detailed reconstruction are as follows :-

(a) All factual truth claims must be settled empirically in accordance with the canons of rational method of investigation.

(b) Philosophy cannot give us facts, but is an activity of clarification of the concepts, so that the classical

conception of speculative philosophy as a super-science breaks down.

(c) Scientific explanation is only one type of interpretation of the given and does not negate the value and validity of alternative modes of explanation of man's response to his experience of the given.

(d) Existential interpretations of man's response to his experiences of the universe are ~~shi~~ *shi* generis, although they have points of contact with other types of interpretations.

(e) Though not capable of proof in the strict logical sense, existential interpretations have their own logic of reasonableness.

(f) Language has plural uses or functions which, when confused with each other, generate pseudo-problems. The language of Indian Philosophy should, therefore, be approached for analysis from functional point of view prior to its interpretation.

The present work is a critical explication of a perennial epistemological problem, namely, the determination of the nature, role, types and validity of perceptual cognition or *pratyaksa* as a source of knowledge or *pramana* in the existential prospective of the philosophical thought in ancient India. The plan of the work is as follows :-

In chapter one Nyāya, Jaina, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Advaita and Rāmānuja views of the nature of valid cognition are presented and critically discussed. In this connection the question whether Indian views of perception as a valid cognition exhibit any pattern, is also critically examined.

In chapter two the definition of perception as propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Advaita, Bhāṭṭa-Mimāṃsaka, Prābhākara-Mimāṃsaka and Bauddhas are presented and examined. Views of Greek philosophers are also presented and a comparative study is enunciated.

In chapter three, a very vital question of epistemology, namely, the question of primacy of perception over other sources of knowledge on the ground of their paroksatva or mediated character, has been posed and critically examined. The writer endeavoured to enunciate a new interpretation of the term "immediacy" with what success it is upto the reader to judge.

In chapter four the distinction between (a) Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka perception (b) Laukika and alaukika perception & (c) Bāhya and Mānasa perception, has been presented from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha, Mādhva, Rāmānuja, Advaita, Mimāṃsā, Jaina, Sāṅkhya and Śābdika points of view and has been subjected to a critical estimation.

In chapter five the question whether perception

constitutes the unit of knowledge is taken up for discussion. In this connection the views of Locke, Kant, Bradley, Hobhouse, Russell and views of Indian thinkers have been taken up for a critical and comparative study.

In chapter six the problem of aberration of perception has been critically discussed. In this connection the different theories of illusion as expounded by the different schools of Indian philosophy have been taken up for critical estimate from a novel point of view with what success it is upto the readers to evaluate.

In chapter seven the nature of consciousness vis-a-vis perception has been presented from Indian and Western points of view. The writer has given his own estimation of these views. However, how far his views are cogent and acceptable it is upto the readers to judge.

In chapter eight the writer has expounded his own conclusion regarding the basic problems of perception. He subscribes to the Advaita point of view, although he is not ready to accept all the conclusions of the Advaitins. How far his reasons for upholding the Advaita points of view are on all fours is left to the readers to judge.

The indebtedness of the writer is to many persons. He is most indebted to Dr. P.Roy, Reader in Philosophy, N.B. University. He is also indebted to Dr. S.K.Sen, now

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CHAPTER I

PROBLEM POSED

1.1. Pramā (Valid Knowledge)

In Indian Philosophy the word 'Jñāna' or knowledge indicates both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge. So in order to name valid knowledge the term 'Pramā', is used whereas in the case of invalid knowledge the term 'apramā' is used. Here, we find a difference between Western Philosophers and Indian Philosophers, because, according to Western Philosophers, knowledge means valid knowledge. Invalid knowledge, according to the Western Philosophers, is not knowledge at all. According to Indian thinkers, e.g., Nyāya philosophers, valid cognition is such that it depicts its object with features, in the same configuration in which they are in the object¹. In the case of invalid cognition or error this correspondence is lacking, at least in part².

Pramā is 'Yathārthajñāna'. 'Yathārtha' (Yathā + artha) means not similarity or resemblance but absence of contradiction (Viṣaya avyabhicāri) with regard to the object. For the object of knowledge may be a physical object while knowledge of object is not physical. Therefore, how can that which is non-physical resemble or be similar to that which is physical ? To avoid this 'Yathārtha' is to be taken not in the sense of similarity but in the sense of absence of contradiction with regard to the object of knowledge.

We may say that Pramā is judgmental knowledge in which the object of knowledge is as it is without any distortion. Whenever we perceive 'silver as silver', then the knowledge of silver is valid knowledge. But when we perceive 'steel as silver' then the knowledge is invalid. In both cases the glittering white appearance of the object is perceived. But in the former case it is perceived as belonging to an object which really has the said appearance while in the latter case it is so perceived although the object is not really so, we may say in other words that in the former case we have knowledge, of 'Rajatatva Viśiṣṭa Rajata subhrarupābhāsa', whereas in the later case we have knowledge of 'rajatatva-aviśiṣṭa-rajata-subhrarupābhāsa', with regard to the truth or validity. Two questions here arise, one relating to its nature and other concerning its test. The following four theories of truth are wellknown :

(a) Correspondence theory (b) Coherence theory, (c) Pragmatic theory and (d) Self-evidence theory. In Western Philosophy the proponents of correspondence theory and the proponents of coherence theory hold that both the nature and test of truth are correspondence and coherence respectively. The proponents of pragmatic theory of truth in Western Philosophy do not admit the legitimacy of the question of the nature of truth as a separate question over and above the question of the test of truth. The Nyāya Philosophers with regard to pramā or valid knowledge, admit correspondence as the nature of truth and pragmatic efficiency as the test of truth.

In Western Philosophy the traditional philosophers subscribed to three different theories of truth viz. (a) correspondence theory (b) coherence theory (c) pragmatic theory. At times a section of them subscribe to self-evidence as a theory of truth. So far as coherence theory of truth is concerned, its proponents admit coherence both as nature and test of truth. As regards this correspondence some held it to be the nature of truth, but with regard to its role as the test of truth they are silent. The proponents of the pragmatic theory hold that the nature of truth is not different from the test of truth. And lastly the proponents of self-evidence theory of truth take self-evidence to be the test of truth. Like the proponents of the correspondence theory of the nature of truth, Nyāya

theory in this regard appears to be in a logically sounder position.

Nature of truth is correspondence or 'Tadvatitatprakāram while its test, according to the Nyāya, is pragmatic efficiency or 'Arthakriyākāritva'. There is no compelling reason to hold that the nature of truth must coincide with the test of truth. Moreover, to take the nature of truth as identical with the test of truth is to commit circularity in thinking. For this means in the final analysis that truth^{is} certifying itself. But question of taking them to be identical arises only when that which is claimed to be the nature is beyond doubt and that which appears to be doubtful cannot be and also should not be taken to be the criterion for the resolution of doubt.

1.2. Nature of Valid Knowledge (Nyāya View)

According to Nyāya school of Indian Philosophy, the word 'Jñāna' and the word 'Pramā' are not co-extensive. The range of reference of the word 'Jñāna' is wider than that of the word 'Pramā'. So the word 'Jñāna' as it is used by the Naiyāyikas is taken to mean or refer to both the objects which are referred to by the word 'Pramā' as well as the objects which are referred to by the word 'apramā'. The class of objects referred to by the word 'Pramā' is

included in but does not include all the objects referred to by the word 'Jñāna'. Here, the word 'object' does not always mean material object. It is rather used in the sense of meaning. Whatever is meant by an expression is said to be its object. This object may be physical (chair, table, etc.) or mental (pleasure, pain etc.).

Thus, the objects referred to by the word 'Jñāna' constitutes a wider class under which the objects referred to by the word 'Pramā' are subsumed. Hence, whatever is a 'Pramā' is also a 'Jñāna' but the converse does not hold. Naturally the question arises, how are we to distinguish the class of objects referred to by the word pramā from the class of other objects referred to by the word 'apramā' although both the classes are subsumed under the greater class of objects referred to by the word 'Jñāna' ?

Pramā, according to Nyāya, is presentational knowledge, Yathārthānubhava. It involves four factors subject (pramātā), object (Prameya), instrument (Pramāṇa) and the resulting knowledge (Pramā). Valid cognition requires these four factors, absence of any one of these factors prevents occurrence of valid cognition.

'Pramā', according to Nyāya, is a quality (Guṇa) in the self (Ātma) which is dependent for its generation on mind-self contact (Ātmamāna-Samyoga) and is diaphanous as revealing the object as it is along with its characteristics.

Apramā is also a quality of the soul depending on self-mind object contact but it is not diaphanous, i.e. it does not reveal the object as it is. It is a false representation. A member of class of objects referred to by word 'Jñāna' is included as a member of the class referred to by the word 'Pramā' if and only if it satisfies the criteria of Pramā mentioned above. If it fails to satisfy that criteria, it is to be included in the class of objects referred to by the word 'apramā'.

There is no inherent necessity in anyone of the objects of cognition to satisfy one or the other or both criteria. Therefore, satisfying the criteria is entirely a matter of contingent relation for this object. Thus, being a 'Pramā' or being 'apramā' is not an inherent or built-in characteristic of an object of cognition. In other words, these characteristics are extrinsic and contingent for objects of awareness.

As these characteristics of being 'Pramā' or 'apramā' are extrinsic to any object of cognition, naturally the question arises : how can we ascertain whether any member of the class referred to by the word 'Jñāna' is characterised by the character constituting 'Pramā' ?

To answer this question, Nyāya devises a test viz, the test of 'arthakriyākāritva' or being fruitful in practice. If the members of the above mentioned class possess arthakriyākāritva', being a pramā can be predicated of them.

If they are unfruitful, we should refrain from such act of predication with regard to the objects in question.

1.3. Nature of Valid Knowledge (Jaina View)

According to Jaina, knowledge itself is a Pramāṇa, which apprehends both itself and its objects³. The Jainas hold that a cognition is self-luminous and it apprehends itself directly as well as its objects. The Jainas have divided knowledge (Jñāna) into two kinds viz. Pramāṇa or true knowledge and Naya. In this connection, we are to mention the meaning of 'Naya'. Jainas held the view that ordinary human beings cannot have absolute knowledge. They have to satisfy themselves only with the knowledge that is conditional and relative. For this reason, the Jainas adopt the principle of naya, according to which the mind is thought to approach reality differently from different points of view. It is partial judgement. It is problematic judgement and as such it is different from necessary judgement and assertory judgement. It is hypothetically entertained.

According to this view, validity of knowledge depends on pragmatic utility and there must be correspondence between the knowledge and the object, and knowledge must be free from contradiction. The Jaina thinker, e.g. Mānikya Nandi, has also included novelty as a feature for

determination of the validity of knowledge. However, we find that for determining validity of knowledge the Jain thinkers have admitted correspondence, pragmatic and coherence theory of truth.

The Jainas have admitted two-fold divisions of knowledge viz. immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa)⁴. As they maintain 'Syādvāda' it is obvious that by 'immediate' they mean 'relatively immediate'.

To make acquaintance with the meaning of word 'Syādvāda' let me write a few lines about it. According to the Jainas, there is no judgement which can claim truth unconditionally. This is known as the 'Syādvāda' which means the doctrine of 'may be'. They hold that every judgement is strictly conditional as absolute affirmation and absolute negation are inadmissible. Again, they hold the view that immediate knowledge is of two kinds, namely, ordinary immediate (Vyavahārika aparokṣa) and absolutely immediate (Pāramārthika aparokṣa). Ordinary immediate knowledge requires medium, such as the sense-organs, but absolutely immediate knowledge does not require any medium.

According to the Jainas, true knowledge is of five kinds viz. Mati (sensuous), Śruti (scriptural), Avadhi (visual intuition), Manohpariyāya (intuition of mental modes) and Kevala (pure and perfect knowledge)⁵. It is to be noted that Kevalajñāna is the highest knowledge, it

cannot be described but only be felt. We should keep in mind that the Jainas have admitted three types of Pramānas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, and Śabda. For our required purpose we will take the definition of perception as given by the Jainas in the chapter on different definitions of perception. But before closing the discussion on the nature of knowledge as enunciated by the Jainas we like to point out a few things. Absolute knowledge is regarded as mediumless both by Jainas and Vedāntins. Naturally the question arises; do they subscribe to the same account of nonmediate or immediate knowledge when they speak of 'Kevalajñāna' (Jaina) or 'Turiyajñāna' (Vedānta) ? Absolute knowledge (Kevalajñāna) is immediate in the sense of being devoid of mediation even of senseorgans and the mind. Knowledge without mediation is of two types; (a) Knowledge (caitanya) which is non-different from self or Ātman (Vedānta) (b) Knowledge as belonging to the soul or Ātman, and as such different from it (Jaina).

Although both the Vedāntins and the Jainas speak of non-mediate knowledge, yet they do not take the term 'Aparokṣa' or non-mediate' in the same sense in their respective epistemological theories. In this regard the Jaina account has, while the Vedānta account has not a built-in metaphysical distinction of substance-attributes in their respective theories.

1.4. Nature of Valid Knowledge (Advaita View)

Advaita Vedānta holds that valid knowledge (pramā) is that the object of which is not apprehended before and which is not contradicted by any other knowledge. Valid knowledge not only remains uncontradicted but also possesses novelty⁶. This is the reason why memory is not accepted as knowledge proper. Smṛti and anumiti are not of the same type of cognition. According to Advaita thinkers, knowledge, to be knowledge, must have two characteristics viz., (a) non-contradiction and (b) informativeness. The criteria of valid cognition of Advaita thinkers has similarity with the Kantian view of knowledge. For Kant, knowledge to be knowledge, must be informative. i.e. it is expressed in synthetic judgements. For Advaitins cognition in so far as it is non-different (abhinna) from caitanya or consciousness which is of the nature of Brahman and as such is saccidānanda svarūpa i.e. is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss, is real and as such is valid. But what is about invalidity ?

Invalidity is a product of māyā or ajñāna which is positive in nature. It is generated by the āvaraṇa (concealment) and Vikṣepa (Projection) śakti of ajñāna. Therefore, cognition, like sun, is self-luminous and self-valid. As sun is sometimes covered by cloud, and is not revealed likewise self-luminous consciousness which is of

the nature of knowledge or cognition is covered or concealed by māyā. Therefore, this concealment which constitutes invalidity is extraneous or Parataḥ.

In this connection, Nyāya view of Prāmānyavāda deserves a mention. According to Nyāya, cognition in itself is neither valid nor invalid. It is rendered valid or invalid by extraneous factors. While cognition takes on the form of the objects as it is, it is valid. When it fails to do so, it is invalid. It may perhaps be not out of place here to mention that there is difference of opinions among the Advaitins with regard to the question whether cognition is a mental state or not. According to the followers of Bhāmati School, mind is the sixth sense-organ. But according to the followers of Vivaraṇa Prasthāna, pleasure, pain etc. are not the objects of mind as sixth sense-organ. They are the direct object of witnessing consciousness which is of the nature of knowledge. Therefore, mind is not a sense-organ as there is no object for mind to fasten on like a sense-organ. Moreover, if mind be a sense-organ, it could not be an auxiliary to any sense-organ which it actually is.

1.5. Nature of Valid Knowledge (Rāmānuja View)

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the knowledge which is supported or corroborated by practice, is called Pramā⁷. Rāmānuja holds that knowledge implies a subject and an object. Knowledge is what eternally belongs to the self. It is like a lamp which can reveal the presence of an object as well as its own existence to its substrates. Knowledge functions not for itself but for another. Cognition includes both smṛti (memory) and anubhava (apprehension). Doubt or samsaya is not pramā. Rāmānujists have emphasised practice or vyavahāra in dealing with the definition of Pramā. According to Rāmānuja, there is no false knowledge or bhramajñāna. All knowledge is true as knowledge reveals some objects.

Every knowledge is intrinsically valid. Rāmānuja is a satkāryavādin. He says that for knowledge to be true, it should in addition to agreeing with outside reality, be of pragmatic value in life. For Rāmānuja every knowledge is intrinsically valid. Therefore, to be knowledge is to be valid. Naturally the question arises, how can we speak of invalidity with regard to knowledge then? In this connection, Rāmānuja refers us to the Upaniṣadic theory of Pancikaraṇa or quintuplication and of the theory of Sarvaṃ Sarvatmakam. According to Panickaraṇa theory, all things are composed of all the five elements of earth, water, fire,

air and ether in varying degrees. Illusory perception of an object, i.e. mirage is due to the apprehension of the element of water which is presented to the eye, but which is only a subordinate element in the sandy water whose preponderating element is earth.

Thus, Rāmānuja says that illusion is due to the apprehension of the subordinate and neglect of the preponderating element. In other cases, e.g. nacre-silver illusion, it is said that it (illusion) is due to the presence of a substance common to the nacre and silver.

Illusion, for Rāmānuja, is not a case of perception of unreal as all perceptions are perception of real but it is only a case of confusing of one object with another due to partial identity based on perception of a common substance when one cognition is being sublated by another, and the disillusionment is explained on the basis of preponderant element lying in its constitution. Thus, cognition is never really to be distinguished into valid and invalid, for all cognition has for its object a real presentative element. According to Rāmānuja, all perception is true, but its truth varies only in different degrees. There is no illusion in the strict sense, according to Rāmānuja. The factor which renders knowledge invalid is extraneous to knowledge and it prevents the knower from knowing the validity of knowledge. For example, when because of Jaundice I see the white wall

before me as yellow, the knowledge of white wall is not rendered intrinsically invalid. Rather, I, the knower, am prevented from knowing the validity of this knowledge because of the diseased condition of my sense-organ which as an extraneous condition prevents the self-luminosity of knowledge from being revealed to me, the knower.

In the light of the assumption made by the Rāmānujists to the effect that every knowledge is intrinsically valid, the explanation of the distinction between valid and invalid knowledge as enunciated by the Rāmānujists does not appear to be satisfactory. A knowledge, to be valid, must reveal its object as it is and not as it is not.

Therefore, a composite object in which some elements preponderate and other elements do not do so, should be so revealed to the knower by the knowledge of the object. If the preponderance is not revealed by the knowledge, the knowledge in question is not and cannot be valid. And this invalidity cannot be imputed to any factor extraneous to knowledge. Hence, the Rāmānujists must have to accept the fact that there are at least some knowledges which are not intrinsically valid and this admission runs counter to their prior admission that every knowledge is intrinsically valid.

1.6 Nature of Valid Knowledge (Sāṅkhya View)

According to Sāṅkhya, as enunciated in Sāṅkhyatattva-loka the Pramāṇas are Vijñāna or caitasikajñāna i.e. Jñāna or knowledge state which is modification of citṭa or mental state in the sense of modification of unconscious sixth sense or manas which when, being lit up as it were by the light of consciousness, appears to be non-different from Puruṣa or consciousness as such and so appears to be conscious. Knowledge, according to the author of Sāṅkhyatattaloka, is anadhigatattvavodha i.e. Vodha or apprehension of tattva or object which was not apprehended or adhigata previously. It appears from the above that Sāṅkhya is insisting on 'anadhigatatva' previous non-apprehension and conformity of knowledge with the object as it is or yathābhutatva or samvādi. As regards other points Sāṅkhya like Tārkikas admit pramāṇa as the Karaṇa or instrument of valid knowledge. According to Sāṅkhya, knowledge means a simultaneous reflection of the object as well as consciousness (puruṣa) into buddhi which is a product of the matter. Of course, consciousness also has its share by way of reflection. But the material cause of a reflection is not the reflectee but the reflector. Thus, knowledge according to Sāṅkhya, is a mode of matter.

But Sāṅkhya is silent as regards the question, what this validity of pramāṇa is consisting of ? According to the

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Sankhya view, both validity and invalidity of cognition are intrinsic characteristics of cognition. A cognition is either intrinsically valid or intrinsically invalid. A mode of cognition or cittavṛitti which is bereft of all doubt and is not contrary to the form of its object or viṣaya and also is not adhigata or previously owned is pramā or valid cognition. In other words, we can say that the puruṣa as knower is endowed with bodha or state of cognition which is bereft of doubt, contradiction and is of an object not apprehended before and this state of cognition is knowledge⁸. Validity of knowledge is intrinsic. It is not due to any extraneous factor. Likewise invalid cognition is Visamvādi or non-conforming to the object and it is also intrinsic and is not due to any extraneous factor.

It is not out of place to mention here the contention of Advaita Vedāntins. The Advaitins hold that while the validity of cognition is self-evident, the invalidity of cognition is due to extraneous circumstances. And at least the Advaitins' view regarding invalidity runs counter to the Sāṅkhya view. By the self-evidence of the cognition, Advaitins mean that in the absence of any detrimental condition of cognition the self apprehends the comprehending mental mode which is the Substratum of its validity as well. However, the invalidity of the cognition is not produced in the same way, for in that case no distinction

between valid and invalid cognition can be made. Invalid cognition is generated by some detrimental factors which are the creation of ajñāna or nescience in the exercise of its capacity as āvaraṇa and Vikṣepa (Concealment and projection).

It appears that while Sāṅkhya contention that validity of cognition is intrinsic is acceptable, the other half of the Sāṅkhya contention, namely, the invalidity of cognition is also intrinsic is simply to be rejected out of hand. The reason for this rejection is not far to see. While validity and truth may safely be ascribed to reality, invalidity and error cannot be allowed to adumbrate the reality. To do so is to deny that reality is reality, Buddhi, Ahankāra and the senses, taken together are called 'Citta' in Yoga and this buddhi is always undergoing incessant changes like the light of a lamp (Pradipa sikhāvat). It is mainly made up of 'sattva' element which is capable of reflecting puruṣa who is of the nature of selfluminous consciousness. Buddhi is incessantly moulding itself from one content to another. This reflection of Puruṣa in buddhi and counter-reflection of buddhi in puruṣa constitute the content of the buddhi which is interpreted as the experiences of the person.

According to Vijñānavikṣu, caitanya or consciousness is reflected in buddhi and this reflection of caitanya in buddhi in its turn is reflected back in caitanya or consciousness constituting knowledge in the ordinary sense of

the term. This account substantially differs from the account given by Vācaspati Miśra in Sāṅkhya Tattakaumudi. According to Vācaspati, buddhi, being constituted by sattva-guṇa alone, is capable of reflecting caitanya or consciousness and when consciousness is so reflected it constitutes the knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term. Vācaspati's view attaches much importance to the Sāṅkhya view that puruṣa is of the nature of consciousness and is asanga or unrelated and so is independent and as such is unmodified and unmodifiable (aparināmi). So cognition in the sense of being a janyapadārtha or category having origination and destruction, cannot be aparināmi and therefore, cannot be of the nature of consciousness. But this view renders cognition in the ordinary sense into a product of Prakṛti or the primal matter and so cognition is basically bereft of consciousness. This consequence appears to be unacceptable even to the cārvākas and the same is true of vijñānavikṣu. To avoid this eventuality vijñānavikṣu postulated the re-reflection of caitanya-reflected buddhi into consciousness or caitanya and this, according to him, constitutes cognition in this ordinary sense of the term. But this view errs by going into the other extreme. What the moot point is, how are we to explain the genesis and annihilation of cognition in the ordinary sense of the term within the fold of Sāṅkhya epistemology? This remains unexplained in spite of Vijñānavikṣu. For either the

re-reflection in consciousness is a real modification of consciousness or it is apparent. If it is a real modification of caitanya or consciousness, caitanya or consciousness cannot be held to be aparināmi or unchangeable. If it is held to be an apparent modification, then ordinary cognition is nothing but an illusion having no value and validity. But to Vijñānvikṣu this also is not acceptable. For ordinary cognition as knowledge is not qualitatively different from Turiya-jñāna or absolute knowledge achieved by the Mukta or liberated self.

1.7. Whether the Indian Views of Perception Exhibit Any Pattern

From the previous discussion it is found that the philosophers are at variance as to the nature of knowledge. Again, they hold different views with regard to the means or ways of knowledge. The cārvāka philosophers hold the view that perception is the only source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika and the Bauddha philosophers take perception and inference as the two different sources of knowledge. Sāṅkhya philosophers admit three sources of knowledge, viz. perception, inference, and Testimony. According to Naiyāyikas, there are four sources of knowledge, viz. (i) Perception (2) Inference (3) Testimony and (4) Comparison. The Prabhākara Mimāṃsakas admit arthāpaṭṭi (presumption) in

addition to Naiyāyikas' four sources. Again, Bhāṭṭa Mimāṅsakas & Advaita vedāntins admit one more viz. anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) in addition to the other five. The Paurāṇikas added two more, viz. inclusion (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya). In this connection, I like to quote Karl Potter : "The Cārvākas accept one pramāṇa, perception. Kanāda and Sugata (i.e., the Buddha) accept in addition inference. Sankhya adds verbal authority (śabda), as do some Naiyāyikas whereas other Naiyāyikas add comparison (Upamāna) as well. Prabhākara adds presumption (arthāpatti) to these, and the Bhāṭṭas and vedāntins add negation (abhāva) as well as presumption. The Paurāṇikas add to these inclusion (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya)⁹."

Knowledge can be divided into two kinds viz. (a) direct knowledge and (b) indirect knowledge.

The knowledge which can be attained without the help of any other knowledge is called direct knowledge or sākṣatjñāna; indirect knowledge is that knowledge which can be attained by means of previous knowledge. Direct knowledge is nothing but perceptual knowledge. According to some thinkers, indirect knowledge is nothing but inferential knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas hold the view that indirect knowledge is inferential. But there are some thinkers who include inference, testimoney, comparison, presumption and non apprehension under indirect knowledge.

Direct cognition or perception is the primary source of knowledge. It is the basic knowledge because other types of cognition depend on perception and without it other forms of knowledge will of course not be possible at all.

There is influence of perception over other types of cognition and as such we may say that perception is the basic source of knowledge. To show this we like to quote a few lines which run thus :

"... Perception provides the raw material out of which thought products are forged Thought products in general are the results of previous perceptual impressions organized into arrangements, and the form of these arrangements is provided either by the original perceptual content or by relationships abstracted from other perceptual contents"¹⁰.

Before taking up other discussion we like to raise a question : Is there any pattern in the welter of the Indian views on perception ?

The answer, we believe, can be given in the affirmative. We venture to suggest the following answer.

Let us take the concrete case of knowledge situation, "I see a rose". This is a case of visual perception and perception being a kind of knowledge it is a case of knowledge (perceptual knowledge). If we analyse this knowledge situation we find the following factors which may

be found to constitute the said knowledge situation. There is, for example, the subject who knows or the knower, and the object of knowledge which is known and somehow these two factors or constituents of knowledge are related by a relation to each other which is expressed by the use of the prepositional word 'of'.

At once a number of questions crops up. First, what is the nature of the subject ? Is it a fleeting momentary state of consciousness ? or is it a substance which has knowledge as one of its attributes and which is non-material in nature ? Or is it again something which is not describable either as material or as non-material i.e. Which may be regarded as other than the material and the non-material having consciousness or knowledge as one of its properties ? The different Indian theories of perception can be arranged in a gradation in the light of the answer which they respectively give to these questions.

The reply of the Cārvāka is that the knower is the living physical body having consciousness as one of its attributes. This account will be found very familiar to one who is acquainted with the Marxist theory of mind. It is objective materialism in its extreme form. Mind is an emergent property of matter when it reaches through dialectical process of evolution a certain critical state of complexity. Next comes the answer of the Naiyāyikas.

The knower is a dravya or substance which has consciousness or knowledge as one of its inessential properties. Here, again the knower is an objective substance but unlike the knower or the subject of the Cārvākas, it is not a material substance. Still it has affinity with the view of the Cārvāka as it also holds that consciousness for this substance is not an essential property.

Now comes the Rāmānujists. According to them, the knower is a non-material substance which has consciousness or knowledge as one of its essential properties. This view has the affinity with the view of the Naiyāyikas in its contention that the knower is a non-material substance while it significantly differs from the contention of the Naiyāyikas with regard to its subscribing to the view that consciousness or knowledge is the essential property of the knower.

Then come the views of the Mimāṃsakas and the Jainas. According to them, consciousness or knowledge is an inherent quality of the knower who is a non-material or spiritual substance. This view, thus, is almost a restatement of the view of the Rāmānujists.

Then comes the view of the Sāṅkhya. According to the proponents of the Sāṅkhya view, the knower is not a non-material or spiritual substance having consciousness as its essential attribute. Rather knower is consciousness and

consciousness is knower. The relation that obtains between knower and consciousness is a relation of identity and not a substantive-attributive relation. Nevertheless there are many consciousnesses as there are many knowers although between one consciousness and another no distinction as consciousness can be made because of the absence of any ultimate differentia like the viśeṣa of the Naiyāyikas to distinguish one entitative existence from another.

Now comes the view of the advaita Vedāntins. They hold that there is only consciousness which is non-different from knowledge and with regard to which the imposition of the distinction of knower, knowledge and known are illusory imposition determining illusorily that which is by its very nature undetermined and undifferenced. Hence, knowledge in the ultimate sense of the term is the self-luminous consciousness or caitanya which is bereft of all distinctions including the distinction of the knower, knowledge and known object.

Thus, we started from an extreme uncompromising objectivism as it is found in the Cārvākas and ends with an extreme uncompromising subjectivism which does not brook any distinction even within the subject lest the admission of the distinction taints and pollutes the purity of undifferenced consciousness which is, in their opinion, knowledge in the true sense of the term.

Notes and References

1. Tadvati tat - prakāraṁ jñānaṁ - Nyāyabhāṣya - Vātsyāyana.
2. Tadabhāvati tat - prakāraṁ jñānaṁ apramā - Nyāyabhāṣya - Vātsyāyana.
3. Sva - paravyavasāyi - jñānaṁ pramānaṁ - Pramāṇanayata-ttvalokalankara - (Sri Vadideva Suri).
4. Tadvibhidam pratyakṣam ca parokṣam ca - Pramananayatattvalokalankara - 2/1 - Sutra.
5. Matisrutāvadhimanahparyāya kevalāni jñānaṁ - Tattvārthadhigamasūtra - Umāsvāmi.
6. Pramātvamanadhigatavadhitārtha viṣayaka - jñānatvaṁ - Vedānta Paribhāṣā - translated by Sri Pancānan Śāstri - p.7 & 9.

7. Yathāvasthita vyavahāranugunam jñānam pramā -
Yatindramatadipikā - Śrinivāsadāsa - Translated by -
Svāmi Adidevananda - p.5.
8. Anadhigatatattvabodhah pramā - Sankhyatāttvālokaḥ -
prakarana - 28 cited in Patanjali Yogadarsana -
Translated by - Hariharananda Āranya - p.569.
9. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies - Vol.III - Edited
by Karl H.Potter - p.553.
10. Imagination and Thinking - A Psychological Thinking
- Peter Mæckeller - p.73.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS OF PERCEPTION

2.1. Introduction

The term 'Pratyakṣa' is derived from two words viz. 'Prati' + 'Akṣa'. The literal meaning of the term 'Pratyakṣa' (perception) is that which is before the eyes. There are many sense-organs (indriyas) besides eyes (cakṣu), and by all these sense-organs we can have Pratyakṣajñānaṃ or perceptual knowledge. In this chapter I will discuss the views of different schools of Indian Philosophy as regards the nature of perception.

2.2. Nyāya definition of Perception

The knowledge arising from the contact between sense (indriya) and object (viṣaya) is called Pratyakṣa

(perception)¹. If "being caused by sense-organ only", be taken to be the defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of pratyakṣa, then the definition becomes fallacious being too wide. For it applies to colour (rūpa) which is also caused by sense-organ although it is not cognition on the basis simply of sense-organness. For a person bereft of eyes is incapable of perceiving colour although his sense-organ called 'mind' is intact. So pratyakṣa is defined as 'Indriyajanyamjñānaṃ'. On the other hand, if we define perception only by knowledge-hood. (Jñānatva), then it will also be too wide because this definition would apply to inference, etc. So for perception's definition 'indriyajanyatva' and 'jñānatva' are required.

But the definition of perception as given above i.e. perceptual cognition caused by sense-object contact, is not considered valid. If this definition is taken to be valid, it will be too wide being applicable in the case of inferential knowledge also. According to Naiyāyikas, mind is also a sense-organ and it is the condition of all knowledge. Hence, as inferential cognitions are knowledge, there is also a relation between inferential knowledge (anumiti) and mind. So the definition becomes too wide.

In order to do away with this defect Viśvanātha defines perception as follows :- Perceptual knowledge is that knowledge which is caused by sense-object contact and is

delimited by sense-organness. The significance of this definition is that mind is the condition of all knowledge (jñāna Kāranatva) but is not limited by one attribute (dharma). Sometimes mind produces knowledge by its capacity as mind (manattva) and sometimes it produces knowledge functioning as a sense-organ. Whenever the instrumentality of mind is limited by sensehood, then it (mind) produces perceptual knowledge. In the case of inferential knowledge instrumentality of mind (Karanatā of manas) is limited by mindhood. So there cannot be fallacy of too wide definition in the case of inference. A question may be raised that this definition is vitiated by the defect of too narrow definition in the case of the perception of God, because the divine perception is not due to sense-object contact. In reply to this, it may be pointed out that the aim of the definition of perception is not to include 'Iśvara Pratyakṣa' within its range, but it is applicable only in the case of noneternal 'Jiva pratyakṣam'.

Whatever the case may be, in order to dispel the confusion, Visvanātha takes another definition of perception which is free from defects and confusion. According to him, perceptual knowledge is such knowledge which cannot have another knowledge as its cause². Here, we find a defect-free way of definition of perception. Positively perception can be defined as immediate knowledge³. Thus we find that the Naiyāyikas have defined perception both positively

and negatively, and the definition of Visvanātha is free from defect and, hence, it can be taken as valid definition of perception. From this definition we can say that Pratyakṣajñāna is not defined through the instrumentality of another cognition. Anumiti is due to cognition of vyāpti, Upamiti is due to knowledge of similarity and for this reason the definition is not too wide definition in the case of anumiti, etc. Moreover, we do not find it to be too narrow definition in the case of perception of God.

Perception is due to respective sense-contact with the object. Perception is of six kinds, viz. (a) olfactory perception, (b) auditory perception, (c) tactual perception, (d) taste/gustatory perception, (e) visual perception and (f) mental perception. Every object of sense must be perceivable. The Nyāya Philosophers have admitted six senses. Gautama, the founder of Nyāya system of Indian Philosophy, has clearly pointed out that perceptual knowledge is valid and certain. It is also free from doubt (saṃśaya) and confusion (viparyaya)⁴.

Perception has been defined by Annambhaṭṭa as follows :

Perceptual cognition is the cognition which results from contact of sense-organ with the object⁵. This definition, if accepted without qualification, gives rise to a number of problems. First, it fails to account for Divine perception. For God does not possess any sense-organ.

Secondly, it fails to exclude inferential cognition as inferential cognition depends on mind's contact with soul. And mind, according to Naiyāyikas, is a kind of sense-organ. Thirdly, cognition involves Prakāratā or morphic identity with the objects. But this account fails to square with the admission of Nisprakārakam Jñānam or amorphous cognition.

It is not out of place in this connection to mention here that the definition of perceptual cognition as given by Viswanātha, a neo-Naiyāyika, in his Bhasapariśeḍha is more in accord with the flawless purity as demanded by the canons of logic. His definition runs as follows :-

Cognition the cause of which is not another cognition, is perceptual cognition. This definition defines perceptual cognition in terms of Karaṇa (cause par excellence) and not in terms of sense-object contact. And thus it avoids the question of the ascription of the status of perceptual cognition to God's super-sensuous knowledge. Secondly, it avoids the over-coverage (ativyāpti) to which Annambhaṭṭa's definition is committed. Thirdly, it also avoids the vexed question of dividing perceptual cognition into amorphous cognition (Nisprakārakam Jñānam) and morphous (Sapprakārakam Jñānam) cognition which admits of prakāratā or morphe as the condition sine qua non of every cognition with a validity claim.

2.3. Advaita definition of perception

Almost all the thinkers of Indian Philosophy have accepted the definition of perception of Nyāya Philosophy according to which perception is such knowledge which is not due to any other knowledge. According to Advaita vedānta, Brahman is attributeless (nirguṇa), indeterminate (nirviśeṣa) reality. Indeterminate Brahman cannot be known by means of external or internal sense. Through the destruction of ignorance by the manifestation of proper knowledge, the perception of the indeterminate Brahman is possible. According to Dharmarājadhvarindra, an exponent of Advaita view, a cognition is not perceptual simply because it is sense-generated. If sense generatedness were the essential mark of perception, then the memory and inferential cognition would also be so because these are due to mind which is a sense-organ according to Nyāya. Further, on this view divine perception will not be possible because God is not endowed with any sense-organ.

In order to do away with these defects the Naiyāyikas have given one other definition of perception as cognition not mediated by any other cognition. But according to Advaita thinkers, even this definition of perception by Nyāya is not unobjectionable. The reason is that it is too wide still in so far as it includes memory. Memory knowledge is not caused by any other cognition. The immediate cause

of memory is not another cognition but latent impressions or trace and trace is not of the nature of cognition.

The valid definition of Pratyakṣa, according to Dharmarājadhvarindra, is consciousness as manifested by mode of internalisation (antahkaraṇa vṛtti). That is consciousness reflected in the mode of internalization or antahkaraṇa is valid knowledge or pramā in the laukika or vyavahārika sense of the term. Pure consciousness in the sense of sāksīcāitanya, as it does not negate ajñāna or ignorance, is not pramā or valid knowledge in ordinary sense of the term.

Any particular knowledge which has a beginning cannot be God's knowledge and every sensory knowledge is a knowledge with a beginning. Hence, divine knowledge cannot be taken to be a sensory knowledge. According to Advaitin, knowledgehood is perceptionhood (Jñānatvaṃ Pratyakṣatvaṃ). Knowledge, according to Advaitin, is non-different from Brahman who is of the nature of consciousness and is bereft of all changes, svagata or internal, svajātiya or similar, and vijātiya or dissimilar. Brahman is unchangeable or aparināmi, Jiva or self being non-different from Brahman, is also unchangeable or aparināmi. Brahman which is non-different from Jiva and is of the nature of consciousness which is knowledge is undifferentiated and infinite. Hence, the question arises : How are we to account for the creation and destruction of

knowledge in the Vyavahārika or empirical sense of the term. In reply to this question, the Advaitin says that knowledge which is infinite Brahman, when superimposed by ajñāna which is of the nature of positive nescience, appears as finite and limited having beginning and end. Such knowledge has, as it were, the parts viz. knowledge part and the object part, and the object part being non-different from knowledge part because of superimposition it makes the infinite Brahman appear as finite and limited knowledge of object. Thus, the undifferenced Brahman which is of the nature of knowledge appears, because of superimposition of ajñāna, as object-consciousness (viṣayacaitanya) knower-consciousness (pramātr̥cāitanya) and instrumental consciousness (Pramāna-caitanya). And instrumental consciousness or pramāna-caitanya being non-different from sākṣicaitanya or witnessing consciousness which never remains covered or āvr̥ta by nescience or ajñāna, ensures the value and validity of viṣayacaitanya or object - consciousness and pramātr̥cāitanya or knower-consciousness which are also non-different from sākṣi-caitanya. This approach is made in the Bhāmati by Vācaspati Miśra and his followers and is known as Bhāmati-prasthāna or the approach of Bhāmati school. This approach follows implicitly the Nyāya line by accepting the Nyāya epistemic doctrine 'mānādhinameyasiddhiḥ' or establishment of the object of knowledge is dependent on the establishment of the instrument of knowledge. This approach is rejected

outright by the author of Vivaraṇa Prameya saṁgraha and his followers. According to Vivaraṇa school, object of knowledge is non-different from knowledge because of superimposition by nescience and as such, so far as knowledge part is concerned, it is always valid and does not require to be established by the prior establishment of the instrumental consciousness of Pramāṇacaitanya.

The mode of internalization which takes on the form of the object which is capable of being grasped by sense-organ, when non-different from the present object so grasped, is perceptual knowledge⁶. Pramā in the empirical sense is different from faulty perception as it negates or removes the veil of ignorance which covers the object.

The faulty perception, although does not negate the veil of ignorance, is still capable like veridical perception of producing the desire to reach or avoid the object of perception and so is knowledge or perception by courtesy and this really is pseudo-perception.

Lastly I am quoting a few lines from Karl H. Potter's book which runs thus :

"Advaita places lot of emphasis on direct realisation, on the immediacy of Self-knowledge. Perception, among the pramāṇas, is regularly identified as providing direct knowledge, and one might suppose that it would ultimately

be perception that delivers the immediate awareness that constitutes liberation"⁷.

2.4. Viśiṣṭādvaitins Definition of Perception

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins have recognised three Pramānas, viz. perception, inference, and verbal testimony⁸. According to Venkatanātha, an exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita, perception is direct knowledge⁹. If perception is defined merely as "Pramā Pratyakṣam" then knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony will also have to be treated as perceptual knowledge. Hence, the term 'Sakṣātkāri' has been added to the definition. Again, if only the term 'Sakṣātkāri' is used omitting 'pramā', then the definition will be too wide incorporating in its fold the cases of illusion because illusory cognition is also immediate cognition. Hence, the term 'pramā' is added in the definition of perception. In this context a question naturally arises in our mind : what speciality or asādhāranatva does pratyakṣa possess which differentiates perceptual knowledge from other types of knowledge. In reply Venkatanātha and Śrinivāsa assert that perception has got a special feature and that feature is self-evidential character of perception. Immediacy which characterises a perceptual object, and the feeling that the subject has to the effect that he has known that object directly, are accounted for by this feature of

self-evidence. Self-revelation is the distinguishing mark of perception.

If we define perception as "Indriyajanya jñānatvaṃ Prayakṣam" then the definition will be too narrow excluding the case of Yogic perception and also the case of perception of 'Íśvara', because the perceptions of Yogins and Íśvara are not due to sense-object contact.

Hence, while according to Visvanātha, perceptual knowledge is not due to any kind of knowledge, the Rāmānujists have taken the definition of perception as given by Venkatanātha. In the Premeḃa Samgraha, we get the definition of perception as 'direct awareness' (Sākṣadanābhavaḃ Pratyakṣam). The Viśiṣṭādvaitins have accepted the view expounded in Nyāya parisuddhi of Venkatanātha regarding the definition of perception. Varadavisṇu says that clearness and distinction of pramā is Pratyakṣatā (Perceptibility). The object of perception is more clear and vivid than the object of other kinds of cognitions. Absence of clearness and distinction of knowledge of objects in the case of inference and testimony distinguishes those modes of knowledge from perceptual knowledge.

Viśiṣṭādvaitin's view of perception differs from the views of Nyāya on the one hand and Advaita view on the other hand. According to the Naiyāyikas, (1) Knowledge is

a quality or attribute of self, (2) It is not a self-revealing quality or attribute of self, and (3) It is an adventitious and not an essential quality of the self. But Rāmānujists go with the Naiyāyikas only to the extent of admitting that knowledge is an attribute of the self. They differ from the Naiyāyikas by admitting this attribute to be self-revealing and essential. On the other hand, according to the Advaita, knowledge is not at all a quality or attribute, rather it is the very nature of the self as consciousness. Hence, it may not be out of place to mention here that there is similarity between Prabhākara Mimānsakas and Viśistādvaitin so far the self-revelatory character of knowledge as a quality of the ātman or self is concerned.

2.5. Mimānsaka definition of perception (Prabhākara)

Perception, according to Prabhākara, is direct awareness¹⁰. According to Prābhākaras, there are five kinds of knowledge, viz. Pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison), Śabda (testimony), and arthāpatti (Presumption). The first kind of knowledge is perception. It has been defined by them in this way : Direct awareness is perception. The direct awareness of an object is called 'Sākṣātpratiti'. The knowledge achieved through other sources of knowledge is less clear and distinct. As by this source of knowledge, we

have clear and distinct awareness, so it (Perception) is called 'visadābhāsa'.

According to Prābhākaras, in every knowledge ātman is present as the locus of knowledge and it is expressed by the word 'Asmad'. Ātman or soul possesses different qualities, viz. Sukha (Pleasure), dukha (sorrow), dvesa (aversion), icchhā (desire), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), etc. In accordance with the view of this school, perception of ātman or soul is not possible because if it be so, then a contradiction will arise between subject and object (Karma katṛ virodha). Ātman is of the nature of substance and samvit (intelligibility) is the quality of it. Samvit is self-manifest and because of this the Prābhākaras do admit 'anṛuvyavasāya'. Moreover, they point out that in every knowledge, knowledge, locus of knowledge (ātman) and object (viśaya) are manifested. For this reason the Prābhākaras are known as 'Triputi-Pratyakṣavādins or proponents of the doctrine of triple perception.

2.6. Mimānsaka Definition of Perception (BHĀṬṬA)

In addition to the Pramānas of the Prābhākara, Bhāṭṭa Mimānsakas include anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). The Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas admit two kinds of knowledge viz. (a) direct knowledge and (b) indirect knowledge. Both the

schools hold that perception is direct knowledge. A proper study will enable us to know that the definition of perception of Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas is almost like the definition of Naiyāyikas. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka's definition of perception is that perception is due to the contact between sense and object¹¹. This definition has been rejected by the Neo-Naiyāyikas pointing out its defect. According to the Bhāṭṭa, there is need of sense-object contact which is bereft of all defects giving rise to valid perceptual knowledge in the puruṣa or knower. Thus, the definition of perception as given by the Bhāṭṭas steers clear of the difficulties which hunt the Nyāya definition. The Naiyāyikas are to admit a kind of perception which is neither valid nor invalid, viz. the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is neither valid nor invalid because validity of perception depends on the conformity of Prakāra with the object and nirvikalpa pratyakṣa is bereft of all prakāras. So the question of validity and invalidity in its case simply does not arise. But by admitting nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa Nyāya sins against the Principle of lāghava or parsimony and over populated the world of epistemology by admitting the existence of questionable epistemic entity. Bhāṭṭas also are facing the difficulties with regard to the knowledge of God as they do not admit the existence of God. Nyāya in this regard is in an unenviable position. How can God possess perceptual knowledge of all objects-past,

present and future, near and distant - without sense-object -contact is an enigma and not a palatable enigma at that. In this respect also the Bhāṭṭas are in a better position.

2.7. The Bauddha Definition of Perception

The Bauddha Philosophers have admitted two sources of knowledge, viz. (a) perception and (b) inference. The Bauddhas deny the authority ^{of} vedas and śruti. Like other philosophers of different schools of Indian philosophy, they have also dealt with the nature of the two sources of knowledge. Here, we propose to enunciate the definition of perception as propounded by the Buddhists. Dinnāga, a Buddhist logician defines perception in his Pramanasamuccaya. To him a perception is free from the taints of imagination and it is not connected with the name, genus, etc¹². According to Dinnāga, "perception relates to objective reality but stops short at it because it cannot classify or even name its objects. These (real) objects are just unclassified particulars"¹³.

Dharmakīrti, the student of Dinnāga and another famous Buddhist logician, has defined perception in the following manner :-

Perception is such experience which is free from error and which is only generated by objects without involving

any name or relation. From this definition, it follows that perceptual knowledge can never be invalid because if we pay sufficient attention to an object which is present before the sense or senses there is simply no scope of its being invalid. Following this definition of perception we can know that the perceptual knowledge can never be associated with imagination (Kalpanā). The reason of dissociating perceptual knowledge from names is that the Buddhist philosophers intend to show the atomic independence of every unit of perceptual knowledge from any taint of imagination or concept. The definition of perception given above cannot help us to know the distinct nature of perceptual experience but it only points out the conditions of valid perception. Perception, according to the Buddhists, is unique (svalakṣaṇa) i.e. refers to its own object alone. They have done away with the names and universal concepts from perception on the ground that these involve imagination (vikalpa).

The definitions of perception of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti show that perception is different from the other sources and the Buddhists' definition of perception is different from the definition of perception given by other schools of Indian Philosophy.

The Buddhists definition of perception pre-supposes their commitment of the philosophy of momentariness. Whatever is momentary must be, for that very reason, Svalakṣaṇa

or unique i.e. uncommon; and naming, relating and classification, presuppose the existence of the common in a totality every member of which is uncommon. And to search and find out the common from among the uncommon is to falsify the nature of the uncommon as uncommon.

2.8. Sāṅkhya Definition of Perception

Sāṅkhya defines perception as a mode of cognition (a modification of Vṛtti which is of the nature of 'I know') which is the resultant of the operations of organs of apprehension when they are in contact with their appropriate objects in their general and specific aspects the later being prominent¹⁴. The mode of cognition is a mode of citṭa or mind which is a product of Prakṛti and as such it is basically unconscious in its nature. Like other products of Prakṛti it consists of three guṇas - sattva, rajas, and tamas. To be acquainted as to the meaning of perception given by Bijñānabhikṣu I like to mention the following quotation.

"Perception, then, according to vijñānabhikṣu, is primarily a result of the interaction of intellect/will and the sense capacities. Mind, as a result, plays a very minor role in Sūtra-Sāṅkhya"¹⁵.

In the case of buddhi sattva guṇa which is of the nature of manifestation, is prominent. Being sāttvika or manifesting, it (buddhi) becomes non-different from unmodifiable and self-illuminous Puruṣa and as such appears as the knower without really being so. According to Iśvara-Kṛṣṇa, perception is a clear and distinct image of its corresponding object. But this definition is not acceptable, because it is applicable to an inference also.

It should be noted that in 'Sāṅkhya kārikā' despite the use of the term, 'Pratyakṣa, (it has also used the term 'Dṛṣṭa' or 'seen' and this has definite significance). There is no mention of sense-object contact separately. The question arises : are all the cases of immediate experience due to sense-object contact ? The answer will be in the negative because there is no need of sense-organ and manas in the case of introspection, and also in the case of dream experience, e.g., 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy'. In order to cover the expressed introspective propositions there is need of 'Dṛṣṭa' or 'seen' not of perception, for in the case of introspection intervention of sense as an instrument is not required.

From a perusal of the Sāṅkhya account of perception as a mode of valid knowledge, it transpires that sāṅkhya tries to reconcile the aspects of knowledge, the private aspects of knowledge i.e. knowledge must be knowledge of somebody

and it is related to somebody in an inalienable non-transferable sense, and the public aspect of knowledge i.e. knowledge to be knowledge must be the same to each and every cognizer i.e. knowledge must be universal. Knowledge, according to Sāṅkhya, must be somebody's knowledge. Knowledge which is owned by no one is no knowledge. This ownership of knowledge is to be understood in a particular sense. I know the table, you also know the table. Both of us know the table at one and the same time. Yet my knowledge of the table is numerically different from your knowledge of the table and your knowledge of the table is numerically different from my knowledge of the table. Again, I have the book, also I have knowledge. But you can take away my book or I can give you my book and book becomes yours. But I cannot give you my knowledge in the same sense in which I can give you my book. This is the private aspect of knowledge which Sāṅkhya has taken into account and this is, we believe, is the real reason for the Sāṅkhya to admit the existence of many puruṣas. On the other hand, knowledge must possess universonality i.e. it must be true in the same sense to all the knowers. This is the minimum condition of knowledge. Sāṅkhya has taken care of this aspect of knowledge also and this is, we believe, is the reason behind the admission of one complex Prakṛti as the background and the pith and marrow of one enjoyable world of experience. We may explain the Sāṅkhya view with the help

of a simile. In a circle there is one centre consisting of one point and a circumference consisting of infinite number of points. If we take each of the infinite number of points in the circumference as a knowing puruṣa or consciousness and the one point at the centre as the prakṛti, we can visualize in a way the Sāṅkhya account of knowledge.

2.9. A Comparative Study Between Indian Philosophy and Greek Philosophy Regarding Perception.

We have defined perception or Pratyakṣa as enumerated by different schools of Indian Philosophy. Now, we intend to discuss the problem from the perspective of Ancient Western Philosophy and Philosophers.

When the Naiyāyikas were framing their theory of knowledge in general and theory of perceptual knowledge by vision in particular the Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle in Greece were also engaged in similar task. Hence, it will, we hope, conduce to a better understanding of the Indian account of perceptual knowledge if it is seen in the background of the theory of perception as propounded by these Greek Philosophers.

Cornford states, "Plato's theory of vision involves three kinds of fire or light, (i) daylight, a body of pure fire diffused in the air by the sun, (ii) the visual

current or 'vision' a pure fire similar to daylight, contained in the eyeball and capable of issuing out in a stream directed towards the object seen, (iii) the colour of external object, 'a flame streaming off from everybody, having particles proportioned to those of the visual current, so as to yield sensation' when the two streams meet and coalesce (Timaeus 45 B, 67 C)"¹⁶.

Now, from the above it is found that platonic account of vision involves three sorts of fire provided by the sun to make visual knowledge possible. (i) Fire provided by sun which is known as daylight, and this is the necessary condition of visibility; (ii) fire in the eye-ball provided by the sun which issues out to meet the object in the case of visual perception, and (iii) fire in the object provided by the sun which issues out in the case of visual perception of the object to meet and coalesce with the fire that issues from our eye-ball. Each one of these conditions is necessary condition of vision. Jointly they are sufficient condition of vision or visual perception.

In Indian Philosophy in general and in Nyāya Philosophy in particular, perception has been accorded the primary place as an instrument of cognition. Of all the perceptual cognition vision has been accorded the most important status as a source of valid cognition. In visual perception of an object there is tejas or fire in the eye-ball which goes

out to the place where the object is supposed to be and assumes or takes on the appearance of the object, and the visual knowledge results. Hence, besides the tejas or fire provided by the sun constituting visibility, the tejas or fire in the eye-ball which is required to go out, in the case of visual perception, to the place where the object is supposed to be, is also a necessary condition. But the idea of fire or tejas coming out of the object and meeting in the case of visual perception, the fire or tejas issuing out of eyeball has not been subscribed by the Naiyāyikas and other Indian Philosophers. So for those Indian Philosophers the aforesaid two conditions are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for the production of pratyakṣa or perceptual cognition.

Aristotle also subscribed to Platonic account of visual perception with the difference that we could know, according to Aristotle, the universal unchangable essence which is an object of knowledge in and through the perception of an object which exemplifies the universal essence which never exists apart from it.

That we could know this universal unchangable essence in and through the perishable object of perception has been attested by the fact of recognition of the object of perception on a later occasion as the object of that class which one previously perceived. So the world of sense has not been totally dissociated from the intelligible world in the Philosophy of Aristotle. His robust empiricism and

scientific temper prevented him from building ivory tower of philosophy without any foundation in sense-experience.

In the Mediaeval Period the philosophers did not distrust senses for they believed that not only the intellect but also the senses are adequate to reveal external reality to us. In other words, they believed that senses do not deceive us. They presented to us objects as they are in themselves without any distortion. This ancient faith in the adequacy of our sense-perception to reveal to us the object as they are in themselves was thrown overboard by the precursor of Modern Science, viz. Galileo and such other philosopher-cum-scientist as Descartes. This distrust of sense Galileo and Descartes inherited from some Mediaeval philosophers, e.g., Anselm and Okham. Anselm believed that God's existence could be proved solely by pure reason without any help from sense-experience and Okham believed that sense-experience gave us only variability and untruth thereby bestowing on the results of the experimental sciences which are based on sense-experiences only probability and not eternal truth.

As regards visual perception the Platonic-Aristotle theory of visual perception exhibits a striking resemblance to that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to Nyāya, we visually perceive the object because the visual appearance or Rupas

of the object is constituted by Teja Paramānus or Fire atoms and light or teja atoms which emanate from sense-organ called the eye coincides with the Teja atoms of the object in the field of visibility constituted by the Teja atoms from Sun. Moreover, while perceiving the perishable object of perception such as the 'Ghata' we also visually perceive in the same act the non-perishable Ghatatva or universal of Ghata. On the other hand, Buddhist, like Okham and other Mediaeval Nominalists, believed that all real existence are particulars which are exclusive of each other. So, all knowledge demanding common characteristics gets the demand fulfilled by means of falsification by intellect which generates common characteristics which in fact do not exist. Advaitins, on the other hand, like Anselm, believed that Absolute or Brahman could be proved to exist by pure reason alone. It is perhaps not out of place to take into account at this point Kant's contention regarding perception. Perceptual knowledge, being knowledge of object, involves, according to Kant, contribution from sense and understanding. The spatio-temporal characters of the object arise from the contribution of sense while the unity, reciprocity etc. of the object arise from the contribution of the categories of the understanding. The object 'block' for example, possesses spatio-temporal characters as well as categorial features at once. As a spatio-temporal entity it is a whole which admits of being divided into parts. As

an entity having categorical features it is the object of a particular kind different from other kinds and also from other objects of the same kind. The Naiyāyikas also account for these features and characters of the object but not in the way in which Kant did it. Their categorical framework is different from that of Kant and this accounts for the said difference.

Modern Empiricism, as advocated by A.J. Ayer, approaches the problems of perception from the point of view of justification by means of linguistic analysis. In the hand of Ayer empiricism has been converted into phenomenalism. In this respect Ayer is a true successor of Berkeley with the difference that unlike Berkeley he did not try to base theism on phenomenalism. According to Ayer, the sentences which we make about material objects in our day to day life can be translated, without remainder, into sentences which refer exclusively to sense data. It is said that this reduction is not admissible in view of the fact that no set of statements about sense data is equivalent to a statement about a material object and also in view of the fact that while material object statements are, sense data statements are not, corrigible. Ayer admits the cogency of the objection but denies its force. From the absence of equivalence, Ayer holds, absence of the same referent does not follow. In other words, Ayer claims that with regard to our knowledge of material object and perceptual knowledge of object

we can move back and forth by way of translation between the material mode of language and formal mode of language. This has a very little relevance to the theories of perception as developed by the ancient Indian Philosophers. For Ayerean view of perception and the language in which it is to be expressed presuppose, to a very great extent, the physiological theory of the structure and function of sense-organs of perception as well as the structures and function of human nervous system together with the theory used in developing instrumental aids for augmenting the range of these sense-organs in such a way as to make objects perceptible which were never perceived before in ancient time.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the French Phenomenologist -Existentialist, was dissatisfied with both whetting of the analytic knife by the practitioners of analytic philosophy in Great Britain and America and spontaneous picture painting of authentic self-living by the practitioners of French Existentialism. Following Husserl he gave the Clarion call 'back to perception'. He believed that only by restoring the primacy which naturally belongs to perception we can do justice to the situation as it really is, for man is essentially a being-in-the-world. He is not an unrelated point-instant-atomic-existence which lives in and through its exclusiveness from all other such atomic existences.

Man is a being who is immersed in the world and cannot be cut out and dissected in the propositions of sensedatum language. We are to recapture the lived experience (labenwelt) and to do it we are to go back to the world as the subject encounters it in perception. Sensation is a myth and we begin with perception. Sensation is only a by-product of analysis and as there are different types of analysis so there are different accounts of what sensation is and different accounts of the propositions of sensation language in which they can be expressed. And in this battle of bloodless categories of different versions of sense-datum language avoiding category-mistakes in their foot-steps we are spectators in a world of shadows and are not in the world of full blooded living reality.

The phenomenological-cum-Existential account is typically a product of 20th Century Western mind benumbed by the impact of horrors of two world wars and as such is furthest remove from any theory of perception propounded by any ancient Indian thinkers. To attempt to compare such a theory with, say, the theory of perception of Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika is like comparing a modern tank with all its gadgets and sophisticated electronic devices with the chariot of, say, Sātyaki or Arjuna in respect of their efficiency as war-machines.

So, a few words regarding desirability or otherwise as well as the extent of comparative study of different

theories taken from different cultural milieu are not out of place here. Products of two different cultures can be successfully compared if and only if the two cultures are not totally different nor are they in their development so apart as to render any attempt at comparison insignificant and meaningless. That is why the ancient Indian theories of perception could be fruitfully compared to the theories of perception of the Greek Philosophers and the Philosophers of the Mediaeval Western Philosophy. This is so because the culture of the Greek as well as the Mediaeval Philosophers were not much different from that of Indian Philosophers. But the culture and civilisation of Western men of the present day are far removed from those of ancient Indian thinkers and any attempted comparison of the theories of ancient Indian thinkers with those of modern philosophers and psychologists of the West will inevitably render the theories of Ancient Indian thinkers a laughing stock.

C.W.K.Mundle is a phenomenologist and he had realistic tendency and for his realistic tendency we like to make a comparative study of his philosophy with the Philosophy of Nyāya which is also basically a realistic philosophy. According to him, "... These tenets may be summarized as claims about perceptible physical objects, namely that these

- (1) are located in physical space,
- (2) are accessible to different sense-organs,

- (3) are immediately presented to sight,
- (4) are immediately presented to touch,
- (5) are accessible to different observers,
- (6) have a continuous existence,
- (7) retain their perceptible properties when not being perceived,
- (8) possess casual powers"¹⁷.

The Naiyayikas also have admitted the eight tenets mentioned above. Hence, a similarity is found between the Nyāya and Mundle's view. But we find, if studied minutely, that the Nyāya admits something more which are not admitted by Mundle's account of perception from the point of view of realistic phenomenology. For example, Nyāya admits perception as a species of knowledge and also admits this species of knowledge, as knowledge, to be an adventitious quality of the self-substance which is born only when the self-substance is in contact with another material substance called mind or manas. Therefore, subscribing to the realistic tenets as enunciated by Mundle is enough for Nyāya theory of perception.

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CHAPTER III

PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION AMONG THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

Questions concerning a problem are of two kinds viz. External and internal questions. (1) External question regarding the establishment of points of agreement or concurrence by proponents and opponents offering different solutions of the problem. This admits of determination of degrees e.g., "what is cognitive experience"? is an external question and answer to this question is to be arrived at by means of an agreement or concurrence as to what degree of articulation makes human experience a cognitive experience.

(2) Internal question is a question which is raised within the ambit of concurrence already made or an agreement already arrived at and admits of 'Yes' 'no' type of

answer, e.g., a question whether a cognitive experience is or is not an interpreted experience. To make the said distinction clear I like to quote a few lines from Alan Pasch : "... a question of degree is an external question; once a decision about a convention has been made, ^{and} a context determined, then - and within the context - any question about the context is an internal question. Furthermore, the answer to an internal question will have the form of a definite ("yes-no") assertion, and this answer is determined by the nature of the context which gives the question significance. The answer to an external question, however, will be a statement of degree, or a proposal about establishing a convention"¹.

The question of primacy of perception is an external question while other questions regarding the role played by perception are arbitrary in cases of conflict between different sources of knowledge and as such are internal questions. Likewise the question whether perception with or without interpretation is possible, is an internal question.

From the perusal of the list of sources of knowledge as enunciated by different schools of Indian Philosophy, it will be evident that everyone of them accepts perception as the first source of knowledge.

The philosophers belonging to different schools of Indian philosophy, despite irreconcilable difference on

other points, are unanimous in bestowing primary status on perception as a source of knowledge. The reason for this will be evident if the nature of perceptual experience be analysed in depth.

Experience, according to them, can be divided into two groups : (i) experience which is generated without the help of any other knowledge as part of the sumtotal of its generative conditions and (ii) experience which is not so generated. And perception or perceptual experience is a cognition which is generated by sumtotal of conditions of which knowledge as a mental mode is not a part. Thus, it is evident that the agreement to accord primacy to perception or Pratyakṣa as a source of knowledge involves a tacit agreement by all schools of Indian Philosophy to the effect that a knowledge the cause of which does not contain in itself any knowledge is perception. This agreement is an external question and answer to this question is the basic reason for unanimity without which no discussion can commence.

Perception is the basic source or primary source of knowledge, as other modes of knowledge or cognition e.g. anumāna or inference, Śabda or testimony, upamāna or comparison, arthāpatti or presumption, anupalavdhi or non-apprehension etc. presuppose perception. We will try to show this in the sequel. It is common knowledge that all

Indian Philosophers except Cārvāka admitted anumāna or inference as a distinct source of valid cognition or pramā. Etymologically 'anumāna means 'after knowledge. "Here, 'after knowledge' means after perceptual knowledge i.e. this knowledge is produced depending on perception. From the Gaūtām Sūtra we find that inference depends on perception.

The word 'Tatpurvakaṃ' or 'before this', used in the Gautam Sūtra means 'pratyakṣa purvakaṃ'. The question may be asked why does experience depend on perception? Inference is dependent on the knowledge of Vyāpti (concomitance) and Vyāpti-jñāna (Experience of concomitance) is due to pratyakṣa, Hence, inferential knowledge presupposes perceptual cognition and therefore, perception, being the basic source of knowledge, is primary.

Like anumāna (inference), Śabda (Testimony) is also dependent on perception. Śabda functions as the correlative between the object and situation. It required collection of appropriate letters in consecutive order constituting word which are appropriate for expressing the knowledge the speaker possesses and is desirous of communicating verbally the same to the listener. Thus, the speaker must perceive the relation between the appropriate word and object. Again the listener has to listen the spoken words of the speaker, and thus, listening is also a perception i.e.

auditory perception.

Śabda is dependent on perception in the sense of perception by a native speaker of the presence or absence of fittingness in the use of that language in a society to which he belongs although he may or may not have a formal training i.e. grammar e.g. "I is". Here in this example, there is absence of fittingness. In ākankhyā (expectancy). Yogyatā (fitness) Tātparjya (significance) which are pre-requisites for Śabdajñāna or verbal knowledge there is fittingness. In the case of testimony there is perception of fittingness and for this reason we can say that testimony is dependent on perception.

Now it will be shown that Upamāna or comparison like inference and testimony depends on perception. We find that the Cārvākas do not admit comparison as a source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyaists do not admit comparison as a distinct source of knowledge. They include it under inference and perception respectively. The Buddhists reduce comparison to perception and testimony. The Naiyāyikas, Mimāṃsakas and Advaitins admit comparison as a separate irreducible source of knowledge. Now our business is to give the meaning of Upamāna as given by different Indian thinkers.

According to Gautama, upamāna is the knowledge of what comes to be known from well known similarity, Later

Naiyāyikas define upamāna as samjñā-samjñi-Jñāna i.e. it is the knowledge of the relation that obtains between name and the thing named. According to the Mimāṃsakas, upamāna is the knowledge by means of similarity where we arrive at the second likeness between objects by means of first likeness e.g. 'Gosadvāsa Gavayapadavācya' i.e. that which is like cow is Gavaya.

To the Mimāṃsakas, knowledge from comparison arises when we perceive 'X' and were told that 'Y' is like 'X'. Then when in another situation we perceive 'Y' we remember what we were told. And this perception together with the remembrance gives rise to the knowledge that 'Y' has likeness to 'X'.

A comparison of the linguistic articulation of these two perceptions of similarity shows that they are different. In the first likeness similarity goes from 'X' to 'Y' whereas in the second it goes from 'Y' to 'X'. However the basic presupposition of the Mimāṃsakas is that the relation of likeness or similarity is not necessarily a symmetric relation like the relation of equality. Again, according to the Advaitins, the knowledge which comes from the knowledge of different objects by means of similarity is called upamiti. Be it noted that according to the Advaitins, Knowledge by comparison can also be arrived at by means of dissimilarity.

Now we like to sum up our discussion. As the Vaiśeṣikas include upamāna under inference we can say that upamāna depends on perception, because inference depends on perception. Again, although Sāṅkhya's view, cannot be taken for granted as valid. Yet it cannot be brushed aside lightly. Their view is not valid because perceptual knowledge is not indubitably shown to be the source of the knowledge of Upamāna. The Nyāya, Mimāṃsā and Advaita views are that Upamāna is due to similarity. If it be so, it depends on perception because the knowledge of similarity or dissimilarity can be obtained by perception. Thus, we can say that upamāna in a sense presupposes perception but not the other way about. Hence, we can say that perception is the basic source of knowledge and as such is primary.

Arthāpatti or presumption is admitted by the Mimāṃsakas and Advaitins as a separate irreducible source of knowledge. It is the legitimate hypothesis of an unperceived fact which explains successfully some known discrepancies in experience. Two inconsistent facts become consistent by means of presumption. According to Śābara, arthāpatti is "the presumption of something not seen on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is

somewhat outside the house"².

Arthāpaṭṭi is of two kinds viz. (a) dr̥stārthapatti and (b) śrutārthāpatti. As for example of Dr̥stārthapatti we can cite of the 'Hidden face'. Here, the perceiver perceives a picture of one thing from one angle without use of words; as soon as the picture is set in a different angle he sees another content in the picture. This contention has its corroboration from an unexpected source, namely, Wittgenstein's explanation of 'Seeing as' in his 'Philosophical Investigation'.

Again, 'you are the tenth' is an example of Śrutārthāpatti. The fact of existence of 'tenth person' is in the field of visual perception, but has remained unnoticed by the perceiver. When the perceiver is told or when field of visual perception of the perceiver is reorganised or differently regulated he started perceiving the previously unnoticed object of perception although the said object remained in the field of perception all the while.

As arthāpaṭṭi is a Pre-supposition, it obviously requires observation which is other name of regulated perception. From this, can we not say that arthāpaṭṭi is based on perception? Moreover, Kapil, Pātanjali, Mādhva, Rāmānuja etc., think that arthāpatti is a kind of inference and not a separate irreducible means of

knowledge³. The Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins also included it under inference. If it be so, then arthāpatti no doubt is dependent on Pratyakṣa or perception. That is why perception should be considered to be the basic source of knowledge.

Now, we shall discuss the status of anupalavdhi as a separate source of knowledge. This instrument of knowledge has been admitted by the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas and the Advaitins.

Anupalavdhi means absence of upalavdhi or cognition which causes a cognition of absence. This means of knowledge cannot function without perception because the apprehension of the non-apprehension of an object is a kind of perception. If the object is not previously perceived, we cannot assert the non-existence of that object. Hence, knowledge of non existence i.e. anupalavdhi depends on perception of particular object. For example, "there is no flower on the table". Here, we perceive 'a table' and not the 'flower', i.e. flower is not perceived. Here, non-apprehension of the flower is perceived by perceiving only 'table' as the locus having no flower on it. In anupalavdhi there is anuyogi (locus) and Pratiyogi (object), and we may say that anupalavdhi is the perception of the absence of perception of object from a locus. It is apprehension of the non-perception of the conjectured existence of an object. From this it follows that non-apprehension depends on perception.

From the above discussion we find that every means of knowledge except perception depends on other means or presupposes perception. Therefore, we can conclude, not perhaps without justification, that perception is the basic source of knowledge. Every knowledge other than perception depends on perception i.e., all knowledge pre-supposes perceptual cognition as its generative condition. However, perception alone does not depend upon any type of cognition for its generation. So we can say that perception is immediate and for this characteristic we can say that perception is the basic source of knowledge. The question of immediacy or directness of perception is also an internal question. The posing of this question pre-supposes (1) agreement regarding the status of perception as cognitive experience, (2) the status of perception as first among the equals, and (3) arbiter for the dissolution of conflict which may arise among the different sources of knowledge.

Indian philosophers of all schools held that human perception comes through a combination of two different factors. The first, they have called direct or immediate awareness and the second interpretation (Kalpana) integrating this immediate awareness with the similar awareness of object of the past resulting in perceptual knowledge of object. For the operation of the second factor objects of common experience, viz. Brksa, manusya, ghata and pata are required.

Corresponding to the direct awareness this is another kind of object viz. the unadulterated given (svalakṣaṇa) i.e. object unalloyed by qualities and relations. In relation to the object of direct awareness, the second is called the constructed or thought constructed (Buddhinirmāna) because integration of kalpanā is done by buddhi.

If this explanation of perception is correct, the question about the nature of our most intimate and indubitable primitive experience, the kind to which these philosophers ardently desire to tag all discursive knowledge, has an answer. Thus the philosophers who explained perception by the distinction between the given and the taken, find in the given the foundations of all knowledge, external and internal, describing awareness of it as an indubitable presupposition for a knowledge of empirical facts.

This distinction of the given and non-given or taken in perception is the end result of an analysis of experience from a particular point of view, and it may be objected that the analysis is not pushed far enough to arrive at an end result which itself is unanalysable. To this objection it may be said in reply that to push the analysis beyond the point of the distinction between the given and non-given is to push it beyond the range of significance.

It may again be objected that the question about the distinction of the given and non-given in the primitive

direct experience being a psychological question recourse must be had to empirical psychology. And the verdict of the empirical psychology is that direct experience does not contain such distinct elements. To this objection it may again be replied that the opinion of psychology in this context has no epistemological significance. It is epistemology rather than psychology that is to be looked for the guidance in the enunciation of the distinction between given and non-given, and accordingly the said distinction must be examined in a purely epistemological light. What this is tantamount to is that whether or not the given has real existence, all that an upholder of the distinction between the given and non-given needs claim for the given is logical or analytic existence. As Russell points out, "the atoms I wish to arrive at as a last resort in analysis are logical atoms"⁴.

Thus, the contention of Mimāṃsakas to the effect that the given is the psychological atom arrived at by means of experience, is untenable. For C.D. Broad observes that pure sensation is "an ideal limit rather than the observable fact"⁵. In this context the contention of the Nyāya to the effect that the given is the atom of logical analysis is cogent. It is a common experience that verdicts of different types of knowledge are often opposed to each other and unless the opposition or conflict be removed the knowledge is incapable of translating itself into action. But how are

we to resolve such a conflict ? Again the Indian Philosophers are generally in agreement that perceptual experience normally is to be used for the resolution of such conflict of experience. For example, when we are assailed by doubt whether 'idam' in front of us is 'Brksa' or 'Tree' or a 'man', the doubt is ultimately resolved by the perception of the specific characteristics, common and peculiar to either of the alternatives, i.e. perception of either leaves and branches, or hands and feet. Likewise the conflict between inferential cognition is usually dissolved by perceptual experience. And the same is true when Upamity or Śābdajñāna is in conflict with another type of knowledge. It is not out of place to mention here that in Western Philosophy perception is accorded a Primary place in the resolution of doubt resulting in knowledge. Thus, western philosophers almost universally admit that "each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience"⁶. This primacy of perceptual experience in resolving doubt is also unequivocally admitted by the supporters of the verification theory of meaning, the theory that "the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it"⁷.

We have found that every thinker has admitted perception as a valid source of knowledge and in all the cases other than perception there is probability of it being false. It is to be noted in this connection that if the sense-organs of the individuals are not defective, then the perceptual

knowledge will be valid no doubt. In the conflict between different types of knowledge perception generally overrides, and in this sense we can say that perception is the basic source of knowledge. In some cases perception gives absolutely true knowledge which can never be attained by other types of knowledge. For example 'I have tooth ache.' Here, by no means it can be proved conclusively that I am not feeling tooth ache. This absolute validity of perception shows that perception overrides other types of knowledge. To quote Prof. K.K.Banerjee "All the systems agree in holding Pratyakṣa (perception) to be a pramāṇa, but then they differ in their accounts of it and this difference is owing to their differences in ontology"⁸.

The above discussion shows that perception is the primary source of knowledge.

At this point an important question arises which demands a discussion and if possible an answer. The question is : Perception being primary or there being primacy of perception, are all other pramāṇas reducible to perception without remainder ? In other words, is there an irreducible element in every pramāṇa other than perception ?

In reply to the above question the Cārvākas claimed that all pramāṇas other than perception are in the last analysis reducible to perception. The reason for this, according to them, is the unargued assumption that if one pramāṇa is dependent on another for its generation, it is

reducible to that pramāna on which it is dependent. If we take this assumption to be true, then all other pramāṇas such as inference, comparison, Testimony, Presumption, non-apprehension etc. are reducible to perception without remainder. But why should we accept this unargued assumption as true ? There is neither rational nor heuristic justification for taking this assumption as true. For example, 'X is dependent on Y' does not and cannot mean necessarily that 'X is reducible to Y'. Dependence does not necessarily imply reduction of one thing into another. Hence, with the exposure of the hollowness of the unargued assumption of the Cārvākas, the ground beneath their conclusion is cut off. Thus we can say that although other pramāṇas are dependent on perception yet they are not reducible to perception. The same applies to the contentions of other schools of Indian Philosophy to reduce one pramāṇa to another.

In this connection, it is of interest to note that Indian Philosophers admitted, in addition to the major sources, some minor sources of cognition also. They are : (a) Aithiya or tradition, (b) Sambhava or inclusion, (c) Cestā or gesture, and (d) Parisēṣa or elimination.

As regards aitihiya or tradition it has been regarded by the Paurānikas as a source of cognition. It is taken by them to mean a body of traditional beliefs which have their origination in immemorial past and which have been handed down from generation to generation. However, as the source of these beliefs are unknown and as we have no dependable

means of ascertaining their reliability, aitiḥya or tradition is, in principle, unacceptable as a source of cognition. However, if by any means these beliefs are rendered believable they are acceptable, not as an independent source of cognition, but as a kind of Āptavacana or testimony.

Sambhava or inclusion is taken as the process knowing something mediately or indirectly on account of its being included in something else which is already known. Sambhava is of two kinds : (a) possible inclusion & (b) certain inclusion. As regards the former it is generally uncertain and as such cannot be regarded as a source of cognition at all. For example, 'a Kṣatriya may not normally possess powers a brahmin is endowed with. But it is uncertain whether a Kṣatriya will never possess these powers. As an example of it we can mention that Viśvāmitra exhibits an exception to the rule. So far the latter is concerned this is illustrated in such cognitive judgement as 'Ten includes one' which is valid. This being so sambhava of the latter type may be accepted as a source of cognition. Still the question remains whether it should be recognised as an independent source of cognition or reducible to another source of cognition. The answer, it goes without saying, is that it is a form of inference. But this inference is not the type of inference which is admitted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mimāṃsakas and the Sāṅkhyaist.

Rather this form of inference is dependent upon the application of the principles of implication. Thus the list of the major sources of cognition is badly in need of enlargement. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mimāṃsakas and the Sāṅkhyaists should, but did not, recognize two altogether different types of inference, one syllogistic and the other implicative.

Ceṣṭā or gesture is regarded by Tāntrika as a source of cognition on the ground of its having a special epistemic significance. Gestures consists of certain bodily movement and facial expression conveying certain meanings or serving as directions to the performing of certain actions. As such they are non-verbal. Gesture which consists of bodily movement and facial expressions conveying meaning may be regarded as a form of inference which is based on the invariable concomitance between the said gestures and their meaning. As regards the gestures which serve as direction to the performance of certain actions, they, being of the nature of Kāraka (action) and not jñāpaka (knowledge) cannot be source of cognition whatsoever.

Parīśeṣa or elimination is a source of cognition in the process of knowing something by means of the elimination from a group of objects. Undoubtedly things are sometimes cognised after this fashion, consequently elimination as a process of cognition is genuine. But this is not an

irreducible source of cognition. Elimination is after all the same as the process of perceiving subject to the exercise of circumspection and discrimination, i.e. a process of observation. Thus *pariśeṣa* is in the last analysis a variant of perception.

"What, then", according to Dr. N.V.Banerjee, "was really needed for the determination of the identity and the number of the sources of cognition was the judicious employment of the principle represented by the law of parsimony. The Cārvākas are, perhaps, the only group of Indian Philosophers who accepted this principle whole-heartedly. But then, the trouble with them was that they went too far in their employment of this principle, This is evident from their rejection of all sources of cognition except perception ..., the Vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsā Philosophy, on the other hand, paid no heed to the principle under consideration at least in respect of their treatment of the sources of cognition. As a result, they indiscriminately inflated their number so as to recognize as many as six of them. As regards the remaining schools of Indian Philosophy, they sought to steer clear of the Scylla of the extremism of Cārvākas and the Charybdis of the counter extremism of the Vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsā Philosophy. Accordingly the number of the sources of the cognition admitted by them ranged between

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two and five. But it was given to Sankhya ~~philosophy~~ alone to arrive at a satisfactory decision with regard to the identity and number of the sources of the cognition. This is evident from the fact that perception, inference and testimony, the three sources of cognition which they have admitted are each independent of the others, and, what is more, they together constitute the entire corpus of unquestionably legitimate sources of cognition"⁹. Intend to join issue with Dr. Banerjee with regard to his use of the word "independent" at the fag end of the quotation stated above. With him we also admit that inference and testimony are not reducible to perception nor are they reducible to others. But absence of reducibility does not and cannot necessarily mean absence of dependence. What is later in time is certainly dependent for its origination on what went before. But this dependence does not mean what is later in time is reducible to what is earlier in time. Nor does it mean that son is reducible to father because son is dependent on father for origination. Therefore, although we accept other contentions of Dr. Banerjee we are able to accept his verdict to the effect that perception, inference and testimony are each independent of the other.

Therefore, at the fag end of our discussion we may, perhaps not without justification, come to the conclusion that (a) there is primacy of perception as source of knowledge, (b) that there are sources of knowledge other than perception and (c) that these other sources of knowledge are dependent on but not reducible to perception.

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CHAPTER IV

CERTAIN TYPES OF PERCEPTION

4.1. Nyāya View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

According to the Nyāya, in one way perception is of two kinds viz. (a) ordinary perception or Laukika Pratyakṣa and (b) extra-ordinary perception or alaukika Pratyakṣa. Ordinary perception, again, is of two types, viz. (i) determinate perception and (ii) indeterminate perception. Here, we will discuss these divisions.

Determinate perception is just opposite to indeterminate perception i.e., it possesses determinate character and it is relational¹. Perception generally is the perception of definite object (Viśiṣṭadravya Pratyakṣa). Substantives, attributes and substantives as characterised by attributes these three make qualified cognition. The perception which is of the nature of Viśiṣṭajñāna

(relational perceptual cognition) is called determinate perception.

Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is such perception in which the object does not possess any determinate character or Prakāra². In it though there is substantives and attributes, yet we cannot understand or know, this is substantive or this is attribute. Here, we have no relational cognition.

From above discussion we find the difference between determinate perception and indeterminate perception. The Naiyāyikas have pointed out that without the admission of indeterminate perception, determinate perception i.e. definite perception, cannot be possible because the cause of relational cognition of the qualified (Viśiṣṭajñāna) is the cognition of qualifying attributes (Viśeṣjñāna).

According to the Naiyāyikas, indeterminate cognition is not perceived retrospectively. It is inferential. The manifestation of objects of cognition in Vyavasāya-jñāna or determinate cognition are the same as those in the case of non-relational perception. According to Nyāya view, indeterminate perception cannot be known by mental perception or by anuvyavasāya. It can only be known by inference. First, there is indeterminate perception and then determinate perception. Consider, for example, a case of perceptual cognition — 'This is pot'. When I said, 'I am seeing a

pot' — which is characterised by potness, I may be questioned, what are you perceiving ? - For answering this question, I am to take the help of mental perception or *anuvyavasāya* (in the sense of retrospection).

The perception of Pot possessing Potness (*Ghatatva viśiṣṭa ghata*) is called determinate perception. But that perception in which objects denoted normally by nouns and adjectives have been manifested but the manifestation of the relation between the objects is absent, is called indeterminate perception. Determinate perception presupposes indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception comes first, it precedes. Determinate perception comes later, it follows. The awareness of *Viśiṣṭa* or being qualified by a quality presupposes the awareness separately of that which is qualified (object denoted by noun) and that which qualifies (object denoted by adjective). Without the perception of the object denoted by the adjective there cannot be *Viśiṣṭa* cognition or determinate cognition. The awareness of substantives and adjectives separately which is non-relational is called indeterminate perception. We can put the contention of the *Naiyāyikas* regarding this issue by saying that indeterminate perception is the first stage of cognition which can never be known directly (i.e. by perception). Yet it is admitted by them because of the fact that without it the very existence of the determinate perception is not possible.

Only of determinate cognition anuvyavasāya is possible but in respect of indeterminate cognition anuvyavasaya is not possible. In indeterminate cognition there is no substance — attribute relation. For this reason perception of indeterminate cognition, is not possible. As indeterminate perception does not involve any judgement, therefore, it is taken to be a case of pre-judgemental cognition. But determinate perception is judgemental cognition.

4.2. Advaita View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Like the Nyāya thinkers the Advaitins (non-dualists) also admit two kinds of perception, namely, determinate and indeterminate perception. According to them,

'vaiśistyavagāhijñāna (mediated by relational knowledge) is determinate perception. Samsargānavagāhi Jñāna (not mediated by relation) is called indeterminate perception.

Determinate perception is an immediate cognition that apprehends relation between terms (Samsarga-avagāhi jñānaṃ). Contrariwise, indeterminate perception is one which is not relational or discursive. It apprehends identity. There is similarity between the views of Nyāya and Advaita as to the definition or lakṣaṇa of determinate perception and indeterminate perception. But there is also difference between the two views regarding the instances of indeterminate perception.

Dharmarāja, the author of Vedānta-Paribhāṣā has explained indeterminate perception with the help of two instances, one of which is taken from ordinary life (Laukika) and the other from scripture (Śāstriya). 'This is that Devadatta' (So'yam Devadatta) is the example of indeterminate perception ^{/(Laukika);} 'Thou art that' (Tattvamasi) is an instance of scriptural (Śāstriya) indeterminate perception. In 'this is that Devadatta' — 'that' indicates Devadatta whom I met previously and 'This' indicates the person Devadatta whom I am seeing here and now before me, same Devadatta continuing in existence from the past to the present. In 'Tattvamasi' we find a relation of non-difference (abheda Samvaddha) between 'Tat' and 'Tvam'. Hence, it may be asked how can it be an indeterminate perception? In reply to this, the Advaitins point out that 'abheda' (non-difference) is not really a 'Samvaddha' or relation requiring two relata. It is identity. Since identity or non-difference is no relation, perception of identity is indeterminate perception.

The Naiyāyikas have raised an objection against the examples of indeterminate perception as given above by pointing out that these are not examples of perceptual cognition but of verbal comprehension. The reason is that such cognition of identity does not arise from sense-object contact or operation of senses. Dharmarāja's answer to this objection is that there is no necessity that perceptual

cognition will always be due to sense-object contact. What is necessary in perception is that there should be identity between the subject of cognition, the object of cognition and the cognition . Some times senses function in bringing about this identity, sometimes not.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of perceptual cognition is due to anuvyavasāya or retrospection. To them, knowledge is not self-revealing but manifested by anuvyavasāya i.e. another piece of knowledge to which it becomes an object. The function of consciousness is to reveal its subject. It is Viṣaya-Prakāśa-svabhāva. It does not manifest itself but only its object. It cannot be an object to itself i.e. self-manifesting. It can only be the object of another cognition and be the object of that. That which is non-relational cannot be an object of anuvyavasāya because to be an object of anuvyavasāya is to be related; and as indeterminate perception is nonrelational, it cannot be known perceptually. Its knowledge is inferential. But the Advaitins hold that the knowledge of indeterminate perception is perceptual for knowledge is self-revealing. For the knowledge of it there is no need to postulate another cognition. The Nyāya thinkers hold that indeterminate knowledge is neither valid nor invalid. But the Advaitins do not subscribe to this view and point out its inconsistency.

There can be another objection against the Advaita theory and their examples of indeterminate perception. It may be said that the instances given ('This is that Devadatta'), (You are Brahman) are instances of apprehension of the relation between the meanings of words, and therefore, the cognition is cognition of relation and not of identity. The Advaita reply to this objection is that this is not so. It is not that the relation of the meaning of words always determine the sense of a sentence; because were it so, unintended relation would also be apprehended. What is conveyed by a sentence is its intention (Tātparya). The sentences in the examples are meant to convey identity or non-difference between Brahman and self or between Devadatta of the past and of the present. In these cases relation is not to be understood, for relation is not meant or intended. Thus, though there is relation between words, there is no relation in the sense intended. Therefore, these sentences exemplify non-relational nirvikalpaka cognition or indeterminate cognition.

Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is prearticulate cognition. But indeterminate perception, according to Advaita, is the cognition in which the distinction between the subject and object is lost as well as the distinction between sukha or pleasure and anubhava or knowledge is lost. Hence, from the Advaita point of view indeterminate perception is superior.

4.3. Viśiṣṭādvaita View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Rāmānujists and the Mādhva thinkers subscribe to similar views regarding determinate and indeterminate perception. Śribhāṣyakāra in his commentary holds the view that determinate perception apprehends the relation of dravya (substance) with guṇa (quality), Karma (action) etc. Indeterminate perception is also cognition of relation of particular attributes. It does not mean absence in knowledge of all attributes (sarvadharmarahita). No purely non-relational perception is possible. It is so because in every knowledge there is an assertion of a relation between the subject and predicate. For example, "this is red". Here, 'this' is subject, 'red' is the predicate which is asserted to be related to the subject. This predicate stands for an attribute which qualifies the object denoted by 'this'. Knowledge without predicate (Vidheyabhāva-sūnya) is an absurdity. But it is to be remembered that in indeterminate perception all attributes are not known, but there may be manifestation of particular attributes³. The first perception of an object is indeterminate perception and its perception at subsequent times when we perceive it is called determinate perception. "What is called nirvikalpaka is the cognition of the first individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. The savikalpaka is the cognition of the second (third and so on) individual qualified by its attributes, configuration,

etc. grasped with retrospection"⁴. "What was indefinite and devoid of specific judgement in the nirvikalpaka perception becomes definite and determinate in the Savikalpaka perception"⁵.

According to the Rāmānujists, all knowledge is rational and is expressed in the form of "This is that". They refute the indeterminate perception of the Advaita-Vedāntins and Naiyāyikas. Śāṅkara, the Advaitin, has admitted that determinate perception has empirical validity. This has been rejected by the Rāmānujists and they hold that determinate perception has metaphysical validity. Thus we find that Rāmānujists' view differs from Nyāya and Advaita views.

4.4. Sāṅkhya View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Vācaspati Mīśra divides perception into two classes viz. (i) indeterminate perception and (ii) determinate perception. This division shows that Vācaspati Mīśra follows the Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas. According to him, ālocanā-jñāna or the primitive cognition from sense-object-contact is indeterminate perception. On the other hand, determinate perception is due to the perception of manas or mind. "According to Vācaspati, buddhi comes into touch with external objects through the senses. At first moment of the contact there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particular features of the object are not noticed,

and we have only indeterminate perception. At the second moment, through the exercise of mental analysis (Vikalpa) and synthesis (saṅkalpa), the object is perceived as possessing, a definite nature and we have determinate perception"⁶. In this connection, it be noted that Vācaspati holds that an object is determined by manas. Like the Tārkikas and Mimānsakas, Sāṅkhya also admits the determinate and indeterminate as an appropriate division of perceptual cognition. The Sāṅkhya like Nyāya thinks that indeterminate perception is the root of determinate perception.

In Sāṅkhyatattvā-Kaumadi it has been said that external Jñānendriyas (organs of knowledge) give us at first indeterminate perception; but determinate perception is a product of manas or mind. But Sāṅkhya is silent on the point whether indeterminate perception is pramā or apramā or cognition other than pramā or apramā. The example which sāṅkhya gives carries the suggestion that sāṅkhya is in this respect subscribing to the contention of the Mimānsakas as opposed to the contention of the Naiyāyikas. That is, they with the Mimānsakas accept indeterminate perception as the psychological antecedent to determinate perception. For example, at the first moment the visual apprehension of the tree appears as greenish object or form and in the next moment it appears as a banyan tree with trunk, branches and providing shade beneath from the sun.

4.5. Mimānsakas View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

According to the Buddhists, there can be no determinate perception ; all valid perception are indeterminate perception. Though the Advaitins admit both determinate and indeterminate perception, yet they opine that by indeterminate perception alone we can have the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. We can never get the knowledge of it by means of determinate perception because Reality is one (non-dual). The grammarian e.g., Bhaṭṭhari, recognizes only determinate perception. According to him, not only is perception determinate but all forms of knowledge are determinate also as all of them involve verbalization. "There is no cognition in the world, which is not accompanied by words; all cognitions are, as it were, interpenetrated by words"⁷. No knowledge can be attained without apprehension of the relation between word and its meaning. Hence, all perceptions being necessarily verbalized are determinate. Indeterminate cognition which is non-relational is a mere figment of the imagination.

Like the Naiyāyikas, the Mimānsakas admit two stages of perception, namely, (a) determinate perception and (b) indeterminate perception⁸. We have found that the grammarians do not admit indeterminate perception but Kumāṛila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school, and Prabhākara

point out that to deny indeterminate perception is to deny a well established fact. The experience that we get at the first moment is non-relational, it is bare sensation. But it is not valueless because predicative consciousness can only be possible by means of indeterminate perception. Determinate perception, according to them, is a relational and articulated form of perception. This means that in determinate perception the different parts of the object are revealed as related giving us the object as one object. Indeterminate perception is prior stage to determinate perception.

The Mimāṃsakas hold that the indeterminate perception is the perception of infants, dumb persons and animals and is produced by the object⁹. On the ground of direct apprehension indeterminate perception is considered by the Mimāṃsakas as Pramā or veridical perception although it is incommunicable being unverbalisable. Here we find a similarity with the view of William James who characterised the perception of an infant as a "blooming, buzzing confusion", i.e., the perception of the infants are not determined by the representative elements. According to Kumāṛila, in indeterminate perception neither particularity nor Universality is present to consciousness. The Mimāṃsakas like Sāṅkhya philosophers regard indeterminate perception as "ālocana jñāna" or pure presentative cognition untainted by representative element. It is inarticulate

cognition. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara are of opinion that determinate perception is valid because its main cause, mukhyakāraṇa, is the subject-object intercourse which is aided by recollection and this recollection is its auxiliary causes (Sahakārikāraṇam).

According to Kumārila, both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are valid. Indeterminate perception is direct apprehension. It is valid because it is direct and immediate. Prabhākara also holds that indeterminate perception is valid because it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection. Moreover, the validity of indeterminate perception is proved by self-awareness.

As regards indeterminate perception of the Bhāṭṭas, says A.B.Keith, "Kumarila happily expresses the primitive form of perceptions as bare observation (Ālocanā) pertaining to the object pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that a new born child has of its environment. (The savikalpaka pratyaksa adding afterwards, or rather breaking up the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa into substance, class, quality, motion as distinct from the thing moving, name etc.)"¹⁰.

4.6. Jaina View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

The Jainas have admitted only determinate perception and rejected indeterminate perception and they hold the view that perception is clear or spasta. "The Jaina thinks that all knowledge including perceptual knowledge is of a determinate nature which is opposed to doubt. The Buddhists hypothesis of indeterminate cognition is not supported by experience. Only doubt can be indeterminate"¹¹.

The Jainas reject indeterminate perception on the following grounds :

First, indeterminate perception cannot be vaisistha-avaḡāhi i.e. cannot determine the nature of its object as endowed with its specific qualities. Hence, indeterminate perception is not clear perception and as such they have demurred to admit indeterminate perception as pratyakṣa or perception. Secondly, it cannot unlike a valid determinate cognition apprehend itself (Sva-agrāhaka). Thirdly, it cannot apprehend its objects definitely, i.e. it is not a distinct cognition.

As by 'perception' the Jainas understand definite, clear and distinct perception and as indeterminate perception does not have such characteristics, therefore, they are not ready to accept indeterminate perception as one of the stages of perception. It may not be out of place here

to mention that the view of the Jainas regarding the non-acceptance of indeterminate perception reminds us by way of contrast the Buddhists' view to the effect that only the indeterminate perception is valid and determinate perception is false i.e. the Jainas views regarding indeterminate perception is just reverse of the Buddha view. The Jainas are of opinion that indeterminate perception which is devoid of all relations of things and qualities is a psychological myth.

Anyway the question is : can we deny indeterminate perception fully ? Our answer will be in the negative. If it be so, the position of the Jainas will not be acceptable. In this connection, I am quoting following lines after Nyāya : "If indeterminate perception (Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa) is denied, and only determinate perception (Savikalpaka) is accepted, such an assumption would involve an ad infinitum regress; for we know that determinate perception is analysed into the knowledge of the thing itself and the knowledge of its attributes; the knowledge of the thing itself and its attributes is therefore a necessary preliminary to determinate perception. First we know the Visēya as unconnected with its Visēsanas then the Visēsanas themselves, and then only by synthesizing these impressions we have determinate perception"¹².

4.7. The Bauddha View of Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

The Bauddha view as to determinate perception and indeterminate perception is just opposite to Mādhva and Rāmānuja where we find the acceptance of determinate perception. The Buddhists admit only indeterminate perception and demur to assert the existence of determinate perception. "Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of sense, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant of reality and is absolutely devoid of the constructions of the understanding"¹³. The Buddhists are of opinion that there is no determinate perception. They point out that the determinate perception is neither valid nor perceptual because determinate perception is presentative-representative process involving determinations and, therefore, falsification. According to the Buddhists, true perception must be without interpretation. Whenever there is any intervention of thought, there cannot be perception. Indeterminate perception, according to the Buddhists, is only form of valid cognition. The Buddhists, e.g., Dharmakirti, Dinnāga, Vasubandhu and others do not accept determinate perception. On the contrary, they point out that name (Naming) Universal (Jāti), quality (guṇa), action (Kriyā), etc. are imaginal and they are of the nature of intellectual game. Indeterminate perception is free from imagination and as such it is alone real. The

Buddhists advocated the theory of momentariness (Kṣaṇa-bhangurvāda) according to which everything of this universe is transitory and does not exist for more moments than one. Non-imaginational cognition becomes possible in the case of momentary object grasped by the sense-organ. The acceptance of indeterminate perception of the Buddhists follows from their theory of momentariness.

To them, without indeterminate perception it is not possible to know the momentary svalakṣaṇa. It (momentary Svalakṣaṇa) can be known by means of indeterminate perception alone. Hence, they admit indeterminate perception alone as valid cognition and they deny determinate perception on the ground that determinate perception involves fictitious images. "Thus for the Buddhists the Nirvikalpa^o Pratyakṣa without any admixture of the operation of thought upon it, was valid, as it alone gave an intuitive insight into the original flux, while the Savikalpa Pratyakṣa giving us precepts of static or solid things was regarded as invalid"¹⁴.

4.8. Mādhva View of Determinate Perception and Indeterminate Perception

That indeterminate perception is non-relational and determinate perception is relational has not been accepted as true by Rāmānuja and Mādhva thinkers. According to them,

every perception is relational. Indeterminate perception which is called non-relational, is chimerical according to these philosophers. Vikalpa or conceptual construct, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is of eight kinds, namely, dravya (substance) Guṇa, (quality), Karma (action), Jāti (Universality), Nāma (identification by naming), Viśeṣa (Particularity), Samavāya (inherence) and abhāva (non-existence). These eight kinds of Vikalpa or conceptual construct having object counterparts show that there are eight kinds of determinate perception. The Mādhva thinkers do not admit Viśeṣa (Particularity) and Sāmavāya (inherence) as separate categories due to absence of cogent reasons. Hence, Viśeṣa and Samavāya as Vikalpa cannot be taken for granted as true. The nāma-Vikalpa and abhāva-Vikalpa cannot be possible through a sudden contact of eyes with the object of knowledge. Dravya Vikalpa, Guṇa-Vikalpa, jāti-Vikalpa and karma-Vikalpa are possible after the direct contact with the object. So, no perception can be regarded as the indeterminate perception. All perceptions are relational in nature¹⁵. In this way the Mādhva thinkers have shown that every perception is determinate cognition (viśeṣabodha) and indeterminate perception is a myth. According to the Mādhvas, determinate perception is valid as and when it apprehends its object as it really is in the spatio-temporal order.

4.9. A Critical Note on Indeterminate Perception

From the views of different thinkers considered so far it is clear that philosophers are at variance as to the nature or types of perception. There are some who admit only indeterminate perception, there are others who admit determinate perception only. Again, there are some who admit both determinate and indeterminate perception. We shall not at this stage discuss who is right. The discussion will be confined to the attempt to have a clear and distinct idea of indeterminate perception.

Presuming two stages of perception we can raise some questions. First, whether indeterminate perception is valid or invalid. As to the question, no unanimous conclusion is reached. The Nyāya philosophy holds the view that indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid¹⁶. Indeterminate perception having neither the Guṇa or uncommon cause of valid specific cognition nor the doṣa or uncommon cause of invalid specific cognition is other than both valid and invalid cognition. On the other hand, the Buddhists reject the determinate perception and regard indeterminate perception as the valid form of perception. They advocate the theory of momentariness which is connected with their theory of indeterminate perception. Thus, we find that there is a difference of opinion as to the validity of indeterminate perception. The Advaitins maintain that the

Brahman can be known by indeterminate perception. This indeterminate perception is direct and immediate and is valid. Hence, the views of the Naiyāyikas are also different from the Advaitins. Indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is not pramā because it is non-relational. Moreover, it is not apramā because valid perceptual cognition presupposes indeterminate perception. Hence, it is neither valid nor invalid. Here, we find that Nyāya logic regarding this issue does not subscribe to truth-falsity dichotomy.

Indeterminate perception, according to Mimāṃsakas, is direct and immediate and transforms itself into determinate perception. So indeterminate perception is valid. Therefore, both indeterminate and determinate perception are valid. This goes against the view of Nyāya thinkers, according to whom, indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid. But it is to be remembered that Nyāya position is well argued. At the level of bare sensation the question of validity and invalidity does not arise.

Secondly, another interesting question is : Is indeterminate perception a psychological antecedent or a logical one of determinate perception ? It seems that according to the Nyāya, indeterminate perception is the logical antecedent of determinate perception - it is not psychological antecedent. This problem arises for those who admit the

existence of both the indeterminate perception and determinate perception. This question does not arise where only one form of perception is admitted. Now (a) what is psychological antecedent ? and (b) what is logical antecedent ? Indeterminate perception can never be the object of retrospection. That is, it can never be an object of another cognition and therefore is incapable of being taken as psychological antecedent. That of which there is no retrospection cannot be a psychological antecedent. Indeterminate perception is a logical antecedent because whenever there is determinate perception there must be indeterminate perception preceding it. Let us mention the views of later Nyāya thinkers who follow Gaṅgeśa. "With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of more predication without ^{any} association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage"^{16a}.

Thirdly, how is indeterminate perception known ? In order to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding this question we should cite the views of the Bauddha, Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita philosophers.

The Buddhists try to prove the existence of indeterminate perception with the help of kṣaṇabhanguravāda or

momentariness and they deny the validity of determinate perception. They maintain that indeterminate perception is atindriya or supra-sensible. The Nyāya thinkers admit indeterminate perception; but they hold the view that this type of perception can never be known directly like determinate perception. Then, how can we know it? In reply to this question Naiyāyikas maintain that the existence of this perception can be known inferentially. Without indeterminate perception there can be no determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is prior to a determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is bare sensation, it is vague and an undifferentiated form of perception. It is beyond the range of retrospection. According to Nyāya and the Bauddha logicians, knowledge of knowledge is due to retrospection. Knowledge is not self-revealed but is revealed by retrospection. Indeterminate perception is neither retrospective cognition nor an object of it. Hence, indeterminate perception is not perceived. In this sense it is supra-sensible. The Advaitins hold the view that indeterminate cognition can never be perceived as an object. According to the Advaitins, Brahman as consciousness, existence, bliss can only be known by indeterminate perception. If indeterminate cognition is not direct apprehension, Brahman can never be perceived. Hence, indeterminate cognition is perception. In this connection, the Advaitin uses the simile of light. Light reveals the object as well

as itself being self-luminous. Similarly Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness reveals the object of knowledge and itself. Even when there is no object, light reveals itself as self-luminous.

Fourthly, whether indeterminate perception differs in quality or in quantity from determinate perception. This Question brings us to the Nyāya and Mimāṃsā. The Nyāya holds the view that indeterminate perception differs from determinate perception in quality but not in quantity. Determinate perception is relational whereas indeterminate perception is not so. This can easily show that the difference between the two is the difference of quality. Indeterminate perception, according to Mimāṃsakas, is inarticulate perception. It is bare sensation and is less clear while determinate perception is vivid perception. This shows that one is less clear and another is more clear, "... , according to the Mimāṃsakas, the difference between savikalpa and Nirvikalpa is a difference of degree rather than of kind, the nirvikalpa being less differentiated, less articulate than our sabikalpa experience"¹⁷. From this we can say that indeterminate perception and determinate perception differ in quantity. In this context, a few relevant lines from Hume's Enquiry are quoted :

"... we may divide all the perceptions of the mind

into two classes of species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others, I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call them impressions, employing that word in a sense different somewhat from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel or love or hate or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of these sensations or movements above mentioned¹⁸.

The distinction between impression and idea in short can be said to be the distinction between less vivacity and more vivacity. Similarly, the distinction between determinate perception and indeterminate perception of the Mimānsakas is the distinction between more vivacity and less vivacity. From the above discussion, we find that there is a point of difference between Naiyāyikas and the Mimānsakas regarding indeterminate perception.

Fifthly, whether indeterminate perception reveals the reality or not. This question leads us to think whether

reality is relational or not. If the reality is non-relational then indeterminate perception reveals the reality, otherwise not. The Advaitins subscribe to the view that the indeterminate perception reveals the reality, Brahman is the highest reality and Brahman is indeterminate and non-relational. From this we can find that to them, reality is non-relational. We have found that reality which is non-relational can be known by indeterminate perception, i.e. indeterminate perception reveals the reality. On the other hand, the Buddhists hold the view that there is no determinate perception, and indeterminate perception alone is real. To them, reality which is changable can only be known by indeterminate perception. So we can find that both the Advaitins and Buddhists are of the opinion that indeterminate perception reveals the reality. But there is a point of difference between Advaita and Bauddha. Now, as opponents' view we can cite the views of thinkers of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Both the schools admit both the stages of perception i.e. indeterminate and determinate perception. They have pointed out as is shown in the previous discussion that determinate perception is dependent on indeterminate perception and without indeterminate perception there cannot be determinate perception. From this it can be said that indeterminate perception helps us to know the reality but it cannot alone reveal reality. In conclusion, we can say that indeterminate perception helps us to reveal reality but it cannot reveal it by its own activity alone as it is

bare sensation.

Sixthly, it seems that the distinction between indeterminate & determinate perception mentioned by the Indian philosophers is parallel to Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance which is known directly or immediately and knowledge by description which is indirect. Now the question is : can it be so ? In knowledge by acquaintance the object is directly apprehended and can only be pointed out ostensively but cannot be verbally articulated. In knowledge by description the object of knowledge is apprehended in terms of a description although the description involved may be incomplete description and also the object is capable of being uniquely described, e.g "the first Lady Prime Minister of India". However, the parallel is only a rough parallel and one to one correspondence between indeterminate perception and knowledge by acquaintance on the one hand and determinate perception and knowledge by description on the other hand should not be sought. The main reason for this absence of one to one correspondence between members of each of the above pairs is that Russellian Philosophy accepts while Indian Philosophy does not, the distinction between immediate knowledge and discursive knowledge and also the distinction between knowledge based on deduction and knowledge based on Induction. For Russellian philosophy the above distinctions are essential and cannot be dispensed with while Indian

philosophy simply ignores this distinction. So the parallel should not be pressed further.

Seventhly, can we say that the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception roughly parallels the distinction between non-propositional and propositional knowledge? In a sense we answer the question in affirmative. For both indeterminate perception and non-propositional knowledge do not involve linguistic articulation. But determinate perception and propositional knowledge from the nature of the case must necessarily involve verbal articulation. Otherwise they are nothing. This justifies our proposal to consider these two distinctions as parallel.

Finally, the question is; does the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception coincide with the Western 'sensing' and 'perceiving'? We believe that is to be answered in the negative. For sensing and perceiving are contingently related, there is no mustness between sensing and perceiving so that sensing must develop into perceiving. Sensing that something is, does not necessarily develop into perceiving what that something is. Contraiwise, indeterminate perception of that it is must develop necessarily into the determinate perception of what it is. Hence, our denial. For example, if I perceive in an indeterminate way something before me without being capable of knowing clearly and distinctly what it is that is before

me, then my indeterminate perception of bare indistinct existence of something must develop into the determinate perception of something clear and distinct having qualities and states, for example, a something having all the characteristics of the bovine species.

4.10. Meaning of Extra-Ordinary Perception and Its Division

Non-eternal or anitya perception is of two kinds, namely, ordinary and extra-ordinary. Ordinary perception is of two kinds. viz. Sabikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa. Extra-ordinary perception, according to Nyāya, is of three kinds, namely, (a) Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or perception of classes. (b) Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or complication and (c) Yogaja pratyakṣa or intuitive perception. Here, we shall take up the discussion on extra-ordinary perception and its division. This extra-ordinary perception has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas. The Cārvākas and Mimāṃsakas have rejected this type of perception admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Moreover, the Advaitins do not accept the view of Nyāya.

Perception, according to Nyāya, is due to sense-object contact. This contact is of six kinds, namely (i) conjunction (Samyoga) (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (Samyukta Samavāya) (iii) inherence in what inheres in a

thing which is conjoined (Samyukta samaveta samavāya) (iv) inherence (samavāya) (v) inherence in what inheres (Samaveta samavāya) and (vi) the relation of character and characterised (Viśeṣaṇa-Viśeṣyābhāva). These six types of contacts are laukika sannikarṣa or ordinary contact. The perception which is due to alaukika Sannikarṣa or extra-ordinary contact is called alaukika pratyakṣa or extra-ordinary perception. Extra-Ordinary perception is of three kinds which we have already mentioned above. Now, we shall deal with the different kinds of such extra-ordinary perception separately.

Though some Indian thinkers admit extra-ordinary perception, e.g. Naiyāyikas. Nevertheless, there are some thinkers who do not admit such type of perception. However, I like to quote the following : "According to some a non-sensuous perception is one which involves no sense-organ. According to others it is one which involves a sense-organ and yet is non-sensuous as the contact between the object and the sense-organ is extra-ordinary or subjective. Now, as against the first view the Bhattas hold that an experience that does not involve use of a sense-organ is no perception at all. And as against the second view they hold that the contact spoken of is unintelligible. The contact that obtains between a sense-organ and its object is always ordinary and never extra-ordinary. The alleged cases involving extra-ordinary contact are cases either of inference or of Phantasy"¹⁹.

4.11. Jñāna-Laksana Pratyakṣa (Complication)

When a sense-feature which is normally picked up by one sense, is captured by another sense resulting in a perception of that captured sense-feature, it is called Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa or complication. The contact which is due to traces of previous knowledge is called Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. We hope to make the nature of this type of cognition clear by means of an example. When we see a piece of sandalwood, we at once perceive the fragrance of the sandalwood virtually from a distance. This knowledge is not inferential knowledge. This is a kind of perception which is known as jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. Here, the present contact is due to previous knowledge. In the past we saw and smelt the sandalwood and got fragrance from it. Now, if only knowledge (Jñānatva) is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa then the alaukika pratyakṣa would be possible through any contact with any individual object. But this is not the fact. Here, automatic subjective recollection of past experience is required for the contact. Hence, we cannot say that every knowledge is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. The contact is not normal or laukika.

Through a proper explanation of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa, we find that this alaukika pratyakṣa is due to saṃskāra or disposition and sense-organ or indriya-janya. Knowledge due to sense-organ is called pratyakṣa and knowledge due to

samskara or disposition is called smṛiti or memory. In jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa we find it is a combination of the two. Hence, the question comes to our mind : Is jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa memory (smṛiti) or is it perception (pratyakṣa) ? If this knowledge is primarily due to sense-contact then it will be regarded as pratyakṣa. Memory knowledge is due to activity of disposition and its object is the past object. In memory knowledge where the object does not indicate the past object but indicate the object of the present then it will be called pratyakṣa. Though jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is due to disposition yet it is found that it does not refer to its object as past but the object of the present. It is found that in the jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa disposition acts as one of the generative conditions.

In the Western philosophy we find that Stout, Ward and Alexander admit complication as a factor in perception. We find a similarity between the views of Naiyāyikas and that of Alexander etc. as to the explanation of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or complication. Alexander says that complication is mere a relation of togetherness between the apprehended and apprehending.

It is to be remembered that by means of such perception we can perhaps explain the fact of illusion e.g. snake-rope illusion. There is rope but not the snake. Here the perceiver due to darkness could not recognize the rope but due to similarity between rope and snake the perceiver

perceives snake in place of rope by means of recollection. It disappears after a while. Hence, we say that only by this alaukika pratyakṣa illusory perception becomes possible.

The opponent may raise a question against jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa pointing out that both cognitions establish a relation. Hence, it is an unnecessary multiplication of admitting two kinds of extra-ordinary perception than is necessary. Apparently it seems that there is no difference between the two. We contend, however, that there is difference between the two. The main difference between the two in our opinion is this that in sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa we get the knowledge of all the members of a class in a generic aspect while in jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the agent acquires the knowledge of an object in its specificity by means of a sense-organ which is not ordinarily a fit sense-organ for making that sensuous apprehension possible.

The Advaitins hold the view that jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is not at all a perception but a kind of inference. Such type of perception dismisses the distinction between perception and inference. Besides, can this type of extra-ordinary perception explain illusory object satisfactorily? Ordinary perception involving sensation required the contact of the object with only one of the different types of sense-organs which is fit to come in contact with it.

For example, visual perception which involves object which is visual sensation, requires 'eye' as the sense-organ which alone is fit to come in contact with object of visual perception. Object which is different from the particular type which is fit for this sense-organ is not grasped by the particular sense and no sensuous knowledge of that type is generated. For example, 'ear' cannot see 'colour' nor 'eye' can hear 'sound'. But if we admit that at least in some cases one type of sense-organ can perceive object which is fit for another type of sense-organ, we are incapable of supplying good reasons for the view that ordinarily a particular type of sense-organ will apprehend only that object which is fit for that particular type of sense-organ.

4.12. Sāmānya-Lakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa (Perception of Classes)

Whenever we perceive an individual of a species by sense-organ, at once we also perceive the generic character (Jāti) of that individual by that sense-organ. As we perceive the class-character (Jāti) we can get perceptual cognition of other individuals generically belonging or coming under that class-character (Jāti). Sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception is called the perception of the universal or jāti. The knowledge of universality brings the perceptient in contact with the individuals belonging to that universality. We cannot perceive all the individuals

through the sense-organs; but they are perceived indirectly through the knowledge of generic character. For example, we can cite this : whenever we perceive a cow, we perceive all the cows generically as coming under cowness and being determined by it. The perception of universal cow is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or perception of class.

Now, we face a question, i.e. why do we admit such a type of perception ? The Naiyāyikas have put forward various arguments in favour of this type of perception. First, without admitting this kind of perception we can never pass to the general conclusion. It is admitted for enabling us to explain the perceiving of all the spatial and temporal perception of all smokes through the perception of smoke of a particular place. Let me make the point clear with the following inference.

All men are rational

$$\begin{array}{c} X \text{ is a man} \\ \hline \therefore X \text{ is rational} \end{array}$$

Here, in the major premise we can find a relation between 'men and 'rational'. How can we establish a general relation between referents of this two terms of the major premise ? In our experience we can have the perception of particular man and his rationality. Hence, in order to establish the relation between the referents of the two

terms of universal proposition, we have to admit sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. Secondly, we accept this type of extra-ordinary perception because by this perception we can differentiate one thing from another thing as belonging to different classes. There is difference between 'man' and 'cow', i.e. 'man is not cow'. How can we differentiate between the two ? we differentiate between the two by means of class-character, namely, 'manhood' and 'cowhood'. 'Manhood' and 'cowhood' can be perceived by this sāmānyalakṣaṇa^{na} pratyakṣa. So we are to admit such type of extra-ordinary perception.

The advaitins have raised objections against sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa. They hold the view that inference is possible even without the knowledge of all individuals of a class and as such there is no need of sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa to perceive all the individuals. Moreover, absence of class-character in an object or a thing does not necessarily presuppose the immediate knowledge of all things or objects. It is sufficient if we know the specific class-character of the thing or object and this can be known by means of perception of particular thing or object in its general aspect and as such Nyāya view is not acceptable to the Advaitins.

In ordinary perception the perceiver and the perceived object are situated at a particular space and

time. But in sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the object of perception being a sāmānya, it is situated in all the areas of space and all moments of time where and when its instances are situated whereas the perceiver is situated only at a particular area of space and time. Naturally the question arises : how the perceiver without leaving the particular area of space and time which he occupies, can come in contact with all the objects-past, present, and future ? To say that it is extra-ordinary or alaukika is to explain it away and not to explain it.

4.13. Yogaja Pratyakṣa (Intuitive Perception)

Every system of Indian Philosophy except Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsaka admits yogaja pratyakṣa. Let us first take the meaning of yogaja pratyakṣa. The Yogins or mystic by means of Yogābhyāsa acquire the extra-ordinary power by means of which they can perceive the distant objects in space and time which we can never perceive ordinarily. The perception of the Yogins by means of meditation is called Yogaja pratyakṣa. The Yogins by means of their intuitive powers can perceive the objects of past, present and future and also the objects of distant land and of different size. The mind of the Yogins are free from all veils and impurities and limitations of sense. Their mind is purified and as such perceive the objects which are subtle, hidden etc.

The perception of the Yogins is like the divine perception. But there is significant difference between perception of the Yogins and divine perception. Divine perception is eternal but the perception of the Yogins are non-eternal.

Yogaja Pratyakṣa is of two kinds, namely, (a) Yukta and (b) Yunjān. In the case of Yukta Yogins extra-ordinary perception is always possible but in the case of Yunjān Yogins extra-ordinary perception is not always possible, they can perceive in the extra-ordinary way by means of meditation.

In short it can be said that yogic perception is the perception directly through the mind without any mediation of external sense-organs which are limited by space and time in their capacity to come in contact with the object. Like sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa and jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa the existence of Yogaja pratyakṣa has been gainsaid by the Mimānsakas. The Mimānsakas pointed out that the Yogic perception is nothing but the concentration of mind towards object. This mystic perception, according to them, is nothing but memory. But memory is not vivid like perception. Hence, they have drawn the conclusion that Yogic perception is non-existent like Sky-Lotus.

We may, however, say that Yogic perception is a function of concentration of mind and this concentration leads the Yogins to perceive such things which are not

present before their sense-organs. In the Bauddha Philosophy we find the admission of the existence of Yogic perception. The Buddhists hold the view that Yogic perception is most distinct. It is bereft of mental constructs or kalpanā. Though the Buddhists do not admit the existence of God and permanent self and permanent world yet they believe in yogic perception and to them this perception is valid. In jaina Philosophy there is admission of such type of perception because they believe in the possibility of self's perception independently of sense-organs.

According to the Mimāṃsakas, the yogis have not perception of supra-sensible objects because the yogis are like us.

The sense-organs of the yogis cannot operate on supra-sensible objects as they are like our sense-organ. Moreover, according to Mimāṃsakas, in perception the object of the perception must always be existent, i.e. present to the sense-organ without which perception cannot be possible at all. Perception to the Mimāṃsakas, is due to contact or Sannikarṣa that obtains between present object and sense. Although the yogis possess extra-ordinary power, yet yogic perception is not possible because in it the object is not present before the sense-organ and, therefore, is not in contact with it, and, therefore, the basic condition of

perception, namely, sense-object contact is lacking in the case of yogaja pratyakṣa. We may not accept the view of the Mimāṃsakas regarding this issue. But one thing is clear, i.e. there is possibility in Yogaja pratyakṣa to be false and this can never be denied. It is undeniable that yogaja pratyakṣa is fallible, for adherents of different systems of Indian Philosophy point out that they have true knowledge of reality which is known by means of intuitive capacity. There is diverse opinions amongst the philosophers as to the knowledge of reality. Every intuitive knowledge is not valid and cannot give us the knowledge of reality and this points out that Yogaja pratyakṣa may be false.

1.14. A Note on Complication and Perception of Classes

Prof. N.V.Banerjee is of the opinion that both sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa & jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa being related to determinate perception are also related to indriya and object in the ordinary way, and, so, they cannot be regarded as instance of alaukika pratyakṣa or extra-ordinary perception. To quote him :

" jñanalaksana pratyakṣa, like samanyalaksana pratyakṣa, is organically related to some savikalpaka pratyakṣa or other and as such is laukika (normal) instead of being alaukika (supranormal)"²⁰.

Now the question arises : Is Dr. Banerjee's contention tenable ? We like to answer in the negative.

Firstly, nowhere in any one of the Nyāya texts it is stated that instances of alaukika pratyakṣa are bereft of the stages of Savikalpaka & Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. What the Nyaya stated is simply that the contact that obtains between object and the indriya is alaukika or extra-ordinary and not laukika or ordinary. Hence Dr. Banerjee's contention does not bear logical scrutiny.

Secondly, from the fact that a type of Pratyakṣa is related to determinate perception, it does not follow that it must be laukika (ordinary) and not alaukika or extra-ordinary. Being alaukika does not preclude, in the case of perception, to have determinate perception as one of its stages. As a matter of fact Dr. Banerjee seems to have the contention that if a mode of perception is related to or happens to have determinate perception as one of its stages it cannot be an alaukika pratyakṣa, as the unargued pre-supposition of his argument.

4.15. External and Internal Perception

Laukika Pratyakṣa or ordinary perception is again divided into two kinds, namely, Vāhya Pratyakṣa or external perception and mānas pratyakṣa or internal perception.

External perception is due to five external sense-organs of knowledge, namely, eye, ear, tongue, skin and nose. So we get five types external sense knowledge which can be named as (i) Visual perception (cākṣusa pratyakṣa) (ii) auditory perception (śrāvana pratyakṣa), (iii) tactual perception (sparsa pratyakṣa, (iv) gustatory perception (rāsana pratyakṣa) and (v) olfactory perception (ghrānaja pratyakṣa). Internal perception is due to soul-mind (ātma-manasanyoga) contact. Mind as an object of knowledge is atindriya or supra-sensible. It can never be perceived. Combining the two kinds of perception, i.e. external and internal perception we get six kinds of perception as there are six sense-organs. It is to be noted that in every kind of external perception we do require the help of mind because in perception the contact of sense-organ with mind is required. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mimāṃsaka philosophy admit of two kinds of perception and six sense-organs. But the Cārvākas admit only external perception. They do not admit internal perception because mind can never be perceived. Regarding these perceptions as mentioned above the difference between the Nyāya and Mimāṃsaka thinkers are related to the auditory perception. "Kanada, the author of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, states that the proof of the existence of manas can be obtained from the fact that in cases of absent-mindedness we do not get knowledge, although an object, an external sense and the self are all present to

co-operate with one another. This shows that the activity of some other factor is necessary for the production of knowledge. This factor is mind"²¹.

The Vedānta paribhāsākāra rejects the sense-organ character of mind. According to the Advaitins, there is no internal organ. They hold the view that mind is not a sense-organ and as such there is no internal sense-organ. Vācaspati holds the view that the perception of Brahman is due to mind, hence, mind can be admitted as Karaṇa, instrument of Brahamasākṣātkāra. But in accordance with the view of Vivaraṇa, mind is not a sense-organ and it is said that Vedavākya is the Karaṇa of Brahamasākṣātkāra. In this way it is shown that mind is not a sense-organ.

The external and internal perception remind us the Lockean philosophy when we find that Locke admitted experience as only the source of knowledge. By experience he meant sensation and reflection. Sensation is external perception whereas reflection is internal perception. From this we can find that there is similarity between Locke's view and the views of Indian thinkers who also admit two kinds of perception, namely, external and internal perception. Humean philosophy is like the Cārvāka philosophy as both of them refrain from admitting internal perception of a non-momentary spiritual substance having mental states and possessing knowledge as its finite and evanescent attribute.

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CHAPTER V

PERCEPTION AS UNIT OF KNOWLEDGE

Perception has been regarded as the 'Unit of Knowledge'. In order to understand the expression 'Unit of Knowledge', we have to know what is meant by 'unit' here. The expression 'unit' refers to the unanalysable particular in terms of which everything of that particular is measured. We find that there are diverse opinions amongst Philosophers as to the meaning of 'unit of knowledge'. Here, the views of some Western Philosophers and Indian Philosophers have been dealt with in short in order to reach a conclusion.

Locke in his book "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" expounded the view that all knowledge comes from experience, rejecting the doctrine of innate ideas. According to him, mind is a 'tabula rasa', a blank sheet, passive and inactive in the beginning. Experience comes from two sources, viz., sensation and reflection. By

sensation we get the knowledge of external objects whereas by reflection we know the operation of our own minds. Whatever knowledge we obtain is due to either sensation or reflection. Simple ideas which are the ultimate constituents of our knowledge can come into being from either sensation or reflection. Human mind can form complex ideas by combining simple ideas which it receives from sensation or reflection. According to Locke, the 'simple ideas' are the 'unit of knowledge'.

But Kant holds the view that Locke has made a mistake in assuming that our knowledge is ultimately made up of simple ideas which are discrete and non-relational. Kant says that even the simplest form of awareness requires the activity of the mind. Thus, inactivity of mind or passivity of it as admitted by Locke is not acceptable to Kant. Kant maintains that 'simple ideas' of Locke are not the 'unit' of knowledge. Moreover, Locke's view has been criticized by Hobbes. He maintains that mind cannot construct things at the very start though it can grasp a complex whole. Kant, who tries to reconcile in his critical philosophy empiricism and rationalism, holds the view that neither empiricists nor rationalists are correct regarding the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is not due to reason alone. Knowledge is a product of sense-experience and reason. Kant rejects of Locke's view regarding the 'unit of knowledge'. He says that by experience we can have

discrete sense - manifold. This discrete and non-organised material is transformed into knowledge of object through the activity of synthesis of human understanding. Kant holds that knowledge is judgemental in nature : judgement is the irreducible 'unit of knowledge'. Knowledge proper, according to Kant, is composed of intuited sense-data duly combined by the understanding. To judge is to think and to think is to conceive of the common characteristics of the individual objects given to us in intuition. In other words in judging the understanding supplies the form of the concept under which the intuited sense-data are subsumed. Now we shall endeavour to give the meaning of judgement in short after Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant has said that the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging.

Judgement is the assertion of characterisation of something by something else. Something which is characterised is the subject and something which characterises is the predicate. Kant takes the judgement in the sense in which Aristotle used it. In a judgement something is said of something else. Something of which something is said is called the subject, something which is said of the subject is called the predicate. At the conceptual level judgement asserts the inclusion of the predicate concept in the subject or denial of the inclusion of the predicate concept in the subject. There is judgement in every act of thought

and as such it is the starting point of every thinking.

By knowledge Kant means knowledge of object expressed in judgement. But this view of knowledge does not account for the growth of knowledge. Any judgement by itself does not constitute a system of knowledge; and without a system the different items of knowledge could not be reckoned as significant items of knowledge. Every judgement becomes significant only in the back drop of a system of knowledge. However, every system of knowledge admits of an organic growth. It is not something cut and dried and given at the very outset. Like the body of an organism the system of knowledge grows and different judgements and Constellation of judgements constitute parts and sub-systems within it; support one another and help the total system to grow and be more integrated. This integration implies entry of material from outside and harmonisation of loose and rough ends of these materials with one another and with already harmonised pieces of knowledge. This organic character of knowledge is not reflected in Kantian analysis of judgemental knowledge. The British idealist F.H. Bradley is well known in philosophy for his contribution to logic and theory of knowledge. According to him, the British Empiricists like Locke, Hume and Mill could not distinguish the questions of logic from the question of psychology. In his theory of knowledge he gives indication about the 'unit of knowledge'. He maintains that judgement is the unit of

knowledge. Knowledge is an awareness of an object. No knowledge is possible without judging. Hence, we can say that to be knowledge is to be a judgement. From this it follows that judgement is the 'unit of knowledge'.

But what is a judgement ? According to Bradley, "Judgement is the act which refers an ideal content (recognised as such) to a reality beyond the act"¹. If knowledge grows it must have a starting-point. This starting point exhibits the essential characteristics of being either true or false. No fact is true unless we think it. A mere sensation does not amount to knowledge till it is actively connected by the mind with other facts. A judgement is an assertion or truth - claim which may be either true or false. We may say that judgement is the starting point of knowledge. For all knowledge in the last analysis is composed of judgements. It is an act of consciousness.

From this conception of judgement we arrive at the following features of judgement. They are : (a) judgement is the act of thinking, (b) judgement is the thinking of an individual mind, (c) judgement is the thinking by means of ideas and it transcends the individual mind. From these features we can conclude that judgement is the act of objectifying and rendering communicable subjective experience.

Judgement is the act of reference. When we say, "rose is red", this means that we judge that the reality is such that 'rose' has 'redness'. From this we find, that judgement

is the act of reference of an ideal content. Now we should know the meaning of 'ideal content'. 'Ideal content' is a logical idea. Logical idea is contrasted with psychological idea. A psychological idea is an image or an occurrent in the individual mind. It is the subject of judgement. Logical idea arises from psychological idea. It is the predicate of the judgement and it is the essence of psychological idea. Moreover, logical idea does not depend on the individual mind.

According to Bradley, thought begins with judgement. No thought is possible without judgement. Hence, it can be said that judgement is essential for knowledge of any object and that is why Bradley regarded judgement as the unit of knowledge. Bradleyan theory of judgement has been criticized by Prof. Cookwilson, Stout and Hobhouse and others. The distinction between psychological and logical idea of Bradley, according to Stout, involves circularity. A logical idea is the part of the psychological idea, to know it as such is to make a judgement - but there cannot be judgement without logical idea. The admission of pre-judgemental level of knowledge or consciousness leads to the collapse of Bradleyan view that judgement is the unit of knowledge. It is Hobhouse who admits simple apprehension as the pre-judgemental stage of knowledge. Hobhouse points out why we should not admit judgement as the unit of knowledge.

According to Hobhouse, the unit of knowledge is pre-judgemental awareness. This pre-judgemental awareness, he calls, 'simple apprehension'. It is like 'sensation' and 'simple ideas' but not identical with any of them. "Whatever our immediate consciousness may be" says Hobhouse, "it is not merely an affection of the mind in this way or that, but an assertion of this or that, a cognitive act"². 'Sensation' we know, is mere affection but 'simple apprehension' of Hobhouse is not mere affection but an assertion. On the other hand, simple idea is a passive state of mind and reveals the object whereas simple apprehension of Hobhouse is active state of mind. This explains why sensation and simple ideas are not identical with the simple apprehension of Hobhouse.

Now the question arises : why does Hobhouse think that the unit of knowledge is pre-judgemental, and not judgemental ? Judgement, we know, involves Subject and Predicate and it relates them. The relation between the Subject and Predicate becomes possible if and only if we have prior knowledge of Subject and Predicate. Without the awareness of the subject and predicate, the question of relating them can never arise. Hence, judgemental knowledge from the very nature of the case presupposes pre-conscious level or pre-judgemental state of cognition. Hence, we cannot say that knowledge begins from judgement rather we should say that it begins with pre-judgement i.e., 'simple apprehension'. Hobhouse clearly holds the view that this 'simple

apprehension' is both logically and psychologically prior to judgemental knowledge. It is logically prior to judgement because without this as antecedent there cannot be judgemental knowledge. Further, it is psychologically prior in the sense that it can exist alone without the association or help of another cognition. Now, we can say that 'simple apprehension' which is both logically and psychologically prior to judgemental knowledge is the 'unit of knowledge'.

According to Russell, individual percepts are the basis of all of our knowledge. Our knowledge at its root is private and unshareable. The knowledge of the warm and intimate things which make up colour and texture of the experience of an individual is from the very nature of the case mainly unshareable. Hence, according to Russell, the given in personal experience is incommunicable and tends to be distorted during the process of articulation in language. The chief purpose of language is communication, and to serve this purpose it must be public. The data of experience are personal and private while the common world in which we believe ourselves and share is a matter of construction. We make corrections in interpreting sense-appearance in order to iron out the uncommon elements in such data. The aim is to achieve common knowledge. According to Russell, individual percept is the basic unit of knowledge and this percept, when it is first encountered,

is unalloyed and is without accretion of any interpretation. However, it acquires the load of interpretation as it is encountered over and over again by the experiencer in his experience. Therefore, Russell says : "you can learn by a verbal definition that a Pentagon is a plain figure with five sides, but a child does not learn in this way the meaning of everyday words such as "Rain", "Sun", "Dinner", or "Bed". These are taught by using the appropriate word emphatically while the child is noticing the object concerned, consequently the meaning that the child comes to attach to the word is product of his personal experience, and varies according to his circumstances and his sensorium. A child who frequently experiences a mild drizzle will attach a different idea to the word "rain" from that formed by a child who has experienced tropical torrents"³.

Now, we take up the problem of 'unit of knowledge' from the standpoint of Indian Philosophy. We know that there are some schools of Indian Philosophy which admit two stages of perception, viz., (i) indeterminate perception and (ii) determinate perception. At this stage, we are confronted with the question, which of them is the 'unit of knowledge' ? At the very outset of this chapter we have given the meaning of the unit of knowledge. And taking that meaning and characteristics of the 'unit of knowledge' into account we shall judge whether indeterminate perception or determinate perception is the 'unit of knowledge'.

Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā Schools of Indian Philosophy admit indeterminate perception as prior to determinate perception and without indeterminate perception there cannot be determinate perception. Indeterminate perception is bare sensation having no particular characterisation (vikalpa). Though it is bare sensation, we cannot have perception proper without it. For instance, take the cognition of 'red cloth'. In this case it can be said that we have no knowledge, if we have no knowledge of 'red' and 'cloth'. Indeterminate perception is pre-judgemental cognition as it cannot be expressed in the Subject - Predicate form. In order to have a proper perception of a characterised thing we must have prior knowledge of the characteristic. It may be indistinct but that does not matter. We can therefore say that the indeterminate perception is the initial stage of knowledge or the 'unit of knowledge'. It is the starting point of knowledge. Without it we can have no knowledge at all. So we can say that indeterminate perception is the 'unit of knowledge'. If a comparative study is made, we shall find that there is partial similarity between the Hobhousean view of 'simple apprehension' and the view of Indian thinkers on indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception is like the 'simple apprehension' of Hobhouse but there is a significant difference. Indeterminate perception is logically prior to determinate perception, but according to Hobhouse, 'simple apprehension' is both

logically and psychologically antecedent of perception. Further, it can be said that indeterminate perception, according to Nyāya, is known by inference and not by direct introspection. But, according to Hobhouse, 'simple apprehension' can be cognised only introspectively.

Indeterminate perception is called sensation and determinate perception is called perception. We have been given to understand and by the psychologists that there is a relation between sensation and perception. Neither of the two can stand alone. Sensation and perception are so closely connected that their separate existence is impossible. In this regard we like to quote Dr. Ward. He says, "The pure sensation we may regard as a Psychological myth"⁴; ... "By pure sensation is meant undifferentiated sensation. An uninterpreted sensation is pure sensation. But 'pure sensation' has no separate existence. Sensation and perception can be separated in thought only but they cannot be experienced separately.

Perception without sensation is not possible although sensation without perception in rare cases may be in existence. This is a real possibility because it is not unthinkable that a sensation i.e., uninterpreted perception may die out or be annihilated before mind grasps it properly for its interpretation. Though they differ from each other in certain respects yet they are interdependent with

some reservation. Stout says, "... we can never have absolutely pure sensation, sensation absolutely devoid of meaning, either original or acquired"⁵. Again, he says, "... the concept of absolutely pure sensation is an artificial abstraction. No actual sensation with which we can definitely deal is absolutely dissociated from past experiences"⁶. On the other hand, Woodworth says, "sensation is the first response aroused by stimulus ... perception is the second response"⁷.

We can say that sensation and perception are interdependent and sensation comes first and then comes perception. Speaking on the same vein we can say that indeterminate perception arises first and then comes determinate perception. This indeterminate perception which is the first stage and starting point of perceptual knowledge is the 'unit of knowledge'. It is perhaps not out of place to note here Russell's contribution to this discussion. When we are moving from private initial experience (indeterminate perception) to common perceptual knowledge (determinate perception), we are moving from personal to impersonal knowledge, i.e., we are moving from knowledge which is subjective and unshareable to knowledge which is common to different persons. Thus, determinate perception is at once more and less than indeterminate perception. It is more because this perceptual knowledge, being impersonal, is

conceptualized and therefore can be externalised and is shareable. It is less because it is incapable of conveying the freshness, accuracy and uniqueness of personal experiences.

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CHAPTER VI

ABERRATION OF PERCEPTION

In a comparative study of philosophical views of East and West regarding perception we should bear in mind that the current technological devices were not available to the ancient Eastern thinkers augmenting their range of perception. They had not at their disposal, e.g., microscope, electron microscope, telescope, radio-telescope, ultra-sound devices, etc. Hence, the characteristics of the objects highlighted by the use of these devices should not be taken into account putting the Eastern philosophers at a disadvantage. Only then we can evaluate their respective contribution to the philosophy of perception in a proper way.

We perceive things veridically. We also perceive things wrongly. How are we to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception ? And also how are we to assign

reasons for the non-verdical perceptions ? In both Indian and Western philosophy we find the discussion on perceptual errors. These perceptual errors are due to disorders of the sense-organs. "Excessive use, disuse, inadequate use, and injudicious use of the sense-organs tend to produce disorders of sensation and affect perception. The stimulus, the external medium of transmission, the sense-organ, the bodily constitution, the mental factor, and the moral equipment might operate jointly and severally to produce erroneous perception"¹. Defective perceptions are also due to (a) indistinct nature of the object, (b) physiological disturbance in the sense-organ, and (c) absence of mental equanimity. Thus it is a fact that there is faulty perception. Now let us mention some Indian concepts as to the perceptual errors.

In taking up the perceptual errors after Indian philosophy we are dealing with the Sāṅkhya concept first. Sense-object contact gives rise to particular mode of intellect or *buddhivṛttiviśeṣa* and perceptual cognition is due to this particular mode of intellect which according to Sāṅkhya, is physical in nature. According to the Sāṅkhya view, *pramāna* is *buddhivṛtti*. Perceptual knowledge is a kind of *buddhivṛtti*. *Indriya* is not *pratyakṣa pramāna*. The Sāṅkhya holds the view that what is *prama* will forever remain *pramā*, it can never become a *ṛpramā*. Thus *pramā* is

eternal in nature. Further, they hold the view that indriya is only an instrument for revealing pramā in the context of worldly knowledge. The buddhivṛtti or mode of intellect in the state of Samsara or empirical world comes into existence through sense-contact is transformed into perceptual cognition. Due to sense-object contact citta or mind takes the form of the object. This mode of parināma, according to Sāṅkhya, is called buddhivṛtti.

I propose to deal with the aberrations of perception here with special reference to Sāṅkhya philosophy. A valid perceptual cognition requires careful attention to the object of perception. To be valid, perception depends on the fulfilment of some conditions, otherwise it becomes invalid or fallacious. The validity of the perceptual cognition depends on three conditions, viz., (a) intellectual condition, (b) physical condition, and (c) moral condition. Intellectual condition is the state of equipose of mind, undisturbed by any extraneous factor. Physical condition is the continuation of the physical body in a state of health. Moral condition implies freedom from superstitions, prejudices and emotional imbalances of mind.

Sankhya kārikā 7 speaks of the reasons for defect or doṣa of perception². In the said verse we find that the defect of perception arising from the following : (a) beyond the range of the capacity of the sense (atidurāt), (b) too close proximity (atisāṃipya), (c) defect of sense-organ (indriyabhava), (d) inattention (anyamanaskatā), (e) subtleness (Sūkṣmatva), (f) obstruction (vyavadhāna),

(g) being overwhelmed (abhibhavan), (h) limitation of sensuous distinguishability and (i) non-apprehension of the non-manifest.

In the said verse the causes of non-perceptions have been given. This may be illustrated now. (a) We cannot perceive the leaves and branches which are at distance. But they are existent. (b) If the object is far away, the particular sense-organ is incapable of apprehending it, similarly, if the object is very near, we cannot perceive. For example, contact lenses in the eyes are not seen by the same eyes. (c) We know that the blind cannot perceive colour and the deaf cannot hear. To such persons, therefore, the world of colour and sound simply does not exist and any talk about such a world would, to him, will be unintelligible. Nevertheless we cannot say of the non-existence of colour and sound. (d) Whenever we are engrossed (tanamaya) in an object, we cannot perceive or apprehend the object which is before us. Here, too, we cannot say of the non-existence of the object. For example, whenever I am engrossed in deep thinking, I may not be aware of the person who is standing beside me. (e) The atoms cannot be perceived. Dyaṇuka (dyad) cannot be perceived and trasarenu (triad) without sunlight cannot be perceived. (f) The object cannot be perceived, if it is covered by something, e.g., we cannot perceive an object which is on

the otherside of the wall. (g) Sometimes the objects cannot be perceived due to overpowering or overshadowing of particular objects. The stars remain in the sky always, yet during the daytime these cannot be perceived. This is due to existence of the sunlight. (h) Whenever similar objects are blended, we cannot distinguish particular object, e.g., drop of water in the lake. (i) Non-revealed objects can never be perceived, e.g., curd in milk.

Here, we are mentioning a quotation from Dr. Gangānāth Jhā :

"Extreme remoteness : Bird soaring high in the sky

Extreme proximity : collyrium in the eye

Destruction of organs : blindness, deafness

Absence of mind : underinfluence of strong desire a man
does not perceive

Minuteness : atom

Intervention : queen behind the wall

Subjugation or suppression : Non-perception of constella-
tion suppressed by bright rays
of the sun

Intermixture : Drops of rain water disappear-
ing in a tank

And so on : non-production, e.g., of curd in the milk"³.

Above illustrations are the cases of non-observation. It is clear that perceptual cognition may be rendered

faulty by mental factors and by physical causes. Faulty perceptual cognition may be divided into two classes :

(a) Fallacy of non-perception (aparyavekṣaṇa), and (b) fallacy of wrong perception (bhrānta paryavekṣaṇa). Non-perception is due to inattention of the mind i.e., it is the defect of internal sense-organ. For example, when Sakuntalā was engrossed in deep thinking of her beloved husband Duṣmanta, she could not know the presence of the great sage Durvāsā. It is to be remembered that Sakuntalā was not inattentive, because she paid attention to her husband. Wrong perception may be due to defects of external sense-organs or for other causes such as insufficiency of light etc. For example, 'perceptions of a snake in the case of a rope'. Non-observation arises when we overlook or neglect something which we should normally observe. But we should always observe the entire contents and then we can have a valid perceptual cognition. The fallacy of wrong observation arises when we observe the object of perception as this or that thing because of sensory defects, whereas it should be perceived in some other mode. For example, we can say that a man suffering from jaundice, perceives a conchshell as yellow, whereas he should perceive it as white. Be it noted here that J.S. Mill also mentioned two kinds of observational fallacies, namely, (a) the fallacy of non-observation and (b) māla-observation.

The Sāṅkhya view of aberration of perceptual cognition has striking resemblance with that of Skinnerian behaviourism. All empirical perceptual cognitions are modification of buddhi which is product of prakṛti and as such is physical. Thus considered empirically perceptual knowledge of ordinary experience is fully explicable in physical terms. All reference to conscious ego are in a sense cut out. This is true of Skinnerian behaviourism in a way. In the said behaviourism the entire world of perceptual knowledge is explicable in terms of stimulus and response whether delayed or non-delayed, modified or non-modified. All reference to any intervening variable such as consciousness or neural traces are cut out. Everything is explained in physical terms.

Deviations in perceptions from specially prevalent norms of perceptual experience are explained by Sāṅkhya in physical terms. For example, objects which are visible normally may become invisible during mist and the invisibility of the objects in this case can be explained in terms of mist which is a physical phenomenon. Likewise in the language of Skinnerian behaviourism our audition of the ringing of the telephone bell becomes inaudible when it is masked by loud noise of crackers. The inaudibility here is explained entirely in physical terms.

In the sequel I will deal with the theories of

erroneous perception as propounded by the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas and Advaitins. According to the Bauddhas, all perceptions, being momentary, are indeterminate cognitions incapable of apprehending any Vikalpa or relational determination whatsoever. Therefore, perception which only says that there is something is veridical while perception which asserts what that something is in a determinate way is invalid. In the light of this how are the Buddhists to explain errors of perceptual cognition in the normal sense of the term ? This is the crux of the problem. To the Buddhists all determinate perceptions are equally invalid. However, some of these perceptions are capable of satisfying practical needs and, therefore, are taken to be valid in a practical sense. But there are cases of determinate perception where practical needs are not satisfied and so they are taken to be erroneous. For example, the determinate perception of rope satisfies the practical need of the people and is taken to be valid whereas the determinate perception of rope as snake, although determinate, fails to satisfy the practical need of the people and as such is taken to be invalid.

The Naiyāyikas as opposed to the Buddhists admit determinate perception fulfilling certain conditions as valid, indeterminate perception being neither valid nor invalid but is a pre-supposition in the interest of the logical harmony. The conditions which render a determinate

perception as valid are firstly its conformity with the object as it is, and, secondly, its issuance in satisfying practical needs. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas admit that the truth of perceptual knowledge, like knowledge of other types, lies in its conformity of object as it is. For example, the perception of 'rope as snake' fails to fulfil the condition, that knowledge should conform to the object and as such, is invalid. Secondly, this conformity gives rise to expectancy which is satisfied by indulging in practical activity and this is also frustrated because of the non-conformity.

According to the Advaitins, in the real sense of the term Brahma Pratyakṣa alone is real, and Brahma Pratyakṣa is devoid of all bhedas or distinctions sa-jātiya, svagata and vijātiya. But Brahma-pratyakṣa is possible only in metaempirical plane and as such is beyond the ken of knowledge of the empirical world in which we live, move and have our being. Therefore, the Advaitins are required to give us a satisfactory explanation of veridical and non-veridical perceptions as they occur in the empirical plane. In the empirical plane we at times perceive 'a rope as an snake', 'a mother of pearl as a piece of silver' or 'a white conch as yellow one'. The Advaitins hold that in the case of erroneous apprehension we perceive an object which is logically indefinable being other than real and unreal (Sadasadvilakṣaṇa) and is capable of being sublated on the rising of valid perception.

All these are different explanations of erroneous perception as propounded by different schools of Indian Philosophy, namely, Bauddha, Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta. Anyway, I like to quote a few lines to have more clear view regarding erroneous perception.

"..." Vatsyayana takes up in this connection three common cases of illusion. These are : Seeing a person in a Pillar, a flock of ducks in a distant flag, a dove in a darkish lump of clay. One peculiarity of illusion can easily elude us if cases like these are considered separately. When the three are examined together, a striking feature common to all illusions leaps before our eyes. You have the illusion of a person only in the pillar, or of flock of ducks only in the flag or of the dove only in the clay. Never is there an illusion of a flock of ducks in the pillar or in the clay, just as there is never the illusion of the dove in the flag or in the pillar. The list of such examples can be indefinitely extended : You have the illusion of a snake only in the rope and never in the shining shell, just as you have the illusion of silver only in the shining shell and never in the rope.

There is thus an obvious selectivity - a rigid regularity — involved even in the cases of common illusions. This has to be counted for. And it can be explained only on the assumption that there is an objective coercion even

in the cases of the common illusions. You do not have the liberty of having any illusion anywhere and at any time. Something outside your own mind or your own consciousness — something that is objective — dictates terms to the nature of the illusion. The Pillar determines that you are to have the illusion of a person and specifically so. The flag obliges you to have the illusion only of the ducks, just as the clay obliges you to have the illusion only of the dove. Not that you are under any obligation to have an illusion. Under normal conditions you can certainly see a pillar in pillar, a flag in a flag. These are cases of right knowledge, and not of illusion. However, in so far as you have an illusion, you are not free from some objective coercion — something outside your consciousness dictating terms to your consciousness. Without understanding this objective coercion, the common cases of illusion remain unexplained"⁴.

Thus there is illusory perception such as perceiving a snake in the locus of rope or rajat or silver in the locus of sukṭi or mother-of-pearl. But here one question arises : why do we not illusorily perceive 'Silver' in the locus of rope or snake in the locus of mother-of-pearl ? The Naiyāyikas' explanation of fastening of consciousness on the deśāntariya, kālāntariya sarpa, (snakes existed elsewhere and elsewhen) is of no avail, for sukṭi or mother-of-pearl is also elsewhere and elsewhen. The Advaitins'

explanation fares no better, for māyā being aindrajalika or magical should not be incapable of projecting or vikṣepa of snake in the locus of mother-of-pearl or sukṭi. Thus, although Advaitins' explanation of the different facets of perception may be to an extent better than that of Naiyāyikas, they are, however, sailing in the same boat in so far as the aforesaid possibilities of illusory perceptions are concerned. This is a surd of perception which no School of Indian Philosophy has been able to explain satisfactorily.

Now, we are mentioning four types of non-veridical perception as admitted by Don Locke. To quote him :

"(1) I sense - something that does not really exist (as with Macbeth's dagger).

(2) I sense something that does really exist, but I take it to be something else, something else that does not really exist (as when I take a vine to be a snake).

(3) I sense something that does really exist but, objectively, it is different from what I sense it as being (as when I see red tomato but, through colour-blindness, sense it as grey).

(4) I sense something that does really exist, and I sense it as it is objectively, but I take it to be what is not (as when, in the Muller-Lyer illusion, I see two lines which are in fact equal, but take one to be longer than the other)"⁵.

The arguments and examples cited by Don Locke seem to have a striking resemblance with those of Mimāṃsakas and Buddhists of ancient India. Perceptual error is taken to arise both by Prof. Don Lock and Indian Philosophers from the fact of taking into account only similarities between that which perceived to exist and that which does not exist factually or from failing to take into account the dissimilarities between that which is perceived to exist and that which does not exist as a matter of fact.

So far as third point of Prof. Don Locke is concerned we are to note that ~~the~~ difference is not a defect, something is seen as grey by some one and the same thing is seen as red by someone else does in no way allow us to reach the conclusion that grey-viewer is perceiving wrongly, while red-viewer is perceiving veridically. As to the merit of the fourth example as given by Don Locke we are to note that it is a failure of estimation of quantity and not a failure of perception. As a matter of fact it is a failure of tacit inference drawn unconsciously on the basis of perceptual data.

Any statement of observation needs to be interpreted by the person observing as well as by the person who is listening to what the observer says. The interpretation of each one of them will take place within his own framework of symbols which in turn will need to be interpreted by

others. Everything that each of us says as report of his observation is open to interpretation, for that is what it means to use symbols, i.e. language. In a sense, therefore, no two persons inhabit the same world of meaning. The language that each uses will need to be interpreted and the interpretation will be within the context and the associations and experience of another person. Each person since childhood lives in his own world of meaning within which he accommodates the cues given by other persons. There will be adjustment, agreement if you like, — but it is logically impossible for anything to transcend essentially personal nature of anyone's understanding of a situation.

From the above discussion, we find that faulty perception is due to disorder of the sense-organ or environmental conditions. Perceptual errors arise on account of abnormal conditions of the senses. Though we find the difference of opinions arising among Indian Philosophers about the source or sources of knowledge, still it is found that all of them accept perception as a distinct source of knowledge. No School of Indian Philosophy, besides the Buddhistic School, raise any question as to the validity of perception, because in perception, they believe, there is direct relation between knower and known.

Now the question is : Can there arise any fallacy in the case of perception ? It is a fact that we at times mistakenly perceive one thing as another. For example, we

mistakenly at times perceive and recognise Mr. X as Mr. Y and when the mistakes are pointed out we apologise and stand corrected. These mistakes are mistakes of perception and they do occur.

Further the question is : Can we say that experience of 'Seeing as' is necessarily invalid perceptual experience ? In our reply to the question we answer in the negative. We admit that there are certain cases of 'seeing as' which are cases of invalid perception. But we do not admit that this admission forces us to the conclusion that all cases of 'seeing as' are cases of invalid perception. There are genuine cases of 'seeing as' experience in which the object is seen sometimes as having one qualifier and at other times as having another qualifier without there being any change in the object. This dawning of one qualifier aspect at one time and another qualifier aspect at some other time qualifying the object does not and cannot entail the proposition that the dawning of one aspect is, while the dawning of another aspect is not, a case of veridical perception. For example, in the case of ambiguous picture of a female we sometimes see the picture as the picture of old mother-in-law and at other times we see picture as the picture of young daughter-in-law. We cannot say that case of seeing the picture as the picture of an old lady is a case of veridical perception and seeing the same picture as the picture of a young lady is the case of nonveridical perception,

and the other way about. Both the cases of 'seeing as' are equally valid or equally invalid.

Now a question may arise : Are perceptual errors due to physical defects only, or due only to mental defects, or due to both of them or due to former at one time or later at other times ? We answer the fourth question in the affirmative. It is evident that perception depends on operation of sense-organs and operation of sense-organs are dependent on prevailing of certain conditions. Let us imagine a situation. Let us take it for granted that like moon outside of earth is always away from the sun and human beings are forced to live in the eternally sunless region. It is clear & evident that in this case human beings will not be endowed with visual experience still less with experience of colour. Likewise if we are in a state of mental agitation we are prone to misperceive the objects. Thus mental conditions are also in a sense responsible for defective perception. For example, when one is suffering from emotional disturbance profoundly, he will be found to search for his spectacles despite the fact that he wears it. Thus he fails to perceive the existence of his spectacles on his nose which under ordinary circumstances he will not fail to note. Again, physiological conditions may cause defective perception. For example, if one has not taken his food at the accustomed hours, he is likely to taste the food as bitter although the same food will not taste bitter

to other persons. This is due to the fact that non-taking of food at the accustomed hours caused non-consumption of digestive juices in the stomach which are circulated through blood throughout the body including the taste buds of his tongue. And this is the cause of the bitter taste in the mouth.

So we may come to the conclusion that everyone of the aforesaid conditions may be the cause of defective perception — severally or jointly. These may give rise to the Mal-observation and Non-observation.

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CHAPTER VII

PERCEPTION AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

That every knowledge involves consciousness is accepted as obvious by every School of Indian Philosophy. But whether knowledge is identical with consciousness is a question on which the different Schools of Indian Philosophy are at variance.

Consciousness or Caitanya is admitted as a brute fact by every School of Indian Philosophy; Yet regarding the question : what is the nature of consciousness ? again the Indian Philosophers are at variance. For example, according to Nyāya, consciousness or Caitanya is a contingent quality of the soul or Ātman, therefore, it is not an ultimate constituent of the world. According to Nyāya, consciousness means awareness or knowledge. Consciousness is one of the attributes of the soul or Ātman. It has also been said by the Naiyāyikas that consciousness is not an eternal quality.

It is a temporal quality. Further, it is said by the Naiyāyikas that consciousness is knowledge and this knowledge is presentative awareness, not representative awareness. The Nyāya Philosophy holds that consciousness is due to contact of the following :

Soul, body, internal sense, external sense and external object. Let us quote a few lines :

"Using the plus sign for conjunction, we may schemetically put the view as follows :

Soul + Body + Internal Sense + External Sense + External Object → Consciousness. ... This means that the soul remains totally unconscious in the absence of any of the following : body, manas, external sense, external object"¹.

In the Cārvāka Philosophy we find that matter is only the reality. And all objects, according to Cārvāka, are the result of different combinations of four elements viz., earth, water, air and fire. Consciousness, then, the Cārvākas regard, as an aggregate of four elements. Consciousness is a by-product or epiphenomenon of matter. Cārvāka view of consciousness has striking resemblance with that of epiphenomenalism which shows the relation between body and mind in terms of one way causality and which points out that mind is the by-product of the body.

Again, for Advaita Vedānta, consciousness or Caitanya

alone is reality and is without a second. And consciousness, according to Advaita Vedānta, is self-luminous. It (consciousness), the Advaitins hold, is neither a quality nor a state of substance. Thus we can say that Advaitins regard consciousness as self-luminous and without a second.

All these go to show how sharp is the cleavage of opinions among Indian Philosophers. Keeping in view the said cleavage we are now to find out their common area of agreement regarding (1) the nature of knowledge, (2) the varieties of knowledge and (3) the hierarchy of knowledge. All the Schools of Indian Philosophy admit perception as one of the fundamental types of cognition. All these Schools also admit that perception essentially involves consciousness. But at this point the agreement ends. What is consciousness ? To this question, the different Schools of Indian Philosophy gave different answers. According to Cārvāka, perception alone is the knowledge which is available to us, and it involves consciousness which is an emergent property of the matter. For Nyāya, perception is one kind of cognition and it involves consciousness which is an adventitious or non-essential quality of the Ātman or Soul. According to Prabhākara School of Mimāṃsaka, perception is direct cognition and as such involves consciousness essentially. To the Buddhists, perception is unalloyed conscious apprehension of reality which is momentary in nature. We have given a number of examples

from different Schools of Indian Philosophy to show that perception is the basic form of cognition on the basis of which the other types of cognition arise. Hence, it is held, the value and validity of the other types of cognition is ultimately dependent on the value and validity of perception. And as veridical cognition is constituted by consciousness and perception is a valid form of knowledge, therefore, perception is a form of consciousness.

What is the distinguishing mark of perception as a form of cognitive consciousness ? It is immediacy. Perception is immediate or direct cognition. But what is meant by the word 'immediacy' in this context ? By 'immediacy' is meant here the absence of any cognition acting as an intermediary cognition in the production of perception. To this view Nyāya lends its support and the Mimāṃsakas are also in agreement here. Buddhists are also subscribers to this view. There is a view that perception is essentially consciousness and immediacy is essentially a feature of consciousness. At this point we make an excursion into the theory of the nature of perception as developed in Western Philosophy in order to drive our point home efficiently. In Western Philosophy, perception is never unmediated. It is always a presentative-representative process in which the representative element dominates. Hence, unmediated perception, from the point of view of Western Philosophy is a fiction.

This sharp difference of opinion is traceable ultimately to the cultural milieu of Western society. In every society ordinary language or natural language functions as medium of the communication among the members of the society. Hence, the ontology which is implicit in such a language is structuring the slant of the point of view from which the native speaker of the language will meaningfully apprehend the world. Different cultural milieus are prevalent in different societies and consequently there are different ontological structures which are lying implicit behind the use of ordinary language of these societies respectively. Human beings are alike. They are also different. Hence, human societies are alike and they are also different. Likewise, natural or ordinary languages which are in use in these societies are also alike in regard to their tacit ontologies. They are also different with regard to certain aspects of these ontologies. These societies and their natural languages share a common area but these areas are peculiar and unique to each one of these societies and each one of these languages. Hence, there is limit of translatability. Each and every expression of the ordinary language of one society is not translatable into equivalent experience of another language of another society. There are recalcitrants which do not brook translatability. And these facts set a limit to communication from one language to another. The above digression is necessary for the elucidation of the views of the philosophers regarding

perception. Ordinarily 'perception' in English language is taken to be equivalent to the word 'Pratyakṣa' in sanskrit language. The meaning of these two expressions in two different languages have common area of meaningfulness. But these areas are strictly limited. For example, in sanskrit language the two words 'manas' and 'Ātman' have different meanings. The difference in meaning is essential for understanding the meaning of the expression 'pratyakṣa' in the context of Indian Philosophy. But this difference is altogether obliterated when we use the word 'perception' anywhere and everywhere as an equivalent expression in English language of the sanskrit word 'Pratyakṣa'.

In the ordinary languages of the Western societies there is no ontological difference between the referent of the word 'mind' and the word 'self'. On the other hand, in sanskrit language and the languages which are derived from Sanskrit there are sharp ontological differences in the use of the words 'manas' and 'Ātman'. The referents of these two Sanskrit words mean different things. Hence, if we simply translate the terms in English by using the words, 'mind' and 'self', our translation is bound to cause confusion and misunderstanding.

Immediacy of perception in the sense of 'Pratyakṣa' is ultimate in Indian Philosophy. But how this immediacy is to be ontologically conceived is a question on which the Indian

Philosophers are at variance. On the one hand, there are the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā which hold that this 'immediacy' is not ontologically substantive. On the other hand, there is the School of Vedānta as well as the School of Yogacara Bauddha who hold that immediacy of perception as a form of consciousness is ontologically substantive. Both Vedānta and Yogācāra Bauddha hold that consciousness alone is real. But they are at variance regarding the nature of consciousness. According to Yogācāra Bauddha, reality is flux of momentary conscious mental states each of which is Utpādivināsaśila or momentary, as such, has a beginning and end in time, whereas according to the Advaita Vedānta, consciousness which is of the nature of Satccidānanda (Sat - Pure Being, Cit = Pure consciousness and ānanda - Pure Bliss) and is without a second, i.e. which is devoid of all differences Svajātiya (difference from something else of the same class), Vijātiya (difference from something else of a different class) and Svagata (difference within a single body), and is alone real. The Advaitin is quick to point out that Yogācāra Bauddhas' contention regarding the nature of reality pre-supposes the view of Advaita Vedānta. For to say that something has a beginning and end in time is to presuppose that it did not exist in the infinite past before its origination and it will not exist in the infinite future after its dissolution or annihilation. But

what is the evidence that it did ^{/not} exist in the infinite past before its origination and will not exist in the infinite future after its dissolution at a particular point of time ? Only an eternal consciousness which is bereft of all temporal distinctions and which spans all the three conventional divisions of time — Past, Present and Future, can certify to the existence of such a temporal fact. Thus, the ultimate reality is not the Utpādavinaśāśila or evanescent bits of conscious states constituting a flux but is the certifying eternal consciousness, which in the ultimate analysis constitutes the evidential value and validity of knowledge. We have discussed above the various theories of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of caitanya or consciousness. It perhaps will not be out of place here to give an account of consciousness as envisaged by some major schools of Western Philosophy. This will conduce to in our opinion a better understanding of the concept of consciousness. Let us now discuss the modern rationalistic view regarding consciousness.

Modern rationalistic view regarding the nature of consciousness is found in the discussion of Descartes, spinoza and Leibnitz. Descartes, the father of modern Western Philosophy, had before him mathematics as a model. He intended to build Philosophy on the basis of some indubitable fact from which with the help of thoroughgoing

method of deduction all the consequence could be deduced. With this end in view Descartes had taken recourse to doubt as a method. In his opinion if he could doubt away the trapping of thought what remained would be indubitable, and on the basis of this indubitable datum we could build philosophy with the help of the method of deduction. He found that at least one thing could not be doubted away, viz., the doubter himself. Doubt being one of the mental states, the doubting consciousness exists. On the basis of this one indubitable fact Descartes build his metaphysical edifice. Thus certainty which is bereft of all doubts pertains to consciousness for doubting is a conscious mental state. Therefore, existence of conscious subject is indubitable and this is the Archimedean point for commencement of Philosophical thought.

Now what is this doubting consciousness or self ? It is evident that this doubting consciousness is personal in nature and as such is more or less permanent and is the subject of different mental states including knowledge. But still the question remains : is the doubting self identical with consciousness ? or is it a substance or a thing which has consciousness either as permanent or as a alienans attribute or quality ?

With regard to these questions Descartes' answers are not very clear. At times he identified 'consciousness' with the 'self'. At other times he depicted 'consciousness', in his language 'thought', as an essential quality or

attribute of the self. The philosophical legacy which Descartes inherited from Plato and other ancient philosophers through his mediaeval mentors prevented him from giving a clear cut and consistent answer to the above question.

Spinoza took consciousness or thought as an essential attribute of a substance which is neither material nor spiritual. For this substance has ~~among~~ other essential qualities, extension or matter ~~is~~ one of them. So the said substance cannot be identified either with thought or ^{with} extension. And this substance is God.

But Descartes and Spinoza took self-existence to be the hall mark of substantiality. That which exists in and through itself without being dependent on anything else for its existence, is substance. Thus, substance is, both to Descartes and Spinoza, causa sui or self - caused.

Leibnitz took this conception of substance to be inadequate but not wrong. According to him, a self - caused entity must be active, and this self - activity is at once self - existent also. Therefore, substantiality is self-activity, and as the self-activity admits of degrees, there are degrees of substantiality. Therefore, all choirs of heaven and furniture on earth are characterised by self-activity although in different degrees. So, there is substantiality everywhere. What we call materiality is nothing but a privation from the point of view of

a greater degree of self-activity.

Self-activity is perception and perception therefore, admits of degrees. Consequently perceiving entities are capable of being graded into a hierarchical series according to the degree of its perceptual activity. So what is apparently inert and is devoid of consciousness, is not really so. Hence, the conclusion follows that everything in the world is conscious and the so-called material things which appear to be divested of consciousness are in reality not so. And consciousness being self-activity is constitutive of everything in the world. It is not something which comes from outside. Rather it constitutes the very pith and marrow of every self-active entity in the world.

Locke questioned at the very outset this assumption of spontaneous self-activity which is constitutive of being of a thing in this world. According to Locke, human mind is passive recipient of data of knowledge from two sources, namely, sensation and **reflection**, in the form of ideas.

"Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring"². Before the advent of ideas of sensation or

reflection human mind is a 'tabula rasa'. Thus, Locke denies at the outset the concept of self-activity of mind supplying data of knowledge and experience independently and out of itself. The ideas, according to him, are of the nature of mind. Ideas, according to Locke, is : "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ..."³. Some 'ideas' according to Locke, resemble to the qualities of things of the external world while others do not. Naturally the question arises : is the mind or self conscious ? If so, in what sense ? Again, the question arises ; are ideas conscious in the same sense in which mind is conscious ? No clear cut answer is available from Locke. It transpires that Locke means by consciousness perception of the operations of understanding by understanding itself. Dressed in modern vocabulary of philosophy it means self-consciousness. Thus being conscious does not necessarily imply being self-conscious. Hence, Locke virtually ushers in the dissociation of consciousness from self-consciousness in the arena of modern Western Philosophy as well as in the arena of modern empiricism.

This tradition has been faithfully carried by Berkeley in his concept of 'notion' of self. There cannot be, according to him, an 'idea' of 'self' for 'ideas' cannot be self-conscious. Therefore, we can have 'notions' and not 'ideas' of 'self-conscious' entities. However, Berkeley demolishes, firstly, the distinction between ideas of

primary qualities and those of secondary qualities reducing virtually all ideas of primary qualities to secondary qualities, and, secondly, he in a sense, demolishes the Lockean distinction between two sources — one external and another internal — of ideas, namely, sensation and reflection. Thus in a stroke Berkeley virtually abolishes the independent existence of the external material world and allows subjectivism to reign supreme. But the question still remains : Why are not ideas self-conscious ? No definite answer is available from Berkeley. Rather he admits, not perhaps with much consistency, the existence of spiritual substance while denying the substantiality of matter although both spiritual and material substance so far as their claim for independent existence goes, sail in the same boat.

The nascent scepticism of Berkeley with regard to the existence of material substance, although goes far, yet does not go far enough as consistency demands. For extraneous reasons such as religious reasons he retains the substantiality of spiritual self. But this retention gives rise to contradiction in his Philosophy and makes it unstable.

Berkeley does away with the distinction between ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary qualities as well as the existence of material substance. The material thing with quality, to Berkeley, is simply a consistently

recurrent bundle of ideas. By one stroke Berkeley with the help of his stratagem does away with the problem of how to verify that our ideas really correspond to the primary qualities of things. However, according to Berkeley, mind is not entirely passive when it is having ideas. So far as ideas of imagination are concerned mind is to an extent active. Therefore, Berkeley comes to the conclusion, firstly, that to be is to ^{be} perceived for an object of knowledge, and secondly, that to be is to perceive for the subject of knowledge. But Berkeley unconsciously and surreptitiously presupposes that activity of the understanding demands the existence of a non-corporeal substance which houses this activity. This presupposition in its turn stems from another presupposition that every act necessarily implies the existence of an agent. But both these presuppositions are unargued and untenable. Berkeley wants to divest Lockean theory from its inconsistencies and irrelevancies.

With the same end in view Hume starts his philosophizing. He at the very outset makes a distinction between impressions and ideas and holds that ideas are less vivid copies of impression.

Hume says :

"By the term impression, then, I mean all the more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions, of

which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned"⁴.

Thus perception is conceived as concerned with impressions while memory and imagination are concerned with ideas. Ideas are dependent on impressions but impressions are not dependent on ideas. However, this is not universally true and admits at least of one exception. When there is a gap in a continuously diminishing or increasing shades of the same colour, we can have the idea of the shade, which typically or uniquely fills the gap without having the corresponding impression of that absent shade of colour. Therefore, Hume accepts and recognizes exceptions. However, when he does away with the concept of spiritual substance as the substance of activities of perception, memory, and imagination on the ground that whenever he searches for self as a spiritual substance, he stumbles upon some perception or other which is momentary or transitory and not upon anything which is permanent and abiding, he fails to note that vital question regarding the identity of stumbler will automatically arise. And logic demands that Hume must answer this question. But Hume does not return any answer to this question and the matter remains unanswered in the arena of empiricism.

Kant while having an overview of the philosophical

thoughts of his predecessors sees their unsatisfactory character. He thinks that the inadequacies of these philosophical thoughts stem from the adoption of inadequate method for tackling the recalcitrant problem of knowledge and existence. The empiricists are adopting the historical method while rationalists are adopting the method of deduction. The problems demand that they be tackled adequately as well as rigorously. The empirical contents of the problem cannot be brushed away as confused or illusory. Kant starts afresh his inquiry into the conditions which are necessary for the possibility of knowledge and adopts the transcendental method to build a metaphysics of experience. Metaphysics is the science of supra-sensible. It searches for things which are beyond the range of experience. But how is metaphysics of experience as the science of the supra-sensible of experience possible? At this point Kant shows his originality. The conditions of the possibility of experience are not themselves experimental. They are super-sensible i.e., they are beyond the ken of experience. Their existences are to be inferred as it were in a backward manner from the structure and characteristics of experience. This is the famous transcendental method constituting the Archimedean point of Kantian critical philosophy.

Perception like other types of knowledge is not sense-manifold i.e. 'a blooming, buzzing confusion' but a knowledge of object. In perception we perceive the sense

-manifold and in that very receiving we intuit i.e., synthesize the sense-manifold. All synthesis are conscious synthesis. But that does not mean that they are self-conscious synthesis. In every experience there exists a demand as it were to be harmoniously united with others and this demand can be met if and only if all experiences are tethered as it were to focus and this focus, according to Kant, is focus imaginarius, namely, I think.

Representative theory of perception despite Kant's critical philosophy leads inevitably to mentalism which inevitably merges in its turn into idealism. Thus Post-Kantian Philosophers endowed thing -in-itself with mental existence and this endowment ultimately flowers into fullfledged system of Hegelian and Post-Hegelian idealism. But soon the reaction had set in. Meinong, Brentano and his company distinguished between act and content and refused to reduce the existence of content to that of act. Following the same line Moore distinguished between 'sensation as act' and 'sensation as object', and he attributes the tendency to identify the act and the object to the diaphanous nature of act of consciousness.

S.K.Maitra says :

"That mind is nothing but consciousness a pure awareness as a transparent medium which makes no difference to the contents or objects that appear and disappear in the

medium in question — the view of the British realists, Moore and Alexander"⁵.

Russell following Moore assesses the distinction. However, he introduces further distinctions. Sense-data are distinct from the act of perception which knows them. At the same time they are also distinct from physical objects of which they are the sense-data. Russell accepts some sort of causal theory and this leads him to accept the intermediate but independent status of sense-data standing between the physical object and the act of perception. Naturally the question arises : if we are in an act of perceiving this physical object confined to sense-data alone and have no independent access to the physical object, how are we to know, firstly, that there exists physical objects, and, secondly, the sense-data conform to them ? No satisfactory answer to these questions is available from Russell. Position of Samuel Alexander vis-a-vis this question is vague and evasive. The same is true of Dawes Hick, Turner and C.D. Broad. Tremendous development of physical sciences and biological sciences in the period in which philosophical speculations of first four decades of this century take place influence the practitioners of the philosophy in this period to try to develop a Philosophy of Positivism on the basis of the findings of modern science as well as on the basis of the tools fashioned by modern mathematics, namely, set theory and mathematical logic.

Thus we get the different Philosophers from the members of the Vienna Circle everyone of which rejects speculative philosophy as a romantic wild goose chase. At this stage it will conduce to a better understanding of the fundamental points at issue if we can enunciate a comparative study of Indian and Western theories of consciousness.

At very outset it will not be amiss to point out that there is no Indian theory of consciousness which denies the existence of consciousness in toto like the behaviourists. Even the Cārvākas admit the existence of consciousness as an emergent quality of human body to be a fact. Therefore, we will do well to keep this point in mind when we shall start discussion and comparison of different Indian and Western theories of consciousness.

The problem of consciousness arises with the problem of knowledge. And the problem of knowledge brings in its wake the problem of criteria for distinguishing between veridical and non-veridical cognition. It is a truism that every cognition involves consciousness. To cognise is to be conscious. Thus the problem of consciousness comes to the fore.

How can we distinguish between veridical cognition from non-veridical cognition ? Theories regarding the nature of consciousness necessitate the returning of different answers to this question. If everything in this

world including consciousness is momentary, then true cognition must also be momentary. And therefore momentariness will be a constitutive element in ^{the} definition of true cognition as well as of consciousness, if any such definition is possible. That momentariness is constitutive characteristics of consciousness and of the cognition is clear and evident from the Heraclitian statement that no one can bathe in the same river twice. The same orientation is also found in the declaration of the Buddhist tenet, namely, whatever is, is momentary. So Heraclitus, Hume and his followers in Western Philosophy, and Buddhists School in Indian Philosophy are in perfect accord over this point.

However, the problems raised their heads again. If everything is momentary, how can we explain the existence of memory ? Likewise if everything is momentary, how can we explain the personal identity or the self-identity of a person stretching over a long span of time ? Refinements of the theories of momentariness were introduced both in West and India. But problems could not be solved by this stratagem. These problems like the proverbial hydra started to raise their head anew even when they are cut by the vorpal sword of refinement.

Searches therefore have been undertaken to find out alternative avenues for solving these problems. For

example, Nyāya in India takes consciousness to exist for more moments than one as a quality being a constitutive element of human knowledge. At the same time due regard has been paid to the constraints exercised by the objective world by introduction of the phrase 'Tadvatitad prakāraḥ' by Nyāya. However, at this point, corresponding philosophy of Plato and Platonists in the West has taken a queer turn. According to Plato, knowledge is universal, invariant, and objective in the sense that it is the same for every knower. Hence, as sense-experience is variant and is not the same for every knower and so lacks universality and objectivity, it cannot claim to be knowledge. How then do we get knowledge? Knowledge according to Plato, is not a case of putting in but a drawing out. We learn to know. But what we learn comes from or is drawn out from the conscious self. It is not put in from outside by the sense-experience. The Platonic theory has a partial resemblance with that of Advaita Vedānta. According to Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is of the nature of knowledge. Brahman alone is reality. And Brahman is one without a second. Thus existence of more entities ^{than} one as well the existence of difference as real are gainsaid by the Advaita Vedānta. But the existence of the difference is not gainsaid by Plato for Plato admits the existence of more ideas than one which are constitutive of reality and therefore while Plato admits pluralism the Advaitin Vedāntins admit monism.

Descartes and Locke like Nyāya admit conscious self-substance which owns knowledge. They also admit material substance or matter constituting the physical world which is the object of knowledge that conscious self-substance possesses. These substances are permanent entities and knowledge being dependent on consciousness exists, as long as its consciousness exists. However, in the case of Nyāya, Descartes and Locke, the question arises regarding the criteria for distinguishing between veridical or true cognition and non-veridical or untrue cognition. Descartes happens to have additional difficulties because of the admission of veracity of God. Likewise Locke also happens to have additional problem because of his admission that we know only the ideas. In the same way Nyāya also fashions the anyathākhyoti as a theory of error to account for the existence of non-veridical or untrue cognition. If we read between the lines of all these Indian and Western theories of cognition, we will find that all of them admitted openly or tacitly the existence of consciousness as a fact. They are at variance with each other regarding their respective answers to the question : What is consciousness ?

It is not out of place perhaps to note here that modes of these differences in their answers arise from their commitment to certain basic tenets constituting the tradition of the School of Philosophy to which each of them belongs. Thus once again we come to the question of the influence of

cultural milieu that induces to see these basic problems from different perspectives and to return different answers accordingly. And even within the same School different traditions continuing different sub-schools has induced these sub-schools to embrace different answers to the same problems. For example, the Bhamati of the Northern School of Vedānta returns different answers to the problems of knowledge or consciousness from those of Vivarṇa School although both of them belong to tradition of Advaita Vedānta.

In the last analysis we are by the inexorable logic to come to a conclusion that ultimately all these differences are traceable to the differences in the cultural tradition and milieu in which a philosopher lives, moves and have his being. This is both strength and weakness of philosophy. Thus philosophy presents a picture at once of a continuity and a crisis. In the cultural milieu it stands for a continuity of systematic thought and thus is perennial. But it also is not blind to the changes that take place in the social life and affect the cultural climate of the society. It accommodates and harmonizes these changes with the already existing strands of systematic thought and discords of the intractable elements. Thus it is at once the same as well as different. This is perhaps the history of paradox ingrained in the nature of any product of the socio-cultural life of any society.

In this connection, it will not perhaps be a digression to set at naught a favourable illusion which engulfs normally the practitioners of analysis of philosophical concepts. The said practitioners take it for granted that all concepts they analyse are cut and dried, finished products. These concepts in their opinion are like the standardised parts of a machine or machines and their function is to separate out by analysis these concepts into neat categories. That philosophical concepts, be it noted at the outset, are of two types : concepts which admit of growth and development and thus are amenable to historical treatment, and concept which are cut and dried and admit only of logical or categorial analysis. Moral and Epistemic concepts, unlike the concepts of mathematics, grow, thrive, and develop. They admit of analysis in historical terms. Concept of perception being essentially an epistemic concept thus admits of historical analysis. Forgetting this truth if we subject the concept of perception to logical or categorial analysis, we will do violence to its nature and will arrive at untrue conclusions.

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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Perceptual cognition depends on the human organism with specific senses. Is perception mediate or immediate so far as ordinary perception is concerned? In the concluding chapter I intend to show that perception, according to the Western Psychologists and Philosophers, is non-mediate in a particular sense. Is it proper to say that perception of the Western thinkers is non-mediate without any qualifications? We answer in the negative because perception requires some mediations without which perception can never be possible at all. The media of perception are the following :

(1) Without previous knowledge, perceptual cognition in full-blooded sense is not possible. Without pre-existing experience there cannot be perceptual cognition at all.

(ii) Both the Western Psychologists and Indian Philosophers are of the opinion that perception depends upon sense-organs. Hence, we can say that sense-organ is a medium of perception. In Whitehead's Philosophy we find that perception requires a medium without which perception is not possible. Again, according to Alexander, knowledge is a 'compresence' between the act of mind and the object. If it be so, perceptual cognition as cognition requires the relation between the act of mind and object. Hence, we can say that perception is not non-mediated.

(iii) Moreover, besides sense-organ in perception, we find that it depends on the function of the brain. For example, if the occipital lobe of the brain is damaged or removed operationally, visual perception fails to occur although the object, the sense-organ and other conditions may be present. E.J. Lowe says : "Whenever one perceives an ordinary public object only in the normal way, it is a fact confirmed by experient that such perception is causally dependent upon a transmission process of some sort between the object and the percipient's brain, a process which is different for different sensory modalities"¹.

(iv) Perception also involves the subject or perceiver. These constituents of perception clearly reveal that perception is not non-mediated. But non-mediation does not include the absence of mediation by sense-organs or other

non-cognition factors. According to Armstrong, "Perception ... is the acquiring knowledge of, or inclination to believe in, particular facts about the physical world, by means of the senses, normally accompanied by knowledge of the means"². D.W.Hamlyn says, "perception is simply the experience that results from a chain of causal processes starting from the former of energy charge that affects the sense organs, this then sets up brain processes, and the experience is the last stage"³.

Thus we can say that perception requires mediation.

Most of the Indian Philosophical systems mean by perception a cognition which is not mediated by any other cognitive state of mind for its origination, i.e. perception, according to them, is non-mediated. Advaita Vedānta does not describe perception in this way. Their description is somewhat different from Nyāya view. Here, I intend below to depict Nyāya view. In Nyāya philosophy we find in perception a contact which can be expressed in this manner thus : Sense-object contact-sense-mind contact and soul-mind contact.

According to Nyāya, perception is impossible if the soul and mind, are not in relation with each other and mind is not in relation to the senses. Hence, perception, in this sense, is not non-mediated. Advaita Vedānta, however, rejects uncompromisingly and unhesitatingly the presence

of any sort of mediation, cognitive as well as extra-cognitive, in perceptual cognition. Genuine perception must be absolutely non-mediated because that perceptual cognition can be absolutely-veridical which is totally devoid of the distinction between knowledge, knower and known. This being the Vedāntic Paradigm of Knowledge-any knowledge which falls short of it, is mediated and to that extent it is non-veridical. And being absolutely non-mediated this perception is bereft even of antaḥkāraṇa-vṛtti of the manas or buddhi. So only Brahmācāitanya or Brahmāsākṣatkāra alone is genuine perception. Be it noted that the Advaita thinkers admit the unity between sense, mind and object in the case of ordinary perception. Besides ordinary perception, they admit immediacy of perception. Perception is of the nature of consciousness. Perception is identical with consciousness. Mediation presupposes the duality of that which mediates and those between which it mediates. But Advaita Vedānta is committed to a metaphysics of non-dualism and as such it must deny the reality of any variety of duality.

In chapter II, various definitions of perception given by different Schools of Indian Philosophy have been discussed. Here, in this chapter, we propose to evaluate those views critically so that we can arrive at a definite conclusion by discarding the untenable definitions, if

any, Before we embark upon the task stated above it seems cogent if we give an exposition of the criteria to be used for the assessment of logical value and validity of these definitions. Our task will be always to be alert to note whether the definition is free from (a) too wide application (b) too narrow application and (c) self-contradiction. Now we shall start our critical study of the various definitions of perception as given by different systems of Indian Philosophy one after another. The definition which are based on sense-object contact are taken up for discussion first. We find that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-Mimāṃsankas (Bhāṭṭa) admit sense-object contact as the generative pre-condition of perception.

Nyāya definition of perception is similar to the definition as given by the Bhāṭṭas. But there is a little but significant difference between the two and the analysis will enable us to exhibit in bold relief the superiority of Nyāya definition to that of Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsankas.

Nyāya definition of perception has been criticised and shown to be fallacious on the ground that perceptual cognition is the resultant of a contact that obtains between sense-organ and its objects. The particular fallacy which is involved here is the fallacy of too narrow definition as it is not applicable to God's perception who has no sense-organ. Further, if perception is defined in terms

of sense-object contact, then the reference of this expression will remain present in the case of both perception and inference (mind being internal sense-organ) so the definition becomes too wide. And by means of this definition we shall not be able to distinguish between perception and inference.

The Advaita Philosophers have pointed out that Nyāya definition of perception involves both the fallacies, namely, too narrow & too wide application. But inference is indirect or Parokṣa source of knowledge. The definition of perception given by Annam-Bhaṭṭa (i.e. perception is the resultant of a contact that obtains between sense-organ and its object) shows the similarity between Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas definition of perception in respect of the inclusion of sense-object contact as one of the constituents of the definition. If the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas subscribe to the similar kind of definition of perception, it will be vitiated by the same defect as occurs in the case of Nyāya definition. The Neo-Naiyāyika, namely, Viśvanātha redefined perception in a novel way to get rid of defect by rewording it. Perceptual cognition is that cognition which is caused by sense-object contact and is delimited by sense-organness (Indriyatvāvacchhinna indriyajanyaññānatva Pratyakṣam)⁴. Here, it is to be noted that this definition is applicable only in the case of perception of human beings and not to

Divine Perception. To steer clear of the defect (as opponent may declare it to be too narrow on the ground that it does not include Divine perception which is also a kind of perception), Visvanātha therefore, expounded a negative definition of perception as follows : Jñāna-Karanakam jnanam pratyakṣam⁵ i.e. perception is that which is not produced by the instrumentality of any other cognition. Now we find that this definition of Visvanātha is neither too wide nor too narrow and also it does not involve any contradiction.

This last definition of perception as propounded by Visvanātha is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas. Why do they not admit it as logically tenable ? We know that the Mimāṃsakas admit the supremacy of the Vedas and regard it as apauruṣeya (not created by any human agent). Again, they do not admit the non-sensuous or mystic perception. These are the reasons for which the Mimāṃsakas do not think of the necessity of such negative definition of perception as given by Visvanātha. As the Mimāṃsakas do not admit the existence of God, hence, they do not admit any defect in the definition of perception. If we admit the existence of God, we are to take further steps in addition to the definition of perception as proposed by mimāṃsakas; otherwise the definition will be applicable only in the cases of human perception and not in the case of Divine perception. As the Nyāya definition of perception covers both human and Divine

perception, Nyāya position appears to be sounder than that of the Mīmāṃsakas.

The Buddhists discard the definition of perception given by Nyāya and Mīmāṃsakas. According to the Buddhists, perception is bereft of all ideal constructions. To them, perception to be valid must reveal only the unique particular as its object without any contamination from ideality and the unique particular, being momentary, is now as excluding all other momentary objects of the infinite past and infinite future.

The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsakas do not attach much importance to the newness of the content of experience in the case of perceptual cognition. Hence, the Buddhists definition cannot be taken as valid by Nyāya and Mīmāṃsakas. They point out that novelty of perception can only be found in the case of first moment of sensation. This is the reason why the Buddhists admit indeterminate perception as the only valid form of perception and to them, determinate perception as relational and as depending on thought-constructs, cannot be a valid form of perception. The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsakas admit both determinate and indeterminate perception. And they hold the view that without indeterminate perception there cannot be determinate perception. If both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are admitted then the Buddha view regarding

perception is not acceptable.

Can the definition of perception of the Bauddha be taken as satisfactory one ? We answer in the negative. A critical examination will exhibit that the Buddhists definition of perception is not valid. Bauddha Philosophy, we know, is based on the theory of momentariness, Kṣanabhanguravāda, i.e. the doctrine whatever is, is momentary. The theory of momentariness cannot be admitted in all cases. Our commonsense tells us that changeability can be understood if and only if there is permanent background. If there is no admission of something permanent, the question of changeability would be incapable of arising. Moreover, the Buddhists speak of Nirvāna as the absolute and permanent cessation of suffering. If the Nirvāna is accepted, momentariness cannot be accepted. But the Buddhists admit both of them and this involves contradiction leading to the collapse of entire Buddhistic account of experience. The collapse of the entire Bauddha Philosophy is ultimately traceable to the contradiction involved in admitting simultaneously the universal sway of momentariness and the permanence of Nirvāna which is the negation of momentariness. Further, the admission of indeterminate perception as valid perceptual cognition and rejection of determinate perception as invalid being a falsification of momentary unique particular because indeterminate perception which is taken to be bare sensation, is more a myth than

reality as its existence is not vouchsafed by any experience but only by a questionable metaphysical tenet of Buddhism. According to the Advaitins, Buddha's definition of perception is not acceptable for it is vitiated by the defect of impossibility. They think that the cognition which is absolutely free from imagination and which has specific individuality (Svalakṣana) is impossible.

Like the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsakas the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta schools also agree that contact of sense and objects gives rise to knowledge. But the definition of 'contact' differs from school to school. This will be discussed later on.

However, we are now discussing the views of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta in order to arrive at a definite conclusion, if any. In Sāṅkhya philosophy we find two kinds of cognition viz. empirical cognition and non-empirical cognition or intelligence. The former is object-mediated cognition whereas the latter is self-positing and self-validating objectless cognition requiring no mediation. Like the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhyists admit sense-object contact in the case of ordinary perceptual cognition. This, we can say, is applicable only in the case of empirical cognition. For the perceptual cognition we require, first, the object, secondly the contact of particular sense-organ

with the object and thirdly, objective modification of the buddhi or intellect which is a product of prakṛti acquiring name and form of the specific object of experience and due to these constituents the intellect makes the perceptual cognition possible.

This perceptual knowledge is direct knowledge-knowledge which issues in liberation of self from bondage, is also direct knowledge. In this context for a fuller understanding the s̄ankhya view of liberation is discussed. Liberation that we find in S̄ankhya Philosophy is possible through the discrimination (Viveka) between the self and not-self. We have to suffer for our ignorance of the true nature of the reality and for this ignorance which is beginningless we are unable to discriminate between self and not-self. This discrimination is possible by Vivekajñāna which again is possible by dhyāna (meditation), dhāranā (attention) etc.

This explanation i.e. reference to dhyāna and dhārnā, exhibits the relation between S̄ankhya and Yoga Philosophy. By Vivekajñāna the direct cognition of the distinction between the self and not-self comes into being. Moreover, this Vivekanajñāna is not theoretical knowledge, rather it is direct non-verbal knowledge and this Vivekajñāna can be subsumed under cognition as pure intelligence.

According to Vedānta, Pratyakṣa-Pramāna is aparokṣa Pramāna and means of caitanya i.e. Brahman. There is no

need of sense-organs for the perception of Brahman. To the Advaitins, knowledge is self-manifesting and as such it does not require another knowledge or antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, internal mode. But in the case of external perception in empirical plane some sort of antaḥkaraṇavṛtti or internal mode is required. But transcendental knowledge is devoid of all distinctions. Brahman or Caitanya Pratyakṣa is direct knowledge or aparokṣajñāna whereas the knowledge which goes by the name of external perception is perception in the ordinary sense of the term, and is not fully direct and non-mediated knowledge. The empirical perception of external object is apparently not self-revealed, but in reality it is also self-revealed to the extent in which it is non-different from consciousness or Caitanya, which is of the nature of Brahman or ultimate reality. The Advaitins think that Brahman is Caitanyasvarupa or consciousness as such and Caitanya is eternal, nitya.

Caitanya as reality is akhanda or is devoid of all distinctions including the distinctions of subject of knowledge, object of knowledge and process of knowledge. Here, it is to be noted that Caitanya is of two kinds, viz. Visuddha Caitanya, pure consciousness and Māyā Upahita Caitanya or Caitanya apparently determined by Māyā. Pure consciousness is endless and eternal. When antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, internal mode, seems to be blended with Caitanya giving rise apparently to the distinctions which obtain between

subject of knowledge, object of knowledge, and knowing process, then Caitanya which is really undifferentiated, appears to be full of distinctions. Antahkaraṇavṛtti or internal mode is the upādhi or condition of Caitanya, that is, it seemingly qualify Caitanya but really does not do so. Like the pictures in cinema show which seemingly appear on the screen and by so appearing seemingly qualify it although does not do so in reality, the screen remaining unaffected and untransmuted in spite of the appearances of the fleeting pictures on it. Similarly the antahkaraṇavṛttis or internal modes seemingly qualify Caitanya but really do not do so. The opponents, e.g., the Naiyāyikas, subscribe to the view that perception requires one or other of the sense-organs, but this is denied by Advaita epistemologists like Dharmarāja. Dharmarāja pointed out that perceptual knowledge does not depend on sense-organ. He, in this context cited the case of Divine perception as admitted by the Naiyāyikas. As the Naiyāyikas admit it, this prove that in the case of every perception, there is no need of sense-organ as an essential constituent of perception.

From this discussion it is evident that the Advaita account of perception which is other than external perception in the empirical plane, does not require any mediation, i.e., it is completely non-mediated, and as such, it is direct (Saksātkāra). It is to be noted that the Advaitins understand by perception in the true sense of the term

only. Brahmaṣṛtyakṣa. And this Brahmaṣṛtyakṣa reveals itself, i.e. reality and at once negates without remainder the ignorance or mithyājñāna which is the cause of bondage .

That which is Sādhaka or establisher of the existence of something cannot be at the same time its Vādhaka or destroyer. Existence of ignorance as an entitative positivity is attested by the illuminative Sākṣi Caitanya or witnessing consciousness which is of the nature of knowledge and reality. As Sākṣi Caitanya, witnessing Consciousness is thus the Sādhaka or establisher of ignorance as an entitative positive or bhāvarupa, it is evident that it cannot be the Vādhaka of ignorance. But in that case we must have to admit that in a sense the witnessing consciousness and the witnessed ignorance coexist. And if this togetherness of the witness and witnessed be admitted, then as a corollary it follows that they cannot be opposed to each other like light and darkness which cannot co-exist together. It therefore follows that the witnessing consciousness or Sākṣicaitanya is not knowledge in the sense in which a piece of valid cognition or Pramā is knowledge.

A pramā is knowledge in the sense of consciousness which is delimited by antaḥkaraṇavṛtti or internal mode, but witnessing consciousness is not consciousness delimited by antaḥkaraṇavṛtti or internal mode, for in susupti there is

only ajñāna and therefore, witnessing. Consciousness, not being Prama, is not opposed to bhāvarupa ajñāna or positive ignorance which is apramā or nescience. Admission of reality of Brahma-Pratyakṣa presupposes the commitment to a metaphysical point of view. So long this commitment is absent the admission of reality or Brahma-pratyakṣa remains suspended. From this point of view all the alternatives and different accounts of perception in the different schools of Indian Philosophy are in reality accounts of alternative commitments to different metaphysical schemes. There cannot be a commitment-free philosophy as there cannot be a presuppositionless account of perception. Therefore, any admission of the possibility of metaphysics-neutral theory of perception, particularly in the context of Indian Philosophy, is a myth. This should specifically be kept in mind when evaluation of different theories in Indian Philosophy is made. A theory in Indian Philosophy becomes significant or meaningful and not a totally non-sensical body of statements only when it is seen against the back drop of the place of its presuppositions in the cultural map in Indian Philosophy. Under the same cultural map e.g., the Nyāya theory differs from that of Vedānta and both of them again from the theory of Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas.

And such differences can be explained fruitfully only in the light of their respective sets of pre-suppositions.

under the same cultural cartography. The proponents of these theories agree to differ and differ uncompromisingly because of their commitments to their respective sets of pre-suppositions. This commitment is genuine and not a matter of pastime like the so-called commitment of Hegel and Neo-Hegelians. The commitment of the Indian Philosophers is serious because in Indian Philosophy theories are not divorced from practices and that is why the Indian Philosophers wrangle in theoretical debate with the ferocity of a gladiator in combat who is afraid of losing his life, if he is defeated in fight. If, for example, a Buddhist monk is defeated in war of argumentation, he will have to give up his life style as a monk and will have to take up the life of a domestic Hindu again. Similarly, if the Mimamsaka wrangler is defeated, he will have to give up his home and hearth and become a saffron-clad recluse of Buddhistic or any other order. This shows the importance of presuppositions in different schools of Indian Philosophy.

In order to discuss the problem of perception we have made a comparative study between the Western views and the Indian views. It is shown that in some respects there is relation between the Indian views and the Western views as to the definition of perception and its nature.

There is also difference between the two. However, we should not compare the two views, namely, Eastern and

Western views, with a view to gradation and as such we cannot say of the superiority of the position of any one of them. To substantiate our contention we like to quote the following" :, it is also wrong to say that Indian analysis of perception is true, and the Western analysis is false. Not all sorts of analyses of perception are applicable to all sorts of environments. The environmental conditions of Britain supports the British analysis of perception, and the environmental condition of India supports the Indian analysis of perception. The environmental condition which supports the Western analysis of perception may fail to support the Indian analysis of perception"⁶.

Thus it seems that it is not advisable to make a comparative study between the Indian and the Western view of perception as this may not give us a topic-neutral outcome.

There is philosophical variation and it cannot be denounced. As there is philosophical variation, it is quite possible that there is difference between the Eastern and the Western thought. Further, we cannot and should not study Indian concepts of perception in the light of the contemporary Western philosophy. In this connection, I like to quote from the book of late K.K.Banerjee, which runs thus : "A student of Western Philosophy may miss many things in Indian Philosophy, and the same may be said of

a student of Indian Philosophy studying Western Philosophy.

But to catalogue them all and to work out their implications may not be profitable"⁷.

Again, both the Indian and the Western Philosophy differ from each other for their outlook. To quote Late K.K. Banerjee again :

"It is ātmavidyā in a sense in which Western Philosophy is not and cannot be. And to Indian Philosophy the concept of form or essence is useless"⁸.

We have shown in our discussion that perception can be nonmediated if it is taken in the sense in which Advaitins use it. Thus our discussion of the problems of perception in Indian Philosophy has come almost to an end. We have used the term 'almost' in the preceding sentence advisedly. We have come to an end but not completely. Certain questions remain unanswered from the nature of the case. However, it would be an unpardonable failure, to broach them without the account given by the Sāṅkhya Philosophers. Thus in Sāṅkhya philosophy it is mentioned that there are eleven indriyas or sense-organs including mind or manas and every such indriya other than manas has its appropriate object to come in contact with. Hence, in a sense, there is a fittingness, as it were, between each indriya and its appropriate object. So one normally cannot grasp the

appropriate object of another indriya because of this lack of fittingness.

Nyāya Philosophy mainly gives importance on logic and as such it admits mainly jñānendriyas or organs of knowledge. And the Naiyāyikas have admitted the importance of the 'senses' or 'indriyas'. Now we are to know whether the mind is an indriya or an organ of sense. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā admit mind as an indriya or sense-organ. But the Buddhists, e.g. Dinnāga, do not admit that the mind is an indriya. Further, the Gitā does not agree to admit mind as an indriya. In upanisads we find that mind or manas is not regarded as an indriya, e.g. in Kathopaniṣad we find that manas has been compared to the pragrahas or reins and the indriyas are compared to the horses. The author humbly intends to raise some problems here for a critical discussion. The problems are as follows :

(1) How are mind, manas and self, ātman related to indriyas which are physical ? In perceptual cognition the role of sense-object contact is admitted by almost all Schools of Indian Philosophy. These Philosophers are at variance as to the nature of the sense-object contact. It may be said at the very outset that these variation of views can be traced back to the metaphysical views of Indian Philosophers regarding God, man and the world of nature. Now we propose to take up these metaphysical views and show

how these views give rise to different conceptions of sense-object contact. At the very outset we should be acquainted with the meaning of the word 'indriya' or 'senses'.

The word 'indriya' or 'sense' can be used in two different senses. Primarily it is said that 'indriya' is that which lords over the outside world. According to Buddhagho-sha, "Indriya means sovereignty or again Indriya in its characteristic mark of deciding (Adhimokha) is that which exercises Lordship"⁹.

Secondly by an 'Indriya' we may mean that which suggests. In Sāṅkhya Philosophy we find that senses are divided into two kinds, namely, internal and external senses. Again, external senses are sub-divided into two kinds, namely, jñānedriya, organs of knowledge, and Karmendriya, organs of action. Mind is also a sense of 'Indriya' which has been admitted by the Sāṅkhya Philosophers. Vedāntaparibhāṣā says that mind cannot be regarded as an 'indriya'. This is also true of the author of Vivaraṇa. According to Vedānta, mind is not an indriya because mind has no specific object to be grasped. Moreover, had mind been a sense-organ or indriya, then it could not be taken merely as a helper of other indriyas. As it is the helper of other indriyas, it cannot be called an indriya. Thus we find again that the Indian thinkers are at variance as to the admissibility of mind as indriya or sense-organ.

Now, we like to mention the nature of both mind and self taking into account the views of different Indian thinkers. Mind is unconscious and it is distinct from self. This has been admitted by almost all orthodox Schools of Indian Philosophy. According to Nyāya, mind is an internal organ. It is intrinsically unconscious. It is eternal, atomic, objective and without body. Mind is mobile and minute entity (aṇu). Mind is substance and, as such, it is the locus of qualities. There are many minds and many selves. Mind cannot be related to two indriyas at the same time. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṅskas have also admitted the existence of the mind. According to them, mind is ubiquitous, (vibhu). They hold the view that as mind is not touchable, mind is all pervading like time and self. Mind is all pervasive and it produces its effect in the body. This mind, according to the Bhāṭṭas, is the instrument of direct cognition of pleasure and pain etc. Mind, to the Bhāṭṭas, is not atomic in dimension. The conjunction between mind and self, according to Bhāṭṭas, is natural and not produced by an action. Mind, according to Sāṅkhya, is a material entity and it is independent of the self. The Sāṅkhya holds the view that the whole world evolves from Prakṛti and the first evolute is Buddhi. And from Buddhi evolves Ahankāra. And from Ahankāra arises mind and other indriyas. Mind always exists as the karaṇa or instrument. It is produced from the Sattvika Ahankāra and is included

in the list of eleven sense-organ. Mind conducts both the jñānendriya and karmendriya. According to Sāṅkhya, both Buddhi and mind are material and eternal. From the above discussion it emerges that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya Philosophy are of opinion that mind is physical. The Advaitins do not admit mind as an indriya or sense-organ. But they hold that mind is middle-sized. Mind is finite substance and it has parts. So it is not individual and atomic. Thus there is diverse opinion as to the nature of mind.

Now a short discussion on self is made for a definite reason. The Naiyāyikas admit Ātman as the eighth substance. Selves are many in number. They are ubiquitous and everlasting substances. The existence of the soul is known by inference, not by perception. On the other hand, according to Vedānta and Sāṅkhya pure consciousness is Ātman or self. If studied elaborately, it will be found that here there is a difference between mind and self. The nature of mind and self also vary from one school to another school of Indian Philosophy. Without entering into too much details regarding this issue we are taking up the following problem i.e. how are mind and self related to Indriyas which are physical? At the very outset we are to remove a confusion which this question tacitly involves. We are to note that Indian Philosophers generally divide indriyas into two groups : (1) external sense-organs and (2) internal sense

-organs. Again, there are five external sense-organs corresponding to five type of sense-knowledge of the external world, namely, rūpa (colour), rasa (taste), śabda (Sound) gandha (smell) and sparśa (touch). And manas, internal sense-organ, enables us to experience pleasure and pain. Both internal and external sense-organs are, according to Indian Philosophers, corporeal and as such they are non-spiritual. Hence, they are opposed to Ātman or self which is of the nature of spirit or consciousness and is, according to some Indian thinkers, substantial in nature. Whether substantial or not Ātman is spiritual and as such opposed to everything non-spiritual including all indriyas, external as well as internal. However, from their opposed nature we can come to the conclusion that spiritual and non-spiritual entities are of different nature. The very generation of knowledge or anubhava pre-supposes at least the existence of true objects and their contact. And this admits pluralism. Indriya is an object. Mind is another object, and Ātman is still another object. When Indriya is in contact with manas and manas is in contact with Ātman, knowledge results. Indriya is material substance and as such it is divisible. Mind is also material substance. But the self is immaterial and indivisible.

How can the material and immaterial be unified? This problem leads in the West to Descartes' interactionism where Descartes had shown the relation between two relative

substances, mind and body, which possess opposite essence. The arguments for and against interactionism of Descartes may be cited here too. In this connection, I like to quote a few lines from Shaffer's Philosophy of Mind :

" ... Descartes held that one and the same thing could not be both a space-occupier and a thinking thing. He seems to have thought that these characteristics were simply so different in their natures that one and the same thing could not have both. Thus he cites the fact that extended things are divisible, whereas thinking things are not divisible But this is a very weak line of argument. Since thinking and occupying space are different characteristics, there will naturally be differences between them. Extended things will necessarily be divisible (I take it Descartes is here thinking of spatially dividing something), and things which are non-extended, say disembodied minds, will not be so divisible. But that is just to say that we have different characteristics here. A thing which thinks would be divisible if it were at the same time an extended thing. So pointing out differences between extension and thinking does not show us that things which have the one characteristic cannot have the other"¹⁰. Thus being spiritual or having spirituality does not necessarily exclude an entity from being material or having materiality.

However, there may be contact between 'material' and 'immaterial' in the sense of divisibility and indivisibility. For example, contact i.e. conjunction between Paramānu and Paramānu = Dvyaṅka. Here, there is need of God effecting contact between Paramānu and Paramānu. But God is immaterial. And as such there is no bar regarding contact between material and immaterial. Though the spiritual and non-spiritual entity cannot interact or causally influence one another, yet they do not stand in the way of generation of perceptual cognition through the contact of sense-organs with Ātman or self. In this connection, it should be noted that Vedānta's denial of God or Isvara is not an unqualified one. Advaitins admit God or Paramātman and many Jivatmāns at the empirical plane, i.e., Vyavahārika jagat or samsāra. Both Paramātman and Jivātman which are different from one another, are creations of Māyā. Māyā by its covering power covers up the self-luminous and non-different character of consciousness which is of the nature of Brahman and by its Vikṣepa Śakti or power of projection projects a world having an Isvara and Jivātman who are enjoying the world and according to their respective acts of enjoyment accrue pāpa and punya, merit and demerit, and suffer accordingly.

Our next question is : Can the indriyas be identified with sense-organ as admitted by the Western Philosophers ? Both the Indian and Western thinkers think that sense-organs

are physical. But the word 'physical', according to Western thinkers, is inclusive of two other words constituting its meaning. They are : organic and inorganic. Therefore, a physical thing may be either organic or inorganic. The organic physical things are parts of living bodies; and indriyas or sense-organs are included in them. The inorganic physical things such as stone and bricks etc. are non-living. In the second sense indriyas or sense-organs are not physical.

According to Indian view, earth, water, air, fire and ether are the five physical objects. And inorganic things such as stone and bricks as well as organic things such as living bodies of man and animal are composed of them. The sense-organs being parts of the living human body are composed of these five physical things. Now the sense-organs such as human eye can grasp its appropriate object because the human^{eye} as well as the appropriate object of it are both composed of one and the same physical element, namely, tejas or fire. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the cases of other sense-organs and their respective objects.

Thus the answer to the question number 'two' depends on stipulation. The answer is both 'yes' and 'No'. We do have five types of sensory experience and each type of experience is related to a particular type of sense-organ.

Thus visual experience is peculiarly dependent on 'eyes', the organ of vision, auditory experience is dependent on 'ear', the organ of hearing and so on. This account of sensory experience is acceptable both to the Indian and Western Philosophers. However, Western physiologists differentiated the sense-organs into receptor and they spoke of interoreceptor, exteroreceptor and proprioreceptor. Thus sense-organs are converted into receptors and receptors are classified differently by the physiologists for their own purposes. So the Western philosophers who are necessarily to tread on the path paved by the Western physiologists are bound from the nature of the case to give an account of perception which will be different from that of Indian philosophers. If the Western thinkers take sense-organ as receptor then the sense-organs become passive. On the other hand, in Indian Philosophy we take indriya in the sense of grāhaka (taker) and as such indriya is active. If it be so, there is bound to be difference between the Indian and the Western views. And we cannot identify indriyas with the sense-organs as admitted by the Western Philosophers.

Still again, another problem, it seems, raises its ugly head. (3) Is perceptual knowledge possible without a perceiver? This question is not a pre-suppositionless question. It pre-supposes that every knowledge must have

a subject. But this pre-supposition is not backed by any reason, at best it is conventional. According to the Buddhists, everything existent being momentary, knowledge is also momentary. Hence, there cannot be a Viṣaya or object which continues to exist for more moments than one and also there cannot be a Viṣayi or subject of knowledge existing for more moments than one. Consequently there being neither non-momentary object nor non-momentary subject, of knowledge, the question of admitting Viṣaya -Viṣayibhava or positive relation obtaining between the subject of knowledge and object of knowledge, does not arise. This view of the Buddhists exhibit a striking resemblance to that of Hume, the British sceptic. We find that Hume has denied the existence of the self. To be acquainted with the position of Hume we like to quote :

"We have no impressions which continue invariable and constant through the whole course of our lives All we are aware of is a bundle of fleeting sensations without any connecting bond, and what we call mind or self is nothing but a fiction of the imagination"¹¹.

Advaita Vedānta in India admits the possibility of supreme knowledge which is both subjectless and objectless and in the arena of modern Western Philosophy Karl Popper admits of the possibility of objective knowledge without a subject. Popper says that knowledge in the objective

sense is knowledge without a knower. It is knowledge without a knowing subject.

Let us now turn to the final question in order to reach a definite conclusion. Philosophy, like any other product of human thinking, does not grow in a vacuum. The soil for its growth is provided by the natural, social and cultural environments. The environments also put constraints which determine the way in which the philosophy will grow. They also put certain questions which grow out of the structural pattern of these environments and demand that philosophy should answer these questions satisfactorily and thereby modifying and enriching the natural, social and cultural environments.

Indian philosophy, like the philosophy of the Western countries, share the same history of origination and growth and suffers from the same constraints. The questions which are put to Indian philosophy by natural, social and cultural environments prevailing in ancient India demand to be answered satisfactorily. These questions are as follows :

- (a) How does transmigration of soul take place ?
- (b) Capacity of the soul to be embodied as a plant or an animal.
- (c) Capacity of the soul to remember experiences of the previous lives.

Different Schools of Indian Philosophy attempted to answer these questions satisfactorily. However, they returned different answers. These differences in answers arise from their differences of philosophical stance. Thus, e.g., while Nyāya answers the question of transmigration of souls easily from its own point of view, the Buddhists are virtually in a fix to answer this question. For their Philosophy of momentariness of every existence fails to accommodate a satisfactory answer to the question, for this question tacitly pre-supposes an existence of non-momentary soul. The Sāṅkhya and the Advaitins are also in a fix to answer this question from an opposite direction. The Sāṅkhyists and the Advaitins admit aparināmi Caitanya or immutable consciousness. But transmigration presupposes mutability at least of the body in which the soul is embodied and memory presupposes experience enriching the soul and this enrichment presupposes changibility. Therefore, both the Sāṅkhyists and the Advaitins virtually explained away this fact of changibility of the soul by enrichment as illusory assigning, of course, the different reasons which grow out of their different philosophical stand-points.

Indian religions, like the religions of other countries, involved plant and animal worship. The believers in these religions hold them to be secret totems and are

dreadful about them. The fear is transformed into reverence as human imagination transformed these fearful objects as harbouring in them the souls which may be the souls of their ancestors. Therefore, this transformation led them to believe that these plants and animals are their kith and kin and deserve to be accorded human treatment. Philosophy must explain this belief to the satisfaction of the people instead of explaining it away. So, almost every system of Indian Philosophy admit this possibility except the Cārvākas.

Likewise, the people who believe in the transmigration of the soul also believe in the capacity of such a soul to remember the experience of its previous life. And Philosophers of the different Schools of India are also to answer, albeit differently, the question to the satisfaction of the people. Hence, almost every Philosophical School in India subscribed to the theory of jātismara or remembrance of the experiences of previous lives immortalised in Kalidasa's famous śloka beginning with 'Ramyāni Vikṣa'.

It is clear and evident from what is stated above that these beliefs very much affect the construction of the different theories by the different Schools of Indian Philosophers to account for consistently the totality of human experience. Here, they exhibited that prowess and skill in constructing the theories which at once more or

less coherently account for as well as accommodate these beliefs and experiences without sacrificing their respective philosophical point of view. Thus, Nyāya accounts for origination of perception of determinate object by admitting the existence of a stage of indeterminate perception as a logical presupposition for the very possibility of determinate perception of object, while with equal rigour the philosophers of the grammarian school deny the existence of any such stage of indeterminate perception. It is very difficult to settle the question by having recourse to experience, for while some schools of Indian Philosophers, e.g., Mimāṃsakas, do while other Schools of Indian Philosophy equally emphatically do not, admit the existence of the experience of indeterminate perception. From the above it follows that different definitions of perception were proposed by different Schools of Indian Philosophy because they were committed to different philosophical stand-points. And the differences between these philosophical stand-points are irreconcilable. Perhaps this is the reason which ultimately induced the Advaitins to declare the world of experience as anirvacaniya or logically indefinable. For if we admit differences as both real and irreconcilable, it is impossible to reach a logically satisfying conclusion. Therefore difference or bheda, must be, according to the Advaitins, taken to be other than real or Sadvilakṣaṇa. The real must be therefore, abheda or non-dual. And that

which is abheda or non-dual must be from the very nature of the case akhanda, undifferentiated, hence, Brahmajñāna which is non-different from Ātmajñāna or self-knowledge, is undifferentiated perception that is bereft of all differences & distinctions whatsoever, and is of the nature of reality. If the Advaitins view of perception as stated above is logically acceptable theory, it follows that perception from the very nature of the case is and should be without any mediation. To bring the question of immediacy of perceptual cognition in a clearer perspective it is essential to have a discussion of the concept of the immediacy of perceptual cognition as it occurred in different systems of Indian Philosophy.

By immediacy of perceptual cognition or anubhava, Nyāya means any cognition the generative cause of which does not include as its part any other cognition. While Jāinas, like Naiyāyikas, also accept the attributive view of knowledge differing from Nyāya only in holding that knowledge is an essential attribute of the soul or Ātman which is substance, they explain immediacy of perceptual cognition in a different way. The Jāinas do not accept the existence of indeterminate perception. They are required, therefore, to explain the immediacy of cognition by having recourse to the concept of Karmic matter or Pudgala functioning as cover which conceals the self-shining knowledge

-attribute of the soul-substance. It is to be noted in this connection that the Jainas subscribe to an adjectival and not to a substantival theory of knowledge. When through meditation the removal of Karmic matter or pudgala is effected, Knowledge shines forth. Therefore, knowledge is not acquired. It is always there in the soul-substance. Acquiring knowledge means removing the cover, namely, the cover of pudgala. Thus, Jainas in a sense subscribe, like Plato, to a theory of drawing out and not to a theory of putting in with regard to knowledge.

Unlike the Jainas the Sāṅkhya philosophy subscribes to a substantial theory. According to them, knowledge is consciousness, and consciousness is knowledge. This equation is added to the equation that self is consciousness and consciousness is self; and self in its own nature is aparināmi or changeless. It follows that the immediacy of knowledge, according to Sāṅkhya, is immediacy of consciousness. And acquiring of knowledge is apparent and not real. But Sāṅkhya admitted on the one hand, the existence of more selves than one, and on the other, consciousness alone as constitutive of the very nature of the self. Hence arises the contradiction : how is one self to be distinguished from another ? The question of birth and death being different does not help. For birth and death affect the body which is a product of Prakṛti and as such is other than the self. Likewise bhoga or enjoyment is

being made through body and therefore differences with regard to bhoga and enjoyment cannot also be taken to be a differentia to distinguish one self from another. Therefore, Sāṅkhya doctrine ultimately lands in a contradiction.

Advaitins findings Sāṅkhya doctrine in a quandary tried to avoid the contradiction. They admitted, firstly, the identity between knowledge and consciousness, secondly, between consciousness and self, and thirdly, between self and reality. Reality or Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is one without a second and is of the nature of satcidānanda. Thus the contradiction of admitting many selves but failing to admit any differentia to distinguish them from one another, is very deftly avoided by the Advaitins.

Cognition is immediate or aparokṣa. It is immediate in the sense of being non-mediated. For there is nothing besides this knowledge which is of the nature of reality and therefore there is nothing to mediate. Thus in and through its thorough-going Monism Advaita achieved absence of contradiction for its theory of perceptual cognition. That is why it is said, perhaps not without justification, that if Sāṅkhya pluralism is eliminated, Advaita monism is inevitable. In this connection the following observation of late Susil Kumār Maitra will clinch the issue to its logical conclusion.

"Śāṅkarite Idealism, in short, is a critical reconstruction of Sāṅkhya realism. The one is a logical corollary of the other even as Hegelian Absolutism is a logical development of Kantian Phenomenalism"¹².

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POST-SCRIPT

Human beings after their arrival in this world come to know it through the experience. They get their knowledge about this world by means of their five senses. These experiences are discrete and separate. Only when they are unified or synthesized in some way or other, they have knowledge of objects. As these objects are found to be of different types, each type constitutes a particular universe of discourse or subject-matter. We study each of these subject-matters as and when we consider it to be important. Having decided that some particular subject-matter is important, we, the human beings, must next have to consider how the chosen subject-matter is to be studied, and our method will depend on what we think about them in which linguistic articulation of the key topics of the subject-matter can best be gained.

There are two possibilities, we may claim that some intuitive insight into the nature of that which is studied enables us to say with complete certitude what the correct articulations are. They are then guaranteed beyond any possibility of doubt and our particular study will consist simply in analysing these linguistic articulations in order to find out the inferences that can be drawn from them. This method, which was widely approved and followed in philosophical circles before the 17th century, is known as rationalism.

Alternatively, we may hold that no such certainty is to be expected and the linguistic articulation — when systematized they are named theories and definitions — are working hypotheses. In other words, they are not, as they stand, necessary truths but simply suppositions whose only claim to validity rests on the possibility of confirming or refuting them by an appeal to the facts. This method of regulated perception or observation is known as empiricism.

Now, it may be thought that the choice between these methods is clear and evident. But this is far from so. Quite a good case can be made out for either of them. Consequently, what is only too likely to happen is a confusion of both. For rationalism it can be argued that most of the subject-matters, if not all, are concerned, not with what is but with what ideally should be the case.

For example, psychology, it will be said, has the task of discovering ultimately how people should behave from how people do behave, and the task of sociology will be to discover what the ideal relations of human beings one to another are in society from their actual relations. In other words, the reference to actual behaviour has been made in a quite incidental way and no appeal to actual facts to confirm or infirm the conclusions arrive at is needed.

Thus following the paths charted out by these two methods respectively we reach diametrically opposite results. This confrontation of methodologists^e giving rise to opposite results sets in motion our thinking about the adequacy and the range of applicability of each of them.

Empiricism as a method studies what actually is and it enriches our stock of cognitive content by bringing in novel informative contents. However, these cognitions remain separate and loose and as such fail to constitute systematic knowledge as a whole. Rationalism gives us principles of unification for systematization of knowledge. But it fails to give us informative contents to be unified. Thus it transpires that both empiricism and rationalism are inadequate not in what they affirm but in what they deny.

Kant saw clearly the inadequacy of both empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism errs in denying the importance of unification and systematization while rationalism errs in holding that human mind, like a spider, makes the web of knowledge out of itself without any help from external world observed through our senses. Knowledge to be knowledge must have both 'content' and 'form'. It is the merit of Kant that he saw clearly the real source of inadequacies of these methods. There cannot be any knowledge if there is no 'content' and 'content' is supplied by experience gained through senses. Likewise, knowledge is nothing but a blooming, buzzing, speechless confusion if it is not systematized and unified. And only in and through the principles of systematization supplied by human reason discrete sensory elements be unified and transformed into objects of knowledge. Thus Kant is found at once in both the camps and his seminal contribution cannot be over-estimated.

Philosophical problems have the tendency to recur in different countries having different cultural set-up; ~~at~~ although in different garbs. Thus the basic problem encountered by the above two methodologies is : how is the contribution of the 'given' and 'mind-imposed' be estimated? We saw the replies to this question given by the empiricists,

rationalists and Kant respectively. However, this problem has also been a bone of contention among the Indian Philosophers too and their replies are no less interesting than those of their European counterparts. This is the justification of undertaking of this work.

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