

CHAPTER EIGHT

Concluding Remarks:

In the preceding chapters we have attempted to show the nature, aim and uses of Russell's philosophical analysis of language. We think that although Russell like Wittgenstein and many others is not designated as a linguistic philosopher, but the linguistic method Russell has proposed has undoubtedly played a central role in the so-called revolution that has taken place in Anglo- American philosophy. In fact Russell's pre-occupation with language displayed in much of his philosophical writings during this period and the flourishing condition of the present day 'semiotic' is a sufficient testimony to the fertility of Russell's ideas. This has been defended by his remark that the influence of language on philosophy is profound and almost universally recognized. In fact, we have no hesitation to claim that there is hardly any philosopher bears a greater share of responsibility than Russell, if language has become the foundation of present day philosophical discussion. Russell's systematic analysis of various aspects of analytic method would reflect a plenty of clues to his philosophy of language. Russell at his early stages believes that philosophical study of language is nothing but the construction of 'philosophical grammar'. However, subsequently, it has become much more than this. Elsewhere Russell seems to have conceived that philosophical linguistics may be expected to provide nothing less than a pathway to the nature of reality, which is the metaphysician's goal. Russell further goes on to say that with sufficient caution the properties of language may help us to understand the structure of the world. In this regard, analysis of language potentially reflects the ontological structure of the world. Having said this philosophy of language cannot be restricted to the examination of uninterrupted formal systems, it should also be extended for eradicating the rhetorical art of unintentional ambiguity. Thus Russell seems to establish that analysis of language can be philosophically relevant if it requires the use of data drawn from logic, psychology and empirical linguistics. Russell, therefore, includes all these questions in the philosophical analysis of language and at the same times maintains neutrality of his

devotion to scientific method. We have seen that Russell distrusts the role of ordinary grammar as it very often fails to reflect the true structure of form of the sentence and this actually leads Russell to find out the logical form of sentence as a true structure of reality. Thus developing the true logical structure through the logical form is one of the important impotent aspects of Russell's method of analysis. Russell then goes on to say that the true logical form is not something that can be practiced within the domain of ordinary language, rather it is a kind of form which belongs to only logical or artificial language. This leads Russell to divorce ordinary language and thereby construct an ideal form of language- a language that is adequate for reflecting the true structure of reality.

In the parameter of ideal language, Russell seeks a minimum number of vocabularies, such as, demonstrative pronouns and logically proper names, as the genuine furniture of the world. A logically proper name, says Russell, is a name with which we are directly acquainted. Here Russell finds the distinction between logically proper names from ordinary proper names and thereby says that unlike a logically proper name, an ordinary proper name does not denote an object with which we can be directly acquainted. This is reflected in his paper entitled as 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descriptions'. We think that Russell's method of philosophical analysis of language is based on three fundamental assumptions, such as, the doctrine of logical form, the theory of acquaintance and the ontological structure of reality. So in the concluding chapter we propose to analysis and assess with critical outlook of all of these concepts and thereby come to know the philosophical contribution of his method of analysis in the domain of linguistic philosophy.

A critical assessment of the theory of acquaintance:

Russell's theory of acquaintance hinges on the assumption that all propositions concerning matters of fact are meaningful only to the extent that the expressions they contain can be defined in terms of expressions standing for entities known by acquaintance. In order to establish his theory of acquaintance, Russell further goes on to say that we must attach some meaning to the words we use and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are directly acquainted. Professor Max Black criticizes Russell on this assertion. According to Black, by admitting this assertion Russell either makes an incorrect characterization of the relationship between a word and

its meaning or he introduces a new conception of meaning by reference to which the theory of acquaintance is true by definition. Black says, "One of two things must be the case. Either Russell is using the term 'meaning' in one of its customary sense; in that case quite simply pointing out that 'Attila' means a certain person with whom we are not acquainted in Russell's sense refutes the argument adduced in favour of the principle. Or, alternatively, a new sense of meaning is implicitly **introduced** in which only objects with which we are acquainted can be meant by words; in that case the argument is a *petitio principii*."¹⁴⁶ Black further quips: does Russell use the word 'meaning' in the same sense of 'acquaintance'? If he in fact does, then the assertion that 'the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted' is merely a tautology that 'the meaning of our words must be the meaning of our words'. Black senses that Russell certainly does not use the word 'meaning' in the sense of 'acquaintance'. There are two possible alternatives by means of which we can apprehend the word 'Attila'. That we can know the word 'Attila' either by knowing the meaning of the word 'Attila' or we can alternatively to be acquainted with 'Attila'. But the question is that the word 'Attila' is neither a sense datum nor a universal capable of characterizing sense-data. So it would not be possible, Black observes, for anybody to be acquainted with 'Attila'. Black claims that if Russell's theory of assertion is said to have any content, then his theory can meaningfully be interpreted in the following manner: "It seems scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgment without knowing by acquaintance what it is that we are judging about" and he adds "It is impossible that our words should have meaning unless they refer to entities **with which we are acquainted**."¹⁴⁷

Black further seems to conceive that in all genuine knowledge there must be some association between the knower and what is known. But this does not mean that in order to know or mean something we must have a direct relationship of this type. Of course, Black says, there may be independent grounds for supposing the direct relationship between the knower and what is known. But he regrets that neither Russell nor anybody else has provided good grounds to establish it. Russell has tried to establish that meaning is necessarily a direct relationship because knowing is necessarily a direct relationship.

¹⁴⁶ Black, Max, 'Russell's Philosophy of Language' included in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* edited by P.A. Schilpp, Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1944, p. 248.

¹⁴⁷ Black, Max, *Language and Philosophy*, op. cit. p. 132.

The two concepts are related in the following way. Since all words designate some type of objects and if a word is to have meaning for us we must have knowledge of this object; and we can genuinely know only objects with which we are acquainted: it follows that only words standing for objects known by acquaintance are meaningful in the strict sense. Acquaintance, for Russell, is a direct cognitive relationship and hence meaning is also a direct relationship. However, Black claims that by establishing the theory in the above manner Russell confuses an epistemological problem with a purely semantical problem. Ordinarily, the meaning (in the sense of reference) of a word is said to be simply the object the words stands for. Thus, the word 'Attila' refers to or means 'Attila' and the relation between them is semantical, but in no sense epistemological. Russell argues that the word 'Attila' is not a logically proper name, but a description. However, Black claims that by considering 'Attila' as a description Russell confuses two questions which are completely distinct; namely, the question of what the word means, and the question of how the words functions for someone who understands it. From a purely semantical point of view, of course, the reference of a word has nothing to do with what a particular person understands by that word.

Thus, by developing the theory of acquaintance, Russell has sought a new theory of meaning, which is different from the ordinary meaning, and in this way the value of the theory of acquaintance has been justified. However, it is not clear from his clarification in what sense the so-called meaning associated with the theory of acquaintance is different from that of ordinary conception of meaning. Considering in this light, the theory of acquaintance may be regarded as a claim that the concepts of **meaning** and **knowing** are actually more closely related than they are ordinarily taken to be. They are, in fact, inseparable in the sense that the two concepts seemed natural and necessary and accordingly if we are to grasp the true meaning of a linguistic expression, we must see what it comes to when it is translated in terms of immediate awareness. This conviction is a fundamental commitment to Russell as it leads to a Cartesian-type subjectivism and a certainty theory of knowing. For him the traditional conception of meaning leaves out the fundamental aspect of language, namely, its relation to human subjectivity. Unless our basic concepts are related to individual experience they are, Russell believes, literally senseless. Professors J.V. Reeves has argued that by asserting an inseparable relation

between meaning and knowing, Russell in his theory of acquaintance involves confusion between the meanings of a proposition with the “facts about my experience that convince me of its truth.”¹⁴⁸ Reeves claims that once the confusion has been explored and pointed out, the issue has been settled and the theory of acquaintance as advocated by Russell has been proved to be a mistake. However, if we anticipate the observation of Reeves and Black, we would certainly miss the insight of Russell’s theory of acquaintance. In fact it would better for us to say that Russell perhaps has conflated two different questions about language and to conflate two questions or two concepts is not necessarily to confuse them as suggested by Reeves and Black. We think that in formulating his theory of acquaintance Russell consciously overcomes the barrier of the customary distinction between meaning and knowing. Russell in fact seems to have conceived that from philosophical perspective it would seem clear that meaning and knowing are closely related to each other. By claiming that meaning and knowing are closely associated with each other, Russell’s theory of acquaintance thereby reflects the important position such as that epistemological questions occupy in Russell’s philosophy of language. More importantly, the introduction of epistemological considerations into an account of meaning does result in a theory that may appear to include some other alien and extraneous elements that ultimately give this theory a very special privilege over rival theories where these elements are missing. May be Black is right in claiming that in introducing a new theory of meaning with the theory of acquaintance, Russell theory in turn involves into a circularity or it may be true analytically. Whatever, it may be the case is not important in the present context. What is important to know is that whether adopting the theory of meaning by virtue of which it is circular is feasible and useful in terms of the purpose for which it was originally proposed. This question, we think, can best be approached by examining the consequence, for language, of adopting this theory of meaning.

Another shortcoming of Russell’s theory of acquaintance is that it would establish the meaning of a word as private to a particular person. Russell himself was aware of this fact and he goes on to say that the vocabulary of the logically perfect language would be

¹⁴⁸ Reeves, J.W. “Origin and Consequences of the Theory of Descriptions”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. xxxiv, 1933-34, p. 223.

'very largely private to the speaker.' The question then is: how could it be possible to communicate when the so-called language is supposed to be private? Would it not be utterly possible to communicate? Is it not a happy accident? Professor Black suggests that with such a language as Russell envisages, "The proposition understood by the hearer would not...be the proposition intended by the speaker.communication would be possible only by grace of some kind of pre-established speaker-hearer ambiguity in virtue of which what was a logically proper name for one functioned as a description for the other."¹⁴⁹ This point, we think, might appear to be a crucial one for the issue under examination and if any philosophical theory proposes meaning criteria which would render this impossible, then it would seem that that fact alone should preclude our adopting the theory.

However, one would like to say that it is the essence of language to provide a means for communication. In fact a proponent of Russell would like to say that the use of language as a medium of communication is the social and pragmatic function of language. This aspect of language is closely associated with everyday life. In this regard language is used not to philosophical scrutiny, but to make statements, commands, ask questions etc. The ideal language of Russell, however, is certainly not intended to be used in this sense. In replying to Black's criticism just quoted, Russell says, "I have never intended to urge seriously that such a language should be created, except in certain fields and for certain problems."¹⁵⁰ Although Russell does not specify here what these problems are, but we know from our earlier examination that the primary purpose for which such a language would be developed is nothing less than to provide a symbolic mirror of the fundamental structure of reality, a language, that will 'show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied.'

So one may criticize Russell on the ground that his conception of a logically perfect language is something of which we are not accustomed. It may even be doubted whether such type language at all be considered as a genuine language. In fact the so-called language as envisaged by Russell is far away from the language we do use in our daily life. His language, it is claimed, could not be used for the purpose ^{of} communication.

¹⁴⁹ Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1944, p.253.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.694.

Since the ideal language of Russell is not designated to be an instrument for communication, it has no significance at all in doing philosophy. This does not make sense to say that Russell's theory of acquaintance deserves no philosophical significance. It has theoretical purpose at least as it tries to assimilate two concepts, which are usually thought to be distinct. Even if we reject Russell's particular view of the relationship between meaning and knowing, it is important to realize that they are, perhaps, as closely related as ~~the~~ suggests. It would generally be the case that the objects we claim to know are objects that are somehow given to us in the various dimensions of our experience, whether this is sense-experience, value-experience or whatever. Going forward, if we assume that a particular type of object is the kind of entity that we can be known we will tend to interpret sentences ostensibly making references to such entities as irreducibly about them. In fact, if we come to know that there is a problem as to the epistemic accessibility of such entities, we will try to reformulate these sentences in such a way that their meaning is stated in terms of other entities, entities which we assume can be known. Or perhaps we will interpret them as not genuinely referential at all. Failing to do either of these things, we will be forced to acknowledge kinds of entities- referents of the words and phrases in the sentences-that we cannot know. That means though these words and phrases have meaning, what they mean is unintelligible. This in fact at least appear to us a patent contradiction and although we may question the particular theory of knowing that led Russell to adopt his theory of acquaintance, we do not see how we overlook the general assumption underlying this theory, the assumption, that the meaning of a sentence must be rendered in terms of entities we can be said to know. In fact the supposed referent of an ostensibly referring expression cannot be cognized and hence the expression is thought to be vacuous and has no function in the realm of meaningful discourse.

Critical assessment of the doctrine of logical form:

Russell's theory of acquaintance is in fact the outcome of his concept of **logical form**, because the theory of acquaintance provided Russell with a criterion by reference to which he could ascertain when a proposition in ordinary language has been translated into the logical form. According to Russell the logical form of a proposition is the form when all of its constituents have been reduced to or defined in terms of expressions designating objects

known by acquaintance. This makes sense to say that the relationship between the theory of acquaintance and the doctrine of logical form is an extremely intimate one in Russell's philosophy. However, although they are supposed to be intimately associated with each other, but from this it does not follow that the soundness of the doctrine of logical form is based on the soundness of the theory of acquaintance. For it is entirely possible both to deny that propositions must have the particular form having being maintained that they must be structurally isomorphic with the facts they assert. In fact that the doctrine of logical form does not presuppose that a proposition must be expressed in terms of items known by acquaintance. For example, physical object symbols or class symbols are perfectly legitimate propositional constituents and still hold that a properly formulated proposition must somehow mirror any fact it may assert. The doctrine of logical form holds that only the propositions and facts have, in some sense, a common structure, and that a symbolism is more or less adequate depending on the extent to which it does or does not clear this structure. But many recent philosophers have called this conception of relationship between proposition and fact, i.e. between language and the world into question. Philosophers, of course, do not find any difficulty with the theory of acquaintance; rather they seem to have conceived that the quest for logical form is a misguided philosophical enterprise in Russell system. At least two major arguments have been raised against Russellian notion of logical form. The first argument is that the relationship between language and reality is purely conventional and accordingly, there is no ground to expect propositions to have any kind of structural affinity with the facts they assert. The second argument is that the 'logical form' of a proposition is the rule or function of a sentence, but not some inherent 'structure' the sentence may possess. Although the two arguments are akin to each other, they are inseparable. Before delving into these arguments, let us first explain the views of philosophers that clearly go against Russell's proposal.

According to Austin there is no need to construct an ideal form of language in order to know the structure of reality. He says, "There is no need whatsoever for the words used in making a true statement to 'mirror' in any way, however, indirect, any feature whatsoever of the situation or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the 'multiplicity', say or the 'structure' or 'form' of the reality, than a word needs to be choice

or writing photographic.”¹⁵¹ Black says that the question of finding out one-to-one correspondence or one-one-correlation of elements or identity of logical structure has no philosophical value. He says, “Whatever else Russell is prepared to regard as ‘accidental’ in language, he is unwilling to abandoned the notion that language must ‘correspond’ to the ‘facts’ through one-one correlation of elements and identity of logical structure. But there is no good reason why we should expect language to correspond to, or ‘resemble’, the ‘world’ any more closely than a telescope does the planet which it brings to the astronomer’s attention.”¹⁵² Even Hampshire says that the confusion of the logical form of proposition with the visible form of its expression in a sentence has led to endless confusion. Logicians, in fact, have attempted to show that the arrangement of words in a sentence somehow ‘picture’ or ‘correspond to the arrangement of ‘objects’ in the fact to which the sentence refers. But at the end, logicians like Russell have failed. The relation of language to fact is not a simple relation of picture to subject. The grammatical form of any spoken language can only be explained by reference to its history and the accidents to its development.

On the basis of the above remarks of Austin, Black and Hampshire, it can be said that Russell’s program of reconstructing propositions in order to clarify their logical form is quite otiose, since there is no necessity that propositions in any sense ‘picture’ what they are about. It is therefore suggests that language is no way related to reality just in the same way a picture is related to the object it represents. One should not ignore the fundamental distinction between the way a proposition states and the way a picture shows that it is about. Professor E. Daitz in his paper ‘The Picture Theory of Meaning’ spells out the difference and thereby says, “ The order of words in a sentence is a conventional order of presentation; the special ordering of the elements in a reflection, picture, or map is an iconic order of representation.”¹⁵³ According to Daitz as a model for sentences, pictures are an unfortunate choice as there underlies important differences between the ways picture and sentences refer. Unlike a sentence, a picture is an icon in the sense that the picture taken as a whole directly represents the objects it pictures; the various elements of the picture represent, in the same sense, elements of the pictured; and that the arrangement of

¹⁵¹ Austin, J.A, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, VOL.XXXIV, 1950, P.199.

¹⁵² Black, Bertrand, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit. p.254.

¹⁵³ Daitz, Essays in Conceptual Analysis, edited by Anthony Flew, London, 1956, pp.63.

elements of the picture directly shows the arrangement of the elements of the pictured. All these features coherently claim that there must be one and only one element of the picture for of the object pictured and these elements must be related in similar ways in both the picture and the object pictured. That is to say that there must be a complete structural isomorphism between the picture and that of which it is a copy. That is what is meant by saying that a picture shows what it is about. Can we say that a sentence function just the same way a picture can? Certainly, it would not be the case as like a picture a sentence is not an icon. In fact the essence of a sentence is to state, where the essence of an icon is to show. Daitz says, "It is clear that sentences do not show, but state, that arrangement, which is an essential factor in iconic signification, need not occur in conventional significance that the elements of a sentence do not stand for objects but they may be used to refer to or describe objects. And since the words in a sentence do not stand for objects, they cannot be in correspondence, with objects."¹⁵⁴ Therefore, Daitz concludes that a sentence and a picture differ in the very respects in which if the one is to be a model for the other- they would have to resemble one another.

The question then is in what sense the concept that 'sentences are not icons' impacts on Russell's conception of logical form. As far as ordinary language is concerned it is evidently true that the usual sense of the sentences do not 'picture' the facts they assert. Sentences in ordinary language do refer facts on the basis of linguistic conventions. There is no structural similarity between a sentence in ordinary language and the fact it asserts. Of course, it may be the case that there exist linguistic conventions, which simply tie certain locations to certain facts. Russell, however, does not forget to point out the linguistic conventions of ordinary language. He goes on to say that it is just this aspect of language for which he is concerned about. He holds that the failure of sentences in ordinary language clearly shows that the structure of the facts corresponding to them is the source of many false notions concerning the ultimate structure of reality. Sentences in ordinary language do manage to assert facts without picturing these facts, and for ordinary purpose, it is certainly not necessary that they do so. For ordinary purpose, the statement 'The author of Waverly is Scotch' though inadequately formulated, but still it is quite serviceable as one can easily understand what the sentence is all about. As far as ordinary transaction is concerned, there

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.* , p.66.

is no need whatsoever for the words used in making a true statement to mirror in any way. If this is supposed to be the case, then what bearing does this fact have on the question for logical form? We think if it has any bearing at all, it has very little. However, this is not important to Russell. What is important to Russell is that Russell pays little interest on ordinary language since he believes that ordinary language is not philosophically important. A language is philosophically important to Russell if it enables to reveal the nature and structure of facts. Sentences of ordinary language mostly fail to do this job and they frequently mislead us about the ontological structure of the world. So the sentence of ordinary language, Russell says, must be reconstructed so that the basic constituents can be clearly seen.

It seems clear to us that by claiming that language should picture reality, Russell does not mean that a proposition is a picture of fact in the same sense in which a Constable landscape is a picture of a portion of the English countryside. Though he does try to show a connection between showing and stating that is usually overlooked, he certainly does not think that stating is the same thing as showing. In fact no sentence can duplicate the structure of a fact in the iconic way a picture duplicates the object it pictures and the relationship between language and reality is not, as Russell certainly realized, a simple relation of picture to object. The metaphor of language as a picture is after all only a metaphor. However, its usefulness to Russell was tied up with his whole conception of linguistic analysis as a means for getting at the ontological structure of reality. On the contrary, there are philosophers who have no such goal like Russell and who regard analysis of language as a philosophical end in itself would like to say that there is no reason to insist on any kind of structural affinity between language and reality. For them there would no more resemble between language and reality than there is between 'a telescope (and) the planet which it brings to the astronomer's attention'. The situation is completely different to Russell. It is imperative to Russell to uncover those features of our language, which have a counterpart in the extra-linguistic world. For Russell the analysis of language gives rise to an ontological insight. Russell's doctrine of logical form may be criticized, but it cannot be dismissed simply by calling attention to the conventional character of language we use.

Another most powerful and serious objection that can be raised against Russell's view of language is that language is a kind of picture of reality. This argument, it is claimed, is resulted from confusing meaning with reference. Philosophers have thought that by admitting this view Russell, however, confuses meaning with reference and thereby focuses his attention on only one particular use of language, viz, the referring use. Against this view of language it is argued that the meaning of a word is never the referent of that word, but is the set of rules that govern its use. As Strawson puts it, "For a referring expression to have meaning, it suffices that it should be possible in suitable circumstances to use it to refer to some one thing, person, place & etc. Its meaning is the set of linguistic conventions governing its correct use so to refer ...sentences and phrases and words have meaning, in virtue of which they may be used to make statements and to refer to things. But the meanings of sentences are not the statements they are used to make, and the meaning of words and phrases are not the things they are used to refer to. Only the grossest equivocation with words like 'mean' and 'refer' can continue to obscure these facts."¹⁵⁵ Here Strawson finds a distinction between a sentence and a statement. Elsewhere he makes a similar distinction between an expression and a use of an expression. Concerning the sentence-statement Strawson says, "One must distinguish between what can be said about the **sentence**, and what can be said about the statements made, on different occasions, by the use of the sentence. It is about statements only that the question of truth or falsity simply can arise."¹⁵⁶

We think that Strawson being a philosopher of ordinary language expresses a view that is directly related to the 'use theory of meaning'- a theory in which a sentence in no sense pictures reality. In fact the so-called sentence as understood by Russell is different from the sentence as understood by Strawson. According to Russell, a sentence is constituted by names standing for particulars and relation-words, which, if true, correspond to a fact in the world. On the contrary according to the use theory a sentence is construed as an instrument for accomplishing a certain linguistic task. According to this theory a sentence may be used to assert facts, but instead of that in can be used for other purposes, such as, for giving commands, expressing wishes or beliefs, for making premises, and so on.

¹⁵⁵ Strawson, P.F, Introduction to Logical Theory, London, 1952, pp.188-89.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. , p.175.

According to Strawson same sentence may be used in different situations differently, for example, he points out that the sentence 'The cat is a hunter' can be used to make statements having quite different forms. It can be used to make a statement about an individual cat as well as a generalization about cats. Black also expresses the same conviction as he holds that 'every form of words may express several different propositions according to context. For him the meaning of a sentence is conceived as a function of the meanings of the several words that go to make it up; whereas for Russell sentence meanings stand to word meanings analogous to the way a picture stands to the various parts of the picture. According to the **use –theory** word meanings stand to sentence meanings in a quite different way as in Ryle's words, 'the tennis-racket stands to the strokes which are or may be made with it.' Ryle's conception of meaning differs from Russell's conception of meaning, as unlike Russell, Ryle's conception of meaning is associated with the pragmatic dimension of language. The pragmatic dimension of language actually highlights the way language functions in actual use-situations. According to this theory, word-meanings are said to contribute to the total meaning of the sentence by making it possible to use the sentence to perform certain linguistic acts. What can be said against Russell is that a sentence cannot be said to have only one logical form, but several logical form as it can be used for different linguistic purposes. Here we particularly call upon the remark of later Wittgenstein who says that 'do not look for the meaning, but look for the use'.

Having said this, many people have actually tried to assimilate meaning to use and thereby under-valued the semantic dimension of language as proposed by Russell. Strawson observation against Russell is a case in point. The sentence 'Socrates loves Plato' states a relationship between Socrates and Plato. Here the sentence 'Socrates loves Plato' can be used to state a relationship between two persons, one named Socrates, and the other named Plato. This relationship appears too artificial, but it is strictly correct according to Strawson interpretation. Moreover, the value of distinguishing between sentence and statement and also between expressions and the use of expressions is seen to better advantage by applying them in the case of a sentence such as 'The cat is a hunter'. In fact the sentence under consideration can be used to make a statement about cats, taken as a class, or to state something about a particular cat. This actually leads us to say that

the sentence has a particular meaning without committing ourselves to saying that it refers either to the class cat or to a particular cat. Thus it is false to say: what does the sentence mean? Instead of that it is appropriate to say: how does the sentence S mean? The question of 'what' is the cry of Russell and the question of 'how' is the cry of Strawson. The answer to the question 'what' is inappropriate according to Strawson and the answer to the question 'how' is actually associated with the linguistic conventions governing its correct use.

In fact, the philosophers who proposed the 'use theory' of meaning are dominated by the 'tool' metaphor and on the contrary, Russell as a proponent of referential theory of meaning is biased by the 'picture' metaphor. 'Tool' metaphor is based on ordinary language philosophy, whereas 'picture' metaphor is based on ideal language philosophy. As far as the nature and function of language are concerned both ideal and ordinary language are completely different. So any sort of criticism comes from ordinary language philosophers will create a serious threat to ideal language philosophy. But that does not mean that ideal language as proposed by Russell has no philosophical significance or relevance at all. The relevance of logical form is that it shows that we must somehow permit the referential dimension of language to have a role in determining linguistic forms. Since language is basically referential, its semantical dimension plays the all important role in determining its forms. The problem is that if we retain the semantical dimension of language, we have to leave or surrender the so-called use theory as associated with ordinary language. However, Russell perhaps would like to say that we should not much bother about since by doing so we will lost a very little as we may still retain statements as the bearers of logical form in the semantical sense.

The quest for Ontological Structure:

Another important aspect of Russell's linguistic analysis is to elucidate the ontological structure of reality. The question we must now examine is in precisely what sense is analysis of language capable of providing us with insight into ontological structure? So far with the critical analysis of Russell's philosophy of language, we have now arrived at the most far-reaching of the several important theses, which in fact gave to his program of analysis its distinctive form. We think that Russell's philosophical analysis of language is desired to elucidate the basic structure of reality and his entire approach to

linguistic analysis led him to conclude that reconstructionism that lies in the explication of logical form is the analytic technique appropriate for effecting philosophical clarification of language. Many philosophers, however, would like to say that although Russell's philosophical analysis of language as a whole is not futile, but it, they conceive, extremely limited in what it is desired to accomplish. It is felt that his conception of analysis as a philosophical method is rigidly reductionistic and accordingly it fails to deal with the complex aspects of ordinary language. We have already discussed a few criticisms raised against his theory of logical form. Here we attempt to see that it arises out of a quite different conception of the purpose of philosophical analysis.

We have seen that Russell in his philosophical analysis of language actually pleads for a shift or change of ordinary language which for him fails at times to depict the true structure of reality. Many philosophers belonging to the camp of ordinary language have raised objections against this shift. However, Professor Weitz inclines to say that such shift is required for doing better philosophy as it helps us to clarify expressions with which we are concerned. Weitz says, "...the shift from the belief that the prime task of philosophy is the replacement of castigated expressions by good ones, to the belief that this task is the elucidation of expressions, such as they are."¹⁵⁷ As far as the elucidation of the expressions is concerned, there remains nothing controversial, but whether such type of elucidation unveils the ontological structure of fact or reality is a matter of concern and many critics are of the opinion that such type of elucidation is too limited to unveil the true structure of fact. Of course the prime task of philosophy is the elucidation of expressions. This conception of philosophy actually derives from Wittgenstein and it has its root in the firm conviction that philosophy after all a kind of therapy. Wittgenstein elsewhere says that philosophy is essentially an activity, but not as it has usually been thought to be theory. Philosophical activities should not be confined to any fixed activity; rather philosophy is understood as a method or a set of methods by means of which we get clear about the logic of our language. Thus, the so-called philosophical problems are generated due to the failure of understanding the true nature of language. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein was primarily concerned with one particular type of proposition and believes that most linguistic confusions were due to a failure to get clear about the way

¹⁵⁷ Weitz, "Oxford Philosophy", *Philosophical Review*, vol.LXII, 1953, P.228.

such propositions function. However, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein realizes that linguistic confusions occur in connection with almost every conceivable type of proposition. Whatever the distinction between his two writings, one thing, however, remains common. He in fact tries to show us how to disentangle ourselves from linguistic confusions in doing philosophy. For him philosophy must show clearly the conceptual paths owing to avoid the ‘bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’. So the conception of philosophy as therapy is revolutionary in the sense that those who are in need of the kind of therapy philosophy provides are none other than philosophers themselves. Wittgenstein even characterizes philosophy as savages and says, “When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people who bear the expressions of civilized man, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw queer conclusions from it.”¹⁵⁸ This remark of Wittgenstein clearly suggests that philosophy is both patient and physician, and the patient is extremely vulnerable to illness. That means when a philosophy confuses in doing philosophy, he has no way-to-way out. Here the role of the physician, i.e. the therapeutic philosopher who in fact enables to bring all his skills not only to cure the patient, but equally protect him from subsequent illnesses. By way of curing these illnesses, the patient, i.e. the philosopher must be acquainted with various language games and thereby making him aware of the way language functions in each. Accomplishing this does make sense to say that the patient becomes healthy and remain so.

It is revealed from the above observation that the so-called philosophical problems are not genuine problem, but they are pseudo-problems as generated by the philosophers. Philosophical problems are therefore due to the philosophers’ own confusions of language. Language, in itself, is not defective, language is all right. It is the philosophers who have tempted to draw ‘queer conclusions’ about the forms and functions of certain types of propositions. Thus, in his **Philosophical Investigations**, Wittgenstein pleas for a kind of ‘linguistic phenomenology’, that will give rise to a purely descriptive account of the rules in the various language games. Wittgenstein says, “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.”¹⁵⁹ What has

¹⁵⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Oxford, 1956, p. 39.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

been said above following later Wittgenstein actually goes against the philosophical analysis of Russell. Sensing that philosophy is a kind of therapy, Wittgenstein would like to say, we think, that the prime task of philosophy is the elucidation of expressions. Now the question is that if the purpose of philosophy is simply to correct linguistic confusions, then we have to point out, Wittgenstein suggests, the proper function of the confusing-producing expressions and in this way the task of philosophy would be completed. Accordingly, there is no need of reforming ordinary language as suggested by Russell for replacing castigated expressions by good ones. Strawson says, "...for the old, limited and theory-ridden program of analysis, we are to substitute a different aim: that of coming to understand philosophically puzzling concepts by careful and accurately noting the ways in which the related linguistic expressions are actually used in discourse."¹⁶⁰

The tussle between Wittgenstein and Russell is that according to according to Russell philosophical problems are generated by some kind of 'linguistic confusions.' Since philosophical problems are the outcome of linguistic confusions, language should be revised in such a way so that no linguistic confusion can further be generated. On the other hand, Wittgenstein would like to say that since philosophical questions are not 'pseudo-questions' generated out of linguistic confusions, then the type of analysis as practiced by Russell is superfluous and his program of reconstructionism is a mistake. There is no question of doubt the therapeutic model as suggested by Wittgenstein as an alternative method of Russell's analysis of language is philosophically worthy, but this does not make sense to say that it stands uncritically against Russell's proposal. If we are very much critical on the therapeutic model of Wittgenstein, we would see that there is at least one fundamental philosophical question to which the therapeutic type of analysis fails to provide an answer. The question is: what are the basic ontological assumptions embedded in the categorical matrix of ordinary language? This is not a question which ever arises for the therapeutic analyst simply because it is not a question that concerns the use of language; rather it is a question concerning, in the most fundamental sense, its relevance, its semantic dimension. As far as the therapeutic analysis is concerned, the most important aspect of language is its pragmatic aspect, i.e. how it is used within a particular language game. What we would like to say at this juncture is that the

¹⁶⁰ Strawson, P.F. *The Revolution in Philosophy*, p. 104.

investigation of the ontological commitments of ordinary language is a matter of interest and importance to philosophers and it is an investigation that remains after therapeutic analysis has done its job. What we intend to say is that the so-called therapeutic analysis of language can not do the same job what Russell has proposed to do by applying his method of analysis. Russell's use of analysis leads him to pursue a policy of replacing castigated expressions by good ones. However, it is quite interesting to mention that philosophers belonging to opposite camp would like to reject the method of analysis as proposed by Russell. Strawson, for instance, asks, "Why should it be supposed that the only way to gain an understanding of the words which expresses the philosophically puzzling concepts was to translate sentences in which they occurred into sentences in which they did not occur. It is too turgid a conception of analysis, because it supposes the existence of exact quasi-definitional relations between classes of concepts, which do not in fact obtain. It is too narrow, because it neglects altogether very many quite different features of the functioning of language, which it is of the first importance accurately to note and describe, if our philosophical problems are to be resolved."¹⁶¹ Although in the above quotation, Strawson does not mention the name of Russell, but what he intends to say actually goes against Russell. As far as Russell's method of analysis is concerned, it is certainly not intended to be a technique for explicating all the different features of the functioning of language. Rather Russell has intended to clarify ordinary language as a vehicle for exhibiting the ontological structure of the world. Accordingly, Strawson remarks here against Russell do not impact at all.

According to Russell the so-called therapeutic analysis of language actually fails to elucidate the ontological structure of the world. Here we examine two fundamental and closely related questions about Russell's philosophy of language. These are; (i) in what sense does clarification of logical structure result in clarification of ontological structure? and (ii) what are the criteria by reference to which we can ascertain when a proposition of ordinary language has been properly clarified? The first question can easily be replied if we look at the salient features of ideal language as envisaged by Russell. One of the most important features of this language is that it will contain no expressions designating non-basic entities. This means that unlike unclarified ordinary language it will be purged of

¹⁶¹ Ibid. , p. 104.

all those expressions, which seem to refer to entities of some type or other, but actually do not. This is one of the ways in which clarification of the structure of ordinary language reveals ontological structure. The world does not contain numbers or golden mountains or classes or physical objects or a variety of other things we at times assume it contains. According to Russell expressions ostensibly designating such entities are merely incomplete symbols having no ontological significance. Only a clarified ordinary language can be said to exhibit the structure of the world. In such a language, Russell pleads for 'minimum vocabulary', which will require for saying everything we wish to say about the world. The objects designated by expressions in this vocabulary are the essential elements, i.e. the atoms, which are supposed to exist in order for the words in our language to have the meaning they have.

As far as the second question is concerned, it can be said that clarification of ordinary language is essential in Russell's philosophy. It helps to eliminate incomplete symbols and also helps us to secure minimum vocabulary of ideal language, which denotes the basic entities in the world. But the all-important question is: how are we to determine when ordinary language has been properly clarified so that we can know the structure of reality from the structure of ideal language? Russell, however, does not suggest any sort of specific criterion to determine when a proposition in ordinary language can be said to clarify. However, Russell's theory of reconstructionism, however, attempts to elucidate the ontological structure on two ways, namely, by eliminating incomplete symbols and by showing what expressions in our language come when we are defined in terms of objects known by acquaintance. These two criteria are by and large identical, as it has already been stated that all expressions except those designating objects known by acquaintance are incomplete symbols. So it can be said that Russell's reconstruction of ideal language must proceed in a particular direction and must terminate in a particular picture of the structure of reality. But a problem may crop up at this juncture. Professor Copi has claimed that the essence of an ideal language is that its logical structure corresponds with in some sense with the ontological structure of the fact. So according to Russell, Copi observes, a language can be known to be ideal only by comparing its logical structure with the ontological structure of the world, which must be known independently if the comparison is to be significant. But if this can be the case then clearly Russell by

asserting his form of ideal language involves into circularity. Since then whether a language is ideal or not can be known by comparing its structure with the ontological structure of the world. But this can be done if the metaphysical structure of the world has already been investigated independently. Copi says, "I conclude, then, that Russell's program for investigating the metaphysical structure of the world by means of examining the logical structure of an 'ideal' language must be rejected because of the circularity inherent in the program proposed. It must be concluded that the general program of inferring the structure of the world from the structure of language must be rejected, because if the language is 'ideal', there is a vicious circle involved, while if the language is not 'ideal', it will have misleading 'accidental' features."¹⁶²

Should we say, on the basis of the above criticisms, that Russell's theory of ideal language has no philosophical significance? We think that Russell's philosophical analysis of language as a philosophical method deserves great value. Our evaluation of Russell's ideal language should be confined on the soundness of his choice of basic ontological categories, because it was his commitment that led him to regard sense-data as the basic ontological category. It also led him to assume that the meaning of propositions of ordinary language must be rendered in terms of such entities. If our commitments coincide with Russell, then it would seem clear to us that the particular ideal language he envisages will likely seem to be an ultimate philosophical goal. However, if our commitments do not coincide with Russell's ideal language, then the quest for such a language is likely to appear misguided. Philosophers who have criticized Russell, of course, must belong to the opposite camp of Russell. They have mostly criticized Russell from ordinary language standpoint. Russell's philosophy desires great value even for those philosophers who are unsystematic to his basic commitment and categories. In fact, Russell's philosophical method shows how to proceed in order to free ourselves from linguistically induced errors about the structure of reality. Russell's reformatory conception of language based on logical form and which has been applied through the theory of types as well as the theory of definite descriptions has opened a new vista in the revolution of language. Nobody in fact denies this. His analysis of

¹⁶² Copi, Irving, *Language Analysis and Metaphysical Inquiry*, included in *The Linguistic Turn*, edited by Richard Rorty, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1967, p.131.

language has played a key role in the philosophical development of analysis. So keeping all the criticisms in mind, still we believe that Russell's method of analysis is one of the most important, perhaps the best important movement in turning philosophy in the domain of linguistic analysis. That is why Ramsey ones calls Russell's theory of descriptions as the paradigm of philosophy.