

CHAPTER - II

Creativity, Competence and Performance : A Contrast.

We have seen in the previous chapter that Chomsky has begun the movement in linguistics known as transformational generative grammar . Transformational grammar was not offered primarily as a theory of syntactic properties of linguistic symbols, but as a theory of linguistic competence—a characteristic of the human mind. In his **Aspect of the theory of Syntax** Chomsky says, “ The problem for the linguists... is to determine... the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer Hence in a technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behaviour.”⁽¹⁾ Thus a grammar is not just a description of the structure sentences, it is even more an account of the speaker’s linguistic competence; the system of rules that he has internalised. In this regard a grammar is very much a part of psychology.

Thus Chomsky apprehends transformational generative grammar within the horizon of mentalism. The generative grammar, which Chomsky addresses is inherently related to what he calls *the creative aspect of language*. It is the ability of the speaker to understand and thereby produce sentences not encountered before. According to Chomsky one of the notable aspect of grammar or language is its creativity. He claims that if one ignores the creativity of grammar, it has only marginal interest Chomsky says, that ‘the most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what we may call *the creativity of language*’.⁽²⁾ It is the speakers’ ability to produce new sentences, sentences that are immediately understood by other speakers although they have no physical resemblance to sentences, which are familiar. This makes sense to say that in a deep sense the creativity of language reflects the mentalism on the part of the speaker.

1. Chomsky, Noam : *Aspect of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1965,P-4
2. *Ibid.* P-6.

We think that the concept of linguistic competence as proposed by Chomsky can best be apprehended if we are going to make a contrast between it and the behavioral theory adopted by Quine and Bloomfield. Explicating the concept of creativity in language, Bloomfield and Quine like so many others have taken up the argument from analogy. It is common to say that at an early stage when one study at his kindergarten he takes the help of grammar owing to formulate certain sentences. Gradually, he becomes acquainted with the mastery of the technique of language (grammar) and hence to be competent of language. The mastery of language is gained on the basis of analogy as Quine and Bloomfield have suggested. According to them a child can produce a few sentences following the grammatical rules. After that he can produce and understand sentences that are quite unlike those he has learned. According to the behaviorists one can produce and understand new sentence by making an analogy with the others. One can apprehend new sentences, which are somehow or other parallel to old sentences which he had already been familiarised with. It appears that the argument from analogy as advocated by the behaviorists is based on inductive generalization. It is a process, which is applied to the new sentences having the prior background of old which we learned in the past. One can learn a new sentence simply because it is observably similar to the old one. One can learn the sentence, e.g. *Ram is eating* simply because it is observably similar to the sentence, say, *Shyam is sleeping*, *Jadu is dancing* etc. with which he has already been acquainted. This similarity, however, is not linguistic, but grammatical structure of the sentences under consideration.

Chomsky, however, does not agree with the principle of inductive generalization. For him argument from analogy, which is ultimately based on inductive generalization as proposed by Quine and Bloomfield, is supposed to be vacuous. It still remains as vacuous unless the relevant notion of analogy is stated substantially. Furthermore, language has multi- dimensional uses. It is so complex and complicated that its creativity can not be apprehended with regard to the argument from analogy. Franz Boas, says that the range of variation to be found in human language was far greater than one might suppose if one

based one's generalization upon the grammatical rules and descriptions. This widespread variation witnesses two important clues. It witnesses the creativity of language in one hand and on the other hand it also gives assurance that it is not guided by the argument from analogy. Creativity, according to Boas, exposes the potential diversity of language, which is not marked by argument from analogy. By advocating grammar, Chomsky lays great stress on the creativity or open endedness of human language and thereby claims that all fluent speakers of a language possess the ability to produce and understand sentences, which they have never heard before. But this creative aspect of language may be neglected, if not denied, in Bloomfieldian school where Chomsky had trained language in his earlier stage. This is mainly for the fact that the Bloomfieldian school was very much conscious of making the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive grammar, between the description of the rules and the prescription of rules which the native speaker ought to follow owing to speak correctly. According to them there are many examples of prescriptive rules set up by the grammarians which have no basis in the normal usage of native speakers of English, However, we do not enter into this controversy.

One thing is important to note here is that the so-called concept of creativity and competence is solely based on the concept of acquisition of language. Many linguists and non-linguists have studied language acquisition without making any real effort to define how the results of the studies might be applied. It may be useful, before turning to Chomsky's views on the subjects to give some indication of the practical and theoretical difficulties involved in studying language acquisition. It is difficult for obvious practical reasons to study input-data, what Chomsky calls *primary linguistic data* that is the amount and nature of speech to which the child is exposed over a period of two to three years. It is clear that such studies are necessary to find out precisely what is learned by the child and what we must assume to be part of his innate capacity for acquiring language. Secondly, it is difficult to study input-output to describe in precise grammatical terms, the utterances that the child produces. Child speech is by its very nature structurally diminished or weakened. It is true that in the earlier stages we need a lot of phonological information to determine the

meaning of a child's utterances. For example, *mummy chair*, might mean that its *mummy's chair* or *mummy has a chair*. Should we then be content simply to describe this utterance as a sequence of Noun + Noun or should we try to determine the nature of the underlying sentences, in order to describe the utterance as ambiguous? It is also difficult to study input output relations. This is simply because there may be a considerable time-log between what the child hears and what he produces.

Moreover, it is also difficult to test child's competence and performance. How do we know when a child, for example, makes a mistake in terms of his own system of competence? Children are notoriously difficult subjects to test. Even if it seems clear that the deep surface distinction is valid for child language, it is not so clear what the exact relationship is between the deep component of an adult grammar and the deep component of child grammar. To explicate this difficulty let us compare on the one hand the following synonymous set of child utterances *juice, me juice, |want juice, my juice*. (All of these utterances mean *either give some |juice, or I want some juice*) and on the other hand the adult utterances, *give me| some juice, I want some juice*. Given this data, the researcher faces the following dilemma. If he assumes that an adult grammar and a child grammar share the same deep component then the data is not describable in terms of a base component. In order to describe the data, a far more abstract universal deep component would be required. On the other hand, if the researcher assumes that an adult grammar and a child grammar do not share the same deep component, then the notion of linguistic universals becomes danger.

However, if we focus on the empiricist standpoint we find a possible answer. Empiricist rules are formed on the basis of what we have observed about utterances in the past. For them one can understand a new sentence because it is observably similar to some sentences whose meaning have been learned in the past. We do this by generalising from what we have observed and then applying the generalization to the new sentence. To take a simple example, it can be said that I recognise the grammaticality of the new sentence.

The boy laughs and the ungrammaticality of *The boy laugh*, because the first is observably similar to sentences I have been told are grammatical in the past viz., *The boy speaks*, *The boy rides*, etc.

Chomsky does not agree with this proposal. He vehemently rejects this account of language acquisition. Chomsky says, “knowledge of language cannot arise by application of step-by-step inductive operations (segmentation, classification, substitution, procedure, analogy, association, conditioning, and so on) of any sort that have been developed within linguistics, psychology or philosophy.”⁽³⁾ In explicating this point let us suppose that a child understands a new sentence, say, *John is persuaded to leave*. Behaviorists claim that the child under consideration enables to do it simply because it is observably similar to some other sentence, say, e.g., *John is compelled to leave* with which he has familiarised before. But one thing is to note here is that the sentence under consideration is observably similar to sentences like *John is eager to leave*. But he does not compare this sentence with the original one. But why? If similarity or analogy is supposed to be the main objective for identifying sentences then the child may compare the sentence: *John is persuaded to leave* with the sentence: *John is eager to leave*. But he cannot do so. For in the sentence; *John is persuaded to leave*, John is considered as the object but in *John is eager to leave*, John is supposed to be the subject. The subject-object distinction is not reflected by mere analogy of the sentences under consideration. It requires a knowledge of abstract grammar that he has internalised.

The above standpoint of Chomsky can further be explained from mathematical perspective. One can, of course, give a similar response to dissimilar stimuli, such as $4+4$, $24\div 3$, $(5\times 2)-2$. Certainly, there underlies no analogy. It reveals two things. It confirms that similar response can be made even there are dissimilarities among the problems under consideration. Secondly, it also assures us that there we have knowledge of the rules of arithmetic through which we can respond to dissimilar stimuli in a similar way. The same principle can also be applied in the case of language. Sentences may

3.Chomsky, Noam: *Recent contribution to the theory of innate ideas*, *Syntheticise* 17, 1967, P 11.

be structurally different or similar. But this does mean to say that one can make a similarity or dissimilarity on the basis of the argument from analogy. Language, says Chomsky, is not a set of generalised stimulus-response connections. One's ability to produce new sentences is due to his internal possession of a set of rules and principles, which can be explained by transformational grammar.

However, it is important to note here that the analogical explanation of linguistic productivity gives rise to a subjectivist view of language. A language, one can say generally, is a set of actual and possible sentences. Grammar acts upon language. So a grammar is said to be a recursive definition of the entire set. One can produce and understand a sentence not because it is observably similar to the previous one, but because it is the outcome of his mental representation of grammar. In this regard a grammar is supposed to be a theory of mental state where the production and comprehension of utterances is underlying. It is also said to be a system of rules that a speaker knows unconsciously. He has internalised the rules of grammar unconsciously. Any attempt of constructing a grammar by a linguist is in effect proposing a hypothesis concerning this internalised system. It follows that the so-called grammar has no existence independent of the speaker's unconscious knowledge. It has no existence independent of the speaker's mental representation of it. In this regard language is supposed to be subjectivity constituted entities in a strong sense. It is also important to observe here that if it is admitted that language is subjectively constituted entities, then it individuates them from inanimate objects of familiar kinds. The reason is so simple as inanimate objects have properties independent of our knowledge or belief about them. Atom, for example, is an inanimate object. It possesses same qualities of properties which our completely independent of our knowledge or belief. But language has no existence apart from its mental representation. It's properties, according to Chomsky, must be those that are given to it by the innate mental process of the organism that has invented it and that invents it anew with each succeeding generation. This subjectively constituted language or mentally represented grammar is involved to account for creativity in language. By invoking

subjectively constituted language, Chomsky goes ahead from the prevalent linguistic tradition with its accent on corpus-based methodology and mechanical discovery procedure. Before Chomsky, linguists have considered language as an objective fact. Language is objective in the sense that it possesses independent properties which are not determined by its users. It stands out there independently of the subjective linguistic beliefs of its users. It waits with all its objective reality to be discovered by a linguist. Here we can employ only a completely mechanical procedure for discovering facts about language in a corpus of attested utterances.

Chomsky, however, does not agree with the objectivity of language. He tries to prevent the employment of mechanical discovery procedures in the investigation of language structure unlike the pre-Chomskyan linguistics. Chomsky goes on to say that the structure of language is in effect a function of its subjective structure. This subjective structure is rooted in the beliefs or intuition that speakers have about it. The structure of language can only be acquired by making authentic assumptions about the subjective structure of that language. This is made possible if it is supposed that language is embodied in the mental reality underlying actual linguistic behaviour. The rules of language as understood by Chomsky are different from the rules that we have in the ordinary English Grammar. Ordinary English Grammar rules are articulated and they are learned by their users. But the rules of language as understood by Chomsky are mentally presented. They are internally presented in the human mind. One can produce and understand new sentences not encountered before. In this sense language can be spoken of as creative. Creativity is reflected by competence. The sole aim of Chomsky is to make a tie between his theory of language, in short grammar and the productivity of new sentences owing to show how competence can be a most fruitful device for understanding the mechanism of creativity. Before entering into this territory let us first explain the notion of creativity and competence and also explain why they are supposed to be important notions in the Chomskyan revolution of psycholinguistics.

The creativity of language is guaranteed by competence and performance of the language user. Competence is demonstrated by transformational generative grammar. It is the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language. On the other hand, performance is the actual use of language in concrete situations. Since competence is equated with the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language, it is supposed to be the mastery or internal representation of a system of rules of the user. If anybody presupposes that there can be pure knowledge of a language without involving into non-linguistic dimension, he says something contrary to what Chomsky has asserted. One cannot hope to know the laws of physics unless one breathes. But does it mean to say that the laws of physics is distinguished from the laws of Biology ? Certainly not. Likewise there may be non-linguistic preconditions for having the knowledge of a language. But from this it does not follow, knowledge of language cannot be got rid of non-linguistic conditions.

There is, of course, nothing wrong to say that one can make judgement about the social or regional origins of others from their way of speaking. Or one can verify whether a particular sentence is suitable to the context or befitting among a certain community. But from this it does not follow that one has knowledge of language. People do often make such judgements. But judgements are regulated by socio-cultural rules and principles and connected with one's non-linguistic behaviour. These belongs to what Chomsky would call the level of performance. So it can be said that knowledge of language is the knowledge of rules and principles governing sentence construction and interpretation. It is the knowledge that enables the speaker-hearer to produce and identify grammatical sentences. It is said to be the knowledge of grammar. One can easily apprehend whether a sentence is grammatical or not; whether a sentence is formulated by following the rules of sentence-construction and interpretation as specified by transformational grammar. This constitutes his competence or knowledge of language. One can also assess whether a sentence is acceptable. It is connected with the actual occasion of utterance. All such things come under the title of performance.

According to Chomsky transformational generative grammar is an account of competence. This grammar ignores so many things that people know about their language. For example a host of socio-cultural factors determine not whether a sentence is grammatical but whether it is appropriate to the context. Transformational generative grammar also overlooks the pragmatic dimension of speech. It also ignores that people have knowledge of socio-cultural norms. Should we then say that there is more in competence than what is dealt with by transformational grammar and that transformational grammar formalizes only a part of what constitutes the speaker-hearer's competence? Here Chomsky uses the notion competence only in a specific sense. For example, the notion of competence is only what is specified by transformational grammar. This is witnessed from that of arithmetic. According to Chomsky knowledge of arithmetic involves not only knowledge of rules of arithmetic but also other kinds of knowledge like how to write digits or originate problems on a page etc. But the latter kind of knowledge is nothing but a performance. It does not in any way represent what we shall call competence or knowledge of arithmetic. Like arithmetic we can get rid of all socio-cultural reference from our knowledge of language and formulate it in terms of rules and principles which are mentally presented.

Nature and Significance of Linguistic Competence

Noam Chomsky has provided a set of proposals and hypothesis concerning the nature of language and linguistic competence. The term competence in general is understood as a disposition with certain properties, such as intelligence, reasoning etc., people correct themselves and others for reasons other than instrumental or aesthetic consideration shows that the use of language is not just habitual behaviour. The proper use and understanding of language involves more than competence requiring use of strategy. The competent user

of a natural language has beliefs about specific points of violations of the rules of the language. According to Chomsky, linguistic theory is concerned, to a large extent, with the intuitions of a competent speaker. That is to say, a competent speaker will have a wide variety of beliefs about what is or is not grammatical without having been exposed previously to the rule or rules the violation of which is responsible for the resulting ungrammaticality. In this regard, linguistic competence falls into the *twilight zone* marked out previously. Linguistic competence involves both **knowing how** and **knowing that**. A competent speaker knows how to produce a variety of utterances including those he never encountered before. He also comes to know that certain linguistic sequences are grammatical while others are ungrammatical. The fact that the speaker has intuition about what is and what is not a grammatical sequence is one of the causal factors responsible for his ability to generate the right sequence of language. Thus linguistic competence is a correlation of both **knowing how** and **knowing that**. A competent speaker knows how to construct a grammatical sentence and also knows that under what situation a sentence is held to be grammatically sound.

We think that the concept of linguistic competence as expounded by Chomsky is particularly relevant to the questions, such as: what can be expected of someone who has the competence in question? And through what process can the competence be manifested and what conditions are required by these processes? We have claimed that the linguistic competence falls in a *twilight zone* between acting in accordance with rules and conscious rule following, but we have yet to outline a proposal for dealing with linguistic competence. We have yet to decide how the propositional knowledge and the know-how are causally interrelated? Chomsky certainly rules out the relevance of inductive generalization and the behavioural approach of analogy in this regard. Rather he inclines to say that such types of knowledge can be obtained as a state of having internalised rules of the language. This standpoint of Chomsky recalls the principle of Aristotle who once held that *actuality is prior to potentiality*. That means a disposition must be always accounted for by some structural

element in the agent having the disposition . According to this principle, if there are two agents of which one possesses disposition such as competence, potentiality etc.,; but the other lacks, then it must be the case that the two agents differ also in some other respect. Thus following Chomsky, we can say that all native speakers possessing linguistic competence must have a common causal antecedent which is either a constituent or a non- disposition property of the agent and which has been designated as the state of mind of having internalized rules. The support of this claim, Chomsky says, actually hinges on a demonstration that a natural language must be viewed as a potentially indefinite set of utterances generated by a set of rules. Such a demonstration has been given, says Chomsky, by so- called T.G.G. Here a native speaker comes to know the internalization and application of rules, he also knows how the internalization of rules originates. These considerations, as a whole, lead to the interpretation of the state of mind accounting for abilities in the case of competence as subconscious or tacit knowledge of rules, says Chomsky.

It is further claimed that every rule discovered by a linguist must be tacitly known by the competent speaker of the language. However, there are some rules which are tacitly known by the speaker and the discovery of these rules will be the result of the work of the linguist under the optimum circumstances. In this regard, it can be said that competence is not the mastery of any and all sets of rules that fit the language, but truly speaking, it is mastery of a set of rules that speakers of the language use to produce and interpret utterances. But how does the tacit knowledge of rules intelligible? According to Chomsky the concept of tacit knowledge involving non-conscious belief arises within the framework presented in surface and deep levels of grammar. At any given time a competent speaker has tacit knowledge of an infinitely large number of specific points of grammaticality. Even many of these can be demonstrated as known by the speaker even though they were never consciously formulated in his mind. Even we must assume tacit knowledge of some rules by the speaker if the concept of non- conscious rule following is to have significance at all.

It is important to say that there underlies a conflation between a theory of syntax and a theory of competence, which we think is very much bewildering. Chomsky elsewhere inclines to say that linguistic competence is the creativity of language, that is, the speaker's ability to produce new sentences. In this sense linguistic competence is supposed to be a mental state of a person; posited to explain his linguistic behaviour. It plays a key role in the production of that behaviour. Linguistic symbols are the result of that behaviour, they are the products of that behaviour. They are datable playable parts of the physical world, sounds in the air, marks on the page, and so on. In sum, linguistic competence, together with various other aspects of the speaker's psychology, produces linguistic behaviour. The behaviour, together with the external environment, produces linguistic symbols. In this regard, a theory of symbols is not a theory of competence.

Why do we seek competence ? What is its necessity ? The notion of competence is very important in Chomskyan linguistic analysis. Dealing with language existing at the time of Chomsky, the Bloomfieldian study of *Corpus* (record of Speech) indicates the importance of the notion of competence . It is claimed that one cannot give an adequate account of language by concentrating on what is given in the corpus alone. This is simply because *Corpus* sometimes lacks so many interesting features of language. It may even be the case that the most carefully collected and comprehensive sets of texts may have some gaps. But they come in the way of formulating an adequate description of language. According to Chomsky, besides the *corpus* there we find numerous false starts, deviations from rules, changes of plan in mid-course in spoken utterances. Thus, spoken utterances, Chomsky observes, suffer from various deviations and are, therefore, ungrammatical. This makes sense to say that we cannot take the *corpus* at its face value. The raw data of *corpus* or *spoken utterances* must be idealized so that we can get rid of all the aspects of natural speech like slips and errors dialectical differences that are not relevant to a description of standard linguistic usage, the social and cultural factors that are associated with actual

use of language. According to Chomsky any grammar should try to formulate a system of rules which the native speakers *know*. Grammar enables native speakers to produce and identify grammatical sentences which are completely free from errors, personal idiosyncrasies, socio-logical and contextual factors. This sort of idealization of linguistic data is not new. It is an accepted move among scientists. The logical or formal language is also standardised language. A logical or scientific theory is formulated by ignoring all accidental factors. Like scientists, Chomsky disregards actual utterances of people that are often subject to various limitations and flexibility. But how does Chomsky find out linguistically irrelevant factors ? What constitutes extraneous factors ? According to Lyons there are serious problems involved in dealing with what would constitute linguistically irrelevant factors. It requires some normative consideration in one's attempt to identify what is linguistically irrelevant. But this does not vitiate the general principle that an adequate description of language demand a standardisation or abstraction. Thus the plan which Chomsky has adopted is clear. He advocates a descriptive study of language simply by eradicating all performance factors, which are liable to make something ungrammatical. He thus formulates a system of rules, what he calls the idealization of language, that projects all and only grammatical sentences and which is a part of the internal equipment of the speaker-hearer.

The nature of Competence

Linguistic competence, being equated with the speaker hearer's knowledge of language can be manifested in a variety of ways. However, a linguistic competence cannot be identified with its manifestations. A theory of competence is concerned with dispositions, properties, while the actual manifestations serve as evidence for or against hypotheses about these topics . In this sense actual manifestations of dispositions are never the ultimate subject of philosophical investigations. There always underlies a close proximity

between competence and performance. Competence, as we saw, is purely dispositions whereas performance is attached with actual manifestations of linguistic utterances . Performance in that sense refers to a series of actual events. Performance again may be classified into actual and ideal. Actual performance deals with actual events , whereas ideal performance deals with possible events. In connection with the discussion of the ideal and the actual performances, we at times hold that the actual performance of a competent agent is the function of the manifestation of a variety of factors not all of which are part of linguistic competence. Thus a theory of performance, i.e., a systematic account that explains actual performance patterns, will have to take into consideration in addition to linguistic competence other matters as well. These other matters are described by Chomsky as matters of performance and are contrasted with matters of competence. Thus it reveals that although performance is a manifestation of competence; but performance or more specifically, matters of performance is contrary to matters of competence. Chomsky himself in his **Aspect of the Theory of Syntax**, (see chapter 1 & 2), repeatedly holds that matters of performance, may be just as legitimate objects of conceptual and scientific study as matters of competence . These matters of performance , such as, limitations on human memory, limits of attention span, interpretation of humans perceptions etc., are not part of linguistic competence. Because a native speaker without these matters of performance can acquire the knowledge of his language.

Barring all these factors cited above, there are other matters that fall under the matter of performance level. There are a variety of skills and competence that are often manifested in linguistic performance, but they are surely not part of linguistic competence. For example various rhetorical skills, aesthetic standards and various skills required for successful daily communication etc. all are manifested in linguistic performance and without acquiring these linguistic performance, a native speaker can easily acquire a full common of his language. Thus, the distinction between matters of performance and the matters of competence is really a distinction between matters of linguistic competence and matters of non- linguistic competence.

The Nature of Idealization

It appears from the above that competence requires idealization or standardization or abstraction. Standardization makes difference competence from performance. But what should be the nature of idealization ? If science aims at to explain a few things rather than to describe everything, something have to be left out. All of science is characterised by the need to exclude from consideration of those factors which are not pertinent to the issue under consideration. We know that heavenly bodies are not mathematical points, but they can be treated as such for the purpose of gravitational theory. We know that Boyle's law applies to ideal gases, and that the gases we observe appear less well behaved, but we do not take this observation to impugn Boyle's discovery or to invalidate the idealization. Generally speaking, the role of scientific idealization (experimentation) is to get us closer to the truth, to the ideal, by eradicating irrelevant extraneous considerations. Idealization reveals what is real, but is usually hidden from view by a mass of detail. It gives, Chomsky says, a distortion of reality.

Our aim is not to explain scientific idealization but to explain the aim of idealization in Chomsky's linguistic theory. But we refer scientific idealization in order to have a clear conception of idealization process. One of the idealizing claims in linguistics that has caused the greatest misunderstanding in Chomsky's much quoted passage on the first page of his classic book **Aspects of the theory of syntax**. Here Chomsky says, "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community ... (who) is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions , shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language is actual performance".⁽⁴⁾

4. Chomsky, Noam : *Aspect of theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1965.P-15

The above passage of Chomsky points out two important issues. (I) Is idealization defensible ? (II) If it is, which idealizations are likely to be fruitful and not beg important questions ? We think that the answer to the question (I) is self evident. All sciences require or involve idealization. The so-called ideal language that has been presupposed by Russell, Early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Frege is an outcome of idealization. The positive aspect of idealization is that it leads us nearer to the ideal reality. This is made possible simply because it *frees the explorer from irrelevant demands*, so it should not be prudent if anybody attempts to ignore it. When we inspect or survey real speaker - hearers in their full complexity, we generally fail to see the principles, which underlie behaviour simply because of interfering factors of one kind or another. To see real principles in full clarity it is necessary that some things be fruitfully ignored. What is fruitfully ignored in the linguistic study of language may be precisely what they are interested in the language of poetry. While acknowledging that many aspects of language remain outside the domain of scientific inquiry, Chomskyan linguistics has demonstrated that it is fruitful to incorporate some aspects into natural science.

But a legitimate focus of argument and disagreement arise with regard to question (II). It is so far established that idealization is fruitful for scientific investigation. But what should be the nature of idealization? Is it yet to be decided ? Chomsky claims that such phenomena as limitation of memory, tiredness, and minor variations between speakers are irrelevant to our understanding of the notion *knowledge of language*. English grammar, e.g., do not in general include a statement saying: "Insert *um* here if you are tired or uncertain" even though languages differ in terms of the hesitation, noises they allow, and even though the places where such phenomena can occur are not entirely random, but can provide interesting clues about language production. If you say *um* while speaking French, you give yourself away as a foreigner (the French) say something like *oe* ; and *um* in English is much more likely to occur after of, rather than before it, in phrases such as in the middle of Texas. Such examples of idealization are relatively unproblematic. More complex

example can also be found in the case of child's acquisition of its first language.

According to Chomsky acquisition of language takes place within a particular window of opportunity known as the critical period. It is lasted for a few years and it comes to an end at maturity. But how can a process, which is functioning over a few years be sensibly treated as though it took no time at all? The paradox is only apparent but not real. Although there underlies a striking uniformity across children learning their first languages in respect of the stages of development they go through, they do not differ from each other. For example, in the course of mastering the system of negation, one child may form negative sentences by using an initial *no*, while another may use a final *no*. One may form *no like cabbage*, other may form *like cabbage no*. Despite this developmental difference both children with end up with the same system of negation in which they use the correct adult form I do not like cabbage. This makes sense to say that the early difference in the children's languages acquisition system has no effect at all on the grammar they end up with. Now the problem is: if we look after the logical problem of language acquisition then we have, of course , support for the **idealization to instancity**. Because it says that the different stages children go through in the language acquisition process are of no import to their ultimate psychological state. This claim may be turned out to be false from other aspect. But what we claim here is that so far the claim of idealization is justified, it certainly leads us to an understanding of one aspect of the real system being studied.

We should plea for idealization of grammar, but at the same time we should not be blind to this. There is, of course, no guarantee that the idealization made are the most fruitful ones or even they are not harmful. There may have some legitimate idealizations. Illegitimate idealization is harmful. Chomsky talks of the dangers of illegitimate idealization. It isolates some inquiry from factors that crucially affect its subject matter. What we think of Chomsky's idealization to the homogeneity of speech community ? Is it legitimate or illegitimate ? Many socio-linguistics feel it as illegitimate. A recent example is provided by the pained claim that 'the idealization program in practice means

that at least for now we should not be studying any community where we perceive a considerable degree of impurity. If it is applied to all communities, then nothing should be studied. But it would obviously be ridiculous. It reveals a deep misunderstanding.

One thing, which is important to be noticed here is that unlike others Chomsky does not admit variational data in his linguistic idealization. For Chomsky variational data is not necessary for understanding the human language faculty. It is not the case that we have only a limited range of data. We are drawing in data. What we need is clearly articulated hypothesis for which some subset of these data can constitute evidence. Now, if the hypothesis in itself crucially involves variation, then obviously the idealization to homogeneity is precious. But Chomsky is preoccupied with the general properties of the language faculty. No one denies that there underlies a variation but in claiming that we need to look for ways of documenting it in order to understand language as part of the human condition. But it is misleading in at least two accounts. In one sense it suggests that such documentation will provide understanding. And secondly because no theory of the human condition which would throw up testable hypothesis is suggested. It is false to claim that it would be impossible for a child to learn language unless it was confronted with the contradictory information of dialect mixture, false starts and the like. No evidence for such a claim is even presented.

If idealization of grammar is universally accepted, then can we say that the so called language as advocated by Chomsky is free from lapses. An idealized grammar still allows one to use performance mistakes such as slips of the tongue as evidence for the nature of the knowledge. All our understanding of linguistic knowledge has to be supported by evidence and evidence comes only from our imagination and ingenuity. On the assumption that our knowledge of language in part determines how we say what we do say: that the rules of grammar enter into the processing mechanisms, malfunctions of the system can provide evidence for the nature of the rules of grammar. This is illustrated on the basis of the regular formation of the past tense in English. The general

rule is that you can add *ed* to the verb producing *talked* from *talk*; *kissed* from *kiss*, and so on. But in the case for a considerable number of irregular verbs, there are complications, e.g., *come* gives *came* rather than *comed*. One can then cite a host of slips of the tongue involving over-regularization, such as the last I knowed about it, he haved to have it, if he swimmied, indicating that normal adult speakers of the language do not just access a store of learned items, but that they actually use a rule of the kind that linguists posit as part of the grammar. The example cited above is said to be elementary. But it puts into perspective the objection that the Chomskyan framework ignores a crucial range of data.

One major innovative characteristic of Chomsky's linguistics is its exploitation of the previously neglected fact that we are able to recognise immediately that some sentences are ungrammatical. It is called negative knowledge. Hamlet, for example, can tell Ophelia that *I love you not*, but we know that we have to say, instead of this, we say, *I did not love you*. Likewise when Othello can ask Desdemona, "Went he hence now" ? We can easily understand, although we know we have re paraphrase it in current English as "Did he go"? We can say *I asked the way to the School*, as well as *I inquired the way to the School*. But I asked the number of people in the case is though fine, that I inquired the number of people in the class is odd. Newton was not the first to notice apples falling, but his insight that why apples fall is in need of an explanation led ultimately to his theory of gravity. Similarly, Chomsky was not the first to notice the elementary facts we have cited here. But his insight that our intuitions can tell us something profound about the human mind is of comparable importance.

Competence-Performance Dichotomy

The Competence-Performance dichotomy can best be approved by D.H.Hymes by citing the metaphor: a garden of Eden view. For him it is "a garden of Eden view," where human life is divided between grammatical

competence and ideal innately sort of power and performance, an exigency rather like the eating of the people, thrusting the speaker hearer out into a fallen world”.⁽⁵⁾ Nothing can be said about the fallen world, about a person in a social world, in a linguistic environment entering into diverse communicative relations with other. The controlling image is of an ideal speaker-hearer, an abstract, isolated individual holding rules of language completely within himself. This is exactly what Chomsky has in mind. His inflection on competence draws out that language is fundamentally structure rooted in inner represented rules. By narrowing concern to independently and readily structural data, his grammar enjoys the prestige of an advanced science. By concentrating on what is internal to language, Chomsky enables to find out something which has the deepest of intrinsic human significance. Hence despite ignoring the social dimensions of speech, he enables to retain “the prestige of dealing with something fundamental to human life.”⁽⁶⁾

According to Chomsky there underlies an attachment between competence and creativity. He holds that competence or knowledge of rules alone can absorb or engross the creative aspect of language. It enables to form and understand sentence, which are previously unheard. It is the creativity of human language, which constantly campaigns against behaviorism. It tries to establish the ungeniunness of man. By linking this creativity with competence Chomsky tries to show what a profound contribution transformational linguistic can make to our understanding of human nature. It is true that at a particular stage a speaker learns the meaning of the sentence he encounters. This forms his learned corpus (recorded speech). Subsequently, he acquires the mastery and is able to form and understand sentences that are quite unlike the sentences in his learned corpus. This is made possible not because of the argument from analogy, not because of inductive generalization, but because the speaker has internalised the abstract generative grammar of his language.

It may be the case that there are some new sentences, which are familiar with the old one with which the speaker had already encountered. But according

5. | *D.H.Hymes: On Communicative Competence, J.B.Pride and Janet Holmee (erd) Socio-linguistic, Penguin, 1979, P-272.*

6. | *Ibid, P-272.*

to Chomsky this similarity is not due to the empirical analogy, it is due to the possession of the same abstract features of mentally represented grammar. This similarity is not based on any observational clue from the ones in the learned corpus, it is an abstract and unobservable kind. According to Chomsky in the acquisition process of language there are some features, which are paradigmatically observable and there are some other features which can be observed via media of paradigmatically observable features. Phonetic features are paradigmatically observable as it belongs to surface level of grammar. But deep structure is unobservable, as it has no point by point correlation to the phonetic realization. It is said to be the knowledge of deep structure. It is responsible for understanding new sentences. This is how Chomsky makes a close proximity between creativity and competence. But the relationship between creativity and competence may not be a consistent one. The relationship between creativity and competence may take different turn and at times may even be delinked if different observations make on them.

However one thing is clear that the notion of linguistic competence is fundamental to Chomsky's generative grammar. But apparently it is difficult to apprehend what Chomsky exactly means by the term competence. Elsewhere he uses the term competence in different ways. In his **Cartesian Linguistic**, he understands competence in terms of generative grammar. **A generative grammar**, says Chomsky, "is a description of the tacit competence of the speaker hearer that underlies his actual performance in production and perception of speech".⁽⁷⁾ But in his another book, he understands or defines competence in terms of *creativity of language*. He says, "The most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what we may call the creativity of language."⁽⁸⁾ Here competence is understood as an ability to produce new sentences, which are immediately understood by other speakers not on the basis of physical resemblance but on the basis of internalization process. Elsewhere he understands competence with regards to performance. He goes on to say "performance is the outcome of a direct reflection of competence."⁽⁹⁾

7. Chomsky, Noam : *Cartesian Linguistic*, New York: Harper and Row, New York, 1966, P-75.

8. Chomsky, Noam : *Topics In The Theory Of Generative Grammar*, The Hague; Mouton, 1966, P-4.

9. Chomsky, Noam : *Aspects of The Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1965, P-4.

Thus it seems clear that Chomsky anticipates competence in a wider sense. Sometimes he defines competence in terms of ability, at times in terms of performance and at other times in terms of creativity. Ability, creativity and performance are closed terms in the sense that one's ability is reflected through performance and one's ability is reflected through creativity. For example, when it is affirmed that Ram has the ability to be a good singer, it is logically affirmed beforehand that Ram has the potentiality or creativity to establish himself as a good singer or it can be said that Ram has the insight or creativity to establish himself as a good singer. So we think there is nothing wrong on the part of Chomsky for making a tie competence with ability, performance and creativity.

Competence Versus Performance: A Contrast

According to Chomsky competence is nothing but an idealized linguistic performance. It is an ability, which is reflected in performance in the course of producing and identifying grammatical sentences. Competence acts on performance in an idealistic model. It is a process by which a native speaker enables to eradicate extraneous factors, such as distractions, shifts of attention, socio-cultural contexts etc. In this sense competence is supposed to be a model to the native speaker. It is a model by which he can produce and understand new sentence in an ideal condition. Thus the relationship between competence and performance is very intimate. Competence is a state of idealization, it is an idealized production, it directly refers to performance mechanism. But at this juncture a doubt may crop up in mind. Linguistic performance, as we generally think, includes not only the ability to produce grammatically well-formed sentences, but also the ability to use language correctly in a variety of socially determined situation. Linguistic performance is not only the ability to produce sentences, which are grammatically correct; it has also the ability to produce them in an appropriate situation. So competence defined by recursive rules cannot do justice to the property of appropriateness to the situation. If so, then

how can it be regarded as an ideal model of linguistic performance?

Chomsky further inclines to say that the concept of performance is a wider concept than competence. This is made clear from the words of Chomsky. Chomsky says, "To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider the interaction of a variety of factors, of which the underlying competence is one" ⁽¹⁰⁾ This remark is interesting. Besides this he also says, "In my sense of competence, the ability to speak and understand the language involves not only competence (that is mastery of the generative grammar of the language, tacit knowledge of the language), but also many other factors". ⁽¹¹⁾ It is true that every native speaker of a language has acquired mastery and thereby internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of the language (competence). But does it mean to say that he is fully aware of the rules of the grammar? Perhaps it may not be the case all without exception. Chomsky goes on to say that when a native speaker expresses his knowledge of the language, he may not be aware of the rules of the grammar. Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing "with mental process that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness". ⁽¹²⁾

So one should not be confused by considering competence as a model of performance, rather it is prudent to regard competence as our ability that is manifested in performance. Competence acts as a component in the model of performance. If competence is to be understood in this regard then we do not find any anxiety to interpret performance with regard to competence. There we observe another important change. As competence is no longer identical with its manifestation in performance the notion of ability is discarded in favour of competence. But this new attempt must meet a necessary demand. If a P-model includes as an essential component it is needed to specify how this competence works. When we aspire to or persist in what has said on this point, we are amazed or astounded by his following observation. *It is necessary, in short, to follow the difference in logical characters between performance and competence.* Now, if it is presupposed that these two concepts are logically distinct, then to confuse one in terms of other involves a category mistake.

10. Chomsky, Noam : *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press, 1965, P-4

11. Chomsky, Noam : 'Linguistics and Philosophy', in S. Hook (ed) *Language And Philosophy*, New York, 1969, P-87

12. Chomsky, Noam : *Aspects Of The Theory Of Syntax*, op.cit., P-8

How can they fit together within one theory? How is it possible to construct a P-model which includes a generative (competence) or an essential element? Is it not a better alternative to hold that competence is an independent abstract entity away from linguistic performance? At times Chomsky goes ahead in that direction, when he gives the neutral definition of competence: (Transformational grammar) is not a model for a speaker or a hearer. He gives another clue to the notion of competence.

It appears from the above consideration that Chomsky uses the notion of competence in different sense. Sometimes he claims that performance is a reflection of competence or in other words, competence is an ability manifested in performance. In this sense there underlies a close proximity between competence and performance. At other times he understands competence not as an ability but tacit knowledge of the rules of language that can ultimately lead to performance. Here too the relation between competence and performance is so closed. Here competence is insulated from its manifestation in performance though it is essential for explaining performance. At other times, he understands competence in a sense which is completely distinct from performance. Here competence is understood as an unconscious knowledge of rules which is far away from the activities of actual speakers. It includes only a non-empirical axiomatization of sentences and their structural descriptions. But we think any attempt to understand competence as something distinct from performance is not worth while. Because in this sense transformational grammar is reduced only to a mere formal abstraction, it no longer remains a model of linguistic behaviour.

Competence Versus Creativity : A Contrast

So far we have examined, after Chomsky, the different senses of competence and performance and also explicated in what sense competence is attached with performance. Let us pass on to discuss another important issue.

The issue is how much and what way or ways competence is attached with creativity. According to Chomsky the concept of creativity is very much involved in the analysis of linguistic competence. Creativity is an ability of a native speaker to interpret utterances of language that have never been previously encountered by the speaker. Thus, creativity, opines Chomsky, is a property of the competent language user and is part of his linguistic competence. It is important to point out here that although Chomsky appears to have conceived the view that the concept of creativity is very much involved in the analysis of linguistic competence, but from this it does not follow that this connection between creativity and competence is not analytic. It could have been the case that the normal user of a natural language at times fails to interpret utterances of his language. That is why, the connection between creativity and competence is thus held to be an empirical claim. In order to explain creativity, we have to assume that the use of language involves either the following strategy or the following rules. Thus, this aspect of competence is part of the evidence that leads one to suppose that linguistic competence is more than intellectual habit. Creativity, by itself, does not entail rule following; it could be accounted for also by the assumption of use of strategy. Moreover creativity not only has a different subject, but also removed from direct conformation and disconformation. It is ascribed to process that underlie linguistic competence which will ultimately clarify the basic structures of language.

According to Chomsky creativity is appeared to be a matter of competence. He says, "The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itself is this: a mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on the appropriate occasion, and other speakers can understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them ... Normal mastery of a language involves ... the ability to understand immediately and infinite number of entirely new sentences It is clear that a theory of language that neglects this *creative* aspect of language is of only marginal interest".⁽¹³⁾ The above passage gives a plenty of clues what does Chomsky mean by creativity of language. By the phrase *normal mastery* Chomsky means competence. It involves the ability to understand new sentences which are not encountered before. Chomsky,

13. Chomsky, Noam : *Current Issue in Linguistic Theory*, In J.H.Fodor, and J.J.Katz(eds). *The Structure of Language*, Englewood Cliffs, 1964 P-54

however, talks about producing new sentences on the appropriate occasion, but this appropriate occasion is a mere matter of existence. It has no significance at all. So there is no reason to associate creativity with an aspect of performance.

The detachment of creativity from performance receives a little setback if one mixes *the creative aspect of language* with the creative aspect of language use. According to Chomsky modern linguists totally failed to come to grip with the creative aspect of language use. It is the ability to form and understand previously unheard sentences. So one may claim that by envisaging creativity of language, Chomsky actually speaks of *the creative aspect of the language use*, which is nothing but a matter of performance. Should we then think that the recursive set of rules generated by transformational grammar embody the speaker's competence, and the *creative aspect of language use* is a matter of performance? The answer is negative. According to Chomsky the *creative aspect of language use* has been described as the ability to form and understand previously unheard sentences, and it is the same ability that is also referred to by the creative aspect of language. The so-called transformational grammar, which represents competence encompasses this ability. This is the only way through which transformational grammar addresses itself to the problem of the creativity of language.

The notion of creativity so far we have discussed differs from the notion of creativity that we have in **Cartesian Linguistics** and **Language and Mind**. This new definition of the creative aspect of language use acquires a new dimension with stronger emphasis on appropriateness to the situation. In **Language and Mind**, Chomsky goes on to say that when we study human language, we are coming nearer to the human essence. The distinctive qualities of mind are unique to man. They are inseparable from any critical phase of human existence, personal or social. According to Chomsky, to be mastered of language one has to understand an infinite number of expressions, that are new to one's experience that bear no simple physical resemblance and are no way analogous to the expressions that constitute one's linguistic experience. One is able to produce such expressions on an appropriate occasion and also to be

understood by others who share this still mysterious ability. The normal use of language is, in this sense, a creative activity. This creative aspect of normal language use is one fundamental factor that distinguishes human language from any unknown system of animal communication.

The above sense of creative aspect of linguistic use stands on the side of performance. So far we have seen, following Chomsky, two senses of creativity. In one sense, competence and creativity are understood in terms of ability, when it is said that competence is the ability to produce and understand new sentences, creativity is also referred to the same ability. But when it is said that one's ability to produce and understand different sentences, is closely related to his behaviour and language use, creativity only goes with it. Now the problem is how can competence get to the bottom of the mastery of the creative aspect of language use, the coherence and appropriate uses of ordinary speech? Any attempt to link creativity with competence seems problematic. If it is supposed that creativity is relevant to generative grammar, it must somehow be connected with competence. This is what generative grammar is supposed to represent. If it is admitted that the most important aspect of creative behaviour is its coherence and appropriateness to the situation, one feature of linguistic competence should be the ability or competence to use language coherently and appropriately. But this is exactly what Chomsky denies about competence. It is not understandable how the recursive rules of grammar can touch the coherence appropriateness of language use. Thus Chomsky's new innovation creates a gap between competence (recursive rule) and creativity (with its emphasize towards coherence and appropriateness.)

In the midst of this notable difficulty, Chomsky still estimates or rates creativity to be the core problem of human language. For him everything other than competence is extralinguistic. Creativity also involves extralinguistic factors when it is defined as the ability to deal with new sentences in the sense of producing and comprehending. He understands language as an aura of creativity. He wants the glory of creative use of language, but grammar, says Chomsky, prevents it. Is it the reason that leads to the affliction of Chomsky in

the following way “what I have called elsewhere *the creative aspect of language use*, remains as much a mystery to us as it was to the Cartesian who discussed it, in parts in the context of the problem of *other minds* ? ⁽¹⁴⁾

Does it mean to say that creativity of language as an outcome of mentally represented generative grammar has lost its ground? Of course it does. But this does not invite us to go back to the model of inductive hypothesis. Chomsky consistently despises inductive hypothesis. So one can say that neither the inductive thesis nor the Chomskyan mental thesis seems to bear on our understanding of new sentences. Inductive hypothesis is not acceptable as the similarity between instances does not consist in sharing of features common to them. No matter whether the features in question are approved on inductive grounds or referred to as abstract deep (mental) ones. Following Copper, a solution of the problem under consideration can be given metaphorically. Copper says that physical objects are warm or cold according to their thermal properties. Our facial tones of voice or expressions are also warm and cold. What is it that makes our facial expressions or voice analogous to a refrigeration? Definitely, the similarity does not follow from an abstraction of what is common to all the things literally described by *warm* or *cold*. According to Copper it is wrong to suppose that sentences are identified by virtue of the feature they share with the previously encountered one, say cold refrigerator. A native speaker can make judgements about his language. He comes to know that active and passive sentences have a common underlying structure though they seem to be distinct at the surface level. Does it not sufficient to claim that the native speaker is endowed with inner represented deep structure? But this supposition sometimes seems to be dangerous as Palmer points out. According to Palmer a native speaker replies his question in accordance with what he learnt at school. He can, following grammatical rules, easily dig up or point out what is right or wrong. For example, he can identify that the sentence: *It is me* is ungrammatical. Palmer says, “It is however true that we cannot write a satisfactory grammar without intuition, but this is the intuition of the Linguist about the way in which languages are constructed”. ⁽¹⁵⁾

14. Chomsky Noam : *Reflection On Language*,Pentheon Press,New York,1975,P-138.

15. F. Palmer : *Grammar*, Penguin, 1971, P-158.

What Palmer claims above actually goes against Chomsky. For him the intuitions of language of native speakers are poor. This view goes against Chomsky. Moreover, if it is asserted that native speakers possess expertise to formulate complicated judgement about their language, this by no means authenticates Chomsky's point. A child can judge that $2+2=4$, but this does not presuppose his knowledge of abstract principle. One's ability to identify the synonymy of two different sentences or the difference between two apparently synonymous sentences does not mean to say that he has acquired implicit knowledge of language. To identify the difference between the sentence *John is easy to please* and *John is eager to please* do not require to have mentally represented deep rules to identify necessary structure of language. Different observational clues, contextual conditions are enough to do that. This point certainly goes against Chomsky who is a strong believer of mental legacy.

According to Chomsky the very notion of tacit knowledge of grammar has played an important role in understanding his account of language. Language, says Chomsky, is articulated by structural interplay and structure again constitutes the native speaker's tacit knowledge. A linguist knows about a language. He also knows that a particular language is described by rules. But unlike a linguist, a native speaker cannot spell out linguistic rules. He can hardly say what the rules of language are. So the rules of grammar cannot be attributed to the native speaker.

Chomsky, however, introduces unconscious knowledge of language owing to describe the competence of a native speaker. For him unlike a linguist, a person's linguistic knowledge is not a case of knowing that, rather it is a kind of knowing of. A native speaker, so to speak, can behave as like as a linguist. If he is conscious he comes to **know that** he has an unconscious **knowledge of** language. According to Chomsky knowledge of rules and structures takes the form of knowing that. It is not the kind of knowledge that occurs in a native speaker. A native speaker fails to grasp the rules in the sense of being able to state them. But many thinkers do not agree with Chomsky as what he said above.

Suppose Chomsky's **know of** makes quite a good sense. It means that a native speaker cannot know his language like a grammarian. He cannot state the rules, but he is guided by them. But this does not make sense to say, he has an internal representation of generative grammar. Even it is not prudent to claim that he has possessed mentalism. A child can build toy bricks which is the outcome of mathematical analysis of the physical structure he builds. But from this it does not follow that he has mental representation of mathematical analysis. To drive a cycle, a cyclist must keep balanced on the bicycle. Does it mean to say that he is aware of the mechanism in order to keep his balance? Certainly not. Even if, it is presupposed that a model of cyclist would contain representations of the relevant principle of mechanics, then should we go on to say that every cyclist has an intuitive or tacit knowledge of the principles of mechanics? Certainly not. So Chomsky's remark about tacit competence do not seem to provide an illuminating way of talking about speakers of a language.

What we have seen above is that in the case of cyclist we cannot claim that he has possessed internal representation of the principles of mathematics, while in the case of native speaker we can claim that he has a tacit knowledge of the rules of grammar. Searle understands Chomsky in the following way, "The agent's **knowing how** to do something may only be adequately explicable on the hypothesis that he knows (has acquired, internalized, learned) a rule to the effect that such and such, even though in an important sense he may not know that he knows the rule or that he does what he does in part, because of the rule (*Italicised mind*)."⁽¹⁶⁾ I know a language if I can state the rules without requiring further retrospective evidence. Similarly, a person at times may recognise that certain descriptions fit their behaviour without retrospective evidence that is so. This may justify unconscious knowledge. An item of knowledge is unconscious when a speaker cannot confess frankly the rules of his language. But unconscious knowledge under specific condition can be brought to recognise without any further retrospective evidence. This makes sense to say that we can reasonably attribute unconscious knowledge to a speaker because of the intelligible link between his case and the one who knows

16| J. R. Searle : *Speech Acts*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970.P-64.

paradigmatically. If unconscious knowledge is supposed to be the case discussed above then it will surely go a long way towards undermining Chomsky's theory of unconscious or tacit knowledge of a speaker.

By advocating the notion of competence Chomsky differs from Wittgenstein. According to Chomsky language is in essence, a structure and not a matter of use. The characterization of language as an instrument of communication fails to separate natural languages from mere causal communication or from the simple command language used by later Wittgenstein to introduce the notion of a language game. Thus, the language as understood by Chomsky is divorced from the flexibility and ambiguities of use. The gap between Wittgenstein and Chomsky can be reflected by Chomsky when he wants to find out something significant about the nature of language. He suggests that it is important to look not at its uses which may be almost an imaginable, but rather at its structure. By the word *Structures*, Chomsky means *abstract structures*. It reveals something about the human mind: Abstract structures also confirm that human mind is such as to be able to form representations of objects other than those merely represented by sense. The computational complicity of language provides the basis for the minimal computational ability of the human mind. It is in the way that language is anchored in mentalism. Unlike Wittgenstein and many others, Chomsky admits that the essence of a language is its structure. According to later Wittgenstein the essence of a language is its use. The question is: by advocating the structure of language, does Chomsky plea the view of artificial or ideal language as proposed by Russell, Early Wittgenstein, Quine, Carnap, Frege and many others? The answer is no. The structure of language advocated by the ideal language philosophers is the logical structure of language. But the structure as advocated by Chomsky is the mental structure of language; It is a mental or an internalised structure of language. Thus it seems clear that Chomsky being a linguist differs from the so-called philosophers of language. Philosophy of language and linguistic philosophy are investing how language reveals reality. In a different sense Philosophy of language deals language as the content of philosophy. Linguistic philosophy is a philosophical method, which is applied to solve the

so-called philosophical problems methodically. But Chomsky as a linguist investigates the dynamic function of language. He investigates how does language focus human mind.

But the all important question is: Can a structurally oriented language function properly if its use is ignored? If a language is supposed to be an isolated set of symbols independent of how it is used, then of course it ignores the Bloomfieldian sentiment that *language is the simplest and the most fundamental of our social activities*. But the verdict that Language is fundamentally social activity cannot be set aside. An adequate account of language needs a socially and functionally relevant explanation of linguistic structure. If language is not a self-contained system independent of context and ways of life, the structure of language is always confederated with behavioural modalities. It is always associated with what we intends to do with it. This is reflected by active-passive transformation of sentences. We use an active sentence, e.g., *John has broken the window* -- when we try to convey something about the door of an action. But when we try to communicate exactly what has been done to the window and how it is affected by John's activity, we prefer the passive sentence, like *the window is broken by John*. This gives a plenty of clues how the view of linguistic structure is corelated with different behavioural strategies with different communicative purposes. So we can say that a sentence which is structurally oriented should be closely related to the social and personal needs that language is required to serve. Searle says, "I think that the most interesting questions about syntax have to do with how form and function interact-- they have to do with the question: *What are|these syntactical forms for ?* Language for me, is to talk with, and to write with, so I want to say that the study of syntax will always be incomplete unless we get a study of linguistic use".⁽¹⁷⁾ It is wrong on the part of Chomsky that he fails to make a tie between structure and function of language. He wrongly ignores the use of language and then puts forward to show that the study of language is the study of human mind.

Finally if competence is connected with the mental activity and

17. J. R. Searle : *Man Of Ideas*, Oxford University Press, 1982, P-171.

competence is reflected through rules of grammar or knowledge of sentence, then how it can be detached from the rules of use? If competence is knowledge of sentence and knowledge of sentence is based on rules of grammar and the rules of grammar are supposed to be useless or meaningless with rules of use, then it can logically follow that competence is useless or impossible without rule of use. Hymes says, "He or she acquires competence as to when to speak and as to what to talk about with whom, when, where, in what manner, and the acquisition of such competence is of course fed by social experience, needs and motives".⁽¹⁸⁾ Thus it can be said that linguistic competence is not only knowledge of grammar; but also of use. In this sense linguistic competence requires socio-cultural environment. A child born in society, growing up in society, within linguistic community, within the custom as well as form of life, as Wittgenstein says, he picks up his language, its (language) form along with its use. But Chomsky gives little attention into the socio-cultural realm of the use of language when he is advocating generative grammar. This is one of the negative aspects of the so-called generative grammar as proposed by Chomsky.



18. D. H. Hynes: 'On Communicative Competance', J. B. Pride and Janet Holmes (eds) *Socio-linguistic*, Penguin, 1979, P. 177 - 78.