

ETHICAL REALISM OF THE RECENT PAST
A CRITICAL SURVEY FROM THE ADVAITA
POINT OF VIEW

Thesis submitted in 198~~9~~ for the Ph. D. degree of
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P R E F A C E

There is a history behind every creation - sweet or bitter, glorious or ignoble. In the mind of the author the past gets into the present, and the present looks back with nostalgia over the moments that are no more and are of no interest to the reader. Autobiography transgresses objectivity; the unconscious intrudes, and the skeleton in the cupboard comes out and walks alive in the corridor.

An amorphous mass crystallizes itself with a local habitation and a name - this is the story behind every creation whether it be the birth of a thought or of supernova. To the environment from which it grows it is ambivalent. It is sustained from and yet stands over against and in opposition to that which surrounds it. And like every child of time, it will have its day and then pass into the silence of eternal Naught.

The central core had started to take shape when the accident of the award of the Griffith Memorial Research Prize in letters in 1959 by Calcutta University tempted the author to start writing. When completed friends suggested that it might be submitted for the Ph.D. of an University. The kind consent of Dr. P. Roy, Reader, University of North Bengal to become the research guide rounded off the series of accidents that results in the present version of the work.

There is little change between the original and the present version of the work. The changes that have been made are of two types, linguistic and structural.

Although the author has made a systematic search for linguistic slips he cannot guarantee that none has been overlooked. The credit for changes of latter type goes to Dr. Roy whose extensive corrections^y have been incorporated in the present version.

The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Roy.

Not that the work does not require changes other than the above ones. But, then, when can the misgivings that some faults have been overlooked be completely allayed? Lethargy, coupled with self-choosing feeling that no fundamental changes are required, has dictated the easiest course of letting everything to itself.

The mind of an author inevitably turns to the friends in whose association he has grown and to the teachers at whose feet he has learnt. As regards friends, they are all dissatisfied, for the work, to them, is too conservative. As regards teachers, they are disappointed, for to them it is too radical. And in the humble opinion of the author it is neither.

Conceived, planned, drafted, written, corrected, bound the work with all its redeeming virtues and besetting faults stands out there, independent of everyone who happens to have any hand in it, to meet, like every other creature of time, its destiny !

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Since Socrates equated virtue with knowledge and since Plato conceived of the highest reality as the Idea of the Good, speculation on morals has continuously been an occupation of European philosophy. As a matter of fact most of the European moral philosophers are, consciously or unconsciously, Platonists. To borrow a conception of from sociology European "Pattern of culture" is Platonic. Thus positively or negatively Platonism colours all European thought.

But what is Platonism in European moral philosophy? It is the theory that moral predicates refer to objects which are (i) non-sensuous, (ii) non-temporal, therefore, changeless, (iii) non-subjective, i.e., independent of the subject who knows them, (iv) reals which adumbrate in the particular matters of sense and as such determine the character and being of these particulars as particular of their respective classes. Besides these reals are beheld or apprehended by a supersensuous intuition. This theory is also known as "Ethical Realism".

In the literature on European ethical philosophy of the recent past two great European philosophers of Twentieth Century, viz., Prof. G.E. Moore of Great Britain and Prof. N. Hartmann of Germany propounded two different theories of Ethical Realism both of which subscribe to Platonism. Nevertheless their differences are no less striking than their unanimity and this clearly points to the danger that a critical study which inadvertently omits to take into account significant differences will get the

dead wood and miss the tree? Every genius starts with the common pattern but introduces some novelty of his own. Hence he does not give us the same thing that he received; and the existence of the living and appreciative mind of the critic is authenticated by his capacity to discern the novel and the uncommon which almost imperceptibly shade off into the common in the work of a genius. No critic is worth the name if he fails to achieve this.

In this work the author has undertaken a critical and comparative study of the two varieties of Ethical Realism as propounded by Prof. G.E. Moore and Prof. N. Hartmann respectively. The author's treatment of the theme throughout the work is analytical and not historical. However, as complete avoidance of historical treatment is not possible no pain is spared to keep such treatment within its legitimate bounds. The dangers that constantly accompany a critical and comparative study are, firstly, the tendency to read, consciously or unconsciously, the predominant ideas of one writer into the other and, secondly, the tendency to slur over or underestimate the differences and distinctions of the thoughts of the writers compared. The author has endeavoured to take as much care as possible to guard against such illicit impositions and unjustifiable pass-overs with what success it is upto the readers to judge.

Two criticisms which may be levelled against this work are (i) too much use of quotations and (ii) exclusion of some ethical theories which apparently subscribe to Ethical Realism. As regards the first charge the author like to point out that it is safe to speak in the writers lest the charge of misinterpretation or distortion be made. To the second charge the humble reply of the author is that the works which, in the opinion of the author,

are not landmarks as enunciating new points of view in the literature on Ethical Realism of Twentieth Century have naturally been left out :

The scheme or pattern of the present work is as follows :- The first chapter is devoted to a faithful exposition, in intelligible terms, of the theory of moral value as propounded by Prof. N. Hartmann particularly bringing into limelight, amongst others, such key contentions as 'the ideal Ought-to-be belongs to the essence of value', 'the impossibility of being realized does in no way militate against the Ideal Ought-to-be', 'though indissolubly linked together, yet value and Ideal Ought-to-be are not identical', 'every value has a certain existence for itself, a superiority over the relativity of the whole sphere'. In the second chapter an attempt has been made to evaluate critically Hartmann's theory of moral value. The third chapter is devoted to a critical and comparative appraisal of Hartmann's theory of human freedom - a topic which, in the humble opinion of the author, deserves a separate chapter for a thorough treatment. In the fourth chapter an exposition of the moral theory of Prof. G.E. Moore has been made bringing to the focus particularly such key concepts as 'Good' is indefinable, no part can be cause of whole because it cannot be the cause of itself, etc. The fifth chapter is devoted entirely to a critical appraisal of Moor's theory. In the sixth chapter an attempt has been made to institute a comparison and a contrast of the moral theories of Moor and Hartmann in order to depict in bold relief the points of agreement and divergence of these two great philosophers of Twentieth Century. In the last chapter the author humbly endeavours to enunciate his own views regarding the significance of moral life.

The author does not subscribe to Ethical Realism and his reasons for not subscribing to Ethical Realism will be found in second, fifth and seventh chapters. Whether these reasons are convincingly adequate or not is upto the reader to judge! In the last chapter the author tried to show that the problems of moral value ought to be tackled for solution from four different points of view, viz., the logical; the Epistemological; the Empirical or Factual, and the Metaphysical standpoints. Whether the conclusions reached by the author are logically cogent and acceptable is a question which the reader is the best judge to answer.

CHAPTER - I

In the realm of recent European ethical thought Dr. Nikolai Hartmann's "Ethics" occupies a unique position. In fact his work is a classic and a landmark amongst recent ethical literature and no other book by the English speaking people save and except perhaps Dr. G.E. Moore's "Principia Ethica" is comparable to it. Like Dr. Moore's work Dr. Hartmann's "Ethics", to quote the translator, "is the most impressive statement of intuitive ethical realism in print". Dr. Hartmann, like Dr. Moore, tried to establish "Ethical Realism" in place of "Ethical Idealism", though from a different point of view. We propose here to examine the ethical theory of Dr. Hartmann critically with a view to determine in the light of our examination, how far his "Ethical Realism" as expounded in his "Ethics" can be regarded as a satisfactory account of the basic issues of moral life.

Values, according to Hartmann, are essences. They are akin to Platonic Ideas. "In their mode of Being", says Hartmann, "Values are Platonic Ideas" *1. "The kind of Being peculiar to the 'Idea' is the kind of Being of that 'through which' everything participating in it is just as it is ". As to the kind of Being peculiar to ideas we know nothing as yet more definite; it is still to be investigated. But thus much is immediately evident; even for values the proposition holds good: they are that 'through which' everything which participates in them is exactly as it is - namely valuable. But in present-day conceptual language this means : values are essences "2".

Values, according to Hartmann, are ideal essences like the logical, and the mathematical and like them values are a priori essences which are non-temporal, objective,

universal and necessary. They do not emanate from the temporal evanescent things or from the percipient but are Ideal essences which can be immediately discerned or discovered only by an inner "vision" which can "behold" value a priori and is a state of consciousness other than thought or cognition though an element of cognition is involved in it as one of its constituents¹.

Values are Ideal self-existent essences which are absolute and are not relative¹. The relatedness to a personal subject does not make the values relative to the subject subject¹. "The relatedness", says Hartmann, "to a personal subject does not bar out the objective character of values but evidently implies it¹. A person cannot change the fact that a thing is good for him¹. The fact that it is so is not relative to his estimate of value nor to him as an appraising subject, but to him as a person¹. Conversely, an estimate of value is relative to the valubleness of the good for the subject¹. In this, "for the subject" does not play the part of a determiner or giver of values; his role K is that of a point of reference in the relation appertaining to the valuational contents. It is the same "for" which is interwoven with so many categorical structures¹. In the fact that geometrical laws hold good only "for" spatial figures, mechanical laws only "for" real bodies,no one sees any relativity as regards the categorical import of these laws¹. Yet there is just as much reason here for speaking of the relativity of these laws and of their categories to entities of a definite kind¹. In the same way psychological laws are also relative to psychic beings; but this does not mean thatthey can

be made by consciousness or can be abolished by the beings themselves!. But, rather, they are laws to which the psychic beings for whom they hold good are unconditionally subjected!.

"In the same way also the consciousness of good and ~~w~~ evil - so far as it exists - is subject unconditionally to the laws of values and anti-values....In short, the relatedness of these values to a human subject is not relativity to the subjects opinion of them or to his appraisement of them, but to the subject's existence, including his entire categorical constitution!.

"But this means that the relation of goods to a personal subject ... is not at all~~s~~ relativity of their value as such, but is a relation which is contained in the valuational material and exists before and independently of any consciousness of it Relational structure of contents is not relativity as regards values - just as the relational structure of the categories (and they all have some such structure) does not signify their relativity!. The difference between relationality and relativity ... is as essential for a clear understanding in ethics as it is in theoretical philosophy!. The opposite of relationality is the substratum, that of relativity is absolute!. There are relative substrata and there are absolute relations!. The relation of the value of goods to the subject is an absolute relation which is comprised in the content of their values!. The thing and the subject are here objectively drawn into the structure of the valuational materials as, so to speak, cause and effect are included in the causal nexus!. In both cases the binding relation is purely objective, and, as regards any understanding of it, is absolute!.

"The existence of the values of goods is consequently not in the least affected by the relation of the goods to the subject!. As regards the subject and his sense of

value it bears the mark of self-existence. Its absoluteness includes the self-existence of its relevancy. To state the point formally : the existence of the goods for me depends upon the independent existence of the values of the goods. It is included in the nature of the goods" 3.

Thus values are not relative inspite of the consciousness or sensing of value, for this sensing is only recognising or receiving and not a creative activity 4. Moreover, the restriction of the applicability of the laws of values and disvalues to entities of a particular kind does not make the values relative. For, here the dependence is one-sided and irreversible. These entities are dependent on values do not depend on them. Thus, "a thing can be valuable", says Hartmann, "only through its relation to a value itself. This must be fixed beforehand. It is the condition of the possibility of there being anything of value and of its being recognised as valuable, as a good - so to speak. Nothing is ever loved, striven for, yearned after, except for the sake of some value, immediately discerned (and felt). But, conversely, never is loving, striving, yearning presupposed in the case of a thing that is of value, or in the case of the value itself which is inherent in the thing. That this relationship is irreversible lies in the very constitution of acting, loving, discerning, striving". It is essentially a one-sided dependence. But what is evident in it is the fact that values possess the character of genuine essences, the character of absoluteness, of principles, and that the knowledge which we have of them can be no other than aprioristic knowledge" 4. Thus values are principles because their existence is presupposed for the

existence of the things that are valuable as well as for the act of evaluation; and as such values are absolute, i.e., independent and objective; and as objective and independent they are genuine self-existent essences !. "Whatever in its mode of being", says Hartmann, "is not relative to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable, whatever sets up before him a self-subsistent regularity and energy of its own which the subject can grasp or miss but cannot get rid of, that has for him the character of self-existence".

"Values have self-existence ... !. Values subsist independently of the consciousness of them. Consciousness can grasp or miss them, but cannot make them or spontaneously decree them (!). Hence, concerning the characteristics which values have, the proposition holds good that they have self-existence" 5 !.

Now according to Hartmann, self-existence or objectivity is of two types, viz., real and ideal, i.e., object which are independent of the consciousness of them are of two types, real and ideal. But at once the question arises : what is meant by real as well as ideal self-existence, how can we distinguish between the two? In reply to this question Hartmann says, "Theoretical Philosophy knows two essentially different kinds of self-existence : one real and one ideal !. The former belongs to all things and events, to everything that is "actual", to whatever has existence : the latter to the structure of pure mathematics and logic, and, over and above these, to the essence of every kind which persist throughout the changes of individual existence and, when distinguished from this, permits of being discerned a priori !.

But again the question arises, how can we know that the ideal object is not absolute nothing, i.e., Not-Being or merely subjective? In reply to this question Hartmann again says, "But the certainty of the phenomenon is clearly revealed by the way the ideal forms present themselves to the knowing consciousness".

"It is this consciousness which believes the logical and mathematical forms ~~to~~ to be something independent of it ! This postulated independence of consciousness is the postulated self-existence of the ideal objects ! If anyone objects that affirmation is poor evidence, that a man who dreams, or ~~as~~ one who is deceived, or who is in error, also believes that the object he beholds is self-existent, the answer is : from a dream there is an awakening, as there is from error and illusion, but from logical and mathematical insight there is no awakening ! The "belief" in ideal self-existence stands entirely on the same level as belief in real self-existence ! We also cannot prove that things exist, but can only postulate this when we perceive !.

"Whoever therefore, doubts ideal self-existence must also doubt real self-existence !.

"Perceived reality differs from mere presentation, from the merely supposed object, by the impossibility of voluntarily displacing it, of perceiving it otherwise than just as it is perceived !. But the ideal object, which is known a priori, differs in exactly the same way from one which is a "mere thought", from one which could also be thought as different! Indeed, the Kantian universality and necessity of a priori are not something psychological, and do not mean that actually everybody sees that $a=1$. In fact not everybody can see it, but only the person who has an eye - that is, the mathematical training to see it. Yet whoever has reached the level of such intelligence cannot

think as he pleases, but must think that only what in itself "is" a necessarily and objectively "is" = 1.

"In the same way no ideal object of a priori insight can be displaced by the subject or made dependent upon him". It offers the same absolute resistance to the will of the subject as any real object of perception". And this resistance "is" its objectivity".⁷.

Values are self-existent, but self-existent of which sorts? Are they real self-existent, or are they ideal? To this Hartmann replies, "Values have no self-existence that is real". The mode of Being peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence. The values are originally patterns of an ethical ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own laws and order".⁸

Thus values are ideal self-existent objects. They are neither absolute nothing nor subjective, for the phenomena of affirmation and the impossibility of voluntarily displacing them as well as the possibility of valutional delusion prove the ideal self-existence of value. The last point requires elucidation. It is said that if there be valutional delusion, then that very fact makes self-existence of values doubtful. But this is, according to Hartmann, a great mistake. "On the contrary", says Hartmann, "where there are delusion and error, these consists of non-agreement with the fact. The fact, as something fixed and independent of the truth and error of the knowledge - that is, the fact as something existing in itself - is precisely the presupposition of delusion; Otherwise delusion would not be delusion. But the "fact" is in this case the value itself. Accordingly, if anything is proof for the self-existence of values, it is exactly the phenomenon of delusion".⁹

Further, "the conviction, which accompanies every genuine judgement of values, that everyone else must judge in the same way and have the same impression"⁽¹⁰⁾ indicates

the universality and necessity of value. Of course, this is not a psychological universal fact. There are people who do feel and judge differently. But this difference in feeling and judgement does not disprove the universality and necessity of value-judgments and consequently of values themselves. It only proves the absence of proper valuational consciousness, the lack of training in discernment and appreciation which is required for kindling the primary sense of value. Thus Hartmann says, "But it is here just as it is with mathematical insight. Not everyone is capable of it; not everyone has the eye, the ethical maturity, the spiritual elevation, for seeing the situation as it is. Nevertheless, the universality, necessity and objectivity of the valuational judgment holds good in the idea. For this universality does not mean that everyone is capable of the insight in question. It only means that whoever is capable of it - that is, whoever has attained the adequate mentality - must necessarily feel and judge thus and not otherwise!"

"In this sense moral judgment and the primal moral feeling which underlies it are universal, necessary and objective (11). Moreover, Hartmann continues, "Values announce themselves primarily as enlistments of emotion. They are therefore exposed to doubt as to their objectivity so much the more, because feeling are less objective than discernments". But, "the concept of self-existence" itself is rooted in the fact that it is as little possible to summon up arbitrarily a sense of value as it is to construct a mathematical law arbitrarily. In both cases there is an objectively beheld existent, which presents itself and which the feeling, the intuition, the thought only follows & but cannot dominate. We can experience as valuable only what in itself is so!. We may of course also be incapable of such and experiencing : but if we are in general capable of

it, we can experience the value only as it is itself, but not as it is not. The sense of value is not less objective than mathematical insight. Its object is only more veiled through the emotional character of the act" (12). Thus, according to Hartmann, values are ideal objective apriori essences and are object of an a priori sensing of value which is an a priori factum. But values by themselves do not exhaust the sphere of ideal essences. There are other ideal objects besides values. They are also known a priori. Thus Hartmann writes, "Indeed, it is also easy to see that the ~~the~~ ontological ideal and the ethical ideal spheres are not isolated members, but that a vast aesthetical ideal sphere is contiguous, and that there are still further members which introduce still further variations of content. Yet in mode of existence the sphere remains a unity. It is also a unity for knowledge. For its patterns are known in all departments always and purely a priori - without distinction as to whether the acts, which are vehicles of this knowledge, bear the stamp of intellect or emotion. In this connection, ~~sense~~ sense of value and logical reasoning stand on the same level. Idealistic knowledge of Being permits of only one mode of knowing, the aprioristic" (13).

But how do the values differ from other ideal essences? In the first place, values ~~do~~ differ from other ideal essences regarding their relation to the real or actual ~~obje~~ objects. In respect of other ideal essences their coincidence or agreement with the real is the limit of their connection. Where they are not in agreement they are not connected. But this does not hold good in respect of values. As regards values Hartmann says, "In the ethical domainalso there is a certain agreement of the ideal and real, just as there are limits to the agreement. But the limits of agreement are here not limits of connection. The connection sub-

sists in full actuality above and beyond them"(17). In the second place, unlike categories values, though they are unconditional, inviolable principles of ideal ethical sphere, are the principles of the actual ethical sphere only conditionally. They are not the unchecked rulers of the actual ethical sphere. As regards their effectiveness in the actual ethical sphere they require help from something which belongs to the realm of the actual and which is independent, i.e., autonomous. Thus Hartmann writes, "In the ideal sphere values are inviolable, supreme determinants, decisive powers, to which there is no resistance, and to which everything is subject Without exaggeration one might say : values are categories of the ideal ethical sphere. But one cannot say: they are categories of the ideal ethical sphere. But one cannot say: they are categories of the actual ethical sphere. Here their role is of another kind, and thereby their difference from the categories appears. Here they are longer inviolable determinants nor absolutely ruling powers. Here not everything is subordinate to them; the act of the subjects do not accommodate themselves to them unresistingly; they have their own laws, determinants of another kind The will can counteract the consciousness of value. The same holds good of inner conduct, of the disposition"(15). Thus "ethical values are therefore only conditionally, and not once for all, principles of moral consciousness and its acts. And the additional conditions which convert them into principles do not lie in the realm of values, not even in the ideal sphere, but in the different law of the moral consciousness. It constitutes the basic difference between values and categories" §(15). Values are, in a sense, weaker than categories because they cannot rule inexorably. But they are, in a sense, also stronger than the categories for they work against categorical opposition and, in the case of success, can transform

Non-Being into Being and, in virtue of this capacity, they are, while the categories are not, creative principles. Thus Hartmann says, "in one way, values are weaker in influence than categories. They do not rule unconditionally;..... of themselves they have not the strength to execute themselves in the actual sphere; they are thrown back upon an outside power which enters in!. But this power is not always there; and, when it is there, it belongs to the actional realm"(17).

"In another way", continues Hartmann, "they are stronger than categories. Categories rule the existence without check !. They are the only ruling powers in their own realm. Values, on the other hand, so far as they are actualised, must be carried out against a stable structure already present !. And, in so far as they succeed, they build upon the categorial stabilities of acts a new and higher formation which rises in the same way over these as over a material subject. In another and more special sense they are creative principles. They can transform Not-Being into Being. The generatio ex nihilo, which is otherwise an impossibility in all realm of Being, here is possible" (18). In the third place, values are indirectly the principles of ethical reality, of real ethical's sphere. This is the metaphysically decisive characteristic of values as principles. Thus Hartmann writes, "the possibility of conduct contrary to values gives to them, as principles of action, their specific quality of actuality. That quality becomes manifest in the fact that even in the case of disagreement the connection is not broken (as with the categories), but continues in full force and is even solidified in a tension *sui generis*. In metaphysical language , it is the tension between two different sorts of principles" (19), viz., the ontological and the axiological determinism, in one world. "This one world", continues Hartmann, "..... is pre-eminently the actional sphere of the moral

consciousness; but subordinately it is the world of reality in general. For, to this latter belongs the moral consciousness, which is drawn into the real world as a member of it and there expresses itself in transcendent acts..... . They are also principles of the actual, of the real ethical sphere. Indirectly, through the actional sphere, they succeed in moulding the real - in line with the ontological categories All that has been said concerning the ethical sphere of action applies, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of ethical reality. Values have a conditionally determinative relation to it also. In it, too, they are not necessarily decisive, they do not fulfil themselves without ~~resistance~~. They are always in a restricted sense principles of the real ethical sphere, according to the ethos of the time Also the conditionality of the principles is here greater, for the actional sphere is the mediating factor. In life the realization of values takes a route which is not accidental, along the consciousness of value, along disposition, will and deed. Only where a personal entity with its striving for a discerned value is at hand, can a value be productively realized. But if we include it in the way in which values generally arrived at being ontological, of actualizing principles, the proposition is essentially valid here, that values - despite their inability to execute themselves - nevertheless in their own way are stronger in force of efficiency than are the categories of Being, in that they, in the theatre of the world, oppose the force of the categories" (20). The character of values as principles clearly shows the ideal mode of self-existence of values which is ideal 'ought to be'. Values as ideal 'ought to be' signifies the fact that values in their mode of ideal self-existence are independent and indifferent to their actualisation or non-actualisation. Thus actualisation or otherwise of values does not affect the peculiar mode of

being of value as ideal self-existent. In other words, the ontological dualism of Being and Non-being are inapplicable to values. Being or Non-being of the actualisation of value does not affect the value as ideal 'ought to be'. This ideal 'ought to be' persists inspite of the actuality or its absence as well as possibility or its absence. Thus Hartmann says, "In the characteristics of values as principles the concept of Ought is distinctly contained. It adheres to the essence of ethical values [There is something absurd in the thought that a value is a thing that ought to be only in so far as its matter is unreal. That a man ought to be honest, straight forward, trustworthy, is something which does not cease to be because somebody actually is so. The man ought to be even as he then is]. Ought in this sense is only an ideal or pure Ought-to-be". Because something is in itself a value, it does not follow that someone ought to do it; it does mean, however, that it Ought to "Be", and unconditionally - irrespective of its actuality or even of its possibility.

"The Being of values, as ideal, is indifferent to real Being and Non-Being. Their ideal Ought-to-Be subsists independently of the reality and unreality of their matter. And, again, their ideal Being is also not indifferent to real Being and Non-Being. The ideal Ought-to-Be includes the tendency towards reality; it sanctions reality when it exists, and intends it when it does not. It transcends ideality.

"This antinomy inheres in the essence of values themselves. It announces the inadequacy of the ontological modalities for their peculiar kind of Being; it is an exact expression of their essence as principles which are ideal and yet are at the same time drawn towards reality. This double nau nature is the ideal Ought-to-Be in them:

it is the ideal of their being directed to the sphere of the real; the idea of their categorical transcendence and of their breaking forth out of the ideal into the real.

"In this sense value and the ideal Ought-to-Be are indissolubly bound together. They are not on that account identical. The Ought signifies direction towards something, the value signifies the something itself to which the direction points. The goal conditions the direction, but the direction towards it conditions the mode of being of the goal. Value and the ideal Ought-to-Be stand in strict correlation, in reciprocal conditionality. The ideal Ought-to-Be is the mode of being of value which is never lost in the ~~the~~ structure of the matter. But value is the content of the Ought; it is the categorical structure, the existential mode of which is that of the ideal Ought-to-Be..... . The correlation is balanced, not like substance and attribute, but like substance and relation. On neither side is there a greater weight. The relation is stable, poised"(21) .

After his exposition of the nature of ideal 'ought-to-Be' Hartmann distinguishes it from both the 'positive ought to be' and (the ought to do). "The positive Ought-to-Be", says Hartmann, ".... occurs where the ideal finds itself in opposition to reality, where self-existent values are unreal.

"This kind of Ought adheres to the structural non-agreement of the sphere, to the tension between them. The tension is precisely the actuality. For the real is indeed indifferent to the disparateness of the ideal as such; it has in itself..... no tendency towards it : but the ideal is not indifferent to the real; in it something presses beyond its own sphere into the real - irrespective of the possibility and impossibility of actualization. Nevertheless, the positive Ought-to-Be '.... is '.... fundamentally distinct from the ideal Ought-to-Be; it does not adhere to value as

such, it is added thereto. In the positive Ought-to-Be, for example, the ideal Ought-to-Be of the value is only one element; the other and equally essential factor in it is the opposition of the spheres. It therefore stands midway between the ideal Ought-to-Be and the Ought-to-Do proper.

"The positive Ought-to-Be accordingly presupposes in a given situation the Non-Being of what ought to be. Hence it is only possible within a real self-existent world - that is, it presupposes this real self-existent world, together with its real determinations which deviate from the constitution of what ought to be . It has, as condition, the whole ontological system. First, against this, in its isolation and indifference to values in general, the positive Ought-to-Be is contrasted in its own kind of Being, as something unfulfilled. For the fulfilment can take placeonly in exactly this real, indifferent, self-contained world. But the disparateness and the resistance first make what-ought-to-be non-existent and thereby make the Ought-to-Be positive" (22).

Hartmann also distinguishes the Ought-to-Do which is pre-eminently ethical from both the ideal Ought-to-Be and the positive Ought-to-Be. The ideal Ought-to-Be is different from the Ought-to-Do because the "Ought-to-Do is always conditioned by Ought-to-Be, but Ought-to-Do is not attached to every Ought-to-Be. I ought to do what ought to be, in so far as it "is" not, and in so far as to make it actual is in my power. This double "in so far as" separates these two kinds of ought. Between goods and moral qualities there is in this respect no difference. The ideal Ought-to-Be inheres necessarily in them, but Ought-to-Do does not" (23). The positive Ought-to-Be is not Ought-to-Do, "for not everything that is not, but ought to be, comes into the domain of striving" (24).

The positive Ought-to-Be, according to Hartmann,

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issues or originates in the ideal realm,"but extends into the real; and in so far as it is a determining factor there, its activity is a real creating, a bringing forth" (25).

"If, now, the positive Ought-to-Be makes itself so effective in the real.... if it penetrates into the blind process of the cosmos, there must be in the existent a point of support for the Ought,.....the Archimedean point at which an ideal power can move the real and itself become a real power.

"In the stream of real existence'....there must be a point of support, upon which Ought-to-Be impinges... . In short, there must be a real self-existent which can serve as the originating point of real tendency in the stream of Being; there must be a form capable of intent in the midst of blind events, itself brought forth and borne along by them and yet, amidst them, powerful in self-activity".(26)

"The subject is such a pole of the positive Ought-to-Be in the realm of the real.

" The subject - not as metaphysical subject in general, but as empirical, actual, just as we know it in man - fulfills in every particular the specific conditions. And indeed only the subject does this. In this he stands alone He is a real existent among others . He is wholly under the laws of actuality, shares in its comings and goings, and is at the same time different from every other being - by virtue of his inner world, consciousness, which has its own code of laws. He is the metaphysical connection with the world of values, he senses their ideal self-existence. And he possesses spontaneous self-activity, capacity to direct events. The subject is the only real entity in which the positive Ought-to-Be can be transformed into a real tendency.

"The metaphysic of the Ought is exactly this, that in its unfoldment in real existence, in its actuality it is necessarily directed to a real subject In so far as the Ought enters into Being, and in so far as the positive

Ought-to-Be becomes an existent, it can be this only as it at the same time seizes hold of something already existent, and points it to that to which its own direction points. It seizes upon the subject. For this alone permits of being grasped hold of by the ideal power of values. The rest of existence is dull and dead to the call of the ideal. It does not "hear" it, it lacks intuitive rationality" (27). "Unlike the categories the positive Ought-to-Be could determine nothing at all unless there were an entity with a capacity for directing events, the direction of which could be guided towards its own aims (the valuational matter) and to which it could communicate its own purely ideal tendency. The Ought has no existential energy emanating from itself; it needs something else which offers to it its own existential energy to be directed by the fg Ought. The Ought needs this alien energy of an existing entity, because the entity thrusts its ontological determination against the resistance of the real" (28).

"As regards the Ought, consciousness is not a knowing but !..... a doing !.....only an active subject - that is, one capable of independent action - can be immediately determined by the Ought in the direction of further determination of an object. The real determination has the form of action, doing, conduct, and so far as it is merely inward, that of a mental attitude, a disposition, a tendency. Here the Ought-to-Be of the object is transformed into the Ought-to-Do of the subject" (29).

"In a certain way the positive Ought-to-Be determines only "at second hand" ! Moral subject is the administrator of the Ought in the world of real existence. He is not an absolutely faithful administrator of this metaphysical good; he can betray it. Whether he recognizes the positive Ought-to-Be as for him a universally valid Ought-to-Do, and whether he then commits himself to it

with his whole might, always rests with him the determining power of the ought Cought depends upon an intermediate element which it does not itself dominate,....and, whenever it recognizes the demand of the Cought, has like the freedom to follow or not to follow" (30). Thus we find that the positive Ought-to-Be, according to Hartmann, is not the unchecked determinant of the real world because it can dominate the real world only indirectly through the moral subject whom who can sense the ought and feel the demand or claim imposed by the value but possesses the liberty to fulfil or not to fulfil the demand. When the moral subject decides to fulfil the demand of the value, i.e., when he transforms the positive Ought-to-Be into Ought-to-Do, he anticipates the value, i.e., he sets up the value as the end to be actualised and strives to actualise it by procuring proper means and in his very decision to actualise the value, the moral value of the decision is realized and the subject himself is transformed into personality. Thus Hartmann says, "The existential determination issuing from values does not pass through the subject without modifying him. It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind - personality, which is as much a categorial novelty as it is a valuational mark. A moral subject, who of ~~most~~ all real entities stands alone en rapport with the ideal world of values and who alone has the metaphysical tendency to communicate them to reality which lacks them - only such a subject is a "person". The essence of personality, for instance, does not attach to the acts which the subject brings to the service of the values. Neither the discernment of values nor the activity, the setting up of an end, the will, transforms the subject into a person.

There are two special element - both distinctively ethical - which contribute the decisive mark. But both refer to the relation of the subject to the values.

"One is this : that the values do not coerce the subject, but, even when they are discerned, impose only a claim upon him, while leaving him free. The fact, therefore, that it is in his power to take hold on ~~the~~ value or not / and to place his own acts in its service or not gives him a kind of equality with the great metaphysical powers of existence - ideal as well as real - at least in principle: in this way he is an independent factor, a proper ultimate of existence along with these other powers. It is this which has been called moral freedom. A personal entity is a "free" entity. It contains its own principle, its own autonomy - together with the autonomy of nature which is in it and the autonomy of values which is also in it.

"But the second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which the subject retains in his acts. These are not identical with those found in the object of acts. Moral values do not inhere in the ends, as such, which are set up, but in the acts directed towards them, AND ultimately in the subject of the acts. They have indeed in themselves an Ought-to-Be, ideal as well as actual, but never directly an Ought-to-Do. They can and should determine the choice of ends, but they do not furnish the matter of the ends.

"Action, will, disposition - even up to the innermost and purely emotional attitude of mind - are the carriers of moral values proper; and thereby the subject can come ~~not~~ into consideration. These values are "relative" to the person as their carrier. For as their carrier the subject is a "person". However different these values may be from those which constitute the matter of the will and

the content ends, they stand in closest relation with them; for exactly that conduct has moral value which is a commitment of the person to ends directed and selected by the moral feeling for values.... ¶ The subject himself sets up his ends! There are always two acts disposed one after the other and equally transcendent; the act which initiates and that which executes. And each independently of the other has range of freedom. For each the person is accounted responsible.... ¶ And this means that he is the carrier of the whole differentiated scale moral values and disvalues. Only in a personal subject as a responsible and accountable being can these inhere" (31).

Thus moral value, according to Hartmann, is the value of choice of end and not the value of the end chosen. In other words, moral value is the value of intention and not the intended value; it is the value of aiming at and not the value we aim at. Hence moral value does not admit of being transformed into the end aimed at, i.e., the Ought-to-Be of moral value is incapable of being transformed into the Ought-to-Do of the subject.

Values, according to Hartmann, are universal and necessary. But the necessity of the Ought and consequently of the value is different from ontological necessity. Considered ontologically, necessity is inseparable from possibility, and actuality is nothing but the quipoise of necessity and possibility. Ontologically, says Hartmann, "actuality, however, is constituted of possibility and necessity. The actual must be at least ontologically possible..... ¶ In the strict sense a thing is "really possible", only when the whole series (of condition) is at hand, down to the last member. On the other side, however, it is then not only possible, but also necessary, that is, it can no longer fail to appear. It could fail to appear, so long as

at least one condition in the series was lacking. If that also were added, nothing more could prevent the real actuality. But exactly this inevitability is ontological necessity. The consequence is this : all that is ontologically possible is precisely thereby ontologically necessary also. Hence, in so far as only the possible can be actual, everything actual must at the same time be ontologically necessary" (32) !.

But necessity is inseparable from possibility only in the sphere of ontology. Beyond this sphere they are separable. Hence in the sphere of values they are separable and as matter of fact are separate or detached. Thus Hartmann says, "possibility and necessity are bound indissolubly together within the actual; but in themselves they are not 'inseparable'. At the boundaries of the actual they fall apart. But in the positive Ought-to-Be the boundary of the actual is transcended" (33) !. The necessity which inheres in the mode of existence of ought to be and of value "is a necessity which is "absolute" (literally:detached), free, bound to nothing outside of itself.

"Now this absolute necessity lends to values their characteristic universality as regards validity - they being valid for every case, even for those which violate them - a universality which holds even in specialization, the individuality, of content (where only one case comes into consideration) and which perdures unabated, rigorous, inaccessible to every compromise, even in the tragedy of life's conflict" (34) !.

Values, according to Hartmann, can be actualised only if the positive ought to be can seize hold of such a natural being who has the capacity of directing events. What does this capacity to direct events mean ? It means,

according to Hartmann, that the moral subject who discerns value can choose to realize the discerned value and so can set it up as an end to be realized. Now what does this process of setting up an end mean? It This setting up of an end means, Hartmann holds, a process which is not causal but teleological or finalistic; and this teleology makes man a teleological being without prejudicing his status as an ontological being. As a teleological process it is a process of ends and means and the relation between the end and the mean is different from that of cause and effect. "The connection between the beginning and the final stage is threefold : first, by an over-leaping of the time process the end is set up; secondly, from the end backwards against the course of time the series of means is determined; and, thirdly, starting with the first means, through the same series the end is actualised !... . The third kind of connection between beginning and goal, the actualization ... is in a forward direction, a causal course, in which the series of means functions as a series of causes only the second kind of connection is of prime importance, the backward - running determination of the means, starting with the end. This constitutes the distinctive categoriological novelty in the finalistic nexus" (35). ~~Exaggerate~~ Of these three stages of actualization, the first two being the reverse of causal process certainly cannot take place in real causally determined world which runs with the flow of time and not against it. Hence they take place in the ideal sphere. Only the third takes place in the real world; and this third process moves in line with the causal process.

Values, according to Hartmann, admit of gradation, i.e., they admit of scaling. How is this gradation known? This objective absolute gradation of value is known, according to Hartmann, by the self-same consciousness which discerns or beholds values. "Immediately", says Hartmann, "with the feeling for the value there must be a feeling for its place in the scale" (36). And "every morally selective consciousness of values is necessarily a consciousness of the scale of value" (37). Thus Hartmann rejects Scheler's five fold criteria of the grade of values, viz., (1) super-temporality, (2) indivisibility, (3) dependence, (4) depth of satisfaction, and (5) degree of axiological absoluteness, and he accepts Hildebrand's theory of specific valuational response. In Hartmann's opinion except the depth of satisfaction Scheler's four other distinguishing marks are very crude and consequently they do not and cannot make visible the finer differences of grade within the classes and groups which are essential for ethics. Further the depth of satisfaction is, though necessary, not sufficient, because satisfaction varies not only quantitatively but also qualitatively and the difference of kind regarding satisfaction, besides the difference in degree, is also required for a finer perception (38). Hence the rejection of Scheler's five-fold criteria of grade and acceptance of Hildebrand's theory specific valuational response by Hartmann. According to Hildebrand, "for each value there is one, and only one, attitude corresponding to its nature, only one emotional reaction, the response suited to it ...". The appropriateness of a specific response to a specific value can by no means be transposed at will The connection between a mental attitude and a value is something fixed in the nature of things. And, indeed, this constant conformity holds in regard to

negative as well as positive values; also to every disvalue a specific kind of attitude corresponds, both as regards quantity and quality (39) !. Hildebrand's theory, correctly understood, furnishes us, holds Hartmann, "with a basis for the phenomenology of grades in a scale of values, and not only for the larger intervals in a whole group, but for the finer and often imponderable gradations of moral values among themselves ...". Hildebrand himself has not elaborated his thought in this direction. But it must permit of being done! Here is a definite task in ethical investigation which needs developing" (40). This task, according to Hartmann, finds an illustration in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. The series of virtues as developed by Aristotle "is evidently graduated according to rank in a moral scale A plain indication of this gradation is the differentiation of the valuation predicates, which Aristotle applies to the single virtues" (41). These virtues and the corresponding negative predicates admit of being arranged in an ascending series. "Behind these predicates", Hartmann holds, "as the word show, is hidden a graduated series, quantitative and qualitative, of acts which assign or withhold values Here is unmistakably a double gradation of emotional reactions, that is, of valuational responses" (42). In this respect Aristotle's procedure is more instructive than that of Scheler. For unlike Scheler's, Aristotle's "differentiation of grades concerns not only general outlines but finer shades among moral values" (43). Of course Aristotle's procedure is not perfect nor his table of values exhaustive. But these defects are understandable and to an extent excusable. No first historical attempt is perfect. "Yet the attempt", Hartmann continues, "is a model for us. For in so far as the problem can be surveyed today, there is no other possible way of finding out the

differences in the scale of values. Differences of response and the difference of predicates which runs parallel with it constitute the only means of access" (44). When the inner ground of this phenomenon is enquired into it is found that that "the predicate and the response are ultimately only outward manifestations of an existing inner connection between grade and the kind of valuational feeling". In other words, the feeling of relation of height among values must adhere to the primal feeling for value in such a way that when two values are given the height of each is given. Indeed, it follows that a consciousness limited to one single value is only an abstraction, and that in all concrete feeling the sense of height in a scale of values is primary" (45).

Now that we do prefer value and that decisive act of preference is made between value and value are phenomena which cannot be gainsaid. But it is also a fact of experience that our preference is not always infallible. Does not this fallibility of preference show a corresponding fallibility of the consciousness of gradation and thereby the subjectivity of gradation itself? To this question Hartmann replies in the negative. According to Hartmann, "the historically and individually variable notion of the gradation, for instance, its subjective relativity, in no way contradicts its objective absoluteness. From the limitation it follows that the gradational relations are also discerned only in a fragmentary way, and that, at any given time, what is accounted higher within the discerned fragment is seen to be higher. With a wider outlook it can be discovered to be lower in the scale. That the criticism, which is passed upon a subjectively subjectively valid gradation, is generally a thoughtful beginning,

implies the existence of an objective independent gradation. The historical relativity of valuational appreciations is not a disproof, but on the contrary a confirmation, of its existence "(46)".

Since the consciousness of value as well as the consciousness of the gradation holds Hartmann, are aware of their respective objects only in a fragmentary way, the best way to arrive at a tentative formulation of the dimension or dimensions of the gradation of value is to go analytically through the values discovered by the current systems of morals of different times and different civilizations as well as the values discovered by the different individuals. Following this procedure Hartmann finds a group of values which are disclosed by the analysis of value and Ought. The distinguishing marks of this group of values are (1) elementariness and generality,² (2) poverty of content and low grade of its values, and (3) existence of polarity or opposition not only between value and disvalue but also and pre-eminently between value and value. Values of this group are borderline-values, i.e., they appear on the boundary line running between the sphere of ontology and that of axiology. In respect of the polarity or opposition between value and value of this group Hartmann notes that this particular group of values exhibits, in the first place, an ideal valuational space with more than one dimension, and, in the second place, unsought reappearance of the traditional categorial oppositions in contrasted pairs - quantity, quality, relation and modality - although with a different degree of distinctness, and that this unsought reappearance of ontological oppositions makes this group thoroughly antinomic in character (47). Hartmann divides this group of values into three sub-groups, viz., (1) Modally opposite values, (2) Relationally opposite values, and (3) Quantita-

tively and qualitatively opposite values. The first sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of Necessity and Freedom, and (b) the antinomic values of the Real Being and Non-Being of Values. The second sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of ~~carrier~~ carrier of values as subject as well as object, as both the intention and the intended object at the same time, (b) the antinomic values of activity and inertia, (c) the antinomic values of one-sided augmentation of a single value (or of a few which are closely related) and a many-sided adjustment of various values at the same time, (d) the antinomic values of harmony and conflict, and (e) simplicity and complexity. The third sub-group contains (a) the antinomic values of Universality and Singularity, (b) the antinomic values of comprehensiveness and Universality, Individuality and the Individual (the opposition or contrast of these values is quantitative opposition), (c) the contrasted values of Collective Unity and the Individual (this valuational opposition is not antinomic in character when it is in the ideal sphere but it becomes so in ethical reality where each becomes tyrannical and claims absolute authority and demands the subordination of the other to itself), (d) the antinomic values of Intermediate Members - the Smaller Community and the Political Party, (e) the antinomic values of Humanity and Nation (48). After his analysis of the first group of values Hartmann takes up the second group of values. The distinguishing marks of this group are (1) concreteness and fulness of content, (2) conditioning the content, (3) mediatory in function in the realization of values, (4) polarity or opposition between value and disvalue and not between value and value; and consequently, the binding line of value and disvalue is always an ascending one from the negative to the positive through the

indifference-point and (5) values of actional sphere, i.e., adhere pre-eminently to the personal subject. Along with this group of values there is another group of values conditioning the content of moral values by furnishing the material basis, i.e., allowing their ought-to-be to be transformed into ought-to-do of the subject, but which do not adhere to the subject and thus are not discoverable from the analysis of the subject. The first group of values constitutes the ~~2~~ value valutional foundation or basis of moral values in the subject and thus is pre-eminently actional in character while the second group of values constitutes the valutional foundation of moral values in the object and consequently is predominantly predominantly situational in character. The first group, viz., the group comprising the foundational values in the subject, contains the following values with their corresponding dis-values : (a) Life as value (and death as corresponding dis-value), (b) Consciousness as a value, (c) Activity as value, (d) Suffering as a value, (e) Strength as a value, (f) Freedom of the will as a value, (g) Foresight as a value, (h) Purposive Efficiency as a value. The second group of values, Viz., the good - values of material things and situations constituting the valutional foundation of moral values in the subject object, contains the following values : (a) Existence as a value, (b) Situation as a value, (c) Power as a value, (d) Happiness as a value, (e) More special classes of Goods as Values, e.g., material goods such as material property, and material goods such as language, Knowledge, education, etc., (49) f.

After his analysis and discussion of the values of first two groups, viz., the group of the borderline values and the group of values constituting the valutional foun-

dations of moral values in the subject and in the object respectively, Hartmann takes into account the case of moral values and classifies them into four group, viz., (1) The group of Fundamental Moral values in which the "good" forms the core and the values in this group are common to many very different kinds of behaviour and in no way characterize one special kind only, (2) The group of values discovered by ancient system of morals in the Greece and Rome, (3) The group of values discovered by Christianity, and (4) The group of values discerned in modern times. These moral values are arrived at not by analysis of the categorial structure of the value and the Ought but by a historico - empirical investigation of values (50). The first group, viz., the group of Fundamental Moral Values contains (a) Noble mindedness as a value, (b) Richness of Experience as a value, and (c) Purity as a value. Goodness forms the core of all the values of this group, i.e., they are good and as such are valuable; and also they are very pervasive because they characterise a good number of behaviours which are completely different in kind. The second group, viz., the group of Moral values discovered by Greco-Roman systems of Morals contains (a) Justice, (b) Wisdom, (c) Courage, (d) Self-control, and (e) Aristotelian list of virtues as propounded in the Theory of Golden Mean. The third group, viz., the moral values discovered by Christian Ethics contains (a) Brotherly Love, (b) Truthfulness and Uprightness, (c) Trustworthiness and Fidelity, (d) Trust and Faith, (e) Modesty, Humility and Aloofness, and (f) the values of Social Intercourse. The fourth group, viz., the group of moral values discovered in modern times contains (a) Love of Remote, (b) Radiant Virtue, (c) Personality, and (d) Personal Love (51).

At the end of his historicoo-empirical survey of ~~our~~ moral values Hartmann concludes that this incomplete survey does not warrant even the formulation of mere "theory concerning a tabulation of values" (52)!. But this survey is not completely valueless on that account. It definitely furnishes within the narrower class of moral values certain differences of grade!. Thus, for example, brotherly love is evidently higher in value than justice, love for the remotest higher than brotherly love, and personal love (as it appears) higher than either. Likewise bravery stands higher than self-control, faith and fidelity higher than bravery, radiant virtues and personality again higher than these!. But it is more difficult to say how, for example, truthfulness, wisdom and faith stand to one another in relative height; it is the same with the basic motives running through all the more special values, such as universality and individuality, likewise purity and fulness of life, pride and humility, and so on (53)!. Thus the historicoo-empirical survey of ethical values (comprising both the moral value and values which are non-moral but morally relevant, e.g., actional value or situational value) does not help us to find the order or orders of the gradation of values and we should seek it elsewhere!

But where can the order or orders of gradation of values be found? This order can be found, holds Hartmann, if we take into consideration simultaneously the height of the value when realized with the corresponding strength of the disvalue when the value is transgressed or violated. In that case we can at once see that the higher the height of the merit of realization of value the less serious is its transgression or violation. Hence Hartmann says, "if one glances along any one such line of ascent in his height and of descent in strength, the inference is unavoidable that

throughout realm of values two equally important orders of gradation hold sway and that w two opposed laws of preference correspond to them" (54). But neither these two orders nor their respective preferences are identical. The ascent in strength is inversely related to the ascent in height. Yet the two orders are not absolutely unrelated. As a matter of fact "one may say that the order of rank in values is itself twofold - or is two-sided and has two meanings. For since ascent in strength is in the opposite direction to ascent in height, the orderly sequence as such remains one throughout" (55). Hence arises the question : How are these two orders related? In reply to this question Hartmann says, "the law of height and of strengthis a fundamental categorical law, which prevails ontologically in all ideal and real Being and thence extends over the realm of values; but in this extension it gains a new meaning. It is therefore necessary to look to the realm of categories, and to ask how far its laws recur in the domain of values and are transformed or replaced by a new kind of regularity" (56). There are three laws and they concern not the structure of the categorial edifice but the dynamic dependence. Hence they are the laws of dependence. They are the following :-

"1. The law of strength : higher principles are dependent upon the lower, but the converse is not true. Hence the higher principle/s is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this sense the weaker. But the more unconditioned, the more elementary and in this sense the stronger principle is always the lower one. In the abstract, the inversion of this relationship is quite conceivable, but is never to be seen in the reality of principles.

2. The Law of Material : every lower principle is only raw material for the higher which is raised upon it.

Now since lower is the stronger, the dependence of the weaker upon it goes only so far as the scope of the higher formation is limited by the definiteness and peculiarity of the material.

3. The law of Freedom : compared with the lower ~~every~~ every higher principle is a new formation with which is raised upon it. As such it has unlimited scope above the lower (the material and the stronger) fixity. This means that in spite of dependence upon the lower principle the higher is free, ~~as~~ as against the lower" (57).

Now these laws of dependence are the basic laws of categories. As a matter of fact there is only one basic categorial law law of dependence, viz., the of law of strength, the other two are merely corollary. But this basic or fundamental law of categories, when introduced in the realm of values, is transformed in respect of its significance or meaning. Thus Hartmann says, "now the basic categorial law, carried over into the table of values, substantiates this - and it is the wholly new meaning which it acquires in the realm of values - in the fulfilment of a value the merit increases not directly in proportion to the grievousness of violating it, but indirectly. When the ~~grievous~~ higher value is violated, the transgression is ~~less~~ less, not more serious; but when the stronger value is fulfilled, the meritoriousness is not greater but less" (58). But are the height or the strength of the value sensed? "A clear answer", says Hartmann, "can be given. If If the clue to height is the assenting sense, as it expresses itself in specific responses and predicates (approval, acceptance, respect, admiration, enthusiasm), so the clue to strength lies in the negative, the rejecting sense, as it asserts itself wherever values are violated. Strength is distinguishable by the corresponding disvalues. The rejecting sense also has its specific responses and predicates".

They are reactions to disvalues" (59). The law of preference of higher value, being related to the assenting sense which discovers the height of value, is different from that of lower values which is related to the rejecting sense discovering the strength of values. Preference to higher values refers to the actualization of values while that of lower values refers to the avoidance of disvalues.

The order of rank of values is two-fold. But the ascent in height being in opposite direction to ascent in strength, the orderly sequence remains one throughout. "But it is bi-polar, and poles contend for mastery. But the kind of mastery of the one is essentially different from that of the other!... . Thus it comes about that two kinds of mastery can co-exist in one ordered sequence" (60)!. But this two-fold gradation of values has an essential bearing on morality. "Morality !.... does not subsist in values as such. Values have their ideal self-existence, independently of their acts actualization. But morality is their actualization in man, hence actual man's relation to them. And this relation, corresponding to the double meaning of the ordered gradation, is two fold with a two-fold Ought, a two-fold requirement: not to violate the lower value and at the same time to actualize the higher (61) !.

"The actualization of values", according to Hartmann, "is a function of the personal initiative" (62), and the fiat or the initiative of the person by means of which the person solves insoluble conflict of values is the strongest proof that the "actual will of the actual person must be "free" (63)!. And this "freedom is a fundamental condition of the possibility of all moral phenomena !.... . The whole significance of morality is abolished, if freedom be proved to be an illusion" (64). As regards the nature of moral freedom Hartmann makes the following observations. In the first

place, "freedom cannot consist in negative indifference, but only in a positive determinateness of a unique order, in a determination peculiar to the will itself, in an autonomy of the will" (65). Secondly, "the determining factor must not lie outside of the subject (or person) hence not even in the values or any other autonomous principles" (66). Thirdly, "The determining factor must also not be set indefinitely deep in the subject, but only in the conscious stratum; otherwise there is no moral freedom" (67). Fourthly, "the determining factor must also not be assumed to inhere in a consciousness that is super-individual otherwise it is not freedom of the person there must be a freedom of the individual conscientius will" (68). Fifthly, "there must be freedom in two senses ; not only freedom over against the regularity of nature but equally there must be freedom over against the moral principles" (69). Lastly, "the freedom of the will is a metaphysical question metaphysical truths can be neither proved nor disproved. Nevertheless they can be discussed as problems" (70) and the only type of argument the use of which is justifiable for the discussion of problem of the freedom of the will is neither the empirico-descriptive argument nor the purely aprioristic argument but the analytical argument which has the "form of an inference from the conditioned to the condition" (71) and which "attains only a hypothetical certainty" (72). In analytical reasoning "aprioristic and empirical elements are fused". The point of departure have the character of demonstrable phenomena; as such, they have the value of facts. But the connections between these and the conclusion are of an aprioristic nature" (73). And in the analytical reasoning for the freedom of the will the following complex facts of moral life constitute the "points of departure : the the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and accountability, and the consciousness of

guilt". These are supplemented by two further factors : the dependence of moral values upon freedom and the oppositional relation of the Ought to the will, or the nature of moral conflict" (74).



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CHAPTER - TWO

We have given, we believe, a brief and fairly correct outline of the ethical philosophy of Nikolai Hartmann. And we now propose to make a critical review of it in order to find out its cogency, plausibility and tenability, if any.

As an ethical realist Hartmann, we may observe at the very outset, stresses the independent reality of the object of consciousness. What does this independent reality mean? If the object be really independent of consciousness, what is the ontological status of consciousness? Is consciousness also real independently of the object? If this is to be conceded, the question arises, How are we to conceive this independence of two real entities? If the object is one entity and consciousness is another, and if they are both real and at the same time each is independent of the other, we are landed into the difficulties involved in the conception of two independent reals. If one of them is real and is different from and independent of the other, then the one is what the other is not in so far as they are different. And if this difference relates only to their respective contents, then as regards that independent reality we have to assume an existence other than the contents which exist. And if this existence or reality which appertains to both the contents, how are the two existences to be conceived as independent of each other? There are several possible alternative here.

(1) We may suppose the existence or being or satta is a universal in which both the contents participate. This is the Nyaya view. But it goes against the conception of reciprocal independence as regards their being or reality.

(2) We may suppose that not merely contents that differ

and so far as are reciprocally independent but also their respective existence or being. This will appear to be Hartmann's view and also of realists like Moore. According to this view, we have independent reals with varying contents. But how is this independence to be conceived? We may suppose that consciousness and object are independently real in the sense that while consciousness continues the object ceases to be, or that when the object continues consciousness ceases. If independence in respect of reality is thus to be conceived as their being independent variables in respect of continuing in time, reality or existence is equated to endurance in time. What, then, is this endurance in time? And what is time itself? When consciousness ceases and object continues the object is said to be existentially independent of consciousness. But what does ceasing to be mean? And what does continuing in being mean? Have they any meaning except as experienced or certified by consciousness? There is thus no escape anyway from consciousness as evidencing or testifying authority. Being in time or ceasing to be in time are meaningless verbiage except as facts proved by the testimony of consciousness. The ultimate evidence of reality or otherwise is thus the evidence of consciousness consciousness, and no realist can establish his case except as he takes his stand on the unshakable foundation of immediate experience or awareness. It is this awareness that posits the real as well as the unreal. It is the ultimate reality of which the particular reals are at best modes or specifications.

As regards the independence of value Hartmann advances four arguments, and none of them, we contend, can bear strict examination. In the first place, "a person", Hartmann says, "cannot at will pronounce anything to be of value for anyone which 'is' not of value for him" (1). Regarding the aforesaid argument it may be observed that experience abounds

in instances which will conclusively falsify it. The Bible may not be an object of intrinsic value to Bertrand Russell but that does not prove that Russell can never be able to pronounce it to be of value for the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury. From the fact that my affection for my family is of no value for my employer it does follow that my employer shall never be able to appreciate the value of my affection for the members of my family. As a matter of fact if the contention of Hartmann be true, tolerance or sympathy can never be a value at all.

Secondly, "a thing", according to Hartmann, "can be valuable only through its relation to a value itself. This must be fixed beforehand" (2). This argument, we may observe, is an old one and it is almost invariably used by all the metaphysicians who subscribe to the Platonic theory of the Abstract Universal. Plato himself used this argument to prove the transempirical existence of ethical universals and Hartmann, it seems, follows the same beaten track. But does this argument prove what Hartmann intends it to establish? We must answer in the negative. This argument does not prove what Hartmann likes it to prove for two reasons. (i) According to Hartmann's own admission, values, unlike categories, do not and cannot rule the particular valuable things of the empirical world inexorably and without exception. While categories do not admit of exception, values do. They cannot compel; at best they can demand inexorably. But it is a demand which may or may not be effective, i.e., the demand made by value may not be acknowledged and fulfilled. This clearly shows the difference between the values and the categories. A category which cannot compel the particulars, i.e., which cannot determine the being and character of the particulars by its recurrence in them without exception, is not a category at all. It is simply a misnomer as a category. In other words, axiological determination of value is an Ought-determination whereas the ontological determination of category

is a Must-determination. Hence the success of an argument in proving the independence of ontological categories does not imply that it will also be successful in proving the independence of axiological essences; still less does it imply its applicability in the sphere of axiology. As a matter of fact experience clearly shows the inapplicability of this argument in the sphere of axiology by clearly showing that the particular things and events are never indifferent to the categories but they are so to the values. They cannot contradict categories (because denial of categorical determination means that they are nonentities) but they may not embody values though they may not cease to be. In other words to prove the legitimacy of the application of this argument Hartmann must have to show that values and categories are essentially identical, their difference being only superficial. And Hartmann can do it either by reducing axiological to the ontological or by reducing the ontological to the axiological, i.e., either as the axiological necessity is reduced to the logical necessity or as the logical necessity is reduced to axiological necessity. But the reduction of the logical necessity to axiological necessity is out of question from the very nature of the case because this reduction will prove just the opposite of what Hartmann intends to prove, i.e., it will reduce Must-determination to Ought-determination, i.e., it will show that the categorical determination is not an \neq inexorable determination. Hence Hartmann can prove ~~this~~ his case only by reducing the axiological necessity to logical necessity. In other words, Hartmann can prove his case only by showing that values are not values at all; rather they are categories masquerading in the guise of values. (ii) Even if we grant the applicability of Hartmann's argument in the realm of axiology, it does not prove his contention of Hartmann. For the particular valuable things exhi-

exhibit a bewildering amount of divergence and deviations and every attempt to find out the indispensable minimum common to all valuable things ends in a failure. In face of such failures critics may declare, perhaps not without justification, that the real use of these axiological terms by the writers of Worth-Philosophy is to conceal, as behind a fog-screen, differences that are too radical to be harmonized and too serious and damaging to be exposed to public scrutiny. In other words, what is common to different valuable things is only the name and nothing else. Hartmann's attempt to get rid of disagreements regarding the use of the adjective 'valuable' by admitting the existence of valuational maturity in one person and denying it to another will not also do, because Hartmann fails to give us a universally agreed criterion which is capable of indicating definitely the existence of such maturity.

Thirdly, "Nothing", according to Hartmann, "is ever loved, striven for, yearned after, except for the sake of some value immediately discerned (and felt). But, conversely, never is loving, striving, yearning presupposed in the case of a thing that is of value, or in the case of the value itself which is inherent in the thing" (3). In this connection "nothing is more instructive than the relation between the crowd and the champion of ideas [When the idea is liberated through the word of the prophet question must be put : Why do all these seize secretly and half-consciously upon the same ~~idea~~ idea, so that this is pre-figured, as it were, in them, and only waits for release? Why does not the ethos of the crowd split into as many ideas as there are heads? Why, then, does not each go a different way? What constrains all to go on their quest and turn towards the same value ?

"There is only one answer. At the point of which all, because of the same need and yearning, must direct their gaze there lies only one value; as they contemplate the given ~~situatiin~~ situation they are not free to imagine at will different norms of good and evil.

"But this means that values have actually an existence in themselves independent of all imagination and longing. It means that the consciousness of them does not determine values, but that values determine the consciousness of them" (4).

This argument, it may be observed, is also an old argument which is much used by Realists in the sphere of epistemology. But this worn-out argument is, in reality, ~~factus~~ inconclusive. As an argument it is no more plausible than the argument which seeks to establish the prior existence and consequently the independence of the hen of the egg. Spinoza, e.g., draws a diametrically opposite conclusion from the same premise. "In no case", says Spinoza, "do we strive for, wish for, long for or desire anything because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it". (5). Realizing the inconclusive nature of this argument Hartmann brings in the argument from the relation of the crowd and the champion of ideas as a supporting prop. But does this supporting argument really support or substantiate Hartmann's contention? From the fact that we are in a body constrained to acknowledge and appreciate the value championed by the prophet it does not follow that the value in question is independent of our consciousness and also of the social structure in which we live, move and have our being. As a matter of fact Hartmann virtually makes such an admission when he says regarding the champion of ideas who comes at an unfavourable time, and who dies in solitude with his task, "who lives before his time is dead in his time" (6). The mob or crowd takes note of the value only at the appropriate time neither before nor after. But what is this time-determination? Is it not an ontological determination? Consequently is it not a fact that the factors which determine the ingressions of / values in the ontological realm as well as

the acknowledgement of value by the mass are ontological factors and values are not independent of ontological factors? Hence it is clear that the fact that sometime we in a body recognize that some thing is of value does not imply necessarily the independence of value. Moreover, it is also a fact of experience that while some men do recognize something to be of value others do not recognize it to be so. Consequently, unless those who do not recognise this something to be of value are proved beyond doubt to be suffering from valuational blindness without exception Hartmann's contention cannot be established. Further, Hartmann's use of this argument is sadly lacking in logical coherence because Hartmann gainsays in the very next page what he asserts in the previous page. Thus though he denies the relevance of the Social Structure of the day in determining our acknowledgement and appreciation of value, yet he tacitly assumes this relevance in saying that "he who lives before his time is dead in his time".

Fourthly, according to Hartmann, the independence, objectivity and ideal self-existence of these essences are "clearly revealed by the way the ideal forms present themselves to the knowing consciousness".

"It is this consciousness which believes the logical and mathematical forms to be something independent of it ... This postulated independence of consciousness is the postulated self-existence of the ideal objects. If anyone objects that affirmation is poor evidence, that a man who dreams, or one who is deceived, or who is in error, also believethat the object he beholds is self-existent, the answer is : from a dream there is awakening, as there is from error and illusion, but from logical and mathematical insight there is no awakening" (7). And as regards values "it is here just as it is with mathematical insight" (8). "Not everyone is capable

of it; not everyone has the eye, the ethical maturity, the spiritual elevation for seeing the situation as it is" (9). But he who has the eye, the ethical maturity, the spiritual elevation to sense, i.e., to feel, the value, has "the conviction, which accompanies every genuine judgment of value, that everyone else must ~~be~~ judge in the same way and have the same impression" (10).

Regarding this argument, we may observe that it contains an important truth. Here Hartmann virtually concedes what we contended all along! The so-called independence of values as advocated by Hartmann is no true independence unless its truth or falsity is certified by consciousness, i.e., unless it is felt independence. Thus far we agree with Hartmann. But we differ when he asserts that (1) this felt consciousness of independence will never be contradicted and that (2) the existence of error and delusion conclusively proves the ~~indepen-~~ independent self-existence of value. We agree with Hartmann in holding that the criterion of truth is non-contradiction, i.e., that which is uncontradicted in experience is true. But to say that the true is what is not contradicted is not the same as saying that the felt consciousness of value is an uncontradicted and uncontradictable experience. According to Hartmann, logical insight, mathematical insight and valuational insight stand on the same footing! They sail in the same boat and consequently they must sink or swim together. Thus Hartmann writes, "the sense of value is not less objective than mathematical insight" (11). and "it is as little possible to summon up arbitrarily a sense of value as it is to construct a mathematical law arbitrarily" (12)! Also, "sense of value and logical reasoning stand on the same ~~law~~^{level}" (13)! It automatically follows from Hartmann's assertion that these are insights that are infallible. Yet he holds that the primal sensing or feeling consciousness, which

is at once a consciousness of value as well as consciousness of the height of that value in the gradation of values which is absolute, i.e., independent of consciousness, is relative, because like values, "these gradational relations also are discovered only in a fragmentary way, and at any given time, what is accounted higher within the discerned fragment is seen to be higher. With a wider outlook it can be discovered to be lower in the scale" (14). And despite this assertion he writes, "That the criticism, which is passed upon a subjectively valid gradation implies the existence of an objective independent gradation. The historical relativity of valuation appreciations is not a disproof, but on the contrary a confirmation of its existence" (15). Again he says, "if all positive morality rests upon genuine discernment, and if all discernment of values is itself an aprioristic perception of valuational essences, the historical relativity of morals cannot rest upon that of values, only upon that of discernment" (16). It is evident from what Hartmann asserts that he is labouring under a great confusion. If discernments are fragmentary and consequently relative, then it clearly follows that all conflicting and contradictory discernments are equally relative and consequently equally valid or equally invalid. But, then, how can Hartmann speak of a narrower and a wider outlook, the latter superseding the former? Also how can he speak of valuational error or delusion? For, according to his theory, there cannot be any error at all these discernments are equally relative and therefore they are either equally valid or equally invalid; and we can never pick up one of these conflicting discernments as true because of its agreement with value, the aprioristic factum, for the simple reason that this agreement or conformity is also discovered by such discernment and consequently it is also relative! If the first discernment is rejected for its fragmen-

tary and narrow outlook by the second discernment which is wider and less fragmentary, then it is quite possible that this second discernment may be rejected by a third discernment which is still wider in outlook and still less fragmentary and so on without end. Thus we are landed into an undesirable infinite regress where every succeeding discernment supersedes the preceding discernment because of its wider outlook and less fragmentary character. As these discernments, these insights, are not infallible, everyone of them is capable of being rejected by another discernment as false. Hence Hartmann's assertion that these insights are infallible (i.e., there is no possibility of awakening from them); that they are uncontradicted and uncontradictable in experience does not hold good. As a matter of fact, ~~experience~~ experience abounds in instances which run counter to Hartmann's assertion. Thus though we can accept with Hartmann uncontradicted experience as the criterion of validity, yet we cannot accept with him the experience of value as an uncontradicted and uncontradictable experience. As to the contention Hartmann that the existence of error and delusion in the realm of value and gradation of value implies the objective independent existence of value and of the gradation of value, we may observe it does not prove what Hartmann intends it to prove. The discernment of value and height of value is not rejected till the occurrence of another discernment which cancels and corrects it. Every discernment is true so long it continues and is not rejected or cancelled by another value-~~experience~~ experience which replaces it. Hence Hartmann's argument does not prove the independent objective existence of value and the gradation of value; it only shows that one value-experience is cancelled and replaced by another value-experience and there is no guarantee that this second value-experience will not be cancelled and replaced by a third one and so on without end. We may conclude, perhaps not without

justification, that none of the arguments of Hartmann is logically justifiable and consequently they fail to establish Hartmann's contention¹.

Hartmann subscribes to what he termed incurable "pluralism" and Atomism in the realm of Axiology in general and Ethics in particular. Considered existentially every value is self-contained and self-complete and as such is independent of the rest. Hence unification of values by means of one high-highest value ends and perhaps will always end in failure². Thus Hartmann writes, "In the realm of values contradiction exists as an ideal fact, a conflict among values. Every value here has a certain existence for itself, a superiority over the relativity of the whole sphere" (17)³. He says also says, "It becomes a task for ethics to resolve contradictions - so far as they may be resolved - that is, so far as they are not due to an original antinomic in values themselves. So far as the latter is the case, ethics must not attempt synthesis". It must also select its point of view according to the phenomena, not the phenomena according to their its point of view, even at the risk of comprehensibility. It must concede validity even to the incomprehensible; it must allow contradictories to exist" (18)⁴. The question of the unification of values is important because "an Ought", according to Hartmann, "has meaning only if it is unequivocal and does not annual itself by an inner contradiction".... Striving must have unity, otherwise it disintegrates and destroys itself. A man cannot walk in two directions at the same time. No one can serve two masters⁵.

"Hence where no unifying principle presents itself, current morality forces such a principle upon the diversity of discerned values. It seizes hold of one single, clearly discerned value and sets it up above the rest, and

subordinates them to it. Hence arise one-sidedness, narrowness, vulnerability, indeed the partial falsification of the scale of values. The transitoriness of every current morality is a consequence of arbitrariness in regard to a unifying principle" (19). Conscious of such failures philosophical ethics since the days of Plato have taken recourse to another procedure. When none of the discerned value is supreme, philosophical ethics assumes and postulates a supreme value over them all, and in contrast to all of them. And it does so only to satisfy its intellectual love of system (20). "Such is the Platonic 'Idea of Good' " (21). Curiously enough almost all the systems of philosophical ethics agreed" that somehow the good is the central ethical value; but that settles nothing. And nothing in the realm of values is more concealed than just this central principle, which is assumed by all morality as self-evident, but which in truth is everywhere differently understood ! Plotinus ... gave the formula for this situation : the good is "beyond the power of thought". the good is irrational" (22). Thus both the procedure failed to reach the goal. Hence the question arises : should this open pluralism of value which is detrimental to the actuality of ought and the unity of striving be accepted or should we search for a hidden unity? But in what sense the question is relevant? If the problem is a problem of philosophical ethics, it is not important. But if the problem is a political one which bears upon the conduct of life itself, it should be taken up seriously and a solution, should should be found, if it be possible to find it. But the problem, according to Hartmann, would be serious for practical life if the and only if a plurality of values without a unifying value be self-contradictory. But an unconditional assertion of this statement is not possible. "Much rather is it possible", says Hartmann, "that a systematic co-ordination of diverse value could exist without culminating in one

supreme point. In the domain of existential categories it is not otherwise. Even there the ultimate which can be discerned is not a single ruling principle, but a whole stratum of principles, each one of which is self-dependent and conditions the others. We should accordingly expect the same in the realm of values, even if other grounds did not suggest it" (23). Values, thus according to Hartmann, do not admit harmonization or unification in terms of a supreme value because, besides contradictions which are due to our fragmentary sensing of value, and consequently admit of resolution into unity, there are contradictions which are due to an original antinomic in values themselves and as such do not admit of any solution. But what, we may ask, is the criterion or criteris by means of which we can distinguish between the contradictions which are due to our fragmentary value-experience and as such are resolvable and the contradictions which are due to an original antinomic in values themselves and as such are non-resolvable? Hartmann did not answer the question because he did not raise the problem. But it is clear that unless such a criterion is found, it is useless to speak of resolvable and non-resolvable contradictions, and to warn philosophical ethics not to ignore the latter because of their incomprehensibility is like asking a bachelor about the health or ill-health of his wife. Again Hartmann's contention that a co-ordination of values without culmination in one supreme point is possible and that it is so in the case of categories and therefore we should expect it to be the same in respect of values even if there be no other ground to suggest it does not bear examination. For if we are to assume that what is true in the case of categories shall also be true in case of values, we must in that case have to assume that when it is true of the categories that their disagreement with actual things, beings and events of the world is the limit of their connection with these things, then it shall also be the same

with the values'. But Hartmann explicitly denies it. He definitely asserts that in the case of values the limit of disagreement is not the limit of connection with the valuable things. But this clearly shows the arbitrary character of ~~the~~ Hartmann's assertions. It seems that what is true of categories is true of values only in respect of a few characteristics and not in respect of other characteristics. But as regards the reason or reasons why values should be dissimilar in respect of certain other characteristics, Hartmann remains silent. Hence his assertion that if there be no unifying principle working in the categories, the same should be also be the case regarding the values makes the implicit assumption that values and categories are fundamentally of the same nature and therefore what is true of the fundamental nature of the categories shall also be true of the fundamental nature of the values. But this is an arbitrary assumption without any support either of reason or of experience. The verdict both of reason and of experience is rather that exactly opposite is the case. Categories are categories because they can rule inexorably and without exception. Inexorable categorial determination is the very pith and marrow of the categories; it is their fundamental nature. But it is this inexorable determination which the values utterly lack; and they lack it because they are values. In other words, what is absolutely necessary and constitutive of the categories is foreign to the nature of values. And therefore we can never be sure of the fact that if something is ~~true~~ true universally of the categories, this something will be true of the values also. Experience tells us that to entertain the idea that it is most probably not true of the values is more reasonable hypothesis. Moreover Hartmann never asked himself the question, how is it that all these different and conflicting systems of philosophical ethics are unanimous in asserting the existence of one supreme unifying value and searching for it?

Had he been able to entertain the question, he would find the real importance for the search of such a principle. Co-ordination or systematization is the aim of all these systems of philosophical ethics and they endeavoured to systematize these conflicting value-experience from their respective standpoints. And these standpoints are metaphysical standpoints. As a matter of fact, Hartmann's own account of values is a metaphysic-oriented account. Hence the next questions are (1) Is co-ordination impossible without a supreme unifying principle? and (2) if this supreme unifying principle be admitted, should this principle be a value like other values? Hartmann raised both the questions and while he answered the first question in the negative, he did not answer the second question because assumed value-experience is and will always be fragmentary and as such will never be able to sense all the values at once which is sine qua non for knowing the existence of a unifying principle unifying all the different values. As regards the first point it may be observed that Hartmann's negative answer to the first question is due to his commitment to a particular metaphysical theory, viz., pluralism and atomism according to which admission of any single, supreme unifying principle will sin against the irreducible independent, self-contained, self-complete atomic self-existence of values. Thus it is not phenomena but a particular metaphysical theory which induces Hartmann to give up any search for unity amidst the values. Hence Hartmann's plea for keeping open the scope of ethical phenomena is belied by Hartmann's own assertion. The search for unity by current systems of morals of different times has not been explained but rather explained away by Hartmann who has endeavoured to explain it in terms of a unity of striving which cannot act unless it is guided by unequivocality of Ought and where there is no such unequivocality of Ought the striving should

be allowed to delude itself by arbitrarily seizing one of the discerned values as Supreme and therefore as the unequivocal Ought for which it is searching. If it is merely an expedient for human striving, human striving would have taken recourse to it whenever it happens to face an equivocality of Ought. But the verdict of experience does not support this view. Is it not a fact of experience that we in our day-to-day practical life are confronted by what may be called conflicts of duty and are at a loss what to do? Are not we not frequently mentally torn apart about what to do and what to leave undone? But if Hartmann's contention be true, then there can be no anxiety for human striving regarding what to do because whenever it happens to face such a situation of equivocality it can shut its eyes and blindly holding any one of the discerned values indiscriminately as the unequivocal Ought it can try to realise it. As a matter of fact even when we face conflicting duties and do one of them our conscience does not delude itself by the sweet thought that it does the right thing. Rather it feels shame and holds itself guilty and repents. And this repentance is life-long; nothing can stop it. Hence the saying : Nobody can strangle his own conscience. Hence it is evident that Hartmann himself, and not others, who is putting the straight-jacket of theory on ethical phenomena. As regards the second question, Hartmann, it may be admitted, is right in pointing out that the unifying principle of values may not itself be a value because to hold one of the values as supreme is to sin against the claims of other values. But to deny, as Hartmann did, the very existence of a unifying principle of values in order to avoid the possibility of sinning against the claims of other values by conferring the position of supreme unifying principle to a particular discerned value is not the proper way out of the impasse. It is like throwing away the baby along with the bath-

water. Because of metaphysical commitment Hartmann's own suggestion that the supreme unifying principle/s of values is not itself a value is not palatable to him. But that hypothesis, it seems, is the only reasonable way out. In this connection it should be noted that Hartmann's contention violates against the law of parsimony. Hartmann rejects the Platonic and other theories of supreme good on the ground that ultimately they show good to be irrational, i.e., incomprehensible. But he also urges us not to reject the contradictions in values because of their incomprehensibility. But is it not better to admit one incomprehensible than many? If incomprehensibility be allowed, it should be allowed as little as possible! Hence the uncompromising ethical monist is more in accord with logic than an uncompromising pluralist like Hartmann. Hartmann's argument for rejecting such a supreme value which is incomprehensible is that different writers understood it differently, i.e., it is amorphous in nature and admits of any interpretation. But that is a fundamental problem of philosophy as such and is not confined to ethics alone. Further, not only the supreme unifying value but other values also are ambiguous in meaning and consequently Hartmann should in the fitness of things reject all these values if he is determine to reject the supreme value on the ground of ambiguity. Hence we may conclude, not without good reason, that Hartmann has ultimately failed to substantiate Ethical pluralism and Atomism.

As regards the ingressions of values into the realm of real existence Hartmann holds that the values can ingress either directly without any mediation on the part of man or indirectly in and through the mediation of man alone. We may name them respectively direct ingressions and indirect ingressions of values. According to Hartmann, the former, i.e., direct ingressions of values is not relevant and ~~more~~ imper-

tant to ethics whereas the latter, i.e., the indirect, mediated ingressions of values constitutes the pivotal problem round which all other ethical problems turn. It is the problem round which turn, e.g., the problem of moral personality, of moral responsibility, of moral freedom, of the precise relation between the realm of ontology and that of axiology, of the location of moral value, i.e., whether moral value resides resides in the end willed, or in the willing of the end, or in both or in neither, etc. According to Hartmann, indirect ingressions of values implies that (1) values, like categories, are principles determining the real but (2) unlike categories, are neither direct nor uncheckered determinants of real self-existent. In other words, values are indirect determinants of real self-existent; they are mediated through the mediation of man who senses them, and their determination of real self-existence depends on the degrees of their success in getting their claims recognised by man who feels them. Thus values are at once beggars and tyrants. They are beggars because they cannot enforce their claims; the moral subject is free to make the decision in favour of or against the fulfilment of their claims. But they are tyrants in respect of their demand or claim. No value-sensing subject is capable of becoming deaf to the claim of the values he sensed even if he decides against their fulfilment. To turn a deaf ear to the claim of the values sensed is an impossibility. Hartmann puts it very eloquently when he says, "All principles are valid 'for' something, for a specific kind of existence. Even values have significance 'for' something. This 'for' expresses their relatedness to a special kind of carrier. But they are still further valid "for someone" - as existential principles never are; and this second 'for' is their relatedness to the value-sensing subject. It does not attach

to the ideal validity of values, but to their positive validity. It is an expression of the fact that the Ought which issues from the value is not attached directly to its character-carrier, but is to a mediating element in the real, to the subject, to whose judgment it leaves the decision as to whether the realization is to be carried out or not.

"Unlike the categories !....!. The positive Ought-to-Be!..needs something else which offers to it its own existential energy to be directed by the Kg Ought. The Ought needs this alien energy of an existing entity because the entity thrusts its ontological determination against the resistance of the real".

"The Ought - and ultimately the value - therefore - !....!..determines the real !....and unconditionally!.. but only through the medium which senses ~~walke~~ value and is capable of directing events" (24) !.

"The subject - not as a ~~metu~~ metaphysical subject in general, but as empirical actual, just as we know it in man - fulfills in every particular the specified conditions" (25). "One fundamental feature of the moral subject is that he is the administrator of the Ought in the world of real existence! He is not an absolutely faithful administrator of this metaphysical good; he can betray it. Whether he recognises the positive Ought-to-Be as for him a universally valid Ought-to-Do, and whether he then commits himself to it with his whole might, always rests with him !.... the determining power of the Ought depends upon an intermediate element which it does not itself dominate, which is under an entirely different domination, and, whenever it recognizes the demand of the Ought, the freedom to follow or not to follow !.... !. The Practical agent !..... is a world - creator in little. What he forms and builds does not emanate from him himself !....! it is something he has overheard from another world, to which he is responsively sensitive. But what he senses has no com-

pulsion over him. It is only a good entrusted to him, the metaphysical import of which he feels as claim laid upon him. Nevertheless, the claim is not a coercion. The essential feature of the moral subject is thisthat with his sense of value he recognises at the same time the values which he feels as standing above him and his action, and he knows that a violation of them (within the range of his will) falls upon his own head. But this is not a realistic limitation" (26). Thus the freedom, the autonomy of the decision of the moral subject is the central problem of ethics. Take away this freedom, and the Ought is set at naught; it is but a meaningless verbiage, an empty word, a mere rhetoric. But what does this central concept of ethics imply? It implies, according to Hartmann, the freedom of man as a moral subject, i.e., man as moral subject is determined neither causally nor teleologically but is self-determined, i.e., determined autonomously. Thus man is an enigma, a logically incomprehensible being, a being who is at once free (morally) and unfree (empirically). He is a being who possesses at once incompatible attributes. Not only is man free morally but he is also determined by values if he freely chooses to realise them. They determine him axiologically and make him a person. Thus there is reciprocal determination between values and the mediator of values. The mediator makes or turns values into existential principles and values in their turn make him a moral personality. "The existential determination issuing from values", Hartmann writes, "does not pass through the subject without modifying him. It gives him a dignity of a peculiar kind - personality, which is as much a categorical novelty as it is a valuational mark The essence of personality is constituted by "two special elements - both distinctively ethical both refer to the relation of the subject to the values.

"One is this : that the values do not coerce the object subjectbut impose only a claim upon him The fact, therefore gives to him a kind of equality with the great metaphysical powers of existence - ideal as well as real - at least in principle. In this way he is an ~~independent~~ independent factor, a proper ultimate of existence along with this and other powers. It is this which has been called moral freedom. A personal entity is "free" entity. It contains its own principles, its own autonomy - together with the autonomy of nature which is in it and the autonomy of values which is also in it.

"But the second element of personality is found in the valuational marks which the subject retains in his acts. These are not identical with those found in the object of acts. They have indeed in themselves an Ought-to-Be, ideal as well as actual, but never directly an Ought-to-Do. They can and should determine the choice of ends, but they do not furnish the matter of the ends These values are "relative" to the person as their carrier. For as their carrier the subject is a "person". However different these values may be from those which constitute the matter of the will and the content of the ends, they stand in the closest relation with them; for exactly that conduct has moral value which is a commitment of the person to ends directed and selected by the moral feeling for values. The commitment of the person is the correlate in & reflex of the setting up of the end which yokes the subject as the moving power to his own tendencies. The subject himself sets up his ends(27) ". But what is the relation between values and personality? It is a relation not of one-sided dependence but of interdependence. "Not only", holds Hartmann, "is the determination of the real by values dependent upon the moral subject on account of his role as mediator; but also, conversely, the moral subject is

on his side at the same time, and rightly, conditioned by the self-existence of the values and by the positive Ought-to-Be, the mediation of which falls to him. Only through the intrusion of values as determining powers into his actional sphere does the subject become that which *th* he morally is, a person" (28). But what is the distinctive feature of this moral personality? It is, according to Hartmann, the capacity to set up ends, i.e., capacity to direct blind causally determined events towards a preconceived goal. But Hartmann's assertion of the moral freedom of the empirical Subject raises more problems than it solves. Firstly, according to Hartmann, the empirical subject is thoroughly determined causally, and yet he is free to decide in favour of or against the realization of values. In other words, the empirical Subject is at once free and unfree. This is contradiction in terms. But according to Hartmann, we should accept this contradiction as a fact. But this is, we are afraid, what we cannot accept. If contradiction be the criterion of acceptance and not rejection of an event as a fact, we shall at once lose all chance of making a distinction between fact and fancy. We must have to accept, if we accept Hartmann's view of fact, a strange epistemological doctrine, viz., the theory of the objective existence of contradictions and errors as facts. Apart from the questionable assertion of the objective existence of contradictions, this theory also goes against another pat theory of Hartmann. Valuational error or delusion, according to Hartmann, is the absence of agreement between knowledge and fact (Value). But if the fact itself be contradictory, no knowledge can agree with it. Further, the question also arises : which one of the two completely opposite and contradictory pieces of knowledge is true? To answer this question in the affirmative is to introduce covertly a criterion of truth and falsity and

Hartmann in fact has taken recourse to this subterfuge when he asserts that from a wider point of view, i.e., from a wider and more inclusive and less fragmentary discernment the value which appeared higher is really higher in relation to a value which appeared higher from a more fragmentary and less inclusive point of view of or discernment. In other words, validity and invalidity do not ultimately consist in mere agreement and disagreement with fact or facts; rather they consist in more inclusive and less inclusive agreement with facts respectively. 'Agreement' and 'inclusive agreement' are not one and the same thing; 'disagreement' and 'less inclusive agreement' are also not identical. Hence Hartmann, we are afraid, is not consistent in his account of validity. Further, if validity, at least valutional validity consists in the agreement of valuational insight (Knowledge) with value (as an a priori fact), how is this agreement known, and how is this knowledge of agreement tested? To say that we know this agreement by some other source of knowledge is to commit oneself to an exactly same question about the validity of the validating knowledge and thus to be landed into infinite regress; and to assert that knowledge of agreement can be tested by the same criterion by which the knowledge that agrees is tested is also to land straight into the grave grave-yard of another infinite regress. Anyway Hartmann's theory that some ethical facts are rationally incomprehensible or contradictory does not square with his theory that validity consists in knowledge's agreement with fact. If validity were to consist in agreement of knowledge with fact, then in the case of rationally incomprehensible or contradictory facts, knowledge, in order to be valid, must agree with such facts, i.e., it must be contradictory. But this, we are afraid, will not be palatable even to those who are honoured by Hartmann as the real discoverer of values.

Secondly, even if we waive our objection and accept the correspondence theory of truth as advocated by Hartmann, we shall find ourselves in a logically indefensible position. Knowledge, according to Hartmann, is comprehension (Otherwise Hartmann's description of things not amenable to knowledge as incomprehensible would be unmeaning). But if knowledge be comprehension, how can Hartmann speak of the knowledge of the incomprehensibles? Hartmann, it seems, uses the word 'knowledge' in two different senses. But he did not acknowledge it anywhere explicitly. According to Hartmann, we can apprehend the incomprehensibles as well as comprehensibles, but we can comprehend, i.e., can understand only the comprehensibles and not the incomprehensibles. But this at once reveals the uncritical presuppositions of Hartmann. Because of his realistic bias Hartmann unjustifiably took it for granted that knowledge does not create; rather it is only revelatory in character. In other words, knowledge is not creation, even partially; it is simply discovery. Knowledge as discovery, according to Hartmann, is of two types, Immediate and Reflective. Immediate discovery is the discovery of the existence of an object, real or ideal, in that its bare particularity and individuality and as such it is a gift of God and only persons so gifted can discover immediately such unsuspected existences existents. Reflective discovery is discovery of the connections and relations of immediately discovered objects in the scheme of things by means of the exercise of reason and as such it is co-extensive with human reason and is therefore universal. Philosophical ethics is concerned with the second type of discovery i.e., the discovery of the place and connections of moral values in the system of values. But the discovery of the existence of moral and other connected values is the work of the gifted individuals who can discern the existence of these values by means of their insight.

The reflective discovery is thus dependent on the primary immediate discovery because unless values are known to exist the question of their connections and place in the system of values does not and cannot arise. But Hartmann's very contention appears to be questionable. How does Hartmann know that knowledge is only revelatory, but not creative, and does not make any contribution to the object? Can Hartmann prove conclusively that the object of knowledge is completely independent of knowledge? The answer is negative and rightly so. No realist up till now has been able to prove conclusively that at least one object of knowledge is completely ~~indepe~~ independent of knowledge. The opponent of the realists on the other hand has been able to prove that at least one object of knowledge, viz., pain, is dependent on knowledge for its ~~exist~~ existence. Thirdly, even if we accept Hartmann's distinction between apprehension and comprehension, i.e., distinction between immediate discovery and reflective discovery, it does not follow that, in the fitness of things, we should also accept his order of precedence regarding the validity of knowledge when apprehension as a source of knowledge comes into conflict with comprehension. Following the beaten track of realism Hartmann, we should note, placed apprehension over comprehension in respect of validity and thereby he, we are afraid, had sinned against common-sense. When we stand on the Railway over-bridge our apprehension tells us that the parallel railway lines are converging at the distance and our comprehension denies it and our common-sense, we are afraid, accepts the verdict of our comprehension in spite of Dr. Hartmann.

The distinctive feature of man as a moral subject, i.e., as a being who can realise values and by making the decision to realise them can become the carrier of moral value or dis-

value is that he is the only conscious entity on the earth. According to Hartmann, by virtue of the possession of consciousness he alone among all earthly beings is capable of looking 'before and after and pine for what is not'. By virtue of this gift of God called consciousness he amongst all the causally determined things and beings can overleap time and can behold the discerned values ideally as ends to be realised and can direct the blind stream of causal events for the realisation of the ends. Thus man alone is a setter up of ends. That is, he alone can freely decide to turn the positive Ought-to-Be of discerned value (i.e., he can recognise its claim for realisation,) into an Ought-to-Be and thus set it up as an end ideally. This capacity to set up ends show that man is a teleological being and that this is the only instance of teleology in a world that is thoroughly causally determined. Human teleology is the only known teleology Divine teleology being a matter of conjecture. But how does man as moral subject set up the value ideally as an end to be achieved? Setting up of an end, according to Hartmann, involves three distinct stages the first two of which takes place in the ~~for~~ ideal whereas the third takes place in the realm of real existence, i.e., in the domain of causal determination. Thus according to Hartmann, "We have in the finalistic nexus three links between the starting - and the finishing-point of the process :

1). The setting up of the end by the subject, an over-leaping of the time process, an anticipation only possible to consciousness and a taking of one's stand regardless of the order of time.

2). The return determination (distinctive of the finalistic process) of the means by the end, beginning with means nearest to the end and so backward to the first means - the present one - which is close to the subject; where the link

just ahead (in the backward process) and is determined (sometimes, chosen) by it.

3) The actualization of the end, its real attainment through the means, wherein the relation of means and end which was reversed in the backward process is changed into a straightforward continuous relation of ~~ex~~us cause and effect". effect" (29):

"The first two stages of the Nexus", holds Hartmann, "constitute a closed circle They lead ideally from the subject in his objective and present world to the end as a thing of the future, and back again from this over the series of means to the subject in his actual present circumstance : And only now does the actual stage of the nexus set in, the stage in which that same series of means in reverse order is passed through in the real process as a causal sequence" (30). "Only the last stage in this three-level relation has the character of a real process in the course of the world. On this account it has full causal structure; issuing from the subject, it is an incursion into the real course of the cosmic ~~ant~~ events : hence it can have no other categorial form than the causal form" (31).

According to Hartmann, the setting up an end is possible if and only if the general categorial law arrived at by category-analysis is true and also if man as a conscious being is capable of anticipation of future. According to the general categorial law, "in the gradation of categories the lower always constitutes the presuppositions of the higher, the lower are the categorial conditions or elements of the higher. Every higher category unifies the lower ones in a new way and is a higher formation which rises over them as over a material. The novelty in it is the formation itself. But thence it follows that the lower categories are always the more independent, the more unconditioned, and even subsist for themselves without the higher, and that the higher are

always conditioned by them, are dependent upon them and exist only under them as their presupposition - indeed, that the new formation can become active within the range which the lower categories leave undetermined. Against a lower a higher principle cannot enter, it cannot suspend the action of the lower; it can form a higher structure only upon ~~as~~ a lower end with it as a building-stone. In short, the lower categories are the stronger, the higher are the weaker" (32). Thus the setting up of an end and consequently realisation of moral value through human agency is possible, according to Hartmann, only in a world which though causally determined through and through, leaves open the scope for the erection of a categorially novel structure by allowing free ingress of teleological determination over and above but not against causal determination. "The finalistic nexusin its second stage does not coincide with the temporal succession, but flows in the opposite direction. Now, to turn time back upon itself is an impossibility; the lower category - time in its irreversibility - is the stronger. Only a form in itself timeless can move freely against the temporal current, can forestall it and return against it. Thought, the content of consciousness can do this Only consciousness can furnish the ontological mode for the anticipation needed in the finalistic nexus and for the reversal of temporal succession" (33). In this anticipation there is a two fold meaning : foresight and predetermination - providence and predestination. Both are concerns of the subject as a setter-up of ends. In both inheres the basic character of man as a moral personality. For it is precisely those anticipatory acts, whereby he is the carrier of moral values and disvalues. And it is just here we get a metaphysical insight into the nature of man. For providence and predestination are the attributes of divinity" (34). "There may or there may

not be a providence of the Almighty but there is a human providence. And, likewise, a human foreordination ... teleology is the peculiarity of human nature for it is possible only in conscious entity capable of knowing and striving In man alone do we meet a setting up of ends, as well as providence and foreordination, the capacity of striving and actualizing a thing predetermined. For a philosophy which modestly and without preconception follows phenomena, there exists only in consciousness the category of end as a constitutive principle - that is, the setting up and pursuit of ends, not merely conformity to ends, which can accidentally exist" (35). Thus, according to Hartmann, only a theory of pluralistic Determinism can explain satisfactorily the existence of such ethical phenomena as the ingressions of valuational or teleological determination in a causally determined world, the setting up of ends, the dual nature of man, moral freedom, etc. All these are possible if and only if we admit the existence of many determinations which are graded into a series of higher and lower, the higher being capable of ingressing into the lower and erecting a structural novelty over and above but not against it. As regards ethical phenomena these are possible in a world of causal determinism and teleological indeterminism, i.e., in a world which is already determined causally through and through but leaves the scope for teleological determination over and above but not against causal determination open. In other words, the higher determination can ingress and can raise a structural novelty over and above the lower only when it is working in line with and not against the lower because the lower being a pre-condition for the existence of the higher is always the stronger. The setting up of an end as an ethical phenomenon, according to Hartmann, can be clearly understood if we realise the inadequacy of the traditional

account of modalities". "If one stands fast," says Hartmann, "by the traditional series of modalities - possibility, actuality, necessity -the dynamic of the Ought, becomes incomprehensible". Necessity, as the only mode which can carry such a dynamic, lies already beyond the actual The traditional series is aware of only a single positive mode below actuality - possibility. And this is absolutely undynamic" (36). "Ontologically, therefore, necessity is the presupposition of actuality. The latter contains pure possibility and necessity in itself as conditions one can define ontological actuality point-blank thus : In it nothing is necessary which was not possible and nothing possible which was not necessary. Ontological possibility is indeed not mere self-consistency (as is the case with logical possibility) : it consists of a series of conditions. So long as one is lacking, the object is impossible; but as soon as the object is possible - that is, as soon as the conditions which was lacking is present - the object is also necessary (it can no longer fail to appear). And precisely this being at the same time possible and necessary is its actuality" (37). "Thus actuality is the to be graded ontologically as the higher mode. It is a synthesis of possibility and necessity, it is their equipoise" (38). "In the positive Ought-to-Be there is a tendency toward something which is not actual. Therefore the modal structure of the actual must be annulled in the mode of Being peculiar to the tendency. The equipoise of possibility and necessity must be annulled The Ought, therefore, as regards its mode of Being, is below actuality - and precisely for the reason that its content (that which is in itself of value) lies beyond the actual" (39). The annulment of equipoise "means that possibility and necessity, in their contents, do not here coincide. One of them

shoots beyond the other, the other remains behind. The question arises: Which of the two is in preponderance? It cannot be possibility; that would not involve a tendency It can, accordingly, be only an excess of necessity over possibility which constitutes the instability of the modes in the positive Ought-to-Be. Necessity is the only dynamic mode, it is that which includes a tendential element, or which can manifest such an element. Necessity can also indicate a claim which inheres in the Ought-to-Be. The positive Ought-to-Be makes the demand that its content shall be actualized, and it thereby implies in the subject who is sensitive to its demands a tendency to actualize them. But in the actualization we have the subsequent provision of the conditions that were lacking - that is, a restoration of possibility, the possibility of what before existed as a demand, that is, as a necessity detached from possibility" (40). "In entological language : possibility and necessity are bound indissolubly together within the actual; but in themselves they are not inseparable. At the boundaries of the actual they fall apart. But in the positive Ought-to-Be the boundary of the actual is transcended" (41). Thus "one strikes upon a new, more fundamental meaning of necessity. Not the Must-Be, not the Unable-to-be- escaped-from, not the Being-involved through the totality of conditions (the ratio sufficiens) is its primary meaning, but the tendency towards something" (42). "In the actualization begins again the balancing of necessity and possibility. The equipoise which in the Ought-to-Be was disturbed is reinstated. But it is no longer entirely the same actual which is restored, but one which is changed in content; the Ought-to-Be and the disturbance disturbance of the balance have left traces of themselves. X The projected necessity, behind which possibility lagged, does not flow back, but in the actualization it draws the halting

possibility after it. Thus it actually subsists in making possible what ought to be. In the teleological nexus of reversed determination (that is, in its second stage) it discovers the means, which in their totality constitute the ontological possibility. By producing the possibility, by bringing about conditions, it actualizes, therefore, that which was set before it. And as the ontological necessity first sets in with the totality of the condition, one may with equal right say: "From the merely ethical, the free-floating and at the same time naked, necessity it leads over the real possibility to the ontologically bound necessity, which follows the possibility" (43).

In his treatment of the problem of *at* setting up of an end Hartmann admitted that without the help of a timeless entity it would not be possible for the teleological or positive Ought-to-Be determination to ingress into the stream of causal determination. And man, the empirical subject, is that timeless entity. But we may ask : How can man be at once empirical, i.e., temporal and timeless? To this Hartmann's answer is that it is incomprehensible no doubt but it is an ethical phenomenon, a fact of ethical experience. Hence even if we cannot explain it, it must be admitted as an existent. But why should we accept it as an incomprehensible ethical fact or phenomenon? Hartmann's argument, to say the least, is inclusive. Incomprehensibility is not the criterion of acceptability. Otherwise we must have to accept any and every incompatible thing without any discrimination. Hartmann, it seems, has also visualised this possibility and to nip this possibility in the bud he has proposed facthood and not incomprehensibility as the true criterion for the acceptability of a thing. But even this criterion, we are afraid, does not fare any better. Facthood in this context refers to ethical facts or phenomena. But how can we accept something to be

be an ethical fact? Certainly by experience. But are ethical facts universally experiencable? No answer in the negative. But if ethical phenomena are not universal, how can Hartmann claim universal acceptability for them? Of course Hartmann could claim and as a matter of fact he did claim that it is universally accepted by all the persons who experienced this fact. But even this qualification does not conclusively prove the existence of such a phenomenon as a fact because there is no guarantee that those who are experiencing such a phenomenon are not suffering from hallucination. Hence Hartmann's argument is not conclusive and in the absence of conclusive argument Hartmann's assertion of the existence of such an entity which is at once timeless and temporal is nothing but a make-believe.

As regards Hartmann's assertion that according to categorial law the higher determination (which is weaker) can ingress into and raise a structural novelty over the lower only when it works in line with and not in opposition to the lower, it may be observed, in the first place, that the application of this law by Hartmann for the explanation of the ingressions of teleological determination into the causal determinations clearly contradicts Hartmann's own dictum : "Metaphysics must heed ethics; not ethics, metaphysics" (44). The categorial law itself is a metaphysical product; it is a speculative framework for the interpretation of phenomena. To put this metaphysical mould over ethical phenomena without prior investigation about the legitimacy of such a procedure is simply putting the facts into the procrustean bed of theory. Hartmann's preaching, we are afraid, is thus at variance with his practice. Secondly, even if the application of this metaphysical mould to the ethical phenomena be granted, the metaphysical assumptions which are implicit in the acceptance of the categorial law are questionable. To accept the

categorial law is to accept a theory of creation, viz., creation de novo. The structural novelty erected by the higher determination is a categorial novelty and as such it is an irrational remainder not reducible to the constituent materials (the lower determination) out of which it is made. But this is a highly questionable metaphysical theory and the legitimacy of its application to the interpretation of phenomena is also highly questionable. All theories of creation out of nothing are received with a grain of salt. Structural or categorial novelty ex hypothesi is not reducible to the causal factors which give rise to it. It is an irreducible remainder. But if it is not reducible to the causal factors, how can it be related to them? Before the origination it was not an existent certainly. Otherwise origination would be unmeaning. But how is this structural or categorial novelty related to the causal factors? Since novelty is meaningless without reference to its time, this relation (if there be any) must be temporal relation. But if this structural novelty be not reducible to the causal factors, the only temporal relation that is possible between the causal factors and the novelty is regular sequence. But regular sequence can never give us necessity, free or bound. Nor can it give us sufficient help to discriminate between subjective and objective succession. And if this novelty is simply a creation de novo the regular sequence of causal factors being accidental simply simply, the question arises : How is it that novelty originates at this particular point of time neither before nor after? To say it is inexplicable is an evasion rather than an answer. Thirdly, the doctrine of the ingress of teleological determination into the entelelogical introduces not only an air of mystery but also destroys the possibility of inference based on entelelogical, i.e., causal determination. If a teleological

determination could get into causally determined things of diverse kinds and make them function as the means of production of one definite kind (i.e., direction-oriented) of result, it would mean that any inference based on causal relation is precarious. We could not, e.g., argue from the result as effect to any particular ~~means~~ means as cause because we could never be sure whether it is a blind cause or a direction-oriented cause and a blind cause and a direction-oriented cause are definitely not identical in meaning. Hartmann himself says, "every causal course of events can be interpreted, without self-contradiction, as a finalistic process The phenomena as such do not oppose this interpretation, they defencelessly yield to any and every interpretation if only it does not contradict them. But the interpretation can be as little proved as disproved by the phenomena" (45). Fourthly, if deterministic monism be inadmissible because it destroys the uniqueness of man as the only carrier of moral values and disvalues (46), human teleology should also be inadmissible because it destroys the uniqueness of the individual who is the real carrier of moral values and disvalues. Man as such is not the carrier of moral values and dis-values but the concrete, empirical individual subject is the real carrier. Human teleology, according to Hartmann, is a prerogative of man. "If the whole world is essentially like him, there remains for him no categorial distinction, no prerogative, no superiority. But upon this prerogative rests the whole ethical problem The finalistic nexus is not at the disposal of every power. If converted into a world-principle, it would dispenses man of his right" (47). But the real carrier of moral value is the individual, the actual, empirical subject. And "he is the unique bearer of moral ~~vk~~ values" (48). And to say that teleology is common

to all human beings is to destroy the uniqueness, the superiority, the prerogative of the individual, empirical subject who is the moral carrier of moral values. Lastly, according according to Hartmann, when the axiological determination ingresses into the realm of the ontological "the finalistic series so fits itself into the causal totality, into the bundle of crossing ranks, of which the real consists, as to divert the total resultant". Its introduction is always at the same time the beginning of a competition. The finalistic determination struggles for the upper hand, for its own control of causal series. If it succeeds, the mastery is a directing of the total process to the previously fixed end, the actualization of the value by the forces of causal series which is indifferent to the value" (49). But if in the ~~ethic~~ ethical reality which is a blend of causes and ends the finalistic series and the causal series do compete with each other to get upper-hand, if the winning of finalistic series means the diversion of the total resultant, then how can Hartmann assert in the same breath that the lower determination is stronger than the higher and that the higher determination can raise a novel superstructure over the lower only when the higher is working in line with and not against the lower determination? If the higher determination can work only in line with and never against the lower, then how can it compete with the lower, still less divert the total resultant? As a matter of fact Hartmann's theory of the gradation of determinations into higher and lower and ingressions of the higher into the lower is simply a contradiction in terms. Instead of explaining the matter it seems to explain it makes the matter more inexplicable.

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CHAPTER - THREE

1. We now propose to undertake a critical examination of Hartmann's theory of human freedom. Freedom, according to Hartmann, is a "plus" phenomenon. According to Hartmann, "freedom is never possible where a single type of determination reigns throughout the world in all its strata. Freedom is only where, in one world, at least two types of determination are superimposed one upon the other : only in such a world can a higher determination adjust its determinants to a lower, so that, viewed from the lower, an actual plus of determination comes into existence" (1). "Freedom, continues Hartmann, "however, is by no means simply a kind of determination, namely, the relation of a higher to a lower, in so far as both co-exist in one and the same real world and apply to one and the same occurrence. Among the beings which are subject to the lower type of determination, that one is then free "in the positive sense" which in addition to this subjection also ~~can~~ comes under the law of a higher determination" (2). Thus "the true meaning of moral freedom is not the negative one of choice but the positive one of an order sui generis, which autonomously encounters that of causality and nevertheless adds itself to the prevailing texture of the real world, without rending it" (3). Hence "both causal and finalistic determination, when taken in the absolute ~~as~~ sense, that is, when monistically applied to the whole cosmic structure, commit exactly the same blunder, although in the opposite direction. Both reduce the world to uniformity !.... which excludes freedom! A universalised causal determinism converts man into a mere natural entity, it degrades him; a universalised finalistic determinism transforms Nature into a thing being that is directed to ends, into such a being as man is; it raises Nature up to his level! Both theories reduce everything to a common denominator. They

thereby nullify the uniqueness of Moral Being in the world. And again they thereby extinguish man's freedom, but with it at the same time morality itself. The positive significance of a free being in a determined world can be due to nothing else than to his superior position, to that heterogeneous plus of determination which he has over and above the other actual entities" (4). "Now evidently the causal nexus is a lower, the finalistic a higher type of determination. This is seen in the simplicity of the former and the complexity (the three stages) of the latter" (5). "One might express the matter thus : a causally determined world is in itself still teleologically undetermined; hence a merely causal determinism, so long as it is not made monistically absolute is at the same time teleological indeterminism. Hence in this respect indeterminism regains a conditional justification. Its legitimate meaning is that a world under laws of nature that are merely formed causally stands open to the setting up of ends and to the purposive activity of any being capable of foresight and predetermination" (6). "Here man's freedom shows itself to be an ontological function of his unique place in the stratification of two types of determination. His is a dual position; he stands under a twofold determination. As a natural being, even to his inmost desires and repulsions, he is determined causally, a plaything of the eternal power of Nature, of powers overwhelmingly superior and operating both through him and altogether irrespectively of him. But as a "person" he is the carrier of another sort of determination which emanates from the ideal realm of values. In his sensing of them he finds himself in part determined by the claim which values make upon him in the form of the Ought! And it is this kind of determinateness which manifests itself in his purposive acti-

vity. He can only transforms into ends what he feels to be of value. But in ~~converting~~ converting values into ends, he transforms them into realities. He positively creates what causal necessity never could bring forth, a world of ethical actuality in the midst of an actual Nature. Through his purposive activity, that is, his categorially higher form of determination, which originates with him, he proves himself to be an entity superior to the power of Nature, a being in whose hands forces blind and aimless in themselves become means to ends discerned and posited beforehand. And indirectly, in the commitment of his personality to objectively discerned values (those that are situational) as well as in his guidance of purposeless events towards values, he attains the higher values, the distinctively moral qualities" (7).

But Moral Freedom, in the first place, must be the freedom of the actual empirical person, and secondly, the empirical person or subject must be free in respect of the determination issuing from ~~ak~~ values also. Thus there "are no longer only two but three types of determination, which here lie in strata, one above the other, in one and the same ethical actuality, in the actual will, in every actual deed of a person. We know approximately only two of these types of the law of nature and the law of the ought. The principle of the person so far as it throws its own determinant into the scale, we do not know !. There exists no way of coming into closer knowledge of it. We must reckon with it as an irrational factor !. But what the problem itself clearly reveals must be this, that there is a determinant of a higher type, as compared not only with the law of nature, but also with the law of the Ought. For over against the latter the person must be free" (8). Now this personal determination is higher than

the finalistic determination of values because of "the categorical laws of dependence, according to which the lower determination is always the "stronger", but the higher is none the less "free" as compared with it; in other words, the higher finds unlimited scope above it as a material"(9). But this raises a new difficulty. "The determination, above which the moral person is said to have scope for a determinant of his own, is twofold : that of natural law and that of value (of the ought). The first is determined causally, the second finalistically"(10). Now the causal nexus is an open system; it admits of the ingress of extra-causal determinants from other quarters so long as the ingress of these determinants does not impede the uninterrupted flow of causal series. It "offers no b
obstacle". It takes up and carries along as a causal series the novelty, which it draws into itself"(11). But this is not so in the case of the finalistic nexus. "Here the ~~res~~ results of the process are prescribed for it as its goal. The consequence is that it can take up no k new determinants from other sources. At every stage it forms a closed system of determining elements which resists any outside influence. For any determinant, entering from without, shifts the goal, diverts the process from it; hence it either destroys the finalistic nexus or is destroyed by it Accordingly we can understand how the finalistic determinants can be superimposed upon the causal determination, but not how a further determinant^s should be able to be superimposed upon the finalistic determination. It could find no scope there Hence it seems that here something impossible is demanded"(12). The question is : How are we to reconcile the ingress of extra-finalistic determinant into the finalistic nexus with the intolerance

of the finalistic nexus to such ingestion? This riddle can be solved, according to Hartmann, if and only if the finalistic determination of the empirical subject by the value, i.e., by the Ought, is only an apparent determination. That the values cannot really determine the will finalistically is evident, according to Hartmann, from the fact that the demand of the Ought is only a claim and never a compulsion. The independence to accept or to reject the demand of the values rests with the subject. Values can never negate this independence. Thus Hartmann says, "Can one properly say that values or principles of the Ought directly determine the will? Is it not equally true, that they do not determine the will? Sometimes the will pursues goals which values prescribe, but sometimes not. The law of the Ought is only a commandment, not a coercion Hence, if one ask : How can positive autonomy of the person as a proper determinant coexist with the autonomy of values? the answer must be given : It does not at all need to exist along with the autonomy of values as an actual teleological determination. The latter simply is not, without further ado, and an actual teleology of values; and only such a teleology would interfere with the incoming of a personal determinant. Whether a teleology of the will by values should take place is a matter for the decision of the will itself. The impulsion of the Ought as such is not enough to determine the will. Still another factor must always be added. And just this inheres in the actual person. It is this other factor alone which earns the title to personal freedom. It consists in the capacity of the person to transform or not to transform a value into a determinant of his own (whether as a conscious end or a selective principle), to commit himself to it or not to commit himself" (13).

Thus "the person must carry within ~~it~~ himself, besides the natural determination and that of the Ought, still a third determinant, different from both". And it must be this, through whose intervention the Ought for the first time becomes a determinant. Hence personal freedom does not encounter a determination already completed through the Ought, but one incompletely, the mere claim, the pure demand as such. And in so far as the claim is fulfilled, it is fulfilled only through the freedom. The initiative of a person is not a function of the values forcing their way through to actuality, but conversely, the actualization of the values is a function of the personal initiative. From the values themselves there issues no actualization, but only from person, when committing himself to them. And this self-commitment occurs not under the compulsion of the values, but according to the person's own standard" (14). In this connection we should note, according to Hartmann, two factors in the freedom of the will which are complementary and are collectively necessary for freedom. Thus he says, "Values cannot determine except with the aid of a personal will which pledges itself to them by its self-determination; but just as little can a will determine, without having before it and directed to it the claim of autonomous values and without sensing these values as such - a claim ever against which alone its self-determination has the significance of a decision. The two factors together, the objective real and the subjective ideal - the autonomy of the principle and the confronting autonomy of the person - constitute through their peculiar supplementation the extra-causal determinant" (15).

Two more question, according to Hartmann, are also to be answered in order to give a complete and satisfactory account of moral freedom. Firstly, is the freedom of will something unique? and secondly, how can moral freedom be proved? Hartmann answers both the questions in the negative. To the first question Hartmann answers that it "is by no means unique in kind. Wherever various existential components cross one another in a complex structure, the same relation is found. The separate components merge in the resultant. They are cancelled in it as in a higher equipoise of the constituent elements. The complex structure is of a higher form and order of being Every higher type of existence with its own categorial formation is eo ipso "free", as over the lower This categorial law of freedom is all-pervading Viewed enteologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorial freedom..... . Fundamentally in its enteological structure autonomy is the same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities. These autonomies are peculiar only to the different stages of being; and they present different problems. The texture of the lower categorial components also, upon which they are build, varies greatly as to the degree to which it can be known. But all these constitutes no fundamental difference, but only a gradation of subordinate kind" (15).

To the second question Hartmann answers that "the freedom of the will is a metaphysical question. In regard to all metaphysical truths the preposition holds good that in the strict sense they can neither be proved nor disproved..... . No philosophy "solves" metaphysical problems, it can only deal with them; and how far it can succeed in so doing must always remain doubtful . But every step in advance, however small, is here of the great

greatest significance - Precisely because the problems are insoluble" (17). According to Hartmann, "all the proofs for the freedom of the will which have been laid down are fallacious" (18). Kant's account of freedom is fallacious because Hartmann holds, even if we concede the truth of the assertion that moral principles emanate from reason we have "only a "transcendental freedom" of reason, not the freedom of the person as an individual entity; hence not a freedom of the will". In the Kantian sense, "reason" is not individual, but is the universal reason in which individuals participate. The "moral law" is the ~~principia~~ principle of a "transcendental subject", a practical "consciousness in general", not otherwise than the twelve categories are the principles of a theoretical "consciousness in general". Hence transcendental freedom is not at all freedom of the moral person. For he is merely the empirical individual" (19). "Kant", Hartmann continues, "means to prove the freedom of the will; yet he does not notice that he is actually proving something !.... which is essential as a presupposition of freedom of the will but is nevertheless not that freedom itself : what he proves is merely that the principle is autonomous !....". In the problem of freedom man does not want to know how far a "transcendental subject" is responsible and accountable for him, but how far he himself is so" (20). Similarly, Fichte who sought "to discover the positive determinant at as great a depth as possible within the nature of the person, and accordingly within the subject !.... elaborated his theory of freedom from the point of view of his doctrine of science. The "ego" is the carrier of freedom, it is the determinant; not, however, the ego which appears empirically, but a deeper, a metaphysical ego. In the conscious ego the will

already manifests itself as completely determined. Accordingly it must bring this characteristic with it from somewhere. The determinateness cannot come from this side of consciousness, from the natural world; hence it must come from beyond, from something which lies behind consciousness, from something which consequently cannot itself be conscious. The whole ego is not in consciousness. Its own proper depths are hidden. There must exist a volition prior to volition; there must be one that is metaphysical before the one that is conscious. And the prior one is the free volition, because it gives determinateness" (21). "But", asks Hartmann, "what is the consequence of this placing freedom behind consciousness" (22). And he answers, "we do not come by such a route to a freedom of consciousness - at least not when starting from the consciousness of freedom - but to a still vaster unfreedom of consciousness. Empirical unfreedom has become metaphysical unfreedom The Fichtean freedom behind consciousness misses exactly what it is striving for, the freedom of moral consciousness It would involve a radical extirpation of freedom" (23). Consciousness is not, according to Fichte, free "but something else behind it which directs it is free. Now as regards this something else we do not know whether it is of the nature of a will, consequently whether its determinative power is in any sense a freedom of the will. At least it is not the freedom of that will which alone we know and to which in our sensing of morality we attribute responsibility it is not the conscious ego which alone is known to us. Hence on the basis of such freedom it is not possible to ascribe to oneself responsibility for its volition and action. The responsibility does not fall upon that volition which I can answer for because its decision took place in the light of my consciousness,

but upon the constitution of the metaphysical ego which is quite independent of my consciousness. The moral consciousness cannot be accountable for what it does not itself decide" (24). In the later phase of his ethics Fichte held that only imperfect will is free and the achievement of perfection means annihilation of the freedom and the Ought because will can decide once and for all to obey Ought and thus becomes perfect and unfree. "In this unique and final act of freedom the will "exhausts" its capacity, it "uses up" the substance of its freedom According to this view, Man's true act of freedom is the self-annihilation of freedom, and at the same time the annihilation of the ego and the Ought" (25). This is, Hartmann holds, is the extirpation of morality because "the whole conception belongs to the sphere of religion, and not to ethics. In it ethics is abandoned. The demand which religion makes is different from that which morality makes. The will ~~which~~ which can no longer choose anything but the good, is no longer a moral will; and personal values, which are not based on freedom, are no longer moral values ethical values..... are necessarily grounded on freedom and can no longer be manifested in a being who has "consumed" his own freedom" (26). In the same way, Schelling, in order to get rid of the conflict of between the freedom of the deciding will which merely appears but does not exist and the freedom of the absolute will which only is but does not appear, subscribed to the argument : "There is a consciousness of freedom, therefore there must also be a freedom of consciousness ... I could not at all sh have a consciousness of freedom if I were not really free, for an unfree being would not be in a position to feel himself to be free" (27). This is, according according to Hartmann, an inference "from the mere phenome-

non of the thing to the existence of the thing But phenomena, like concepts, do not involve real existence" (28). "Just as the existence of God does not follow from the consciousness of God, however clear, so real freedom of consciousness (that of the conscious will) never follows from the given consciousness of freedom, however unescapable and imperturbable this may be" (29).

Even if metaphysical problems, according to Hartmann, cannot be proved or disproved but can only be discussed, we can still, in order to gain new insight into the problems, incline to prove, and in the case of proving the freedom of the will "three types of argumentation are possible : an empirico-descriptive type, one that is purely aprioristic, and an analytical type" (30). The empirico-descriptive argument is ruled out from the very nature of the case. "There can be no empirical argument for metaphysical objects In the moral life there are no direct facts of freedom; that is, none that would not require explanation, and could not be understood otherwise" (31). Similarly the purely aprioristic argument is also also ruled out because, unlike values, existence of "freedom of" is of a quite another kind; it does not appear in ideal, but in actual structures in living persons in their full concrete existence. Hence the existence, which is to be assigned to it, is real self-existence Herewith the limit also is set to purely a priori argument. Existential problems are never soluble a priori. They depend upon a mass of existential data" (32). Thus "the analytical procedure alone fits the subject-matter. Here one sets out from the given ethical situation, from the real as from the ideal - from the former in the consciousness of freedom, from the latter in the nature of moral

principles; and from the principles of all events a return can be made to the real ontal Being of freedom. The return has the form of an inference from the conditioned to the condition" (33)!

"In this kind of reasoning aprioristic and empirical elements are fused. The point of departure have the character of demonstrable phenomena; as such, they have the value of facts. But the connections between these and the conclusion are of an aprioristic nature" (34)!

"In the analytical argument for the freedom of the will", Hartmann holds, "three complex facts of moral life come into consideration as points of departure : the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and accountability, and the consciousness of guilt. These are supplemented by two further factors : the dependence of moral values upon freedom and the oppositional relation of the Ought to the will, or the nature of moral conflict" (35).

Consciousness of self-determination, according to Hartmann, is a firmly rooted conviction and as such it is an universal phenomenon. But despite its universality, the sceptic may argue, it may a necessary illusion. But "the consciousness of self-determination", Hartmann holds, "is a fact of ethical actuality" (36). Hence "if the consciousness of self-determination be an illusion, scepticism must explain the illusion" because the Sceptic's account of the state of affairs "runs counter to the phenomenon" (37). Therefore the onus of the responsibility of proving the phenomenon falls upon the Sceptic. "He must show how the phenomenon is possible, how the illusion arises" (38). And the Sceptic's account of the phenomenon "requires a whole complex of assumptions" (39), which though conceivable, is "neither explained nor established. Hence

".....scepticism passes over into clefted metaphysics It cannot carry the burden of proof proof it assumes" (40). Thus "as a phenomenon, the consciousness of self-determination possesses a far greater metaphysical weight Here the conditions which favour habitual illusion do not press so close On the contrary, rather is prevailing tendency away from illusion. Hence if the consciousness of self-determination nevertheless exists universally, there must lie concealed behind it in the constitution of man an absolutely fixed and unequivocal power which keeps the balance among all these tendencies. The existence of freedom of will would be just such a power" (41). And we should note that, "however much reasoning may fall short of establishing freedom, there is contained in the consciousness of self-determination something which brings us very near to such a conclusion" (42).

Responsibility or accountability, according to Hartmann, is an actual ethical fact which is "universal and which accompanies all properly ethical actions" (43). "The metaphysical weight of responsibility and accountability as an argument for freedom is not only far greater in objectivity and cogency than that of the consciousness of self-determination, but is also of totally different kind" (44). This argument is of greater objectivity and cogency because here "the person takes upon himself a load, the carrying of which is not in the line with any natural inclination or interest but is contrary to every natural tendency" (45). And it is of a totally different kind because "there is no direct phenomenon of self-determination, but only a phenomenon of "consciousness" of it. But there is a direct phenomenon of responsibility and also accountability, and by no means merely a phenomenon of consciousness or, as it were, a feeling of responsibility. The assumption of responsibi-

lity is a positive fact which can in no way be disputed; it is ethical actual like any other deed, volition, commitment or disposition" (46).

The argument from responsibility, holds Hartmann, "is a real argument ~~for~~ for freedom" (47). And "the freedom which is manifested in the assuming and carrying of responsibility is in the strict sense freedom of the individual moral consciousness a freedom of the conscious individual person when he is faced with the moral ~~principle~~ principle, that is, a freedom in regard to the claim of Ought" (48). Thus "two authoritative factors always inhere in any responsibility : one which is responsible, and one before which it is responsible. The latter is the moral principle - every value is such an authoritative factor; the former is the person in his ability to fulfil or not fulfil the requirement of the principle. If the person is simply subject to the principle as to a law of nature, he would have no autonomy in relation to it. But.... if he were without a valuational sense and impervious to the claim !..... there would be nothing in regard to which a decision would delve upon him. For in regard to no other law is he called upon to decide; in regard to every other he simply conforms. In both cases he would be without responsibility. But responsibility is constantly upon him; he takes it upon himself at every step in life and carries it as something that beyond all question falls to his share !..... This is evidence within him of personal autonomy, the visible sign of his freedom" (49).

Accountability, according to Hartmann, implies imputation, i.e., ascribing and claiming the moral value or disvalue of a deed and it exists independently. Imputation is impersonal, i.e., "there is no taking of sides, but simply and an adjudicating of authorship" (50). In adjudication, Hartmann holds, we can distinguish three stages".

In the first place, the act of imputation itself Imputation is not inherently an individual act which would have for itself a particular subject. It is a communal, inter-subjective fact, exactly like the universality of theoretical views. For instance, as with these latter it holds good that each one who grasps the situation must necessarily form the same judgment as everyone else, so here : whoever simply sees that a person is acting must necessarily attribute to him the value or disvalue of the deed. This "must" is in no sense an Ought, it is rigid necessity; no one can avoid it" (51). Thus here we arrive at a "fundamental aprioristic relationship. Hence the universal inter-subjective validity. From the outset everyone sees any person's act - his own or another's - from the point of view of freedom. He does not "experience" freedom, but prior to all experience he presupposes it. This is why in general any person's deed appears to us as morally relevant This is what binds one person to another, uniting him who imputes with him to whom something is imputed. For of his own accord the latter has the same conception. It is the communal attribute of all personality as such" (52). In the second place, "there is the accountability of a person. In the person to whom something is imputed, this is what answers to the act of imputation. Without it an imputation would be an error. There may be such an error, for there is such a thing as unaccountability accountability is not a universal dignity accompanying all human conditions. And it is in accord with this circumstance that our moral consciousness can very well distinguish unaccountability Genuine accountability, however, just as one who imputes it presupposes it - and no less in the case of self-determination - is nothing else

than moral freedom. Hence exactly the distinction which even the unsophisticated mind makes here provides the evidence for the existence of moral freedom. And here also it is not an autonomy of the principle, nor that of a metaphysical back-ground to personality, but the autonomy of the person himself in his individual, conscious will - freedom of the will in the strict sense of the word" (53). The third and the most important and most decisive stage in the fact of imputation, according to Hartmann, is "the claim which the person makes to imputation" (54). "A man of high moral development confirms the imputation which others make, not only by imputing to himself whatever he does but by asserting his right to such imputation; indeed he feels his human dignity to be violated, if his accountability for his deed is denied. Such a denial he regards as an attempt to deprive him of his moral Being as a person Indeed the morally mature man rightly repels the well-meant exculpation He insists upon being responsible, if he feels himself to be so For him there is here far more at stake than this what he experiences in the depreciatory moral judgment : the value which is at the basis of his personality is at stake - his freedom" (55). Thus "in the claim to imputation is contained one of the strongest positive indications of the ethically real existence of freedom. For this claim runs counter to every natural interest, to all indolence, to the all-too-human weakness of shifting blame from off one's own shoulders". Here is the evidence of a real human power in the constitution of personality, which introduces into life a ~~totality~~ totally different point of view This point of view is that of a strictly personal autonomy" (56). The factual complex of responsibility and accountability are "phenomena

of living tendencies, powers, claims, in short, of real actional factors. They are of significance only if they ~~are~~ are rooted in real personal freedom"(57). The claim to accountability and the assumption of responsibility indicate that "if I do not impute to another what lies within the domain of his responsibility, I fail thereby to recognise not only a principle which determines him but the man himself as a moral person. If anyone deprives me of the responsibility which I take upon myself, he sins against my essential nature as a person. He does not, as it were, deny my specific valuational qualitiesbut he denies something more fundamental ; my capacity to manifest any moral qualities whatsoever, a capacity which is the fundamental condition of my moral existence"(58). Thus the phenomena of responsibility and imputation are significant, according to Hartmann, if and only if they are rooted in real personal freedom, i.e., only if they rest for their existence solely on the capacity of any and every human being to manifest moral qualities which is the fundamental condition of the existence of a man as a moral Being. Otherwise "they are ~~useless~~ not only a diversified system of illusions, but even in themselves are meaningless"(59). Here the sceptic will join issue with the upholders of moral freedom. And we should do well, according to Hartmann, to examine the contention of the sceptic. According to the sceptic, "we cannot bar out the possibility that responsibility, accountability, indeed even the right to have one's actions imputed to oneself, is a radical illusion inherent in the constitution of the alleged moral life"(60). But "in ethics as in epistemology a withdrawal from the phenomenon avenges itself. An elaborate hypothesis must

be built up; and if it succeeds, it proves that it presupposes what it meant to refute : in the case of epistemology, the self-existence of the object; in the case of ethics, freedom" (61). In the problem of freedom, "if we have happily eliminated the freedom of the person from the factual complex of responsibility and imputability, the functions of the willing, and acting and acting subject, through whom we mean to explain the appearance of freedom, show themselves on their part to be of such a grade of structure that categorial freedom again attaches to them according to the basic ontological laws themselves. The kind of determination which one is called upon to explain in the consciousness of freedom does not resolve itself into the components(as such), from which one could explain it most adequately. But if one adds the higher categorial determinant - and one cannot avoid doing so - it is just this which according to the categorial law of freedom is "free", as ever against those very components by means of which, as being their unfree resultant, it was intended to be accounted for. Hence one has only exchanged one freedom for another, namely, the directly felt and conscious freedom of the person for an inferred freedom of the categorical principle of the person, which as such is of course not conscious. But the distinction is not a difference in the matter, but only in the way of looking at it. Metaphysically both are one and the same freedom throughout. The "principle" of a person is nothing but the essence of the person, which is also implied in the unreflective consciousness of self-determination. We cannot escape the existential reality of personal freedom" (62). Thus ethical scepticism, according to Hartmann, ends in self-refutation.

. The phenomenon of the consciousness of guilt, according to Hartmann, is closely akin to the complex phenomena of responsibility and imputability. But its degree of certainty as an argument is higher. Unlike responsibility "guilt exists only as a consequence; it first comes into being in moral transgression" (63). In guilt "we have a peculiar intensification of what also lies concealed in responsibility; Here the burden is more keenly felt and more elementary ; at the same time it is also more imperative inevitable. One can still either assume or ~~wash away responsibility~~ waive responsibility But one cannot shift guilt from off one's own shoulders The state of guilt is in the highest degree real and is felt to be real. It bursts in upon a man like a fate. He makes no mistake about the guilt But nevertheless he feels that this bursting-in is not from outside. A power rises within himself, which brings evidence against him. What was already latent in the responsibility, the inner court wherein the person is twice represented and at the same time divided against himself, comes for the first time in the state of guilt to drastic expression, to the more convincing inner reality. Everyone is acquainted with this phenomenon as the voice of conscience and, with its peculiar moral character, "remorse" By an inner necessity they follow upon the deed, as seen as its ethical disvalue is felt. This necessity and inevitability constitute the consciousness of guilt, a witness to self-determination (64). And the metaphysical significance of guilt "lies in its reference to real self-determination . For guilt signifies authorship, exclusively on the part of the person himself. On this account the consciousness of guilt is unequivocally connected with personal self-determination. The accusing conscience is the consciousness of that origination, fused

with the concomitant consciousness of being contrary to value. From this fusion we distinctly here strife issuing : To acknowledge the deed with our own moral Being and at the same time to reprobate it, in the same moment to be witness both for and against ourself" (65). The state of guilt as a moral fact inverts every natural inclination of man. "Hence finally the possibility of any subjective falsification of the phenomenon is excluded. No one would load himself with guilt, so long as he could avoid it It is against his will that the guilty man takes the lead upon himself. This is very different from the phenomenon of responsibility. There is delight in responsibility, a truly exalted feeling accompanying the thought of being responsible : But delight and exaltation in being guilty are repugnant to common sense" (66). The fact that there is such a thing as the will to guilt cannot be brought against this view as an effective argument because though there exists definitely such a will, yet "it speaks not against but for the reality of freedom in the Being of the person For it is not a will to guilt for the sake of guilt, but a will to endure the guilt for the sake of one's freedom. Whoever has loaded himself with guilt, can get rid himself of it only at the price of his own autonomous personality. The escape from guilt is not worth the price" (67). Lest a misunderstanding may creep in it should be noted in this connection that in moral transgression "that which commits the transgression, and that which on the other hand rises up in the name of the violated value, are both not of an axiological but of an ontological nature" (68). Hence "that which as consciousness conscience raises its accusing voice against the man, is therefore not his ideal ethos" (69), i.e., ideal personality or personality as a value which is an ideal self-existent. In guilt "the person comes forward

as a witness against himself, accuses himself, struggles against his own most vital interest. How could he do this, if there were not another reason for it in himself, if in him as a person there were not something of greater import, something distinctive of him, which demanded this negation and violation of life, precisely in order to preserve his integrity" (70). That is why "the strength of the argument ~~comes~~ from the factual complex of the consciousness of guilt outweighs considerably that from responsibility and imputability. The paradox in a man's oppressive witness against himself is the same in the will of to guilt, when rightly understood. In both phenomena the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man" (71).

Besides the phenomena of the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of responsibility and imputability and the consciousness of guilt there are some other independent facts of moral life which, though not so cogent logically, yet point to the reality of moral freedom. Firstly, there is, e.g., "a moral sense of being worthy and unworthy, of enjoying good fortune, of living through something great, of experiencing love, the trust, friendship, or even only of possessing some outward thing of value. In these who are morally mature, this sense of worthiness extends to other person just as profoundly, even if not so intensively. It is something wholly immediate, something anterior to all reflection. It gives evidence of a primary demand of the moral sense in the person that there should be provided a counter-poise in his moral being to the values which have

been tendered to him, that to a certain degree there should be established a valuational balance. This demand would be meaningless, if the person were not capable of such a special independent equipoise and indeed master of it. But the condition implied in being a carrier of personal value is freedom; and the state of being master of them is personal freedom in particular. In characteristic fashion this phenomenon, when reversed, is still the same. A person makes reversed demand upon lifethat the worthy man should receive values in proportion to his worthinessactual life is indifferent to itnevertheless it is rooted deep in moral sense and to feel no satisfaction at the good fortune of the innocent and the highly deserving, no indignation at the triumph of the reprobate, is rightly looked upon as morally perverted Thus the postulate of human happiness is not simply an utopia; as a vision, it also has a place in critical ethics" (72). Secondly, personal freedom is similarly "reflected in retaliation, revenge, punishment, reward and everything that is akin to these. The question heresimply concerns the significance of these phenomena, independently of their moral value or dis-value. And in this connection it is again evident that they are to be traced to the real essence of personality, which is taken as the autonomous originator and to which as such recompense is assigned. If there be no such originator, if the person possesses no real freedom, then retaliation, revenge, punishment are not only morally assailable, but are simply senseless, purely imaginary phenomena" (73). Thirdly, the same is the case "with all domineering, all ruling over others, with lust of power and arrogance". The significance of arrogance and lust of power is not as bottom the ~~valueless~~ valuational presumption of the person, but his

presumption that he is free ! Hence his violation of another's freedom. The arrogant man as such is not vain, the vain may be obsequious. As in humility there is no suppression but only spontaneous subordination, so in arrogance and lust of power there are spontaneous expansion and usurpation of freedom. Here we find freedom running wild, rampant, everreaching itself. This phenomenon, even in its disvalue, is ethically significant, as a manifestation of the reality of freedom" (74).

"The aim of all ethical claim upon man, "according to Hartmann, "is to establish thorough concrete agreement b/w between the Ought and the will so here the task of the actual personal will is to adjust itself to the ideal Being of values a self-adaptation of the real to the ideal" (75). As regards the relation of the Ought to the will, "we may" says Hartmann, " Summarize the situation in brief. The Ought and the will are given in an indestructible texture of oppositions. If one traces this oppositionality to its origin, one finds behind it axiological antinomies, that is, an antithetic of Ought and Cought. Now this cannot be solved, however much the sense of value searches for syntheses. At least, a person - when face to face with the conflict - cannot wait until an ideal synthesis presents itself to him. Out of his own resources, here and now, he must make a decision. As he in fact from hour to hour makes such a decision, there must be something in him which is capable of deciding in this way - independently of the correctness or incorrectness of the decision. This something remains ever against the entire conflict of the Ought, carries its deciding determinant into the conflict and thereby proves itself to be autonomous as regards the conflict".

"Thus, besides the antinomy of Ought and Ought, there is further antinomy : that between the autonomy of the Ought in general (the principle) and the autonomy of the person. Here is the antinomy of the two autonomies. The relationship now stands as follows.

The antinomy of Ought and Ought has shown itself to be insoluble. But it is precisely this insolubility, which makes the antinomy of the two autonomies in the positive sense soluble. For if the former were in itself soluble, there would be no need of the autonomous decision ~~far~~ from the other side in the case of an actual conflict, and the person would be thrown back upon the cancellation of the conflict; but if ~~f~~ gave another solution to the conflict than the distinctively ideal one, it would do violence to the conflict. Hence if the antinomy of Ought and Ought were soluble, that of personal autonomy and the Ought-autonomy would be insoluble. But if the former is insoluble, the coexistence of two autonomies is the only possibility of deliverance ~~from~~ from the conflict of Ought and Ought. Thus is found in the insolubility of the one antinomy a clear indication as to the solution of the other. This other is the Ought-antinomy. Of course its solution is not given; it is not seen through, not understood, but it is guaranteed by the factors of the problem.

"If from this point we look back upon the factual complex of responsibility, imputability and the consciousness of guilt, we must ask : How does a new argument for the freedom of the will inhere in the relation of the Ought and the will? To this it may be answered : The former arguments clearly pointed back to an autonomy of the person, in whom a basic ethical capacity inheres, a potency sui-generis, but they did not reveal this potency, they could say nothing further as to its nature. Now the opposition of

the Ought and the will, by the analysis of the radical difficulties involved in it, throws the first light, although in an uncertain light, upon this point. Here is established the relation of freedom to the ethical principle, to the whole sphere of values and to their ideal autonomy. It is an antinomic relation, more abrupt than the relation to natural law. And it is the new factor, the illuminating element in this vista. For an antinomic counter-member presupposes independence. But it is this which is alone of import in the nature of the person. Independence is the whole meaning of freedom in the positive sense. Seen from this point of view, the basic capacity to which responsibility imputability refers is in fact a metaphysical plus of determination; and it is a plus such as a person alone among all actual entities possesses, both in face of natural law and of the moral law, both in face of enteological and exioegical determination.

"Precisely that which in the table of values is the despair of the conscientious searcher - the evident impossibility of solving the valuational conflicts in a manner acceptable for the life of man - the positive and ~~astonish~~ astonishingly definite solution of the no less burning problem of freedom It is the strongest proof that personal freedom, as an actual power, stands behind the factual complexes of responsibility and imputability. The conflict cannot be solved from the table of values, hence also not on the basis of the valuational sense. But this means that it cannot be solved at all - at least not for human insight, which with difficulty grasps the highest syntheses. But nevertheless it can be solved in given cases by a fiat, by initiative, by the independent procedure of a being who thereby takes responsibility and guilt upon himself. And, without being solved, it is actually decided in just this way by the fiat of the person. To decide is not

to solve. If man could solve the problem, if he could discover an axiologically adequate solution, he would not need to decide anything at all; he would only need to carry out the solution. But the given question of life are not of this sort. Step by step in life man must decide them without being able to solve them. He can neither change nor escape them; & he can only push through them, by virtue ~~of~~ of his initiative, even if by his initiative he becomes guilty.

"Thus it comes about that, wherever persons act , actual decisions are made. But the power which utters the ~~fix~~ fiat must evidently be actual one; for it is actually determinant in the actual volition and conduct of an actual person. Hence the actual will of the actual person must be "free"— at least as regards the values involved in the conflict" (76).

Hartmann's account of moral freedom, we may note, is composed of two parts, positive and negative. Negatively, it is a refutation of the different theories of freedom as propounded by other philosophers and also it is a refutation of ethical scepticism which denies the very existence of freedom as illusory. Positively, it is an assertion of the real existence of moral freedom and as such it admits of twofold treatment, viz., with reference to the nature of moral freedom which is a metaphysical question, and with reference to the proofs of moral freedom which is a question of logic and epistemology.

Kant's theory /of freedom, according to Hartmann, is on whole wrong, though it contains an important truth. Kant is definitely on the right track when he asserts that moral freedom must be freedom in the positive sense, i.e., it must be freedom to add new determination determinant and not the absence of any determination whatsoever. Thus Kant is right in asserting that freedom does not mean negation of already existing determination but it simply means addition of new

determination in the world over and above the existing determinations. But Kant is definitely ~~was~~ wrong in his surmise when he asserts that the moral freedom is the freedom not of the concrete individual conscious person but of "practical Reason" or practical "consciousness in general". But Hartmann's appraisal of Kant's theory of freedom, we are afraid, is based on his misunderstanding of the Kantian theory of ethics. Moral freedom must be ex hypothesi the freedom of practical consciousness or it is nothing. But from the assertion that freedom must be freedom of practical consciousness it does not necessarily follow that this freedom must be absolutely distinct and unique in each individual conscious empirical subject. Everyone of the individual conscious knowers is rational. But from this it does not necessarily follow that reason in each individual conscious knower should be absolutely separate and distinct from the reason in every other conscious individual knower. Had that been so, intelligible communication in the sphere of knowledge and intelligible imputation of responsibility or accountability in the sphere of ethics would be totally impossible! As a matter of fact Hartmann himself has gainsaid the uniqueness of personal freedom when he asserts, "Viewed enteologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorial freedom Fundamentally in its enteological structure autonomy is the same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities" (77). As regards Kant's discovery of freedom in the positive sense, i.e., freedom in the sense of addition of new determinant in the world ~~which~~ already determined by other determinants of which Hartmann speaks with so much enthusiasm and eloquence, it may be observed perhaps not without justification, that Hartmann's eloquence and enthusiasm are misplaced. Kant's theory of

moral freedom of, to be more precise, Hartmann's version of Kant's theory of moral freedom does not establish as Hartmann believed moral freedom or a truth about freedom; rather it establishes moral unfreedom. What does this addition of a new determinant mean? This new determinant can determine, according to Hartmann, the causally determined world only when it works in line with the flow of causal determination and not against it, i.e., only when it leaves the flow of the causal series uninterrupted. Thus the freedom to add the new determinant is not absolute but limited; the new determinant can be added to the causally determined world if and only if the new determinant does not run counter to the direction of the flow of causal series. Thus teleological determination can be brought into the world by the fiat or initiative, the autonomy of the person only if this teleological determination of the Ought, i.e., of the value, can coincide completely as ends and means with the series of effects and the causes. Hence the autonomy or the freedom of the person has no power to bring into the world a teleological determination, even if it be higher determination, which runs counter to the direction of the flow of causal series. Thus human freedom is limited; it cannot bring into the world any and every higher determination but only those higher determinations which can and do run in the same direction as with the flow of causal series. Hence there is not much to boast about Kant's discovery of freedom in the positive sense. This freedom is not something unique. Considered categorially, this freedom is also ~~uniquely~~ enjoyed by the possessor of the potency sui generis of every lower stratum, such as the stratum of logical determination, the stratum of mathematical determination, stratum of causal determination, the stratum of biological determination, the stratum of psychological

determination, etc. Hence Hartmann's joy in the Kantian discovery of human freedom in the positive sense exhibiting human ~~super~~ superiority is the joy of confusion and misunderstanding.

As regards the Fichtean view of moral freedom, Hartmann is definitely right in rejecting the idea of freedom behind consciousness as well as the idea of the final total annihilation of freedom by the perfect will which can will good and nothing but good and has no freedom to will the bad. Definitely moral freedom must be the freedom of consciousness and not of something behind consciousness and also the moral freedom of the will which has no freedom to will the bad is simply unfreedom even if the will be a perfect one.

As regards Schelling's theory of moral freedom Hartmann's contention that the consciousness of freedom can never vouchsafe the existence of the freedom of consciousness ~~as~~ simply because of the possibility of illusion does not bear strict examination. As a matter of fact Hartmann's Critique of the consciousness of freedom is a tissue of contradictions. Hartmann contended that ~~present~~/proof consists in facts and not in the testimony of consciousness. To this contention the answer is that facts as experienced, i.e., as consciousness of facts constitutes the real evidence in all cases. All evidence, in the last analysis, is the evidence of consciousness. No evidence, unless it is an experienced evidence, can be accepted as proof of anything. Further, Hartmann's account of the consciousness of freedom as the consciousness of something illusory permanently, i.e., as the consciousness of something which appears to the knowing consciousness as the freedom of consciousness but is not really so, does not bear critical examination. Hartmann's account of illusion and its correction is, it may be observed, vitiated by realistic biases and, as such, is un-

untenable. Consider, e.g., the difference between erroneous cognition and true cognition; the cognition of the snake and the cognition of the rope in the snake-rope illusion. Why is cognition of snake an erroneous cognition whereas the cognition of rope a true cognition? Is not the snake-experience an illusory experience because it is not an uncontradicted experience as it is cancelled by the rope-experience? Is not the rope-experience a veridical experience because, unlike snake-experience, it is not cancelled? Thus non-contradiction is the criterium of truth, and an experience, so long as it continues and is not cancelled, is not false. Thus false experience or illusion is that experience which is cancelled and consequently the possibility of permanent illusion as advocated by Hartmann is a chimera, a figment not of logical out of wild imagination. Of course we agree with Hartmann that phenomena do not involve real-existence. To be a fact of experience does not necessarily mean to be real. But from this assertion it does not necessarily follow that the evidence of the reality of a thing is completely independent of the consciousness of that thing. As a matter of fact to be real means not only to be a fact of experience but to be that which is uncontradicted in experience. But Hartmann due to his illogical realistic bias for the self-existence of the object failed to stress that aspect of experience which, in the fitness of things, should be stressed. He failed to note that the so-called self-existence of object is no self-existence unless it is experienced self-existence, i.e., unless it is evidenced by the testimony of consciousness. Likewise the freedom of the will, i.e., the freedom of consciousness is not genuine freedom of consciousness unless it is backed by the evidence of consciousness, i.e., unless it is experienced.

As regards Hartmann's accusation against ethical scepticism, we may observe, it is not a fair accusation. For the fact that the Sceptic is criticising a particular analysis of phenomena it does not follow necessarily (as Hartmann presumed) that the Sceptic must put forward an alternative analysis of his own. From the fact that a critic is criticising a historical drama of Shakespear it does not necessarily follow that the unfortunate critic must produce an alternative historical drama better in style than the Shakespearean one more in accord with historical facts. Had critics been compelled to supply the alternatives for what they criticised, criticism would be non-existent in the world. Hence Hartmann's contention that if the Sceptic be compelled to produce the alternative analysis of phenomena, his analysis, though conceivable, would not be more convincing and more in accord with the phenomena than our theory and ~~and~~ consequently we can dispense with the negative criticism of the Sceptic as a criticism of little value because our theory is more in accord with fact & and therefore more probable than the theory of the Sceptic, does not hold good. As a matter of fact Hartmann's contention contains implicit assumption which is not logically justifiable and the assumption is : Either the Sceptic must produce an alternative and better analysis than our theory or he must withdraw his negative criticism of our theory. And this is an assumption which is completely untenable. In this connection we may also note that though Hartmann criticised the philosophy of Post-Sankarite Vedanta for its ethical views, yet in his criticism of Scepticism he betrays his ignorance of Indian Philosophy. Had he been properly acquainted with Indian Philosophy, he would know the existence of Vaidantic School and consequently would not criticise the Sceptic after such a cavalier fashion.

. As regards the nature of moral freedom of the person Hartmann holds (1) "that there must be positive freedom, not indeterminateness but determination of a particular kind.

(2). The determining factor must not lie outside of the subject (person) hence not even in the values or any other autonomous principles.

(3). The determining factor must also not set indefinitely deep in the subject, but only in the conscious stratum; otherwise there is no moral freedom (Fichte's mistake). Hence freedom must lie neither on the hither nor on the further side of consciousness, but solely in itself.

(4). Yet the determining factor must also not be assumed to inhere in a consciousness that is super-individualotherwise it is not the freedom of the person There must be a freedom of the individual conscious will !.

(5). There must be freedom in two senses : not only freedom ever against the regularity of nature (the causal nexus and any other entological determinations), but equally there must be freedom ever against moral principles and the demands of the Ought - whether ever against an imperative or against the values !. The will must have scope precisely as regards these principles by which as a moral will it ought to allow itself to be determined" (78).

Hartmann, it should be noted at the very outset, subscribed to Libertarianism in his theory of moral freedom. Like other Libertarians he recognised that an act of willing of the finite, individual, conscious empirical person is a free act in the sense required for moral responsibility only if the agent (a) is the sole cause of the act (i.e., the act must be completely self-caused, self-determined); and (b) could exert his causality in alternative ways (i.e., the agent should be confronted by genuinely open possibilities, in other words, the agent must have the power of alternative

actions. These two conditions are, according to Hartmann, indispensable conditions for the possibility of moral freedom. Hartmann thus gainsaid the doctrine called 'Self-determinism' because this theory holds that the moral act issues necessarily from the nature of the agent and consequently it also holds that in the case such an act the agent could not do otherwise than he did and rejects the condition (b). Thus Hartmann steers clear of all the three doctrine, viz., Kantisic determinism, Indeterminism and Self-determinism. He also successfully dodges the theory of Psychic Determinism by his theory of Categorical or Structural Novelty which is a phenomenon sui generis ! Nevertheless Hartmann's theory of freedom does not bear strict examination. In the first place, moral freedom, according to Hartmann, is at once individual and universal. It is individual because "it inheres in the nature of all autonomy always to exist only in that wherein the law originates ! Only if the person contains a source of determination of his own is he also autono-mous" (79). And the "existential structure found in a moral personality is a super-existence sui generis here the individual has its unique mode mode of existence above its components" (80) the essential feature of which is independent. For "every higher type of existence with its own categorical formation is ex ipso "free", as ever the lower. Its mere superiority suffices for this... So it must be accepted as highly ~~reasonableness~~ reasonable in principle that into the disposition, volition and moral conduct of the individual person there enters a distinctive law, which abounds to the person alone, a genuine positive autonomy of his own, together with all inner and conditioning, and that his self-determination consists in this autonomy (81) ! It is universal because "viewed ontologically, the freedom of the will is only a special case of categorical freedom !

Fundamentally in its ontological structure autonomy is the same, whether in organic, psychological, logical or ethical entities" (82). Thus the freedom of the will, according to Hartmann, is at once unique and universal. But now can we may ask, something unique be universal without contradicting its intrinsic nature as unique? The freedom of the will, according to Hartmann, is something unique, i.e., uncommon, and if a common character of the uncommon be admitted, it will destroy the very nature of the uncommon as uncommon. Hartmann tried to go round the difficulty by asserting the freedom of the will as a hard fact of ethical life which, even if it is not amenable to the demand of unity or harmony of logic, should be accepted as such because of its facthood. But here we are forced to join issue with Hartmann. Is the fact of the freedom of the will really irrational? We answer in the negative. And we can, we hope, show that Hartmann himself also, perhaps inadvertently, answered it in the negative. Hartmann holds that in the phenomena of arrogance and lust of power there is "not the blind power of compulsive energy, but the wide-awake energy of initiative, which challenges the initiative of others, overcomes it, usurps its right In arrogance and lust of power there are spontaneous expansion and the usurpation of freedom. Here we find freedom running wild, rampant, everreaching itself. This phenomenon, even in its disvalue, is ethically significant, as a manifestation of the reality of freedom" (83). Thus the freedom of the will is irrational, as these phenomena of lust of power and arrogance amply show, only when it is running amuck bringing disvalue instead of moral value in the world; freedom which is sober and runs within bounds without everreaching itself is thus freedom with an element of rationality or logical harmony in it. Thus Hartmann's contention that the freedom of the will as an ethical fact is completely

irrational and does not contain even an iota of rationality in it does not bear strict examination. At least an element of reason and logic enters, it is evident from the account of the ingression of moral values (not disvalues) as given by Hartmann, into the freedom of the will. Thus the freedom of the will is not always bereft of reason. Further, if the freedom of the will be completely irrational, how can Hartmann arrive even at hypothetical certainty about the existence of such a freedom? We can discuss and argue only about those things which admit of the logical treatment of reason and can arrive at some conclusion about them with categorical or hypothetical certainty. But a thing which from the very nature of the case does not and cannot admit of rational treatment for its resolution into logical unity cannot for the same reason also become an object of discussion and argumentation. But Hartmann's very attempt to arrive at a hypothetical certainty about the reality of the freedom of the will by the way of discussion and argumentation belies his contention that the freedom of the will, being a metaphysical object, is beyond proof or disproof. Only that which is a contradiction in terms like the son of a barren mother is completely beyond proof or disproof and as such is also incapable of becoming an object of discussion also. And whatever is capable of becoming an object of discussion is also capable of becoming an object of proof or disproof, completely or partially.

Secondly, the freedom of the will being a metaphysical object, its existence, Hartmann contends, can be known only indirectly through certain phenomena of ethical life which indicate the existence of the freedom of the will as the needle of the galvanometer indicates the existence of electricity. Some of the phenomena indicates not only the existence but also the nature of the freedom of the will or moral freedom. These phenomena are consciousness of self-

determination, phenomena of responsibility and accountability, sense of guilt, phenomena of the moral sense's demand of justice for the virtuous man, phenomenon of the feeling of rightness of punishment for the wicked, the phenomena of lust of power and arrogance and the fact of the fiat and initiative on the part of the individual when he is confronted with a conflict of Ought and Ought and decides. All these phenomena can occur, according to Hartmann, if and only if the condition for their occurrence be real and the condition for occurrence is, Hartmann contends, the reality of moral freedom or the freedom of the will. In other words, the occurrence of these phenomena presupposes the existence of moral freedom and they cannot take place as ethical facts unless the freedom of the will be real. Thus the argument from ~~these~~ these phenomena is analytical, i.e., it is an argument from the conditioned to the condition. But does this argument really prove that what Hartmann intends it to prove? We answer in the negative. How can these phenomena indicate the existence of moral freedom? They can, Hartmann contends, do so because in various degrees they go against the natural inclination of man for self-deception, and also because in them "the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation & of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man" (84). But how does Hartmann know, we may say, that all these phenomena go against the natural tendency of self-deception in man, though in different degrees? Because, Hartmann perhaps would tell us, these phenomena are not accompanied by delight, exaltation, etc., which it is the natural tendency of man to follow (85). But how does Hartmann, we may again ask, know that it is the natural tendency of a man to ascribe to himself the authorship of these deeds which

are accompanied by delight and exaltation and to deny the authorship of these deeds which are not so accompanied? Experience seems to be Hartmann's only answer. But how experience can give us the universal concurrence between the deeds ~~are~~ accompanied by delight and exalted feeling and the tendency of man to ascribe their authorship to himself? Experience ~~is~~ definitely cannot give us this strict universality and necessity and without this the concurrence between them is certainly a chance concurrence which can never furnish any sure basis for necessary inference or finality in the conclusion arrived at. To show that it is a natural tendency in man to ascribe to himself the authorship of such deeds as are followed by delight and exaltation Hartmann must prove beyond doubt that such a tendency is the result or effect which necessarily follows from the constitution of human nature. And this is what Hartmann failed to do and consequently he has forfeited all his claim for the universality and necessity of this so-called natural tendency of man and also for the validity of the conclusions that he has drawn on the basis of the absence of this natural tendency.

Thirdly, in these "phenomena", according to Hartmann, "the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rises with its claim to inviolability, as against the empirical person with his violation of values. The manifestation of that Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in Men" (86). But why should, we may ask, the deeper metaphysical Being of the person rise with its claim to inviolability against the empirical person with his violation of values? Certainly the empirical person does not commit a sin against the ~~sacred~~ inviolability of the metaphysical Being of the person by his violation of values. For his violation of values is a vio-

tion of the claim of inviolability of the axiological entities and not of ontological entities, a sin against the Ought and not against the Is. Hence this claim of inviolability on the part of the deeper metaphysical Being is an undue, dishonest claim. Again it is quite incomprehensible how the deeper metaphysical Being of the person can claim. Only values which are axiological entities and as such, are of the nature Ought-to-Be can claim or demand as they cannot coerce or compel. Hence how can the deeper metaphysical Being of the person claim, unless it is an Ought-to-Be, i.e., value, which as metaphysical, ex hypothesi it cannot be? And even if it be granted that this accusing deeper metaphysical Being of the person is personality as an ideal value, it does not necessarily follow from this that the manifestation of this deeper metaphysical Being behind the empirically acting and erring person is nothing short of the manifestation of freedom in man because it cannot be so unless "the actual person, despite his shortcomings, feels himself to be more deeply identical with personality as a value than with his own empirical inclinations" (87). And this feeling of deeper identity on the part of the empirical person is an actual feeling and as such is conditioned by causal factors which govern our empirical feeling. Thus the manifestation of the freedom in man does not depend solely in the manifestation of the deeper metaphysical Being of the person behind the acting and erring empirical person. Ontological or causal factors are equally necessary for its manifestation.

Fourthly, apart from the empirical conflict in regard to values which issues solely from the situation itself, according to Hartmann, there stands side by side with it the opposition between Ought and Ought, the conflict of value with value. And when confronted with such a conflict the "

"consciousness of value is always looking out for syntheses. But "an antithetic of Ought and Oughtcannot be solved, however much the sense of value searches for syntheses a person - when face to face with conflict - cannot wait until an ideal synthesis presents itself to him. Out of his own resources, here and now, he must make a decision" (89). But "to decide is not to solve" (90). Hence for the consciousness of values "there remains nothing elseto do than take upon itself the conflict among the values and decide by its own initiative. Now inevitably every such decision is at the same time a fulfilment and a violation of them. For the decision can be in favour only of one side, never of both at the same time. Accordingly when confronted with the conflict in a concrete case, a person will necessarily be blamable on one side, and that through the very initiative whereby he seeks a way out of the conflict" (91). Thus valuational conflicts can only be "solved in given cases by a list, by initiative, by the Independent procedure of a being who thereby takes responsibility and guilt upon himself. If man could discover an axiologically adequate solution, he would not need to decide anything at all; he would only need to carry out the solution. But the given questions of life are not of this sort. Step by step in life man must decide them without being able to solve them. He can neither chance nor escape them; he can only push through them, by ~~the~~ virtue of his initiative, even if by this his initiative he becomes guilty" (92). But why, we may ask, the person cannot wait until a synthesis presents itself to him? Why must he make a ~~bad~~ decision here and now? The answer is obvious. He cannot wait and he must make a decision here and now because the situation is given and this given situation is so constituted as to compel him to take a decision without waiting for the arrival of ideal synthesis and ~~thus~~ without any other ~~an~~ avenue of escape from making such a decision here.

and now. Thus the decision made by the person in the given situation is not a free decision but a decision which ~~as~~ he is constrained to make. In other words, the person in the given situation is not free but compelled. He is making the decision not because he is making it freely without any idea of avoiding it if he could but because he is constrained to make it with the idea of avoiding it and searching in vain for an avenue of escape so that he could avoid it. Thus it is not true, as Hartmann contends, that "the actual will of the actual person must be "free" - at least as regards the values involved in the conflict" (93). Rather the opposite is the case. Further why should the man who, when faces a conflict of value with value, is making a decision in favour of one, be blamable? He can be morally blameworthy if and only if he makes a decision freely against the other value. But does he make his decision freely against the claim of the other value? We must answer in the negative. The charge that he can and would make a decision freely against the claim of the other value can be brought against the empirically acting person if and only if it can be shown conclusively that even in the case of an ideal synthesis making it possible for the person to consider favourably the claims of both the values, at once, the person stands favourably for the claim of one of them turning down the claim of the other. Hence Hartmann's contention that from the point of view of moral conflict which is inter-ethical, i.e., the opposition is between Ought and Ought and not between the Is and the Ought, "light is thrown upon the relation of the Ought to the will - and thereby upon the question of personal freedom" (94), that though the arguments from the factual complex of responsibility, imputability and the consciousness of guilt definitely point back "to an autonomy of the person, in whom a basic ethical capacity inheres, a potency

sui generis" (95), yet "they could say nothing further as to its nature" (96), that "the opposition of the Ought and the will, by the analysis of the radical difficulties involved in it, throws the first light, although an uncertain light, upon the point" does not withstand critical perusal. The argument from the factual complex responsibility, imputability and the sense of guilt and other minor ethical phenomena can point out the existence but not the natural nature of personal freedom because these arguments according to Hartmann, are of the nature of an inference from the conditioned to the condition. They establish that the existence of the conditioned is not possible without the existence of the condition but they cannot reveal its nature. In other words, they can establish that the conditioned is but not what it is. Thus Hartmann admits the possibility of knowing the bare existence of a real without the knowledge of its nature. But Hartmann has made a mistake by describing the argument of this type as "analytical, an inference from the conditioned to the condition, that is, a hypothetical argument" (97). In inference we start from premises and draw conclusion that will justify the conclusion. But in the argument of this type which seems to be an inverted inference our starting-point is the conclusion itself and we work back to the premises that will justify the conclusion. Hence strictly speaking it is no inference logically. Considered as inference all these arguments are open to the objection that there is more in the conclusion than is justified by the premises. From the phenomena we can infer only the phenomena, but from the phenomena we cannot infer the real existence, i.e., the metaphysical, presupposition of the phenomena. From the phenomena to the metaphysical ground thereof obviously there there is a leap not strictly inferential. Hence Hartmann

Spoke erroneously when he described this type of argument as an inference from the conditioned to the condition. As a matter of fact it is a kind of argument usually known as Arthapatti or presumptive argument in Indian Philosophy. According to some Indian Philosophers, argument of this type is a presumption necessitated for resolution of an observed contradiction in experience. Validity of this kind of argument is not inferential validity and consequently to judge the truth or otherwise of this argument in terms of the criterion inferential validity is simply an erroneous procedure. Therefore Hartmann, we are forced to conclude, is completely on the wrong track not only in respect of the nature of this argument but also in respect of its validity. Moreover it is quite inexplicable how we can know the bare existence of a thing without knowing its nature. Even the so-called inference which is ultimately a presumptive argument can and does indicate ~~as~~ not only the bare existence but also non-phenomenal character of the real-existence and thereby distinguish it from phenomenal existence. Thus what we know even inferentially is not bare existence but determinate existence and consequently Hartmann's contention that we are capable of knowing bare existence is quite untenable. Further Hartmann's claim that the relation of the Ought to the will clearly brings into relief the nature of moral freedom is not a justifiable claim. The relation of the Ought to the will only shows, by showing the non-identity of the Ought and the will, that the power to identify itself with the Ought rests with the will and therefore the will of the empirical person in this sense is free. It ~~as~~ does not show how this freedom of the will is different from the freedom of the organic, psychological and logical entities. As a matter of fact the argument establishes the existence of freedom only in a generic sense and not in the specific sense of the freedom of the will. Hence Hartmann's proud declaration

that real freedom of the moral person is "by far the most tenable hypothesis" and "is not only the most direct and simple, avoiding all theoretical bye-paths;also the explanation which lies nearest to the facts" (98), is an empty and baseless declaration devoid any evidential value and validity. As a matter of fact to accept Hartmann's version of the real freedom of the moral person is not to avoid but to ~~try~~ tread on the beaten track of a particular theory, viz., the metaphysical theory of emergence, a theory of creation de novo.

Fifthly, Hartmann's theory of freedom, we should note, is based on a particular metaphysical theory and is refuted with the refutation of that theory. Hartmann admits of the existence of many determinations which are graded into a series of higher and lower the higher being a structural novelty over and above the lower. Thus the higher determination as a structural novelty not reducible to lower is, though dependent upon the lower for its existence, free. In other words, the higher determination is free over and against the lower determination in the sense that though the higher is dependent upon the lower existentially (take away the lower determination and the higher determination will at once cease to be) it exhibits novel features which are not reducible to the lower without remainder and as such it is free. It is also free in the sense that the higher, so long as it follows and does not go counter to the direction of the determination of the lower, can bring new determination in the realm of the lower which are not reducible to the lower. In other words, freedom, according to Hartmann, is a plug-phenomenon; it is not absence but addition of another new determination to the already determined world. Freedom is possible, according to Hartmann, only in the world where there prevails a lower determinism with a higher ~~as~~ indeterminism. But for the existence of moral freedom

freedom the existence of a lower determinism with higher indeterminism, though necessary, is not sufficient. In addition to it there must exist a third determination wedged between the higher and the lower whose function is to actualise the higher determination into lower by its initiative without being constrained in its function by either of them. Thus, according to Hartmann, the existence of the freedom of the will be possible if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled, viz., (1) there should be strata of determinations should be graded into a series of higher and lower, the stratum of lower determination being a relatively open system capable of receiving the higher determination, into itself, it does not contradict its intrinsic nature or commits conflict with its property ingressed into itself, ", (2) the lower determination is stronger than the higher and the higher is dependent on and conditioned by the lower because of its strength, and (3) wedged between the higher and the lower there should be a third power, a potency *sui generis*, which is capable of actualising the higher into the lower by irrational and unpredictable fiat or initiative which cannot be constrained by either the higher or the lower determination. And in the case of the freedom of the will of the acting, erring, empirical person the stratum of lower determination is the stratum of entological causal determination, the stratum of higher determination is the axiological teleological determination of values and the potency *sui generis* is unconstrained initiative of the empirical person which of which the actualisation of values is the function. Thus the freedom of the initiative is the freedom of the empirical person, or to be more precise, freedom of the actual willing of the empirical person, "if freedom is anything at all, it must be an actual power, a potency of the actual man" (99).

says Hartmann. The question of freedom, he continues, is an existential problem and "existential problem are ontological questions of actuality and without empirical foundations they cannot be discussed" (100). Thus "the actual will of the actual person" Hartmann asserts, "must be 'Free'" (101). Thus by 'actual person' Hartmann means empirical person, i.e., "living persons in their full concrete existence" (101). And by 'actual will' Hartmann means empirical act of willing of the empirical person. Now empirical person and his empirical act of willing are phenomena. But is freedom of the will also a phenomenon? As "an actual power, a potency of the actual man" (103), it should also in the fitness of things be empirical and consequently phenomenal; but this, according to Hartmann, is not so. Freedom being a condition for the existence of such phenomena as the consciousness of self-determination, responsibility and imputability, the sense of guilt, the moral sense of the demand valutional balance between the virtuous and his happiness, the moral sense of the justifiability of the punishment of the wrong-doer and the phenomena of lust of power and arrogance it cannot itself be a phenomenon like the conditioned. Also it has real existence and it is not of the same status of the phenomena. But here at once the question arises : If it is not empirical or phenomenal, how then can it qualify an empirically existent something, a phenomenon? Of course Hartmann will at once refer to the irrational nature of fact and will urge us to accept fact even if it be irrational or logically inconceivable. But is it really an irrational fact, we may ask, or is it an irrational product of a speculative imagination which soars high, like baleen serving all its soarings in facts? This freedom of the will resolves itself, in the ultimate analysis, into the freedom of unconstrained choosing of one of the irreconcilable alternatives. This act of choosing is unconstrained, i.e., it is

not forced or compelled in any way either by causal psychic determination or by the teleological determination of the values. But here again arises a question : why an act of choice which is quite undetermined causally, i.e., which is, except the fact of succession in time, uncaused be an actual choice? In other words, in so far as it is actual, it is not and cannot be uncaused; and in so far it is uncaused, it is not and cannot be actual. Hartmann could eviate the difficulty by appealing to experience, but he forfeited his right of appeal to experience by his hasty assertion, viz., "just as the existence of God does not follow from the consciousness of God, however clear, so real freedom of consciousness (that of the conscious will) never follows from the given consciousness of freedom, however unescapable and impurifiable this may be" (104). Hence lacking the support of consciousness he cannot prove the actuality of freedom of conscious will, the actuality of this potency sui generis and consequently he cannot also prove the facthood of freedom. Moreover, Hartmann, it seems, cannot trust the testimony of consciousness in immediate experience because of the possibility of illusion. But how can he trust the testimony of consciousness in such mediate experience as inferential knowledge which always involves the possibility of error and fallacy? And when both the immediate experience and mediate knowledge are sailing in the same boat Hartmann has no right to prefer one and reject the other. We admit that the freedom of "the actual will of the actual person" is a logically inexplicable fact but our admission is based on inferential knowledge but on the testimony of the consciousness of immediate experience. And if consciousness is incapable of standing as a guarantee for the existence of such freedom nothing can guarantee its existence. As a matter of fact the

act of actual willing of the actual person is a unique occurrence which occurs only at the particular moment and it did not occur in the infinite past nor will it occur in the infinite future, and we know it to be a finite, unique occurrence because its absence for all the time prior to its beginning to be, the limited period of its existence and its absence for all the time to come after it ceases to be can be certified only by a consciousness that comprises the whole of time. In other words, it is only an eternal consciousness that can certify the evanescent occurrence of mental events in time. That this particular act of willing is free is also guaranteed by the testimony of consciousness. This particular act of willing is free because though it follows in the wake of the previous mental event its succession here is not objective and necessary the opposite being conceivable. In other words, of two mental events, A and B, where A is followed by B we cannot say that the mental event, B, is causally determined by the preceding mental event, A, unless the mental event, B, not following the in the wake of the mental event, A, in time is completely inconceivable to our consciousness. And in the case of the free act of willing it is quite conceivable that the mental event, A, may not be followed by the mental act of willing, B, with its object, say Q), but by 'B' (with its end or object, say R). Hence the freedom of the actual will of the actual person is established in the last analysis by the testimony of consciousness which certifies the possibility of conceiving the opposite regarding the succession of the previous mental event in time by the particular act of willing and thereby guarantees its uncaused character and consequently its freedom.

Despite all the faults, fallacies and questionable gaps in his reasonings Hartmann, it must be admitted, deserves recognition as a speculative genius of rare orders with hardly any parallel in the history of modern philosophy. Unlike his British contemporaries with their single track mind and inordinate love for the technique of analysis Hartmann is a front rank philosopher of speculation on the basis of empirical data. His thought rolls in masses and volumes and tackles the problem, like an octopus, at once from all sides. He is bold in his sky-kissing conception, completely scrupulous in his phenomena dissection and thorough in the execution of his system-building. His thorough dissection of ethical phenomena revealed for the first time the hitherto unsuspected richness of moral experience. The gifts he inherited from such giants of philosophy of the past as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mr Nietzsche and others and the harvest he reaped from the field of his such continental contemporaries as Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler he has very successfully brought to bear upon the problems of moral life in order to erect one of the boldest, grandest and most magnificent system of Ethics. With the solitary exception of Whitehead who is more continental and less British in his mental make-up there is none among the modern philosophers who can be compared with Hartmann in respect of his Magnum opus "Ethics" in three volumes.

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CHAPTER - FOUR

Dr. Moore in his book "Principia Ethica" brought about a revolution in the realm of ethical thought by introducing analysis for the resolution of notoriously knotty problem of Ethics. One main object of his book, says Moore, may be expressed by saying that it is a sort of 'Prælegomena to any future Ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific : In short, he tried to make Ethics scientific and since its publication in 1903, it has been exercising a profound influence in the realm of ethical thought.' "His Principia Ethica" published in 1903," says Broad, "marked the beginning of a new and very fruitful phase in English moral philosophy" '(1).

Ethics, says Moore, may be defined as "the general enquiry into what is good". "Ethics," he continues, "is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; but being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared to tell us what is good as well as what is conduct. For 'good conduct' is a complex notion: all conduct is good; for some is certainly bad and some may be indifferent. And on the other hand, other things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then 'good' denotes some property, that is common to them and conduct; and if we examine good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger of mistaking for this property, some property which is not shared by these other things: and thus we shall have made a mistake about Ethics even in this limited sense; for we shall not know what good really is. This is a mistake which many writers have actually made, from limiting their enquiry to conduct. And hence I shall try to avoid it by considering first what is good in general; hoping that if we can arrive at any

certainty about this, it will be much easier to settle the question of good conduct; for we all pretty well know what 'conduct' is. This, then, is our first question; what is good? and What is bad? and to the discussion of this question (or those questions) I give the name Ethics, since that science must at all events, include it "(2). Thus we find that the central problem of Ethics, according to Moore, is the determination of good in general and the fundamental ethical question is : what is good? All other ethical problems are subsidiary and admit of solution only when the fundamental problem is satisfactorily solved.

The term 'good', according to Moore, has many usages, and in some of the senses in which it is used it is definable. But in the sense in which it is relevant to ethics it is not definable. In short, though 'good' is definable as answering the question, what is good?, yet it is not definable as answering the question, what good in itself is? and these two questions are definitely not identical. Thus 'good' in the sense of an ethical adjective qualifying a substantive is, in Moore's opinion, indefinable. " 'good', then, if we mean by it that quality", says Moore, "which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word". The most important sense of "definition" is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariable compose a certain whole; and in this sense 'good' has no definition because it is simple and has no parts(3)). Thus the term 'good' is an indefinable ultimate predicate in the fundamental moral judgments of intrinsic values. Moore describes this ultimate and most fundamental predicate of ethical judgments as simple, simple, indefinable, unanalysable, intrinsic, and non-natural. The indefinability and unanalysability of 'good' follow from

its simplicity for simplicity means partlessness and definition in its most important sense, according to Moore, is nothing but the resolution of a complex whole into its simplest parts by means of analysis. 'Good' is intrinsic in the sense in which the description of a thing say, A, as good means that it is good that the thing in question, viz., A, should exist, even if it exists quite alone without any accompaniment or effect whatever. In this connection Moore distinguishes between good as a means, good as end and ultimate good. Good as a means or instrumental good means that a thing say, X, is good because of its effects or effects which are intrinsically good or which are also good because of their effects which are intrinsically good. Ultimate good when used as a predicate means that the thing of which it is the predicate is good for its own sake. The distinction between intrinsically good and ultimate good is that while a complex whole which is intrinsically good may contain parts which are not themselves intrinsically good, an ultimately good whole contains no such parts(4).

Moral judgments or rather ethical statements, according according to Moore are of two kinds, viz., statements concerning the good in itself or intrinsic value and statements concerning right actions or duties. Judgments of the former kind are self-evident or intuitive, in the sense that they are incapable of proof, i.e., they cannot be proved or disproved by anything else except themselves while the judgments of the latter kind are not self-evident, i.e., they admit of proof or disproof from the consideration of other truths. Judgments concerning right actions involve evidence of two kinds, viz., causal truths as well as ethical truths whereas judgments concerning intrinsically good things involve only ethical truths which are intuitive. E.g., when we say of a particular action that this is a right action we mean that

the action in question is one which is capable of producing an effect or set of effects which are intrinsically good. Thus we find that judgment concerning right action involves truths of both types, i.e., it involves causal truth regarding the productivity of intrinsically good effects by such actions as well ethical truth regarding the non-natural and intrinsic quality, called good, qualifying these ~~such~~ effects(5).

As regards these voluntary actions which can be characterised as right actions Moore observes, "That there is some characteristic which belongs to and must belong to absolutely all right voluntary actions and to ~~no~~ wrong ones", and "That one such characteristic consists in the fact that the total consequences of the right actions must always be as good, intrinsically, as any which it was possible for the agent to produce under the circumstances (it being uncertain, however, in which sense precisely the word 'possible' is to be understood), whereas this can never be true of wrong ones" (6). It is evident from Moore's statement that he admits the possibility of a number of alternative voluntary actions every one of which is as equally right as all of them can produce equally intrinsically good total consequences. Consequently "to say that a man acted rightly does not imply that, if he had done anything else instead, he would have acted wrongly" (7). And in this respect the notion of duty differs from that of right. For to say that a man ought to do a particular action does imply that it would be wrong for him to do anything else. But despite this difference 'duty' (and 'right', in a sense, do coincide, i.e., are coextensive). For not acting rightly means, in a sense, not doing what we ought to do. Nevertheless 'duty' and 'right' are not coextensive in the sense in which avoidance of a particular right action does not mean ~~not~~ avoidance of duty. Avoidance of duty means the avoidance of all the equally right alternative actions.

and doing an action the total consequence of which is less in value than the total consequences of at least another action. All these consequences follow from Moore's definition of 'duty' and 'right'. "Our 'duty', therefore, can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. And what is 'right' or 'morally permissible' only differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible alternative". Thus "to assert that certain ways of acting are 'duties' is to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest possible sum of good" (8).

From Moore's definition of 'duty' and 'right' it follows that statements of what we ought to do are not self-evident because they are causal statements and as such they depend for their evidential value and validity on the truth of the statements of Laws of Nature. Consequently the question, 'what kind of action ought we to perform?' and 'What kind of conduct is right?' "can only be answered by an entirely new method - the method of empirical investigation; by means of which causes are discovered in other sciences". "In order to show that any action is a duty", says Moore, "it is necessary to know both what are the other conditions, which will be the effects of these conditions; and to know all the events which will be in any way affected by our action throughout an infinite future. We must have all this causal knowledge, and further we must know accurately the degree of value both of the action itself and of all these effects; and must be able to determine how, in conjunction with other things in the Universe, they will affect its value as an organic whole. And not only this, we must also possess all this knowledge with regard to the effects of every possible alternative; and must then be able to see by comparison that the total value due to the

existence of the action in question will be greater than that which would be produced by any one of these~~s~~ alternatives" (9).

But in order to determine by comparison that the total value due to the existence of the action in question, i.e., action which claims to be our duty, will be greater than that which would be produced by any of the alternatives, we must take into account the total values of all these alternatives, and these alternatives, and these total values are complex wholes, composed of many parts. Since however the quantity of the intrinsically good things produced is the correct criterion of right and ~~wor~~ wrong and the maximum quantity of the intrinsically good things produced is the criterion of duty, it is necessary for us to make a quantitative comparison of the total values of these possible alternatives. But when we start to compare these total values which are intrinsically good complex wholes we must bear in mind the caution that these complex wholes are not always simply the sum-total of the values of their parts. "The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts" (10). This principle is named by Moore the 'Principle of Organic wholes'; and an intrinsically good organic whole is a whole which is composed of heterogeneous parts, i.e., some of the parts are intrinsically good while other parts are intrinsically bad or indifferent or both. Thus Moore says, "I shall use it to denote the fact that a whole has a intrinsic value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts !..... ! Understood in this special and perfectly definite sense the relation of an organic whole to its parts is one of the most important which Ethics has to recognise. A chief part of that science should be comparing the relative values of various goods; and the greatest error will be com-

nitted in such comparison if it be assumed that wherever two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely the sum of the values of these two things" (11). Moore also shows the relation which subsists between the parts and the intrinsically good organic whole of which they are parts. Firstly, the existence of an organic whole depends necessarily on the existence of its parts, the necessary being extra-causal or extra-natural, i.e., unlike the necessity that subsists between a good thing and its cause or means, the necessity does not depend for its existence on the present state of laws of nature. Further the part is, while the mean is not, a part of the whole for the existence of which its existence is a necessary condition. In short, the part is, whereas the mean is not, constitutive of an organic whole. Secendly, though a whole's existence which is intrinsically valuable includes the existence of the part, yet the existence of the part may have neither any intrinsic value whatever or no more intrinsic value than that of means (12).

We shall conclude with a brief discussion of Moore's view on "Free will" as expounded by Moore in his "Ethics", chapter-VI, pp.196-222 (Harr University Library Series). According to Moore, "We do hold that many voluntary actions are right and others wrong; that many ought to have been done, and others ought not to have been done; and that it was agent's duty to do some of them, and his duty not to do others. Whether any actions, except voluntary ones, can be properly said to be right or wrong, or to be actions which ought or ought not to have been done, and, if so, in what sense and under what conditions, is again question which our theory does not presume to answer. It only assumes that these things can be properly said of some voluntary actions, whether or

net they can also be said of other actions as well. It confines itself, therefore, strictly to voluntary actions" (13). What, then, is a voluntary action? Volition depends on choice and "in many cases, there certainly are a considerable number of different actions, any one of which we could do, if we chose, and between which, therefore, in this sense, we have a choice" (14). Consequently, "many of our actions are under the control of our wills, in the sense that if, just before we began to do them, we had chosen not to do them, we should not have done them; and", says Moore, "I propose to call all actions of this kind voluntary actions" (15). Thus, according to Moore, "whenever a voluntary action is right or wrong (and we have throughout only been talking of voluntary actions), it is true that the agent could, in a sense, have done something else instead. This is an absolutely essential part of the theory" (15).

According to Moore, there are two theories, viz., the theory of Absolute Determinism and the theory of Absolute Indeterminism, and any one of these theories, if true, will contradict Moore's view. Thus Moore says, "those who hold that no man ever could have done anything other than what he did do, are, if they else hold that right and wrong depend upon what we can do, logically bound to hold that no action of ours is ever right and none is ever wrong; and this is a view which constitutes an extremely serious and fundamental objection to our theory; since our theory implies, on the contrary, that we every often do act wrongly, if never quite rightly. Those on the other hand, who hold that we absolutely can do things, which we don't do, and that right and wrong depend upon what we thus can do, are also liable to be led to contradict our theory, though for a different reason. Our theory holds that, provided a man could

have done something else, if he had chosen, that is sufficient to entitle us to say that his action really is either right or wrong. But those who hold the view we are considering will be liable to reply that this is by no means sufficient; that to say that it is sufficient, is entirely to misconceive the nature of right and wrong. They will say that, in order that an action may be really either right or wrong, it is absolutely essential that the agent should have been really able to act differently, able in some sense quite other than that of merely being able, if he had chosen. If all that were ever really ever true of us were merely that we could have acted differently, if we had chosen, then, these people would say, it really would be true that none of our actions are ever right and that none are ever wrong (underlining ours). They will say, therefore, that our theory entirely misses out one absolutely essential condition of right and wrong - the condition - that, for an action to be right or wrong, it must be freely done. And moreover, many of them will hold also that the class of actions which we absolutely can do is often not identical with those which we can do, if we choose From which it will follow that many actions which our theory declares to be wrong, will, according to them, be right, these actions really are the best of all that we could have done, though not the best of all that we could have done, if we had chosen" (16).

Thus neither Absolute Determinism nor Absolute Indeterminism, if true, will lend countenance to Moore's theory, though for different reasons. Absolute Determinism which is impatient of any form of Indeterminism, partial or complete, will make the freedom of choice as implied in the clause "if one had chosen" simply an illusion; while absolute Indeterminism which is impatient of any form of Determinism, partial or complete, will declare Moore's view of the determination

of voluntary actions by choice which itself is free as a travesty of fact.

Moore in his discussion of the Free Will controversy points out "that one of the commonest and most legitimate usages of the phrases 'could' and 'could not' is to express a difference, which often really does hold between two things neither of which did actually happen. Only a few instances need be given. I could have walked a mile in twenty ~~sixty~~'s minutes this morning, but I certainly could not have run two miles in five minutes! I did not, in fact, do either of these two things; but it is pure non-sense to say that the mere fact that I did not, does away with the distinction between them, which I express by saying that the one was within my powers, whereas the other was not. Although I did neither, yet the one was certainly possible to me in a sense in which the other was totally impossible. Or, to take another instance : It is true, as a rule, that cats can climb trees, whereas dogs can't. Suppose that on a particular afternoon neither A's cat nor B's dog do climb a tree! It is quite absurd to say that this mere fact proves that we must be ~~wax~~ wrong if we say (as we certainly often should say) that the cat could have climbed a tree, whereas the dog couldn't. Or, to take an instance which concerns an inanimate object. Some ships can steam 20 knots, whereas others can't steam more than 15. And the mere fact that, on a particular occasion, a 20 knot steamer did not actually run at this speed certainly does not entitle us to say that she could not have done so, in the sense in which a 15-knot one could not. On the contrary, we all can and should distinguish between cases in which (as, for instance, owing to an accident to her propeller) she did not, because she could not, and cases in which she did not, although she could" (17).

Now Moore applies this use of the phrase 'could' and 'could not' as expressing the difference between cases in which we did not act because we could not, i.e., the performance of the action in question was an impossible for us, and the case in which we did not act although we could, i.e., in spite of the absence of actual performance of the action by us it was possible for us to do the act, to the controversy of Free Will.

According to the determinist who denies Free Will, nothing else could have happen save and except what did happen. But even if we have taken the premise for granted, the conclusion that nothing else could have happened save and except what did happen does not follow unless the determinist can prove that the word 'could' is univocal, i.e., it can be used in one sense or meaning only. The indeterminist holds "that, if we have Free Will? it must be true, in some sense, that we sometimes could have done, what we did not do"; whereas the determinist holds "that, if everything is caused, it must be true, in some sense, that we never could have done, what we did not do" (18). And the question arises : Are the two meanings of the word 'could' the same? Now if we ask the question : In which sense of the word 'could' it was possible for us to do what we did not do?, the answer, according to Moore, is that "there is one suggestion, which is very obvious : namely, that what I mean is simply after all that I could, if U. I had chosen; or (to avoid a possible complication) perhaps we had better say "that I should, if I had chosen" (19). But even this may not satisfy the determinists. They may argue "for instance, that there never is any reason to treat or to regard the voluntary commission of a crime in any different way from that in which we treat or regard the involuntary catching of a disease. The man who committed the crime could

net, they say, have helped committing it any more than the other man could have helped catching the disease; both events were equally inevitable" (20). To this Moore replies that "the mere fact that the man would have succeeded in avoiding the crime, if he had chosen (which is certain often true), whereas the other man would not have succeeded in avoiding the disease, even if he had chosen (which is often true) gives an ample justification for regarding and treating the two cases differently. It gives such a justification, because, where the ~~succ~~ occurrence of an event did depend upon the will, there, by acting on the will (as we may do by blame or punishment) we have often a reasonable chance of ~~succ~~ preventing similar events recurring in the future; whereas, where it did not depend upon the will, we have no such chance" (21). "There is", Moore says, "therefore, much reason to think that when we say that we could have done a thing which we did not do, we often mean merely that we should have done it, if we had chosen,". And if it is what we mean, then it absolutely follows that we really have Free Will, and also that this fact is quite consistent with the principle that everything has a cause; and it follows also that our theory will be perfectly right, when it makes right and wrong depend on what we could have done, if we had chosen" (22). But even then the critics may not be satisfied. They can point out that even if it be certain that we ever should have acted differently, if we had willed differently, this by itself, though necessary, is by no means sufficient to entitle us to hold that we possess Free Will. The critics will say; "Granted that we often should have acted differently, if we had chosen differently, yet it is not true that we have Free Will, unless it is also often true in such cases that we could have chosen differently" (23). In reply to this contention Moore points out "that here

again it is absolutely certain that, in two different senses, at least, we often could have chosen, what, in fact, we did not choose; and that in neither sense does this fact contradict the principle of causality" (24).

"It is", Mees concludes, "therefore, quite certain (1) that often we should have acted differently, if we had chosen so; (2) that similarly we often should have chosen differently, if we had chosen so to choose; and (3) that it was almost always possible that we should have chosen differently, in the sense that no man could know for certain that we should not so choose. All these three things are facts, and all of them are quite consistent with the principle of causality" (25).

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CHAPTER - FIVE

We have given a fairly correct outline of Moore's view on Ethics, and now we propose to examine his views critically in order to find out, in the light of our examination, how far they are tenable.

For Moore the central problem of Ethics is the determination of the good and the fundamental ethical question is: What good (in general) in itself is? And his answer to this question is that good is an indefinable, unanalysable, simple, intrinsic and non-natural quality. But in asking that very question 'What good in itself is?' Moore simply commits, I think, the fallacy of many questions. For Moore in his very manner of questioning assumes that there cannot be many qualitatively distinct goods. In short, he assumes the non-existence of a plurality of qualitatively distinct goods or goodness. & Moore himself says that the answers given to the question, 'What is common and peculiar to all ethical judgments?' are not satisfactory. But from the existence of unsatisfactory answers it does not necessarily follow that there is no value-predicate common and peculiar to all ethical judgments. Hence Moore's off-hand rejection of the possibility of the existence of moral good as qualitatively distinct from aesthetic and other goods as the value-predicate common and peculiar to all ethical judgments is not justifiable. Further from the fact that other things, besides conduct, are good it does not necessarily follow that 'good' denotes some property or quality which is common to them and conduct. For it may be possible that the 'good' which belongs to conduct is qualitatively distinct from the 'good' which belongs to other things. Hence without definitely disproving this possibility as untenable it is not justifiable to hold that 'good' denotes a property which is common to conduct (which comes within the sphere of

Ethics proper) and other things (which do not come within the sphere of Ethics), i.e., that there are not many goods which are qualitatively different and belong to different spheres not reducible to a common denominator".

As regards Moore's description of 'good' as a simple, indefinable, unanalyseable, intrinsic and non-natural quality it may be remarked that the argument from unanalysability is a dangerous argument. For the simplicity of the quality 'good' is inferred from the failure of the attempts to analyse this notion. But in the case of the failure of previous attempts to analyse the notion we are left with the alternatives that (a) that there is a correct analysis of the notion which has not yet been discovered; or (b) that the notion is simple and unanalyseable. And to hold the second alternative without positively disproving the first is intellectually disquieting.

Moore illustrates his view of a simple,unanalyseable and indefinable quality by citing the example of yellow. "Consider yellow", says Moore, "for example. We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment's reflection is sufficient to show that these light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive. Indeed we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of these vibrations is that they are what correspond in space to the yellow which we perceive"(1). It will appear from the above that Moore makes a distinction between a quality such as yellow that is perceived as simple and unanalyseable and its physical equi-

valent which are certain light-vibrations. And he further holds that we perceive this simple unanalysable quality ~~as such~~ ~~as such~~ because are struck by the patent difference of quality amongst the different colours. Here is an obvious confusion which one hardly expects from a writer of Moore's standing. If a colour is perceived through its "patent difference" from other colours it is hardly legitimate to say in the same breath that it is a simple unanalysable quality. If a colour is known through its difference from other colours there is obviously some mediation involved. The difference is either part and parcel of the colour which it differentiates or is different from it. In the first alternative one can hardly say that the colour is known by itself and not through its difference from other colours. In the second alternative we are landed into an infinite regress of a difference that differs by another difference. In fact, what may be called the Achilles' heel of Modern Realism is the conception of sense-datum that is not merely given but also perceived by itself, self-contained. That the so-called yellow is at best a particular shade of yellow referring necessarily to other shades of yellow and differentiated from reds, greens and other sensations of colour, sound etc., is a primary fact which the majority of the Modern Realists seem to ignore. Kant's lesson in the first Critique that there is no perception except through the synthesis of Apprehension and the Synthesis of Representation not to speak of the Synthesis of Apperception seems to be unceremoniously brushed aside by the majority of the realistic writers. Starting from the assumption of unmediated brute matters of sense they construct realistic philosophies all which err in their basic conceptions. A sensation as such is never an object of perception. When the Realists speak of yellow as a unique datum perceived

as such they forget that they are talking only of sensation and not the perception of yellow. The following from Walsh's "Reason and Experience" knocks the bottom out of most of the realistic constructions, miscalled analysis. "Simple judgment of sense", says Walsh, "at least, it argued, must be such that we can see them to be true on their own merits without reference to any other judgment". Thus, if I hear a loud noise I hear a loud noise; there is no sense in asking what other judgments I am prepared to assert at at the time of hearing. But though this argument is a very strong one, I am not ~~sure~~ sure that it is really decisive. In the judgment 'I hear a loud noise' we can distinguish, as in other more complex assertions, two elements : a given element, supplied here by sensation, and an element of interpretation. And though the interpretative element is of minor importance in a case like this, it is none the less present. It is in virtue of it that I classify the experience as noise and describe it as loud. But such a process of classification, in which an appeal is made to general ideas (being noise, loud, etc.,) involves a reference beyond the context of immediate experience, and so suggest that the judgment is not, after all, self-contained. It is not one experience, but a whole class of them, which I describe as being a noise. But if this is so it looks as if we must say simple judgments of sense, as of other judgments, that their condition lies partly outside themselves; that they are not to be accepted because they are evident in themselves, but only ~~so~~ ~~as~~ far as they fit in with other judgments" (2). In a footnote in the same page of the book Mr. Walsh says, "The case for this point was argued most effectively by Bradley in the second chapter of his Logic. In reviving it must not be thought to wish to deny the reality and the importance of the given. But I hold (as I think Bradley did)

that the given is a presupposition of experience rather than something we can express precisely in simple judgments. The given is known in feeling, not in judgments".

Regarding Moore's view of the propositions of intrinsic value that they are self-evident or intuitively certain, i.e., true by themselves alone so that no reason can be given for them. We may observe, perhaps not without justification, that Moore's view in this respect is not satisfactory. In the first place, Moore holds that an intrinsic value judgment or end-judgment, unlike an extrinsic value judgment or means-judgments, is necessarily ~~so~~ true in all instances, if it be true in one instance of an intrinsically good thing. But this is a statement which it is very difficult to prove. It is ~~very~~ very difficult to prove, for instance, that what we value today as intrinsically good, say knowledge, was ~~so~~ valued in ~~the~~ the past and will be ~~so~~ valued in the infinite future. And unless it is ~~so~~, the statement that the intrinsic value judgment, if true in one instance, will necessarily be true in all instances is nothing more than unproved assumption. Secondly, in the case of conflict of intuitions there is no way out!. For it is not possible from the very nature of the case to supply extra-intuitional evidence in favour of any one of the conflicting intuitions. But that amounts to the assertions that two completely opposite intuitions are true and that there is no way to disprove any one of them, and this will land us straight in the undesirable realm of ethical anarchy where every assertion is true because it is true and the deciding factor which resolves the conflict of intuitional assertions is not the strength of logic but the strength of the big stick and the blackjack. Thirdly, if both the contradictory intuitions are allowed as equally true, there will be no

there will be no possibility of determination of right action or duty, for the assessment of the total values of the total consequences of actions will be impossible due to the lack of agreement among the assessors themselves regarding what is good and what is bad.

With regard to the simplicity of the notion 'good' it may be observed that Moore's trend of reasoning proves just the opposite of what he intends to prove. If 'good conduct' be a complex notion because of the fact some conduct is not good, and that some other things, besides conduct, are good, the same line of reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to the notion of intrinsic good. There are definitely goods which are not intrinsic and also there are, besides intrinsic good, intrinsic properties which are not intrinsically good. Hence the notion of 'intrinsic good' should, in the fitness of things, be called a complex notion.

As to the 'intrinsicality' of value we may note that by intrinsicality Moore means in fact the independence of values from everything else save and except the intrinsic nature of a thing which it is predicate. But this definition does not bear strict examination. Consider, e.g., the case of toothache. Toothache is painful; and pain, according to Moore, is intrinsically bad. And according to Moore, though toothache and the consciousness of toothache are different from each other, yet toothache cannot exist without the consciousness of toothache. Thus we find that at least in one case the existence of a value-predicate does not depend exclusively on the intrinsic nature of the thing of which it is the predicate(3).

As regards Moore's view of right action and duty we may observe that Moore failed to recognise the value of means as distinct from values end-values. Moore did not recognise

the fact that a means can be valued as intrinsically good and therefore as right even when the means fails to achieve the end. The locomotive driver of a fast moving passenger train who, finding some of the fish-plates of the railway track removed, applied the brake in order to stop the train but failed miserably is a man who, in Moore's opinion, did not ~~not~~ act rightly (assuming that his action, in the case of success, would produce total consequences not less but perhaps more in value than any other action he could perform under the circumstances). But we are afraid the verdict of common sense which finds it arch-champion in Moore will go against Moore's opinion in this case. An action, therefore, can be morally good and therefore right even if it fails to achieve the end. Hence we may conclude that Moore's view of right action is not correct and that its incorrectness is due to his failure to recognise the distinction between the value of aiming at and the value we aim at, i.e., the distinction between moral value and non-moral value, and also due to his failure to recognise the fact that moral good is as much intrinsically valuable as non-moral good.

Now we will discuss the most difficult part of Moore's ethical philosophy, viz., Moore's view on the relation of value to existence. Metaphysicians, says Moore, "have always been much occupied, not only with that other class of natural objects which consists in mental facts, but also with the class of objects or properties of objects, which certainly do not exist in time, are not therefore parts of Nature, and which, in fact, do not exist at all! To this class, as I have said, belongs what we mean by the adjective 'good'. It is not goodness, but only the things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time can have duration, and begin and cease to exist - can be objects of perception/preception.

But the most prominent member of this class are perhaps numbers! It is quite certain that two natural objects may exist; but it is equally certain that two itself does not exist and never can. Two and two are four. But that does not mean that either two or four exists. Yet it certainly means something. Two is somehow, although it does not exist. And it is not only simple terms of propositions — the objects about which we know truth that belong to this class. The truths which we know about them form, perhaps, a still more important subdivision. No truth does, in fact exist; but this is peculiarly obvious with regard to truths like 'Two and two are four', in which the objects, about which they are truths, do not exist either. It is with recognition of such truths as those — truths which have been called 'universal' and of their essential unlikeness to what we can touch, see and feel, that metaphysics proper begins" (4). It is obvious from the above quotation that, according to Moore, the quality goodness is not a part of Nature because it does not, while the things and qualities which are good do, exist in time. Hence it is not a natural object, and consequently cannot be an object of perception. Like truths and numbers goodness also is something although it does not exist; and like them, it can be called 'universal', i.e., it is not something temporally existent, i.e., it cannot begin and cease to exist in time although it can be a predicate, i.e., can qualify, things which can and do begin and cease to exist in time. Thus when Moore says that duty means an action which causes more good to exist than any possible alternative what he means is that duty is the action which causes more good things to exist than any possible alternative.

Now it may perhaps be observed safely that Moore's view on the relation of existence to value or good is also

not satisfactory, for it raises more problems than it solves. In the first place, if intrinsic value or goodness is somehow timeless and can be predicate of a temporal things, i.e., can attach itself as a quality to a thing which has a temporal location, then certainly there is a relation of value to the temporally located things, viz., the relation of attachment of a non-temporal ~~w~~ quality of goodness which is somehow to a temporal thing, i.e., a thing which exists in time. Now what is the existential status of this relation? Does this relation of goodness to the temporally good things exist in time, or is it a timeless something like goodness? If this relation exists in the sense in which the things that are good exist, then it must be admitted (1) that this relation exists for a short duration, i.e., it begins and ceases to exist, and (2) that there are many such relations (because if there are not many such relations, then before the beginning and after the cessation of its existence there was not and there will not be any good things because of the absence of relation between the non-temporal goodness and the temporal things). Now these relations, viz., the relations of goodness to things which are good, are members of a particular class and are different from relations which belong to other classes. Hence there must be, in the fitness of things, something common and peculiar to the relations of this class. But this something, being a universal, belongs to the same class to which goodness, truths, numbers, etc., belong; and at once the question arises : what is the existential ~~s~~ status of this universal something to its particular instances, viz., the particular temporal relations of goodness to things which are good? And if the answer to this question is that this relation exists in the same in which the things which are good exist, the circle will continue till the repla

replacement of this particular type of answer by some other.

On the other hand, if the relation of goodness to the things which are good is in the same sense in which goodness is, then the relation being timeless, the good things which exist, i.e., which begin and cease to exist in time, will become timeless, i.e., they also are somehow and do not temporally exist. Thus the adoption of the second alternative amounts to the assertion that the things which are good exist both in time and outside time which is an obvious contradiction in terms.

Secondly, when Moore says duty means an action which causes more good to exist than any possible alternative he means and should mean by the phrase 'more good to exist' that 'more good things exist'. Thus what increases or decreases is not goodness but the number of good things, for the adjective 'good' or goodness timelessly is; and consequently cannot admit of more or less, increase or decrease. Now when Moore speaks of the existence of intrinsically valuable organic wholes and the existence of intrinsically valuable parts which compose these organic wholes, and also when he speaks of comparison of the relative values of these wholes so as to determine which of them is of more intrinsic value than the others he definitely uses the term 'existence' here in the sense in which the things that are good exist. But if this be the case, Moore's account of the relation between an organic whole and the parts which compose it appears to be a bit confusing. According to Moore, though both the cause or means and the part are necessary conditions for a whole, the part is not necessary in the same sense in which the cause is necessary. For the parts are, while the cause is not, constitutive of the whole. If you take away the parts, the whole ceases to exist; but if you take away the cause after the

production of the whole, the existence of whole is not effected in any way. But we should note that Moore takes here the word 'cause' in a narrow sense. By 'cause' he means 'efficient cause' only. The parts are the material cause of the whole. Hence if you take away the parts, the whole ceases to exist. Besides his identification of 'cause' with 'efficient cause' Moore denies the possibility of the part being at once the material and efficient cause of the whole as self-contradictory. "To say", Moore says, "that a thing is an 'organic whole' is generally understood to imply that its parts are related to one another and to itself as means to end !.....". But a still more cogent reason for its discontinuance is that, so far from being necessarily connected, the second is a property which can attach to nothing, being a self-contradictory conception" (5). This conception is self-contradictory, for, according to Moore, "the whole must include all its parts and no part can be a cause of the whole , because it / cannot be cause of itself" (6). But Moore's reason for considering this conception as self-contradictory is not convincing as the reason itself is based on a confusion. Indeed a part cannot be cause of itself, but in what sense? Consider, e.g., an organic whole X which is composed of two parts A and B. The whole X must include all its parts, viz., ~~and~~ A and B, and no part, i.e., either A or B, can be a cause of the whole X, because it, i.e., either A or B, cannot be cause of itself. Thus it follows from Moore's argument given above that the part A cannot be the cause of the whole X because it cannot be a cause of itself, i.e., because A is identical with X; and the part B also cannot be cause of X because it cannot be cause of itself, i.e., because B is identical with X¹. Now if we follow Moore's line of reasoning, we shall be in a curious predicament. If A is identical with X, and B

also is identical with X, then the natural conclusion is : A is identical with B, or in other words, A is B. But this amounts to the assertion that a whole is not composed of parts, an assertion to which Moore definitely will not subscribe. Hence Moore's contention that the view that the part can be at once the part as well as the cause of a whole of which it is the part is a self-contradictory conception is not tenable. As a matter of fact the assertion that the cause must be antecedent to the effect does not mean that there must be definite definite time gap (whatever the span of the time gap may be) between the cause and the effect. It means simply that the effect under no circumstances can exist before the cause. It does not prohibit the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. And if this be granted, then it is not self-contradictory to hold that the part can be at once the part as well as the cause of the whole.

Besides it may be observed that Moore's endeavour to secure the autonomy of Ethics, to ensure the independence of Ethics from Metaphysics fails miserably in his own writings. His notion of goodness which is somehow timelessly is based on a very controversial metaphysical theory, i.e., the theory of Abstract Universal. Goodness, like the universal, is somehow but does not exist. Its being, like the being of universals, is not affected by the origination and annihilation of the particular things which are good; and like the Platonic universal it is not, while the particular good things are, an object of perception. Hence Ethics ties itself to the apron-string of the grand-dame Metaphysics in spite of Dr. Moore!

As regards Moore's view of the difference between the possible and the impossible as expressed in one of the commonest and most legitimate usages of the phrase 'could' and 'could not' it may be observed that the difference between

the possibility and the impossibility of two actions respectively neither of which did happen is not so sharp and rigid as Moore thinks. Moore contends that he "could have walked a mile in twenty minutes this morning," though he did not. But Moore ignores the circumstance that he could have done so only if certain conditions were fulfilled. Amongst such conditions one may mention the following. He could have done it if he had not met with an accident and sprained his ankle on his way or that he had no sudden attack of illness on his way, etc. He also certainly "could not have run two miles in five minutes" that morning, though he did not; provided that there was no emergency for his running and that of the saying : "emergency brings out unsuspected qualities in man", is absolutely baseless provided that there was no cause of running fast and that the laws of nature were changed; and so on. Further the statement that between two actions neither of which did actually happen one was within my powers, whereas the other was not, involves, at least, two assumptions, viz., (1) that we knew for certain the extent of our powers precisely, and (2) that we knew for certain the number of actions which are within our powers precisely. But we do know precisely the extent of our powers as well as the number of actions which fall within our capacity? Experience, we are afraid, abounds in instances which will definitely falsify the two aforesaid assumptions.

In criticism of Moore's own view of Free Will we may point out that Moore's statement in (2) of the last question "if we had chosen so to choose"(7) obviously leads to an infinite regress. If we choose a choice we can also choose to choose a choice and so on ad infinitum. But apart from this obvious absurdity in the conception of a choice that itself is chosen there are other discrepancies that cannot be over-

looked. Moore says that his view of Free Will in the above sense is quite compatible with the rule of causality. But if no man could know for certain that "we should not so choose" (8) as Moore says in (3) in the above quotation, such ignorance is also causally determined and in such circumstances there is no possible escape from such ignorance and its consequences. How, then, can Moore say in the same breath that every phenomenon is causally determined including our actions without sufficient knowledge of what we could choose and at the same time that our will is free in the sense that we could have acted otherwise, if we had so chosen? If Moore ~~as~~ had repudiated the universal reign of causality as some modern physicists do he might have saved freedom of will in his sense of the term. But to concede the universal operation of the law of causality and at the same time to assert that one might have done otherwise than one did, if one had so chosen, appears like eating one's cake and having it at the same time.

Despite the inconclusiveness and in some cases the faulty nature of Moore's reasonings and arguments no person with a really philosophical bent of mind can gainsay the fact that Moore is one of the British Master Minds of the present century. He is really the "Philosopher's philosopher"; and it is no exaggeration to say that Modern British philosophical ethics have begun with the publication of Moore's Principia Ethica. He showed us more than anybody else that philosophy is no picnic, and he taught us the value of analysis and criticism by demonstrating them in his own writings. "Often this has had", says C.D.Broad humorously but justifiably, "the devastating effect of the child in the fable, who horrified the courtiers by piping out that the emperor was in fact naked" (9). In the field of Moral Philosophy he

brought in the limelight the hitherto neglected problem of value and showed it to be the central problem of ethics. He also showed us how to use analysis in the field of ethics in order to avoid misunderstanding. His contribution lies not in answering but in asking question with precision and clarity. And all modern philosophers, irrespective of their widely divergent opinions, will agree, I hope, with Professor Wisdom in holding that "the ruthless clarity with which Moore shows us the pathless Jungle before us helps us to realize what must be done to get through. There is no path. We must cut a way from tree to tree". (10)

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CHAPTER - SIX

In the field of modern ethical literature the number of most conspicuous names are two, viz., G.E. Moore and Nikolai Hartmann. Both of them dazzled the readers in their own original way - Moore by his thorough and thread-bare analysis of ethical facts bringing to light for the first time hidden and hitherto unknown and unsuspected components of these facts and their inter-relations and Hartmann by the comprehensiveness and depth of his imagination which rolls in masses and volumes and like a Leizise tackles a problem in its totality by attacking it simultaneously from all sides. Hence if a comparison of their ethical doctrines be instituted and pursued, our labour, we hope, will be amply repaid and new insight into the problems be gained.

As regards the type of existence of Goodness or value both Moore and Hartmann hold that it exists in the Platonic sense, i.e., as ideal non-temporal essence along with truth and logic-mathematical entities. Metaphysicians, according to Moore, "have always been much occupiedwith the class of objects or properties of objects, which certainly do not exist in time, are not therefore parts of Nature, and which, in fact, do not exist at all. To this class belongs what we mean by the adjective 'good'. It is not goodness, but only the things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time - can have duration, and begin and cease to exist - can be objects of perception. But the most prominent member of this class are perhaps numbers And it is not only simply terms of prepositions - the objects about which we know truth - that belong to this class. The truth which we know about them form, perhaps, a still more important subdivisions. No truth does, in fact, exist..... It is with recognition of such truths as these - truths

which have been called 'universal' - and of their essential unlikeness to what we can touch, see and feel, that metaphysics proper begins" (1). Similarly Hartmann also holds that "in their mode of Being values are Platonic Ideas!..... The kind Being peculiar to the 'Idea' is !.... the kind of Being of that 'through which' everything participating in it is just as it is !.... even for values the preposition holds good : they are that 'through which' everything which participates in them is as it is - namely valuable. But !...this means : values are essences" (2). And " 'theoretical philesephy', Hartmann continues, "knows two essentially different kinds of self-existence : one real and one ideal. The former belongs to all things and events, to everything that is 'actual', to whatever has existence; the latter to the structure of pure mathematics and logic, and, over and above these, to the essences of every kind throughout the changes of individual existence and, when distinguished from this, permits of being discerned a priori ! Values have no self-existence that is real !.... ! The mode of Being peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence. The values are originally patterns of an ethical ideal sphere, of a realm with its own structures, its own laws and orders" (3). Thus both Moore and Hartmann ascribe to goodness or value ideal self-existence i.e., a timeless existence which is independent of time as well as the subject which knows it, and the good or valuable things are what they are because of their participation in this ideally self-existent/ value or goodness. In other words, goodness or value is the condition of the possibility of existence of good or valuable things in the sense that goodness or value recurs in the particular good or valuable things and in so recurring determines their

character and being as particulars of the class of good or valuable things.

With respect to the nature of objectivity of goodness or value they unanimously hold it to be a non-natural type of objectivity. Thus Moore says, "If we consider whether any object is of such a nature that it may be said to exist now, to have existed, or to be about to exist, then we may know that object is a natural object, and that nothing, of which this is not true, is a natural object..... I do not deny that good is a property of certain natural objects!.... and yet I have said that 'good' itself is not a natural property. Well, my test for these too also concerns their existence in time. Can we imagine 'good' as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it"(4). Likewise Hartmann also asserts, "Ethics can learn that the universality, the apriority and the categorial character of the principle have no need of a subjective origin Its only need is an origin which is not to be found in naturalistic objectivity - that is not in nature or in the world perceived by the senses. From this sphere ethical consciousness must not derive its principle there is a self-existent ideal sphere in which values are native, andas the contents of this sphere, values, self-subsistent and dependent upon no experience, are discerned a priori"(5). Thus both Moore and Hartmann hold the objectivity of goodness or value to be a non-natural objectivity because it is not dependent upon experience or any other temporal process.

As regards our knowledge of goodness or value they held that this knowledge is an a priori intuition. "Values", Hartmann asserts, " !.... are discerned a priori"(6)."Every moral preference is intuitive, is immediately there and is

always contained in the grasping of a given circumstance (whether it be a situation or a finished course of conduct) Comprehension of ethical reality is always, even for the naivest consciousness, transfused with valuations All acts which are related to this fulness of life and which grasp reality are at the same time acts which grasp values and which select according to values" (7). "All comprehension is accomplished in categorial structures, and precisely herein consists the apriority of the latter" and "aprioristic knowledge is already contained in all knowledge of things is inherently intuitive" (8). Moore also subscribes to the view which admits the a priori intuitive apprehension of goodness or value. According to Moore, good in the sense of goodness is the fundamental principle of Ethics and it "must be self-evident The expression 'self-evident' means properly that the proposition so called is evident or true, by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself that it has absolutely no reason" (9). "The Intuitional view of Ethics consists in the supposition that certain rules", Moore continues, "stating that certain actions are always to be done or to be omitted, may be taken as self-evident premisses. I have shown with regard to judgment of what is good in itself, that this is the case; no reason can be given for them" (10). "It is not goodness" he also holds, "but only the things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time can be objects of perception" (11). Thus judgments about goodness are neither perceptual nor inferential but intuitive and a priori. Hence it is quite evident that with regard to our knowledge of goodness or value they alike subscribe to a priori Intuitionism.

Regarding the nature of ethical enquiry they also unanimously subscribe to the view that Ethics must be independent of Metaphysics. Thus Hartmann emphatically asserts, "Metaphysics must need ethics; not ethics, metaphysics" (12). Similarly Moore also says, "to hold that from any proposition asserting 'Reality is of this nature' we can infer, or obtain confirmation for, any proposition asserting 'This is good in itself' is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. And that a knowledge of what is real supplies reasons for holding certain things to be good in themselves is either implied or expressly asserted by all those who define the Supreme Good in metaphysical terms. This contention is part of what is meant by saying that Ethics should be 'based' on Metaphysics 'Metaphysical Ethics', then, involve the supposition that Ethics can be based on Metaphysics; and our first concern with them is to make clear that this supposition must be false" (13). Thus both of them alike tried to establish the independence of Ethics.

In respect of the status of goodness or value both Moore and Hartmann subscribe to what may be called Ethical Realism and Neo-Platonism. Both of them inherited the Platonic tradition and applied it in their own individual way to their respective philosophy of value. The basic thesis of the upholders of the Platonic tradition is the admission of a group of non-natural existents which cannot be seen, heard, touched or felt, i.e., which cannot be objects of perception and yet which, though non-natural, can be the property of a natural object, i.e., an object which exists in time. These non-natural existents are timeless, i.e., they do not come into existence and cease to be in time, i.e., they have no duration. Goodness or value is a member of this group of non-natural existents. Thus Moore holds that such non-na-

natural existents "have always played a large part in the reasonings of metaphysicians from Plato's time till now; and that they have directed attention to the difference between these and what I have called 'natural objects' is the chief contribution to knowledge which distinguishes them from '....' empirical' philosophers" (14). And thus goodness as a non-natural property cannot be identical with any natural object and consequently it cannot be identical with any function of mind because 'nature' "may be said to include all that has existed, does exist, or will exist in time and of our minds we should say that they did exist yesterday, that they do exist to-day, and probably will exist in a minute or two". When we begin to consider the properties of objects, then the problem is more difficult. Which among the properties of natural objects are natural pm properties and which are not? Well, my test for these too also concerns their existence in time. Can we imagine 'good' as existing by itself in time, and not merely as a property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it, whereas with the greater number of properties of object -natural properties - their existence does seem to me to be independent of the existence of these objects. They are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare substance: For they are in themselves substantial and give to the object all substance that it has. But this is not so with good. If indeed good were a feeling, as some would have us believe, then it would exist in time. But that is why to call it so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. It will always remain pertinent to ask, whether the feeling itself is good; and if so, then good cannot itself be identical with any feeling" (15).

Likewise good cannot be identical with any thought or value. And thus it is independent of mind and does not depend on mind for its non-temporal existence. Similarly Hartmann also tells us that "in ancient times it was seen that there is another realm of being than that of existence, than that of 'real' things and of consciousness which is not less 'real'". Plato named it the realm of Ideas This fact is especially illuminating for the theory of value : in their mode of Being, values are Platonic Ideas. They belong to that further realm of Being which Plato first discovered, the realm which we can spiritually discern but cannot see or grasp Value Values emanate neither from the things (or real relationships) nor from the percipient. No naturalism and subjectivism attach to their form or Being. Furthermore, they are not 'formal' they are 'material', structures which constitute specific quality of things, relations, relations or persons according as they attach to them or are lacking. And not only are they never merely 'invented' but they are not even capable of being directly grasped by thought; rather are they, immediately discerned only by an inner 'vision', like Plato's 'Ideas'"(16). Thus goodness or value, in the opinion of both Moore and Hartmann, is ideal, i.e., non-temporal self-existent and as such it is not dependent on mind as well as other natural objects and natural properties. Thus goodness or value is a non-natural entity which is real because it is independent of human mind and those who, like Moore and Hartmann, uphold the view that goodness or value as a non-natural entity is independent of mind may be said to subscribe to what may be called Ethical Realism. And in respect of goodness or value Hartmann and Moore are Realists in a Platonic sense.

Again both Moore and Hartmann alike subscribe to the theory of emergence. Moore in his idea of Organic whole and Hartmann in his concept of Categorical Novelty definitely commit themselves to the theory of emergence. Thus Moore says, "I shall, where it seems convenient, take the liberty to use the term 'organic' with a special sense. I shall use it to denote the fact that a whole has an intrinsic value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts.... Understood in this special and perfectly definite sense the relation of an organic whole to its parts is one of the most important which Ethics has to recognise. A chief part of that science should be occupied in comparing the relative values of various goods; and greatest error will be committed in such comparison if it be assumed that wherever two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely the sum of the values of these two things"(17). Similarly Hartmann also asserts "the general categorical law, according to which every higher category unifies the lower ones in a new way and is a higher ~~formation~~ formation which rises over them as over a material. The ~~new~~ novelty in it in this formation itself"(18).

In a comparative study not only similarities but differences also should be taken into account in order to form a balanced opinion as regards the worth of the writers compared. And therefore in the fitness of things we should now note critically their differences also.

In the first place, Moore, who is a very cautious philosopher, does not commit himself to any particular theory regarding the being and character of the non-temporal good the existence of which he admits. And thus he makes his position fool-proof no doubt but incomplete. It is fool-proof because the critics cannot find any chink in his armour. But it is also incomplete because though he puts the Good, Truth

and Number in the same class, yet he does not exhibit their differences. Thus the idea of the Good becomes the Achilles' heel in the ethical theory of G.E. Moore. Hartmann, on the other hand, though more vulnerable to attack from the critics for his theory regarding the mode of being of Values, is very clear in this respect. Very meticulously he points out the difference between Values and the other Ideal existents. Thus Moore's account of the ideal of the Good, though consistent, is veritably vague whereas Hartmann's account of values, though highly questionable, is not at least unclear.

Secondly, Moore is an uncompromising teleologist whereas Hartmann is a deontologist in respect of the status of right action. An action, according to Moore, is right if and only if there be no other action which, if done, can produce more valuable valuable or better consequences,. Thus the value or worth of a right action is only extrinsic good or value; it has no intrinsic value as an Ought to do. In other words, Moore did not recognise the intrinsic value of means qua means; he only recognised the extrinsic value of means as effective means. But Hartmann, unlike Moore, recognised the intrinsic value of both the means and the ends. He accepted the value of aiming at as well as the value aimed at. In this respect, we must say, Hartmann gave us evidence of better insight into moral life. Moral experience of the community, it is needless to say, abounds in instances where ineffective actions or means are not deprived of their moral worth or value because of their failure to reach the end. As a matter of fact Moore's theory of right action leads us to the absurd conclusion that the thief who happened to pick successfully Prof. Moore's pocket was right so long he believed that the total conceivable consequences of his action are

better than or are equal in value to the total conceivable consequences of any other action that could be performed instead of this one. But it is quite obvious that common sense will never accept this conclusion even if it originates from a philosopher of Moore's standing. Thus Moore, who is a recognised as the Defender of Common Sense, throws common sense overboard in respect of the intrinsic value of the right ~~not~~ action. Therefore, Hartmann, we conclude, is right and is more consistent in his view in this respect than Moore. As a matter of fact Moore by subscribing to the teleological theory of right action proved himself to be at least partially ~~wake~~ value-blind.

Thirdly, unlike Moore, Hartmann gave us a detailed classification of values as and when found in the different Western system of Morals as they appeared in a chronological order in history. Thus the students of the Moral Philosophy of the West, according to Muirhead, are indebted to Hartmann for his classic interpretation of the Socratic-Piestic-Aristotelian classification of Moral values in terms of the classification of virtues. But Hartmann's own classification of moral values as found in the different systems of Western Morals, though peerless, is yet ~~incompta~~ incomplete and lopsided. So far as the empirical study of discovery of different values in the different systems of Morals are concerned one should take into account all the known systems of Morals without exception. But Hartmann did not do it. He scrupulously avoided the Oriental systems of Morals and / draw drew his conclusions from a critical discussion of the Occidental systems of Morals alone. Hence his account of the discovery of moral values is not impartial and it also suffers from the lack of fruitful comparative study. E.g., he failed to note that Plato's Moral Philosophy might have been studied in a

better and more fruitful way in the light of the ethical philosophy of Ancient Indian thinkers. "The Hindu classification", writes Prof. S.K.Maitra, "is fuller and more complete than the Platonic classification of virtues according to the different social classes only. In the latter we miss not only a list of sadharana or common duties but also the distinctive Hindu classification according to Asrama or moral capacity relative one's particular stage of life". There is indeed a common duty even according to Plato, viz., the virtue of Justice which is to be realised by the soldier, the artisan as well as the legislator, but it is not an independent duty which is to be realised in itself but is only a function of the proper discharge of its specific duties by each particular social class. Thus the soldier realises justice by protecting the State while the legislator realises it by wise legislation and administration, i.e., each realises it in specific form through the discharge of his specific duties. Hence justice is a common duty only in the sense of being common-in-the-specific. But the sadharana or common duties of the Hindus are common in a different sense. They are common as being independent duties of all the social classes alike It is laid down that the common duties cannot be transgressed in the discharge of the specific duties, the idea being that there are certain general relations between man and man which cannot be discarded in the interests of particular communities. The common duties are thus the preconditions of the specific duties, i.e., they are not the common-in-the-specific such as Plato's Justice, but the common-as-the-principle-of-the-specific. In this sense the sadharana dharma's of the Hindus are a safeguard against the communal egotism and intolerance. They provide, through a code of universal duties, a

a basis for a much more humanitarian treatment For Plato the barbarian is without any moral standing : there are not only no duties to be fulfilled by him but also no duties to be fulfilled in respect of him. The Hindu however, inspite of the social degradation of the Sudra, does not exclude him altogether from moral protection, but shelters him from persecution through a code of universal duties which are obligatory on man as man. These duties are to be observed by all alike, being the duties obligatory on everybody in his dealings with everybody else"(19). Thus it is obvious from the above quotation that Hartmann, though fully aware of the source from which a rich harvest of new insights into the problem may be reaped, yet did not exploit the source fully.

Fourthly, Moore, unlike Hartmann, gave a detailed discussion regarding the nature and status of Moral Judgments. In this respect Moore ought to be praised. Moore made a distinction between causal judgment and value judgment and in this respect he is definitely right. But undoubtedly he erred when he reduced Ought judgment regarding right action into causal judgment. He also showed very clearly the *reductio ad absurdum* involved in the emotive theory of value judgments as propounded by the Logical Positivist. With the solitary exception of Bertrand Russell who declared that though he does not agree with Nietzsche yet he cannot logically disprove his theory, all the logical positivists ~~were~~ fight shy of the absurd consequences that follow from the acceptance of their premise. In this respect Moore was ably supported by C.D.Bread who showed that an analytic proposition is not necessarily a tautological proposition. "It seems clear to me", writes Bread, "that a term may in fact be complex and in fact have a certain analysis, and that people may yet use it in the main correctly without recognising that it

is complex or knowing the right analysis of it. In that case the preposition which asserts that it has such and such an analysis will be analytic, but will not be tautologous" (20). But despite the soundness of his criticism of the doctrine of the logical positivist Moore's argument failed to establish his conclusion that moral judgments that are passed on the motive for action are not relevant in assessing the moral worth of a voluntary action. In other words success and not morally praiseworthy motive is relevant in assessing the moral worth of an action (21). And this is obviously a conclusion that is not supported by our moral experience.

Fifthly, unlike Moore, Hartmann made a distinction between moral and non-moral value, i.e., between value of aiming at and value aimed at. Thus he had done justice to the moral experience of the mankind which does not evaluate the moral worth of our voluntary action solely in terms of their consequences. He also made a distinction between good-value, situational value and aesthetic value and assigned lower place to goods and situational values and higher place to aesthetic value in relation to moral value in the scale or gradation of values. But this placing of values in a scale, though novel and original, is highly questionable and is not acceptable to religious-minded philosophers. The Church Fathers, e.g., would place aesthetic value below moral value and moral value beneath religious value. The consequentialists on the other hand would place moral value below goods and situational values though they are at variance as regards the assigning of place in the scale to aesthetic and religious values respectively. Thus Hartmann's theory in this respect is not unquestionable. But the questionability of his scheme does not negate the value of his novel and original approach.

Sixthly, Hartmann, unlike Moore, also gave us two fundamental division is, viz., realize the higher value without violating the lower values. The reason for presupposing two fundamental division is, according to Hartmann, is that values are fundamentally different from entities that can be subsumed under logical division and as such the rules of logical division do not apply to axiological division without violation to the essential nature of the axiological entities. This scheme also, though highly original as well as novel, is not without difficulties. If the rules for the logical treatment of a subject do not apply to the entities of a particular type, it means that the entities in question are not amenable to logical treatment and as such cannot be a subject of discussion and communication. But if that be the case, Hartmann's practice nullifies his preaching. And Hartmann's Magnum Opus 'ETHICS' in that case is nothing but a voluminous paper-tower of Babel. Moreover what about the cases where in the successful attempt to realize the higher values the lower values have been violated? In such cases is the person responsible for this violation morally praise-worthy or blame-worthy? If he be morally blame-worthy for the violation of lower values, he ex hypothesis is also morally praise-worthy for the realisation of higher values. And does the merit for the realization of higher values set at naught the demerit for the violation of lower values? If it does, it will make morality a matter of commerce and will lend countenance to the view of Indian businessmen who say that one should not be afraid of committing crimes because a single dip in the water of the Ganges will wash one's sins away. And if it does not, it will exhibit the paradox that the same man is at once morally praise-worthy and blame-worthy for the same act. But despite all these short-comings Hartmann's theory is original

to the extent that he for the first time recognised the fact that volitional conflicts cannot be resolved by subsuming values under logical division. But he is quite mistaken in his view that this conflict can be resolved by constructing an axiological division in terms of the structure as revealed in the empirical experience of value.

Lastly, both Hartmann and Moore gave us their respective theories of free will. But both the theories are unsatisfactory and one-sided. Moore's theory of a free choice that chooses another choice is no less unsatisfactory than the Hartmannian theory that the unavoidable choice of the agent when confronted with an irresolvable conflict of values proves the existence of free will. Both of them rather naively overlooked the fact that an act of willing, so long as it remains an act of willing, cannot be free. If it be free, it ceases to be an empirical act of willing. Nevertheless their treatment of the subject had at least brought home the fact that the problem cannot be solved by simply cataloguing the arguments for and against Determinism and Indeterminism. Continuity is an experienced fact and the same is true fix of crisis, &c., novelty; and the problem is to effect a reconciliation without annihilation of anyone of them.

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CHAPTER - SEVEN

The problem of moral value or good may be considered from four points of view, viz., (1) the logical, (2) the epistemological, (3) the empirical or factual and (4) the metaphysical standpoints.

In its logical aspect the problem of moral value centres round the question of a logically adequate definition of value. Value may be defined either ostensively or verbally. But neither ostensive nor verbal definition of value, we contend, is logically adequate. Ostensive definition is logically inadequate because it depends solely on pointing out physically and this physical pointing out can and does fail in many cases because of the lack of precision in such pointing out. Consider, e.g., the case of a new-born baby. If all the new born babies are not numbered immediately after their birth and are kept side by side in the same room, will it be possible even for the doctor who helped them to come into this world to tell apart? The answer is obvious. Consider, again e.g., the case of the definition of a Classic. Can even the established critics like Mathew Arnold dare to give a logically adequate ostensive definition of Classic? The answer is in the negative. The ostensive definition of value is more difficult because values are not sensory qualities and as such cannot be pin-pointed physically or instrumentally.

As regards the verbal definition of value, we contend that value cannot be defined verbally. The basic condition of verbal definition is the conventional agreement between the speaker and the listener, the writer and the reader, to use the same linguistic expression in the same referential context.

and to follow the same conventional rules for forming complex expressions out of simple expressions to depict personal, private experience. But this is seldom achieved and even where it is achieved, it is so achieved at the cost of the unchosen elements in personal experience. Thus we find no two Shakespearean critics agree as regards the aesthetic worth of Shakespeare's works. Likewise in the field of morality there is more of clash and conflict and less of agreement. E.g., E.g., the upholders of the theory : 'Let hundred criminals go unpunished, but do not punish an innocent man' clash ~~with~~ violently with the supporters of the theory : 'To clean the Augean Stable of corruption even innocent lives, if necessary, should be sacrificed'. Thus value, it is obvious, is indefinable logically. And we conclude that value is indefinable not because it is ^{an} absolutely simple, unanalyzable ultimate but because it is unintelligible, i.e., it is experienced as an existent in a locus, yet it is logically rejected or cancelled in that ~~one~~ locus ~~xxxm~~ for past, present and future. Thus it is presented unreality that appears but does not exist and as such is logically indefinable.

In its epistemological aspect the question concerning moral value is : How is value known? The question, we hold, should be answered in the negative. The value is felt while the object of which it is the value, is known. Thus the rose is known but the beauty of the rose is felt. Likewise the overt action is known but the moral worth of the overt action is felt. Hence Moore is definitely right when he holds that the value is not, whereas other qualities or properties are, constitutive of the object.

Our experience of value, we hold, comes through intuition which is of the nature of feeling. But this feeling of value is different from ordinary feeling of pleasure and pain. Like ~~and~~ ordinary feeling it is immediate and direct

but unlike ordinary feeling it does not evaporate when we attend to it. Also the ~~immediacy~~ immediacy of the feeling of value is not irresistible like sense-immediacy. If we like we can withdraw ourselves from attending to the feeling of value. This feeling, unlike the feeling of pleasure and pain, is not compelling; it can impel only. The force of the value-feeling can be resisted, toned down, in some cases at least annihilated altogether. E.g., unless one can deliberately strangle one's finer sensibilities regarding the value of human lives, one cannot be a successful soldier in the army. It is a fact that values do conflict; and when they conflict in our experience we are perturbed. But how do we know or experience valuational conflicts? The conflict of values, we hold, can be felt directly. Hence the torment of the individual. We therefore conclude that values and valuational conflicts are directly or immediately felt and this immediate feeling is not infallible. It is, like knowledge, equally subject to rejection and correction and any theory regarding the ~~infallibility~~: infallible apriori feeling of value is simply untenable in the face of the evidence of experience. Thus there is no finality in our experience of value; no experience of value, we contend, can be held to be valid eternally.

In its empirical or factual aspect the problem of moral value gives rise to two questions, viz., (a) what are the different types and kinds of values? and (b) How are values to be graded and classified? Both the questions can be answered, we hold, only provisionally. In the arena of experience nothing is permanent except experience itself. Hence no empirical study can give us any finality as regards number of different types and kinds of value. Treasure of experience is inexhaustible, and any attempt to arrive at a

complete enumeration of value is a cry in the wilderness if not a child's cry for the moon. As regards the second question we also hold that any classification and gradation of value is only provisional and never final. There is always the possibility of the emergence of new values in experience upsetting the existing gradation and classification. And therefore unless some way is found to set at naught this ~~possibility~~ possibility, there cannot be any final gradation and classification of values that is valid for all times.

In its metaphysical aspect the problem of moral value raises two questions, viz., (a) How is value related to reality? and (b) What is the status of value in the metaphysical scheme of things and beings of the world?

As to the first question we subscribe, after Sankara, to a negative metaphysic of dualism of appearance and reality. Values, as objects of consciousness, we contend, are appearances and as such involve difference necessarily. That is, values as objects of consciousness are different from consciousness. And all difference, we hold, being unreal as contradicting and destroying itself, the difference between reality and consciousness is also unreal. Therefore consciousness is reality and reality is consciousness and reality is that which breaks no denial. Hence consciousness is also that which breaks no denial because the denial of consciousness must also be evidenced by consciousness. But consciousness is not an object of consciousness; it is the non-objective light that lights up objects without being itself objective. Thus consciousness is never objective, though it reveals objects which shine forth in the light of consciousness. Hence reality being the non-objective light of consciousness which reveals objects, objects, phenomenal as well as apparent, are the other of reality which is consciousness and therefore unreal and false. The objective world of things and values is thus, like the

object of illusion, an objective unreality or unreal positivity. For the object of illusion is an object, a content of experience or thought and as such is not mere nothing. And yet as negated and cancelled, it is not real either. It is thus neither real nor unreal, the negation of both being and non-being, and is therefore logically indefinable. The entire objective world (including values which are also objective) in this respect is on a par with the illusory objects. On logical criticism it dissolves into an undefinable indefinable positivity which is neither real nor unreal. The world is thus an eternally negated objectification of a non-objective reality. And all objects as well as values are thus false appearances which, though positive as content of consciousness, yet lack essential truth and reality. They are fleeting appearances, contents that are manifested in consciousness but are no real qualifications thereof. They are like the forms in a cinema show which flit over the screen but leaves no trace behind. They are appearances in reality but not appearances of it.

As regards the second question we hold that values are unreal or false appearances. And though reality does not admit of degrees, of more or less, the false and the unreal may be graded as they admit of degrees. Thus falsity is graded into higher and lower; and though both the higher and lower falsity are equally false as the other of reality, yet the higher falsity can negate or cancel the lower falsity. Thus the pragmatic, the aesthetic, the moral and the religious values are all alike false, yet the aesthetic value being the higher falsity can cancel the utility value and it in its turn can be cancelled likewise by moral value which again, being lower, is cancelled by the religious value and so on and so forth. Thus all values are false appearances, and the gradation of values is a gradation of falsity the lower falsity being cancelled by the higher.

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