

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION:

An outlook on the history of Analysis:

As the objective of this thesis is to explicate and examine Bertrand Russell's philosophical method of analysis, it is highly important to know, at the very outset, the historical background of analysis as well as Russell's own position and contribution in the history of analysis. It is true to say that the history of philosophy has never been confined to a single school or to a single method within the span of a century. The twentieth century of philosophy is not exception to this. During this century philosophers have explored various method of analysis. Despite the diversity of approaches, it is claimed that the present century is characterized by the method of analysis, which is often called 'linguistic analysis' or 'logical analysis of language'. So it would not be an exaggeration if it is claimed that the twentieth century philosophy is the philosophy of linguistic analysis. What does the term 'linguistic analysis' mean? Linguistic analysis is a philosophical method, which aims at to solve the so-called traditional philosophical problems by proper analysis of the meaning of language or by proper understanding of the meaning or logic of language. More specifically, we can say following Richard Rorty that linguistic analysis is a philosophical method, which intends to solve or dissolve philosophical problems either by forming language or by understanding more about the language we presently use. He says, "I shall mean by "linguistic philosophy" the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use."¹ The term 'analysis', however, is an umbrella term or general term in the sense that it incorporates various methods of philosophical analysis. That is why, it is rightly pointed out that the twentieth century philosophy is supposed to be the 'Age of analysis'.² So the

¹ Rorty, Richard: In the Introduction of *The Linguistic Turn*, The University of Chicago Press; Chicago and London, 1963, p. 3.

² Ammerman, R. (edited): *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, Tata McGraw – Hill Publishing Company Ltd., Bombay- New Delhi, 1965,p.1.

term 'analysis' can be apprehended in terms of a way of grouping together with a number of heterogeneous philosophers who share certain interest and procedures. To analysis something means to have a better understanding of what is being analyzed. Or more specifically, it can be said that to analysis something means to have a deeper understanding of the thing in itself. If the term 'analysis' is understood in the sense just mentioned, then we can say that there underlies a parity between a chemist and a philosopher in terms of their method of analysis. The chemist, for example, is attentive to the analysis of physical substances into their constituent parts just like a philosopher who is interested in analyzing linguistic or conceptual units or speech acts units. A philosopher, being an analyst, is much keener in knowing the structure of language by a careful and through going study of its elements and their interactions. Thus, one thing seems clear that unlike a scientific or any other analysis, philosophical analysis of twentieth century is essentially the study of language.

One should not, however, be confused, at this juncture, the philosophical study of language with other studies of language. Barring the philosophical study of language, there we find other scientific or dynamic studies of language with which linguistics, philologists, grammarians, and lexicographers are associated. They are inclined to study language for empirical investigation. Unlike the linguistic philosophers, they are much more responsive to explore facts about how our language is used, what types of meaning linguistic words have, how languages begin, change and die. All these are said to be the scientific and dynamic questions regarding language, which can only be justified by endorsing the so-called dynamic analysis of language. Philosophers having analytic persuasion or tradition, however, differ from linguistics as they seem to believe that the so-called scientific method of analysis of language does not help much to solve the so-called traditional philosophical questions.

It is important to point out here that the method of analysis finds its foothold in philosophy only by way of referring to the scientific method of analysis. The impact of the rapid advancement of science was felt in philosophy more when people primarily devoted to physics and mathematics and thereby come to the philosophical field. It is also believed that the influence of science in philosophy actually makes the platform or foundation of distrusting the so-called traditional metaphysics that had been dominating

philosophy at the end of nineteenth century. The end of nineteenth century was under the influence of Bradley. Philosophy saw the other extreme in the extravagant realism of Meinong. At that time it became the practice of some philosophers to hypostatize, classes, numbers, and so on. Thus, both idealism and realism go beyond the empirical. The method of analysis, more precisely, linguistic analysis has been evolved actually to deal with those fields.

The tendency, however, to transgress the empirical is not new. Right from the beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes, we noticed that philosophers had been inclined to speculation with the results that had constructed philosophical systems, which excluded the empirical world or gave them an altogether different meaning. As a result the entire body of metaphysical statements was generated. The prime concern of twentieth century linguistic philosophy in general is that it intends to make the platform of distrusting the possibility of metaphysics. Of course, the rejection of metaphysics is not a new phenomenon. The skepticism of Hume directed to all metaphysics, which he found to consign to the flames. Kant could not find any epistemological basis of metaphysical knowledge. Reference may be made of old positivism, which refused to go beyond the frame of this perceptible world. Thus, the rejection of metaphysics, it appears from the above, is not a special feature of philosophy of the present century. However, the grounds for the rejection and the technique employed for this purpose are very different. Philosophy of twentieth century rejects metaphysics on a completely new ground.

The rejection of metaphysics, however, at different periods yields different conclusions. An empiricist like Hume was convinced that the only possible aspects of the human mind are impressions. Metaphysics is simply worthless, an ideal speculation. For Kant, again, metaphysics is an ideal imagination. What distinguishes the contemporary rejection of metaphysics is that it does not consider metaphysics as an ideal speculation, but as nonsense. Hume inclines to say that we are not in a position to determine the truth value of metaphysical sentences. We cannot particularly determine whether the body of metaphysical sentences is true or false. Metaphysics, therefore, cannot have any value for us. Clearly this kind of rejection leaves the question of the meaning of metaphysics. Although the unknowability of truth and falsity of metaphysics was considered enough to recommend the rejection of metaphysics, but such kind of rejection fails to raise the

question of the meaning of metaphysics. Thus Hume's rejection of metaphysics was a confusion of our own epistemic limitation.

The modern age rejects metaphysics not as a body of ideal speculation, but as completely meaningless. Metaphysical sentences are empty and therefore the question of its being truth or falsity simply does not arise. This is firmly committed by Wittgenstein among the modern critics of metaphysics in the **Tractatus**.

Moore: The beginner of Analysis:

Truly speaking, the so-called philosophical analysis was actually started with the works of G.E. Moore. It was Moore who chiefly responsible for confining philosophy within the parameter of analysis. Incidentally, Moore had started his philosophical career with his allegiance to Idealism. Gradually, he became so much annoyed with the departure of metaphysical statements from common sense beliefs and ideas that he preferred to move from Idealism to common sense Realism. The central tenet of Idealism was contained in the idea of the world as a single individual whole. Any attempt to isolate any element in this whole would involve distortion and partial falsehood. Reality is characterized by consistency and coherence. Anything that involves contradiction is unreal. It is this metaphysical tenet, which found expression in all idealistic statements. Moore rejected metaphysical statements simply because they actually run counter to common sense beliefs and ideas. The character of Moore's philosophy is commonly described as a defense of common sense. It is quite in order to see how Moore is considered as an analyst. Doubts have been raised if Moore's technique employed in dealing with metaphysical statements can at all be leveled 'analysis'. One can however, raise a quip against Moore by saying that although he (Moore) practiced analysis, he did not elaborately spell out the nature of analysis which he had practiced.

The question whether Moore was a philosopher of common sense or of analysis had often appeared confusing. It appears more confusing when the two have been supposed to be separable. The way out of this confusion is suggested by the very important conception of the task of philosophy as found in Moore. Moore's contention is that it is not the role of

philosophy to question the truths of common sense beliefs, but rather to seek their proper analysis.

Moore was a firm opponent of Idealism. He rejects the principle of Idealism in a number of his philosophical writings. However, before Moore and Russell, the principle of Idealism was also criticized by many, but it was Moore alone who first critically attacked the metaphysical positions advanced by the Idealists. Moore was of the opinion that a careful study of the philosophical questions of Idealists ultimately proved to be mistaken. He censures idealism both from common sense and also from a plea to the ordinary meanings of the words. Moore vehemently criticizes the Idealists doctrine of the **Internality of Relations** which states that a thing is what it is in part because of its relations .If its relations change at any stage, it becomes a different thing. No relation, for the idealist, is a mere accident or external. As a result one can be known by its relation to all other things in the world.

Moore, however, rejects the doctrine of **Internality of Relations** as proposed by the Idealists. Moore conceives that to claim that all relations are internal is absurd as it goes against our common sense. For him it is contrary to our common sense to claim that a person having a dog may be a different person when he lost the dog or sold the dog. Common sense teaches us that it is false to assert that all relations are internal; rather it tells us that some relations are internal and some others are external. The main feature of common sense view of the world is the belief that there are in the universe enormous numbers of material objects. Moore seems to believe that the common sense view of the world is true for the simple reason that the propositions of common sense can be known with certainty. No other meaning than the ordinary should be attributed to them and hence there meaning must not be decided with any idealistic bias. The consequence, which follows immediately, is that the philosophers who have called into question the truth of these propositions and thereby formulated extraordinary ones are to be condemned. Thus a serious scandal to philosophy is removed

Bertrand Russell: The classical analyst:

Like Moore, Russell also rejects Idealism for somewhat different reasons. Unlike Moore, Russell's rejection of Idealism is based on logic and mathematics. Moore attacked Idealism, we have observed, from common sense view as well as ordinary language perspective, but Russell rejects Idealism from logical and mathematical dimensions. In substantiating the logical implication in philosophy, Russell himself turns philosophy into a new direction. Russell says, "Logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysics"³ Russell himself conceives it very well that only the logical treatment would be fruitful in solving all outstanding traditional problems of metaphysics. Russell says, "I think practically that all traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes due to bad grammar, and that almost all the traditional problems of metaphysics and tradition results- supposed results- of metaphysics are due to a failure to make the kind of distinctions in what we may call philosophical grammar"⁴ Russell therefore goes against metaphysics as well as Idealism because of its consequences of mathematics. He says that if it is supposed by the Idealists that all relations are external, and then it is ultimately proved that there is one and only one reality in the universe. However, if this principle of Idealists is taken into account, then, Russell feels, that the proposition of mathematics do not hold good. This, however, cannot be the case. So Russell maintains that the principle of Idealism is false as it fails to dig up that all meaningful propositions are of subject- predicate form. To overcome all the so-called outstanding traditional problems of metaphysics, Russell proposes mathematical and logical applications in philosophy. He elsewhere opines that the so-called philosophical problems can be solved successfully when philosophical method is framed like a scientific method. Keeping this in mind, Russell thereby introduces a philosophical method of analysis, which is very much on a par with a scientific method of analysis in terms of its precision as well as accuracy. For Russell the method of analysis, which is either in terms of symbolic logic or in terms of ordinary language, is thought to be a useful tool to sharpen and clarify philosophical problems so that they could be readily solved.

³ Russell, Bertrand and A.N.Whitehead: *Principia Mathematica*, 1910, see also *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by R.R.Ammerman, op. cit., p.5.

⁴ Russell, Bertrand: *What There Is*, included in the *Classic of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by R.R. Ammerman, *Ibid*, p.26.

Although the method of classical or traditional analysis was developed under the leadership of Bertrand Russell, it was heavily practiced and proposed by English philosophers as well. The basic tenet of classical analysis is that propositions expressed in ordinary language are correct in the sense that they are not objectionable in principle. The propositions that we have in ordinary language are neither logically nor metaphysically absurd, but the serious problem of the propositions of ordinary language lies otherwise. It is claimed that although the propositions of ordinary language are both logically and metaphysically satisfiable as they enable to cope up with the principle, but nevertheless they are neither logically nor metaphysically satisfiable as they hide the true meaning of language. So the question of reformulation of ordinary language comes into being. The basic task of the analysts, therefore, is to reformulate the proposition of ordinary language so that the real or true form of proposition is reflected and thereby the true meaning of proposition is clearly and precisely stated. According to the classical analysts' every proposition of ordinary language must be formulated adequately both logically and metaphysically. This is needed simply because the verbal form of a proposition of ordinary language often hides or misleads its true logical form. Consequently, it may happen at times that a proposition, which is by its very nature complex or general, may appear at times to be singular. Russell well known theory of descriptions is a classic example in this regard. It gives us an ample clue of conducting the logical analysis of a category of propositions, which combines both of these aspects. The classic proposition of Russell 'The author of Waverly was Scotch' appears at first sight to be a simple or singular proposition. Russell after analyzing the proposition comes to know and thereby shows us clearly and adequately that the proposition under consideration is really a complex one. Thus, it is again confirmed how the true logical analysis of a proposition gives rise to a real form. This is said to be logical analysis of a proposition.

Barring the logical analysis of proposition, the classical analysts also propose the metaphysical analysis of proposition. Metaphysical analysis of proposition is a subsequent step of the logical analysis of proposition. The aim or objective of the logical analysis of proposition is to have the true form of a proposition. A proposition, by virtue of its true form, seems to refer to things, relations and qualities, which from a

metaphysical point of view are simply complexes of more fundamental entities. So the prime task of the metaphysical analysis of proposition is to reformulate or translate the proposition by means of which the names of these complexes are eliminated in favour of the names of the more fundamental entities without changing the original meaning of the proposition. The examples are what Russell called 'logical constructions'. In this regard, Russell cites the name of phenomenalist. A phenomenalist, being an analytic persuasion or inducement, will not turn down the reality of material objects, but he will rather incline to say that these objects are logical constructions or complexes whose elements are the data of sense perception. Alternatively, it can be said that a proposition containing names of such objects may be translated into a proposition which contains only names of such 'givens', which are being hampered or changed its meaning. It is a process of reduction. Here one can reduce such objects to sensory data without forfeiting its original meaning. Professor Urmson conceives at least three reasons in approving or opting for the metaphysical analysis of proposition as proposed by the classical analysts. For him, it assists one to overcome the paradoxical situation. He goes on to say that when philosophers are confused or puzzled by the unknowable objects, then they aim at a metaphysical demonstration of existence of these entities. On the contrary, it may happen that the other group of philosophers stands a paradoxically skeptical attitude by withholding the possibility of knowledge of such entities. In a situation like this, Urmson observes Russell maxim of logical constructions. Russell's maxim of logical construction gives rise to a solution to subdue the problem by way of analyzing these problematic entities in terms of better known entities. Secondly, the method of classical analysis also helps us to know the fundamental nature of reality. The sole objective of logical analysis is to have the ultimate real. It is a process of elimination and in this process a certain number of possible candidates (entities) are eliminated. However, this elimination process is not exhaustive simply because in such a process we never come to the end of analysis. Thirdly and more importantly, in the classical method of analysis, an analyst can easily find out the distinctive nature and goal of philosophical inquiry. Here we can also sort out the difference between metaphysical and natural sciences in a simple and an elegant way. Natural science speaks of new facts-facts, which are previously ignored.

Metaphysical analysis, on the contrary, gives rise to a new and better understanding of the facts, which have already been disclosed by sciences.

Logical Positivism: A follow up of classical analysis

The logical positivism of the **Vienna Circle** follows the methodology of classical analysis. Like the classical method of analysis, it does not accept the outcome of metaphysical analysis. This is simply because of the fact that the so-called logical positivism of **Vienna Circle** is characterized by the anti-metaphysical standpoint. Logical positivists hold that the main objective of philosophical analysis is to clarify, of course precisely and distinctly, the language of science. The sole objective of this clarification is to find out the relationship between observation and theory or between scientific concepts at different levels of abstraction. The only slogan logical positivism puts up with is that all metaphysical sentences without exception are meaningless as they lack the test of empirical verification. Like Wittgenstein, they also maintain the conviction that metaphysical questions are pseudo-questions and hence cannot be answered. Rudolf Carnap, a leading campaigner of logical positivism conceives metaphysical propositions as such, which claim to present knowledge about something, which is over and beyond all experience. Anything that cannot be experienced can never be spoken of in meaningful language. This reminds us the slogan of Wittgenstein who says, "The limits of my language are the limits of my world."⁵ The logical positivists of **Vienna Circle** have inclined to identify philosophy with analysis, namely, the analysis of the language of science. Carnap's celebrated book the **Logical Syntax of Language** is one of the first and most important attempt to carry out in detail certain important parts of the positivists program.

A.J.Ayer was another leading campaigner of logical positivism. His famous book **Language, Truth and Logic**, which became the center of contention, clearly outlined the conception of positivism. Although it is true to say that Ayer himself modifies or repudiates many ideas of his book in his later writings, but still it remains extremely influential in bringing positivism to the attention of philosopher. Ayer mainly focuses on

⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,

the principles what is popularly known as 'The principle of verification'. According to this principle a sentence is to be literally meaningful if it satisfies certain specified conditions. Metaphysical sentences, Ayer conceives, failed to fulfill the required principles set forth by the positivists. Accordingly, it has been claimed by Ayer that metaphysical sentences are not meaningful. Philosophy, Ayer conceives, is nothing but the outcome of the clarification or of the analysis of language. So the prime task of philosophy is to expose the non-sensical character of metaphysical utterances.

However, the influence of logical positivism does not carry on in philosophy for longer period as it has left no scope of traditional metaphysical investigation in the domain of philosophy. Incorporating all types of philosophy with the analysis of language, logical positivism virtually declines any metaphysical investigation in philosophy. So the philosophers who have a strong affiliation towards traditional philosophy are inclined to believe that the practice of metaphysics still deserves important in philosophy. Like positivism, the classical analysis of language gradually lost its base in philosophy in general. Importantly, with the advance of philosophy, classical analysis was replaced not by one but simultaneously by several quite different conceptions of the nature and function of analytic philosophy. One of the notable drawbacks of classical analysis is that it finds no relevance beyond logic and mathematics. Any type of philosophical analysis or clarification is welcome in philosophy, but this does not make sense to say that the process of analysis should be confined within the parameter of a specific discipline. That is why, it has been charged by many that although the so-called classical analysis deserves a spectacular success on logic and mathematics and the attempts it has been made are energetic as well as subtle, nevertheless, it has failed to formulate or provide a satisfactory account of proposition. For example, it has failed, which it has intended to do, that the state was simply a complex of individual people and thus there underlies a logical deduction or construction out of these individuals. If we take into account the classical method of analysis, we should deduce the state to the individuals without forfeiting the meaning of the word 'state'. However, such type of logical or mathematical deduction at times does not hold good. Such type of deduction or logical construction can only be made possible if the process of analysis is confined within the province of science. So, one can raise an objection against the classical analysts by saying that

barring logic and mathematics the logical construction, as proposed by the classical analysts, has no useful application in other fields. The failure of classical analysis leads philosophers to plea for a new conception of analysis, which is called the philosophical analysis of ideal language. We shall explain this concept in due course after Russell, but at present let us explain the relevance of this concept in context to the classical analysis.

It is said that the construction of ideal or artificial language as a method of philosophical analysis is an attempt to way out from the dead-end of classical analysis. The construction of artificial language is philosophically needed simply because of the failure of classical analysis in the fields outside of deductive sciences. Why this failure? This failure is mainly due to the fact that barring deductive science, our concepts are vague and ambiguous and our language is too imprecise. Consequently, any form of application of classical analysis beyond deductive science ultimately invites skepticism and speculative metaphysics. Ordinary (everyday) language, being a flexible and ambiguous language, also fails to provide us a true scientific analysis of their meaning. So the construction of ideal or artificial or logical language is required for philosophical purposes. Bergmann proposes the construction of ideal language with the hope that it will help to clarify metaphysical questions to the point where they either can be shown to be meaningless or can be answered by making use of the more precise language. So it is wrong to claim that the proposal of ideal language analysis is a complete departure from the classical method of analysis as proposed by Moore and Russell. We shall see in the course of our discussion that the so-called method of classical analysis as proposed by Russell is on a par with the ideal language analysis in many respects, because to have the basic form of proposition, one has to take the help of the method of deductive procedure by which anything else can be deduced.

The proponents of ideal language philosophers seem to realize that since ordinary language is not free from ambiguity, it is better to reconstruct a new form of language which is completely free from ambiguity and which will enable to give us a true picture of reality. They also conceive that the practice of such a language is not an end in itself. What they have in mind is to construct a language as an alternative method of ordinary language, which will help them to clarify our everyday ways of thinking with utmost clarity and precision. It will also help us to make it clear the conceptual apparatus, which

lies submerged in our natural languages in a way in which an architect's blueprint can clarify an impressionistic sketch. Thus, constructionalists propose a method of the nature of the philosophical analysis, which can be applied barring formal logic, to philosophical purposes. Russell elsewhere takes the help of this artificial language. Earlier Wittgenstein, Carnap and a few others also have proposed such method and exercised this method of analysis. We have also seen the application of ideal language in Nelson Goodman's as well as Quine's philosophical writings. However, this theory as a method of philosophical analysis does not hold good as uncritical and one of the important drawback of this theory is that it has no application in England, particularly in the **Vienna Circle**. This theory has got its popularity only in the philosophical circles of United States. Thus as far as the application is concerned this theory is not supposed to be a holistic one.

Consequently, the ideal language analysis as a philosophical method does not persist very long as it was vehemently criticized by many philosophers from different perspectives. Philosophers of other persuasions find an alternative method of analysis which is quite contrary to the method of artificial language. This method of philosophical analysis is popularly known as the method of ordinary language analysis, which though largely but not entirely takes its shape under the influence and leadership of later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's proposal of ordinary language is dramatic in the sense that he proposes this kind of analysis in view of his criticisms of his earlier work of **Tractatus Logico Philosophicus**. The method of analysis which Wittgenstein has proposed and employed in his **Tractatus Logico Philosophicus** was directed by the influence of classical analysis as proposed by Russell. Later Wittgenstein, however, conceives that the method of classical analysis is not sound as it is based on a false conception of language and thought. He, however, does not think that the failure of classical analysis is caused due to the ambiguity of our usual notions. For him one should not consider the lack of precision of ordinary language as a fault for which the construction of ideal language is required. For him it is the basic characteristic of any empirical concept to be imprecised and it does not require any form of formalized language. He further goes on to say that the concept of an ideal language distorts our ordinary concepts rather than clarifying them.

A plea for ordinary language analysis:

Unlike the ideal language analysts, later Wittgenstein proposes the heterogeneity of our concepts and also of our ordinary linguistic practices. Unlike the monolithic conception of language, Wittgenstein conceives a great number of 'language games' having different rules. Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of making comparison between concepts. He does not conceive any justification of telling whether one concept is more complex than another simply because the roles they play are completely different. The same comparison can also be found in the method of classical analysis. The method of classical analysis admits the disparity between empirical concepts and logical concepts and in this regard the classical method of analysis as proposed by Russell differs from the ordinary method of analysis as apprehended by the later Wittgenstein. As there are many language games in ordinary language, says Wittgenstein, so to talk about different things is to talk in different language games. When we are talking about sensations, we are doing it by one language game and when we are talking about material objects, we are doing it by another language game. Thus every language game is different from each other. So any attempt to reduce one thing from another is not possible as they belong to different language games.

Wittgenstein inclines to say that any attempt of reducing one language game from another often invites confusion. One should not or even perhaps cannot range the concepts of a language in a hierarchical process, because in principle no such system of hierarchy exists in our language game. Here we can cite the famous example of Wittgenstein. The words of language, says Wittgenstein, differs among themselves as much as the various tools in a toolbox. A tool is known by its various functions. Likewise, a word is known by its various uses. Wittgenstein and many others seem to believe that most of the traditional philosophical problems have arisen on the part of the philosophers who have failed to apprehend various functions or uses of ordinary language. Philosophers even failed to apprehend the variety of functions, which concepts have, and as a matter of fact they have drawn erroneous conclusions. Classical analysts or the philosophers of ideal language have attempted to acquire a deeper understanding of language. On the contrary, Wittgenstein in his method of analysis attempts to know the

functions of language. A philosophical problem is just like a puzzle, a riddle that needs to be dissolved rather than solved straightforwardly. So philosophical problems, according to this group of analysts, arise from the false conception of the functions of language what Ryle calls a 'category mistake'. Thus, it has been proposed that one can resolve philosophical problems not by giving a perfect explanation of these concepts, but by the way of exhibiting the generic character of the concepts involved in it. Ryle in his **Concept of Mind** opines that the nature of mind result from the mistaken notion that the mind is a sort of ghost inhabiting in a machine i.e., in the body. Wittgenstein, like Ryle, suggests the same view in his **Philosophical Investigations**.

Apart from all these method of analysis cited above, there we find another method of analysis which is on a par with Wittgenstein's method of analysis on many accounts. This method is called the method of 'Oxford Analysis'. Oxford analysis differs from the classical method of analysis as unlike the classical method of analysis, Oxford method of analysis is very much interested in words, in syntax and in idioms. One of the notable aspects of Oxford analysis is that it does not intend to use linguistic analysis for resolving philosophical problems like the classical analysts. Oxford philosophers, on the contrary, are much keener in studying language for its own sake. That is why, it is said that Oxford philosophers are in a better position unlike most others to sort out the linguistic distinctions.

Like later Wittgenstein, Oxford philosophers conceive the usefulness of ordinary language. For them ordinary language is adequate and contains extra-ordinary wealth of concepts. It enables to carry out a vast variety of functions to which philosophers have usually closed their eyes. Ordinary language is all right as it facilitates the needs of those philosophers who favoured it. Ordinary language, they observe, can be precisely known when precision is required and vague when it is not. Those who dispose of natural language on account of its ambiguity, they either fail to understand the logic of ordinary language or vastly oversimplified it. The true nature of ordinary language remains to be obscured to them simply because they give only a superficial study of natural language. Thus Oxford philosophers came to realize that only by a careful and detail study of natural language, the richness and variety of natural (ordinary) language can be recalled and it is the only way through which one can properly understand the function of natural

language. It may appear at time that there underlies a few expressions which are likely to be synonymous, but after a careful examination it is revealed that though they are synonymous, they cannot be used interchangeably. The use of an expression of ordinary language is much more contextual and it can be varied from context to context. It was Austin who in his famous articles shows the variety and richness of ordinary language by using it in various ways. His article 'A Plea for Excuses' and 'Other minds' are glaring examples in this regard. In these articles Austin tries to show how the terms, such as 'mistake', 'accident', 'inadvertence' etc., can be used in various ways in various situations.

P. F. Strawson was another leading proponent of ordinary language philosopher who seems to conceive the usefulness of ordinary language. He finds the relevance of ordinary language by saying that ordinary language is useful to build up the conceptual framework of human mind. Ordinary language is thought to be most agreeable as it helps us to have a better understanding of the world. Linguistic philosophers of the earlier stage fail to find out the relevance of ordinary language because of its ambiguity. Wittgenstein himself has started his philosophical career with a kind of language that was very much contrary to ordinary language. What is most important is that he subsequently finds out the shortcomings of his method and the language he has used. As a matter of fact Wittgenstein finally shifts his earlier method to the method of ordinary language analysis—a method that is by far accepted as a true or genuine method of analysis. This is mainly for the fact that it has wider application in comparison to all other methods previously proposed or used and it enables to cope up with all the problems of traditional philosophy and thereby gives rise to the solutions to overcome these problems. Oxford philosophers, unlike many others, are careful to look after the diverse projects of ordinary language. They conceive that a proper and careful analysis of ordinary language will help us to eradicate many philosophical problems and also unearth how many traditional philosophical problems are badly framed. That is why Austin aptly puts: if ordinary language is not the end-all of philosophy, surely, it is at least the began all.

It is important to note here that there underlies some subtle differences between Wittgensteinian method of linguistic analysis and the method of ordinary language analysis. We have seen that Wittgenstein in his method of analysis tends to solve

philosophical problems. His method of analysis is hypothetical in the sense that it is directed to the principle: if there were no philosophical problems, then there was no need for philosophical analysis of language. Oxford philosophers, on the contrary, conceive philosophical analysis of language as an intrinsic value. Secondly, Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis of language is directed to unearth the generic character of the concepts we intend to analyze, but according to Oxford analysts a minute analysis is indispensable. Thirdly and more importantly, Wittgenstein is the only philosopher of linguistic analysis who maintains a consistency in his method of analysis. It is clear from his cryptic remark when he goes on to say that analysis is the only method which is useful in philosophy. Unlike Wittgenstein, Oxford analysts think otherwise at times. For him the method of analysis is one among many others and it is wrong to suppose, they conceive, that the method of analysis is sufficient to cope up with all philosophical disputes. It is clear from the remark of Austin when he goes on to say that ordinary language analysis is the begin all, but not the end all. Strawson's remark also indicates an alternative method of ordinary language analysis when he seems to conceive that 'up to a certain point ordinary language is all right'.

Barring the above mentioned disparity between Wittgenstein and Oxford analysts, there we find, however, some common ground in between them. Both Wittgenstein and Oxford analysts distrusted the classical analysis that admitted the hierarchy of concepts and of propositions starting from the ultimate simple to the highly complex Both of them also deny the monolithic conception of language as proposed by the classical school. Unlike the classical method, they conceive philosophical problems with a completely different outlook. For them there is no point of defining a philosophical concept in terms of another, rather it is a matter of differentiating the function of one concept from another.

Like later Wittgenstein and Oxford analysts, there underlies a close proximity between the classical method of analysis and the method of artificial language analysis on many accounts. Besides this, there also underlies a subtle distinction in between them. The classical method of analysis holds, as we saw, that the propositions we have in ordinary language give rise to a perfect picture of the facts which they describe. On the contrary, the proponents of ideal language analysts have claimed that every proposition must be perspicuous which ordinary language fails to provide. It is not clear at all whether the

propositions we have through the classical analysis are perspicuous or not. Classical analysts, unlike ideal language analysts, take the advantage of symbolic logic and the method of deductive analysis. However, ideal language analysts do not take the help of symbolic logic, but it attempts to minimize the vocabulary of ideal language so that there underlies no ambiguity in the vocabulary of artificial language and in this regard they include only proper name and demonstrative pronouns in the domain of the vocabulary of ideal language.

So far we have examined, though briefly, the various method of analysis started from Moore and came to an end in the later Wittgenstein. We have seen in the course of our discussion that every method of analysis is somehow related to other and there always underlies a criss-cross relationship among them. Although my thesis is predominantly confined to the philosophical analysis of Bertrand Russell who himself belongs to the classical method of analysis, but we feel extremity or gravity in focusing the history of analysis simply to explore Russell's own position and contribution to the history of linguistic analysis. This will surely help us, in the course of our discussion, to sort out precisely how far Russellian method of linguistic analysis is correlated to the other methods of analysis. That is why this chapter is selected as an introduction of my thesis.

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