

### CHAPTER - THREE

1. We now propose to undertake a critical examination of Hartmann's theory of human freedom. Freedom, according to Hartmann, is a "plus" phenomenon. According to Hartmann, "freedom is never possible where a single type of determination reigns throughout the world in all its strata. Freedom is only where, in one world, at least two types of determination are superimposed one upon the other : only in such a world can a higher determination adjust its determinants to a lower, so that, viewed from the lower, an actual plus of determination comes into existence" (1). "Freedom, continues Hartmann, "however, is by no means simply a kind of determination, namely, the relation of a higher to a lower, in so far as both co-exist in one and the same real world and apply to one and the same occurrence. Among the beings which are subject to the lower type of determination, that one is then free "in the positive sense" which in addition to this subjection also comes under the law of a higher determination" (2). Thus "the true meaning of moral freedom is not the negative one of choice but the positive one of an order sui generis, which autonomously encounters that of causality and nevertheless adds itself to the prevailing texture of the real world, without rending it" (3). Hence "both causal and finalistic determination, when taken in the absolute *vs* sense, that is, when monistically applied to the whole cosmic structure, commit exactly the same blunder, although in the opposite direction. Both reduce the world to uniformity . . . . which excludes freedom. A universalised causal determinism converts man into a mere natural entity, it degrades him; a universalised finalistic determinism transforms Nature into a thing being that is directed to ends, into such a being as man is; it raises Nature up to his level. Both theories reduce everything to a common denominator. They

thereby nullify the uniqueness of Moral Being in the world. And again they thereby extinguish man's freedom, but with it at the same time morality itself. The positive significance of a free being in a determined world can be due to nothing else than to his superior position, to that heterogeneous plus of determination which he has over and above the other actual entities" (4). "Now evidently the causal nexus is a lower, the finalistic a higher type of determination. This is .....seen in the simplicity of the former and the complexity (the three stages) of the latter" (5). "One might express the matter thus : a causally determined world is in itself still teleologically undetermined; hence a merely causal determinism, so long as it is not made monistically absolute .....is at the same time teleological indeterminism. Hence in this respect indeterminism regains a conditional justification. Its legitimate meaning is ..... that a world under laws of nature that are merely formed causally stands open to the setting up of ends and to the purposive activity of any being capable of foresight and predetermination" (6). "Here man's freedom shows itself to be an ontological function of his unique place in the stratification of two types of determination. His is a dual position; he stands under a twofold determination. As a natural being, even to his inmost desires and repulsions, he is determined causally, a plaything of the eternal power of Nature, of powers overwhelmingly superior and operating both through him and altogether irrespectively of him. But as a "person" he is the carrier of another sort of determination which emanates from the ideal realm of values. In his sensing of them he finds himself in part determined by the claim which values make upon him in the form of the Ought. And it is this kind of determinateness which manifests itself in his purposive acti-

vity. He can only transform into ends what he feels to be of value. But in ~~convert~~ converting values into ends, he ~~tr~~ transforms them into realities. He positively creates what causal necessity never could bring forth, a world of ethical actuality in the midst of an actual Nature. Through his purposive activity, that is, his categorially higher form of determination, which originates with him, he proves himself to be an entity superior to the power of Nature, a being in whose hands forces blind and aimless in themselves become means to ends discerned and posited beforehand. And indirectly, in the commitment of his personality to objectively discerned values (those that are situational) as well as in his guidance of purposeless events towards values, he attains the higher values, the distinctively moral qualities" (7).

But Moral Freedom, in the first place, must be the freedom of the actual empirical person, and secondly, the empirical person or subject must be free in respect of the determination issuing from ~~sk~~ values also. Thus there "are no longer only two but three types of determination, which here lie in strata, one above the other, in one and the same ethical actuality, in the actual will, in every actual deed of a person. We know approximately ..... only two or three types ~~of~~ the law of nature and the law of the ought. The principle of the person ..... so far as it throws its own determinant into the scale, we do not know ..... There exists no way of coming into closer knowledge of it. We must reckon with it as an irrational factor ..... But what the problem itself clearly reveals must be this, that there is a determinant of a higher type, as compared not only with the law of nature, but also with the law of the Ought. For over against the latter the person must be free" (8). Now this personal determination is higher than

the finalistic determination of values because of "the categorical laws of dependence, according to which the lower determination is always the "stronger", but the higher is none the less "free" as compared with it; in other words, the higher finds unlimited scope above it as a material" (9). But this raises a new difficulty. "The determination, above which the moral person is said to have scope for a determinant of his own, is twofold : that of natural law and that of value (of the ought)". The first is determined causally, the second finalistically" (10). Now the causal nexus is an open system; it admits of the ingression of extra-causal determinants from other quarters so long as the ingression of these determinants does not impede the uninterrupted flow of causal series. It "offers no obstacle". It takes up and carries along as a causal series the novelty, which it draws into itself" (11). But this is not so in the case of the finalistic nexus. "Here the exact results of the process are prescribed for it as its goal. The consequence is that it can take up no new determinants from other sources. At every stage it forms a closed system of determining elements which resists any outside influence. For any determinant, entering from without, shifts the goal, diverts the process from it; hence it either destroys the finalistic nexus or is destroyed by it". . . . . Accordingly we can understand how the finalistic determinants can be superimposed upon the causal determination, but not how a further determinant should be able to be superimposed upon the finalistic determination. It could find no scope there . . . . . Hence it seems that here something impossible is demanded" (12). The question is : How are we to reconcile the ingression of extra-finalistic determinant into the finalistic nexus with the intolerance

of the finalistic nexus to such ingression? This riddle can be solved, according to Hartmann, if and only if the finalistic determination of the empirical subject by the value, i.e., by the Ought, is only an apparent determination. That the values cannot really determine the will finalistically is evident, according to Hartmann, from the fact that the demand of the Ought is only a claim and never a compulsion. The independence to accept or to reject the demand of the values rests with the subject. Values can never negate this independence. Thus Hartmann says, "Can one properly say that values or principles of the Ought directly determine the will? Is it not equally true, that they do not determine the will? Sometimes the will pursues goals which values prescribe, but sometimes not. The law of the Ought is only a commandment, not a coercion ..... Hence, if one ask : How can positive autonomy of the person as a proper determinant coexist with the autonomy of values? the answer must be given : It does not at all need to exist along with the autonomy of values as an actual teleological determination. The latter simply is not, without further ado, and an actual teleology of values; and only such a teleology would interfere with the incoming of a personal determinant. Whether a teleology of the will by values should take place is a matter for the decision of the will itself. The impulsion of the Ought as such is not enough to determine the will. Still another factor must always be added. And just this inheres in the actual person. It is this other factor alone which earns the title to personal freedom. It consists in the capacity of the person to transform or not to transform a value into a determinant of his own (whether as a conscious end or a selective principle), to commit himself to it or not to commit himself" (13).

Thus "the person must carry within it himself, besides the natural determination and that of the Ought, still a third determinant, different from both. And it must be this, through whose intervention the Ought for the first time becomes a determinant. Hence personal freedom does not encounter a determination already completed through the Ought, but one incompleated, the mere claim, the pure demand as such. And in so far as the claim is fulfilled, it is fulfilled only through the freedom. The initiative of a person is not a function of the values forcing their way through to actuality, but conversely, the actualization of the values is a function of the personal initiative. From the values themselves there issues no actualization, but only from person, when committing himself to them. And this self-commitment occurs not under the compulsion of the values, but according to the person's own standard" (14). In this connection we should note, according to Hartmann, two factors in the freedom of the will which are complementary and are collectively necessary for freedom. Thus he says, "Values cannot determine except with the aid of a personal will which pledges itself to them by its self-determination; but just as little can a will determine, without having before it and directed to it the claim of autonomous values and without sensing these values as such - a claim over against which alone its self-determination has the significance of a decision. The two factors together, the objective real and the subjective ideal - the autonomy of the principle and the confronting autonomy of the person - constitute through their peculiar supplementation the extra-causal determinant" (15).

Two more questions, according to Hartmann, are also to be answered in order to give a complete and satisfactory account of moral freedom. Firstly, is the freedom of will something unique? and secondly, how can moral freedom be proved? Hartmann answers both the questions in the negative. To the first question Hartmann answers that it "is by no means unique in kind. Wherever various existential components cross one another in a complex structure, the same relation is found. The separate components merge in the resultant. They are cancelled in it as in a higher equilibrium of the constituent elements. The complex structure is of a higher form and order of being.... Every higher type of existence with its own categorial formation is *eo ipso* "free", as over the lower..... This categorial law of freedom is all-pervading..... Viewed ontologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorial freedom..... Fundamentally in its ontological structure autonomy is the *et* same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities. These autonomies are peculiar only to the different stages of being; and they present different problems. The texture of the lower categorial components also, upon which they are built, varies greatly as to the degree to which it can be known. But all these constitutes no fundamental difference, but only a gradation of subordinate kind" (15).

To the second question Hartmann answers that "the freedom of the will is a metaphysical question. In regard to all metaphysical truths the proposition holds good that in the strict sense they can neither be proved nor ~~disproved~~ ~~disproved~~ disproved..... No philosophy "solves" metaphysical problems, it can only deal with them; and how far it can succeed in so doing must always remain doubtful. But every step in advance, however small, is here of the great

greatest significance - Precisely because the problems are insoluble" (17)!. According to Hartmann, "all the proofs for the freedom of the will which have been laid down are fallacious" (18)!. Kant's account of freedom is fallacious because Hartmann holds, even if we concede the truth of the assertion that moral principles emanate from reason we have "only a "transcendental freedom" of reason, not the freedom of the person as an individual entity; hence not a freedom of the will. In the Kantian sense, "reason" is not individual, but is the universal reason in which individuals participate. The "moral law" is the ~~principle~~ principle of a "transcendental subject", a practical "consciousness in general", not otherwise than the twelve categories are the principles of a theoretical "consciousness in general"!. Hence transcendental freedom is not at all freedom of the moral person. For he is merely the empirical individual" (19)!. "Kant", Hartmann continues, "means to prove the freedom of the will; yet he does not notice that he is actually proving something !...! which is essential as a presupposition of freedom of the will but is nevertheless not that freedom itself : what he proves is merely that the principle is autonomous !...! !. In the problem of freedom man does not want to know how far a "transcendental subject" is responsible and accountable for him, but how far he himself is so" (20)!. Similarly, Fichte who sought "to discover the positive determinant at as great a depth as possible within the nature of the person, and accordingly within the subject !...! !. elaborated his theory of freedom from the point of view of his doctrine of science. The "ego" is the carrier of freedom, it is the determinant; not, however, the ego which appears empirically, but a deeper, a metaphysical ego. In the conscious ego the will

already manifests itself as completely determined. Accordingly it must bring this characteristic with it from somewhere. The determinateness cannot come from this side of consciousness, from the natural world; hence it must come from beyond, from something which lies behind consciousness, from something which consequently cannot itself be conscious. The whole ego is not in consciousness. Its own proper depths are hidden. There must exist a volition prior to volition; there must be one that is metaphysical before the one that is conscious. And the prior one is the free volition, because it gives determinateness" (21). "But", asks Hartmann, "what is the consequence of this placing freedom behind consciousness" (22). And he answers, "we do not come by such a route to a freedom of consciousness - at least not when starting from the consciousness of freedom - but to a still vaster unfreedom of consciousness. Empirical unfreedom has become metaphysical unfreedom . . . . The Fichtean freedom behind consciousness . . . . misses exactly what it is striving for, the freedom of moral consciousness . . . . It would involve a radical extirpation of freedom" (23). Consciousness is not, according to Fichte, free "but something else behind it which directs it is free. Now as regards this something else . . . . we do not know whether it is of the nature of a will, consequently whether its determinative power is in any sense a freedom of that will. At least it is not the freedom of that will which alone we know and to which in our sensing of morality we attribute responsibility . . . . it is not the conscious ego which alone is known to us. Hence on the basis of such freedom it is not possible to ascribe to oneself responsibility for its volition and action. The responsibility does not fall upon that volition which I can answer for because its decision took place in the light of my consciousness,

but upon the constitution of the metaphysical ego which is quite independent of my consciousness. The moral consciousness cannot be accountable for what it does not itself decide" (24). In the later phase of his ethics Fichte held that only imperfect will is free and the achievement of perfection means annihilation of the freedom and the Ought because will can decide once and for all to obey Ought and thus become perfect and unfree. "In this unique and final act of freedom the will "exhausts" its capacity, it "uses up" the substance of its freedom !..... !. According to this view, Man's true act of freedom is the self-annihilation of freedom, and at the same time the annihilation of the ego and the Ought" (25). This is, Hartmann holds, is the extirpation of morality because "the whole conception belongs to the sphere of religion, and not to ethics. In it ethics is abandoned. The demand which religion makes is different from that which morality makes. The will ~~want~~ which can no longer choose anything but the good, is no longer a moral will; and personal values, which are not based on freedom, are no longer moral values !..... ethical values !..... are necessarily grounded on freedom !..... and can no longer be manifested in a being who has "consumed" his own freedom" (26). In the same way, Schelling, in order to get rid of the conflict of between the freedom of the deciding will which merely appears but does not exist and the freedom of the absolute will which only is but does not appear, subscribed to the argument : "There is a consciousness of freedom, therefore there must also be a freedom of consciousness !...! I could not at all ~~at~~ have a consciousness of freedom if I were not really free, for an unfree being would not be in a position to feel himself to be free" (27). This is, according according to Hartmann, an inference "from the mere phenome-

non of the thing to the existence of the thing ..... But ..... phenomena, like concepts, do not involve real existence" (28). "Just as the existence of God does not follow from the consciousness of God, however clear, so real freedom of consciousness (that of the conscious will) never follows from the given consciousness of freedom, however unescapable and imperturbable this may be" (29).

Even if metaphysical problems, according to Hartmann, cannot be proved or disproved but can only be discussed, we can still, in order to gain new insight into the problems, incline to prove, and in the case of proving the freedom of the will "three types of argumentation are possible : an empirico-descriptive type, one that is purely aprioristic, and an analytical type" (30). The empirico-descriptive argument is ruled out from the very nature of the case. "There can be no empirical argument for metaphysical objects ..... In the moral life there are no direct facts of freedom, that is, none that would not require explanation, and could not be understood otherwise" (31). Similarly the purely aprioristic argument is also ruled out because, unlike values, existence of "freedom of is of a quite another kind; it does not appear in ideal, but in actual structures in living persons in their full concrete existence. Hence the existence, which is to be assigned to it, is real self-existence ..... Herewith the limit also is set to purely a priori argument. Existential problems are never soluble a priori. They depend upon a mass of existential data" (32). Thus "the analytical procedure ..... alone fits the subject-matter. Here one sets out from the given ethical situation, from the real as from the ideal - from the former in the consciousness of freedom, from the latter in the nature of moral

principles; and from the principles at all events a return can be made to the real ontal Being of freedom. The return has the form of an inference from the conditioned to the condition" (33).

"In this kind of reasoning aprioristic and empirical elements are fused. The point of departure have the character of demonstrable phenomena; as such, they have the value of facts. But the connections between these and the conclusion are of an aprioristic nature" (34).

"In the analytical argument for the freedom of the will; Hartmann holds, "three complex facts of moral life come into consideration as points of departure : the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and accountability, and the consciousness of guilt. These are supplemented by two further factors : the dependence of moral values upon freedom and the oppositional relation of the Ought to the will, or the nature of moral conflict" (35).

Consciousness of self-determination, according to Hartmann, is a firmly rooted conviction and as such it is an universal phenomenon. But despite its universality, the sceptic may argue, it may a necessary illusion. But "the consciousness of self-determination", Hartmann holds, "is a fact of ethical actuality" (36). Hence "if the consciousness of self-determination be an illusion, scepticism must explain the illusion" because the Sceptic's account of the state of affairs "runs counter to the phenomenon" (37). Therefore the onus of the responsibility of proving the phenomenon falls upon the Sceptic. "He must show how the phenomenon is possible, how the illusion arises" (38). And the Sceptic's account of the phenomenon "requires a whole complex of assumptions" (39), which though conceivable, is "neither explained nor established". Hence

.....scepticism passes over into clogged metaphysics ..... It cannot carry the burden of ~~proof~~ proof it assumes" (40). Thus "as a phenomenon, the consciousness of self-determination possesses a far greater metaphysical weight ..... Here the conditions which favour habitual illusion do not press so close ..... On the contrary, rather is prevailing tendency away from illusion. Hence if the consciousness of self-determination nevertheless exists universally, there must lie concealed behind it in the constitution of man an absolutely fixed and unequivocal power which keeps the balance among all these tendencies. The existence of freedom of will would be just such a power" (41). And we should note that, "however much reasoning may fall short of establishing freedom, there is contained in the consciousness of a self-determination something which brings us very near to such a conclusion" (42).

Responsibility or accountability, according to Hartmann, is an actual ethical fact which is "universal and which accompanies all properly ethical actions" (43). "The metaphysical weight of responsibility and accountability as an argument for freedom is not only far greater in objectivity and cogency than that of the consciousness of self-determination, but is also of totally different kind" (44). This argument is of greater objectivity and cogency because here "the person .....takes upon himself a load, the carrying of which is not in the line with any natural inclination or interest but is contrary to every natural tendency" (45). And it is of a totally different kind because "there is no direct phenomenon of self-determination, but only a phenomenon of "consciousness" of it. But there is a direct phenomenon of responsibility and ~~some~~ accountability, and by no means merely a phenomenon of consciousness or, as it were, a feeling of responsibility. The assumption of responsibi-

lity is a positive fact which can in no way be disputed; it is ethical actual like any other deed, volition, commitment or disposition" (46).

The argument from responsibility, holds Hartmann, "is a real argument ~~for~~ for freedom" (47). And "the freedom which is manifested in the assuming and carrying of responsibility is ..... in the strict sense freedom of the individual moral consciousness ..... a freedom of the conscious individual person when he is faced with the moral ~~principle~~ principle, that is, a freedom in regard to the claim of Ought" (48). Thus "two authoritative factors always inhere in any responsibility : one which is responsible, and one before which it is responsible. The latter is the moral principle - every value is such an authoritative factor; the former is the person in his ability to fulfil or not fulfil the requirement of the principle. If the person is simply subject to the principle as to a law of nature,..... he .....would have no autonomy in relation to it. But..... if he were without a valuational sense and impervious to the claim ..... there would be nothing in regard to which a decision would delve upon him. For in regard to no other law is he called upon to decide; in regard to every other he simply conforms. In both cases he would be without responsibility. But responsibility is constantly upon him; he takes it upon himself at every step in life and carries it as something that beyond all question falls to his share ..... This is evidence within him of personal autonomy, the visible sign of his freedom" (49).

Accountability, according to Hartmann, implies imputation, i.e., ascribing and claiming the moral value or disvalue of a deed and it exists independently. Imputation is impersonal, i.e., "there is no taking of sides, but ~~step~~ simply ~~and~~ an adjudicating of authorship" (50). In adjudication, Hartmann holds, we can distinguish three stages".

In the first place, the act of imputation itself .....  
Imputation is not inherently an individual act which would have for itself a particular subject. It is a communal, inter-subjective fact, exactly like the universality of theoretical views. For instance, as with these latter it holds good that each one who grasps the situation must necessarily form the same judgment as everyone else, so here : whoever simply sees that a person is acting must necessarily attribute to him the value or disvalue of the deed. This "must" is in no sense an Ought, it is rigid necessity; no one can avoid it" (51). Thus here we arrive at a "fundamental aprioristic relationship. Hence the universal inter-subjective validity. From the outset everyone sees any person's act - his own or another's - from the point of view of freedom. He does not "experience" freedom, but prior to all experience he presupposes it. This is why in general any person's deed appears to us .....as morally relevant ..... . This is what binds one person to another, uniting him who imputes with him to whom something is imputed. For of his own accord the latter has the same conception. It is the communal attribute of all personality as such" (52). In the second place, "there is the accountability of a person. In the person to whom something is imputed, this is what answers to the act of imputation. Without it an imputation would be an error. There may be such an error, for there is such a thing as unaccountability ..... accountability ..... is not a universal dignity accompanying all human conditions. And it is in accord with this circumstance that our moral consciousness can very well distinguish unaccountability ..... . Genuine accountability, however, just as one who imputes it presupposes it - and no less in the case of self-determination - is nothing else

than moral freedom. Hence exactly the distinction which even the unsophisticated mind makes here provides the evidence for the existence of moral freedom. And here also .....it is not an autonomy of the principle, nor that of a metaphysical back-ground to personality, but the autonomy of the person himself in his individual, conscious will - freedom of the will in the strict sense of the word" (53). The third and the most important and most decisive stage in the fact of imputation, according to Hartmann, is "the claim which the person makes to imputation" (54). "A man of high moral development confirms the imputation which others make, not only by imputing to himself whatever he does but by asserting his right to such imputation; indeed he feels his human dignity to be violated, if his accountability for his deed is denied. Such a denial he regards ... ..as an attempt to deprive him of his moral Being as a person ..... . Indeed the morally mature man rightly repels the well-meant exculpation ..... . He insists upon being responsible, if he feels himself to be so ..... For him there is here far more at stake than ~~the~~ what he experiences in the depreciatory moral judgment : the value which is at the basis of his personality is at stake - his freedom" (55). Thus "in the claim to imputation is contained one of the strongest positive indications of the ethically real existence of freedom. For this claim runs counter to every natural interest, to all indolence, to the all-too-human weakness of shifting blame from off one's own shoulders. Here is the evidence of a real human power in the constitution of personality, which introduces into life a ~~totality~~ totally different point of view ..... . This point of view is that of a strictly personal autonomy" (56). The factual complex of responsibility and accountability are "phenomena

of living tendencies, powers, claims, in short, of real actional factors. They are of significance only if they ARE rooted in real personal freedom"(57). The claim to accountability and the assumption of responsibility indicate that "if I do not impute to another what lies within the domain of his responsibility, I fail thereby to recognise not only a principle which determines him but the man himself as a moral person. If anyone deprives me of the responsibility which I take upon myself, he sins against my essential nature as a person. He does not, as it were, deny my specific valuational qualities .....but he denies something more fundamental ; my capacity to manifest any moral qualities whatsoever, a capacity which is the fundamental condition of my moral existence"(58). Thus the phenomena of responsibility and imputation are significant, according to Hartmann, if and only if they are rooted in real personal freedom, i.e., only if they rest for their existence solely on the capacity of any and every human being to manifest moral qualities which is the fundamental condition of the existence of a man as a moral Being. Otherwise "they are ~~not~~ not only a diversified system of illusions, but even in themselves are meaningless"(59). Here the sceptic will join issue with the upholders of moral freedom. And we should do well, according to Hartmann, to examine the contention of the sceptic. According to the sceptic, "we cannot bar out the possibility that responsibility, accountability, indeed even the right to have one's actions imputed to oneself, is a radical illusion inherent in the constitution of the alleged moral life"(60). But "in ethics as in epistemology a withdrawal from the phenomenon avenges itself. An elaborate hypothesis must

be built up; and if it succeeds, it proves that it presupposes what it meant to refute : in the case of epistemology, the self-existence of the object; in the case of ethics, freedom" (61). In the problem of freedom, "if we have happily eliminated the freedom of the person from the factual complex of responsibility and imputability, the functions of the willing, and acting and acting subject, through whom we mean to explain the appearance of freedom, show themselves on their part to be of such a grade of structure that categorical freedom again attaches to them according to the basic ontological laws themselves. The kind of determination which one is called upon to explain in the consciousness of freedom does not resolve itself into the components (as such), from which one could explain it most adequately. But if ~~we~~ one adds the higher categorial determinant - and one cannot avoid doing so - it is just this which according to the categorial law of freedom is "free", as ever against those very components by means of which, as being their unfree resultant, it was intended to be accounted for. Hence .... one has only exchanged one freedom for another, namely, the directly felt and conscious freedom of the person for an inferred freedom of the categorial principle of the person, which as such is of course not conscious. But the distinction is not a difference in the matter, but only in the way of looking at it. Metaphysically both are one and the same freedom throughout. The "principle" of a person is nothing but the essence of the person, which is also implied in the unreflective consciousness of self-determination. We cannot escape the existential reality of personal freedom" (62). Thus ethical scepticism, according to Hartmann, ends in self-refutation.

. The phenomenon of the consciousness of guilt, according to Hartmann, is closely akin to the complex phenomena of responsibility and imputability. But its degree of certainty as an argument is higher. Unlike responsibility "guilt exists only as a consequence; it first comes into being in moral transgression" (63). In guilt "we have a peculiar intensification of what also lies concealed in responsibility; ..... Here the burden is more keenly felt and more elementary; at the same time it is also more imperative inevitable. One can still either assume or ~~waive responsibility~~ waive responsibility ..... But one cannot shift guilt from off one's own shoulders ..... The state of guilt is in the highest degree real and is felt to be real. It bursts in upon a man like a fate. He makes no mistake about the guilt .... But nevertheless he feels that this ~~bursting-in~~ bursting-in is not from outside. A power rises within himself, which brings evidence against him. What was already latent in the responsibility, the inner court wherein the person is twice represented and at the same time divided against himself, comes for the first time in the state of guilt to drastic expression, to the more convincing inner reality. Everyone is acquainted with this phenomenon as the voice of conscience and, with its peculiar moral character, "remorse" .... By an inner necessity they follow upon the deed, as soon as its ethical disvalue is felt. This necessity and inevitability ..... constitute the consciousness of guilt, a witness to self-determination (64). And the metaphysical significance of guilt "lies in its reference to real self-determination. For guilt signifies authorship, exclusively on the part of the person himself. On this account the consciousness of guilt is unequivocally connected with personal self-determination. The accusing conscience is the consciousness of that origination, fused

with the concomitant consciousness of being contrary to value. From this fusion we distinctly here strife issuing :  
..... To acknowledge the deed with our own moral Being and at the same time to reprobate it, in the same moment to be witness both for and against ourself" (65). The state of guilt as a moral fact inverts every natural inclination of man. "Here finally the possibility of any subjective falsification of the phenomenon is excluded. No one would load himself with guilt, so long as he could avoid it ..... It is against his will that the guilty man takes the load upon himself. This is very different from the phenomenon of responsibility. There is delight in responsibility, a truly exalted feeling accompanying the thought of being responsible : But delight and exaltation in being guilty are repugnant to common sense" (66). The fact that there is such a thing as the will to guilt cannot be brought against this view as an effective argument because though there exists definitely such a will, yet "it speaks not against but for the reality of freedom in the Being of the person ..... For it is not a will to guilt for the sake of guilt, but a will to endure the guilt for the sake of one's freedom. Whoever has loaded himself with guilt, can get rid himself of it only at the price of his own autonomous personality. The escape from guilt is not worth the price" (67). Lest a misunderstanding may creep in it should be noted in this connection that in moral transgression "that which commits the transgression, and that which on the other hand rises up in the name of the violated value, are both not of an axiological but of an ontological nature" (68). Hence "that which as consciousness conscience raises its accusing voice against the man, is therefore not his ideal ethos" (69), i.e., ideal personality or personality as a value which is an ideal self-existent. In guilt "the person comes forward

as a witness against himself, accuses himself, struggles against his own most vital interest. How could he do this, if there were not another reason for it in himself, if in him as a person there were not something of greater import, something distinctive of him, which demanded this negation and violation of life, precisely in order to preserve his integrity" (70). That is why "the strength of the argument ~~from~~ from the factual complex of the consciousness of guilt outweighs considerably that from responsibility and imputability. The paradox in a man's oppressive witness against himself is the same in the will ~~of~~ to guilt, when rightly understood. In both phenomena the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man" (71).

Besides the phenomena of the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and imputability and the consciousness of guilt there are some other independent facts of moral life which, though not so cogent logically, yet point to the reality of moral freedom. Firstly, there is, e.g., "a moral sense of being worthy and unworthy, of enjoying good fortune, of living through something great, of experiencing love, ~~the~~ trust, friendship, or even only of possessing some outward thing of value. In these who are morally mature, this sense of worthiness . . . . . extends to other person just as profoundly, even if not so intensively. It is something wholly immediate, something anterior to all reflection. It gives evidence of a primary demand of the moral sense in the person that there should be provided a counter-poise in his moral being to the values which have

been tendered to him, that to a certain degree there should be established a valuational balance. This demand would be meaningless, if the person were not capable of such a special independent equipoise and indeed master of it. But the condition implied in being a carrier of personal value is freedom; and the state of being master of them is personal freedom in particular. In characteristic fashion this phenomenon, when reversed, is still the same. A person makes reversed demand upon life .....that the worthy man should receive values in proportion to his worthiness .....actual life is indifferent to it .....nevertheless it is rooted deep in moral sense and ..... to feel no satisfaction at the good fortune of the innocent and the highly deserving, no indignation at the triumph of the reprobate, is rightly looked upon as morally perverted ..... Thus the postulate of human happiness is not simply an utopia; as a vision, it also has a place in critical ethics" (72). Secondly, personal freedom is similarly "reflected in retaliation, revenge, punishment, reward and everything that is akin to these. The question here .....simply concerns the significance of these phenomena, independently of their moral value or disvalue. And in this connection it is again evident that they are to be traced to the real essence of personality, which is taken as the autonomous originator and to which as such recompense is assigned. If there be no such originator, if the person possesses no real freedom, then retaliation, revenge, punishment are not only morally assailable, but are simply senseless, purely imaginary phenomena" (73). Thirdly, the same is the case "with all domineering, all ruling over others, with lust of power and arrogance .... The significance of arrogance and lust of power is not as bottom the ~~valuetakenst~~ valuational presumption of the person, but his

presumption that he is free ..... Hence his violation of another's freedom. The arrogant man as such is not vain, the vain may be obsequious. As in humility there is no suppression but only spontaneous subordination, so in arrogance and lust of power there are spontaneous expansion and usurpation of freedom. Here we find freedom running wild, rampant, overreaching itself. This phenomenon, even in its disvalue, is ethically significant, as a manifestation of the reality of freedom" (74).

"The aim of all ethical claim upon man, "according to Hartmann, "is to establish thorough concrete agreement between the Ought and the will ..... so here the task of the actual personal will is to adjust itself to the ideal Being of values ..... a self-adaptation of the real to the ideal" (75). As regards the relation of the Ought to the will, "we may" says Hartmann, " ..... Summarize the situation in brief. The Ought and the will are given in an indestructible texture of oppositions. If one traces this oppositionality to its origin, one finds behind it axiological antinomies, that is, an antithetic of Ought and Ought. Now this cannot be solved, however much the sense of value searches for syntheses. At least, a person - when face to face with the conflict - cannot wait until an ideal synthesis presents itself to him. Out of his own resources, here and now, he must make a decision. As he in fact from hour to hour makes such a decision, there must be something in him which is capable of deciding in this way - independently of the correctness or incorrectness of the decision. This something remains ever against the entire conflict of the Ought, carries its deciding determinant into the conflict and thereby proves itself to be autonomous as regards the conflict'.

Thus, besides the antinomy of Ought and Ought, there is further antinomy : that between the autonomy of the Ought in general (the principle) and the autonomy of the person. Here is the antinomy of the two autonomies. The relationship now stands as follows.

The antinomy of Ought and Ought has shown itself to be insoluble. But it is precisely this insolubility, which makes the antinomy of two autonomies in the positive sense soluble. For if the former were in itself soluble, there would be no need of the autonomous decision from the other side in the case of an actual conflict, and the person would be thrown back upon the cancellation of the conflict; but if it gave another solution to the conflict than the distinctively ideal one, it would do violence to the conflict. Hence if the antinomy of Ought and Ought were soluble, that of personal autonomy and the Ought-autonomy would be insoluble. But if the former is insoluble, the coexistence of two autonomies is the only possibility of deliverance from the conflict of Ought and Ought. Thus is found in the insolubility of the one antinomy a clear indication as to the solution of the other. This other is the Ought-antinomy. Of course its solution is not given; it is not seen through, not understood, but it is guaranteed by the factors of the problem.

"If from this point we look back upon the factual complex of responsibility, imputability and the consciousness of guilt, we must ask : How does a new argument for the freedom of the will inhere in the relation of the Ought and the will? To this it may be answered : The former arguments clearly pointed back to an autonomy of the person, in whom a basic ethical capacity inheres, a potency sui - generis, but they did not reveal this potency, they could say nothing further as to its nature. Now the opposition of

the Ought and the will, by the analysis of the radical difficulties involved in it, throws the first light, although in an uncertain light, upon this point. Here is established the relation of freedom to the ethical principle, to the whole sphere of values and to their ideal autonomy. It is an antinomic relation, more abrupt than the relation to natural law. And it is the new factor, the illuminating element in this vista. For an antinomic counter-member presupposes independence. But it is this which is alone of import in the nature of the person. Independence is the whole meaning of freedom in the positive sense. Seen from this point of view, the basic capacity to which responsibility imputability refer is in fact a metaphysical plus of determination; and it is a plus such as a person alone among all actual entities possesses, both in face of natural law and of the moral law, both in face of ontological and axiological determination.

"Precisely that which in the table of values is the despair of the conscientious searcher - the evident impossibility of solving the valuational conflicts in a manner acceptable for the life of man - the positive and astonishingly definite solution of the no less burning problem of freedom . . . . . It is the strongest proof that personal freedom, as an actual power, stands behind the factual complexes of responsibility and imputability. The conflict cannot be solved from the table of values, hence also not on the basis of the valuational sense. But this means that it cannot be solved at all - at least not for human insight, which with difficulty grasps the highest syntheses. But nevertheless it can be solved in given cases by a fiat, by initiative, by the independent procedure of a being who thereby takes responsibility and guilt upon himself. And, without being solved, it is actually decided in just this way by the fiat of the person. To decide is not

to solve. If man could solve the problem, if he could discover an axiologically adequate solution, he would not need to decide anything at all; he would only need to carry out the solution. But the given questions of life are not of this sort. Step by step in life man must decide them without being able to solve them. He can neither change nor escape them; he can only push through them, by virtue ~~of~~ of his initiative, even if by his initiative he becomes guilty.

"Thus it comes about that, wherever persons act . . . . , actual decisions are made. But the power which utters the fiat must evidently be actual one; for it is actually determinant in the actual volition and conduct of an actual person. Hence the actual will of the actual person must be "free" - at least as regards the values involved in the conflict" (76).

Hartmann's account of moral freedom, we may note, is composed of two parts, positive and negative. Negatively, it is a refutation of the different theories of freedom as propounded by other philosophers and also it is a refutation of ethical scepticism which denies the very existence of freedom as illusory. Positively, it is an assertion of the real existence of moral freedom and as such it admits of twofold treatment, viz., with reference to the nature of moral freedom which is a metaphysical question, and with reference to the proofs of moral freedom which is a question of logic and epistemology.

Kant's theory of freedom, according to Hartmann, is on whole wrong, though it contains an important truth. Kant is definitely on the right track when he asserts that moral freedom must be freedom in the positive sense, i.e., it must be freedom to add new determinations determinant and not the absence of any determination whatsoever. Thus Kant is right in asserting that freedom does not mean negation of already existing determination but it simply means addition of new

determinatiin in the world over and above the existing determinations. But Kant is definitely wrong in his surmise when he asserts that the moral freedom is the freedom not of the concrete individual conscious person but of "practical Reason" or practical "consciousness in general". But Hartmann's appraisal of Kant's theory of freedom, we are afraid, is based on his misunderstanding of the Kantian theory of ethics. Moral freedom must be ex hypotesi the freedom of practical consciousness or it is nothing. But from the assertion that freedom must be freedom of practical consciousness it does not necessarily follow that this freedom must be absolutely distinct and unique in each individual conscious empirical subject. Everyone of the individual conscious knowers is rational. But from this it does not necessarily follow that reason in each individual conscious knower should be absolutely separate and distinct from the reason in every other conscious individual knower. Had that been so, intelligible communication in the sphere of knowledge and intelligible imputation of responsibility or accountability in the sphere of ethics would be totally impossible.

As a matter of fact Hartmann himself has gainsaid the uniqueness of personal freedom when he asserts, "Viewed ontologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorical freedom .... Fundamentally in its ontological structure autonomy is the same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities" (77). As regards Kant's discovery of freedom in the positive sense, i.e., freedom in the sense of addition of new determinant in the world already determined by other determinations of which Hartmann speaks with so much enthusiasm and eloquence, it may be observed perhaps not without justification, that Hartmann's eloquence and enthusiasm are misplaced. Kant's theory of

moral freedom of, to be more precise, Hartmann's version of Kant's theory of moral freedom does not establish as Hartmann believed moral freedom or a truth about freedom; rather it establishes moral unfreedom. What does this addition of a new determinant mean? This new determinant can determine, according to Hartmann, the causally determined world only when it works in line with the flow of causal determination and not against it, i.e., only when it leaves the flow of the causal series uninterrupted. Thus the freedom to add the new determinant is not absolute but limited; the new determinant can be added to the causally determined world if and only if the new determinant does not run counter to the direction of the flow of causal series. Thus teleological determination can be brought into the world by the fiat or initiative, the autonomy of the person only if this teleological determination of the Ought, i.e., of the value, can coincide completely as ends and means with the series of effects and the causes. Hence the autonomy or the freedom of the person has no power to bring into the world a teleological determination, even if it be higher determination, which runs counter to the direction of the flow of causal series. Thus human freedom is limited; it cannot bring into the world any and every higher determination but only those higher determinations which can and do run in the same direction with the flow of causal series. Hence there is not much to boast about Kant's discovery of freedom in the positive sense. This freedom is not something unique. Considered categorially, this freedom is also enjoyed by the possessor of the potency sui generis of every lower stratum, such as the stratum of logical determination, the stratum of mathematical determination, stratum of causal determination, the stratum of biological determination, the stratum of psychological

determination, etc. Hence Hartmann's joy in the Kantian discovery of human freedom in the positive sense exhibiting human superiority is the joy of confusion and misunderstanding.

As regards the Fichtean view of moral freedom, Hartmann is definitely right in rejecting the idea of freedom behind consciousness as well as the idea of the final total annihilation of freedom by the perfect will which can will good and nothing but good and has no freedom to will the bad. Definitely moral freedom must be the freedom of consciousness and not of something behind consciousness and also the moral freedom of the will which has no freedom to will the bad is simply unfreedom even if the will be a perfect one.

As regards Schelling's theory of moral freedom Hartmann's contention that the consciousness of freedom can never vouchsafe the existence of the freedom of consciousness ~~step~~ simply because of the possibility of illusion does not bear strict examination. As a matter of fact Hartmann's Critique of the consciousness of freedom is a tissue of contradictions. Hartmann contended that ~~proof~~ proof consists in facts and not in the testimony of consciousness. To this contention the answer is that facts as experienced, i.e., as consciousness of facts constitutes the real evidence in all cases. All evidence, in the last analysis, is the evidence of consciousness. No evidence, unless it is an experienced evidence, can be accepted as proof of anything. Further, Hartmann's account of the consciousness of freedom as the consciousness of something illusory permanently, i.e., as the consciousness of something which appears to the knowing consciousness as the freedom of consciousness but is not really so, does not bear critical examination. Hartmann's account of illusion and its correction is, it may be observed, is vitiated by realistic biases and, as such, is un-

untenable. Consider, e.g., the difference between erroneous cognition and true cognition; the cognition of the snake and the cognition of the rope in the snake-rope illusion. Why is cognition of snake an erroneous cognition whereas the cognition of rope a true cognition? Is not the snake-experience an illusory experience because it is not an uncontradicted experience as it is cancelled by the rope-experience? Is not the rope-experience a veridical experience because, unlike snake-experience, it is not cancelled? Thus non-contradiction is the criterion of truth, and an experience, so long as it continues and is not cancelled, is not false. Thus false experience or illusion is that experience which is cancelled and consequently the possibility of permanent illusion as advocated by Hartmann is a chimera, a figment not of logical but of wild imagination. Of course we agree with Hartmann that phenomena do not involve real-existence. To be a fact of experience does not necessarily mean to be real. But from this assertion it does not necessarily follow that the evidence of the reality of a thing is completely independent of the consciousness of that thing. As a matter of fact to be real means not only to be a fact of experience but to be that which is uncontradicted in experience. But Hartmann due to his illogical realistic bias for the self-existence of the object failed to stress that aspect of experience which, in the fitness of things, should be stressed. He failed to note that the so-called self-existence of object is no self-existence unless it is experienced self-existence, i.e., unless it is evidenced by the testimony of consciousness. Likewise the freedom of the will, i.e., the freedom of consciousness is not genuine freedom of consciousness unless it is backed by the evidence of consciousness, i.e., unless it is experienced.

As regards Hartmann's accusation against ethical scepticism, we may observe, it is not a fair accusation. For the fact that the Sceptic is criticising a particular analysis of phenomena it does not follow necessarily (as Hartmann presumed) that the Sceptic must put forward an alternative analysis of his own. From the fact that a critic is criticising a historical drama of Shakespears it does not necessarily follow that the unfortunate critic must produce an alternative historical drama better in style than the Shakespear-ean one more in accord with historical facts. Had critics been compelled to supply the alternatives for what they criticised, criticism would be non-existent in the world. Hence Hartmann's contention that if the Sceptic be compelled to produce the alternative analysis of phenomena, his analysis, though conceivable, would not be more convincing and more in accord with the phenomena than our theory and ~~consequently~~ consequently we can dispense with the negative criticism of the Sceptic as a criticism of little value because our theory is more in accord with fact  $\%$  and therefore more probable than the theory of the Sceptic, does not hold good. As a matter of fact Hartmann's contention contains implicit assumption which is not logically justifiable and the assumption is : Either the Sceptic must produce an alternative and better analysis than our theory or he must withdraw his negative criticism of our theory. And this is an assumption which is completely untenable. In this connection we may also note that though Hartmann criticised the philosophy of Post-Sankarite Vedanta for its ethical views, yet in his criticism of Scepticism he betrays his ignorance of Indian Philosophy. Had he been properly acquainted with Indian Philosophy, he would know the existence of Vaidantic School and consequently would not criticise the Sceptic after such a cavalier fashion. fashion.

As regards the nature of moral freedom of the person Hartmann holds (1) "that there must be positive freedom, not indeterminateness but determination of a particular kind.

(2). The determining factor must not lie outside of the subject (person) hence not even in the values or any other autonomous principles.

(3). The determining factor must also not set indefinitely deep in the subject, but only in the conscious stratum; otherwise there is no moral freedom (Fichte's mistake). Hence freedom must lie neither on the hither nor on the further side of consciousness, but solely in itself.

(4). Yet the determining factor must also not be assumed to inhere in a consciousness that is super-individual .....otherwise it is not the freedom of the person .... There must be a freedom of the individual conscious will.

(5). There must be freedom in two senses : not only freedom over against the regularity of nature (the causal nexus and any other ontological determinations), but equally there must be freedom over against moral principles and the demands of the Ought - whether over against an imperative or against the values ..... The will must have scope precisely as regards these principles by which as a moral will it ought to allow itself to be determined" (78).

Hartmann, it should be noted at the very outset, subscribed to Libertarianism in his theory of moral freedom. Like other Libertarians he recognised that an act of willing of the finite, individual, conscious empirical person is a free act in the sense required for moral responsibility only if the agent (a) is the sole cause of the act (i.e., the act must be completely self-caused, self-determined); and (b) could exert his causality in alternative ways (i.e., the agent should be confronted by genuinely open possibilities, in other words, the agent must have the power of alternative

actions. These two conditions are, according to Hartmann, indispensable conditions for the possibility of moral freedom. Hartmann thus gainsaid the doctrine called 'Self-determinism' because this theory holds that the moral act issues necessarily from the nature of the agent and consequently it also holds that in the case such an act the agent could not do otherwise than he did and rejects the condition (b). Thus Hartmann steers clear of all the three doctrine, viz., Mechanistic determinism, Indeterminism and Self-determinism. He also successfully dodges the theory of Psychic Determinism by his theory of Categorical or Structural Novelty which is a phenomenon sui generis. Nevertheless Hartmann's theory of freedom does not bear strict examination. In the first place, moral freedom, according to Hartmann, is at once individual and universal. It is individual because "it inheres in the nature of all autonomy always to exist only in that wherein the law originates ....". Only if the person ... contains a source of determination of his own ..... is he also autonomous" (79). And the "existential structure ..... found in a moral personality ..... is ..... a super-existence sui generis .... here ..... the individual ..... has its unique mode of existence above its components" (80) the essential feature of which is independent. For "every higher type of existence with its own categorical formation is ex ipso "free", as ever the lower. Its mere superiority suffices for this.. So it must be accepted as highly ~~reasonable~~ reasonable in principle ..... that into the disposition, volition and moral conduct of the individual person there enters a distinctive law, which pertains to the person alone, a genuine positive autonomy of his own, together with all inner and conditioning, and that his self-determination consists in this autonomy (81). It is universal because "viewed ontologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorical freedom .....

Fundamentally in its ontological structure autonomy is the same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities" (82)'. Thus the freedom of the will, according to Hartmann, is at once unique and universal'. But now can, we may ask, something unique be universal without contradicting its intrinsic nature as unique? The freedom of the will, according to Hartmann, is something unique, i.e., uncommon, and if a common character of the uncommon be admitted, it will destroy the very nature of the uncommon as uncommon'. Hartmann tried to go round the difficulty by asserting the freedom of the will as a hard fact of ethical life which, even if it is not amenable to the demand of unity or harmony of logic, should be accepted as such because of its facthood'. But here we are forced to join issue with Hartmann. Is the fact of the freedom of the will really irrational? We answer in the negative. And we can, we hope, show that Hartmann himself also, perhaps inadvertently, answered it in the negative'. Hartmann holds that in the phenomena of arrogance and lust of power there is "not the blind power of compulsive energy, but the wide-awake energy of initiative, which challenges the initiative of others, overcomes it, usurps its right ...'. In arrogance and lust of power there are spontaneous expansion and the usurpation of freedom'. Here we find freedom running wild, rampant, overreaching itself. This phenomenon, even in its disvalue, is ethically significant, as a manifestation of the reality of freedom" (83)'. Thus the freedom of the will is irrational, as these phenomena of lust of power and arrogance amply show, only when it is running amuck bringing disvalue instead of moral value in the world; freedom which is sober and runs within bounds without overreaching itself is thus freedom with an element of rationality or logical harmony in it'. Thus Hartmann's contention that the freedom of the will as an ethical fact is completely

irrational and does not contain even an iota of rationality in it does not bear strict examination. At least an element of reason and logic enters, it is evident from the account of the ingression of moral values (not disvalues) as given by Hartmann, into the freedom of the will. Thus the freedom of the will is not always bereft of reason. Further, if the freedom of the will be completely irrational, how can Hartmann arrive even at hypothetical certainty about the existence of such a freedom? We can discuss and argue only about those things which admit of the logical treatment of reason and can arrive at some conclusion about them with categorical or hypothetical certainty. But a thing which from the very nature of the case does not and cannot admit of rational treatment for its resolution into logical unity cannot for the same reason also become an object of discussion and argumentation. But Hartmann's very attempt to arrive at a hypothetical certainty about the reality of the freedom of the will by the way of discussion and argumentation belies his contention that the freedom of the will, being a metaphysical object, is beyond proof or disproof. Only that which is a contradiction in terms like the son of a barren mother is completely beyond proof or disproof and as such is also incapable of becoming an object of discussion also. And whatever is capable of becoming an object of discussion is also capable of becoming an object of proof or disproof, completely or partially.

Secondly, the freedom of the will being a metaphysical object, its existence, Hartmann contends, can be known only indirectly through certain phenomena of ethical life which indicate the existence of the freedom of the will as the needle of the galvanometer indicates the existence of electricity. Some of the phenomena indicates not only the existence but also the nature of the freedom of the will or moral freedom. These phenomena are consciousness of self-

determination, phenomena of responsibility and accountability, sense of guilt, phenomenon of the moral sense's demand of justice for the virtuous man, phenomenon of the feeling of rightness of punishment for the wicked, the phenomena of lust of power and arrogance and the fact of the fiat and initiative on the part of the individual when he is confronted with a conflict of Ought and Ought and decides. All these phenomena can occur, according to Hartmann, if and only if the condition for their occurrence be real and the condition for occurrence is, Hartmann contends, the reality of moral freedom or the freedom of the will. In other words, the occurrence of these phenomena presupposes the existence of moral freedom and they cannot take place as ethical facts unless the freedom of the will be real. Thus the argument from these phenomena is analytical, i.e., it is an argument from the conditioned to the condition. But does this argument really prove what Hartmann intends it to prove? We answer in the negative. How can these phenomena indicate the existence of moral freedom? They can, Hartmann contends, do so because in various degrees they go against the natural inclination of man for self-deception, and also because in them "the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man" (84). But how does Hartmann know, we may say, that all these phenomena go against the natural tendency of self-deception in man, though in different degrees? Because, Hartmann perhaps would tell us, these phenomena are not accompanied by delight, exaltation, etc., which it is the natural tendency of man to follow (85). But how does Hartmann, we may again ask, know that it is the natural tendency of a man to ascribe to himself the authorship of these deeds which

are accompanied by delight and exaltation and to deny the authorship of these deeds which are not so accompanied? Experience seems to be Hartmann's only answer. But how experience can give us the universal concomitance between the deeds ~~are~~ accompanied by delight and exalted feeling and the tendency of man to ascribe their authorship to himself? Experience ~~d~~ definitely cannot give us this strict universality and necessity and without this the concomitance between them is certainly a chance concomitance which can never furnish any sure basis for necessary inference or finality in the conclusion arrived at. To show that it is a natural tendency in man to ascribe to himself the authorship of such deeds as are ~~followed~~ followed by delight and exaltation Hartmann must prove beyond doubt that such a tendency is the result or effect which necessarily follows from the constitution of human nature. And this is what Hartmann failed to do and consequently he has forfeited all his claim for the universality and necessity of this so-called natural tendency of man and also for the validity of the conclusions that he has drawn on the basis ~~f~~ of the absence of this natural tendency.

Thirdly, in these "phenomena", according to Hartmann, "the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in Man" (86). But why should, we may ask, the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rise with its claim to inviolability against the empirical person with his violation of values? Certainly the empirical person does not commit a sin against the Sacred inviolability of the metaphysical Being of the person by his violation of values. For his violation of values is a viola-

tion of the claim of inviolability of the axiological entities and not of ontological entities, a sin against the Ought and not against the Is. Hence this claim of inviolability on the part of the deeper metaphysical Being is an undue, dishonest claim. Again it is quite incomprehensible how the deeper metaphysical Being of the person can claim. Only values which are axiological entities and as such, are of the nature Ought-to-Be can claim or demand as they cannot coerce or compel. Hence how can the deeper metaphysical Being of the person claim, unless it is an Ought-to-Be, i.e., value, which as metaphysical, ex hypotesi it cannot be? And even if it be granted that this accusing deeper metaphysical Being of the person is personality as an ideal value, it does not necessarily follow from this that the manifestation of this deeper metaphysical Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man because it cannot be so unless "the actual person, despite his shortcomings, feels himself to be more deeply identical with personality as a value than with his own empirical inclinations" (87). And this feeling of deeper identity on the part of the empirical person is an actual feeling and as such is conditioned by causal factors which govern our empirical feeling. Thus the manifestation of the freedom in man does not depend solely in the manifestation of the deeper metaphysical Being of the person behind the acting and erring empirical person. Ontological or causal factors are equally necessary for its manifestation.

Fourthly, apart from the empirical conflict in regard to values which issues solely from the situation itself, ~~xxx~~ according to Hartmann, there stands side by side with it the opposition between Ought and Ought, the conflict of value with value. And when confronted with such a conflict the "

"consciousness of value is always looking out for syntheses. But "an antithetic of Ought and Ought .....cannot be solved, however much the sense of value searches for syntheses .... a person - when face to face with conflict - cannot wait until an ideal synthesis presents itself to him. Out of his own resources, here and now, he must make a decision"(89). But "to decide is not to solve"(90). Hence for the consciousness of values "there remains nothing else .....to do than take upon itself the conflict among the values and decide by its own initiative. Now inevitably every such decision is at the same time a fulfilment and a violation of them. For the decision can be in favour only of one side, never of both at the same time. Accordingly when confronted with the conflict in a concrete case, a person will necessarily be blamable on one side, and that through the very initiative whereby he seeks a way out of the conflict"(91). Thus valuational conflicts can only be "solved in given cases by a fact, by initiative, by the independent procedure of a being who thereby takes responsibility and guilt upon himself. If man ..... could discover an axiologically adequate solution, he would not need to decide anything at all; he would only need to carry out the solution. But the given questions of life are not of this sort. Step by step in life man must decide them without being able to solve them. He can neither change nor escape them; he can only push through them, by the virtue of his initiative, even if by this his initiative he becomes guilty"(92). But why, we may ask, the person cannot wait until a synthesis presents itself to him? Why must he make a bad decision here and now? The answer is obvious. He cannot wait and he must make a decision here and now because the situation is given and this given situation is so constituted as to compel him to take a decision without waiting for the arrival of ideal synthesis and without without any other an avenue of escape from making such a decision here

and now. Thus the decision made by the person in the given situation is not a free decision but a decision which he is constrained to make. In other words, the person in the given situation is not free but compelled. He is making the decision not because he is making it freely without any idea of avoiding it if he could but because he is constrained to make it with the idea of avoiding it and searching in vain for an avenue of escape so that he could avoid it. Thus it is not true, as Hartmann contends, that "the actual will of the actual person must be "free" - at least as regards the values involved in the conflict" (93). Rather the opposite is the case. Further why should the man who, when faces a conflict of value with value, is making a decision in favour of one, be blamable? He can be morally blameworthy if and only if he makes a decision freely against the other value. But does he make his decision freely against the claim of the other value? We must answer in the negative. The charge that he can and would make a decision freely against the claim of the other value can be brought against the empirically acting person if and only if it can be shown conclusively that even in the case of an ideal synthesis making it possible for the person to consider favourably the claims of both the values, at once, the person stands favourably for the claim of one of them turning down the claim of the other. Hence Hartmann's contention that from the point of view of moral conflict which is inter-ethical, i.e., the opposition is between Ought and Ought and not between the Is and the Ought, "light is thrown upon the relation of the Ought to the will - and thereby upon the question of personal freedom" (94), that though the arguments from the factual complex of responsibility, imputability and the consciousness of guilt definitely point back "to an autonomy of the person, in whom a basic ethical capacity inheres, a potency

sui generis" (95), yet "they could say nothing further as to its nature" (96), that "the opposition of the Ought and the will, by the analysis of the radical difficulties involved in it, throws the first light, although an uncertain light, upon the point" does not withstand critical perusal. The argument from the factual complex responsibility, imputability and the sense of guilt and other minor ethical phenomena can point out the existence but not the ~~natural~~ nature of personal freedom because these arguments according to Hartmann, are of the nature of an inference from the conditioned to the condition. They establish that the existence of the conditioned is not possible without the existence of the condition but they cannot reveal its nature. In other words, they can establish that the conditioned is but not what it is. Thus Hartmann admits the possibility of knowing the bare existence of a real without the knowledge of its nature. But Hartmann has made a mistake by describing the argument of this type as "analytical, an inference from the conditioned to the condition, that is, a hypothetical argument" (97). In inference we start from premises and draw conclusion that will justify the conclusion. But in the argument of this type which seems to be an inverted inference our starting-point is the conclusion itself and we work back to the premises that will justify the conclusion. Hence strictly speaking it is no inference logically. Considered as inference all these arguments are open to the objection that there is more in the conclusion than is justified by the premises. From the phenomena we can infer only the phenomena, but from the phenomena we cannot infer the real existence, i.e., the metaphysical, presupposition of the phenomena. From the phenomena to the metaphysical ground thereof obviously there is a leap not strictly inferential. Hence Hartmann

spoke erroneously when he described this type of argument as an inference from the conditioned to the condition. As a matter of fact it is a kind of argument usually known as Arthapatti or presumptive argument in Indian Philosophy. According to some Indian Philosophers, argument of this type is a presumption necessitated for resolution of an observed contradiction in experience. Validity of this kind of argument is not inferential validity and consequently to judge the truth or otherwise of this argument in terms of the criterion inferential validity is simply an erroneous procedure. Therefore Hartmann, we are forced to conclude, is completely on the wrong track not only in respect of the nature of this argument but also in respect of its validity. Moreover it is quite inexplicable how we can know the bare existence of a thing without knowing its nature. Even the so-called inference which is ultimately a presumptive argument can and does indicate not only the bare existence but also non-phenomenal character of the real-existence and thereby distinguish it from phenomenal existence. Thus what we know even inferentially is not bare existence but determinate existence and consequently Hartmann's contention that we are capable of knowing bare existence is quite untenable. Further Hartmann's claim that the relation of the Ought to the will clearly brings into relief the nature of moral freedom is not a justifiable claim. The relation of the Ought to the will only shows, by showing the non-identity of the Ought and the will, that the power to identify itself with the Ought rests with the will and therefore the will of the empirical person in this sense is free. It does not show how this freedom of the will is different from the freedom of the organic, psychological and logical entities. As a matter of fact the argument establishes the existence of freedom only in a generic sense and not in the specific sense of the freedom of the will. Hence Hartmann's proud declaration

that real freedom of the moral person is "by far the most tenable hypothesis" and "is not only the most direct and simple, avoiding all theoretical bye-paths; .....also the explanation which lies nearest to the facts"(98), is an empty and baseless declaration devoid any evidential value and validity. As a matter of fact to accept Hartmann's version of the real freedom of the moral person is not to avoid but to tread on the beaten track of a particular theory, viz., the metaphysical theory of emergence, a theory of creation de novo.

Fifthly, Hartmann's theory of freedom, we should note, is based on a particular metaphysical theory and is refuted with the refutation of that theory. Hartmann admits of the existence of many determinations which are graded into a series of higher and lower the higher being a structural novelty over and above the lower. Thus the higher determination as a structural novelty not reducible to lower is, though dependent upon the lower for its existence, free. In other words, the higher determination is free over and against the lower determination in the sense that though the higher is dependent upon the lower existentially (take away the lower determination and the higher determination will at once cease to be) it exhibits novel features which are not reducible to the lower without remainder and as such it is free. It is also free in the sense that the higher, so long as it follows and does not go counter to the direction of the determination of the lower, can bring new determination in the realm of the lower which are not reducible to the lower. In other words, freedom, according to Hartmann, is a plus-phenomenon; it is not absence but addition of another new determination to the already determined world. Freedom is possible, according to Hartmann, only in the world where there prevails a lower determinism with a higher ~~dx~~ indeterminism. But for the existence of moral freedom

freedom the existence of a lower determinism with higher indeterminism, though necessary, is not sufficient. In addition to it there must exist a third determination wedged between the higher and the lower whose function is to actualise the higher determination into lower by its initiative without being constrained in its function by either of them. Thus, according to Hartmann, the existence of the freedom of the will be possible if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled, viz., (1) there should be strata of determinations should be graded into a series of higher and lower, the stratum of lower determination being a relatively open system capable of receiving the higher determination, into itself, it does not contradict its intrinsic nature or permits conflict with its property ingressed into itself, °. (2) the lower determination is stronger than the higher and the higher is dependent on and conditioned by the lower because of its strength, and (3) wedged between the higher and the lower there should be a third power, a potency sui generis, which is capable of actualising the higher into the lower by irrational and unpredictable fiat or initiative which cannot be constrained by either the higher or the lower determination. And in the case of the freedom of the will of the acting, erring, empirical person the stratum of lower determination is the stratum of ontological causal determination, the stratum of higher determination is the axiological teleological determination of values and the potency sui generis is unconstrained initiative of the empirical person which of which the actualisation of values is the function. Thus the freedom of the initiative is the freedom of the empirical person, or to be more precise, freedom of the actual willing of the empirical person, "if freedom is anything at all, it must be an actual power, a potency of the actual man" (99).

says Hartmann. The question of freedom, he continues, is an existential problem and "existential problems . . . . are ontological questions of actuality and without empirical foundations they cannot be discussed" (100). Thus "the actual will of the actual person" Hartmann asserts, "must be 'Free' " (101). Thus by 'actual person' Hartmann means empirical person, i.e., "living persons in their full concrete existence" (101). And by 'actual will' Hartmann means empirical act of willing of the empirical person. Now empirical person and his empirical act of willing are phenomena. But is freedom of the will also a phenomenon? As "an actual power, a potency of the actual man" (103), it should also in the fitness of things be empirical and consequently phenomenal; but this, according to Hartmann, is not so. Freedom being a condition for the existence of such phenomena as the consciousness of self-determination, responsibility and imputability, the sense of guilt, the moral sense of the demand valuational balance between the virtuous and his happiness, the moral sense of the justifiability of the punishment of the wrong-doer and the phenomena of lust of power and arrogance it cannot itself be a phenomenon like the conditioned. Also it has real existence and it is not of the same status of the phenomena. But here at once the question arises : If it is not empirical or phenomenal, how then can it qualify an empirically existent something, a phenomenon? Of course Hartmann will at once refer to the irrational nature of fact and will urge us to accept fact even if it be irrational or logically inconceivable. But is it really an irrational fact, we may ask, or is it an irrational product of a speculative imagination which soars high, like balloons serving all its meetings in facts? This freedom of the will resolves itself, in the ultimate analysis, into the freedom of unconstrained choosing of one of the irreconcilable alternatives. This act of choosing is unconstrained, i.e., it is

not forced or compelled in any way either by causal psychic determination or by the teleological determination of the values. But here again arises a question : why an act of choice which is quite undetermined causally, i.e., which is, except the fact of succession in time, uncaused be an actual choice? In other words, in so far as it is actual, it is not and cannot be uncaused; and in so far it is uncaused, it is not and cannot be actual. Hartmann could evade the difficulty by appealing to experience, but he forfeited his right of appeal to experience by his hasty assertion, viz., "just as the existence of God does not follow from the consciousness of God, however clear, so real freedom of consciousness (that of the conscious will) never follows from the given consciousness of freedom, however unescapable and imperturbable this may be" (104). Hence lacking the support of consciousness he cannot prove the actuality of freedom of conscious will, the actuality of this potency sui generis and consequently he cannot also prove the facthood of freedom. Moreover, Hartmann, it seems, cannot trust the testimony of consciousness in immediate experience because of the possibility of illusion. But how can he trust the testimony of consciousness in such mediate experience as inferential knowledge which always involves the possibility of error and fallacy? And when both the immediate experience and mediate knowledge are sailing in the same boat Hartmann has no right to prefer one and reject the other. We admit that the freedom of "the actual will of the actual person" is a logically inexplicable fact but our admission is based on inferential knowledge but on the testimony of the consciousness of immediate experience. And if consciousness is incapable of standing as a guarantee for the existence of such freedom nothing can guarantee its existence. As a matter of fact the

act of actual willing of the actual person is a unique occurrence which occurs only at the particular moment and it did not occur in the infinite past nor will it occur in the infinite future, and we know it to be a finite, unique occurrence because its absence for all the time prior to its beginning to be, the limited period of its existence and its absence for all the time to come after it ceases to be can be certified only by a consciousness that comprises the whole of time. In other words, it is only an eternal consciousness that can certify the evanescent occurrence of mental events in time. That this particular act of willing is free is also guaranteed by the testimony of consciousness. This particular act of willing is free because though it follows in the wake of the previous mental event its succession here is not objective and necessary the opposite being conceivable. In other words, of two mental events, A and B, where A is followed by B we cannot say that the mental event, B, is causally determined by the preceding mental event, A, unless the mental event, B, not following the in the wake of the mental event, A, in time is completely inconceivable to our consciousness. And in the case of the free act of willing it is quite conceivable that the mental event, A, may not be followed by the mental act of willing, B, with its object, say Q), but by 'B' (with its end or object, say R). Hence the freedom of the actual will of the actual person is established in the last analysis by the testimony of consciousness which certifies the possibility of conceiving the opposite regarding the succession of the previous mental event in time by the particular act of willing and thereby guarantees its uncaused character and consequently its freedom.

Despite all the faults, fallacies and questionable gaps in his reasonings Hartmann, it must be admitted, deserves recognition as a speculative genius of rare orders with hardly any parallel in the history of modern philosophy. Unlike his British contemporaries with their single track mind and inordinate love for the technique of analysis Hartmann is a front rank philosopher of speculation on the basis of empirical data. His thought rolls in masses and volumes and tackles the problem, like an octopus, at once from all sides. He is bold in his sky-kissing conception, completely scrupulous in his phenomena dissection and thorough in the execution of his system-building. His thorough dissection of ethical phenomena revealed for the first time the hitherto unsuspected richness of moral experience. The gifts he inherited from such giants of philosophy of the past as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche and others and the harvest he reaped from the field of his such continental contemporaries as Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler he has very successfully brought to bear upon the problems of moral life in order to erect one of the boldest, grandest and most magnificent system of Ethics. With the solitary exception of Whitehead who is more continental and less British in his mental make-up there is none among the modern philosophers who can be compared with Hartmann in respect of his Magnum opus "Ethics" in three volumes.



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