

CHAPTER - TWO

We have given, we believe, a brief and fairly correct outline of the ethical philosophy of Nikolai Hartmann. And we now propose to make a critical review of it in order to find out its cogency, plausibility and tenability, if any.

As an ethical realist Hartmann, we may observe at the very outset, stresses the independent reality of the object of consciousness. What does this independent reality mean? If the object be really independent of consciousness, what is the ontological status of consciousness? Is consciousness also real independently of the object? If this is to be conceded, the question arises, How are we to conceive this independence of two real entities? If the object is one entity and consciousness is another, and if they are both real and at the same time each is independent of the other, we are landed into the difficulties involved in the conception of two independent reals. If one of them is real and is different from and independent of the other, then the one is what the other is not in so far as they are different. And if this difference relates only to their respective contents, then as regards that independent reality we have to assume an existence other than the contents which exist. And if this existence or reality which appertains to both the contents, how are the two existences to be conceived as independent of each other. There are several possible alternative here.

(1) We may suppose the existence or being or satta is a universal in which both the contents participate. This is the Nyaya view. But it goes against the conception of reciprocal independence as regards their being or reality.

(2) We may suppose that not merely contents that differ

and so far as are reciprocally independent but also their respective existence or being. This will appear to be Hartmann's view and also of realists like Moore. According to this view, we have independent reals with varying contents. But how is this independence to be conceived? We may suppose that consciousness and object are independently real in the sense that while consciousness continues the object ceases to be, or that when the object continues consciousness ceases. If independence in respect of reality is thus to be conceived as their being independent variables in respect of continuing in time, reality or existence is equated to endurance in time. What, then, is this endurance in time? And what is time itself? When consciousness ceases and object continues the object is said to be existentially independent of consciousness. But what does ceasing to be mean? And what does continuing in being mean? Have they any meaning except as experienced or certified by consciousness? There is thus no escape anyway from consciousness as evidencing or testifying authority. Being in time or ceasing to be in time are meaningless verbiage except as facts proved by the testimony of consciousness. The ultimate evidence of reality or otherwise is thus the evidence of ~~consciousness~~ consciousness, and no realist can establish his case except as he takes his stand on the unshakable foundation of immediate experience or awareness. It is this awareness that posits the real as well as the unreal. It is the ultimate reality of which the particular reals are at best modes or specifications.

As regards the independence of value Hartmann advances four arguments, and none of them, we contend, can bear strict examination. In the first place, "a person", Hartmann says, "cannot at will pronounce anything to be of value for anyone which 'is' not of value for him" (1). Regarding the aforesaid argument it may be observed that experience abounds

in instances which will conclusively falsify it. The Bible may not be an object of intrinsic value to Bertrand Russell but that does not prove that Russell can never be able to pronounce it to be of value for the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury. From the fact that my affection for my family is of no value for my employer it does follow that my employer shall never be able to appreciate the value of my affection for the members of my family. As a matter of fact if the contention of Hartmann be true, tolerance or sympathy can never be a value at all.

Secondly, "a thing", according to Hartmann, "can be valuable only through its relation to a value itself. This must be fixed beforehand" (2). This argument, we may observe, is an old one and it is almost invariably used by all the metaphysicians who subscribe to the Platonic theory of the Abstract Universal. Plato himself used this argument to prove the transempirical existence of ethical universals and Hartmann, it seems, follows the same beaten track. But does this argument prove what Hartmann intends it to establish. We must answer in the negative. This argument does not prove what Hartmann likes it to prove for two reasons. (i) According to Hartmann's own admission, values, unlike categories, do not and cannot rule the particular valuable things of the empirical world inexorably and without exception. While categories do not admit of exception, values do. They cannot compel; at best they can demand inexorably. But it is a demand which may or may not be effective, i.e., the demand made by value may not be acknowledged and fulfilled. This clearly shows the difference between the values and the categories. A category which cannot compel the particulars, i.e., which cannot determine the being and character of the particulars by its recurrence in them without exception, is not a category at all. It is simply a misnomer as a category. In other words, axiological determination of value is an Ought-determination whereas the ontological determination of category

is a ~~Must~~-determination. Hence the success of an argument in proving the independence of ontological categories does not imply that it will also be successful in proving the independence of axiological essences; still less does it imply its applicability in the sphere of axiology. As a matter of fact experience clearly shows the inapplicability of this argument in the sphere of axiology by clearly showing that the particular things and events are never indifferent to the categories but they are so to the values. They cannot contradict categories (because denial of categorical determination means that they are nonentities) but they may not embody values though they may not cease to be. In other words to prove the legitimacy of the application of this argument Hartmann must have to show that values and categories are essentially identical, their difference being only superficial. And Hartmann can do it either by reducing axiological to the ontological or by reducing the ontological to the axiological, i.e., either as the axiological necessity is reduced to the logical necessity or as the logical necessity is reduced to axiological necessity. But the reduction of the logical necessity to axiological necessity is out of question from the very nature of the case because this reduction will prove just the opposite of what Hartmann intends to prove, i.e., it will reduce ~~Must~~-determination to ~~Ought~~-determination, i.e., it will show that the categorical determination is not an ~~in~~exorable determination. Hence Hartmann can prove ~~this~~ his case only by reducing the axiological necessity to logical necessity. In other words, Hartmann can prove his case only by showing that values are not values at all; rather they are categories masquerading in the guise of values. (ii) Even if we grant the applicability of Hartmann's argument in the realm of axiology, it does not prove his contention of Hartmann. For the particular valuable things exhi-

exhibit a bewildering amount of divergence and deviations and every attempt to find out the indispensable minimum common to all valuable things ends in a failure. In face of such failures critics may declare, perhaps not without justification, that the real use of these axiological terms by the writers of Worth-Philosophy is to conceal, as behind a fog-screen, differences that are too radical to be harmonized and too serious and damaging to be exposed to public scrutiny. In other words, what is common to different valuable things is only the name and nothing else. Hartmann's attempt to get rid of disagreements regarding the use of the adjective 'valuable' by admitting the existence of valuational maturity in one person and denying it to another will not also do, because Hartmann fails to give us a universally agreed criterion which is capable of indicating definitely the existence of such maturity.

Thirdly, "Nothing", according to Hartmann, "is ever loved, striven for, yearned after, except for the sake of ~~an~~ some value immediately discerned (and felt). But, conversely, never is loving, striving, yearning presupposed in the case of a thing that is of value, or in the case of the value itself which is inherent in the thing" (3). In this connection "nothing is more instructive than the relation between the crowd and the ~~champion~~ champion of ideas [When the idea is liberated through the word of the prophet question must be put : Why do all these seize secretly and half-consciously upon the same ~~idea~~ idea, so that this is pre-figured, as it were, in them, and only waits for release? Why does not the ethos of the crowd spilt into as many ideas as there are heads? Why, then, does not each go a different way? What constrains all to go on their quest and turn towards the same value ?

"There is only one answer. At the point of which all, because of the same need and yearning, must direct their gaze there lies only one value; as they contemplate the given ~~situati~~ situation they are not free to imagine at will different norms of good and evil.

"But this means that values have actually an existence in themselves independent of all imagination and longing. It means that the consciousness of them does not determine values, but that values determine the consciousness of them" (4).

This argument, it may be observed, is also an old argument which is much used by Realists in the sphere of epistemology. But this worn-out argument is, in reality, ~~in~~ inconclusive. As an argument it is no more plausible than the argument which seeks to establish the prior existence and consequently the independence of the hen of the egg. Spinoza, e.g., draws a diametrically opposite conclusion from the same premise. "In no case", says Spinoza, "do we strive for, ~~wish~~ wish for, long for or desire anything because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it". (5). Realizing the inconclusive nature of this argument Hartmann brings in the argument from the relation of the crowd and the champion of ideas as a supporting prop. But this does this supporting argument really support or substantiate Hartmann's contention? From the fact that we are in a body constrained to acknowledge and appreciate the value championed by the prophet it does not follow that the value in question is independent of our consciousness and also of the social structure in which we live, move and have our being. As a matter of fact Hartmann virtually makes such an admission when he says regarding the champion of ideas who comes at an unfavourable time, and who dies in solitude with his task, "who lives before his time is dead in his time" (6). The mob or crowd takes note of the value only at the appropriate time neither before nor after. But what is this time-determination? Is it not an ontological determination? Consequently ~~is~~ it not a fact that the factors which determine the ingress of λ values in the ontological realm as well as

the acknowledgement of value by the mass are ontological factors and values are not independent of ontological factors? Hence it is clear that the fact that sometime we in a body recognize that some thing is of value does not imply necessarily the independence of value. Moreover, it is also a w fact of experience that while some men do recognize something to be of value others do not recognize it to be so. Consequently, unless those who do not recognise this something something to be of value are proved beyond doubt to be suffering from valutional blindness without exception Hartmann's contention cannot be established. Further, Hartmann's use of this argument is sadly lacking in logical coherence because Hartmann gainsays in the very next page what he asserts in the previous page. Thus though he denies the relevance of the Social Structure of the day in determining our acknowledgement and appreciation of value, yet he tacitly assumes this relevance in saying that "he who lives before his time is dead in his time".

Fourthly, according to Hartmann, the independence, objectivity and ideal self-existence of these essences are "clearly revealed by the way the ideal forms present themselves to the knowing consciousness".

"It is this consciousness which believes the logical and mathematical forms to be something independent of it ... This postulated independence of consciousness is the postulated self-existence of the ideal objects. If anyone objects that affirmation is poor evidence, that a man who dreams, or one who is deceived, or who is in error, also believes that the object he beholds is self-existent, the answer is : from a dream there is awakening, as there is from error and illusion, but from logical and mathematical insight there is no awakening" (7). And as regards values "it is here just as it is with mathematical insight" (8). "Not everyone is capable

of it; not everyone has the eye, the ethical maturity, the spiritual elevation for seeing the situation as it is" (9)!. But he who has the eye, the ethical maturity, the ~~sprk~~ spiritual elevation to sense, i.e., to feel, the value, has "the conviction, which accompanies every genuine judgment of value, that everyone else must ~~js~~ judge in the same way and have the same impression" (10)!

Regarding this argument, we may observe that it contains an important truth. Here Hartmann virtually concedes what we contended all along. The so-called independence of values as advocated by Hartmann is no true independence unless its truth or falsity is certified by consciousness, i.e., unless it is a felt independence. Thus far we agree with Hartmann. But we differ when he asserts that (1) this felt consciousness of independence will never be contradicted and that (2) the existence of error and delusion conclusively proves the ~~indep-~~ independent self-existence of value. We agree with Hartmann in holding that the criterion of truth is non-contradiction, i.e., that which is uncontradicted in experience is true. But to say that the true is what is not contradicted is not the same as saying that the felt consciousness of value is an uncontradicted and uncontradictable experience. According to Hartmann, logical insight, mathematical insight and valuational insight stand on the same footing. They sail in the same boat and consequently they must sink or swim together. Thus Hartmann writes, "the sense of value is not less objective than mathematical insight" (11). and "it is as little possible to summon up arbitrarily a sense of value as it is to construct a mathematical law arbitrarily" (12)!. Also, "sense of value and logical reasoning stand on the same ~~level~~ level" (13)!. It automatically follows from Hartmann's assertion that these are insights that are infallible. Yet he holds that the primal sensing or feeling consciousness, which

is at once a consciousness of value as well as consciousness of the height of that value in the gradation of values which is absolute, i.e., independent of consciousness, is relative, because like values, "these gradational relations also are discovered only in a fragmentary way, and !...! at any given time, what is accounted higher within the discerned fragment is seen to be higher. With a wider outlook it can be discovered to be lower in the scale" (14). And despite this assertion he writes, "That the criticism, which is passed upon a subjectively valid gradation !...! implies the existence of an objective independent gradation. The historical relativity of valuation appreciations is not a disproof, but on the contrary a confirmation of its existence" (15). Again he says, "if all positive morality rests upon genuine discernment, and if all discernment of values is itself an aprioristic perception of valuational essences, the historical relativity of morals cannot rest upon that of values, only upon that of discernment" (16). It is evident from what Hartmann asserts that he is labouring under a great confusion. If discernments are fragmentary and consequently relative, then it clearly follows that all conflicting and contradictory discernments are equally relative and consequently equally valid or equally invalid. But, then, how can Hartmann speak of a narrower and a wider outlook, the latter superseding the former? Also how can he speak of valuational error or delusion? For, according to his theory, there cannot be any error at all these discernments are equally relative and therefore they are either equally valid or equally invalid; and we can never pick up one of these conflicting discernments as true because of its agreement with value, the aprioristic factum, for the simple reason that this agreement or conformity is also discovered by such discernment and consequently it is also relative. If the first discernment is rejected for its fragmen-

tary and narrow outlook by the second discernment which is wider and less fragmentary, then it is quite possible that this second discernment may be rejected by a third discernment which is still wider in outlook and still less fragmentary and so on without end. Thus we are landed into an undesirable infinite regress where every succeeding discernment supersedes the preceding discernment because of its wider outlook and less fragmentary character. As these discernments, these insights, are not infallible, everyone of them is capable of being rejected by another discernment as false. Hence Hartmann's assertion that these insights are infallible (i.e., there is no possibility of awakening from them); that they are uncontradicted and uncontradictable in experience does not hold good. As a matter of fact, ~~experience~~ experience abounds in instances which run counter to Hartmann's assertion. Thus though we can accept with Hartmann uncontradicted experience as the criterion of validity, yet we cannot accept with him the experience of value as an uncontradicted and uncontradictable experience. As to the contention Hartmann that the existence of error and delusion in the realm of value and gradation of value implies the objective independent existence of value and of the gradation of value, we may observe it does not prove what Hartmann intends it to prove. The discernment of value and height of value is not rejected till the occurrence of another discernment which cancels and corrects it. Every discernment is true so long it continues and is not rejected or cancelled by another value-~~experience~~ experience which replaces it. Hence Hartmann's argument does not prove the independent objective existence of value and the gradation of value; it only shows that one value-experience is cancelled and replaced by another value-experience and there is no guarantee that this second value-experience will not be cancelled and replaced by a third one and so on without end. We may conclude, perhaps not without

justification, that none of the arguments of Hartmann is logically justifiable and consequently they fail to establish Hartmann's contention.

Hartmann subscribes to what he termed incurable "pluralism" and Atomism in the realm of Axiology in general and Ethics in particular. Considered existentially every value is self-contained and self-complete and as such is independent of the rest. Hence unification of values by means of one highest value ends and perhaps will always end in failure. Thus Hartmann writes, "In the realm of values contradiction exists as an ideal fact, a conflict among values. Every value here has a certain existence for itself, a superiority over the relativity of the whole sphere" (17). He says also, "It becomes a task for ethics to resolvecontradictions- so far as they may be resolved - that is, so far as they are not due to an original antinomic in values themselves. So far as the latter is the case, ethics must not attempt synthesis". It must also select its point of view according to the phenomena, not the phenomena according to their point of view, even at the risk of incomprehensibility. It must concede validity even to the incomprehensible; it must allow contradictories to exist" (18). The question of the unification of values is important because "an Ought", according to Hartmann, "has meaning only if it is unequivocal and does not annul itself by an inner contradiction". Striving must have unity, otherwise it disintegrates and destroys itself. A man cannot walk in two directions at the same time. No one can serve two masters.

"Hence where no unifying principle presents itself, current morality forces such a principle upon the diversity of discerned values. It seizes hold of one single, clearly discerned value and sets it up above the rest, and

subordinates them to it. Hence arise one-sidedness, narrowness, vulnerability, indeed the partial falsification of the scale of values. The transitoriness of every current morality is a consequence of arbitrariness in regard to a unifying principle" (19). Conscious of such failures philosophical ethics since the days of Plato have taken recourse to another procedure. When none of the discerned value is supreme, philosophical ethics assumes and postulates a supreme value over them all, and in contrast to all of them. And it does so only to satisfy its intellectual love of system (20). "Such is the Platonic 'Idea of Good' " (21). Curiously enough almost all the systems of philosophical ethics agreed that somehow the good is the central ethical value; but that settles nothing. And nothing in the realm of values is more concealed than just this central principle, which is assumed by all morality as self-evident, but which in truth is everywhere differently understood Plotinus gave the formula for this situation : the good is "beyond the power of thought" "the good is irrational" (22). Thus both the procedure failed to reach the goal. Hence the question arises : should this open pluralism of value which is detrimental to the actuality of ought and the unity of striving be accepted or should we search for a hidden unity? But in what sense the question is relevant? If the problem is a problem of philosophical ethics, it is not important. But if the problem is a political one which bears upon the conduct of life itself, it should be taken up seriously and a solution, should should be found, if it be possible to find it. But the problem, according to Hartmann, would be serious for practical life if ~~the~~ and only if a plurality of values without a unifying value be self-contradictory. But an unconditional ~~assertion~~ assertion of this statement is not possible. "Much rather ~~it~~ is it possible", says Hartmann, "that a systematic co-ordination of diverse value could exist without culminating in one

supreme point. In the domain of existential categories it is not otherwise. Even there the ultimate which can be discerned is not a single ruling principle, but a whole stratum of principles, each one of which is self-dependent and conditions the others. We should accordingly expect the same in the real realm of values, even if other grounds did not suggest it" (23). Values, thus according to Hartmann, do not admit harmonization or unification in terms of a supreme value because, besides contradictions which are due to our fragmentary sensing of value, and consequently admit of resolution into unity, there are contradictions which are due to an original antinomic in values themselves and as such do not admit of any solution. But what, we may ask, is the criterion or criteria by means of which we can distinguish between the contradictions which are due to our fragmentary value-experience and as such are resolvable and the contradictions which are due to an original antinomic in values themselves and as such are non-resolvable? Hartmann did not answer the question because he did not raise the problem. But it is clear that unless such a criterion is found, it is useless to speak of resolvable and non-resolvable contradictions, and to warn philosophical ethics not to ignore the latter because of their incomprehensibility is like asking a bachelor about the health or ill-health of his wife. Again Hartmann's contention that a coordination of values without culmination in one supreme point is possible and that it is so in the case of categories and therefore we should expect it to be the same in respect of values even if there be no other ground to suggest it does not bear examination. For if we are to assume that what is true in the case of categories shall also be true in case of values, we must in that case have to assume that when it is true of the categories that their disagreement with actual things, beings and events of the world is the limit of their connection with these things, then it shall also be the same

with the values. But Hartmann explicitly denies it. He definitely asserts that in the case of values the limit of disagreement is not the limit of connection with the valuable things. But this clearly shows the arbitrary character of Max Hartmann's assertions. It seems that what is true of categories is true of values only in respect of a few characteristics and not in respect of other characteristics. But as regards the reason or reasons why values should be dissimilar in respect of certain other characteristics, Hartmann remains silent. Hence his assertion that if there be no unifying principle working in the categories, the same should be also be the case regarding the values makes the implicit assumption that values and categories are fundamentally of the same nature and therefore what is true of the fundamental nature of the categories shall also be true of the fundamental nature of the values. But this is an arbitrary assumption without any support either of reason or of experience. The verdict both of reason and of experience is rather that exactly opposite is the case. Categories are categories because they can rule inexorably and without exception. Inexorable categorial determination is the very pith and marrow of the categories; it is their fundamental nature. But it is this inexorable determination which the values utterly lack; and they lack it because they are values. In other words, what is absolutely necessary and constitutive of the categories is foreign to the nature of values. And therefore we can never be sure of the fact that if something is ~~true~~ true universally of the categories, this something will be true of the values also. Experience tells us that to entertain the idea that it is most probably not true of the values is more reasonable hypothesis. Moreover Hartmann never asked himself the question, how is it that all these different and conflicting systems of philosophical ethics are unanimous in asserting the existence of one supreme unifying value and searching for it?

Had he been able to entertain the question, he would find the real importance for the search of such a principle. Co-ordination or systematization is the aim of all these systems of philosophical ethics and they endeavoured to systematize these conflicting value-experience from their respective standpoints. And these standpoints are metaphysical standpoints. As a matter of fact, Hartmann's own account of values is a metaphysic-oriented account. Hence the moot questions are (1) Is co-ordination impossible without a supreme unifying principle? and (2) if this supreme unifying principle be admitted, should this principle be a value like other values? Hartmann raised both the questions and while he answered the first question in the negative, he did not answer the second question because assumed value-experience is and will always be fragmentary and as such will never be able to sense all the values at once which is sine qua non for knowing the existence of a unifying principle unifying all the different values. As regards the first point it may be observed that Hartmann's negative answer to the first question is due to his commitment to a particular metaphysical theory, viz., pluralism and atomism according to which admission of any single, supreme unifying principle will sin against the irreducible independent, self-contained, self-complete atomic self-existence of values. Thus it is not phenomena but a particular metaphysical theory which induces Hartmann to give up any search for unity amidst the values. Hence Hartmann's plea for keeping open the scope of ethical phenomena is belied by Hartmann's own assertion. The search for unity by current systems of morals of different times has not been explained but rather explained away by Hartmann who has endeavoured to explain it in terms of a unity of striving which cannot act unless it is guided by unequivocality of Ought and where there is no such unequivocality of Ought the striving should

be allowed to delude itself by arbitrarily seizing one of the discerned values as supreme and therefore as the unequivocal Ought for which it is searching. If it is merely an expedient for human striving, human striving would have taken recourse to it whenever it happens to face an equivocality of Ought. But the verdict of experience does not support this view. Is it not a fact of experience that we in our day-to-day practical life are confronted by what may be called conflicts of duty and are at a loss what to do? Are not we not frequently mentally torn apart about what to do and what to leave undone? But if Hartmann's contention be true, then there can be no anxiety for human striving regarding what to do because whenever it happens to face such a situation of equivocality it can shut its eyes and blindly holding any one of the discerned values indiscriminately as the unequivocal Ought it can try to realise it. As a matter of fact even when we face conflicting duties and do one of them our conscience does not delude itself by the sweet thought that it does the right thing. Rather it feels shame and holds itself guilty and repents. And this repentance is life-long; nothing can stop it. Hence the saying : Nobody can strangle his own conscience. Hence it is evident that Hartmann himself, and not others, who is putting the straight-jacket of theory on ethical phenomena. As regards the second question, Hartmann, it may be admitted, is right in pointing out that the unifying principle of values may not itself be a value because to hold one of the values as supreme is to sin against the claims of other values. But to deny, as Hartmann did, the very existence of a unifying principle of values in order to avoid the possibility of sinning against the claims of other values by conferring the position of supreme unifying principle to a particular discerned value is not the proper way out of the impasse. It is like throwing away the baby along with the bath-

water. Because of metaphysical commitment Hartmann's own suggestion that the supreme unifying principle of values is not itself a value is not palatable to him. But that hypothesis, it seems, is the only reasonable way out. In this connection it should be noted that Hartmann's contention violates against the law of parsimony. Hartmann rejects the Platonic and other theories of supreme good on the ground that ultimately they show good to be irrational, i.e., incomprehensible. But he also urges us not to reject the contradictories in values because of their incomprehensibility. But is it not better to admit one incomprehensible than many? If incomprehensibility be allowed, it should be allowed as little as possible. Hence the uncompromising ethical monist is more in accord with logic than an uncompromising pluralist like Hartmann. Hartmann's argument for rejecting such a supreme value which is incomprehensible is that different writers understood it differently, i.e., it is amorphous in nature and admits of any interpretation. But that is a fundamental problem of ~~philosophy~~ philosophy as such and is not confined to ethics alone. Further, not only the supreme unifying value but other values also are ambiguous in meaning and consequently Hartmann should in the fitness of things reject all these values if he is determined to reject the supreme value on the ground of ambiguity. Hence we may conclude, not without good reason, that Hartmann has ultimately failed to substantiate Ethical pluralism and Atomism.

As regards the ingression of values into the realm of real existence Hartmann holds that the values can ingress either directly without any mediation on the part of man or indirectly in and through the mediation of man alone. We may name them respectively direct ingression and indirect ingression of values. According to Hartmann, the former, i.e., direct ingression of values is not relevant and ~~is~~ imper-

tant to ethics whereas the latter, i.e., the indirect, mediated ingression of values constitutes the pivotal problem round which all other ethical problems turn. It is the problem round which turn, e.g., the problem of moral personality, of moral responsibility, of moral freedom, of the precise relation between the realm of ontology and that of axiology, of the location of moral value, i.e., whether moral value resides resides in the end willed, or in the willing of the end, or in both or in neither, etc. According to Hartmann, indirect ingression of values implies that (1) values, like categories, are principles determining the real but (2) unlike categories, are neither direct nor unchecked determinants of real self-existents. In other words, values are indirect determinants of real self-existents; they are mediated through the mediation of man who senses them, and their determination of real self-existence depends on the degrees of their success in getting their claims recognised by man who feels them. Thus values are at once beggars and tyrants. They are beggars because they cannot enforce their claims; the moral subject is free to make the decision in favour of or against the fulfilment of their claims. But they are tyrants in respect of their demand or claim. No value-sensing subject is capable of becoming deaf to the claim of the values he sensed even if he decides against their fulfilment. To turn a deaf ear to the claim of the values sensed is an impossibility. Hartmann puts it very eloquently when he says, "All principles are valid 'for' something, for a specific kind of existence". Even values have significance 'for' something. This 'for' expresses their relatedness to a special kind of carrier. But they are still further valid "for someone" - as existential principles never are; and this second 'for' is their relatedness to the value-sensing subject. It does not attach

to the ideal validity of values, but to their positive validity. It is an expression of the fact that the Ought which issues from the value is not attached directly to its character-carrier, but to a mediating element in the real, to the subject, to whose judgment it leaves the decision as to whether the realization is to be carried out or not.

"Unlike the categories '.....'. The positive Ought-to-Be '.....' needs something else which offers to it its own existential energy to be directed by the Ought. The Ought needs this alien energy of an existing entity because the entity thrusts its ontological determination against the resistance of the real.

"The Ought - and ultimately the value - therefore - '.....' determines the real '.....' and unconditionally '.....' but only through the medium which senses ~~wake~~ value and is capable of directing events" (24) .

"The subject - not as a ~~meta~~ metaphysical subject in general, but as empirical actual, just as we know it in man - fulfils in every particular the specified conditions" (25).
"One fundamental feature of the moral subject is that he is the administrator of the Ought in the world of real existence. He is not an absolutely faithful administrator of this metaphysical good; he can betray it. Whether he recognises the positive Ought-to-Be as for him a universally valid Ought-to-Do, and whether he then commits himself to it with his whole might, always rests with him '.....' the determining power of the Ought depends upon an intermediate element which it does not itself dominate, which is under an entirely different domination, and, whenever it recognizes the demand of the Ought, the freedom to follow or not to follow '.....' . The Practical agent '.....' is a world - creator in little. What he forms and builds does not emanate from him himself '.....' it is something he has overheard from another world, to which he is responsively sensitive. But what he senses has no con-

pulsion over him. It is only a good entrusted to him, the metaphysical import of which he feels as claim laid upon him. Nevertheless, the claim is not a coercion. The essential feature of the moral subject is thisthat with his sense of value he recognises at the same time the values which he feels as standing above him and his action, and he knows that a violation of them (within the range of his will) falls upon his own head. But this is not a realistic limitation" (26). Thus the freedom, the autonomy of the decision of the moral subject is the central problem of ethics. Take away this freedom, and the Ought is set at naught; it is but a meaningless verbiage, and empty word, a mere rhetoric. But what does this central concept of ethics imply? It implies, according to Hartmann, the freedom of man as a moral subject, i.e., man as moral subject is determined neither causally nor teleologically but is self-determined, i.e., determined autonomously. Thus man is an enigma, a logically incomprehensible being, a being who is at once free (morally) and unfree (empirically). He is a being who possesses at once incompatible attributes. Not only is man free morally but he is also determined by values if he freely chooses to realise them. They determine him axiologically and make him a person. Thus there is reciprocal determination between values and the mediator of values. The mediator makes or turns these values into existential principles and values in their turn make him a moral personality. "The existential determination issuing from values", Hartmann writes, "does not pass through the subject without modifying him. It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind - personality, which is as much a categorical novelty as it is a valuational mark The essence of personality is constituted by "two special elements - both distinctively ethical both refer to the relation of the subject to the values".

"One is this : that the values do not coerce the subject subjectbut impose only a claim upon him". The fact, therefore gives to him a kind of equality with the great metaphysical powers of existence - ideal as well as real - at least in principle. In this way he is an independent independent factor, a proper ultimate of existence along with this and other powers. It is this which has been called moral freedom. A personal entity is "free" entity. It contains its own principles, its own autonomy - together with the autonomy of nature which is in it and the autonomy of values which is also in it.

"But the second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which the subject retains in his acts. These are not identical with those found in the object of acts. They have indeed in themselves an Ought-to-Be, ideal as well as actual, but never directly an Ought-to-Do. They can and should determine the choice of ends, but they do not furnish the matter of the ends". These values are "relative" to the person as their carrier. For as their carrier the subject is a "person". However different these values may be from those which constitute the matter of the will and the content of the ends, they stand in the closest relation with them; for exactly that conduct has moral value which is a commitment of the person to ends directed and selected by the moral feeling for values. The commitment of the person is the correlate in & reflex of the setting up of the end which yokes the subject as the moving power to his own tendencies. The subject himself sets up his ends(27) ". But what is the relation between values and personality? It is a relation not of one-sided dependence but of interdependence. "Not only", holds Hartmann, "is the determination of the real by values dependent upon the moral subject on account of his role as mediator; but also, conversely, the moral subject is

on his side at the same time, and rightly, conditioned by the self-existence of the values and by the positive Ought-to-Be, the mediation of which falls to him. Only through the intrusion of values as determining powers into his actional sphere does the subject become that which he morally is, a person" (28). But what is this distinctive feature of this moral personality? It is, according to Hartmann, the capacity to set up ends, i.e., capacity to direct blind causally determined events towards a preconceived goal. But Hartmann's assertion of the moral freedom of the empirical subject raises more problems than it solves. Firstly, according to Hartmann, the empirical subject is thoroughly determined causally, and yet he is free to decide in favour of or against the realization of values. In other words, the empirical subject is at once free and unfree. This is contradiction in terms. But according to Hartmann, we should accept this contradiction as a fact. But this is, we are afraid, what we cannot accept. If contradiction be the criterion of acceptance and not rejection of an event as a fact, we shall at once lose all chance of making a distinction between fact and fancy. We must have to accept, if we accept Hartmann's view of fact, a strange epistemological doctrine, viz., the theory of the objective existence of contradictions and errors as facts. Apart from the questionable assertion of the objective existence of contradictions, this theory also goes against another part theory of Hartmann. Volitional error or delusion, according to Hartmann, is the absence of agreement between knowledge and fact (Value). But if the fact itself be contradictory, no knowledge can agree with it. Further, the question also arises : which one of the two completely opposite and contradictory pieces of knowledge is true? To answer this question in the affirmative is to introduce covertly a criterion of truth and falsity and

Hartmann in fact has taken recourse to this subterfuge when he asserts that from a wider point of view, i.e., from a wider and more inclusive and less fragmentary discernment the value which appeared higher is really higher in relation to a value which appeared higher from a more fragmentary and less inclusive point of view of or discernment. In other words, validity and invalidity do not ultimately consist in mere agreement and disagreement with fact or facts; rather they consist in more inclusive and less inclusive agreement with facts respectively. 'Agreement' and 'inclusive agreement' are not one and the same thing; 'disagreement' and 'less inclusive agreement' are also not identical. Hence Hartmann, we are afraid, is not consistent in his account of validity. Further, if validity, at least valuational validity consists in the agreement of valuational insight (Knowledge) with value (as an a priori fact), how is this agreement known, and how is this knowledge of agreement tested? To say that we know this agreement by some other source of knowledge is to commit oneself to an exactly same question about the validity of the validating knowledge and thus to be landed into infinite regress; and to assert that knowledge of agreement can be tested by the same criterion by which the knowledge that agrees is tested is also to land straight into the grave-grave-yard of another infinite regress. Anyway Hartmann's theory that some ethical facts are rationally incomprehensible or contradictory does not square with his theory that validity consists in knowledge's agreement with fact. If validity were to consist in agreement of knowledge with fact, then in the case of rationally incomprehensible or contradictory facts, knowledge, in order to be valid, must agree with such facts, i.e., it must be contradictory. But this, we are afraid, will not be palatable even to those who are honoured by Hartmann as the real discoverer of values.

Secondly, even if we waive our objection and accept the correspondence theory of truth as advocated by Hartmann, we shall find ourselves in a logically indefensible position. Knowledge, according to Hartmann, is comprehension (Otherwise Hartmann's description of things not amenable to knowledge as incomprehensible would be unmeaning). But if knowledge be ~~com~~ comprehension, how can Hartmann speak of the knowledge of the incomprehensibles? Hartmann, it seems, uses the word 'knowledge' in two different senses. But he did not acknowledge it anywhere explicitly. According to Hartmann, we can apprehend the incomprehensibles as well as comprehensibles, but we can comprehend, i.e., can understand only the comprehensibles and not the incomprehensibles. But this at once reveals the uncritical presuppositions of Hartmann. Because of his realistic bias Hartmann unjustifiably took it for granted that knowledge does not create; rather rather it is only revelatory in character. In other words, knowledge is not creation, even partially; it is simply discovery. Knowledge as discovery, according to Hartmann, is of two types, Immediate and Reflective. Immediate discovery is the discovery of the existence of an object, real or ideal, in ~~the~~ its bare particularity and individuality and as such it is a gift of God and only persons so gifted can discover immediately such unsuspected ~~existence~~ existents. Reflective discovery is discovery of the connections and relations of immediately discovered objects in the scheme of things by means of the exercise of reason and as such it is co-extensive with human reason and is therefore universal. Philosophical ethics is concerned with the second type of discovery i.e., the discovery of the place and connections of moral values in the system of values. But the discovery of the existence of moral and other connected values is the work of the gifted individuals who can discern the existence of these values by means of their insight.

The reflective discovery is thus dependent on the primary immediate discovery because unless values are known to exist the question of their connections and place in the system of values does not and cannot arise. But Hartmann's very contention appears to be questionable. How does Hartmann know that knowledge is only revelatory, but not creative, and does not make any contribution to the object? Can Hartmann prove conclusively that the object of knowledge is completely independent of knowledge? The answer is negative and rightly so. No realist uptill now has been able to prove conclusively that at least one object of knowledge is completely independent of knowledge. The opponent of the realists on the other hand has been able to prove that at least one object of knowledge, viz., pain, is dependent on knowledge for its existence. Thirdly, even if we accept Hartmann's distinction between apprehension and comprehension, i.e., distinction between immediate discovery and reflective discovery, it does not follow that, in the fitness of things, we should also accept his order of precedence regarding the validity of knowledge when apprehension as a source of knowledge comes into conflict with comprehension. Following the beaten track of realism Hartmann, we should note, placed apprehension over comprehension in respect of validity and thereby he, we are afraid, had sinned against common-sense. When we stand on the Railway over-bridge our apprehension tells us that the parallel railway lines are converging at the distance and our comprehension denies it and our common-sense, we are afraid, accepts the verdict of our comprehension in spite of Dr. Hartmann.

The distinctive feature of man as a moral subject, i.e., as a being who can realise values and by making the decision to realise them can become the carrier of moral value or dis-

value is that he is the only conscious entity on the earth^f. According to Hartmann, by virtue of the possession of consciousness he alone among all earthly beings is capable of looking 'before and after and pine for what is not'^g. By virtue of this gift of God called consciousness he amongst all the causally determined things and beings can overleap time and can behold the discerned values ideally as ends to be realised and can direct the blind stream of causal events for the realisation of the ends^h. Thus man alone is a setter up of endsⁱ. That is, he alone can freely decide to turn the positive Ought-to-Be of discerned value (i.e., he can recognise its claim for realisation,) into an Ought-to-Do and thus set it up as an end ideally^j. This capacity to set up ends show that man is a teleological being and that this is the only instance of teleology in a world that is thoroughly causally determined^k. Human teleology is the only known teleology Divine teleology being a matter of conjecture. But how does man as moral subject set up the value ideally as an end to be achieved? Setting up of an end, according to Hartmann, involves three distinct stages the first two of which takes place in the ~~the~~ ideal whereas the third takes place in the realm of real existence, i.e., in the domain of causal determination^l. Thus according to Hartmann, "We have in the finalistic nexus three links between the starting - and the finishing-point of the process :

1)^m. The setting up of the end by the subject, an over-leaping of the time process, an anticipation only possible to consciousness and a taking of one's stand regardless of the order of timeⁿ.

2)^o. The return determination (distinctive of the finalistic process) of the means by the end, beginning with means nearest to the end and so backward to the first means - the present one - which is close to the subject; where the link

just ahead (in the backward process) and is determined (sometimes, chosen) by it.

3) The actualization of the end, its real attainment through the means, wherein the relation of means and end which was reversed in the backward process is changed into a straightforward continuous relation of *causa* cause and effect². effect" (29):

"The first two stages of the Nexus", holds Hartmann, "constitute a closed circle They lead ideally from the subject in his objective and present world to the end as a thing of the future, and back again from this over the series of means to the subject in his actual present circumstance . And only now does the actual stage of the nexus set in, the stage in which that same series of means in reverse order is β passed through in the real process as a casual sequence" (30). "Only the last stage in this three-level relation has the character of a real process in the course of the world. On this account it has full causal structure; issuing from the subject, it is an incursion into the real course of the cosmic ~~ant~~ events : hence it can have no other categorial form than the causal form" (31) (31).

According to Hartmann, the setting up an end is possible if and only if the general categorial law arrived at by category-analysis is true and also if man as a conscious being is capable of anticipation of future. According to the general categorial law, "in the gradation of categories the lower always constitutes the presuppositions of the higher, the lower are the categorial conditions or elements of the higher. Every higher category unifies the lower ones in a new way and is a higher formation which rises over them as over a material. The novelty in it is the formation itself. But thence it follows that the lower categories are always the more independent, the more unconditioned, and even subsist for themselves without the higher, and that the higher are

always conditioned by them, are dependent upon them and exist only under them as their presupposition - indeed, that the new formation can become active within the range which the lower categories leave undetermined. Against a lower a higher principle cannot enter, it cannot suspend the action of the lower; it can form a higher structure only upon ~~its~~ a lower and with it as a building-stone. In short, the lower categories are the stronger, the higher are the weaker" (32). Thus the setting up of an end and consequently realisation of moral value through human agency is possible, according to Hartmann, only in a world which though causally determined through and through, leaves open the scope for the erection of a categorially novel structure by allowing free ingression of teleological determination over and above but not against causal determination. "The finalistic nexusin its second stage does not coincide with the temporal succession, but flows in the opposite direction. Now, to turn time back upon itself is an impossibility; the lower category - time in its irreversibility - is the stronger. Only a form in itself timeless can move freely against the temporal current, can forestall it and return against it. Thought, the content of consciousness can do this Only consciousness can furnish the ontological mode for the anticipation needed in the finalistic nexus and for the reversal of temporal succession" (33). In this anticipation there is a two fold meaning : foresight and predetermination - providence and predestination. Both are concerns of the subject as a setter-up of ends. In both inheres the basic character of man as a moral personality. For it is precisely those anticipatory acts, whereby he is the carrier of moral values and disvalues. And it is just here we get a metaphysical insight into the nature of man. For providence and predestination are the attributes of divinity" (34). "There may or there may

not be a providence of the Almighty but there is a human providence. And, likewise, a human foreordination ... teleology is the peculiarity of human nature for it is possible only in conscious entity capable of knowing and striving In man alone do we meet a setting up of ends, as well as providence and foreordination, the capacity of striving and actualizing a thing predetermined. For a philosophy which modestly and without preconception follows phenomena, there exists only in consciousness the category of end as a constitutive principle - that is, the setting up and pursuit of ends, not merely conformity to ends, which can accidentally exist" (35). Thus, according to Hartmann, only a theory of pluralistic Determinism can explain satisfactorily the existence of such ethical phenomena as the ingression of valuational or teleological determination in a causally determined world, the setting up of ends, the dual nature of man, moral freedom, etc. All these are possible if and only if we admit the existence of many determinations which are graded into a series of higher and lower, the higher being capable of ingressing into the lower and erecting a structural novelty over and above but not against it. As regards ethical phenomena these are possible in a world of causal determinism and teleological indeterminism, i.e., in a world which is already determined causally through and through but leaves the scope for teleological determination over and above but not against causal determination open. In other words, the higher determination can ingress and can raise a structural novelty over and above the lower only when it is working in line with and not against the lower because the lower being a pre-condition for the existence of the higher is always the stronger. The setting up of an end as an ethical phenomenon, according to Hartmann, can be clearly understood if we realise the inadequacy of the traditional

account of modalities" §. "If one stands fast," says Hartmann, "by the traditional series of modalities - possibility, actuality, necessity -the dynamic of the Ought, becomes incomprehensible §. Necessity, as the only mode which can carry such a dynamic, lies already beyond the actual §. The traditional series is aware of only a single positive mode below actuality - possibility §. And this is absolutely undynamic" (36) §. "Ontologically, therefore, necessity is the presupposition of actuality §. The latter contains ~~poss~~ possibility and necessity in itself as conditions [....] one can define ontological actuality point-blank thus : In it nothing is necessary which was not possible and nothing possible which was not necessary. Ontological possibility is ~~indeed~~ indeed not mere self-consistency (as is the case with logical possibility) : it consists of a series of conditions. So long as one is lacking, the object is impossible; but as soon as the object is possible - that is, as soon as the conditions which was lacking is present - the object is also necessary (it can no longer fail to appear) §. And precisely this being at the same time possible and necessary is its actuality" (37) §. "Thus actuality is ~~the~~ to be graded ontologically as the higher mode. It is a synthesis of possibility and necessity, it is their equipose" (38) §. "In the positive Ought-to-Be there is a tendency toward something which [....] is not actual. Therefore the modal structure of the actual must be annulled in the mode of Being peculiar to the tendency. The equipose of possibility and necessity must be annulled The Ought, therefore, as regards its mode of Being, is below actuality - and precisely for the reason that its content (that which is in itself of value) lies beyond the actual" (39) §. The annullment of equipose "means that possibility and necessity, in their contents, do not here coincide. One of them

shoots beyond the other, the other remains behind. The question arises: Which of the two is in preponderance? It cannot be possibility; that would not involve a tendency It, can, accordingly, be only an excess of necessity over possibility which constitutes the instability of the modes in the positive Ought-to-Be. Necessity is the only dynamic mode, it is that which includes a tendential element, or which can manifest such an element. Necessity can also indicate a claim which inheres in the Ought-to-Be. The positive Ought-to-Be makes the demand that its content shall be actualized, and it thereby implies in the subject who is sensitive to its demands a tendency to actualize them. But in the actualization we have the subsequent provision of the conditions that were lacking - that is, a restoration of possibility, the possibility of what before existed as a demand, that is, as a necessity detached from possibility" (40). "In ontological language : possibility and necessity are bound indissolubly together within the actual; but in themselves they are not inseparable. At the boundaries of the actual they fall apart. But in the positive Ought-to-Be the boundary of the actual is transcended" (41). Thus "one strikes upon a new, more fundamental meaning of necessity. Not the Must-Be, not the Unable-to-be-escaped-from, not the Being-involved through the totality of conditions (the ratio sufficiens) is its primary meaning, but the tendency towards something" (42). "In the actualization begins again the balancing of necessity and possibility. The equipoise which in the Ought-to-Be was disturbed is reinstated. But it is no longer entirely the same actual which is restored, but one which is changed in content; the Ought-to-Be and the disturbance of the balance have left traces of themselves. X The projected necessity, behind which possibility lagged, does not flow back, but in the actualization it draws the halting

possibility after it. Thus it actually subsists in making possible what ought to be. In the teleological nexus of reversed determination (that is, in its second stage) it discovers the means, which in their totality constitute the ontological possibility. By producing the possibility, by bringing about conditions, it actualizes, therefore, that which was set before it. And as the ontological necessity first sets in with the totality of the condition, one may with equal right say: "From the merely ethical, the free-floating and at the same time naked, necessity it leads over the real possibility to the ontologically bound necessity, which follows the possibility" (43).

In his treatment of the problem of setting up of an end Hartmann admitted that without the help of a timeless entity it would not be possible for the teleological or positive Ought-to-Be determination to ingress into the stream of causal determination. And man, the empirical subject, is that timeless entity. But we may ask: How can man be at once empirical, i.e., temporal and timeless? To this Hartmann's answer is that it is incomprehensible no doubt but it is an ethical phenomenon, a fact of ethical experience. Hence even if we cannot explain it, it must be admitted as an existent. But why should we accept it as an incomprehensible ethical fact or phenomenon? Hartmann's argument, to say the least, is inclusive. Incomprehensibility is not the criterion of acceptability. Otherwise we must have to accept any and every incompatible thing without any discrimination. Hartmann, it seems, has also visualised this possibility and to nip this possibility in the bud he has proposed facthood and not incomprehensibility as the true criterion for the acceptability of a thing. But even this criterion, we are afraid, does not fare any better. Facthood in this context refers to ethical facts or phenomena. But how can we accept something to be

be an ethical fact? Certainly by experience. But are ethical facts universally experientiable? No answer in the negative. But if ethical phenomena are not universal, how can Hartmann claim universal acceptability for them? Of course Hartmann could claim and as a matter of fact he did claim that it is universally accepted by all the persons who experienced this fact. But even this qualification does not conclusively prove the existence of such a phenomenon as a fact because there is no guarantee that those who are experiencing such a phenomenon are not suffering from hallucination. Hence Hartmann's argument is not conclusive and in the absence of conclusive argument Hartmann's assertion of the existence of such an entity which is at once timeless and temporal is nothing but a make-believe.

As regards Hartmann's assertion that according to categorial law the higher determination (which is weaker) can ingress into and raise a structural novelty over the lower only when it works in line with and not in opposition to the lower, it may be observed, in the first place, that the application of this law by Hartmann for the explanation of the ingression of teleological determination into the causal determination clearly contradicts Hartmann's own dictum: "Metaphysics must heed ethics; not ethics, metaphysics" (44). The categorial law itself is a metaphysical product; it is a speculative framework for the interpretation of phenomena. To put this metaphysical mould over ethical phenomena without prior investigation about the legitimacy of such a procedure is simply putting the facts into the procrustean bed of theory. Hartmann's preaching, we are afraid, is thus at variance with his practice. Secondly, even if the application of this metaphysical mould to the ethical phenomena be granted, the metaphysical assumptions which are implicit in the acceptance of the categorial law are questionable. To accept the

categorial law is to accept a theory of creation, viz., creation de novo. The structural novelty erected by the higher determination is a categorial novelty and as such it is an irrational remainder not reducible to the constituent materials (the lower determination) out of which it is made. But this is a highly questionable metaphysical theory and the legitimacy of its application to the interpretation of phenomena is also highly questionable. All theories of creation out of nothing are received with a grain of salt. Structural or categorial novelty ex hypothesi is not reducible to the causal factors which give rise to it. It is an irreducible remainder. But if it is not reducible to the causal factors, how can it be related to them? Before the origination it was not an existent certainly. Otherwise origination would be unmeaning. But how is this structural or categorial novelty related to the causal factors? Since novelty is meaningless without reference to its time, this relation (if there be any) must be temporal relation. But if this structural novelty be not reducible to the causal factors, the only temporal relation that is possible between the causal factors and the new novelty is regular sequence. But regular sequence can never give us necessity, free or bound. Nor can it give us sufficient help to discriminate between subjective and objective succession. And if this novelty is simply a creation de novo the regular sequence of causal factors being accidental simply simply, the question arises: How is it that novelty originates at this particular point of time neither before nor after? To say it is inexplicable is an evasion rather than an answer. Thirdly, the doctrine of the ingression of teleological determination into the ontological introduces not only an air of mystery but also destroys the possibility of inference based on ontological, i.e., causal determination. If a teleological

determination could get into causally determined things of diverse kinds and make them function as the means of production of one definite kind (i.e., direction-oriented) of result, it would mean that any inference based on causal relation is precarious. We could not, e.g., argue from the result as effect to any particular ~~means~~ means as cause because we could never be sure whether it is a blind cause or a direction-oriented ~~cause~~ cause and a blind cause and a direction-oriented cause are definitely not identical in meaning. Hartmann himself says, "every causal course of events can be interpreted, without self-contradiction, as a finalistic process". The phenomena as such do not oppose this interpretation, they defencelessly yield to any and every interpretation if only it does not contradict them. But the interpretation can be as little proved as disproved by the phenomena" (45). Fourthly, if deterministic menism be inadmissible because it destroys the uniqueness of man as the only carrier of moral values and disvalues (46), human teleology should also be inadmissible because it destroys the uniqueness of the individual who is the real carrier of moral values and disvalues. Man as such is not the carrier of moral values and dis-values but the concrete, empirical individual subject is the real carrier. Human teleology, according to Hartmann, is a prerogative of man. "If the whole world is essentially like him, there remains for him no categorical distinction, no prerogative, no superiority. But upon this prerogative rests the whole ethical problem". The finalistic nexus is not at the disposal of every power. If converted into a world-principle, it would disposses man of his right" (47). But the real carrier of moral value is the individual, the actual, empirical subject. And "he is the unique bearer of moral ~~with~~ values" (48). And to say that teleology is common

to all human beings is to destroy the uniqueness, the superiority, the prerogative of the individual, empirical subject who is the moral carrier of moral values. Lastly, according according to Hartmann, when the axiological determination ingresses into the realm of the ontological "the finalistic series so fits itself into the causal totality, into the bundle of crossing ranks, of which the real consists, as to divert the total resultant. Its introduction is always at the same time the beginning of a competition. The finalistic determination struggles for the upper hand, for its own control of causal series. If it succeeds, the mastery is a directing of the total process to the previously fixed end, the actualization of the value by the forces of causal series which is indifferent to the value" (49)¹. But if in the ~~ethic~~ ethical reality which is a blend of causes and ends the finalistic series and the causal series do compete with each other to get upper-hand, if the winning of finalistic series means the diversion of the total resultant, then how can Hartmann assert in the same breath that the lower determination is stronger than the higher and that the higher determination can raise a novel superstructure over the lower only when the higher is working in line with and not against the lower determination? If the higher determination can work only in line with and never against the lower, then how can it compete with the lower, still less divert the total resultant? As a matter of fact Hartmann's theory of the gradation of determinations into higher and lower and ingression of the higher into the lower is simply a contradiction in terms. Instead of explaining the matter it seeks to explain it makes the matter more inexplicable.



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