

CHAPTER VII

PERCEPTION AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

That every knowledge involves consciousness is accepted as obvious by every School of Indian Philosophy. But whether knowledge is identical with consciousness is a question on which the different Schools of Indian Philosophy are at variance.

Consciousness or Caitanya is admitted as a brute fact by every School of Indian Philosophy; Yet regarding the question : what is the nature of consciousness ? again the Indian Philosophers are at variance. For example, according to Nyāya, consciousness or Caitanya is a contingent quality of the soul or Ātman, therefore, it is not an ultimate constituent of the world. According to Nyāya, consciousness means awareness or knowledge. Consciousness is one of the attributes of the soul or Ātman. It has also been said by the Naiyāyikas that consciousness is not an eternal quality.

It is a temporal quality. Further, it is said by the Naiyāyikas that consciousness is knowledge and this knowledge is presentative awareness, not representative awareness. The Nyāya Philosophy holds that consciousness is due to contact of the following :

Soul, body, internal sense, external sense and external object. Let us quote a few lines :

"Using the plus sign for conjunction, we may schemetically put the view as follows :

Soul + Body + Internal Sense + External Sense + External Object → Consciousness. ... This means that the soul remains totally unconscious in the absence of any of the following : body, manas, external sense, external object"¹.

In the Cārvāka Philosophy we find that matter is only the reality. And all objects, according to Cārvāka, are the result of different combinations of four elements viz., earth, water, air and fire. Consciousness, then, the Cārvākas regard, as an aggregate of four elements. Consciousness is a by-product or epiphenomenon of matter. Cārvāka view of consciousness has striking resemblance with that of epiphenomenalism which shows the relation between body and mind in terms of one way causality and which points out that mind is the by-product of the body.

Again, for Advaita Vedānta, consciousness or Caitanya

alone is reality and is without a second. And consciousness, according to Advaita Vedānta, is self-luminous. It (consciousness), the Advaitins hold, is neither a quality nor a state of substance. Thus we can say that Advaitins regard consciousness as self-luminous and without a second.

All these go to show how sharp is the cleavage of opinions among Indian Philosophers. Keeping in view the said cleavage we are now to find out their common area of agreement regarding (1) the nature of knowledge, (2) the varieties of knowledge and (3) the hierarchy of knowledge. All the Schools of Indian Philosophy admit perception as one of the fundamental types of cognition. All these Schools also admit that perception essentially involves consciousness. But at this point the agreement ends. What is consciousness ? To this question, the different Schools of Indian Philosophy gave different answers. According to Cārvāka, perception alone is the knowledge which is available to us, and it involves consciousness which is an emergent property of the matter. For Nyāya, perception is one kind of cognition and it involves consciousness which is an adventitious or non-essential quality of the Ātman or Soul. According to Prabhākara School of Mimānsaka, perception is direct cognition and as such involves consciousness essentially. To the Buddhists, perception is unalloyed conscious apprehension of reality which is momentary in nature. We have given a number of examples

from different Schools of Indian Philosophy to show that perception is the basic form of cognition on the basis of which the other types of cognition arise. Hence, it is held, the value and validity of the other types of cognition is ultimately dependent on the value and validity of perception. And as veridical cognition is constituted by consciousness and perception is a valid form of knowledge, therefore, perception is a form of consciousness.

What is the distinguishing mark of perception as a form of cognitive consciousness ? It is immediacy. Perception is immediate or direct cognition. But what is meant by the word 'immediacy' in this context ? By 'immediacy' is meant here the absence of any cognition acting as an intermediary cognition in the production of perception. To this view Nyāya lends its support and the Mimāṃsakas are also in agreement here. Buddhists are also subscribers to this view. There is a view that perception is essentially consciousness and immediacy is essentially a feature of consciousness. At this point we make an excursion into the theory of the nature of perception as developed in Western Philosophy in order to drive our point home efficiently. In Western Philosophy, perception is never unmediated. It is always a presentative-representative process in which the representative element dominates. Hence, unmediated perception, from the point of view of Western Philosophy is a fiction.

This sharp difference of opinion is traceable ultimately to the cultural milieu of Western society. In every society ordinary language or natural language functions as medium of the communication among the members of the society. Hence, the ontology which is implicit in such a language is structuring the slant of the point of view from which the native speaker of the language will meaningfully apprehend the world. Different cultural milieus are prevalent in different societies and consequently there are different ontological structures which are lying implicit behind the use of ordinary language of these societies respectively. Human beings are alike. They are also different. Hence, human societies are alike and they are also different. Likewise, natural or ordinary languages which are in use in these societies are also alike in regard to their tacit ontologies. They are also different with regard to certain aspects of these ontologies. These societies and their natural languages share a common area but these areas are peculiar and unique to each one of these societies and each one of these languages. Hence, there is limit of translatability. Each and every expression of the ordinary language of one society is not translatable into equivalent experience of another language of another society. There are recalcitrants which do not brook translatability. And these facts set a limit to communication from one language to another. The above digression is necessary for the elucidation of the views of the philosophers regarding

perception. Ordinarily 'perception' in English language is taken to be equivalent to the word 'Pratyakṣa' in sanskrit language. The meaning of these two expressions in two different languages have common area of meaningfulness. But these areas are strictly limited. For example, in sanskrit language the two words 'manas' and 'Ātman' have different meanings. The difference in meaning is essential for understanding the meaning of the expression 'pratyakṣa' in the context of Indian Philosophy. But this difference is altogether obliterated when we use the word 'perception' anywhere and everywhere as an equivalent expression in English language of the sanskrit word 'Pratyakṣa'.

In the ordinary languages of the Western societies there is no ontological difference between the referent of the word 'mind' and the word 'self'. On the other hand, in sanskrit language and the languages which are derived from Sanskrit there are sharp ontological differences in the use of the words 'manas' and 'Ātman'. The referents of these two Sanskrit words mean different things. Hence, if we simply translate the terms in English by using the words, 'mind' and 'self', our translation is bound to cause confusion and misunderstanding.

Immediacy of perception in the sense of 'Pratyakṣa' is ultimate in Indian Philosophy. But how this immediacy is to be ontologically conceived is a question on which the Indian

Philosophers are at variance. On the one hand, there are the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā which hold that this 'immediacy' is not ontologically substantive. On the other hand, there is the School of Vedānta as well as the School of Yogacara Bauddha who hold that immediacy of perception as a form of consciousness is ontologically substantive. Both Vedānta and Yogācāra Bauddha hold that consciousness alone is real. But they are at variance regarding the nature of consciousness. According to Yogācāra Bauddha, reality is flux of momentary conscious mental states each of which is Utpādivināsaśila or momentary, as such, has a beginning and end in time, whereas according to the Advaita Vedānta, consciousness which is of the nature of Satccidānanda (Sat - Pure Being, Cit = Pure consciousness and ānanda - Pure Bliss) and is without a second, i.e. which is devoid of all differences Svajātiya (difference from something else of the same class), Vijātiya (difference from something else of a different class) and Svagata (difference within a single body), and is alone real. The Advaitin is quick to point out that Yogācāra Bauddhas' contention regarding the nature of reality pre-supposes the view of Advaita Vedānta. For to say that something has a beginning and end in time is to presuppose that it did not exist in the infinite past before its origination and it will not exist in the infinite future after its dissolution or annihilation. But

what is the evidence that it did ^{/not} exist in the infinite past before its origination and will not exist in the infinite future after its dissolution at a particular point of time ? Only an eternal consciousness which is bereft of all temporal distinctions and which spans all the three conventional divisions of time — Past, Present and Future, can certify to the existence of such a temporal fact. Thus, the ultimate reality is not the Utpādavinaśāśila or evanescent bits of conscious states constituting a flux but is the certifying eternal consciousness, which in the ultimate analysis constitutes the evidential value and validity of knowledge. We have discussed above the various theories of Indian Philosophy regarding the nature of caitanya or consciousness. It perhaps will not be out of place here to give an account of consciousness as envisaged by some major schools of Western Philosophy. This will conduce to in our opinion a better understanding of the concept of consciousness. Let us now discuss the modern rationalistic view regarding consciousness.

Modern rationalistic view regarding the nature of consciousness is found in the discussion of Descartes, spinoza and Leibnitz. Descartes, the father of modern Western Philosophy, had before him mathematics as a model. He intended to build Philosophy on the basis of some indubitable fact from which with the help of thoroughgoing

method of deduction all the consequence could be deduced. With this end in view Descartes had taken recourse to doubt as a method. In his opinion if he could doubt away the trapping of thought what remained would be indubitable, and on the basis of this indubitable datum we could build philosophy with the help of the method of deduction. He found that at least one thing could not be doubted away, viz., the doubter himself. Doubt being one of the mental states, the doubting consciousness exists. On the basis of this one indubitable fact Descartes build his metaphysical edifice. Thus certainty which is bereft of all doubts pertains to consciousness for doubting is a conscious mental state. Therefore, existence of conscious subject is indubitable and this is the Archimedean point for commencement of Philosophical thought.

Now what is this doubting consciousness or self ? It is evident that this doubting consciousness is personal in nature and as such is more or less permanent and is the subject of different mental states including knowledge. But still the question remains : is the doubting self identical with consciousness ? or is it a substance or a thing which has consciousness either as permanent or as a alienans attribute or quality ?

With regard to these questions Descartes' answers are not very clear. At times he identified 'consciousness' with the 'self'. At other times he depicted 'consciousness', in his language 'thought', as an essential quality or

attribute of the self. The philosophical legacy which Descartes inherited from Plato and other ancient philosophers through his mediaeval mentors prevented him from giving a clear cut and consistent answer to the above question.

Spinoza took consciousness or thought as an essential attribute of a substance which is neither material nor spiritual. For this substance has ~~among~~ other essential qualities, extension or matter ~~is~~ one of them. So the said substance cannot be identified either with thought or ^{with} extension. And this substance is God.

But Descartes and Spinoza took self-existence to be the hall mark of substantiality. That which exists in and through itself without being dependent on anything else for its existence, is substance. Thus, substance is, both to Descartes and Spinoza, causa sui or self - caused.

Leibnitz took this conception of substance to be inadequate but not wrong. According to him, a self - caused entity must be active, and this self - activity is at once self - existent also. Therefore, substantiality is self-activity, and as the self-activity admits of degrees, there are degrees of substantiality. Therefore, all choirs of heaven and furniture on earth are characterised by self-activity although in different degrees. So, there is substantiality everywhere. What we call materiality is nothing but a privation from the point of view of

a greater degree of self-activity.

Self-activity is perception and perception therefore, admits of degrees. Consequently perceiving entities are capable of being graded into a hierarchical series according to the degree of its perceptual activity. So what is apparently inert and is devoid of consciousness, is not really so. Hence, the conclusion follows that everything in the world is conscious and the so-called material things which appear to be divested of consciousness are in reality not so. And consciousness being self-activity is constitutive of everything in the world. It is not something which comes from outside. Rather it constitutes the very pith and marrow of every self-active entity in the world.

Locke questioned at the very outset this assumption of spontaneous self-activity which is constitutive of being of a thing in this world. According to Locke, human mind is passive recipient of data of knowledge from two sources, namely, sensation and **reflection**, in the form of ideas.

"Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring"². Before the advent of ideas of sensation or

reflection human mind is a 'tabula rasa'. Thus, Locke denies at the outset the concept of self-activity of mind supplying data of knowledge and experience independently and out of itself. The ideas, according to him, are of the nature of mind. Ideas, according to Locke, is : "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ..."³. Some 'ideas' according to Locke, resemble to the qualities of things of the external world while others do not. Naturally the question arises : is the mind or self conscious ? If so, in what sense ? Again, the question arises ; are ideas conscious in the same sense in which mind is conscious ? No clear cut answer is available from Locke. It transpires that Locke means by consciousness perception of the operations of understanding by understanding itself. Dressed in modern vocabulary of philosophy it means self-consciousness. Thus being conscious does not necessarily imply being self-conscious. Hence, Locke virtually ushers in the dissociation of consciousness from self-consciousness in the arena of modern Western Philosophy as well as in the arena of modern empiricism.

This tradition has been faithfully carried by Berkeley in his concept of 'notion' of self. There cannot be, according to him, an 'idea' of 'self' for 'ideas' cannot be self-conscious. Therefore, we can have 'notions' and not 'ideas' of 'self-conscious' entities. However, Berkeley demolishes, firstly, the distinction between ideas of

primary qualities and those of secondary qualities reducing virtually all ideas of primary qualities to secondary qualities, and, secondly, he in a sense, demolishes the Lockean distinction between two sources — one external and another internal — of ideas, namely, sensation and reflection. Thus in a stroke Berkeley virtually abolishes the independent existence of the external material world and allows subjectivism to reign supreme. But the question still remains : Why are not ideas self-conscious ? No definite answer is available from Berkeley. Rather he admits, not perhaps with much consistency, the existence of spiritual substance while denying the substantiality of matter although both spiritual and material substance so far as their claim for independent existence goes, sail in the same boat.

The nascent scepticism of Berkeley with regard to the existence of material substance, although goes far, yet does not go far enough as consistency demands. For extraneous reasons such as religious reasons he retains the substantiality of spiritual self. But this retention gives rise to contradiction in his Philosophy and makes it unstable.

Berkeley does away with the distinction between ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary qualities as well as the existence of material substance. The material thing with quality, to Berkeley, is simply a consistently

recurrent bundle of ideas. By one stroke Berkeley with the help of his stratagem does away with the problem of how to verify that our ideas really correspond to the primary qualities of things. However, according to Berkeley, mind is not entirely passive when it is having ideas. So far as ideas of imagination are concerned mind is to an extent active. Therefore, Berkeley comes to the conclusion, firstly, that to be is to ^{be} perceived for an object of knowledge, and secondly, that to be is to perceive for the subject of knowledge. But Berkeley unconsciously and surreptitiously presupposes that activity of the understanding demands the existence of a non-corporeal substance which houses this activity. This presupposition in its turn stems from another presupposition that every act necessarily implies the existence of an agent. But both these presuppositions are unargued and untenable. Berkeley wants to divest Lockean theory from its inconsistencies and irrelevancies.

With the same end in view Hume starts his philosophizing. He at the very outset makes a distinction between impressions and ideas and holds that ideas are less vivid copies of impression.

Hume says :

"By the term impression, then, I mean all the more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively perceptions, of

which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned"⁴.

Thus perception is conceived as concerned with impressions while memory and imagination are concerned with ideas. Ideas are dependent on impressions but impressions are not dependent on ideas. However, this is not universally true and admits at least of one exception. When there is a gap in a continuously diminishing or increasing shades of the same colour, we can have the idea of the shade, which typically or uniquely fills the gap without having the corresponding impression of that absent shade of colour. Therefore, Hume accepts and recognizes exceptions. However, when he does away with the concept of spiritual substance as the substance of activities of perception, memory, and imagination on the ground that whenever he searches for self as a spiritual substance, he stumbles upon some perception or other which is momentary or transitory and not upon anything which is permanent and abiding, he fails to note that vital question regarding the identity of stumbler will automatically arise. And logic demands that Hume must answer this question. But Hume does not return any answer to this question and the matter remains unanswered in the arena of empiricism.

Kant while having an overview of the philosophical

thoughts of his predecessors sees their unsatisfactory character. He thinks that the inadequacies of these philosophical thoughts stem from the adoption of inadequate method for tackling the recalcitrant problem of knowledge and existence. The empiricists are adopting the historical method while rationalists are adopting the method of deduction. The problems demand that they be tackled adequately as well as rigorously. The empirical contents of the problem cannot be brushed away as confused or illusory. Kant starts afresh his inquiry into the conditions which are necessary for the possibility of knowledge and adopts the transcendental method to build a metaphysics of experience. Metaphysics is the science of supra-sensible. It searches for things which are beyond the range of experience. But how is metaphysics of experience as the science of the supra-sensible of experience possible? At this point Kant shows his originality. The conditions of the possibility of experience are not themselves experimental. They are super-sensible i.e., they are beyond the ken of experience. Their existences are to be inferred as it were in a backward manner from the structure and characteristics of experience. This is the famous transcendental method constituting the Archimedean point of Kantian critical philosophy.

Perception like other types of knowledge is not sense-manifold i.e. 'a blooming, buzzing confusion' but a knowledge of object. In perception we perceive the sense

-manifold and in that very receiving we intuit i.e., synthesize the sense-manifold. All synthesis are conscious synthesis. But that does not mean that they are self-conscious synthesis. In every experience there exists a demand as it were to be harmoniously united with others and this demand can be met if and only if all experiences are tethered as it were to focus and this focus, according to Kant, is focus imaginarius, namely, I think.

Representative theory of perception despite Kant's critical philosophy leads inevitably to mentalism which inevitably merges in its turn into idealism. Thus Post-Kantian Philosophers endowed thing-in-itself with mental existence and this endowment ultimately flowers into fullfledged system of Hegelian and Post-Hegelian idealism. But soon the reaction had set in. Meinong, Brentano and his company distinguished between act and content and refused to reduce the existence of content to that of act. Following the same line Moore distinguished between 'sensation as act' and 'sensation as object', and he attributes the tendency to identify the act and the object to the diaphanous nature of act of consciousness.

S.K.Maitra says :

"That mind is nothing but consciousness a pure awareness as a transparent medium which makes no difference to the contents or objects that appear and disappear in the

medium in question — the view of the British realists, Moore and Alexander"⁵.

Russell following Moore assesses the distinction. However, he introduces further distinctions. Sense-data are distinct from the act of perception which knows them. At the same time they are also distinct from physical objects of which they are the sense-data. Russell accepts some sort of causal theory and this leads him to accept the intermediate but independent status of sense-data standing between the physical object and the act of perception. Naturally the question arises : if we are in an act of perceiving this physical object confined to sense-data alone and have no independent access to the physical object, how are we to know, firstly, that there exists physical objects, and, secondly, the sense-data conform to them ? No satisfactory answer to these questions is available from Russell. Position of Samuel Alexander vis-a-vis this question is vague and evasive. The same is true of Dawes Hick, Turner and C.D. Broad. Tremendous development of physical sciences and biological sciences in the period in which philosophical speculations of first four decades of this century take place influence the practitioners of the philosophy in this period to try to develop a Philosophy of Positivism on the basis of the findings of modern science as well as on the basis of the tools fashioned by modern mathematics, namely, set theory and mathematical logic.

Thus we get the different Philosophers from the members of the Vienna Circle everyone of which rejects speculative philosophy as a romantic wild goose chase. At this stage it will conduce to a better understanding of the fundamental points at issue if we can enunciate a comparative study of Indian and Western theories of consciousness.

At very outset it will not be amiss to point out that there is no Indian theory of consciousness which denies the existence of consciousness in toto like the behaviourists. Even the Cārvākas admit the existence of consciousness as an emergent quality of human body to be a fact. Therefore, we will do well to keep this point in mind when we shall start discussion and comparison of different Indian and Western theories of consciousness.

The problem of consciousness arises with the problem of knowledge. And the problem of knowledge brings in its wake the problem of criteria for distinguishing between veridical and non-veridical cognition. It is a truism that every cognition involves consciousness. To cognise is to be conscious. Thus the problem of consciousness comes to the fore.

How can we distinguish between veridical cognition from non-veridical cognition ? Theories regarding the nature of consciousness necessitate the returning of different answers to this question. If everything in this

world including consciousness is momentary, then true cognition must also be momentary. And therefore momentariness will be a constitutive element in ^{the} definition of true cognition as well as of consciousness, if any such definition is possible. That momentariness is constitutive characteristics of consciousness and of the cognition is clear and evident from the Heraclitian statement that no one can bathe in the same river twice. The same orientation is also found in the declaration of the Buddhist tenet, namely, whatever is, is momentary. So Heraclitus, Hume and his followers in Western Philosophy, and Buddhists School in Indian Philosophy are in perfect accord over this point.

However, the problems raised their heads again. If everything is momentary, how can we explain the existence of memory ? Likewise if everything is momentary, how can we explain the personal identity or the self-identity of a person stretching over a long span of time ? Refinements of the theories of momentariness were introduced both in West and India. But problems could not be solved by this stratagem. These problems like the proverbial hydra started to raise their head anew even when they are cut by the vorpal sword of refinement.

Searches therefore have been undertaken to find out alternative avenues for solving these problems. For

example, Nyāya in India takes consciousness to exist for more moments than one as a quality being a constitutive element of human knowledge. At the same time due regard has been paid to the constraints exercised by the objective world by introduction of the phrase 'Tadvatitad prakāraḥ' by Nyāya. However, at this point, corresponding philosophy of Plato and Platonists in the West has taken a queer turn. According to Plato, knowledge is universal, invariant, and objective in the sense that it is the same for every knower. Hence, as sense-experience is variant and is not the same for every knower and so lacks universality and objectivity, it cannot claim to be knowledge. How then do we get knowledge? Knowledge according to Plato, is not a case of putting in but a drawing out. We learn to know. But what we learn comes from or is drawn out from the conscious self. It is not put in from outside by the sense-experience. The Platonic theory has a partial resemblance with that of Advaita Vedānta. According to Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is of the nature of knowledge. Brahman alone is reality. And Brahman is one without a second. Thus existence of more entities ^{than} one as well the existence of difference as real are gainsaid by the Advaita Vedānta. But the existence of the difference is not gainsaid by Plato for Plato admits the existence of more ideas than one which are constitutive of reality and therefore while Plato admits pluralism the Advaitin Vedāntins admit monism.

Descartes and Locke like Nyāya admit conscious self-substance which owns knowledge. They also admit material substance or matter constituting the physical world which is the object of knowledge that conscious self-substance possesses. These substances are permanent entities and knowledge being dependent on consciousness exists, as long as its consciousness exists. However, in the case of Nyāya, Descartes and Locke, the question arises regarding the criteria for distinguishing between veridical or true cognition and non-veridical or untrue cognition. Descartes happens to have additional difficulties because of the admission of veracity of God. Likewise Locke also happens to have additional problem because of his admission that we know only the ideas. In the same way Nyāya also fashions the anyathākhyoti as a theory of error to account for the existence of non-veridical or untrue cognition. If we read between the lines of all these Indian and Western theories of cognition, we will find that all of them admitted openly or tacitly the existence of consciousness as a fact. They are at variance with each other regarding their respective answers to the question : What is consciousness ?

It is not out of place perhaps to note here that modes of these differences in their answers arise from their commitment to certain basic tenets constituting the tradition of the School of Philosophy to which each of them belongs. Thus once again we come to the question of the influence of

cultural milieu that induces to see these basic problems from different perspectives and to return different answers accordingly. And even within the same School different traditions continuing different sub-schools has induced these sub-schools to embrace different answers to the same problems. For example, the Bhamati of the Northern School of Vedānta returns different answers to the problems of knowledge or consciousness from those of Vivarṇa School although both of them belong to tradition of Advaita Vedānta.

In the last analysis we are by the inexorable logic to come to a conclusion that ultimately all these differences are traceable to the differences in the cultural tradition and milieu in which a philosopher lives, moves and have his being. This is both strength and weakness of philosophy. Thus philosophy presents a picture at once of a continuity and a crisis. In the cultural milieu it stands for a continuity of systematic thought and thus is perennial. But it also is not blind to the changes that take place in the social life and affect the cultural climate of the society. It accommodates and harmonizes these changes with the already existing strands of systematic thought and discords of the intractable elements. Thus it is at once the same as well as different. This is perhaps the history of paradox ingrained in the nature of any product of the socio-cultural life of any society.

In this connection, it will not perhaps be a digression to set at naught a favourable illusion which engulfs normally the practitioners of analysis of philosophical concepts. The said practitioners take it for granted that all concepts they analyse are cut and dried, finished products. These concepts in their opinion are like the standardised parts of a machine or machines and their function is to separate out by analysis these concepts into neat categories. That philosophical concepts, be it noted at the outset, are of two types : concepts which admit of growth and development and thus are amenable to historical treatment, and concept which are cut and dried and admit only of logical or categorial analysis. Moral and Epistemic concepts, unlike the concepts of mathematics, grow, thrive, and develop. They admit of analysis in historical terms. Concept of perception being essentially an epistemic concept thus admits of historical analysis. Forgetting this truth if we subject the concept of perception to logical or categorial analysis, we will do violence to its nature and will arrive at untrue conclusions.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. What is living and what is Dead in Indian philosophy - Deviprasād Chattopadhyāya, p.409.
2. Locke as quoted in 'A History of Philosophy' - A.Wodberg, Vol.2, p.86.
3. Locke as quoted in 'A History of philosophy' Vol.2 by A.Wedberg, p.77.
4. Enquiry concerning ^{Human} Understanding - Hume as cited by Anders Wedberg in his A history of philosophy - Vol.2, p.85.
5. The main problems of philosophy - S.K.Maitra, An Advaita Approach. Part I, p.143.